Debunking 'Determinism'

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Some comrades might be interested in these highly controversial remarks I have just posted at Marxmail:


Ok, here is my summary [of my ideas on 'determinism'], but comrades should not expect a water-tight solution to such a knotty problem in a few paragraphs. I am only posting this because I was asked to do so.



This issue has always revolved around the use of terminology drawn from traditional philosophy (such as "determined", "will", "free", and the like), the use of which bears no relation to how these words are employed in ordinary speech.

For example, "determine" and its cognates are typically used in sentences like this "The rules determine what you can do in chess", "The time of the next train can be determined from the timetable", or "I am determined to go on the demonstration" and so on. Hence this word is normally used in relation to what human beings can do, can apply, or can bring about.

As we will see, their use in traditional thought inverts this, making nature the agent and human beings the patient. No wonder then that the 'solution' to this artificial problem (i.e., 'determinism' and 'free will') has eluded us for over 2000 years.

To use an analogy, would we take seriously anyone who wondered when the King and Queen in chess got married, and then wanted to know who conducted the ceremony? Or, whether planning permission had been sought for that castle over in the corner? Such empty questions, of course, have no answer.

To be sure, this is more difficult to see in relation to the traditional question at hand, but it is nonetheless the result of similar confusions. So, it is my contention that this 'problem' has only arisen because ideologically-motivated theorists (from centuries ago) asked such empty questions, based on a misuse of language. [More on this below.]

When the details are worked out, 'determinism', for instance, can only be made to seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised, so that such things as 'natural law' 'determine' the course of events -- both in reality in general and in the central nervous system in particular -- thus 'controlling' what we do.

But, this is to take concepts that properly apply to what we do and can decide, and then impose them on natural events, suggesting that nature is controlled by a cosmic will of some sort. [Why this is so, I will outline presently.]

So, it's natural to ask: Where is this law written, and who passed it?

Of course, the answer to these questions is "No one" and "Nowhere", but then how can something that does not exist control anything?

It could be responded that natural law is just a summary of how things have so far gone up to now. In that case, such 'laws' are descriptive not prescriptive -- but it is the latter of these implications that determinists need.

Now, the introduction of modal notions here (such as 'must', or 'necessary') cannot be justified from this descriptive nature of 'law' without re-introducing the untoward anthropomorphic connotations mentioned above.

So, if we say that A has always followed B, we cannot now say A must follow B unless we attribute to B some form of control over A (and recall A has not yet happened, so what B is supposed to be controlling is somewhat obscure). And if we now try to say what we mean by 'control' (on lines such as 'could not be otherwise', or 'B made A happen') we need to explain how B prevented, say, C happening instead, and made sure that A, and only A took place.

The use of "obey" here would give the game away, since if this word is used with connotations that go beyond mere description, then this will imply that events like A understand the 'law' (like so many good citizens), and always do the same when B beckons, right across the entire universe --, and, indeed, that this 'law' must exist in some form to make things obey it. Of course, if it doesn't mean this, then what does it mean?

Now, I maintain that any attempt to fill in the details here will introduce notions of will and intelligence into the operation of B on A (and also on C) -- and that is why theorists have found they have had to drag in anthropomorphic concepts here (such as 'determine', 'obey' 'law' and 'control') to fill this gap, failing to note that the use of such words does indeed imply there is a will of some sort operating in nature. [But, note the qualification I introduce here, below. There were ideological reasons why these words were in fact used.]

If this is denied then 'determine' (etc.) can only be working descriptively, and we are back at square one.

Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.

This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.

As I noted earlier, this whole way of looking at 'the will' inverts things. [I]We are denied a will (except formally) and nature is granted one. As many might now be able to see, this is yet another aspect of the alienating nature of traditional thought, where words are fetishised and we are dehumanised.

And this should not surprise us since such questions were originally posed theologically (and thus ideologically), where theorists were quite happy to alienate to 'god' such control over nature and our supposedly 'free' actions'. Hence, we too find that we have to appropriate such distorted terminology if we follow traditional patterns of thought in this area.

No wonder Marx argued:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118.]

And:


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.' [Ibid., pp.64-65.]
These concepts "rule" us too if we are suitably uncritical.

Many of these ideas are not original to me (but the Marxist application of them is). They first appeared, as far as I am aware, in Bertrand Russell's essay:

Russell, B. (1917a), 'On The Notion Of A Cause', in Russell (1917b), pp.132-51.

--------, (1917b), Mysticism And Logic (George, Allen and Unwin).

These ideas can be found explicitly stated in the following (but not from a Marxist angle):

Gallop, D. (1962), 'On Being Determined', Mind 71, pp.181-96.

I have also followed this analysis of 'law':

Swartz, N. (1985), The Concept Of A Physical Law (Cambridge University Press).

--------, (2006), 'Laws Of Nature', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

A PDF of the former can be downloaded here:

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/

The latter is found here:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/lawofnat/

Influential Wittgensteinian criticisms of modern scientistic philosophies of 'mind' can be found here:

Bennett, M., and Hacker, P. (2003), Philosophical Foundations Of Neuroscience (Blackwell).

--------, (2008), History Of Cognitive Neuroscience (Blackwell).

Those who think an appeal to ordinary language is inappropriate here should re-read what Marx said above, consult the first half of following, and then think again:

Button, G., Coulter, J., Lee, J., and Sharrock, W. (1995), Computers, Minds And Conduct (Polity Press).

The bottom line is that Marxists have been too quick to appropriate concepts and forms-of-thought from traditional (alienated ruling-class) philosophy without subjecting them to close enough scrutiny. Unfortunately, this means that while our politics seems radical enough, our theory (both here and in relation to dialectics, for example) is thoroughly traditional -- and, if I may say so, disconcertingly conservative.

I explain why I say this in the first few sections of the following:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm

Finally, I'd try to get this material published in Marxist journals, etc., but I am generally treated as a pariah, and face emotive and irrational hostility wherever I try to present such ideas.

Seems "ruling ideas rule" comrades who are editors, too.

RL

Of course, the above does not imply I believe in something called 'The Freedom of the Will'.

More about this here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2

[yuon]

An interesting post. There are some things I'm not sure of regarding your ideas in this area though.

You think that the "natural laws" are merely descriptive (rather than prescriptive)? Do you think that there exists something, that could be said to explain why things are? For example, gravity is a human notion, but it is based on observational evidence and science. Presumably, "mass attracts" (i.e. gravity) is true regardless of whether we perceive it, or indeed, whether anything perceives it?



So, if we say that A has always followed B, we cannot now say A must follow B unless we attribute to B some form of control over A (and recall A has not yet happened, so what B is supposed to be controlling is somewhat obscure). And if we now try to say what we mean by 'control' (on lines such as 'could not be otherwise', or 'B made A happen') we need to explain how B prevented, say, C happening instead, and made sure that A, and only A took place.
I think this paragraph is a major stumbling point for me. If I pick up a (say) apple, and then let it go, it will (assuming I'm standing on the Earth, and aren't in free fall), "fall" towards the Earth (while, at the same time, the Earth will "fall" towards the apple).

It appears that you are attacking the entire notion of "causes". B causes A is simply to say that whenever B happens, because of the way that matter and energy interacts, A always happens subsequently. I can't see anyway to include "will" in there at all. I don't think we can say that B controls A (because B has no will), however, I believe we can say that "A must follow B", assuming we interpret "must" to simply mean that there is no physical way for the particular interaction of matter and energy B not to end up in the state of of matter and energy that we regard as A.

I'm not sure if I'm even making sense to myself here, but, at least I'm making as much sense to myself as the paragraph quoted!

----

What about mathematics? 1 + 1 always equals 2 (even for large values of one :cool:). I note in this thread (http://www.revleft.com/vb/my-usual-philosophy-t46568/index.html?t=46568) you also reject the idea that mathematics can be "deterministic". But, do you reject the idea that there are "laws" (for want of a better word) that mean that if you were given one object and then given another object, that you will then always have two objects (assuming no objects to start with) no matter how many times the process is repeated? Does a(b+c) always equal (ab)+(ac)?

Can this concept be extended into the physical realm, as a descriptor, if nothing else?

----

Finally, what then of how the universe works? If determinism is bunk, what then is the answer? Is there an answer?
(I notice in one thread you say "This does not mean that indeterminism holds sway; if determinism makes no sense, then its opposite does not either." Sounds a bit dialectal. :laugh: Please note, I don't actually not very much about dialects, that was a joke, not a serious remark. Apparently not even an original joke, CyM made the same joke in this thread (http://www.revleft.com/vb/determinism-t69238/index2.html).)

Does science do an adequate job, to your mind, of describing the universe? Is it possible for "science" to ever provide an universal description of how the universe works?

I await your answers :drool:.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Yuon:


You think that the "natural laws" are merely descriptive (rather than prescriptive)? Do you think that there exists something, that could be said to explain why things are? For example, gravity is a human notion, but it is based on observational evidence and science. Presumably, "mass attracts" (i.e. gravity) is true regardless of whether we perceive it, or indeed, whether anything perceives it?

Well, no, I was actually voicing an obvious objection to the view that such laws actually exist. Note how I put this:


So, it's natural to ask: Where is this law written, and who passed it?

Of course, the answer to these questions is "No one" and "Nowhere", but then how can something that does not exist control anything?

It could be responded that natural law is just a summary of how things have so far gone up to now. In that case, such 'laws' are descriptive not prescriptive -- but it is the latter of these implications that determinists need.

You:


Do you think that there exists something, that could be said to explain why things are? For example, gravity is a human notion, but it is based on observational evidence and science. Presumably, "mass attracts" (i.e. gravity) is true regardless of whether we perceive it, or indeed, whether anything perceives it?

Well, this brings in deep questions about what counts as an 'explanation'. What I would say is that these 'laws' are rules we use to help us make sense of nature and 'balance the books' as it were. Us Wittgensteinians call them 'forms of representation'.

Anything else stands in danger of attributing will, intention and purpose to nature, which, of course, makes no sense at all.

And you must know that in Relativity theory, mass does no such thing; it moves naturally along geodesics, depending on how these are 'warped' in Spacetime.

This metaphor is not much better; according to Newton, mass moves as if it were on a piano wire, whereas for Einstein it moves along tram lines! But neither of these can explain why things happen without introducing the anthropomorphic notions I outlined in my last post. Hence the use of such metaphors (like 'attract', 'warped', and so on).

As I note in this thread, we still have no idea why anything actually happens in nature (and nor are we ever likely to):

http://www.revleft.com/vb/true-concept-force-t109485/index.html


I think this paragraph is a major stumbling point for me. If I pick up a (say) apple, and then let it go, it will (assuming I'm standing on the Earth, and aren't in free fall), "fall" towards the Earth (while, at the same time, the Earth will "fall" towards the apple).

Well, we certainly use our knowledge of the past, or some scientific principle or other, to predict that it will fall, but there is nothing in nature that controls it -- unless we believe that gravity issues order which apples have to obey.


It appears that you are attacking the entire notion of "causes". B causes A is simply to say that whenever B happens, because of the way that matter and energy interacts, A always happens subsequently. I can't see anyway to include "will" in there at all. I don't think we can say that B controls A (because B has no will), however, I believe we can say that "A must follow B", assuming we interpret "must" to simply mean that there is no physical way for the particular interaction of matter and energy B not to end up in the state of matter and energy that we regard as A.

Certainly use a 'must' here if you want to, but only as an expression of what we expect to happen. But there are no 'musts' in nature, unless, once more, you think that one event, or series of events, can command the future. But, in order to do that, it/they must have intelligence, foresight and will.

And I'm not attacking causation, only pointing out that when we extend our everyday notions of cause (which are reassuringly rich) into nature we naturally attribute to nature capacities it does and cannot have -- unless, that is, we see nature as controlled by Mind, etc.

Now, when you try to fill in the details behind this:


assuming we interpret "must" to simply mean that there is no physical way for the particular interaction of matter and energy B not to end up in the state of matter and energy that we regard as A

you will only be able to do so if you re-introduce notions of control and will. Otherwise this is just a table-thumping way of saying "I can't imagine it not happening!".

It is so easy to drift off into anthropomorphism here, which is why such animistic ideas have dominated thought for over 2000 years.


What about mathematics? 1 + 1 always equals 2 (even for large values of one ). I note in this thread you also reject the idea that mathematics can be "deterministic". But, do you reject the idea that there are "laws" (for want of a better word) that mean that if you were given one object and then given another object, that you will then always have two objects (assuming no objects to start with) no matter how many times the process is repeated? Does a(b+c) always equal (ab)+(ac)?

Well, these are just rules we use to help us in our day-to-day practice (unless they become objects of study themselves, in Pure Mathematics).

And I did not do this:


I note in this thread you also reject the idea that mathematics can be "deterministic".

The rules we have in mathematics we certainly use to help us determine what we should conclude and then maybe what we should do (which, as you will no doubt recall is what I said was the proper remit of this word), but they cannot determine anything on their own since they are just lifeless signs!


Finally, what then of how the universe works? If determinism is bunk, what then is the answer? Is there an answer?

(I notice in one thread you say "This does not mean that indeterminism holds sway; if determinism makes no sense, then its opposite does not either." Sounds a bit dialectal. Please note, I don't actually not very much about dialects, that was a joke, not a serious remark. Apparently not even an original joke, CyM made the same joke in this thread.)

Again, it depends on what you mean by 'answer'.

And I am Ok with 'dialectical' when it is employed as say Aristotle would have used it -- but not as dialectical marxists use it -- as a set of principles that lay down a priori laws that govern all of reality. And I used to make this sort of response to CYM, but it didn't even go in one ear, never mind out the other.


Does science do an adequate job, to your mind, of describing the universe? Is it possible for "science" to ever provide an universal description of how the universe works?

I am all for more and better science, since it helps us control nature. But when it becomes an ideology, when it becomes scientism, I'm agin it (to use a northern expression).

An excellent example of scientism can be seen in Mo212's posts here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/criticisms-science-truth-t119040/index.html

[yuon]

Well, thanks for those answers! I'm pretty sure that cleared up most, if not all, of the questions and issues I had with your original post. Actually though, as might be expected, your post raises a couple more things I'm not sure on.

Certainly use a 'must' here if you want to, but only as an expression of what we expect to happen. But there are no 'musts' in nature, unless, once more, you think that one event, or series of events, can command the future. But, in order to do that, it/they must have intelligence, foresight and will.

And I'm not attacking causation, only pointing out that when we extend our everyday notions of cause (which are reassuringly rich) into nature we naturally attribute to nature capacities it does and cannot have -- unless, that is, we see nature as controlled by Mind, etc.
Could you go into more detail here about what you mean by "causation", our "everyday notions" of causation (I assume that you mean something like, I hit the bottle, which caused it to fall), and how these don't hold up when we attribute them to nature?

Would you say it is incorrect or not useful to say something like, "the neutron hit the uranium atom causing it to split into smaller atoms and other particles"? Is that more or less useful than "I hit the bottle causing it to fall"?

Oh, and I assume that you are familiar with Hume (for those who aren't, see 1 (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/), 2 (http://www.iep.utm.edu/humelife/) and 3 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hume)), are you implying that the problem of induction (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction) is in effect being ignored by most people?

Now, when you try to fill in the details behind this:


assuming we interpret "must" to simply mean that there is no physical way for the particular interaction of matter and energy B not to end up in the state of matter and energy that we regard as A
you will only be able to do so if you re-introduce notions of control and will. Otherwise this is just a table-thumping way of saying "I can't imagine it not happening!".

It is so easy to drift off into anthropomorphism here, which is why such animistic ideas have dominated thought for over 2000 years.
I disagree that it is necessary to "re-introduce notions of control and will". Surely it is sufficient to say that "it is a necessity of how the universe is that when B happens, A follows"? It is a necessity in the same way that 1+1=2.

[Luís Henrique]

What about mathematics? 1 + 1 always equals 2 (even for large values of one :cool:).

But "2" is only a conventional name. 1+1 = 1+1.

The question is that the tachygraphical system for mathematics allows calculation, so that I can solve a problem like finding how much is 56478397+677932 without actually counting from 56478397 to the sum - in fact, without even thinking about any of those quantities at all.

Unfortunately, the naming system we have for pretty much anything else doesn't have such property.


Does a(b+c) always equal (ab)+(ac)?

Yes...


(I notice in one thread you say "This does not mean that indeterminism holds sway; if determinism makes no sense, then its opposite does not either."

I would be wary of this line of reasoning. Does it make sence to say "God exists"? If it doesn't, does saying "God doesn't exist" make sence"? If being logical makes sence, does it follow that being illogical makes sence too?

I fear that we could be here making word games about the meaning of the word "sence". For instance, I can say that any of the following sentences "make no sence":



Unicorns stipflate.
Unicorns exist.
Unicorns are all pink.
Unicorns are all pink, except for those that are not.
Unicorns are horses with a single horn in their forehead.

But "making no sence" means a different thing for each of these sentences, and so the "negation" of each of those sentences bears different "making sence" values:

Unicorns don't stipflate. (as we haven't the leastest idea on what "to stipflate" means, both this sentence and the sentence it negates are totally devoid of sence.)

Unicorns don't exist. (it makes no sence to state the existence of an animal that has never been observed - but denying such existence doesn't seem to lack sence at all.)

Unicorns aren't all pink. (this may have a double meaning - it could be affirming that unicorns indeed exist, but are not pink; or it could be implying that something that doesn't exist cannot be pink.)

It is not the case that all unicorns are either pink or not pink. (evidently, if unicorns existed, then they would either be pink or not, so this sentence is logically flawed [it doesn't make sence if the sentence it negates makes sence]; but since unicorns don't exist, they in fact "are" neither pink nor not-pink [it makes sence when the sentence it negates doesn't].)

Unicorns are not horses with a horn on their forehead. (well, they aren't, because they don't exist; but that's the description of "unicorns" as far as we know - that would be what they are, if they existed...)

So we would have to know in what sence determinism "makes no sence" in order to understand whether undeterminism makes sence or not.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Yuon:


Could you go into more detail here about what you mean by "causation", our "everyday notions" of causation (I assume that you mean something like, I hit the bottle, which caused it to fall), and how these don't hold up when we attribute them to nature?

Well the everyday language of causation is fortunately exceedingly rich, and includes words such as:


adjust, amend, make, produce, revise, improve, deteriorate, edit, bend, straighten, weave, dig, plough, sow, twist, turn, tighten, fasten, loosen, relax, tense up, slacken, bind, wrap, pluck, rip, tear, mend, perforate, repair, damage, sharpen, modify, widen, lock, unlock, differentiate, divide, partition, unite, amalgamate, connect, drop, pick up, wind, unwind, push, pull, peel, scrape, graze, file, scour, dislodge, shatter, mix, separate, cut, chop, crush, grind, shred, slice, dice, saw, sew, knit, spread, climb, rise, ascend, descend, slide, slip, roll, spin, revolve, oscillate, protest, challenge, expel, eject, remove, overthrow, expropriate, scatter, gather, assemble, defeat, strike, revolt, riot, march, demonstrate, rebel, campaign, agitate, organise...

and many many more.

Language, originally the result of collective labour and developed as a means of communication, is not too good at representing things. In order to try to do so, theorists found they had to take words which express the relations human beings have with one another and with nature and then apply them to the relations that exist in nature itself. Unless great care is taken, these words will carry with them the inter-human connotations they possess in their ordinary use. Alas, traditional theorists were recklessly careless.

Superstitious individuals had earlier tried to interpret natural processes as the work of various assorted 'spirits' and 'gods', using anthropomorphic language in order to do so. Later, in more developed class society, priests and theologians systematically indulged in this 'art form' for ideological reasons (i.e., to suggest that the natural and social order was divinely-ordained, and so could not and should not be resisted). Subsequently, as we can see from the record, ancient Greek thinkers began looking for increasingly secular ways of theorising about the world (to give a less animistic rationale for the new forms of class society beginning to emerge in the 6th century BC), but they retained this transferred and transformed language, not noticing they had in fact banished the aforementioned 'spirits' and 'gods' in name only (as Feuerbach half recognised) -- but, the anthropomorphic connotations still remained, and there they remain to this day.

I try to explain why they did this -- and still do -- and thus why dialecticians also do this, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Rest_of_Summary_of_Twelve.htm

The ideology these days underlying such scientistic theories involve somewhat similar reasoning: nature and society are the way they are and you can do nothing about it, and that includes oppression, exploitation, racism and sexism. It's in our genes, and we are all 'determined' by our somatic and genetic inheritance. You can't argue with science, so don't even try. Just doff your cap and get back to work. You should be grateful for a job...


Would you say it is incorrect or not useful to say something like, "the neutron hit the uranium atom causing it to split into smaller atoms and other particles"? Is that more or less useful than "I hit the bottle causing it to fall"?

No problem with that, so long as this is viewed as an explanation in an attenuated sense. Since such 'particles' are just probability waves (so we are told), they cannot interact literally. On that see below (except I use the example of forces not particles to illustrate this point, but the same reasoning applies).

