Rome and Carthage

[Led Zeppelin]

I'm reading a book on the history of ancient Rome and just finished the chapter on the Punic Wars. It seems as though Rome was able to win the first Punic War not by being superior materially, but by being superior in terms of tactics (especially on land) and experience. Also, having a regular army as opposed to mercenaries was a big contributing factor as well (this enabled the experience factor to have great importance).

Carthage was, in terms of finance and economic means, far superior to Rome. They had a monopoly on most of the Meditterenean area for decades and made ample use of this. Many tribes and city-states on the coast of Spain, in North-Africa as a whole (up to Egypt) and the islands of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica were under their domination. This was one of the most important reasons for Rome to initiate the war, since they wanted to take control of these islands, especially the one bordering Italy's southern region, Sicily.

Since Carthage was at this point a regional superpower and was superior to Rome in terms of finance and economy, it comes as a surprise to some that Rome managed to win. But when you know the history of Carthage and Rome, specifically their military history, it's not really that surprising that Rome was able to outmaneuver, out man, and overpower the Carthaginians. Carthage was first and foremost a financial, commerce-based empire. Trade was the most important factor to them, and in this they excelled. Throughout their history the Carthaginians used their overwhelming economic power to subdue their foes, mostly by means of mercenaries. The problem with this type of warfare is that it doesn't add on to the military tradition of 'army', simply because it is non-existent. Yes, the generals and officers do gain experience and this is one of the reasons Carthage was able to produce such great leaders as Hamilcar Barca, Hasdrubal and, of course, Hannibal (by the time Hamilcar and his son Hannibal took over the reigns of the military, this problem started to be tackled, which explains their success after the loss of the First Punic War), but without a regular army force which is trained and experienced in action, you won't be able to win a war against Rome.

The Romans had a completely different military history. Their military specialization lay not in mercenaries and overwhelming the foe through economic power, but in stamping out a regular, experienced, well-trained and well-equipped army; the famous Legions of Rome. In the field, the Legions could overpower the Carthaginians with ease. Only the excellent abilities of the Carthaginian military leadership gave them some victories during the first Punic War, the most important and well-known being those of Hamilcar.

Only in one respect did the Carthaginians have a lead over the Romans at the outbreak of the first Punic War; on the sea. Carthage's naval forces were virtually unopposed by the Romans during the first years of the war, simply because the Romans had no navy. Regular lootings and privateering along Italy's coast were an easy way to gain money and resources, while also striking fear into the Romans. Of course their superiority in this respect also helped them maintain their islands. The Romans were unable to stage a successful siege of the coastal cities because they were not able to block supplies to them by sea.

I'll write more on this later, just thought I'd start up a discussion on this.

[chegitz guevara]

Uhm, the experience of Hannibal in Italy would seem to refute that thesis, as Hannibal consistently won with less troops.

And the First Punic War took 20 years for Rome to achieve victory, and they only won because Carthage was tired of fighting.If an antiwar faction hadn't taken control in 244BC, it's possible the war could have ended on more favorable terms for the Carthaginians, as after the Battle of Drepana, Rome had little interest in rebuilding their fleet. The Carthaginians began demobilizing and then their navy was destroyed in the Battle of the Aegates Islands. The demobilization gave the Romans a chance to catch up and ultimately achieve naval superiority.

[Led Zeppelin]

As you can see on the map below, Carthage held a monopoly on the mediterranean area. The map can be a bit deceiving because not only did the Carthaginians dominate the coastal areas of North-Africa and Spain, but also a large part of the inner lands through proxies and conquered tribes that paid tribute and were practically vassals to them.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/First_Punic_War_264_BC.png

I mentioned the navy in my previous post, and I want to expand on that a bit. It is indeed true that Carthage was far superior to Rome on the sea and this superiority remained unchallenged until well into the first Punic War, when the Romans were forced to start building a navy worthy of the name in order to invade North-Africa and successfully finish the attacks on Sicily. Syracuse, an independent power reigning over the south-eastern tip of Sicily (green in the map above) was first allied with Carthage when the war began (due to the Romans allying themselves with an enemy of theirs, which was, incidentally, also used as the pretext for war with Carthage), but then later on switched to the Romans after their initial land victories in Sicily and a siege of the city.

