Random Precision
24th September 2009, 21:43
A book review I wrote for my 20th-Century Latin America course on Samuel Farber's The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered (University of North Carolina Press, 2006), follows:
In this slim volume, Cuban-born American sociologist Samuel Farber sets out to build a picture of the Cuban Revolution as both a revolution strictly controlled from above, yet also a revolution that became both thoroughly anti-imperialist and widely popular throughout the nation it overturned. He attempts to do this primarily by confronting with reality various popular conceptions of the revolution encouraged by both its opponents on the Cuban and American Right, and its supporters on the pro-Communist Left.
Throughout the narrative, Farber concerns himself with navigating between two extreme points of view on the revolutionary process: the first might be called the “reactive” point of view, that Fidel Castro and the 26th of July movement were solely reacting to the actions of American imperialism attempting to preserve its hold on Cuba. The other might be called the “conspirational” point of view, which holds that Castro from the beginning intended to set up an anti-imperialist, communist regime, perhaps with the aid of Moscow.
One of the most enduring ideas of the Cuban revolution from the reactive point of view, for instance, is that it very well might have gone in a non-Communist direction had United States policy been a bit more moderate. Farber uses his impressive source base to demonstrate the inability of the quite considerable American business complex in Cuba to come up with a coherent reaction to the Castro government’s land seizures, nationalizations and other legislation. For example, he brings to light the fact that US oil companies in Cuba had been ready to process Soviet-bought oil until the American government ordered them not to. This necessitated a US government policy toward the revolution. Any US government policy, no matter how “moderate” in intention, was inherently limited by the need for policy that would maintain its imperial dominance of Latin America. For instance, the last American ambassador to Cuba, Philip Bonsal, could be said to be the most important proponent of this view before the American government adopted an actively hostile policy toward Castro’s government. Bonsal merely aimed at “buying time” for a native Cuban opposition to pro-Communist trends within the 26th of July Movement and indeed, the leadership of Fidel Castro to strengthen and take the revolution in a direction that was more friendly to American policy. Bonsal was of the opinion that “Castro can recognize and be guided by the facts” of the “political and economic conditions to which he is subjected”, or in other words be convinced to accommodate his revolution to continued American neo-colonial dominance of Cuba’s economy (100). The discussion of Bonsal as representative of moderation demonstrates excellently that such “moderation” was strictly within the limits of US Cold War policy toward Latin America, and could never have adapted itself to the profound social changes the Revolution instituted.
Farber is similarly excellent on treating the opposite, conspirational viewpoint, which typically involves Castro planning from the beginning to engineer an anti-American, Marxist-Leninist revolution in Cuba. He notes that this outlook is held in different forms by both the right wing opposed to the revolution and the left wing supporting it. He is able to put this myth, whatever the form it takes, to bed pretty well with his investigation of Fidel Castro’s politics. It is noted that Castro took a much more moderate stance from 1957 even through 1959, and as is well known, that liberals were included in the first revolutionary government. Farber characterizes Castro’s politics as another brand of Latin American populism inherited from his student background- according to Farber, he was an “economic illiterate” who read far more into literature, history and philosophy than into Marxist political economy before the revolution (57). Furthermore, Farber takes time to define the role of the Cuban Communists in the Partido Socialista Popular as being often fundamentally opposed to Castro- they did not back the insurgency until the late months of 1958, and even then were unsteady allies who fell ahead of or behind Castro’s tendency toward the left throughout the first years of revolution. Furthermore, Moscow barely took notice of the revolution in Cuba at first- it was only because of the waxing of Soviet power on the international scene, and the constellation of forces within Cuba- “the collapse of the traditional army, and the political weakness of the upper and middle classes” (170) that the Soviet Union was able to commit itself to defending a country 90 miles from its main imperial opponent.