In theoretical philosophy we do not have a successful theory of interaction (at this level, or even in the macro world). I try to say why in this debate with Lynx:


Lynx:


Fields are real world objects that lend themselves to mathematical analysis - perhaps you are referring to the (imaginary) lines of force?

In that case, what are fields made of? If they are made of nothing, how are they different from nothing? If they are made of something, what holds them together but other forces? In that case, you'd be explaining force by means of force, and thus going round in circles.


Fields don't make objects move, but they can affect the lines of force, by diverting and concentrating them. Flux density is an often used term. The magnitude of the force is represented by the number of lines of force per given area.

Once more, how can fields do this if they are made of nothing? And if they are made of something, then other forces (of cohesion, resistance, etc.) come into play, as noted above.

In that case, you'd have forces changing the motion of bodies.

But, forces are not made of anything; so how can they affect the motion of bodies?

This is in fact the classic problem posed by Leibniz, to which no one has been able to think of an effective answer. There isn't much on-line on this, but the following partly explains the background:

http://www.garybanham.net/LECTURES_files/METALECTURE16.pdf

And several related issues are explained by one of my old teachers:


"As significant as his critique of Descartes' mechanics was Leibniz's attack on Newton's account of force. In the Principles, Newton limited himself to describing interactions between bodies in terms of general mathematical laws. This limitation was both a strength and a weakness. Newton succeeded in making the complexities of nature amenable to mathematical description only by simplifying the phenomena: by treating material particles as if they were infinitely hard yet infinitely elastic, concentrated at points, capable of exchanging any amount of force all at once, connected by forces operating instantaneously at a distance, and so on. Leibniz complained that this made Newton's system an idealised abstraction, which could not possibly be true of the real world. In reality, nothing was absolutely hard or elastic, nothing happened instantaneously, and every causal interaction was mediated by a complex mechanism. In general terms, Newton would have agreed with Leibniz's comment. He too believed in underlying mechanisms, but he refused to speculate about them in the Principles (his famous, 'I do not invent hypotheses')....

"Much later, in his Specimen of Dynamics (1695), Leibniz tried to give an account of the mechanism which mediated exchanges of force between colliding bodies. In real collisions (unlike Newton's idealisations), there had to be a finite period during which one body slowed down and the other picked up speed. This implied that bodies had a certain size, and were not absolutely hard or elastic, since the only conceivable mechanism for transfer of force was that bodies were first squashed together, and then gradually sprang back from each other once all the kinetic energy had been taken up. However, as soon as it is accepted that transfer of force between every day objects must be mediated by a mechanism, there is no point at which you stop needing smaller and smaller sub-mechanisms. At no level can you suddenly say that force is transferred directly.

"Elasticity is itself a phenomenon requiring explanation in terms of pushings of particles. At the first instant of impact, the outermost particles of each colliding body push against their neighbours, and these in turn push against their neighbours, and so on right through each body. But then each of these pushings needs to be explained by the compression of sub-particles, and so on to infinity. The conclusion Leibniz drew was that, ultimately, forces were not really transferred at all. All action was, as he put it, spontaneous. The energy required for a body's motion on the occasion of an impact, had to be drawn from its own resources, since it could not actually take up any energy from bodies impinging on it....

"An even more significant aspect of the theory was its abandonment of the traditional notion that matter was essentially inert. Leibniz saw that if the only function of matter was as a passive carrier of forces, then it had no role to play in scientific explanation. Its only role would be the metaphysical one of satisfying the prejudice that forces must inhere in something more substantial than themselves. He maintained that matter was nothing other than the receptive capacity of things, or their 'passive power', as he called it. Matter just was the capacity to slow other things down, and to be accelerated rather than penetrated (capacities which ghosts and shadows lack) -- in other words, inertia or mass, and solidity. So, taking also into account 'active powers' such as kinetic energy, Leibniz reduced matter to a complex of forces. In this he was anticipating modern field theory, which treats material particles as concentrated fields of force –- an anticipation duly recognised by its founder, the Italian mathematician Ruggiero Giuseppe Boscovich (1711-87)." [Ross (1984) Leibniz, pp.40-44.]

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1452002&postcount=17

This remains unsolved to this day, and I would maintain that it is insoluble, since it is a direct result of trying to view language as a means of representation, and thus treating the metaphors theorists have to use because of this as if they were literally true.


Oh, and I assume that you are familiar with Hume (for those who aren't, see 1, 2 and 3), are you implying that the problem of induction is in effect being ignored by most people?

Indeed, but my argument bears no relation to Hume's.


I disagree that it is necessary to "re-introduce notions of control and will". Surely it is sufficient to say that "it is a necessity of how the universe is that when B happens, A follows"? It is a necessity in the same way that 1+1=2.

But, where does this 'necessity' come from? As soon as you try to say, you have to introduce the sorts of terms I alleged.

Of course, if this is just a description underlined by thumping the table (which is what the use of this word in the end inevitably implies), then it cannot be 'necessary'. And that is what I said would happen in my original post.

[MarxSchmarx]

Rosa:

Indeed, but my argument bears no relation to Hume's.
Quite the contrary. I find your critique of "necessity", with which I agree, to be essentially Hume's. Indeed, the "Enquiry" is quite emphatic about the fact that we impute our prejudices about human activity upon "necessary" "natural" relationships. Whatever one thinks of Hume's broader project, if I may be so blunt, what precisely is it that distinguishes your original post and subsequent explications about determinism from Hume's argument(s) against causation?

[Jimmie Higgins]

First I'll just say that I'm history oriented, not philosophy oriented so maybe I'm jsut missing the obvious. But how does this impact anything?

I can think of specific ways that language has been used in Science to imply some kind of magical process... social darwinism - or many crude interpretations of darwin use phrases such as "the assent of man" that imply that evolution is a series of perfect steps rather than a more fluid trial and error and accident process.

But often these misconceptions are actually political rather than some inexactness or laziness of language. Social Darwinists had an interest in trying to show that industrial capitalism was the last and most perfected step in social evolution and that inequality was actually the "survival of the fittest".

People anthropomorphize EVERYTHING! I'm usually argue that nature really plays a small role in human behavior, but I think our brains are hardwired to understand social dynamics because we are social creatures. We can look at a tree and feel a false empathy towards it thinking that it's "sad" or "tired" because the tree is in poor health. Boats are women, people attribute personality to their cars all the time... but somehow we still manage to take the car to a mechanic rather than a psychologist when it's acting sluggish.

In other words, I think that we can say "laws of nature" without thinking that there is some supernatural force behind observable phenomenon. The fact that people take science and inject some pseudo-science in it has less to do with language and more to do with the influence of the "ruling ideas" Marx talked about and whose interests those ideas serve.

Again, I might be missing the point entirely. I'm at work right now and so I was interrupted several times while reading the post. Excuses excuses.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

MarxSchmarx:


Quite the contrary. I find your critique of "necessity", with which I agree, to be essentially Hume's. Indeed, the "Enquiry" is quite emphatic about the fact that we impute our prejudices about human activity upon "necessary" "natural" relationships. Whatever one thinks of Hume's broader project, if I may be so blunt, what precisely is it that distinguishes your original post and subsequent explications about determinism from Hume's argument(s) against causation?

It has absolutely nothing to do with Hume's argument, which is epistemological and psychologistic. Mine is neither.

I am quite happy to acknowledge necessary connections in causation, but these are forms of representation, based on what we say about causation by our use of language.

In other words, I accept de dicto but not de re necessities.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gravedigger:


But often these misconceptions are actually political rather than some inexactness or laziness of language. Social Darwinists had an interest in trying to show that industrial capitalism was the last and most perfected step in social evolution and that inequality was actually the "survival of the fittest".

I agree, but I think this goes deeper, I think, and brings in questions connected with the nature of ruling-class ideology -- and here it is quite easy to show that, in philosophy at least, such ideological orientations are connected with a misuse of language.

In popular science (and particularly evolutionary psychology), too, this also appears in the use of the phrase 'selfish genes', and other anthropomorphic terms in Neo-Darwinism, for example -- as indeed, I think you noted.


In other words, I think that we can say "laws of nature" without thinking that there is some supernatural force behind observable phenomenon. The fact that people take science and inject some pseudo-science in it has less to do with language and more to do with the influence of the "ruling ideas" Marx talked about and whose interests those ideas serve.

Again, I agree, but, as Marx also noted, this arises from a distortion of language:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

Moreover, when any attempt is made by traditional philosophers to try to fill in the details relating to the operation of 'physical law', these anthropomorphic ideas simply re-appear, and in the way I have outlined in the above posts. [You will find examples of this phenomenon in the references I added to the OP.]

[MarxSchmarx]

Rosa:


It has absolutely nothing to do with Hume's argument, which is epistemological and psychologistic. Mine is neither.

I am quite happy to acknowledge necessary connections in causation, but these are forms of representation, based on what we say about causation by our use of language.


Well why aren't "forms of representation" and use of language inherently "psychologistic"? Certainly problems relating to understanding how they come about and whether they can be justified seems a very epistemological problem.


In other words, I accept de dicto but not de re necessities.

My understanding, and I am not a philosopher, is that this is in fact a pretty mainstream position among practicing philosophers.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

MarxSchmarx:


Well why aren't "forms of representation" and use of language inherently "psychologistic"? Certainly problems relating to understanding how they come about and whether they can be justified seems a very epistemological problem.

No they are logical.


My understanding, and I am not a philosopher, is that this is in fact a pretty mainstream position among practicing philosophers.

Well, it was until Saul Kripke wrote 'Naming and Necessity'; now, if there is such a thing as 'maintstream', it is that necessities can be de re, de dicto and/or de se.

And, the Wittgensteinian slant on de dicto is different, too.

[Paul Cockshott]

I think Rosa is in danger of slipping of into idealism with some of this.

And you must know that in Relativity theory, mass does no such thing; it moves naturally along geodesics, depending on how these are 'warped' in Spacetime.

This metaphor is not much better; according to Newton, mass moves as if it were on a piano wire, whereas for Einstein it moves along tram lines! But neither of these can explain why things happen without introducing the anthropomorphic notions I outlined in my last post. Hence the use of such metaphors (like 'attract', 'warped', and so on).

The words attract or warp are not really anthropomorphic notions other than to the extent that they are words which describe the behaviour of parts of the material world as experienced through our sensory and motor systems. For instance the notion of gravitational attraction uses the word attraction as an analogy with the magnetic attraction that we can feel with our fingers when we bring iron near a magnet. The use of the word warping applied to space time is based on a metaphor with the way cloth warps, with the threads representing the original geodesics.

The words are metaphorical, because that is something we are forced to do if we are going to use language to communicate, but in the course of their new usage, the words acquire technical meanings that were not present in the original usage.

At the same time as this presentation of the theory is expressed in prose, there is, at least in non popular works, a technical presentation in maths, and the scientists learning the theory attribute meanings to the prose in from the maths.

The use of the term 'natural law' is also a metaphor, used to talk about certain very general invariants in reality. If we take the 'circuit law' for example, that says that the sum of current into and out of a node must be equal, this is just a concise way of expressing a consequence of the invariance or conservation of charge.

One could call this a law or one could call it a theorem, or one could call it an axiom, or one could call it Kirchoff's equation. These labellings all have metaphorical linkages to other domains of discourse, but there is nothing sinister about this, it is just an inevitable step in the extension of linguistic meaning.

When one uses the terms deterministic versus non deterministic in scientific discussions we have a quite special meaning to them. You can indeed, as Rosa has done, construct an 'archéologie du savoir' about the word determinism after the style of Foucalt. Tracing its use back to ideas from juridical ideology, but that has only the most tenous bearing on the way the word is now used.

A deterministic theory gives a definite final state as a result of the model plus the boundary conditions. A non-deterministic theory gives a probability density function over states as a result of the boundary conditions and the passage of time. Note the in physics literature one would often get the phrase 'dynamical laws' instead of model above, but this substition of one label for another would have no bearing on what scientists mean by deterministic or non deterministic theories.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


The words attract or warp are not really anthropomorphic notions other than to the extent that they are words which describe the behaviour of parts of the material world as experienced through our sensory and motor systems. For instance the notion of gravitational attraction uses the word attraction as an analogy with the magnetic attraction that we can feel with our fingers when we bring iron near a magnet. The use of the word warping applied to space time is based on a metaphor with the way cloth warps, with the threads representing the original geodesics.

Well, I covered this in what I wrote:


Language, originally the result of collective labour and developed as a means of communication, is not too good at representing things. In order to try to do so, theorists found they had to take words which express the relations human beings have with one another and with nature and then apply them to the relations that exist in nature itself. Unless great care is taken, these words will carry with them the inter-human connotations they possess in their ordinary use. Alas, traditional theorists were recklessly careless.

The verb 'attract' is one of the words we use (by analogy with attraction between two human beings, perhaps) to account for a natural processes, like magnetism, and later to account for gravitation.


The words are metaphorical, because that is something we are forced to do if we are going to use language to communicate, but in the course of their new usage, the words acquire technical meanings that were not present in the original usage.

And this is a point I made too:


Language, originally the result of collective labour and developed as a means of communication, is not too good at representing things. In order to try to do so, theorists found they had to take words which express the relations human beings have with one another and with nature and then apply them to the relations that exist in nature itself. Unless great care is taken, these words will carry with them the inter-human connotations they possess in their ordinary use. Alas, traditional theorists were recklessly careless.

This is something Leibniz, for example, was aware of (in his own way), in his attempt to account for interaction, which is why he explained it in terms of the pre-established harmony between monads (tiny minds). In the end, he saw quite clearly that if a philosophical account is to be given of interaction, notions connected to will and intention must be brought in. As far as I can see, no one has been able to show where he went wrong. So, his work amounted to an inadvertent reductio ad absurdum of determinism.

And, no problem with the technical meaning of the terms scientists use, but when the details are filled in, how does the 'attraction' here work?

If this word is being used merely descriptively, no problem, once more (as I noted in my OP); but as soon as it is used to explain why things happen one way and not another, and why the always will happen this way, then an appeal will have to be made to the animistic connotations this word (and others) used to have, and in many cases, still have.

Paul is invited to fill in the physical details, here, without this happening.


The use of the term 'natural law' is also a metaphor, used to talk about certain very general invariants in reality. If we take the 'circuit law' for example, that says that the sum of current into and out of a node must be equal, this is just a concise way of expressing a consequence of the invariance or conservation of charge.

And this is what I also said. But, when this term is used to give content to determinism, it ceases to be a metaphor, it ceases to be descriptive and becomes a word that is used to explain why things could not be any other way, as if event/object B (referred to in my OP) had control over the future, or over other objects/events, A.

And as far as the physics is concerned, I covered this too! When physicists tell us things like this:


If we take the 'circuit law' for example, that says that the sum of current into and out of a node must be equal, this is just a concise way of expressing a consequence of the invariance or conservation of charge

This is a description of what does in fact happen. If this now were to become part of an attempt to tell us what must happen, then, when the details are filled in (and we do not just wave our hands at this), the untoward connotations I mentioned in my OP will re-emerge. From my OP:


Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.

This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.

Paul:


One could call this a law or one could call it a theorem, or one could call it an axiom, or one could call it Kirchoff's equation. These labellings all have metaphorical linkages to other domains of discourse, but there is nothing sinister about this, it is just an inevitable step in the extension of linguistic meaning.

Sure, there is nothing 'sinister' about this; I can't think what it was in my OP that suggested otherwise. And there us no problem with the extension to language; this is indeed how science progresses. Problems only begin when these theorems (etc) are recruited philosophically so that they give content to determinism -- which is not a scientific theory.


When one uses the terms deterministic versus non deterministic in scientific discussions we have a quite special meaning to them. You can indeed, as Rosa has done, construct an 'archéologie du savoir' about the word determinism after the style of Foucalt. Tracing its use back to ideas from juridical ideology, but that has only the most tenuous bearing on the way the word is now used.

Scientists are at liberty to use this word ('determinism') as they see fit, unless they try to import connotations from the philosophical use of this word, that is, when they attempt to give us a philosophical theory of how the present binds the future.

When they do attempt to do this, that is were notions of control and will enter in -- as I pointed out (clearly I had thought!) in my OP.


A deterministic theory gives a definite final state as a result of the model plus the boundary conditions. A non-deterministic theory gives a probability density function over states as a result of the boundary conditions and the passage of time. Note the in physics literature one would often get the phrase 'dynamical laws' instead of model above, but this substitution of one label for another would have no bearing on what scientists mean by deterministic or non deterministic theories.

No problem with this either, except when this ceases to be merely descriptive, and becomes a way of explaining how a present state of affairs B (from my OP) controls the production of a future state A.

When that is done, and the details are filled in, that is where the science turns into anthropomorphic metaphysics.

And, if Paul still disagrees, he is once again invited to fill in these physical details. How exactly does the present control the production of the future? How precisely does B ensure that A is always produced and not C?

[Paul Cockshott]

And, if Paul still disagrees, he is once again invited to fill in these physical details. How exactly does the present control the production of the future? How precisely does B ensure that A is always produced and not C?

One can not answer that in the abstract, apart from particular examples. But in general I do not accept tha the present determines the future. That is a one sided view of things. Mechanics is time reversible so the present is determined by the future and the future by the present. The idea that there is an order to time and that it moves is definitely a projection from the way things appear to us.

[Paul Cockshott]

The verb 'attract' is one of the words we use (by analogy with attraction between two human beings, perhaps) to account for a natural processes, like magnetism, and later to account for gravitation.

I think that the metaphor goes the other way. Children learn to play with magnets and about the attractive power of magnets long before puberty and long before they have any idea of what sexual
'attraction' is.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


One can not answer that in the abstract, apart from particular examples. But in general I do not accept that the present determines the future.

Well, this is what we do in philosophy, and it is what scientists try to do when they extend their theories into a cosmic (or even local) principle which binds the future.

And when you say this:


That is a one sided view of things. Mechanics is time reversible so the present is determined by the future and the future by the present. The idea that there is an order to time and that it moves is definitely a projection from the way things appear to us.

you are indeed trying to make an abstract point -- and I invite you once again to say how anything can 'determine' the future without importing the untoward anthropomorphic connotations I outlined on my OP.

Sure, we can use mechanics to determine what we take the future to be, but nature cannot do that, unless you think nature has a will, or is mind.


I think that the metaphor goes the other way. Children learn to play with magnets and about the attractive power of magnets long before puberty and long before they have any idea of what sexual 'attraction' is.

Well, you do know, I presume, that the ancients believed that magnets could do this because of cosmic 'sympathies' (derived from a theological view of nature), and because there was a 'soul' in each magnet.

Thales, for example, held that a magnet contained a soul:

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=iwfy-n5IWL8C&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12&dq=ancient+explanation+of+magnetism&source=bl&ots=TyD2RNHrgT&sig=FlBVyLam3O1x_82whMT6cpAu02E&hl=en&ei=ucHlSsqMJMyC4QaflMGLDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CA4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=ancient%20explanation%20of%20magnetism&f=false

As did many others (including Hegel; even Engels noted this fact).

So, the use of 'attract' and 'repel' here are connected with mind and will, as I suggested.

But, you are once again invited to explain how a magnet can 'attract' anything without the use of animistic terms.

And an appeal to the 'field' will be to no avail here, for the reasons I outlined in my OP:


Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.

This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.

[rhys]

One can not answer that in the abstract, apart from particular examples. But in general I do not accept tha the present determines the future. That is a one sided view of things. Mechanics is time reversible so the present is determined by the future and the future by the present. The idea that there is an order to time and that it moves is definitely a projection from the way things appear to us.

If the present is determined by the future and we don't know the future, we might as well give up now, surely?

[Paul Cockshott]

Thales, for example, held that a magnet contained a soul:

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=i...netism&f=false (http://www.anonym.to/?http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=iwfy-n5IWL8C&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12&dq=ancient+explanation+of+magnetism&source=bl&ots=TyD2RNHrgT&sig=FlBVyLam3O1x_82whMT6cpAu02E&hl=en&ei=ucHlSsqMJMyC4QaflMGLDQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CA4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=ancient%20explanation%20of%20magnetism&f=false)

As did many others (including Hegel; even Engels noted this fact).

So, the use of 'attract' and 'repel' here are connected with mind and will, as I suggested.

.
This is the diachrony of metaphor not the synchrony. Today when a child learns about attraction they do it in terms of observation of magnets. This is the first meaning. They learn the interpersonal meaning at a much later stage as a metaphor.


But, you are once again invited to explain how a magnet can 'attract' anything without the use of animistic terms

Classically it would be explained as a consequence of the conservation of the sum of potential and kinetic energy. If a piece of iron is closer to the magnet rather than further away, its potential energy falls, and in consequence its kinetic energy must rise to balance this, resulting in motion.

[Paul Cockshott]

Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is.