The Romans showed that they were able to defeat the Carthaginians on land with great ease, and together with the Syracusans who made sure that the Romans were supplied and therefore did not have to suffer from the naval dominance of Carthage they went on the task of building a navy and manning it.

The problem with this was also military tradition. The Carthaginians had great leaders, but no sufficient army on land. The Romans had great leaders on land as well as an army, but no sufficient navy. When they did start building the ships, they had to start from scratch in terms of experience and leadership. They were able to counteract this deficiency somewhat by manning the boats with the seafaring peoples of the Hellenic East, predominately Greeks, but also Syracusans. However, the Generals were still Roman, and they now gained the rank of Admiral without knowing anything about naval warfare or tactics.

This inexperience led to several disasters, including the destruction of an entire fleet due to the orders of the Admiral to sail in bad weather (this actually happened on multiple occasions). Another way to counteract this was to build an extra platform on their ships and fill them with Legions, to make use of the superiority of their land forces. This was one of the main reasons the Romans were able to actually win naval battles. The Carthaginian ships collided with the Roman, the latter used their platforms to land on the former, and the Legions would cut the Carthaginians to pieces.

When the Romans proved themselves able to win on land as well as on sea, they decided to take the battle to the Carthaginians. A fleet was assembled and set sail to North-Africa to draw them into battle.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0d/Africainvasion.JPG

As you can see above, the Romans advanced initially but were defeated later on, when Carthage had assembled a powerful force to confront them. The reason for this was the departure of a large section of the initial Roman invading force. The Consul decided that he could face the Cartheginians by himself so sent them home.

After the victories in Sicily the Romans believed that on land they were invincible, just as the Germans thought they were invincible after their initial victories; it is the same with all armies it seems. It is after all much easier to attribute your initial victories to some inherent invincibility than to material circumstances (experience, tactics, equipment, etc.). It turned out that Carthage, even with a mercenary army, was still able to defeat the Romans. The role of the great military leaders played no small part in this, of course. It is no coincidence that Hamilcar was the one who presided over the Carthaginians victories in Sicily.

[Led Zeppelin]

Uhm, the experience of Hannibal in Italy would seem to refute that thesis, as Hannibal consistently won with less troops.

Well, actually, I mentioned this specifically:

Yes, the generals and officers do gain experience and this is one of the reasons Carthage was able to produce such great leaders as Hamilcar Barca, Hasdrubal and, of course, Hannibal (by the time Hamilcar and his son Hannibal took over the reigns of the military, this problem started to be tackled, which explains their success after the loss of the First Punic War), but without a regular army force which is trained and experienced in action, you won't be able to win a war against Rome.

Hamilcar started tackling that problem, and Hannibal went a far way to completely resolve it. He also relied on mercenaries, of course (as did the Romans and practically any other force in those days) but he relied on them differently. First of all he insured that they were regular mercenaries, regular in the sense that they were hired for a long period of time under a specific officer or general. Secondly, he made sure that they were sufficiently trained to fight as an army, as opposed to as small bands or without any training at all.

Also, all this fighting experience (which they gained through the many border skirmishes in Spain) raised the general experience level of the army, and helped make it a cohesive whole. This army coupled with the military genius of its leaders changed the balance of superiority in favor of the Carthaginians on land.


And the First Punic War took 20 years for Rome to achieve victory, and they only won because Carthage was tired of fighting.If an antiwar faction hadn't taken control in 244BC, it's possible the war could have ended on more favorable terms for the Carthaginians, as after the Battle of Drepana, Rome had little interest in rebuilding their fleet. The Carthaginians began demobilizing and then their navy was destroyed in the Battle of the Aegates Islands. The demobilization gave the Romans a chance to catch up and ultimately achieve naval superiority.

