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koo1917
9th September 2009, 13:27
Violence returns to Xinjiang

Monday, 7 September 2009.
Five killed in latest ethnic clashes as Chinese regime loses control over Western region

chinaworker.info reporters Tens of thousands of Han Chinese citizens have marched in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, in recent days to demand the resignation of provincial party boss Wang Lequan. The unprecedented protests that began on Wednesday 2 September are in reaction to a spate of syringe attacks apparently carried out by Uighur Muslim youth, mostly but not exclusively targeting Han Chinese. Uighurs, a Turkic speaking group are the dominant ethnic group in Xinjiang, but a minority in Urumqi and several other cities in the province. "Wang Lequan step down" chanted Han demonstrators, who accuse provincial leaders of failing to protect them. The dominant mood of these mobilisations has been chauvinistic and anti-Uighur, while protesters also raised political demands - for greater economic support and compensation from central government and for the punishment of bureaucratic corruption.
These dramatic events, including attempts by Han demonstrators to break into Uighur areas of the city, are part of a pattern of escalating inter-ethnic tension in Xinjiang following major riots in July that resulted in nearly 200 killed. On 3 and 4 September, several clashes were reported between Han Chinese and Uighurs and military police (PAP) fired tear gas to disperse Han crowds. According to official reports five people have been killed and 14 wounded, but no details have yet been given, nor a breakdown of the ethnicity of the victims. In addition, three Hong Kong journalists were beaten and arrested by military police when they interviewed protesters, an incident that has brought forth protests and condemnation in Hong Kong.
Syringe attacks spread panic
The spate of syringe attacks that began around two weeks ago are puzzling, and have succeeded in spreading panic in Urumqi. The uncertainty has been exacerbated by the strict media controls of the one-party state, including the locking down of all internet and mobile phone messaging since July as a way to block political interchange and - ironically - new protests. Under these conditions, with local officials seemingly incapable of explaining to the public what is actually happening, the rumour mill has spun out of control. Although no one has yet died from the syringe attacks, many believe the syringes contains AIDS or anthrax. So far it is reported that 531 people have been stabbed by syringes but there is no evidence at this stage of any virus or other harmful substance. Heroin traces were found in one hypodermic needle that was used to attack a policeman, but heroin addiction is a widespread problem in Urumqi, among Uighur youth but not only them, and therefore one syringe containing heroin traces is not yet proof of a largescale or orchestrated chemical attack. Although Han have been the majority of those targeted in these attacks, some victims are Uighur or from other ethnic minorities.
Medical staff warn that an atmosphere of panic has led some people to imagine they have been stabbed when in fact they have only suffered insect bites or other less sinister problems. Yet it cannot be ruled out that some of those who have been stabbed with hypodermic syringes have indeed suffered infection - a firm diagnosis can take several months due to the behaviour of certain viruses such as HIV. The mood of panic in Urumqi is reflected in other rumours that meat and vegetables at local wet markets have been poisoned. Whatever transpires, it is clear that the 'communist' authorities in Xingjiang have broken all records in mishandling this situation. This crisis, which began with the police overreaction to a peaceful Uighur demonstration on 5 July, is a sign the regime is losing control of the situation in Xinjiang and its capital city. Suppressing and censuring information to avoid a governmental loss of face, or worsening ethnic tensions, seems to have rebounded disastrously on the government in this case.
The syringe attacks are an extremely misguided and counterproductive "method" for fighting the Chinese state, if this is indeed their aim. Whoever is behind them may calculate that by spreading panic they can force more Han to leave the region. But this is a complete miscalculation. Those - from both communities - who have the possibility to move have largely already done so. Only a united mass movement of all ethnic groups can force change: win democratic rights and economic security by overthrowing the current system. Actions such as the syringe attacks only deepen the ethnic divide and block the road to such united action. Ultimately, such actions only strengthen the state apparatus and give it the excuse to use even tougher repression. Still, the amateurish and obviously localised nature of the syringe attacks shows that any terroristic tendencies that exist among Uighur youth are on a low level, without weapons or outside sponsorship - contrary to what the regime claims.
Aftermath of July riots
Until last week the tension between ethnic groups in Urumqi has remained high, but without further protests. Yet even police spokesmen have admitted "any tiny issue can trigger new conflicts". The events of July were a turning point, shattering the precarious 'peace' that was based on increasing repression against the Uighurs and their distinctive national and religious identity. Since then, many shops have stayed closed and the price of day-to-day commodities has soared. After the July killings there was an exodus from Urumqi; tens of thousands of Han Chinese left for other regions of China while many Uighurs also fled to the countryside or to Uighur-majority towns further south. Tourism, an important source of local income, has collapsed. This explains why many of the Han protesters of recent days also demanded greater support for the economy from the central government. Tragically, there is no grassroots force - no workers' movement - to unite the masses irrespective of ethnicity and show a way out of this situation. Undoubtedly the Uighur population have been radicalised by these events, especially the younger generation, but they have yet to produce a leadership and a strategy that can build the necessary mass movement to achieve change. Also the Han have shed many illusions they had in the state and ruling party. They feel increasingly 'abandoned' - called upon to move to the West for jobs and to 'develop the new China', but now isolated in an environment where they are not welcome. In both communities fear is probably the dominant feeling in these times.
Ironically, just one week prior to the latest upheavals (25 August) president Hu Jintao made a visit to Xinjiang to demonstrate the regime's unshaken control. Wang Lequan, the target of most Han anger in recent days, is seen as a close ally of the president and Hu's appearance there was possibly part of a behind-the-scenes struggle between the two 'communist' factions (Hu's own group and the group close to former president Jiang Zemin) over Wang's future and the conduct of policy in Xinjiang and other predominantly non-Han regions.
On 5 September it was announced that the party chief of Urumqi city, Li Zhi, and the province's top security official, Liu Yaohua, have been sacked - a gesture to assuage mass Han criticism. The two men appear to have been sacrificed to protect the more important scalp of Wang Lequan. Yet according to a report from AFP, Wang too has been sacked although an announcement has been deferred until after the upcoming Central Committee meeting. This meeting is a key conclave in which the two factions will hammer out which figures should be promoted and demoted before the leadership handover set to take place in 2012, when Hu Jintao steps down.
Should Wang be forced out now, this would be unprecedented - a senior provincial leader and member of the ruling Politburo being toppled by mass pressure. That such a possibility exists is a measure of how far the central and provincial leaders have lost trust among the Han masses in Xinjiang, and are thereby losing control over the region and the political turbulence it is producing. "Forcing Wang to step down would be seen, as everyone in Chinese political circles must know, as a terrifying precedent for further demotions and transfers," commented Russell Leigh Moses, a Beijing-based academic (Bloomberg 7 September). Just for this reason, it is possible that Wang will survive at least for the time being - because his departure now would come at such a high political cost to the regime as a whole. But in the final analysis, this issue will be settled on the streets of Urumqi. New mass unrest in coming days or weeks would almost certainly spell the end of Wang's tenure.
Shifting from one line to another