Why are fields unable to determine the motion of particles?

Have you a new physics to replace the standard theory of electromagnetism?

We represent fields as we do all physics using mathematical concepts, but these are in the main concepts either specifically developed to deal with the problem, or else ones carefully selected from a repertoire in order to get ones that correspond to material reality. Do you doubt that fields have a real existence?

[Paul Cockshott]

If the present is determined by the future and we don't know the future, we might as well give up now, surely?

You obviously do not use knowlege of the future to work out what is happening now, but you can still use time symmetry to work backwards in time in a practical way. An observation of a meteor entering the atmosphere at a particular trajectory can be used to work backwards to where it came from.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


This is the diachrony of metaphor not the synchrony. Today when a child learns about attraction they do it in terms of observation of magnets. This is the first meaning. They learn the interpersonal meaning at a much later stage as a metaphor.

Well, I'd like to see the psychological data that underpins this claim of yours -- since it seems to be based on the idea that every child has access, and always has had access to a magnet -- even before they formed interpersonal relations (with parents, friends and siblings). You can't really believe this, can you?

But, even if you are right, I'd like to see you fill in the physical details that explain why, say, every North pole 'attracts' a South, and does not one day repel it -- as I pointed out in my OP, about the relation between B, A and C -- without the use of anthropomorphic terminology.


Classically it would be explained as a consequence of the conservation of the sum of potential and kinetic energy. If a piece of iron is closer to the magnet rather than further away, its potential energy falls, and in consequence its kinetic energy must rise to balance this, resulting in motion.

And why should nature do this, as opposed to not conserving energy?

In fact, all you have done here is replace B and A from my OP with terms drawn from physics, which I covered in this comment:


Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.

This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.

You:


Why are fields unable to determine the motion of particles?

Well, a field is a mathematical construct, and has no physical properties.

But, even if it did have physical properties, a field cannot 'determine' anything since it has no intellect.

Now, you may reject this on the grounds that you are using 'determine' technically, not philosophically. Fine, no problem with that, but then you will need to tell us how and in what way a field can make A (from my OP) happen as opposed to C, and do so in a way that goes beyond hand waving or surreptitiously using words that carry with them anthropomorphic connotations (such as 'B controls A').


Have you a new physics to replace the standard theory of electromagnetism?

No, as I have said all along, I am happy with modern physics -- except where it is used to give content to determinism. Physics describes what does in fact happen, and we can used it to predict what we expect will happen, but, and once more, nature cannot do this since it isn't mind.


We represent fields as we do all physics using mathematical concepts, but these are in the main concepts either specifically developed to deal with the problem, or else ones carefully selected from a repertoire in order to get ones that correspond to material reality. Do you doubt that fields have a real existence?

Well, in what way do fields have 'real existence'? Do you think there are infinitely thin lines, of infinite strength -- but made of nothing -- that run through the region of a field?

Or, that in scalar fields there Real Numbers floating about the place? Or that there are little arrows populating tangent and/or vector fields?

But, even if there were, how can such things bind the future? Even if there were 'real fields' they would just be physical correlates of the B and the A I used in my OP.

Are you committed to the idea that mathematical objects are intelligent?

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul:



Well, I'd like to see the psychological data that underpins this claim of yours -- since it seems to be based on the idea that every child has access, and always has had access to a magnet -- even before they formed interpersonal relations (with parents, friends and siblings). You can't really believe this, can you?


I am not saying that all children have access to tmagnets in all cultures, but we are discussing a particular word 'attraction' that in English is used both to explain magnetism and to explain sexual behaviour. Children certainly have interpersonal relations with their parents or siblings before they encounter magnets, but they are not exposed to the use of the word 'attraction' as an explanation of these interpersonal relations. In contemporary usage the word 'attraction' is not used for mother child relations, but as an explanation for sexually driven behaviour that does not start until a somewhat later age.




But, even if you are right, I'd like to see you fill in the physical details that explain why, say, every North pole 'attracts' a South, and does not one day repel it -- as I pointed out in my OP, about the relation between B, A and C -- without the use of anthropomorphic terminology.

The explanation in terms of conservation of energy was non anthropomorphic.






And why should nature do this, as opposed to not conserving energy?


This is a rather theological question, in the form you put it.

One could simply answer that investigation has shown that this is the way reality works.

If you try constructing a number of models of physics in which energy is not conserved it is possible that you may discover some deeper implication of the conservation of energy, but formulating a model of physics which does not involve it would be no mean feat. It is certainly not something you will be able to just knock off in a spare tea break.




Well, a field is a mathematical construct, and has no physical properties.

But, even if it did have physical properties, a field cannot 'determine' anything since it has no intellect.
[\quote]

There is a mathematical concept of a field which is a generalisation of the concepts of the various fields, gravitational, electromagnetic, etc, used in physics. The general mathematical concept of a field as a vector associated with each point in a metric space has no physical reality, but particular phsical fields, like the gravitational field do exist.
The mathematical concept of a field is derivative. It was derived as a generalisation of the particular ones discovered by physics.

The term 'determine' used in physics makes no assumption about the existence of intellect or will. I suspect you are using a loose analogy between the word determine as used in physics and the pop psychology use : ' I determined that I would buy a Ford Mustang', which does rely on pop psychology concepts like 'will'. That two words are
the same does not mean they denote the same concept: recall what Marx said
in his Notes on Wagner, about butter and antimony butter?

[quote]

Now, you may reject this on the grounds that you are using 'determine' technically, not philosophically. Fine, no problem with that, but then you will need to tell us how and in what way a field can make A (from my OP) happen as opposed to C, and do so in a way that goes beyond hand waving or surreptitiously using words that carry with them anthropomorphic connotations (such as 'B controls A').
[\quote]

What is wrong with the principle of least action?

[quote]



No, as I have said all along, I am happy with modern physics -- except where it is used to give content to determinism. Physics describes what does in fact happen, and we can used it to predict what we expect will happen, but, and once more, nature cannot do this since it isn't mind.


What is it you are saying that nature cannot do?




Well, in what way do fields have 'real existence'? Do you think there are infinitely thin lines, of infinite strength -- but made of nothing -- that run through the region of a field?

Or, that in scalar fields there Real Numbers floating about the place? Or that there are little arrows populating tangent and/or vector fields?


The problem here is that our everyday language and everyday experience give us only a limited purchase on the levels of reality discovered by physics. We have to understand these realities with a number of tools, some of them mathematical, some of them computational, and some of them using the inbuilt computational apparattus available to us : predominantly the visual cortex. If we can set up mental pictures to represent fields, even though the fields do not themselves reflect light and thus are invisible, it is easier for us to understand them.

I am pretty certain that the fields are not actually real valued, since it seems unlikely to me that any phsysically existing thing exists to infinite precision. Were it to do so, there would be all sorts of problems with entropy and information. But this does not mean that the concept of real valued fields is a workable approximation until such time as we are able to get for example and appropriate quantisation of gravity.





But, even if there were, how can such things bind the future?



Because the equations of motion have a limited number of degrees of freedom. If you bind these at any time, past or future, these boundary conditions give position, momentum etc, determinate values at all points in time.



Are you committed to the idea that mathematical objects are intelligent?

certainly not, I suspect that was a joke on your part.

[Paul Cockshott]

Sorry I was negating my quotes with a backslash not a forward one in the text above.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


I am not saying that all children have access to magnets in all cultures, but we are discussing a particular word 'attraction' that in English is used both to explain magnetism and to explain sexual behaviour. Children certainly have interpersonal relations with their parents or siblings before they encounter magnets, but they are not exposed to the use of the word 'attraction' as an explanation of these interpersonal relations. In contemporary usage the word 'attraction' is not used for mother child relations, but as an explanation for sexually driven behaviour that does not start until a somewhat later age.

But, then how do children learn the word 'attract' if few of them have any experience of magnets?


The explanation in terms of conservation of energy was non anthropomorphic.

I never said it was; what I did say is that when you try to fill in the details (which you keep leaving out), then you will have to use anthropomorphic terms to explain why energy is conserved and not, say, its opposite. How does nature always manage to do this?

You reply:


This is a rather theological question, in the form you put it.

Well, that is indeed how this is posed in metaphysical philosophy. But you have yet to say why this happens as opposed to something else.


One could simply answer that investigation has shown that this is the way reality works.

I am OK with that; that was the point of my saying that description is all that science can give us.

But, when any attempt is made to export this into giving a deterministic account of reality, the science soon becomes prescriptive.


If you try constructing a number of models of physics in which energy is not conserved it is possible that you may discover some deeper implication of the conservation of energy, but formulating a model of physics which does not involve it would be no mean feat. It is certainly not something you will be able to just knock off in a spare tea break

And I do not pretend to even want to do this, but then, we have no explanation of why this happens as opposed to something else, or why nature always behaves this way, which is what metaphysicians aim to be able to do.

And, problems only occur, as I have said several times, when an attempt is made to try to spin a deterministic tale out of this -- which philosophers certainly try to do, as do scientists when they attempt to popularise their work, and indulge in some impromptu, amateur metaphysics.


There is a mathematical concept of a field which is a generalisation of the concepts of the various fields, gravitational, electromagnetic, etc, used in physics. The general mathematical concept of a field as a vector associated with each point in a metric space has no physical reality, but particular physical fields, like the gravitational field do exist.

The mathematical concept of a field is derivative. It was derived as a generalisation of the particular ones discovered by physics.

And, so, precisely what form does the gravitational field take that isn't a reification of this mathematics -- a sort of bargain basement Platonism?

And I question which took priority; I think these two notions (mathematical fields and physical fields) took shape alongside each other in the work of theorists like Euler, Boscovich etc.

But, I certainly have yet to see any successful physical model of the field that isn't a reification of mathematics. Have you?


The term 'determine' used in physics makes no assumption about the existence of intellect or will.

And I have acknowledged this several times. But, when this term ('determine') is used to try to show how one event/object/set of events can bind the future, control it or make it go one way rather than another, as often happens, then you leave the physics behind, and enter anthropomorphic metaphysics, as I alleged.

So, the field can only bind the future if it controls it -- hence my allegation of anthropomorphism.


I suspect you are using a loose analogy between the word determine as used in physics and the pop psychology use : ' I determined that I would buy a Ford Mustang', which does rely on pop psychology concepts like 'will'. That two words are
the same does not mean they denote the same concept: recall what Marx said
in his Notes on Wagner, about butter and antimony butter

Well, have a look at my OP (I am beginning to suspect you did not read it too carefully), where I make this very point, except I do not attribute it to pop psychology, but to our ordinary use of language:


This issue has always revolved around the use of terminology drawn from traditional philosophy (such as "determined", "will", "free", and the like), the use of which bears no relation to how these words are employed in ordinary speech.

For example, "determine" and its cognates are typically used in sentences like this "The rules determine what you can do in chess", "The time of the next train can be determined from the timetable", or "I am determined to go on the demonstration" and so on. Hence this word is normally used in relation to what human beings can do, apply, or can bring about.

As we will see, their use in traditional thought inverts this, making nature the agent and human beings the patient. No wonder then that the 'solution' to this artificial problem (i.e., 'determinism' and 'free will') has eluded us for over 2000 years.

If you want to evacuate the scientific use of this word of all such connotations, you will find me your most fervent supporter, but if you do this, you will also have to admit that we cannot in fact explain (in a physical sense ) why anything actually happens in nature.


What is wrong with the principle of least action?

Once more, why do you think I am criticising the physics?

There is nothing wrong with it, but this principle cannot explain why it is always obeyed, or why something else does not happen in its stead.

And if you can't do that, you have no explanation of why things happen the way they do.


What is it you are saying that nature cannot do?

The sorts of things that deterministic metaphysicians tell us it can.


The problem here is that our everyday language and everyday experience give us only a limited purchase on the levels of reality discovered by physics. We have to understand these realities with a number of tools, some of them mathematical, some of them computational, and some of them using the inbuilt computational apparatus available to us : predominantly the visual cortex. If we can set up mental pictures to represent fields, even though the fields do not themselves reflect light and thus are invisible, it is easier for us to understand them.

Sure, but when it comes to explaining why things happen, we need access to ordinary language to give classical determinism any bite. Mathematical objects cannot make things happen.


and some of them using the inbuilt computational apparatus available to us

But here you find you have to anthropomorphise the brain!


If we can set up mental pictures to represent fields, even though the fields do not themselves reflect light and thus are invisible, it is easier for us to understand them

Well we use such things as averages (or which are analogous to averages -- like the centre of mass of the galaxy) to explain things, but no one imagines that such averages have a physical existence.

Same with fields -- unless you know otherwise...

But then you concede this point:


I am pretty certain that the fields are not actually real valued, since it seems unlikely to me that any physically existing thing exists to infinite precision. Were it to do so, there would be all sorts of problems with entropy and information. But this does not mean that the concept of real valued fields is a workable approximation until such time as we are able to get for example and appropriate quantisation of gravity.

I am not sure how this will help, for whatever physical correlate of gravity we end up with, it too will not be able to control events, since it too will not have an intellect.


Because the equations of motion have a limited number of degrees of freedom. If you bind these at any time, past or future, these boundary conditions give position, momentum etc, determinate values at all points in time.

But, while these equations allow us to determine what we take to be the course of events, they have no physical correlates in nature so that they can ensure that what we use them to predict will unfailing come to pass.

Unless, once again, you think equations can control anything, or that they run the universe -- as a surrogate for 'god'.


certainly not, I suspect that was a joke on your part.

Half a joke yes, but it seems to me that some of your replies suggest you think equations are intelligent -- such as this one:


Because the equations of motion have a limited number of degrees of freedom. If you bind these at any time, past or future, these boundary conditions give position, momentum etc, determinate values at all points in time.

That is, if you think that these equations actually determine what happens, rather than they are merely tools we use to help us predict what we take the future to be.

If the latter -- no problem.

If the former, however, then you do indeed think equations are intelligent.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


Sorry I was negating my quotes with a backslash not a forward one in the text above.

You can use the edit key to correct this.

[Paul Cockshott]

I am breaking this into a number of sub mails as the system sometimes crashes on me doing a long reply. I just lost a couple of hours work that way.




Paul
I am not saying that all children have access to magnets in all cultures, but we are discussing a particular word 'attraction' that in English is used both to explain magnetism and to explain sexual behaviour. Children certainly have interpersonal relations with their parents or siblings before they encounter magnets, but they are not exposed to the use of the word 'attraction' as an explanation of these interpersonal relations. In contemporary usage the word 'attraction' is not used for mother child relations, but as an explanation for sexually driven behaviour that does not start until a somewhat later age.
Rosa

But, then how do children learn the word 'attract' if few of them have any experience of magnets?

I was talking about how the word is understood in modern Britain, where children do learn about magnets in primary school and their understanding
of the word attract comes from this.






The explanation in terms of conservation of energy was non anthropomorphic.
I never said it was; what I did say is that when you try to fill in the details (which you keep leaving out), then you will have to use anthropomorphic terms to explain why energy is conserved and not, say, its opposite. How does nature always manage to do this?

You reply:



This is a rather theological question, in the form you put it.Well, that is indeed how this is posed in metaphysical philosophy. But you have yet to say why this happens as opposed to something else.

I suspect you are asking the impossible here. You ask me to give an explanation of a physical process in some way other than
in terms of our understanding of physics.
I dont think it is valid to assume that a deeper 'metaphysical' explanation can be given.

[Paul Cockshott]

The explanation in terms of conservation of energy was non anthropomorphic.
I never said it was; what I did say is that when you try to fill in the details (which you keep leaving out), then you will have to use anthropomorphic terms to explain why energy is conserved and not, say, its opposite. How does nature always manage to do this?

You reply:



This is a rather theological question, in the form you put it.Well, that is indeed how this is posed in metaphysical philosophy. But you have yet to say why this happens as opposed to something else.
I suspect you are asking the impossible here. You ask me to give an explanation of a physical process in some way other than
in terms of our understanding of physics.
I dont think it is valid to assume that a deeper 'metaphysical' explanation can be given.








Paul
If you try constructing a number of models of physics in which energy is not conserved it is possible that you may discover some deeper implication of the conservation of energy, but formulating a model of physics which does not involve it would be no mean feat. It is certainly not something you will be able to just knock off in a spare tea break
Rosa
And I do not pretend to even want to do this, but then, we have no explanation of why this happens as opposed to something else, or why nature always behaves this way, which is what metaphysicians aim to be able to do.



And, problems only occur, as I have said several times, when an attempt is made to try to spin a deterministic tale out of this -- which philosophers certainly try to do, as do scientists when they attempt to popularise their work, and indulge in some impromptu, amateur metaphysics.



There is a mathematical concept of a field which is a generalisation of the concepts of the various fields, gravitational, electromagnetic, etc, used in physics. The general mathematical concept of a field as a vector associated with each point in a metric space has no physical reality, but particular physical fields, like the gravitational field do exist.

The mathematical concept of a field is derivative. It was derived as a generalisation of the particular ones discovered by physics.
And, so, precisely what form does the gravitational field take that isn't a reification of this mathematics -- a sort of bargain basement Platonism?

And I question which took priority; I think these two notions (mathematical fields and physical fields) took shape alongside each other in the work of theorists like Euler, Boscovich etc.

But, I certainly have yet to see any successful physical model of the field that isn't a reification of mathematics. Have you?
Well there certainly has been a tradition in physics since Gallileo and perhaps since Pythagoras of modelling things in terms of numbers. Why?

This is what Wigner was asking in his article {The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences} and he answers
it in terms of the time and space invariance of the laws of physics which allows them to be economically modelled in
numerical terms.

I think it is because the symbolic manipulation of numbers was the most flexible modelling technology available from the enlightenment
until very recently.
It allowed one physical system :

1. let us say Lagrange, a couple of assistants, a supply of paper and pencils, some formulae or rules
of calculation and some astronomical observations recorded in a ledger to simulate a second physical system.

2. the earth, the sun, venus and a telescope mounted on the earth outside Paris.

The system 1 simulates the evolution of system 2, and the use of symbolic maths is part of the technology used.
One could also in principle have constructed a highly precise Orrery and got good results, and were one to
have done so the intuitive psychological understanding we would have got of what goes on in the system 2
would in turn have been influenced by our technology of modelling : the references to Newtons 'clockwork universe'
come from the use of Orrerys. But of course this long preceeds Newton, there is plausible argument that the
Antikera device was an Orrery, perhaps from the school of Archimedes or from Alexandria.

Because we use numerical methods in our formulation of physical models, our psychological understanding
of physical processes is very much influenced by by the modelling technology. You say that there are no
non mathematical formulations of physical fields. I dont think this is true. Consider the visualisation
or model of the gravitational field around a black hole that is often given in popular accounts: a parabolic
trumpet pointing upwards down which a ball rolls in spiral path like the ones used for pennies by the
lifeboat charity. Here we use a physical visualisation of the field as a curved surface.

Symbolic mathematics has remained the most popular modelling tool in physics for a long time
because of its great flexibility. A person with a pencil and paper, or more recently a
general purpose computer, can , given the appropriate algorithm, model a wide variety of
physical systems. If we believe the strong version of the Church Turing hypothesis ( which I do )
then it is computationally universal, and can in principle be used to model any physical system.
But as Feymman pointed out( Simulating physics with computers, in R. P. Hey, A. (ed.)Feynmann and computation:
exploring the limits of computers, Perseus Books, 1999, 133-153) the use of symbolic numerical
methods breaks down when handling even quite small quantum systems because of an exponential
growth in complexity. For these systems some form of analogue quantum modelling may well be necessary
see (Buluta, I. & Nori, F., Quantum Simulators, Science, AAAS, 2009, 326, 108).
If we have to resort to this it will be come even harder to develop psychologically satisfying
visualisations or understandings.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


I am breaking this into a number of sub mails as the system sometimes crashes on me doing a long reply. I just lost a couple of hours work that way.

Write your reply in word first (and save it), then post it here; it's what I do.


I was talking about how the word is understood in modern Britain, where children do learn about magnets in primary school and their understanding of the word attract comes from this.

I got that, but this does not affect the things I have said. You seem to believe that every child (in modern Britain) only uses this word when he/she has played around with magnets first, and that in every case he/she does this before they feel their first emotional or sexual impulse toward another human being. Not only is this implausible, I can't think how you might substantiate it.