Actually it was 23 years. Carthage actually had sued for peace many times before it was finally signed. They had sued for it whenever they were badly defeated and were in danger of being entirely destroyed, which happened on a few occasions (for example they sued for peace when the Romans invaded Africa). You cite the anti-war faction taking control in 244, but you don't mention how or why they were able to do so. There is no doubt at all that the many defeats enabled them to do so. If Hamilcar and the rest of the 'war-faction' didn't have to deal with so many disastrous defeats, but instead with marvelous victories, there is no doubt that at home the feelings for war would be much more favorable.

Regarding the demobilization, I don't see how that had any effect on the Roman ability to build a fleet. Yes, for some time they didn't want to rebuild one, but after the raids on Italy they changed their mind and did. The Carthaginians were unable to stop the Romans from doing so before when their fleet was still intact, so there is no way they could have done anything about it later either, regardless of their fleet being intact or not.

[Lyev]

It's interesting you compare the Romans to the Nazis, Led Zeppelin. I'm fairly sure it's what Marx is getting at in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. He says 'they borrow names, slogans, costumes so as to stage the new world-historical scene in this venerable disguise and borrowed language'. In others words, institutions copy past institutions. Although it's not only borrowing 'names, slogans, costumes', the way the Nazi stormed across Europe with their Blitzkrieg tactics is really quite similar when compared with the Romans storming across Europe some 2000 odd years previous. You talk about the Romans believing they were invisible- it was like with the Nazis, it seemed as if they were invicible for a while. I think it's safe to say their were some similiarities between the Hitlers Army and the Roman Legions like effiency and both had the best technology of their epochs.

[Led Zeppelin]

It's interesting you compare the Romans to the Nazis, Led Zeppelin. I'm fairly sure it's what Marx is getting at in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. He says 'they borrow names, slogans, costumes so as to stage the new world-historical scene in this venerable disguise and borrowed language'. In others words, institutions copy past institutions. Although it's not only borrowing 'names, slogans, costumes', the way the Nazi stormed across Europe with their Blitzkrieg tactics is really quite similar when compared with the Romans storming across Europe some 2000 odd years previous. You talk about the Romans believing they were invisible- it was like with the Nazis, it seemed as if they were invicible for a while. I think it's safe to say their were some similiarities between the Hitlers Army and the Roman Legions like effiency and both had the best technology of their epochs.

Well I wasn't really comparing the Roman army to the Nazi army. I was comparing their air of superiority and invincilibity after their initial victories to that of the Nazi army's. As I said, I actually think this is the case with a lot of armies historically, because it's easier to attribute victory to your perceived inherent invincibility than to analyze the material reasons of it.

Regarding Marx's quote, he mentioned that the French revolutionaries of 1789 invoked the tradition of the Roman Republic, while the 'revolutionaries' of 1848 had to invoke the tradition of the 1789 revolution. I agree that you can find a lot of parallels like that in history but the comparison I made, though also being a historical parallel, is of a different kind.

[Dimentio]

Really, the Romans lost most of the initial battles at sea. It was their maritime victories which ensured their supremacy. Rome had no namy at PW 1, and had to build one from scratch. I would say that Rome had superior resources and higher flexibility than Carthage, which as you say was a commercial and maritime power.

Moreover, Carthage often had the Romans beaten on land both in PW 1 and PW 2. The problem which Carthage mainly had was what to do with the mercenaries when they were not engaged in campaigns. After PW 1, the mercenaries nearly looted Carthage when they feared for their payment.

[TheCultofAbeLincoln]

It is my understanding that the Romans were only able to achieve victory in the second punic war by taking the war to Carthaginian territories, and drawing Hannibal out of Italy.

Hannibal was a genius. His victory at Cannae against overwhelming odds was remarkable, and, if I'm not mistaken, the gretest defeat Rome ever suffered at one battle. Estimates by ancient historians are of 60-80 thousand Romans dead to 10 thousand or fewer for Hannibals forces (which included Gauls and other tribes).

But on the other hand, it might have been a good thing for Rome in the long term to see the limitations of the phalanx and the need for more mobile infantry that would do them well in fighting the hellenistic kingdoms later on.