The see-sawing of the regime from one crisis line to another is increasing the fear and anger in both communities while satisfying neither. Han citizens see the regime as failing to defend them against attacks, while Uighurs see the situation as exactly the opposite. If Beijing treads warily towards one group - for example in delaying any executions of Uighurs arrested for the July killings until after the 1 October anniversary (to avoid a global backlash that would overshadow the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic) - this is seen by the Han Chinese in Xinjiang as an unwillingness to give them forceful protection.
Initially the regime did not announce the ethnicity of the syringe attackers (more than 20 have reportedly been arrested), perhaps hoping to minimize the Han backlash and contain the situation. But now this has failed they have officially stated the attacks are the work of "separatists" wanting to split China. This will dismay many Uighurs who do not support these ghoulish attacks, but now rightly fear they will pay the price in Han retaliation and more state repression. Now, in a bid to save his own seat, Wang has dispatched 7,000 government officials as "harmony makers" to go door-to-door and explain government policies and "solve disputes," Xinhua reported. But Wang, who has held the top post in Xinjiang since 1994, is a notorious advocate of hardline repression. He is nicknamed the "stability secretary" although that name sounds inappropriate in today's changed conditions. Whether this latest policy shift has any substance, and whether it can save its author, remains to be seen.
Socialists warn that - in the absence of a workers' movement that can provide real answers to the crisis - these events pose enormous dangers of reaction and a descent into ethnic civil war, which could even resemble the horrors in Yugoslavia in the past, or parts of Iraq today. The task of socialists and websites like chinaworker.info is to explain the crucial need for working class unity across religious and ethnic lines.
The problems of unemployment, poverty, poor housing etc, can only be overcome by a united mass movement against the ruling economic system and regime. An intrinsic part of this struggle is the need for full democratic rights including the right of the Uighurs and other minorities to develop their language and culture in full freedom, as opposed to the coercive policies of the current Chinese state. Only a multi-ethnic grassroots defense force based on and controlled by democratic neighborhood and workplace committees can break the spiral of hatred and distrust in Urumqi and other parts of Xinjiang, and guarantee the mutual peace and security of Han, Uighur and other ethnicity neighborhoods. The PAP and state forces have long lost this authority in Uighur areas, and have now also lost the support of Han areas. In order to avoid barbarism - a vicious ethnic conflict and attacks on ordinary working people - the only and urgent alternative is democratic socialism.