One on-line etymological dictionary traces the origin of this word thus:


1530s, from Fr. attraction, from L. attractionem (nom. attractio) "a drawing together," noun of action from attractus, pp. of attrahere (see attract). Originally a medical word, "absorption by the body;" meaning "action of drawing to" is from 1540s (again medical); extended to magnetic, then figuratively to personal (1608) qualities. Meaning "a thing which draws a crowd, interesting or amusing exhibition" is from 1829, a sense that developed in Eng. and soon transfered to the Fr. equivalent of the word.

http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=attraction

Attractive:


1540, "absorptive," from Fr. attractif (14c.), from attract- (see attract). Meaning "having the quality of drawing people's eye or interest" is from 1590; sense of "pleasing, alluring" is from 1602.

http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=attract&searchmode=none

Attract:


1540, from L. attractus, pp. of attrahere "to draw, to attract," from ad- "to" + trahere "draw" (see tract (1)). Originally a medical term for the body's tendency to absorb fluids, nourishment, etc., or for a poultice treatment to "draw out" diseased matter (1563). Of the ability of people or animals to draw others to them, it is attested from 1568; of physical forces (magnetism, etc.), from 1607 (implied in attraction).

http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=attract&searchmode=none


Origin: 1400–50; late ME < L attractus drawn to (ptp. of attrahere), equiv. to at- at- + trac- (var. s. of trahere to draw) + -tus ptp. suffix

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/attract


the Latin word attractus (attraction, drawing to; drawn together, knit) derived from the Latin word attrahere (attract, draw, drag together) derived from the Classical Latin word trahere (to draw; draw, drag, haul) using the Latin prefix ad- (to, in addition)
derived from the Latin word ad (to; near; to; to; to; near)

http://www.myetymology.com/latin/attractus.html

From this you will no doubt see that the word originally derives not from magnets, but from the relation human beings and/or human bodies have with the world, as I alleged in my OP. Thus is not surprising, since, as I also alleged, language is primarily a form or communication between human beings, not a form of representation (of the world). So, it is hardly surprising that these words (i.e., these verbs) originated from just such interactions between human beings and/or between humans beings and the world.

Paul:


I suspect you are asking the impossible here. You ask me to give an explanation of a physical process in some way other than in terms of our understanding of physics. I dont think it is valid to assume that a deeper 'metaphysical' explanation can be given.

Well, this is what I have been saying all along; there can be no metaphysical explanation here (I devote a long essay at my site to explaining why this is so -- Essay Twelve Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm)) -- but that does not stop philosophers trying to find one, nor scientists from surreptitiously appealing to one in order to give content to determinism whenever they stray into this area.

And, that is where the anthropomorphism sneaks in.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


Well there certainly has been a tradition in physics since Galileo and perhaps since Pythagoras of modelling things in terms of numbers. Why?

Well, it goes back well before Galileo, and as you no doubt know, these theorists were Pythagorean/Platonists or Christian Platonists, who thought that 'god' had ordered the world using mathematics -- so it is no surprise to me that this view of mathematics still dominates science (even if 'god' has been edited out in many cases). But that does not mean we have to go along with this 'modified' Platonism.

The point is that mathematics embodies rules we use to help is make sense of the world and of the (often market) relations we have with one another.

And that is why mathematical objects cannot be given a physical correlate.


This is what Wigner was asking in his article {The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences} and he answers
it in terms of the time and space invariance of the laws of physics which allows them to be economically modelled in
numerical terms.

I think it is because the symbolic manipulation of numbers was the most flexible modelling technology available from the enlightenment until very recently. It allowed one physical system :

1. let us say Lagrange, a couple of assistants, a supply of paper and pencils, some formulae or rules of calculation and some astronomical observations recorded in a ledger to simulate a second physical system.

2. the earth, the sun, venus and a telescope mounted on the earth outside Paris.

The system 1 simulates the evolution of system 2, and the use of symbolic maths is part of the technology used. One could also in principle have constructed a highly precise Orrery and got good results, and were one to have done so the intuitive psychological understanding we would have got of what goes on in the system 2 would in turn have been influenced by our technology of modelling : the references to Newtons 'clockwork universe' come from the use of Orrerys. But of course this long preceeds Newton, there is plausible argument that the Antikera device was an Orrery, perhaps from the school of Archimedes or from Alexandria.

Because we use numerical methods in our formulation of physical models, our psychological understanding of physical processes is very much influenced by the modelling technology. You say that there are no non mathematical formulations of physical fields. I dont think this is true. Consider the visualisation or model of the gravitational field around a black hole that is often given in popular accounts: a parabolic trumpet pointing upwards down which a ball rolls in spiral path like the ones used for pennies by the
lifeboat charity. Here we use a physical visualisation of the field as a curved surface.

Symbolic mathematics has remained the most popular modelling tool in physics for a long time because of its great flexibility. A person with a pencil and paper, or more recently a general purpose computer, can , given the appropriate algorithm, model a wide variety of physical systems. If we believe the strong version of the Church Turing hypothesis ( which I do) then it is computationally universal, and can in principle be used to model any physical system. But as Feynman pointed out( Simulating physics with computers, in R. P. Hey, A. (ed.) Feynman and computation: exploring the limits of computers, Perseus Books, 1999, 133-153) the use of symbolic numerical methods breaks down when handling even quite small quantum systems because of an exponential growth in complexity. For these systems some form of analogue quantum modelling may well be necessary see (Buluta, I. & Nori, F., Quantum Simulators, Science, AAAS, 2009, 326, 108).

If we have to resort to this it will be come even harder to develop psychologically satisfying visualisations or understandings.

Well, I do not disagree with much of this, but I fail to see how it helps, or how it is in any way a reply to my OP.

[Paul Cockshott]

I got that, but this does not affect the things I have said. You seem to believe that every child (in modern Britain) only uses this word when he/she has played around with magnets first, and that in every case he/she does this before they feel their first emotional or sexual impulse toward another human being. Not only is this implausible, I can't think how you might substantiate it.

One on-line etymological dictionary traces the origin of this word thus:

Quote:
1530s, from Fr. attraction, from L. attractionem (nom. attractio) "a drawing together," noun of action from attractus, pp. of attrahere (see attract). Originally a medical word, "absorption by the body;" meaning "action of drawing to" is from 1540s (again medical); extended to magnetic, then figuratively to personal (1608) qualities. Meaning "a thing which draws a crowd, interesting or amusing exhibition" is from 1829, a sense that developed in Eng. and soon transfered to the Fr. equivalent of the word.
You seem to be undermining yourself here. The citations give scientific uses first: medical, then magnetic, and only afterwards by extension to personal qualities.

I am not saying that children will not have experienced favourable emotions towards others, but only that they will not have conceptualised this in terms of the word attraction.

[Paul Cockshott]

you will no doubt see that the word originally derives not from magnets, but from the relation human beings and/or human bodies have with the world, as I alleged in my OP. Thus is not surprising, since, as I also alleged, language is primarily a form or communication between human beings, not a form of representation (of the world).

Well it was pretty obvious that it was derived from trahere and related to pulling, But your etymology research brings out that it was originally a technical medical word -- a neologism using latin, the language of the educated. It then spread to general metaphorical use.

I have no problem with saying that the notion of pulling predates the word attraction. People have been pulling on ropes for a long time. Spiders have been doing it even longer. My objection was to claim that the scientific notion of attractive forces derived from interpersonal relationships. If you say it derived from the practice of pulling on ropes, I would have no objection.

[Paul Cockshott]

Well, I do not disagree with much of this, but I fail to see how it helps, or how it is in any way a reply to my OP.

It was a reply to your remark that fields were a reification of mathematics. My view is the reverse. Fields are real, and the mathematical notion of a field is a derived technology to allow us to calculate about physical fields and thus to make predictions.

[Paul Cockshott]

And that is why mathematical objects cannot be given a physical correlate.

I disagree. Mathematical objects such as numbers are always embodied in counting technologies: abacusses, numerals, computer registers. These exist physically and can be put into correlation with other physical systems. Look at Ifrah's book From One to Zero on the proto-sumerian number system and its evolution from physical tokens, or for that matter Wrandall Wrays work on tally systems as the basis for money.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


You seem to be undermining yourself here. The citations give scientific uses first: medical, then magnetic, and only afterwards by extension to personal qualities.

No, it is quite clear that the Latin is based on what human beings can do. [The medical meaning is based on what human beings do, too.] My OP, and my third post, alleged that these verbs originate in this way:


But, this is to take concepts that properly apply to what we do and can decide, and then impose them on natural events, suggesting that nature is controlled by a cosmic will of some sort.

Language, originally the result of collective labour and developed as a means of communication, is not too good at representing things. In order to try to do so, theorists found they had to take words which express the relations human beings have with one another and with nature and then apply them to the relations that exist in nature itself. Unless great care is taken, these words will carry with them the inter-human connotations they possess in their ordinary use. Alas, traditional theorists were recklessly careless.

Bold added.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575116&postcount=1

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1575328&postcount=6

I did not specify the order in which these have to occur, since we can never know, but they certainly originate in what humans beings do -- since language is based on collective labour, not individual speculation.


Well it was pretty obvious that it was derived from trahere and related to pulling, But your etymology research brings out that it was originally a technical medical word -- a neologism using latin, the language of the educated. It then spread to general metaphorical use.

Which is, indeed, what I said in my OP.


I am not saying that children will not have experienced favourable emotions towards others, but only that they will not have conceptualised this in terms of the word attraction.

Which, they will be able to understand from their familiarity with words connected with what they can draw to themselves, as the Latin root word suggests.


I have no problem with saying that the notion of pulling predates the word attraction. People have been pulling on ropes for a long time. Spiders have been doing it even longer. My objection was to claim that the scientific notion of attractive forces derived from interpersonal relationships. If you say it derived from the practice of pulling on ropes, I would have no objection.

Well, this is implied by my original post -- see above. But pulling on ropes is not the only way that human being pull things. They typically use their arms -- to pull food, toys, etc. to themselves.

Sure spiders and other animals pull things, but that also suggests that these verbs originate in the efforts of agents to do things in the world around them. Extending them to inanimate nature itself, as I said, requires due care, and traditional theorists were reckless in this regard, animating nature at every turn.


It was a reply to your remark that fields were a reification of mathematics. My view is the reverse. Fields are real, and the mathematical notion of a field is a derived technology to allow us to calculate about physical fields and thus to make predictions.

Well, if fields are real, what are they made of? What physical form do they take?


I disagree. Mathematical objects such as numbers are always embodied in counting technologies: abacusses, numerals, computer registers. These exist physically and can be put into correlation with other physical systems. Look at Ifrah's book From One to Zero on the proto-sumerian number system and its evolution from physical tokens, or for that matter Wrandall Wrays work on tally systems as the basis for money.

Well, nothing I have said is inconsistent with this, and I am at a loss as to why you might think so.

But, I am also at a loss as to why you think this negated what I said:


And that is why mathematical objects cannot be given a physical correlate.

Have you read Frege on this? I'm sure you must have. Numbers are either the mark of concept expressions (so that we may say how many objects fall under a certain concept), or the index if an operation (to paraphrase Wittgenstein), connected with counting, etc.

We certainly use them in the way you suggest, but they do not populate the world like tables and chairs do. There is no physics of numbers, nor could there be.

Finally, you needn't post three or four replies to each of my posts -- as I noted earlier, to stop you losing posts:


Write your reply in word first (and save it), then post it here; it's what I do.

[Lord Hargreaves]

So, it is my contention that this 'problem' has only arisen because ideologically-motivated theorists (from centuries ago) asked such empty questions, based on a misuse of language.

But surely the error you are describing here is inherent to language (and you seem to say this yourself). Therefore I don't see how you can so strongly blame "ideologically motivated" people for the error, as if they alone manufactured it and set about fooling the rest of us. That is surely the wrong impression to give

I don't see the link between the natural tendency of language to anthropomorphize (because language is human and not purely transcendental: surely that is all that is needed for an explanation?) and the fault of this somehow lying with the ruling class, entailing the necessity for working class struggle against capitalism. In fact the two things seem completely and utterly unrelated.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


But surely the error you are describing here is inherent to language (and you seem to say this yourself). Therefore I don't see how you can so strongly blame "ideologically motivated" people for the error, as if they alone manufactured it and set about fooling the rest of us. That is surely the wrong impression to give

I do not think this is 'inherent' in language, and I'd like to see a proof to the contrary.


I don't see the link between the natural tendency of language to anthropomorphize (because language is human and not purely transcendental: surely that is all that is needed for an explanation?) and the fault of this somehow lying with the ruling class, entailing the necessity for working class struggle against capitalism. In fact the two things seem completely and utterly unrelated.

Well, you haven't read my extended explanation of this link. After all, I did say this in my OP:


Ok, here is my summary [of my ideas on 'determinism'], but comrades should not expect a water-tight solution to such a knotty problem in a few paragraphs. I am only posting this because I was asked to do so.

You will, however, find an explanation at my site --, but, since I know you have an aversion to reading my essays, I have outlined my ideas on this in several places already at RevLeft:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1349779&postcount=2

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1378013&postcount=1

But, once more, do not expect a PhD level explanation in the above; that can be found at my site.

And, finally, language does not have a 'natural tendency to anthropomorphise' since language cannot do anything. Certainly, superstitious people might have a tendency to animate nature, as might theists, traditional philosophers, and some scientists, but this is not inherent in language since for every anthropomorphic sentence you can think of, there exists its negation. That is why we can say such things as "The planets are not pushed around by angels", "The Sun does not attract the earth", "The mind is not 'determined'", and so on.

That, of course, is why we have the negative particle.

[Lord Hargreaves]

Yes, well, I'm obviously not knowledgable on this, but I can't say I agree with you. I don't think it is something any of us can avoid, and so I don't think we can be saved by a return to "ordinary language" (because I don't think such a thing exists).

So, for me at least, it would either be an internal problem inside language itself (language is anthropomorphic because it is human language, which seems to me a far more plausible idea that what you seem to suggest - it would be an instance of Nietzschean perspectivism etc.) or it would be a historical problem, where language is reified because human society is reified (a more straightfowardly Hegelian-Marxist idea). Or, perhaps, some combination of the two

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Yes, well, I'm obviously not knowledgeable on this, but I can't say I agree with you. I don't think it is something any of us can avoid, and so I don't think we can be saved by a return to "ordinary language" (because I don't think such a thing exists).

So, for me at least, it would either be an internal problem inside language itself (language is anthropomorphic because it is human language, which seems to me a far more plausible idea that what you seem to suggest - it would be an instance of Nietzschean perspectivism etc.) or it would be a historical problem, where language is reified because human society is reified (a more straightfowardly Hegelian-Marxist idea). Or, perhaps, some combination of the two

Let me ask: Is your post written in ordinary language (give or take a few technical terms)? If so, then your argument self-destructs. If not, then it must be some specialised language, and we will need a translation manual so we might understand you. But, that translation manual itself must allow us to translate what you have to say into ordinary language, or what you have to say will remain incomprehensible.

Either way, your argument self-destructs.

And: whatever you allege about ordinary language, or indeed any language, can be negated, indicating, once again, that whatever you say, or whatever anyone says, is not inherently anthropomorphic.

As Marx noted:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

So, Marx would not have denied the existence of ordinary language.

Seems to me that you need to 'dissolve' some of your language into ordinary language, too.

[SocialismOrBarbarism]

Reminds me of this:


History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity. This can be speculatively distorted so that later history is made the goal of earlier history, e.g. the goal ascribed to the discovery of America is to further the eruption of the French Revolution. Thereby history receives its own special aims and becomes “a person rating with other persons” (to wit: “Self-Consciousness, Criticism, the Unique,” etc.), while what is designated with the words “destiny,” “goal,” “germ,” or “idea” of earlier history is nothing more than an abstraction formed from later history, from the active influence which earlier history exercises on later history.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that; it shows that Marx also thought along lines similar to me.

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul:



No, it is quite clear that the Latin is based on what human beings can do. [The medical meaning is based on what human beings do, too.] My OP, and my third post, alleged that these verbs originate in this way:




Well your quotes from dictionaries indicate that the Latin usage related to drawing, pulling on ropes or harnesses:
the Latin word attractus (attraction, drawing to; drawn together, knit) derived from the Latin word attrahere (attract, draw, drag together) derived from the Classical Latin word trahere (to draw; draw, drag, haul) using the Latin prefix ad- (to, in addition)
derived from the Latin word ad (to; near; to; to; to; near)

This is something that both people and draft animals did. But if I pull on a rope, why does it not simply part?

It holds under tension because of the electrostatic attraction of the molecules in the rope.
So whilst at a macroscopic level we are drawing on a rope, at a microscopic level it is the electrostatic field
that allows the tension to be transmitted. So the electrostatic field is the deeper reality that
allows the everyday practice of pulling to which we are familiar to work.

I would still contend that whether in English its first usage was in medical science to refer to the absorbtion of nutrients or to the operation of magnets, the current understanding that people gain of it as children comes from playing with magnetic toys, which kids get at a very early age.
You can not get a toy trainset for a toddler now without magnetic couplings.





I did not specify the order in which these have to occur, since we can never know, but they certainly originate in what humans beings do -- since language is based on collective labour, not individual speculation.


Those are not the only two alternatives. The technical language of science, which now permeates everyday usage, arises neither from everyday human activity nor from individual speculation. It clearly arises from a form of human activity rather than the activity of sea urchins, but it does not refer to mundane labour activities.







Well, if fields are real, what are they made of? What physical form do they take?


This is a rather silly question. If I say what is the Forth Bridge made of you can reply that it is made of steel. But why is the steel apparently solid?
It is because of the electrostatic field of the atoms. You are asking a question at the wrong level. It is fields that make up all of what we see. If you see light, you are seeing field oscillations.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


Well your quotes from dictionaries indicate that the Latin usage related to drawing, pulling on ropes or harnesses:
the Latin word attractus (attraction, drawing to; drawn together, knit) derived from the Latin word attrahere (attract, draw, drag together) derived from the Classical Latin word trahere (to draw; draw, drag, haul) using the Latin prefix ad- (to, in addition)
derived from the Latin word ad (to; near; to; to; to; near)

Indeed, which is what I maintained: that these verbs are related to what we (or other agents) do in the world.


This is something that both people and draft animals did. But if I pull on a rope, why does it not simply part?

It holds under tension because of the electrostatic attraction of the molecules in the rope.
So whilst at a macroscopic level we are drawing on a rope, at a microscopic level it is the electrostatic field
that allows the tension to be transmitted. So the electrostatic field is the deeper reality that
allows the everyday practice of pulling to which we are familiar to work.

Indeed, once more, but to give content to the capacity of such fields to do this, that is, if you try to go beyond mere decryption of what they in fact do, then you will have to re-introduce these everyday terms, and in doing that, they would become anthropomorphic.

So, if you answer your own question (and tell us how and why fields can do this -- when they lack tensile strength themselves) -- going beyond mere description --, then you will be have to anthropomorphise nature.

We thrashed this out at length and in some detail in a thread in the Science section on forces:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/true-concept-force-t109485/index.html


I would still contend that whether in English its first usage was in medical science to refer to the absorption of nutrients or to the operation of magnets, the current understanding that people gain of it as children comes from playing with magnetic toys, which kids get at a very early age.
You can not get a toy train set for a toddler now without magnetic couplings.

Well, this is a substantive thesis in learning theory, which is implausible to begin with -- since it seems to work on the assumption that children do not pull things (and thus learn from this) very early on in life. Since all children do the latter, but only a tiny minority play with trains and/or magnets, I think I know where my money lies.


Those are not the only two alternatives. The technical language of science, which now permeates everyday usage, arises neither from everyday human activity nor from individual speculation. It clearly arises from a form of human activity rather than the activity of sea urchins, but it does not refer to mundane labour activities.

I agree, but ordinary language has not been affected by this, just augmented.

Moreover, in order to give content to this new terminology from the sciences (as I briefly illustrated above in relation to that rope and your explanation of its cohesion), ordinary verbs drawn from what we do will have to be used.

Once more, if science remains at the purely descriptive stage, no problem -- you and I see eye-to-eye. Problems only surface when theorists try to go beyond this, in order, for example to give content to determinism.


This is a rather silly question. If I say what is the Forth Bridge made of you can reply that it is made of steel. But why is the steel apparently solid?

No it's not a 'silly question'. If the field is real, and interacts with material bodies, then it must have a physical form of some sort. If not, then it is just a 'useful fiction'. No one thought it was 'silly' to ask what the Ether was made of 150 years ago -- and the field is just a modern form of the Ether.


But why is the steel apparently solid?

Well, and once more, in order for you to explain why it is 'apparently' solid, you are going to have to use verbs taken from human activity again (such as 'resist' and 'penetrate'). Without these, you would not be able to explain 'solidity'.


It is because of the electrostatic field of the atoms. You are asking a question at the wrong level. It is fields that make up all of what we see. If you see light, you are seeing field oscillations.

No, the human eye is not sensitive enough to see light waves. If it were, then the controversy between wave theorists and corpuscularians between say 1700 and 1900 would never have happened, since we would all be able to see that light is a wave, etc.


It is because of the electrostatic field of the atoms. You are asking a question at the wrong level. It is fields that make up all of what we see.

Again, you will find you have to anthropomorphise the brain and the eye to make this work.

But, let us assume that the field is real (in whatever sense you want to give to that word), then it would just become B in my OP. In that case, you would still not be able to explain why a certain field produced effect A as opposed to C without using verbs drawn from what human beings (or other agents) can do -- that is if you want to go beyond mere description. And that will land you in the anthropomorphic mire, once again.