So Farber has navigated admirably well between the two extremes that portray the revolutionaries as solely reacting to the actions of American imperial power, or that of a Moscow-inspired plan to turn Cuba Communist. What, therefore, lies between these two poles- what, in other words, was the Cuban Revolution? Here is where Farber begins to leave safe ground. His analysis of the revolutionary forces tends to revolve solely around the character of Fidel Castro as “a master tactician who, while privately committed to a notion of pushing Cuba in a generally left-wing anti-imperialist direction, lacked a master plan” (168). Fair enough, one might say, but Castro would not have been able to carry out such a far-reaching social revolution on his own. Farber rightly makes much of Castro’s personal hegemony within the 26th of July Movement- he quotes the oppositional revolutionary Carlos Franqui noting that the meetings of the leadership were “consultation[s]” or “conversations… in which a decision is taken for granted” (66-67). However, Farber seems uncomfortable when it comes to analyzing what the figure of Castro, and thus his hegemonic power in the revolution, actually represents. At first he defines Castro as a caudillo- a figure in the style of certain 19th-century Latin American populists who dominated whole countries through their charisma and patronage, for example Juan Manuel de Rosas of Argentina and Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana of Mexico. However, later in the book he is inclined to analyze Castro using the Marxist conception of Bonapartism- the phenomena in which a leader, typically of the military, is able to take a large amount of power and freedom of action relative to the social classes in a nation because of the ruling class’ inability to govern, or a deadlock of the classes contending for power. His analysis of Castro using either concept is heavily problematic- a caudillo was very much a member of the ruling class and could never bring about a social revolution, even from above, and a Bonaparte was never able to surmount the social classes of his nation for as long as Castro has.
This inability to successfully define what Castro represents might be described as the central weakness of Farber’s thesis. Furthermore, one feels that he has placed far too much importance on Castro the individual. He notes repeatedly the presence of the Communist wing of the 26th of July movement, led by Raúl Castro and Ernesto Guevara, as well as the presence of other elements besides the 26th of July itself. His explanation of how Castro was able to keep power over all these forces to direct the revolution seems in need of elaboration. Furthermore, his narrative only steps beyond the conquest of political power in 1959 to deal with the deterioration of relations with the United States, while he admits that the aspects of social revolution in Cuba continued throughout the early 1960s. One wishes that he had extended his narrative into this period for the sake of explaining how Castro kept control of the revolutionary process during the period of greatest upheaval.
Such are the main problems in Farber’s analysis. His source base, however, is quite impressive and includes a select range of the most telling primary and secondary material. He is unafraid to quote Fidel Castro in his own words, and draws as well from personal accounts of Castro ranging from that of his friend Gabriel García Márquez to the mostly hostile account of American reporter Tad Szulc. He similarly demonstrates familiarity with primary source material from other Cuban revolutionaries, including Che Guevara as well as the dissident Carlos Franqui, and the works of Blas Roca, the leader of the Cuban Communists before the revolution. The part of his work that deals with the United States is heavily supported by declassified Central Files from the State Department. He also draws from secondary work including James O’Connor’s analysis of the economic basis of Cuban socialism, the work of Morris Morley and Richard Welch in documenting the relationship between the United States and revolutionary Cuba, and that of Louis Pérez on revolutionary Cuban society. While there is certainly much more literature than what Farber has selected, one feels that a book twice as long could have been written with similar backing, which could have dealt more strongly with the problems this reader sees in his thesis.
In conclusion, therefore, The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered is an excellent brief summary of what is wrong with many conventional ideas on the process of revolution in Cuba. It is to be recommended on that basis, and readers especially of a left-wing political bent will find a refreshing account that neither falls into anti-Communist hysteria nor praises the revolutionary regime to the skies. Farber especially deserves credit for demolishing the persistent myth of possible American moderation toward the Cuban Revolution. However, inasmuch as he has succeeded in defining what the Revolution was not- a Communist coup or a reaction to American imperial policy- he has failed in his tentative attempts to define what the Revolution was. His book should be used as a starting point for those attempting to answer that question.
