Autopoiesis

[thesmokingfrog]

Have anyone read about the autopoietic theory? or the biology of cognition (a scientific theory that, according to their authors, 'knows the knowing')?

In a way, Maturana and Varela's theories seems to 'save' (from the hegelian obscurantism, haha) much of the good things about dialectics.

there is a paper in enolagaia (/M70-80BoC.html, apparently I can't yet post links) about the biology of cognition if ur interested.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

But there are no:


good things about dialectics.

Or, if there are, comrades have been remarkably coy about what these are.

Anyway, I am rather unfamilair with the theory you mention, and from what little have seen, I do not want to know any more, since it seems to me just another dogmatic a priori theory.

[thesmokingfrog]

hahaha xD, i've read some of ur articles with interest rosa (antidialectics fundamentalist;)).
the good thing about the dialectics (as informal logic), i'd say, is the not essentialist conception of language. U know, 'the being and not-being are the same' (concretely speaking) kind of stuff.

Well, the biology of cognition is not strictly speaking a philosophical theory (even thou it does address many classical philosophical themes) so it is not a dogmatic apriori theory, at least not in this sense (all theory, in reality, can be a dogmatic apriori theory if not used to reformulate empyrical and real phenomena). It originates from the theory of autopoiesis, I won’t deviate from the subject explaining it at deep (but I could make the effort if you want).
Autopoiesis solves the problem of dualism in an interesting way, some of the consequences of this is that autopoietic systems are structurally determined, so therefore autonomic and discrete units distinct from their environment. This means that living beings exists in two distinct (but not independent) phenomenical dominions which are not reducible to one another, (1) a physiological dominion, and a (2) behavioral dominion. The behavioral dominion, is the one of the living being, considered as a whole (not networks of processes of production that constitute the physiological dominion), in coupling with its environment, so to realize a way of life (the one that characterizes the specie)
They say that all cogintion is a behavioural phenomenon (in the former sense). As such is an effective (active, not passive perception) proccess. the conclusion is that living beings do not know a pre-given world, living beings are uninterested about the 'noumenic' world, they 'create' (not out of thin air, out their structural coupling with the world) it in their mundane lifes.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

TheSmokingFrog:


the good thing about the dialectics (as informal logic), i'd say, is the not essentialist conception of language. U know, 'the being and not-being are the same' (concretely speaking) kind of stuff.

And yet it is impossible to make sense of this use of language.


Well, the biology of cognition is not strictly speaking a philosophical theory (even thou it does address many classical philosophical themes) so it is not a dogmatic apriori theory, at least not in this sense (all theory, in reality, can be a dogmatic apriori theory if not used to reformulate empyrical and real phenomena). It originates from the theory of autopoiesis, I won’t deviate from the subject explaining it at deep (but I could make the effort if you want).

Well, it seems to make all the errors of post-Cartesian philosophy; what these are I have examined here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm

and here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm


Autopoiesis solves the problem of dualism in an interesting way, some of the consequences of this is that autopoietic systems are structurally determined, so therefore autonomic and discrete units distinct from their environment. This means that living beings exists in two distinct (but not independent) phenomenical dominions which are not reducible to one another, (1) a physiological dominion, and a (2) behavioral dominion. The behavioral dominion, is the one of the living being, considered as a whole (not networks of processes of production that constitute the physiological dominion), in coupling with its environment, so to realize a way of life (the one that characterizes the specie)
They say that all cogintion is a behavioural phenomenon (in the former sense). As such is an effective (active, not passive perception) proccess. the conclusion is that living beings do not know a pre-given world, living beings are uninterested about the 'noumenic' world, they 'create' (not out of thin air, out their structural coupling with the world) it in their mundane lifes.

Well, as I say, this seems to replicate the problems of post-Cartesian philosohy of mind, in that it treats dualism as a problem that needs solving, when it is in fact the result of a confused use of language.

[thesmokingfrog]

Well, as I say, this seems to replicate the problems of post-Cartesian philosohy of mind, in that it treats dualism as a problem that needs solving, when it is in fact the result of a confused use of language.
where exactly are those errors?? im having problems locating them in the essay.