Which is what I alleged in my OP.

[Calmwinds]

Rosa do you consider sociobology a valid field. and do you consider society to be an accurate reflection of biology? (That would be a reference to Gould).

Also what is your view on digital physics? The modern 'monads' so to speak.



The ideology these days underlying such scientistic theories involve somewhat similar reasoning: nature and society are the way they are and you can do nothing about it, and that includes oppression, exploitation, racism and sexism. It's in our genes, and we are all 'determined' by our somatic and genetic inheritance. You can't argue with science, so don't even try. Just doff your cap and get back to work. You should be grateful for a job...

This is very interesting, because the very ideology you say leads people to think this is what led me to revolutionary socialism. It was that if this is the way it is, it is not good enough, and we need to further control nature to bring this into line. My actual views on determinism are largely with respect to biology,psychology, and psychometrics. But I do not think this view would necessarily lead to conservatism (You did not say this, but I think this is what you imply).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Calmwinds:


Rosa do you consider sociobology a valid field. and do you consider society to be an accurate reflection of biology? (That would be a reference to Gould).

I agree with Gould on this.


Also what is your view on digital physics? The modern 'monads' so to speak.

This branch of Physics is clearly based on an overworked series of metaphors:


In physics and cosmology, digital physics is a collection of theoretical perspectives that start by assuming that the universe is, at heart, describable by information, and is therefore computable. Given such assumptions, the universe can be conceived as either the output of some computer program or as being some sort of vast digital computation device (or, at least, mathematically isomorphic to such a device).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_physics

You:


This is very interesting, because the very ideology you say leads people to think this is what led me to revolutionary socialism. It was that if this is the way it is, it is not good enough, and we need to further control nature to bring this into line. My actual views on determinism are largely with respect to biology,psychology, and psychometrics. But I do not think this view would necessarily lead to conservatism (You did not say this, but I think this is what you imply).

Not necessarily 'conservatism', since there are times when this ideology can be recruited to revolutionary change.

And, I am not against control, but it is we who control nature, not the other way round (as determinism would have us believe).

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul:

Indeed, once more, but to give content to the capacity of such fields to do this, that is, if you try to go beyond mere decryption of what they in fact do, then you will have to re-introduce these everyday terms, and in doing that, they would become anthropomorphic.

So, if you answer your own question (and tell us how and why fields can do this -- when they lack tensile strength themselves) -- going beyond mere description --, then you will be have to anthropomorphise nature.

What does Rosa mean here by giving content to the capacity of fields?

There are two possible meanings that I can see, she can correct me if neither of these are what she means:

1. We give content to a field in a pedagogic sense, using pictures and metaphors to allow a person to understand them in terms of conceptual categories they already have. When introducing an idea it is helpfull to give a rich metaphorical texture to help people understand it.

2. We might give content to to the idea of a field by developing a deeper physics which explains fields in terms of some underlying reality : a property of the geometry of space ( general relativity, string theory, spinors etc), or in terms of some sort of particle interactions.

Which of these is meant by the request?bas

It is also not clear that it is correct to say that fields lack tensile strength, for two reasons

1. because materials that have tensile strength derive it from low level electrostatic interactions

2. because it is by no means clear that magnetic fields do lack tensile strength. One measures tensile strength in terms of the work that has to be done to stretch something. Work has to be done to distort magnetic field lines, and distortions of the magnetic field can in this way store large quantities of energy that are released when the field relaxes : for instance in a solar flare.








Well, this is a substantive thesis in learning theory, which is implausible to begin with -- since it seems to work on the assumption that children do not pull things (and thus learn from this) very early on in life. Since all children do the latter, but only a tiny minority play with trains and/or magnets, I think I know where my money lies.
This thesis that children learn to pull things before they learn about magnets, it is both weakeer and more plausible than the original one advanced : that children learn the word attractiion in the context of personal relations before they hear it in the context magnets. I would agree that children pull things other than magnets first, but do they learn to label this 'attraction' or simply 'pulling'. Pulling of course is not just a human activity, steam engines pull trains, dogs pull on sticks.

It is not clear that our understanding of the world should accord a special place to human activity, or to use another term that was in a previous post 'animate' versus inanimate processes. The categorisation animate versus inanimate seems to be a hangover from classical philosophy.





No it's not a 'silly question'. If the field is real, and interacts with material bodies, then it must have a physical form of some sort. If not, then it is just a 'useful fiction'. No one thought it was 'silly' to ask what the Ether was made of 150 years ago -- and the field is just a modern form of the Ether.


The reason it is silly is that we now know that there is no ether. The thought that there was an ether arose from the same sort of desire for a 'substance' to underly electromagnetic fields that Rosa still seems to have. Any substance underlying the fields would run into the same sort of problems with the relativity of motion as the ether did.



Well, and once more, in order for you to explain why it is 'apparently' solid, you are going to have to use verbs taken from human activity again (such as 'resist' and 'penetrate'). Without these, you would not be able to explain 'solidity'.

The concept of solid is given meaning by opposition to gas or liquid. A solid retains its shape in the presence of external force, a liquid does not. Solid objects can not inter penetrate. But all this is a macroscopic process. At a micro level Compton's scattering experiments indicated that solids are made up of atoms which are not themselves solid, sufficiently small particles can pass right through them.

Just because pressure applied by humans is one thing that a solid may resist does not mean that resistance is an anthropocentric concept at all. A tree branch may resist pressure I apply to it, but it also resists pressure applied by the wind, or resists the force applied by gravity. I find the constant special emphasis on
human activity as something special and distinctive strange from somebody arguing against anthropocentrism.



No, the human eye is not sensitive enough to see light waves. If it were, then the controversy between wave theorists and corpuscularians between say 1700 and 1900 would never have happened, since we would all be able to see that light is a wave, etc.

Whether the human eye does see light waves, and whether investigators understood that was what it was seeing are two distinct questions.
Once you understand the wave theory you soon start noticing interference fringes in the imperfections of ones vision, or on the sriations of gramophone record or CD.
It is only when you know what to look at that it is evident that what the eye is seeing is actually light waves, but if the underlying structure of reality were directly visible there would be no need for science.




But, let us assume that the field is real (in whatever sense you want to give to that word), then it would just become B in my OP. In that case, you would still not be able to explain why a certain field produced effect A as opposed to C without using verbs drawn from what human beings (or other agents) can do -- that is if you want to go beyond mere description. And that will land you in the anthropomorphic mire, once again.

Which is what I alleged in my OP.

Well you may call this mere description, I think most scientists would say it was explanation.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul, are you debating with me, or an audience of yours? If the former, why keep saying things like this:


What does Rosa mean here by giving content to the capacity of fields?

If you are debating with me, then this would be more appropriate:


What do you mean here by giving content to the capacity of fields?

Paul:


There are two possible meanings that I can see, she can correct me if neither of these are what she means:

1. We give content to a field in a pedagogic sense, using pictures and metaphors to allow a person to understand them in terms of conceptual categories they already have. When introducing an idea it is helpful to give a rich metaphorical texture to help people understand it.

2. We might give content to the idea of a field by developing a deeper physics which explains fields in terms of some underlying reality : a property of the geometry of space ( general relativity, string theory, spinors etc), or in terms of some sort of particle interactions.

In fact, I have already indicated what I mean by this (in my OP, which I do not now think you read with due care and attention):


When the details are worked out, 'determinism', for instance, can only be made to seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised, so that such things as 'natural law' 'determine' the course of events -- both in reality in general and in the central nervous system in particular -- thus 'controlling' what we do.

But, this is to take concepts that properly apply to what we do and can decide, and then impose them on natural events, suggesting that nature is controlled by a cosmic will of some sort. [Why this is so, I will outline presently.]

So, it's natural to ask: Where is this law written, and who passed it?

Of course, the answer to these questions is "No one" and "Nowhere", but then how can something that does not exist control anything?

It could be responded that natural law is just a summary of how things have so far gone up to now. In that case, such 'laws' are descriptive not prescriptive -- but it is the latter of these implications that determinists need.

Now, the introduction of modal notions here (such as 'must', or 'necessary') cannot be justified from this descriptive nature of 'law' without re-introducing the untoward anthropomorphic connotations mentioned above.

So, if we say that A has always followed B, we cannot now say A must follow B unless we attribute to B some form of control over A (and recall A has not yet happened, so what B is supposed to be controlling is somewhat obscure). And if we now try to say what we mean by 'control' (on lines such as 'could not be otherwise', or 'B made A happen') we need to explain how B prevented, say, C happening instead, and made sure that A, and only A took place.

The use of "obey" here would give the game away, since if this word is used with connotations that go beyond mere description, then this will imply that events like A understand the 'law' (like so many good citizens), and always do the same when B beckons, right across the entire universe --, and, indeed, that this 'law' must exist in some form to make things obey it. Of course, if it doesn't mean this, then what does it mean?

Now, I maintain that any attempt to fill in the details here will introduce notions of will and intelligence into the operation of B on A (and also on C) -- and that is why theorists have found they have had to drag in anthropomorphic concepts here (such as 'determine', 'obey' 'law' and 'control') to fill this gap, failing to note that the use of such words does indeed imply there is a will of some sort operating in nature.

If this is denied then 'determine' (etc.) can only be working descriptively, and we are back at square one.

Incidentally, the above problems are not to be avoided by the introduction of biochemical, neurological, and/or physiological objects and processes. The same questions apply here as elsewhere: how can, for example, a certain chemical 'control' what happens next unless it is intelligent in some way? Reducing this to physics is even worse; how can 'the field' (or whatever) control the future? 'The field' is a mathematical object and no more capable of controlling anything than a Hermite polynomial is. Of course, and once more, to argue otherwise would be to anthropomorphise such things -- which is why I made the argument above abstract, since it covers all bases.

This also explains why theorists (and particularly scientists who try to popularise their work) find they have to use 'scare quotes' and metaphor everywhere in this area.

So, I am not concerned with the physics here, but with attempts made to recruit aspects of physics to give support to determinism, which is what this thread is about.


Which of these is meant by the request?

It is also not clear that it is correct to say that fields lack tensile strength, for two reasons

1. because materials that have tensile strength derive it from low level electrostatic interactions

2. because it is by no means clear that magnetic fields do lack tensile strength. One measures tensile strength in terms of the work that has to be done to stretch something. Work has to be done to distort magnetic field lines, and distortions of the magnetic field can in this way store large quantities of energy that are released when the field relaxes : for instance in a solar flare.

Fine, but then the field in this case must have a physical meaning -- but what is it? Indeed, one might wonder how something can be 'distorted' if it has no physical nature. And this word ("distort") is yet another verb drawn from ordinary language, but which possesses anthropomorphic connotations of its own if used unwisely. Unless, that is, you mean this in a technical sense, that is, as 'mathematical distortion'. But that has no physical meaning. So, we are no further forward.


This thesis that children learn to pull things before they learn about magnets, it is both weaker and more plausible than the original one advanced : that children learn the word attraction in the context of personal relations before they hear it in the context magnets. I would agree that children pull things other than magnets first, but do they learn to label this 'attraction' or simply 'pulling'. Pulling of course is not just a human activity, steam engines pull trains, dogs pull on sticks.

Well, my original explanation still stands, since I alleged that these verbs have their original home in interpersonal relations and in relations we have with the world (or in those that other agents have with the world). It seems to me more plausible that children learn the content of this word in their relation to their own activity in the world, and in their inter-personal relationships. Children certainly find others attractive long before they encounter magnets. I know I did before I was six. And by that I do not mean 'sexually attractive', either. This is certainly more believable than to suppose that they learn this from model trains and magnets. The verb 'to attract' was in common currency long before even a small proportion of the population had ever encountered magnets, or toy trains.


It is not clear that our understanding of the world should accord a special place to human activity, or to use another term that was in a previous post 'animate' versus inanimate processes. The categorisation animate versus inanimate seems to be a hangover from classical philosophy

Of course it will accord a special place for human activity (especially for Marxists) -- that is, if you believe that language arose out of collective labour -- i.e., out of our relation with the world and with one another.

This, of course, explains why nature was animated and anthropomorphised in 'primitive societies'.

It also explains why theorists have to use such metaphors to give content to determinism, etc.


The reason it is silly is that we now know that there is no ether. The thought that there was an ether arose from the same sort of desire for a 'substance' to underlie electromagnetic fields that Rosa still seems to have. Any substance underlying the fields would run into the same sort of problems with the relativity of motion as the ether did.

In fact, we 'know' no such thing. Here is what Paul Dirac thought:


"By 1951, however, we find an eminent physicist, P. A. M. Dirac, having to argue in the journal Nature (168:906-7) that although Einstein's 1905 principle of relativity led, reasonably enough, to the ether's generally being abandoned, with the new quantum electrodynamics we may be, after all, 'rather forced to have an aether'" [Cantor and Hodge (1981), p.ix.]

Cantor, G., and Hodge, M. (1981) (eds.), Conceptions Of Ether. Studies In The History Of Ether Theories, 1740-1900 (Cambridge University Press).

And, even Einstein continued to believe in the ether; on that see:

Kostro, L. (2000), Einstein And The Ether (Apeiron Books).

http://redshift.vif.com/BookBlurbs/einsteinether.htm

Max Jammer (if you know who he is) said this of Kostro's book:


Einstein, as Kostro shows in great detail, acknowledged only three kinds of ether. But what Einstein called “ether” is no longer a rarefied material medium that permeates all space, but rather the much more abstract geometrodynamic constituent of spacetime which determines the inertio-gravitational behavior of matter… We must be indebted to Professor Kostro for having devoted himself to study in such detail this facet of Einstein’s work and for drawing our attention to this generally unknown chapter in the scientific biography of the man whom the periodical Time recently named "Person of the Century."

See also:

Granek, G. (2001), 'Einstein's Ether. Why Did Einstein Come Back To The Ether?', Apeiron 8, 3. A PDF of this article is available here (http://redshift.vif.com/JournalFiles/V08NO3PDF/V08N3GRF.PDF).

And:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Einstein_aether_theory

http://xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/gr-qc/pdf/0410/0410001v2.pdf

Here is Einstein's famous 'Ether Speech':

http://www.tu-harburg.de/rzt/rzt/it/Ether.html

where he say this:


Recapitulating, [B]we may say that according to the general theory of relativity space is endowed with physical qualities; in this sense, therefore, there exists an ether. According to the general theory of relativity space without ether is unthinkable; for in such space there not only would be no propagation of light, but also no possibility of existence for standards of space and time (measuring-rods and clocks), nor therefore any space-time intervals in the physical sense. But this ether may not be thought of as endowed with the quality characteristic of ponderable media, as consisting of parts which may be tracked through time. The idea of motion may not be applied to it.

Bold added.

Even the New Scientist is getting in on the act; speaking about research into 'Dark Energy', it had this to say:


"Unfortunately, physicists are having trouble finding a way to fit a cosmological constant into their best existing theories. 'A small non-zero dark energy is more difficult to explain than zero,' says Sean Carroll, a cosmologist from the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena. 'So we are driven to wilder ideas.'

"One of those wild ideas is quintessence, which postulates the existence of a hitherto unsuspected quantum field permeating the universe.... Because this implies that there would also be a new fundamental force of nature, the idea set some physicists thinking: instead of adding a new force, why not modify an old one? Perhaps there are unexpected properties of gravity that appear over gargantuan distances that Einstein's general relativity does not predict....

"By giving us detailed measurements of the acceleration of different parts of the universe, the next generation of surveys could reveal the nature of the dominant component of the universe. Whatever it turns out to be, it will be big news. 'Dark energy could be the ether of the 21st century,' says Carroll. Even if we explain it away, we will learn something profound about the universe.

"It is a viewpoint shared by cosmologists everywhere. 'We are definitely seeing something extra in the universe, we just do not know how to interpret it yet,' says [Ofer Lahav of University College London]. And that has given cosmologists a new sense of purpose. A seismic shift in our understanding of the universe is coming. How soon it will arrive and from what direction it will come -- that's still anyone's guess." [Clark (2007), pp.31-33. Bold emphasis added.]

Clark, S. (2007), 'Heart Of Darkness', New Scientist 193, 2591, pp.28-33.

So, my question still stands: what is the field made out of? If nothing, then how is it different from nothing -- or, at least, from a 'useful fiction'?

Paul, still addressing his 'audience':


The reason it is silly is that we now know that there is no ether. The thought that there was an ether arose from the same sort of desire for a 'substance' to underlie electromagnetic fields that Rosa still seems to have. Any substance underlying the fields would run into the same sort of problems with the relativity of motion as the ether did.

I do not 'desire' this; it seems to me that what you have to say about the field requires this. So, the fault, if such it is, lies with you, not me.


The concept of solid is given meaning by opposition to gas or liquid. A solid retains its shape in the presence of external force, a liquid does not. Solid objects can not inter penetrate. But all this is a macroscopic process. At a micro level Compton's scattering experiments indicated that solids are made up of atoms which are not themselves solid, sufficiently small particles can pass right through them.

And while this remains in the descriptive mode, there is no problem with this. But as soon as you stray into explaining how and why solids have these properties, you necessarily introduce these untoward verbs again; such as:


Solid objects can not inter penetrate.

The significance of this verb should not be lost on male comrades.

But, then you say this:


At a micro level Compton's scattering experiments indicated that solids are made up of atoms which are not themselves solid, sufficiently small particles can pass right through them

Often they do, but sometimes they do not, and to explain why that happens, you will have to use verbs like 'inter-penetrate' again. And this will still happen even if you translate this into the language of forces and the field.


Just because pressure applied by humans is one thing that a solid may resist does not mean that resistance is an anthropocentric concept at all. A tree branch may resist pressure I apply to it, but it also resists pressure applied by the wind, or resists the force applied by gravity. I find the constant special emphasis on
human activity as something special and distinctive strange from somebody arguing against anthropocentrism

I agree, and that is what I said in my OP; but, when you pass from the descriptive mode into an explanatory or prescriptive mode, that is where these connotations emerge once more. This was covered by this comment in my OP:


So, if we say that A has always followed B, we cannot now say A must follow B unless we attribute to B some form of control over A (and recall A has not yet happened, so what B is supposed to be controlling is somewhat obscure). And if we now try to say what we mean by 'control' (on lines such as 'could not be otherwise', or 'B made A happen') we need to explain how B prevented, say, C happening instead, and made sure that A, and only A took place.

The use of "obey" here would give the game away, since if this word is used with connotations that go beyond mere description, then this will imply that events like A understand the 'law' (like so many good citizens), and always do the same when B beckons, right across the entire universe --, and, indeed, that this 'law' must exist in some form to make things obey it. Of course, if it doesn't mean this, then what does it mean?

Now, I maintain that any attempt to fill in the details here will introduce notions of will and intelligence into the operation of B on A (and also on C) -- and that is why theorists have found they have had to drag in anthropomorphic concepts here (such as 'determine', 'obey' 'law' and 'control') to fill this gap, failing to note that the use of such words does indeed imply there is a will of some sort operating in nature.

And I have already covered your 'special emphasis' point. You must also know that in the ancient past (and among 'primitive tribes' today) the action of the wind was (is) attributed to the action of invisible agents.

Paul:


Whether the human eye does see light waves, and whether investigators understood that was what it was seeing are two distinct questions.

Then you need to be clear about what you mean be 'see', which you weren't as far as I could see (no pun intended).


Once you understand the wave theory you soon start noticing interference fringes in the imperfections of ones vision, or on the striations of gramophone record or CD. It is only when you know what to look at that it is evident that what the eye is seeing is actually light waves, .

Well, you must be using 'see' in a new and unspecified sense, since not even you can see light waves!

However, we certainly see by means of them.


but if the underlying structure of reality were directly visible there would be no need for science

Indeed, but then scientists cannot tell us what ordinary words 'really' mean; they are no more expert in the use of language than is any other competent user. They may be able to reveal to us the causal concomitants of sight, but they cannot tell us what we see. Unless, once more, they mean 'see' in a special sense; but, in that case, what they have to tell us will not relate to what we see, but to what we 'see', and the nature of what we see will remain unaffected.


Well you may call this mere description, I think most scientists would say it was explanation.

To a certain extent I agree, but when it comes to telling us why B made A happen as opposed to C, then they cannot explain nature.

And this is for reasons I outlined in my first three posts in this thread.

[Hit The North]

and do you consider society to be an accurate reflection of biology? (That would be a reference to Gould).



What does it mean to say that society is an "accurate reflection of biology"?

That sounds like you're arguing that society can be explained by the biological constitution of human beings; implying that human society follows innate behavioural patterns or instincts hard-wired into individual human beings. So hierarchy and inequality is somehow part of human nature?

[Paul Cockshott]

When the details are worked out, 'determinism', for instance, can only be made to seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised, so that such things as 'natural law' 'determine' the course of events -- both in reality in general and in the central nervous system in particular -- thus 'controlling' what we do.