In this slim volume, Cuban-born American sociologist Samuel Farber sets out to build a picture of the Cuban Revolution as both a revolution strictly controlled from above, yet also a revolution that became both thoroughly anti-imperialist and widely popular throughout the nation it overturned. He attempts to do this primarily by confronting with reality various popular conceptions of the revolution encouraged by both its opponents on the Cuban and American Right, and its supporters on the pro-Communist Left.
Throughout the narrative, Farber concerns himself with navigating between two extreme points of view on the revolutionary process: the first might be called the “reactive” point of view, that Fidel Castro and the 26th of July movement were solely reacting to the actions of American imperialism attempting to preserve its hold on Cuba. The other might be called the “conspirational” point of view, which holds that Castro from the beginning intended to set up an anti-imperialist, communist regime, perhaps with the aid of Moscow.
One of the most enduring ideas of the Cuban revolution from the reactive point of view, for instance, is that it very well might have gone in a non-Communist direction had United States policy been a bit more moderate. Farber uses his impressive source base to demonstrate the inability of the quite considerable American business complex in Cuba to come up with a coherent reaction to the Castro government’s land seizures, nationalizations and other legislation. For example, he brings to light the fact that US oil companies in Cuba had been ready to process Soviet-bought oil until the American government ordered them not to. This necessitated a US government policy toward the revolution. Any US government policy, no matter how “moderate” in intention, was inherently limited by the need for policy that would maintain its imperial dominance of Latin America. For instance, the last American ambassador to Cuba, Philip Bonsal, could be said to be the most important proponent of this view before the American government adopted an actively hostile policy toward Castro’s government. Bonsal merely aimed at “buying time” for a native Cuban opposition to pro-Communist trends within the 26th of July Movement and indeed, the leadership of Fidel Castro to strengthen and take the revolution in a direction that was more friendly to American policy. Bonsal was of the opinion that “Castro can recognize and be guided by the facts” of the “political and economic conditions to which he is subjected”, or in other words be convinced to accommodate his revolution to continued American neo-colonial dominance of Cuba’s economy (100). The discussion of Bonsal as representative of moderation demonstrates excellently that such “moderation” was strictly within the limits of US Cold War policy toward Latin America, and could never have adapted itself to the profound social changes the Revolution instituted.
Farber is similarly excellent on treating the opposite, conspirational viewpoint, which typically involves Castro planning from the beginning to engineer an anti-American, Marxist-Leninist revolution in Cuba. He notes that this outlook is held in different forms by both the right wing opposed to the revolution and the left wing supporting it. He is able to put this myth, whatever the form it takes, to bed pretty well with his investigation of Fidel Castro’s politics. It is noted that Castro took a much more moderate stance from 1957 even through 1959, and as is well known, that liberals were included in the first revolutionary government. Farber characterizes Castro’s politics as another brand of Latin American populism inherited from his student background- according to Farber, he was an “economic illiterate” who read far more into literature, history and philosophy than into Marxist political economy before the revolution (57). Furthermore, Farber takes time to define the role of the Cuban Communists in the Partido Socialista Popular as being often fundamentally opposed to Castro- they did not back the insurgency until the late months of 1958, and even then were unsteady allies who fell ahead of or behind Castro’s tendency toward the left throughout the first years of revolution. Furthermore, Moscow barely took notice of the revolution in Cuba at first- it was only because of the waxing of Soviet power on the international scene, and the constellation of forces within Cuba- “the collapse of the traditional army, and the political weakness of the upper and middle classes” (170) that the Soviet Union was able to commit itself to defending a country 90 miles from its main imperial opponent.