But, this is to take concepts that properly apply to what we do and can decide, and then impose them on natural events, suggesting that nature is controlled by a cosmic will of some sort. [Why this is so, I will outline presently.]

So, it's natural to ask: Where is this law written, and who passed it?

Of course, the answer to these questions is "No one" and "Nowhere", but then how can something that does not exist control anything?


I had read this Rosa, but when phsysicists speak of a law of nature they do not mean that it was a law passed by anybody. Physicists are overwhelmingly atheistic and do not think of it as a divine law either. What they mean is that given certain boundary conditions, then within a deterministic system the only possible states at space time positions other than those given by the boundary conditions are given by the laws of nature. The term control in this context means something much stronger than its use in normal language, in physics it means a limit on the possible.

[Calmwinds]

What does it mean to say that society is an "accurate reflection of biology"?

That sounds like you're arguing that society can be explained by the biological constitution of human beings; implying that human society follows innate behavioural patterns or instincts hard-wired into individual human beings. So hierarchy and inequality is somehow part of human nature?

No, I am not justifying hierarchy or inequality. I have made no argument to human nature, indeed even if it was all nature (I am sort of on the nature side of the nature vs nurture) hierarchy and inequality is not justified even if it is human behavior.

[Paul Cockshott]

Rosa speaking of the distortion of a magnetic field:


Fine, but then the field in this case must have a physical meaning -- but what is it? Indeed, one might wonder how something can be 'distorted' if it has no physical nature. And this word ("distort") is yet another verb drawn from ordinary language, but which possesses anthropomorphic connotations of its own if used unwisely. Unless, that is, you mean this in a technical sense, that is, as 'mathematical distortion'. But that has no physical meaning. So, we are no further forward.

Paul replying:
Yes of course fields have a physical meaning, the meaning in this case is their effect on charged particles. The context of the word distortion was the discussion of tensile strength. In this case it means a process by which the thing being discussed becomes longer.


Rosa speaking of fields:


So, my question still stands: what is the field made out of? If nothing, then how is it different from nothing -- or, at least, from a 'useful fiction'?


One can respond to this both with another question and an answer.

Question: what do you mean by 'made of' and why should the notion be relevant to fields?

Answer: How is a field different from nothing? A field of 1 volt per centimeter differs from nothing, no field ( 0 volts per centimeter ) by the fact that the former will accelerate an electric charge but the latter will not.

On solid bodies. I should have formulated the interpenetration point more clearly, as formulated it does not adequately distinguish liquids from solids. What I should have said is both that two solid bodies may not occupy the same space, and that to distort or change the shape of a solid body a minimum quantity of work has to be done irrespective of how slowly you distort it wheras a solid can be moved through a liquid with an amount of work that tends to zero as the speed tends to zero.

I am not convinced that one has to use words like interpenetrate to describe scattering from nuclei, can you show that physicists descriptions of this are all anthropomorphic?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


I had read this Rosa, but when physicists speak of a law of nature they do not mean that it was a law passed by anybody. Physicists are overwhelmingly atheistic and do not think of it as a divine law either. What they mean is that given certain boundary conditions, then within a deterministic system the only possible states at space time positions other than those given by the boundary conditions are given by the laws of nature. The term control in this context means something much stronger than its use in normal language, in physics it means a limit on the possible.

Well, not as carefully as you should (as we will soon see again).

And I do know this:


but when physicists speak of a law of nature they do not mean that it was a law passed by anybody.

You see why I say you did not read it too carefully, since I was talking about philosophers in the OP, not physicists. This is the PHILOSOPHY section, remember, not SCIENCE, and we are debating a classical philosophical question, which has these very clear implications.

And there are plenty of physicists who are theists and/or Buddhists (who write as if they do believe this), and up to 150 years ago, many certainly did believe that these 'laws' were written by God. Indeed, Galileo and Newton were quite explicit in this, and many of the things Einstein said suggest he was a Platonist of sorts.

And there are plenty of others who, when they stray off into amateur philosophy, write as if they also believe this. You do too, here:


What they mean is that given certain boundary conditions, then within a deterministic system the only possible states at space time positions other than those given by the boundary conditions are given by the laws of nature. The term control in this context means something much stronger than its use in normal language, in physics it means a limit on the possible.

Well, again, I did allow for this in my OP -- but, I'd like to see what you think puts 'limits' on what can happen.

This looks pretty prescriptive to me -- i.e., it looks rather like the traditional view of 'laws', which nature has to obey, it can do no other.


Yes of course fields have a physical meaning, the meaning in this case is their effect on charged particles. The context of the word distortion was the discussion of tensile strength. In this case it means a process by which the thing being discussed becomes longer.

But, then in that case 'the soul' had a physical meaning for Descartes, since this is what it was able to do in the Pineal gland, according to him -- and yet, the soul was not a physical substance for him. And it does not sound like it is one for you either; as I noted earlier, it sounds like it is the reification of some abstruse mathematics to which you keep attaching material sounding terms, or to which you keep attributing physical properties which inhere in nothing at all.

The fact that you cannot tell us what it is made of confirms this.


Question: what do you mean by 'made of' and why should the notion be relevant to fields?

Well, many tables and chairs are made of wood. 'Made of' in that sense.


Answer: How is a field different from nothing? A field of 1 volt per centimeter differs from nothing, no field ( 0 volts per centimeter ) by the fact that the former will accelerate an electric charge but the latter will not.

That just tells us how other bits of matter (called instruments) behave when we put them in certain regions of space (called 'the field').

And yet, we have no idea why they do this, except we label it, 'the field'.

That is no more use than when the doctor says 'you have a virus' when he/she has no idea what is making you sick.

You might as well say, 'it's god who does this' for all 'the field' tells us.


On solid bodies. I should have formulated the interpenetration point more clearly, as formulated it does not adequately distinguish liquids from solids. What I should have said is both that two solid bodies may not occupy the same space, and that to distort or change the shape of a solid body a minimum quantity of work has to be done irrespective of how slowly you distort it whereas a solid can be moved through a liquid with an amount of work that tends to zero as the speed tends to zero.

Well, you once again help yourself to the verb 'distort', which, if it is being used in a technical sense, is no help at all. If on the other hand it is being used in its normal sense, then you too are anthropomorphising nature, unless, once more, you are merely being descriptive.

In that case, it's no use in helping explain why these things happen.


I am not convinced that one has to use words like interpenetrate to describe scattering from nuclei, can you show that physicists descriptions of this are all anthropomorphic?

I did not assert they were (are you having problems with my use of plain English?); here is what I did say:


I agree, and that is what I said in my OP; but, when you pass from the descriptive mode into an explanatory or prescriptive mode, that is where these connotations emerge once more. This was covered by this comment in my OP:

I have made this point so many times, I can only think you are being perverse.

[Hit The North]

No, I am not justifying hierarchy or inequality. I have made no argument to human nature, indeed even if it was all nature (I am sort of on the nature side of the nature vs nurture) hierarchy and inequality is not justified even if it is human behavior.

So what do you mean when you say society accurately reflects biology?

[Paul Cockshott]

If you pose things in terms of nature having to obey laws, then you are explicitly setting up a statement in terms as close as possible to a juridical metaphor. What I was saying was not that.
You ask what puts limits on what can happen?
Well it is the boundary conditions that put limits on what can happen subsequently. The range of possible outcomes is given by the spread of the boundary conditions.

I dont see why you object to my using a technical meaning of distortion when refering to tensile strength. Tensile strength is a technical matter and is defined in terms of distortion, with this word being used in a technical way.

I said at the begining that I thought your position was in danger of slipping into idealism. I became more and more suspiscious as things progressed. A passage in your latest reply makes it quite clear that you are going that way:



Quote:
Answer: How is a field different from nothing? A field of 1 volt per centimeter differs from nothing, no field ( 0 volts per centimeter ) by the fact that the former will accelerate an electric charge but the latter will not.
That just tells us how other bits of matter (called instruments) behave when we put them in certain regions of space (called 'the field').

This is a classic instrumentalist position, the sort of Machist position that Lenin polemicised against in Materialism and Empirocriticism.

The materialist or realist position is that fields exist objectively and independently of our measurement of them.
You had asked what is the difference between a field and nothing. I gave you an answer which you did not address, instead you returned to an essentially instrumentalist attack on the reality of material universe as revealed by scientific research.

You say that you want the field to be made of something, in the sense that a table is made of wood. But this is question at the wrong level, fields refer to a lower level of reality than wood. Fields help explain what the wood is made of and why it has strength. Fields are a more primitive component of reality than wood or plastic. In part your desire for a substance to fields can be met by pushing down another level to the standard model and saying that the fields are composed of guage bosons.

Quote:
I am not convinced that one has to use words like interpenetrate to describe scattering from nuclei, can you show that physicists descriptions of this are all anthropomorphic?
I did not assert they were (are you having problems with my use of plain English?); here is what I did say:

Quote:
I agree, and that is what I said in my OP; but, when you pass from the descriptive mode into an explanatory or prescriptive mode, that is where these connotations emerge once more. This was covered by this comment in my OP:
I have made this point so many times, I can only think you are being perverse.

I was actually replying to this specific paragraph

Often they do, but sometimes they do not, and to explain why that happens, you will have to use verbs like 'inter-penetrate' again. And this will still happen even if you translate this into the language of forces and the field.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


If you pose things in terms of nature having to obey laws, then you are explicitly setting up a statement in terms as close as possible to a juridical metaphor. What I was saying was not that.

In that case, you have no way of explaining why these laws differ from accidental generalisations.


You ask what puts limits on what can happen?
Well it is the boundary conditions that put limits on what can happen subsequently. The range of possible outcomes is given by the spread of the boundary conditions.

And how are they able to do this?


I don't see why you object to my using a technical meaning of distortion when referring to tensile strength. Tensile strength is a technical matter and is defined in terms of distortion, with this word being used in a technical way.

I really don't think you read what I post with any care at all, since I have repeatedly said that if you are using such terms in a technical sense, no problem.

What I do raise issue with is whether such technical terms can explain why B always makes A happen and never C. How do such terms (or what they allegedly refer to in reality), manage to exercise control over the course of events.

Now, you might not want to go down that route, fine; no problem with that either. But, in that case, 'determinism' becomes an empty theory.

I can live with that, too.


I said at the beginning that I thought your position was in danger of slipping into idealism. I became more and more suspicious as things progressed. A passage in your latest reply makes it quite clear that you are going that way:


Answer: How is a field different from nothing? A field of 1 volt per centimeter differs from nothing, no field ( 0 volts per centimeter ) by the fact that the former will accelerate an electric charge but the latter will not.
That just tells us how other bits of matter (called instruments) behave when we put them in certain regions of space (called 'the field').

This is a classic instrumentalist position, the sort of Machist position that Lenin polemicised against in Materialism and Empirocriticism.

Not so; what I am pointing out is that your view relies in instrumentalism since you cannot tell us what the field is (what its physical nature is), only what its effects allegedly are.

I merely raise questions that you (and Lenin) just hand wave away.

[Anyway, I regret your reference to that execrable book Lenin inflicted on our movement. I have taken it apart here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13%2001.htm]


The materialist or realist position is that fields exist objectively and independently of our measurement of them.

This is a classic example of fideism; you have faith that the field exists, but you can tell us nothing about it except its alleged effects.

It is worth recalling that Lenin said the following about the Ether:


"That is why Engels gave the example of the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticised mechanical materialism. In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is, from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, ether and so on exist as objective realities outside the human mind or not? The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly; and they do invariably answer it in the affirmative, just as they unhesitatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior to organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in favour of materialism, for the concept matter, as we already stated, epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Lenin (1972) Materialsim and Empiriocriticism, p.312. Bold emphases added.]

Lenin's faith in the Ether seems on a par with yours in 'the field'. Indeed, it's an odd sort of realism that postulates the existence of things you now declare do not exist. [And, it is worth recalling that Mach was right here, and Lenin wrong.]

I can just imagine a 1908 version of you waxing lyrical about the Ether, in similar terms to the way you wax lyrical over the field.


You had asked what is the difference between a field and nothing. I gave you an answer which you did not address, instead you returned to an essentially instrumentalist attack on the reality of material universe as revealed by scientific research.

I did not address it since it was no answer at all. We still know nothing of the field except its alleged effects on instruments. So all we do know, on your view -- not mine, is that certain instruments (or other accumulations of matter) behave in certain ways in certain regions of space. But, how a non-physical entity ('the field') can bring this about is a total mystery. And no wonder, the field is just a reification of some rather abstruse mathematics.

You deny this, but everything you tell us about it simply confirms this allegation.


You say that you want the field to be made of something, in the sense that a table is made of wood. But this is question at the wrong level, fields refer to a lower level of reality than wood. Fields help explain what the wood is made of and why it has strength. Fields are a more primitive component of reality than wood or plastic. In part your desire for a substance to fields can be met by pushing down another level to the standard model and saying that the fields are composed of gauge bosons.
Even so, you can't tell us what physical reality it possesses. If it has none (or none you want to share) how can the field make A happen rather than C?

And what are gauge bosons made of...?


I was actually replying to this specific paragraph


Often they do, but sometimes they do not, and to explain why that happens, you will have to use verbs like 'inter-penetrate' again. And this will still happen even if you translate this into the language of forces and the field.

And I stand by this paragraph, and fail to see how what you had to say is an effective response to it.

I also added this, to an earlier post which you ignored:


But, let us assume that the field is real (in whatever sense you want to give to that word), then it would just become B in my OP. In that case, you would still not be able to explain why a certain field produced effect A as opposed to C without using verbs drawn from what human beings (or other agents) can do -- that is if you want to go beyond mere description. And that will land you in the anthropomorphic mire, once again.

Which is what I alleged in my OP.

[blake 3:17]

Quote:
Rosa do you consider sociobology a valid field. and do you consider society to be an accurate reflection of biology? (That would be a reference to Gould).
I agree with Gould on this.


Mr. Anti-Reification?

[Paul Cockshott]

On Lenin and the Ether

Lenin was defending what was then the gneneral understanding of physicists, not being a physicist himself he failed to understand the implications of Einsteins work published 3 years earlier and did not seem to know of the Michaelson Morely experiment.

But the dropping of the ether theory in response to new experimental evidence is quite different from an attitude of Humean philosophical skepticism . If Rosa cites experimental evidence that undermines field theory, that would be something different.


Reification

I do not accept the whole premise of about reification of mathematics. The relationship goes the other way. I think Deutsch's account of this is right, Physicists construct a population of mathematical models which then undergo a Darwinian selection process for compatibility with experiment. The ones that are accepted are the ones whose properties best match the properties of reality given the then available experimental base.

It is not at all clear what would be acceptable to Rosa as an explanation of what a field is. When dealing with the deeper aspects of reality, the commonsense metaphors that rely either on our inherited perceptual machinery or on personal experience are inadequate. Entities like fields or energy have to be explained in mathematical terms since it is very hard to explain them adequately in in mere words. This is because reality has structures that our language and perceptual machinery were never evolved to handle. We thus have to build new tools to undestand it.

Fields again
The demand for an explanation of what fields are made of is misplaced. This makes sense in the macroscopic world of 'substances', but the microscopic world is not like that. I refered to guage bosons earlier, but ( if my understanding is correct, bearing in mind I am not a physicist ) the electromagnetic field for example is not 'made' of photons - the relevant guage boson. Instead these are the quanta of interaction supported by the field, and the probability of photon exchange occuring between particles is a function of the field intensity.

In going a level down in explanation, you find that the substantialist ideas of things being 'made of' other things no longer quite fits, and you land yourself having to deal with probability density functions etc.

If one was to argue that determinstic models are ultimately wrong because of this, then that is fairly defensible argument, but this does not appear to be the argument.

What is a physical entity
If one contends that the entities ( like fields or bosons) that physicists study and use in their modeling are not actually physical entities. I think it is necessary to explain what one thinks a physical entity actually is, and to show that one can carry out a effective research programme using this definition.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


Lenin was defending what was then the general understanding of physicists, not being a physicist himself he failed to understand the implications of Einstein's work published 3 years earlier and did not seem to know of the Michaelson Morely experiment.

But the dropping of the ether theory in response to new experimental evidence is quite different from an attitude of Humean philosophical skepticism . If Rosa cites experimental evidence that undermines field theory, that would be something different.

And yet he described it as an 'objective' existent exterior to the mind, and not a 'subjective' existent, which is the way you picture him as describing it.


"That is why Engels gave the example of the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticised mechanical materialism. In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is, from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, ether and so on exist as objective realities outside the human mind or not? The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly; and they do invariably answer it in the affirmative, just as they unhesitatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior to organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in favour of materialism, for the concept matter, as we already stated, epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it." [Lenin (1972) Materialism and Empiriocriticism, p.312. Bold emphasis added.]

And he was still describing it this way in his Notebooks ten or so years later. For example, Philosophical Notebooks, p.250.


But the dropping of the ether theory in response to new experimental evidence is quite different from an attitude of Humean philosophical skepticism . If Rosa cites experimental evidence that undermines field theory, that would be something different.

Where have I expressed 'Humean scepticism'? My arguments bear no relation to Hume's.

And where have I denied the field? What I have done is question its ontological status, and in view of the fact that you cannot tell us of its physical makeup, I am right to continue to do so.

And, once more, are you addressing me, or your 'audience'?

If the former, then it is more appropriate to word your sentences this way


If you cite experimental evidence that undermines field theory, that would be something different

Since I have pointed this out several times, I can only think you wish to insult me.


I do not accept the whole premise of about reification of mathematics. The relationship goes the other way. I think Deutsch's account of this is right, Physicists construct a population of mathematical models which then undergo a Darwinian selection process for compatibility with experiment. The ones that are accepted are the ones whose properties best match the properties of reality given the then available experimental base.

Maybe so, but your wording, and the fact that you can tell us nothing of its physical make-up, in fact suggests this.


It is not at all clear what would be acceptable to Rosa as an explanation of what a field is. When dealing with the deeper aspects of reality, the commonsense metaphors that rely either on our inherited perceptual machinery or on personal experience are inadequate. Entities like fields or energy have to be explained in mathematical terms since it is very hard to explain them adequately in in mere words. This is because reality has structures that our language and perceptual machinery were never evolved to handle. We thus have to build new tools to understand it.

This is just shorthand for 'We haven't a clue what the field is'.

Hence, my allegation that 'the field' is just a reification still stands.


The demand for an explanation of what fields are made of is misplaced. This makes sense in the macroscopic world of 'substances', but the microscopic world is not like that. I referred to gauge bosons earlier, but ( if my understanding is correct, bearing in mind I am not a physicist ) the electromagnetic field for example is not 'made' of photons - the relevant gauge boson. Instead these are the quanta of interaction supported by the field, and the probability of photon exchange occurring between particles is a function of the field intensity.

This resembles the reply theists make when they are asked to give us details about the nature of 'god' -- all they can do is appeal to vague metaphors too.


In going a level down in explanation, you find that the substantialist ideas of things being 'made of' other things no longer quite fits, and you land yourself having to deal with probability density functions etc.

And even at this level, all we have is a more and more detailed description, not an explanation (in the sense I outlined earlier).


If one was to argue that determinstic models are ultimately wrong because of this, then that is fairly defensible argument, but this does not appear to be the argument.

Indeed, my argument isn't that determinism is 'wrong', but that it is based on a distortion of language, and is thus far too confused for anyone to be able to say whether it is right or wrong.


If one contends that the entities ( like fields or bosons) that physicists study and use in their modelling are not actually physical entities. I think it is necessary to explain what one thinks a physical entity actually is, and to show that one can carry out a effective research programme using this definition.

As I noted, in the end, even if it were impossible to say what a 'physical entity' is (as a technical term in physics; it is quite easy to say what one is in ordinary language), this still applies:


But, let us assume that the field is real (in whatever sense you want to give to that word), then it would just become B in my OP. In that case, you would still not be able to explain why a certain field produced effect A as opposed to C without using verbs drawn from what human beings (or other agents) can do -- that is if you want to go beyond mere description. And that will land you in the anthropomorphic mire, once again.

Which is what I alleged in my OP.

[Zanthorus]

I've only skimmed through the thread but:

Rosa: What about group and other social pressures to conform? Couldn't that be considered something that forces people to choose a certain action?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Zanthorous:


Rosa: What about group and other social pressures to conform? Couldn't that be considered something that forces people to choose a certain action?

Well, I have no problem with anthropomorphising humanity, since this is one area where it is quite legitimate to do so (as the word suggests). But, even then, I'd be careful how I used the word 'determine'.

Hence, within a framework set by historical materialism, it should be possible to give an account of why members of certain classes have the interests they have, and make the choices they do.

As far as conformity is concerned, I think it better to say that because of their need to conform (which is often a result of social pressure), human beings force themselves to adopt certain behaviours.

[Paul Cockshott]

Quote:
If one contends that the entities ( like fields or bosons) that physicists study and use in their modelling are not actually physical entities. I think it is necessary to explain what one thinks a physical entity actually is, and to show that one can carry out a effective research programme using this definition.
As I noted, in the end, even if it were impossible to say what a 'physical entity' is (as a technical term in physics; it is quite easy to say what one is in ordinary language), this still applies:

Quote:
But, let us assume that the field is real (in whatever sense you want to give to that word), then it would just become B in my OP. In that case, you would still not be able to explain why a certain field produced effect A as opposed to C without using verbs drawn from what human beings (or other agents) can do -- that is if you want to go beyond mere description. And that will land you in the anthropomorphic mire, once again.

Which is what I alleged in my OP.
__________________
This seems to avoid my question as to what you would allow as being validly physical, since you exclude many of the things that physicists treat as being physical.

For instance is a steam locomotive physical to you?

Is the steam in its boiler and pistons physical ?

If you accept these as physical why is the magnetic field in the motors of an electric locomotive non-physical?

Like steam, the magnetic field in the electric motor is invisible, exerts force and can be used to transmit energy. Why is one physical and the other not?

Or are they both non-physical.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


This seems to avoid my question as to what you would allow as being validly physical, since you exclude many of the things that physicists treat as being physical.

Depends on which use of this word you are alluding to. If it's its more ordinary use in everyday life, then it has many uses, for example:

1) That's physically impossible.

2) Let's get physical.

3) He's here for his physical.

4) His illness is emotional, not physical.

5) His obstacle took physical form in the shape of a police cordon.

Etc.

So, you tell me...


For instance is a steam locomotive physical to you?

Is the steam in its boiler and pistons physical ?

If you accept these as physical why is the magnetic field in the motors of an electric locomotive non-physical?

Like steam, the magnetic field in the electric motor is invisible, exerts force and can be used to transmit energy. Why is one physical and the other not?

Or are they both non-physical.

You should now be able to answer this for yourself, as soon as you decide which of the above senses you mean.

But, recall, I am not questioning a single thing in physics, just the metaphysical theory (determinism) that many use physics to justify.

And that is what this thread is about, not the sort of things you keep bringing up.

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul:



Depends on which use of this word you are alluding to. If it's its more ordinary use in everyday life, then it has many uses, for example:

1) That's physically impossible.

2) Let's get physical.

3) He's here for his physical.

4) His illness is emotional, not physical.

5) His obstacle took physical form in the shape of a police cordon.

Etc.

So, you tell me...



You should now be able to answer this for yourself, as soon as you decide which of the above senses you mean.

But, recall, I am not questioning a single thing in physics, just the metaphysical theory (determinism) that many use physics to justify.

And that is what this thread is about, not the sort of things you keep bringing up.
I think that item 1 is the closest to the sense of physical we are debating. If you
once accept that something can be physically impossible, you have accepted the
basic tenets of determinism.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


I think that item 1 is the closest to the sense of physical we are debating. If you
once accept that something can be physically impossible, you have accepted the
basic tenets of determinism.

Not at all. We judge the impossibility, but there is no way we can attribute this to nature without anthropomorphising it.

The impossibility here is therefore de dicto not de re.

[Meridian]

What we see as causes and effects are in fact only what our minds categorize as such.

For example, when scientists try to show the effect of gravity in a closed system, they (dumbed down example) need to pick up and apple to have it fall. There is no closed system. Like Kant showed, there is only one room/space. There is nothing, besides maybe our minds, that separates the incident with the apple falling from the scientist picking it up and letting it fall.

So, if the traditional view of determinism is that everything is both a cause and an effect then in my opinion a more correct view is that the entire universe and time is one, and that nature is patterns (what we call "laws" of nature).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^ This sounds like a causal explanation of what our minds actually accomplish, which, if correct is entirely circular (since it was, presumably, formed by a mind).

[Paul Cockshott]

^^^ This sounds like a causal explanation of what our minds actually accomplish, which, if correct is entirely circular (since it was, presumably, formed by a mind).

Your positions seem to me to be rmarkably close to idealism in the sense that you constantly make human minds the starting point of your philosophy rather than taking the material world as the starting point.

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul:



Not at all. We judge the impossibility, but there is no way we can attribute this to nature without anthropomorphising it.

The impossibility here is therefore de dicto not de re.

In what way is the statement that you can not build a perpetual motion machine because the entropy in a closed system must increase, an anthropomorphism?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


Your positions seem to me to be remarkably close to idealism in the sense that you constantly make human minds the starting point of your philosophy rather than taking the material world as the starting point.

On the contrary, I take historical materialism as my starting point, and part of that analysis involves not only the intelligent use of language, but a recognition that what we can say about the world is socially-conditioned.

And, it's a bit rich being told this by someone who seems happy to reduce the material world to the field -- a mathematical construct -- thus making it disappear.


In what way is the statement that you can not build a perpetual motion machine because the entropy in a closed system must increase, an anthropomorphism?

Where have I said it was?

You really must try not to make stuff up about what I have or haven't said.

[Meridian]

^^^ This sounds like a causal explanation of what our minds actually accomplish, which, if correct is entirely circular (since it was, presumably, formed by a mind).
I am not sure if you are saying my logic is circular, or what exactly you mean by this.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Your brief statement looks like a causal account of what the mind allegedly can or can't do. But, since it was framed by your mind, about other minds, then those other minds, for all you know might not work the way you say. For all you know, causation might be an objective feature of the world, while you are the only one who thinks otherwise. In other words, your argument is circular, and your theory could be false. If you appeal to anything external to your mind for support then that will attribute external reality with powers your theory says it hasn't got.

If, on the other hand, you are giving us an objective account of what happens independently of your mind, then your theory, if true, must be false, since it tells us what must be the case concerning the causal powers of other minds independently of your own. In that case, causation will not be an artefact of your mind, but an objective feature of reality.

So, your theory is either false or circular, or both.

[Paul Cockshott]

And, it's a bit rich being told this by someone who seems happy to reduce the material world to the field -- a mathematical construct -- thus making it disappear.


There are both fields and particles.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


There are both fields and particles.

I am not sure what this is supposed to be in answer to.

Anyway, you must know that the idea that there are such 'partilces' is controversial.

Castellani, E. (1998) (ed.), Interpreting Bodies. Classical And Quantum Objects In Modern Physics (Princeton University Press).

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/view/subjects/fields-and-particles.html

For example:

"Identical Quantum Particles and Weak Discernibility (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00003598/)" Dennis Dieks and Marijn Versteegh, at the above site.

In general:

French, S., and Krause, D. (2006), Identity In Physics: A Historical, Philosophical And Formal Analysis (Oxford University Prtess).

[Meridian]

Your brief statement looks like a causal account of what the mind allegedly can or can't do. But, since it was framed by your mind, about other minds, then those other minds, for all you know might not work the way you say.
I am not really a skeptic when it comes to other minds and such. I find it pointless. Is this what you are getting at? No, I do not know what other minds are like. Nor do I know that they are real and not just the creation of my own mind. Is this really valuable skepticism? Nope.


For all you know, causation might be an objective feature of the world, while you are the only one who thinks otherwise.
I find this a weird statement, so I assume I am misinterpreting it. Take that as a compliment. It might very well be that I am the only who thinks otherwise. But that does not make much difference, now, does it? Causation, in one sense, can be said to be an "objective feature" of the world. That is not really what my argument deals with. My position is as follows:

Other mind skepticism aside, abstraction and categorization is fundamental to how we think. Scientists use it to explain causation. They do this through showing correlation between a "cause" and its "effect". Yet they limit what correlations they show. It may not be incorrect that that and that cause leads to that and that effect, but it is always incorrect that it is only given cause that lead to said effect.

The reason for that is that if anyone wishes to show any given "cause" (for anything), they themselves either need to arrange for that cause to happen and have an effect in the first place, or the cause needs to happen without the persons involvement. Either way, there must be a cause for the cause (slash effect) to exist... And so on, until the beginning of time.

However, I have a feeling I did not truly respond to your arguments. I will try to see if I understand your reasoning again:


If, on the other hand, you are giving us an objective account of what happens independently of your mind,
Yes, I believe that is what I am attempting to do.


then your theory, if true, must be false, since it tells us what must be the case concerning the causal powers of other minds independently of your own.
I do not agree that my theory tells us what must be the case concerning the causal powers of other minds independently of my own. I do not question free will. I question the common understanding of events as a simple matter of cause and effect. I argue that it is meaningless to say that, f.ex. a person is determined to act a certain way because of any select amount of events/causes leading up to a decision/effect. The totality of time would be the cause leading up to said decision. Perhaps this is the root of our misunderstanding.


In that case, causation will not be an artefact of your mind, but an objective feature of reality.
I honestly do not know how you reached this conclusion.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian:


I am not really a skeptic when it comes to other minds and such. I find it pointless. Is this what you are getting at? No, I do not know what other minds are like. Nor do I know that they are real and not just the creation of my own mind. Is this really valuable skepticism? Nope.

I did not in fact raise a sceptical question about the existence of 'other minds'. What I did do was raise a question whether other minds see things your way.

Read it again:


But, since it was framed by your mind, about other minds, then those other minds, for all you know might not work the way you say. For all you know, causation might be an objective feature of the world, while you are the only one who thinks otherwise. In other words, your argument is circular, and your theory could be false. If you appeal to anything external to your mind for support then that will attribute external reality with powers your theory says it hasn't got.

Nothing in there even remotely like "How do you know there are other minds?"


I find this a weird statement, so I assume I am misinterpreting it. Take that as a compliment. It might very well be that I am the only who thinks otherwise. But that does not make much difference, now, does it? Causation, in one sense, can be said to be an "objective feature" of the world. That is not really what my argument deals with. My position is as follows:

It's no more nor no less weird than your original comments.

The point behind raising a question about whether or not you are the only one who thinks this was quite clear; in the context of questions about objectivity, I was making a point that your theory seems entirely subjective.

If it isn't, and it is an objective theory about causation, then, if true, it must be false, and for the reasons I suggested in my last post.

On the other hand, if it's a subjective opinion, you are perfectly entitled to express it, of course, but in that case, it cannot be a philosophical theory.

So, what you say is either false or uninteresting.


Other mind skepticism aside, abstraction and categorization is fundamental to how we think. Scientists use it to explain causation. They do this through showing correlation between a "cause" and its "effect". Yet they limit what correlations they show. It may not be incorrect that that and that cause leads to that and that effect, but it is always incorrect that it is only given cause that lead to said effect.

I disagree, there is no way that any sense can be made of 'abstraction' (in the philosophical sense, that is).


The reason for that is that if anyone wishes to show any given "cause" (for anything), they themselves either need to arrange for that cause to happen and have an effect in the first place, or the cause needs to happen without the persons involvement. Either way, there must be a cause for the cause (slash effect) to exist... And so on, until the beginning of time.

But, this is not at all how this happens. We are taught, as we learn to speak, how to use causal language. We do not negotiate our way around here as individuals.

And it is this causal language that give causality it objective status, not some philosophical theory.


I do not agree that my theory tells us what must be the case concerning the causal powers of other minds independently of my own. I do not question free will. I question the common understanding of events as a simple matter of cause and effect. I argue that it is meaningless to say that, f.ex. a person is determined to act a certain way because of any select amount of events/causes leading up to a decision/effect. The totality of time would be the cause leading up to said decision. Perhaps this is the root of our misunderstanding.

I wasn't making a point about 'free will' so we can put that to one side.

Now, your theory does attempt to say what is the case with other minds and their causal powers. Here is your original wording:


What we see as causes and effects are in fact only what our minds categorize as such.

For example, when scientists try to show the effect of gravity in a closed system, they (dumbed down example) need to pick up and apple to have it fall. There is no closed system. Like Kant showed, there is only one room/space. There is nothing, besides maybe our minds, that separates the incident with the apple falling from the scientist picking it up and letting it fall.

So, if the traditional view of determinism is that everything is both a cause and an effect then in my opinion a more correct view is that the entire universe and time is one, and that nature is patterns (what we call "laws" of nature).

Here you try to tell us what "our minds" do, what scientists do, what Newton did, and what Kant tried to do.

This all sounds causal to me.

In that case, my earlier criticisms still stand.

[Meridian]

Here you try to tell us what "our minds" do, what scientists do, what Newton did, and what Kant tried to do.

This all sounds causal to me.
Look, I am not questioning whether or not language deals in terms of cause and effect.

I am questioning the fact that we categorise, through (amongst other things) language, specific things/events into specific causes and effects. The reason I question this is not that it is not true that f.ex. a scientist can pick up an apple to have it fall, it is that it is always limiting to only include certain causes when wanting to prove a certain effect.

I will use causal language because the point, for me, in using language is to be understood. I assume the context will be understood, to some degree. It is not contradicting my point because I do not question that we think in terms of cause/effect in modern language. In fact, that is the point of my argument.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian:


Look, I am not questioning whether or not language deals in terms of cause and effect.

I am questioning the fact that we categorise, through (amongst other things) language, specific things/events into specific causes and effects. The reason I question this is not that it is not true that f.ex. a scientist can pick up an apple to have it fall, it is that it is always limiting to only include certain causes when wanting to prove a certain effect.

I will use causal language because the point, for me, in using language is to be understood. I assume the context will be understood, to some degree. It is not contradicting my point because I do not question that we think in terms of cause/effect in modern language. In fact, that is the point of my argument.

Then you will be forced to mis-use the language of causation, and will thus no longer be talking about causation, but about 'causation', instead.

[Meridian]

Then you will be forced to mis-use the language of causation, and will thus no longer be talking about causation, but about 'causation', instead.
Let me check if I understand what you mean here:
You are saying that I, in using the language of causation to explain myself, will be (according to my own theory) misusing, or using logically invalid, language? And by misusing language I will be unable to talk about causation?

I don't know if that is the correct interpretation. If it is, it would also mean that no one is able to talk about causation, which would mean that my theory is correct.

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul:

I am not sure what this is supposed to be in answer to.

Anyway, you must know that the idea that there are such 'partilces' is controversial.
.
It was in response to your claim that I disolved the concept of matter into fields. I claimed the objective reality of fields but not that they were all that
existed. Yes, there is controversy about just what meaning particles have,
but at the level of abstraction at which they are relevant, one has both
particles and fields. I was not claiming that there were just fields, as your post seemed to imply.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


It was in response to your claim that I disolved the concept of matter into fields. I claimed the objective reality of fields but not that they were all that existed. Yes, there is controversy about just what meaning particles have, but at the level of abstraction at which they are relevant, one has both particles and fields. I was not claiming that there were just fields, as your post seemed to imply.

Doesn't this commit you to the existence of abstract objects, and a sort of bargain basement Platonism?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian


Let me check if I understand what you mean here:
You are saying that I, in using the language of causation to explain myself, will be (according to my own theory) misusing, or using logically invalid, language? And by misusing language I will be unable to talk about causation?

I don't know if that is the correct interpretation. If it is, it would also mean that no one is able to talk about causation, which would mean that my theory is correct.

Well, our use of language is quite clear. If someone says that the brick they threw smashed that window, they are not talking about what their mind has dreamt up.

If someone else tells us that the footprints in the snow were made by her boots as she walked across the garden, then only the insane will think that those prints were made by some mind or other.

By misusing language, you will not be talking about what the rest of us mean by causation, but about 'causation', an idiosyncratic creation of your own.

Now this may present you with problems about speaking about causation (in that it will prevent you from doing so), but not the rest of us.

[Meridian]

Having read through your opening post again I find myself agreeing with most of your points. For example, the anthropomorphication of nature in our language. And clearly, to me, the point you make about natural laws actually being descriptive instead of prescriptive is what I meant when I said that natural laws actually are more like patterns in nature, not "laws". I don't actually think we are in much disagreement, but I don't understand most of your remarks and it seems we are arguing past each other.

What I have been trying to show is the shortcomings in our language when it comes to cause and effect. I suppose dealing with terms like "how we think" etc., has provided unclarity.

To summarize my position: We have no logical basis for separating one cause from another and one effect from another (in language) as they are all part of the same cause/effect process (in nature). This is categorization of natural events (the word "events" is even guilty of this) and is similar to your thoughts about humans using anthropomorphized words describing nature. The categorization of events philosophically has mathematical roots, which is why I was not hasty to talk about our use of it in language.



Well, our use of language is quite clear. If someone says that the brick they threw smashed that window, they are not talking about what their mind has dreamt up.

If someone else tells us that the footprints in the snow were made by her boots as she walked across the garden, then only the insane will think that those prints were made by some mind or other.I do not disagree with those remarks, except, perhaps, that people could think that "a person" made those marks, not boots.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian:


For example, the anthropomorphication of nature in our language. And clearly, to me, the point you make about natural laws actually being descriptive instead of prescriptive is what I meant when I said that natural laws actually are more like patterns in nature, not "laws". I don't actually think we are in much disagreement, but I don't understand most of your remarks and it seems we are arguing past each other.

Well, I am in fact alleging that the language determinists use, not language as such, is anthropomorphic. And, since I reject all philosophical theories as non-sense, and you were offering us a reductive, philosophical thesis about causation (whereas I prefer to look at how we actually use language about causation, not theorise about it), there is plenty for us to disagree about.


What I have been trying to show is the shortcomings in our language when it comes to cause and effect. I suppose dealing with terms like "how we think" etc., has provided unclarity.

I do not agree that language has any shortcomings when it comes to causation. What we mean by causation is given in our ordinary use of language about language. Anything else is about 'causation', not causation.


To summarize my position: We have no logical basis for separating one cause from another and one effect from another (in language) as they are all part of the same cause/effect process (in nature). This is categorization of natural events (the word "events" is even guilty of this) and is similar to your thoughts about humans using anthropomorphized words describing nature. The categorization of events philosophically has mathematical roots, which is why I was not hasty to talk about our use of it in language.

But this is not how we use language about cause and effect.

[Meridian]

Well, I am in fact alleging that the language determinists use, not language as such, is anthropomorphic. And, since I reject all philosophical theories as non-sense, and you were offering us a reductive, philosophical thesis about causation (whereas I prefer to look at how we actually use language about causation, not theorise about it), there is plenty for us to disagree about.
So you are "against" philosophy entirely? How about logic?



I do not agree that language has any shortcomings when it comes to causation. What we mean by causation is given in our ordinary use of language about language. Anything else is about 'causation', not causation.

Well, then I suppose that what you write as 'causation' is nature as it exists besides our linguistic understanding imposed upon it. My theories are regarding nature as it exists outside of our language. Understanding is not simply an effect of language; we can change language to meet the needs of new understandings. My proposal is that our language is incoherent with nature.



But this is not how we use language about cause and effect.
When a person is saying, f. ex. that "The person was driving too fast, therefore the car crashed" it is exactly a separation of causes and effects that takes place. The person may have been speeding but it was not the only cause of the crash, and the crash was not the only effect of speeding.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian:


So you are "against" philosophy entirely? How about logic?

Well, I am a Wittgensteinian, so 'yes' to the former, 'no' to the latter.


Well, than I suppose that what you write as 'causation' is nature as it exists besides our linguistic understanding imposed upon it. My theories are regarding nature as it exists outside of our language. Understanding is not simply an effect of language; we can change language to meet the needs of new understandings. My proposal is that our language is incoherent with nature.

In fact, I made no existential claims; that would be to profound a theory (in this instance), which I refuse to do. What I said was:


What we mean by causation is given in our ordinary use of language about causation. Anything else is about 'causation', not causation.




Understanding is not simply an effect of language; we can change language to meet the needs of new understandings.

Indeed, but we could never discover we have been misusing language [i]en masse.


My proposal is that our language is incoherent with nature.

But, we have no access to nature except by means of language and common understanding. So, if our language is inadequate with respect to causation, why do you trust it with regard to nature?


When a person is saying, f. ex. that "The person was driving too fast, therefore the car crashed" it is exactly a separation of causes and effects that takes place. The person may have been speeding but it was not the only cause of the crash, and the crash was not the only effect of speeding.

Well that is an inference which, if conditionalised, could be false. But, if it is capable of being false then it is equally capable of being true.

And you are right, there could be other causes operating, but that does not imply that the inference is invalid.

[Meridian]

Well, I am a Wittgensteinian, so 'yes' to the former, 'no' to the latter.

That is interesting. Is not good philosophy characterized by following strict logic, though?



In fact, I made no existential claims; that would be to profound a theory (in this instance), which I refuse to do. What I said was:
What we mean by causation is given in our ordinary use of language about causation. Anything else is about 'causation', not causation.When a person speaks about a ball they are looking at, they are not (presumably) thinking of the word "ball", they are describing, and, ultimately, categorizing, information their senses gather. When someone speaks about causation, or use words having the function of cause and effect in language it is the same deal.

It is in this manner what someone says about causation is related to nature, before it is categorized and come forward in linguistic form. They are speaking of one event supposedly leading to another. And in order to do that they need a concept of event, which in itself is a categorization.