So Farber has navigated admirably well between the two extremes that portray the revolutionaries as solely reacting to the actions of American imperial power, or that of a Moscow-inspired plan to turn Cuba Communist. What, therefore, lies between these two poles- what, in other words, was the Cuban Revolution? Here is where Farber begins to leave safe ground. His analysis of the revolutionary forces tends to revolve solely around the character of Fidel Castro as “a master tactician who, while privately committed to a notion of pushing Cuba in a generally left-wing anti-imperialist direction, lacked a master plan” (168). Fair enough, one might say, but Castro would not have been able to carry out such a far-reaching social revolution on his own. Farber rightly makes much of Castro’s personal hegemony within the 26th of July Movement- he quotes the oppositional revolutionary Carlos Franqui noting that the meetings of the leadership were “consultation[s]” or “conversations… in which a decision is taken for granted” (66-67). However, Farber seems uncomfortable when it comes to analyzing what the figure of Castro, and thus his hegemonic power in the revolution, actually represents. At first he defines Castro as a caudillo- a figure in the style of certain 19th-century Latin American populists who dominated whole countries through their charisma and patronage, for example Juan Manuel de Rosas of Argentina and Antonio Lopez de Santa Ana of Mexico. However, later in the book he is inclined to analyze Castro using the Marxist conception of Bonapartism- the phenomena in which a leader, typically of the military, is able to take a large amount of power and freedom of action relative to the social classes in a nation because of the ruling class’ inability to govern, or a deadlock of the classes contending for power. His analysis of Castro using either concept is heavily problematic- a caudillo was very much a member of the ruling class and could never bring about a social revolution, even from above, and a Bonaparte was never able to surmount the social classes of his nation for as long as Castro has.
This inability to successfully define what Castro represents might be described as the central weakness of Farber’s thesis. Furthermore, one feels that he has placed far too much importance on Castro the individual. He notes repeatedly the presence of the Communist wing of the 26th of July movement, led by Raúl Castro and Ernesto Guevara, as well as the presence of other elements besides the 26th of July itself. His explanation of how Castro was able to keep power over all these forces to direct the revolution seems in need of elaboration. Furthermore, his narrative only steps beyond the conquest of political power in 1959 to deal with the deterioration of relations with the United States, while he admits that the aspects of social revolution in Cuba continued throughout the early 1960s. One wishes that he had extended his narrative into this period for the sake of explaining how Castro kept control of the revolutionary process during the period of greatest upheaval.
Such are the main problems in Farber’s analysis. His source base, however, is quite impressive and includes a select range of the most telling primary and secondary material. He is unafraid to quote Fidel Castro in his own words, and draws as well from personal accounts of Castro ranging from that of his friend Gabriel García Márquez to the mostly hostile account of American reporter Tad Szulc. He similarly demonstrates familiarity with primary source material from other Cuban revolutionaries, including Che Guevara as well as the dissident Carlos Franqui, and the works of Blas Roca, the leader of the Cuban Communists before the revolution. The part of his work that deals with the United States is heavily supported by declassified Central Files from the State Department. He also draws from secondary work including James O’Connor’s analysis of the economic basis of Cuban socialism, the work of Morris Morley and Richard Welch in documenting the relationship between the United States and revolutionary Cuba, and that of Louis Pérez on revolutionary Cuban society. While there is certainly much more literature than what Farber has selected, one feels that a book twice as long could have been written with similar backing, which could have dealt more strongly with the problems this reader sees in his thesis.
In conclusion, therefore, The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered is an excellent brief summary of what is wrong with many conventional ideas on the process of revolution in Cuba. It is to be recommended on that basis, and readers especially of a left-wing political bent will find a refreshing account that neither falls into anti-Communist hysteria nor praises the revolutionary regime to the skies. Farber especially deserves credit for demolishing the persistent myth of possible American moderation toward the Cuban Revolution. However, inasmuch as he has succeeded in defining what the Revolution was not- a Communist coup or a reaction to American imperial policy- he has failed in his tentative attempts to define what the Revolution was. His book should be used as a starting point for those attempting to answer that question.