Indeed, but we could never discover we have been misusing language en masse.I beg to differ. If, for example, scientists were to discover that matter does not exist in the traditional sense, but instead is a constantly reinventing illusion of some sort then it could very well change our language dramatically. The same applies to other fundamental concepts of nature, such as time and light. If we were to discover proof that there in reality is no time, only matter changing form then perhaps that would change how we spoke of the past and future.



But, we have no access to nature except by means of language and common understanding. So, if our language is inadequate with respect to causation, why do you trust it with regard to nature?I disagree with the idea that we have no access to nature except by means of language. I am not quite sure what you mean by "common understanding". I would rather say we ultimately have access to nature by being a part of it, presuming we are defining nature as the material world, and that language is simply a system of organizing the information constantly gathered from everything.

If the information we gather from nature is a whole then language (or, our conscious understanding of nature) is dividing said whole and organising the parts into useful systems.



Well that is an inference which, if conditionalised, could be false. But, if it is capable of being false then it is equally capable of being true.

And you are right, there could be other causes operating, but that does not imply that the inference is invalid.
As you notice, I was not questioning whether the inference was true or not.

What I am questioning is the basis of the given and similar inferences. The person saying the sentence is proclaiming that "driving too fast" (the cause) lead to "crashing" (the effect). It is, for example, problematic to separate the state of (or cause) "driving too fast" from the state of (or cause) "driving". It is also problematic to separate the state of (or cause) "driving too fast" from the state of (or cause) "being alive". Does that mean that "being alive" lead to "crashing"? Yes, this follows if (the cause) "driving too fast" lead to (the effect) "crashing".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Meridian:


Is not good philosophy characterized by following strict logic, though?

The two are not always so well connected. Traditional philosophy is characterised by the propensity its practitioners have displayed since ancient Greek times for propounding a priori and dogmatic theses, aimed at uncovering fundamental truths about reality derived from thought alone, a bit like you have endeavoured to do with respect to causation.

And like you are now trying to do with perception and 'categorisation':


When a person speaks about a ball they are looking at, they are not (presumably) thinking of the word "ball", they are describing, and, ultimately, categorizing, information their senses gather. When someone speaks about causation, or use words having the function of cause and effect in language it is the same deal.

I deny that this is what anyone does when they look at anything, let alone a ball.


It is in this manner what someone says about causation is related to nature, before it is categorized and come forward in linguistic form. They are speaking of one event supposedly leading to another. And in order to do that they need a concept of event, which in itself is a categorization.

I'm not sure how you propose to prove that a single human being has ever done this.


I beg to differ. If, for example, scientists were to discover that matter does not exist in the traditional sense, but instead is a constantly reinventing illusion of some sort then it could very well change our language dramatically. The same applies to other fundamental concepts of nature, such as time and light. If we were to discover proof that there in reality is no time, only matter changing form then perhaps that would change how we spoke of the past and future.

Well, if we have all been misusing the word "matter", and that includes you when you try to tell us we have, then any sentence containing that word will lack a sense, since it will contain a word ("matter") that no one understands, not even scientists.

On the other hand, if you and scientists are using the word "matter" in the way the rest of us are, then the problem disappears.

Consider this:

H1: Ordinary language cannot account for or depict material objects.

But, is H1 itself written in ordinary language? It certainly looks like it. If it is, it is pertinent to ask what the word "material" in H1 actually means.

If we, as ordinary speakers, do not understand this word, what precisely is it that you and/or scientists are presuming to correct? We may only be educated if we know of what it is that we are ignorant -- that is, if we already know what material things are is (so that we can at least say that our word "matter" does not match some ideal). But, ex hypothesi, we are not supposed to know this since our language is allegedly inadequate in this area.

[This point shows that the argument here is not solely about language, but about what it conveys to us -- in this case, what our words convey about material things. Indeed, if we want to study these, we can only get a handle on this by the use of words.]

If it is now objected that the above example is irrelevant, then it behoves that objector to indicate in what way our ordinary words for material objects fall short of whatever they are supposed to fall short of -- without actually using the word "material" (or any of its synonyms, such as "matter") anywhere in that attempt. Short of doing that, that objector's own use of this word (or one of its cognates) to express his/her objection (howsoever mild or nuanced it is) will be subject to the very same unspecified shortcomings, and the objection itself would fail for lack of content.

In that case, however, such an objector would find him/herself in a worse predicament than the rest of us (allegedly are); this is because he/she will now be unclear, not just about our ordinary words for material objects, but about the application of his/her own non-standard, jargonised replacement for them, because he/she will necessarily be unclear about what they were supposed to be replacing!

Now, if would-be critics want to revise a word in common use, all well and good; but this cannot affect the ordinary meaning that word currently has. Such a revision would merely relate to this new and typographically identical word, with its new and/or extended meaning. The ordinary word word will go on its way, unaffected by all this palaver.

So, no attempt can be made to undermine or question the use that a word already has without that revision itself descending into incoherence, as we have just seen.

Hence, it is not possible to pretend to understand an ordinary word like "material" and then claim that it is defective (whether scientists initiate such an attempt, or not). Either the objector's understanding of this word is defective -- and the ordinary term is alright as it is --, or the ordinary word is defective and no one (including that objector) actually understands it.

In the latter case, there would be nothing left to modify; in the former, no one need bother.

The same comments also apply to the other words you mentioned.


I disagree with the idea that we have no access to nature except by means of language. I am not quite sure what you mean by "common understanding". I would rather say we ultimately have access to nature by being a part of it, presuming we are defining nature as the material world, and that language is simply a system of organizing the information constantly gathered from everything.

By "common understanding" I am referring to the unreflective, ordinary way we go about our daily affairs. If someone, say, asks you in ordinary circumstances to check out the material in a jacket they want to buy, you automatically understand what they are asking. You would not, except perhaps as a rather poor joke, tell them that scientists have shown that such material is just the expression of Banach Space, tensor fields, differential equations, spruced-up with a few probability density functions.

And by this:


no access to nature except by means of language

I mean that even you had to use language to deny it!


If the information we gather from nature is a whole then language (or, our conscious understanding of nature) is dividing said whole and organising the parts into useful systems.

Well, we do not 'gather information' from nature, since nature is not intelligent, and can send us no messages.

Unless, of course, you are using "information" in new and as-yet-unspecified sense.


What I am questioning is the basis of the given and similar inferences. The person saying the sentence is proclaiming that "driving too fast" (the cause) lead to "crashing" (the effect). It is, for example, problematic to separate the state of (or cause) "driving too fast" from the state of (or cause) "driving". It is also problematic to separate the state of (or cause) "driving too fast" from the state of (or cause) "being alive". Does that mean that "being alive" lead to "crashing"? Yes, this follows if (the cause) "driving too fast" lead to (the effect) "crashing".

Even if you are right, I do not see this as "problematic" and can't see why you do so see it.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

The presence of the rock occupying spacetime t1 through t7 was followed by the shattering of a window. The window, analytically defined by structurally integrity, was no longer meeting this definition following the time interval t1 through t8. If the rock was absent from the scenario between time interval t through t7, the window would not have shattered.

Could the rock be absent between these time intervals. Epistemologically, it appears as such. In the state of affairs, what does it mean to say the rock could be absent in this scenario.

It means as follows. There was no event X occurring before this event where a particular factor x1, if not present, would cause a different result to transpire.

For every event, there was an event before it and if that event was not present, circumstances would be different. Without these prior events, the circumstance would not occur. We induce this from everyday regularities we observe in nature.

You can avoid special language when describing determinism. Additionally, you can consider the following analysis of nature.

X happens. Y happens next. Z happens. This continues in such a way. Causation works more like a puzzle than a laser (as typically suggested). It's not firing beams. When I put in the last piece of the puzzle, I (being bad at puzzles) finally realize the combination of pieces and my efforts have caused the existence of a puppy picture.

***

Let me be a simpleton for a moment. I prefer to speak in everyday terms, in every day ways, et cetera.

We see an event happen. There was an event that caused it. You can describe cause in whatever way suits you. However, there was something (or things) prior in time that if you took them away, the event would have have occurred. Where is this shown false anywhere in nature?

Is there really any strong reason to believe determinism is false, how we choose to describe it aside? Maybe I am missing something. Even if a few cases may be troubling for determinism, it works so well as an explanatory theory (as I see it), it's more prudent to work things into the theory than demolish it because of a few worries. If we can't find a cause for 1 thing, we should keep looking. Otherwise, we don't build up our knowledge base.

How do we describe anything in terms of verb usage, action, etc, without the idea of causality? All the time I see people against determinism. I don't know what they are offering in return that has any explanatory power.

Randomness relies on notions of causality. Free will relies on notions of causality. Constant conjunction is just a Humean way of conceptualizing causality. The necessity is just a presumption. Causality is an explanatory model that theoretically works for all relationships of a specific type.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Could the rock be absent between these time intervals. Epistemologically, it appears as such. In the state of affairs, what does it mean to say the rock could be absent in this scenario.

What do you mean by "appears"? As you depict things, this is either no rock known to human kind, or this is no window.

Unless, of course, you are using "rock" and/or "window" in a new, and as-yet-unexplained sense.


It means as follows. There was no event X occurring before this event where a particular factor x1, if not present, would cause a different result to transpire.

For every event, there was an event before it and if that event was not present, circumstances would be different. Without these prior events, the circumstance would not occur. We induce this from everyday regularities we observe in nature.

You can avoid special language when describing determinism. Additionally, you can consider the following analysis of nature.

X happens. Y happens next. Z happens. This continues in such a way. Causation works more like a puzzle than a laser (as typically suggested). It's not firing beams. When I put in the last piece of the puzzle, I (being bad at puzzles) finally realize the combination of pieces and my efforts have caused the existence of a puppy picture.

Well, your 'special language' re-surfaces in your odd use of other ordinary words, such as the two I mentioned above.

And, as I predicted you might, you are still trying to derive fundamental truths about nature from an odd use of language. May I suggest you re-read this answer I gave you several months back:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

Add to it this:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1596520&postcount=20

Recall that if you try to find an a priori solution to this (bogus) 'problem' then you will merely have confirmed that ruling ideas rule you too!


Is there really any strong reason to believe determinism is false, how we choose to describe it aside? Maybe I am missing something. Even if a few cases may be troubling for determinism, it works so well as an explanatory theory (as I see it), it's more prudent to work things into the theory than demolish it because of a few worries. If we can't find a cause for 1 thing, we should keep looking. Otherwise, we don't build up our knowledge base.

I certainly have never said determinism is false, just that it only works if you are prepared to anthropomorphise nature -- in other words, it is a non-sensical 'theory'.


I don't know what they are offering in return that has any explanatory power.

But, what is there to 'explain'? This entire tradition in philosophy derives from a systematic misuse of language.

Anyone who thinks otherwise is rather like someone who becomes embroiled in trying to find the answer to 'problems' like these: "Ok, who crowned the king in chess? And is the bishop Roman Catholic or Protestant? [Alternative answers to these serious problems have 'no explanatory power'...]"

You really have to shake yourself free from such ruling-class confusions.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

With the rock, I am suggested that if it hadn't been present, the window would not have broken. For every event, there is a variable that you can say "if it hadn't been presented" the event would not have happened. This variable also occurred before the event.

Why can you anthropomorphise humans? There is no distinct way that human begins interact with the environment that warrants us having our own "special" language. If I say, the computer caused the machine to start, I should also say "The man caused the machine to start."

I'm not sure why anthropomorphizing nature is bad or even necessary for determinism. As you mentioned elsewhere, language is a mirror. If you just take the general idea of determinism, "what it means as a concept as understood in the mind," it seems like a quite plausible idea.

I'm not sure why all this focus on language. If your goal is to have us use language in a more clear and specific way, then I can commend that. However, I don't see how the use of particular terms somehow eliminates the validity of a particular idea.

If I say "It's raining cats and dogs" is that a completely nonsensical statement? It's quite clear that it isn't nonsensical, as far as I can see.

If I say "there are causal laws that determine events" it is certainly a huge undertaking to spell out what that means. However, you haven't really given a reason to believe outright it can't be done.

What exactly is "anthropomorphising nature?" Giving it terms that only apply to humans? Giving humans special terms is a mistake in the first place. Dennett and the Churchlands are dealing with that issue specifically (Wittgenstein fans) in Philosophy of Mind. We need to bring human language down to earth.

I really don't see how there seemingly observable, predictable order of things that appears in everyday life is called into question by how language is used. Language is being used to back determinism into a corner and tear apart its meaning and sensibility. However, if we ground ourselves and get out of this storm of confusing philosophy of language, we can understand what is really being talked about.

Maybe I'll figure it out. I don't know.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


With the rock, I am suggested that if it hadn't been present, the window would not have broken. For every event, there is a variable that you can say "if it hadn't been presented" the event would not have happened. This variable also occurred before the event.

Ah, that's a lot clearer. This is a counterfactual account you are giving us. But something else might have broken the window.


Why can you anthropomorphise humans? There is no distinct way that human begins interact with the environment that warrants us having our own "special" language. If I say, the computer caused the machine to start, I should also say "The man caused the machine to start."

I've already said you can!

Me:


Well, I have no problem with anthropomorphising humanity, since this is one area where it is quite legitimate to do so (as the word suggests). But, even then, I'd be careful how I used the word 'determine'.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1588384&postcount=60

You:


I'm not sure why anthropomorphizing nature is bad or even necessary for determinism. As you mentioned elsewhere, language is a mirror. If you just take the general idea of determinism, "what it means as a concept as understood in the mind," it seems like a quite plausible idea.

Well, it suggests that nature is a human being, or is intelligent. This is indeed how ruling-class ideology has depicted nature for thousands of years. It is also a dead-end.


As you mentioned elsewhere, language is a mirror.

I did no such thing!


If you just take the general idea of determinism, "what it means as a concept as understood in the mind," it seems like a quite plausible idea

But, as I have already noted, this theory only gets off the ground by misusing language (on that, see below), so there is no 'problem' here that needs solving.


I'm not sure why all this focus on language. If your goal is to have us use language in a more clear and specific way, then I can commend that. However, I don't see how the use of particular terms somehow eliminates the validity of a particular idea.

1) Even you had to use language to make this point!

2) Now, try to make the same point, but do not use any language this time...


If I say "It's raining cats and dogs" is that a completely nonsensical statement? It's quite clear that it isn't nonsensical, as far as I can see.

No, it's a figurative use of language:

http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/raining%20cats%20and%20dogs.html

But what has this got to do with anything?


If I say "there are causal laws that determine events" it is certainly a huge undertaking to spell out what that means. However, you haven't really given a reason to believe outright it can't be done.

Then, if you are using figurative language here, we'd need to see what William James called its "cash value".

For example, if I say that a certain man (say "NN") is a pig, I am alluding to NN's uncouth manner and/or hygiene (etc.)

So, what is the cash value of your metaphor (if it is one)? What work does "determine" do here?

Do laws decide anything? No. Do they express fortitude? No. Do they make inferences? No.

But that is how the word "determine" is ordinarily used. As in:

1) The committee determined the date of the next meeting.

2) "I'm determined to finish the marathon!"

3) "From the information you gave me, I've determined where you were born."

So, why employ this metaphor if none of the above uses apply to it?

If I were to say "NN is a pig" but did [I]not mean NN was uncouth and unwashed (etc.) you'd be at a loss as to what I did mean. I'd have divorced this metaphor from its cash value, and I'd end up not meaning anything at all.

Same here.


What exactly is "anthropomorphising nature?" Giving it terms that only apply to humans? Giving humans special terms is a mistake in the first place.

But, you are a human being. So, in saying this, you are giving yourself a special status. And you have to use ordinary language to do so -- otherwise no one would be able to understand you. If you now misuse that language, it needs pointing out to you, since, by your doing so, you will only have recapitulated the errors that created 'determinism in the first place.


Dennett and the Churchlands are dealing with that issue specifically (Wittgenstein fans) in Philosophy of Mind. We need to bring human language down to earth

Can't be done -- and I'd like to see you try. [For example, you'd have to use Martian, or Venusian, or some other non-human language in order to do so.]

I've explained why in an earlier reply to Meridian (using the example of "matter", but the same argument applies to the use of any ordinary word):



I beg to differ. If, for example, scientists were to discover that matter does not exist in the traditional sense, but instead is a constantly reinventing illusion of some sort then it could very well change our language dramatically. The same applies to other fundamental concepts of nature, such as time and light. If we were to discover proof that there in reality is no time, only matter changing form then perhaps that would change how we spoke of the past and future.

Well, if we have all been misusing the word "matter", and that includes you when you try to tell us we have, then any sentence containing that word will lack a sense, since it will contain a word ("matter") that no one understands, not even scientists.

On the other hand, if you and scientists are using the word "matter" in the way the rest of us are, then the problem disappears.

Consider this:

H1: Ordinary language cannot account for or depict material objects.

But, is H1 itself written in ordinary language? It certainly looks like it. If it is, it is pertinent to ask what the word "material" in H1 actually means.

If we, as ordinary speakers, do not understand this word, what precisely is it that you and/or scientists are presuming to correct? We may only be educated if we know of what it is that we are ignorant -- that is, if we already know what material things are is (so that we can at least say that our word "matter" does not match some ideal). But, ex hypothesi, we are not supposed to know this since our language is allegedly inadequate in this area.

[This point shows that the argument here is not solely about language, but about what it conveys to us -- in this case, what our words convey about material things. Indeed, if we want to study these, we can only get a handle on this by the use of words.]

If it is now objected that the above example is irrelevant, then it behoves that objector to indicate in what way our ordinary words for material objects fall short of whatever they are supposed to fall short of -- without actually using the word "material" (or any of its synonyms, such as "matter") anywhere in that attempt. Short of doing that, that objector's own use of this word (or one of its cognates) to express his/her objection (howsoever mild or nuanced it is) will be subject to the very same unspecified shortcomings, and the objection itself would fail for lack of content.

In that case, however, such an objector would find him/herself in a worse predicament than the rest of us (allegedly are); this is because he/she will now be unclear, not just about our ordinary words for material objects, but about the application of his/her own non-standard, jargonised replacement for them, because he/she will necessarily be unclear about what they were supposed to be replacing!

Now, if would-be critics want to revise a word in common use, all well and good; but this cannot affect the ordinary meaning that word currently has. Such a revision would merely relate to this new and typographically identical word, with its new and/or extended meaning. The ordinary word will go on its way, unaffected by all this palaver.

So, no attempt can be made to undermine or question the use that a word already has without that revision itself descending into incoherence, as we have just seen.

Hence, it is not possible to pretend to understand an ordinary word like "material" and then claim that it is defective (whether scientists initiate such an attempt, or not). Either the objector's understanding of this word is defective -- and the ordinary term is alright as it is --, or the ordinary word is defective and no one (including that objector) actually understands it.

In the latter case, there would be nothing left to modify; in the former, no one need bother.

The same comments also apply to the other words you mentioned.

It's not possible to attack ordinary language, whatever Daniel Dennett or Paul Churchland might say.

And this has nothing to do with "Wittgenstein fans", as you put it. It has to do with making sense, and you can't do that if you try to undermine ordinary language.


I really don't see how there seemingly observable, predictable order of things that appears in everyday life is called into question by how language is used. Language is being used to back determinism into a corner and tear apart its meaning and sensibility.

Who is calling into question our capacity to predict things? Not me. Indeed, I have specifically made the point that this is what the sciences do all the time, and legitimately so.

But, determinism has nothing to do with this. It is not a scientific theory,


However, if we ground ourselves and get out of this storm of confusing philosophy of language, we can understand what is really being talked about.

As I noted above, I'd like to see you try to 'solve' this without using any language at all.


Maybe I'll figure it out. I don't know.

There is nothing to figure out. Again, referring back to the chess analogy. Imagine someone using say the King in chess to prop open a door. Imagine someone else asking this question: "Why did the King decide to do that?"

There is no answer to such a non-sensical question.

Same with determinism, only it's harder to see (which is why it has fooled so many for so long -- but someone had to point out that this king was naked...).

[Paul Cockshott]

It's not possible to attack ordinary language, whatever Daniel Dennett or Paul Churchland might say.

And this has nothing to do with "Wittgenstein fans", as you put it. It has to do with making sense, and you can't do that if you try to undermine ordinary language.
It is not a question of attacking ordinary language. When the epistemological break associated with the establishment of a new science occurs words are given new technical meanings. The new meanings refer to new concepts that were not present in everyday language. Quarks do not have colour or charm, these are just a playful use of language.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


It is not a question of attacking ordinary language. When the epistemological break associated with the establishment of a new science occurs words are given new technical meanings. The new meanings refer to new concepts that were not present in everyday language. Quarks do not have colour or charm, these are just a playful use of language.

I was addressing someone who was attacking it.

And I am not questioning the new terminology invented by scientists, either. What on earth led you to suppose I was?