[manic expression]

Good topic. By the way, if you're not reading Theodore Aryault Dodge's book on the Second Punic War, you're not reading the best.


Hamilcar started tackling that problem, and Hannibal went a far way to completely resolve it. He also relied on mercenaries, of course (as did the Romans and practically any other force in those days) but he relied on them differently.

The Romans didn't rely on mercenaries, definitely not on land, which was always their strength. Every land-owning Roman farmer was expected to be part of the army in a time of war, they were expected to provide their own equipment as well. The Romans' Italian allies, too, were not treated as mercenaries; Hannibal's attempts to divide the Italian allies from the Romans didn't get that far partially for that reason (with the exception of Capua, IIRC). The Roman army would largely stay that way for more than a few centuries afterwards.


First of all he insured that they were regular mercenaries, regular in the sense that they were hired for a long period of time under a specific officer or general. Secondly, he made sure that they were sufficiently trained to fight as an army, as opposed to as small bands or without any training at all.

Any general who ever used mercenaries half-efficiently trained or otherwise utilized them to fight as an army, not as small bands. The mercenaries were hired for a long time because they were sitting in the middle of Roman Italy and it's not like they could've just walked away.

The mercenaries of Hannibal were exceptional, sometimes for those reasons but also for others (in addition to Hannibal's skills as a leader). Hannibal drew a good number of his ranks from the Celtic tribes in the north of Italy, who were ancient and bitter enemies of Rome and at that time facing the prospect of Roman dominance right in the face. Hannibal's Italian allies knew they could look forward to no courtesy from the Romans if captured. The North African cavalrymen who proved key in so many of Hannibal's maneuvers had close connections with Carthage and none with Rome (this would change later when Numidia switched sides just before Zama, depriving Hannibal of his most effective troops, but that's another story). Hannibal's mercenaries were uniquely motivated to fight Rome with vigor.

[Led Zeppelin]

Good topic. By the way, if you're not reading Theodore Aryault Dodge's book on the Second Punic War, you're not reading the best.

The book I'm reading is called The History of Rome by Theodor Mommsen. It's very good so far. I'll check out the book you mentioned as well after finishing this one (though it will take a while because this is a pretty voluminous book).


The Romans didn't rely on mercenaries, definitely not on land, which was always their strength. Every land-owning Roman farmer was expected to be part of the army in a time of war, they were expected to provide their own equipment as well. The Romans' Italian allies, too, were not treated as mercenaries; Hannibal's attempts to divide the Italian allies from the Romans didn't get that far partially for that reason (with the exception of Capua, IIRC). The Roman army would largely stay that way for more than a few centuries afterwards.

Yes, but they did rely on mercenaries on sea, at least during the first Punic War (I've only read the book so far so I'm not sure about later on).


Any general who ever used mercenaries half-efficiently trained or otherwise utilized them to fight as an army, not as small bands.

I think you misunderstood what I was trying to say there. I meant that the mercenaries fought in small bands by themselves, that is, before being under leadership of a general (Hannibal in this case), and that therefore when they did become enlisted Hannibal had to train them to fight as an army.


The mercenaries were hired for a long time because they were sitting in the middle of Roman Italy and it's not like they could've just walked away.

The mercenaries of Hannibal were exceptional, sometimes for those reasons but also for others (in addition to Hannibal's skills as a leader). Hannibal drew a good number of his ranks from the Celtic tribes in the north of Italy, who were ancient and bitter enemies of Rome and at that time facing the prospect of Roman dominance right in the face. Hannibal's Italian allies knew they could look forward to no courtesy from the Romans if captured. The North African cavalrymen who proved key in so many of Hannibal's maneuvers had close connections with Carthage and none with Rome (this would change later when Numidia switched sides just before Zama, depriving Hannibal of his most effective troops, but that's another story). Hannibal's mercenaries were uniquely motivated to fight Rome with vigor.

Well, as I said before, I haven't read the chapter on the Second Punic War yet. I'm at the part where Hannibal is training his army in Carthaginian Spain and is preparing for the invasion of Rome (after allying himself with a few tribes hostile to the Romans to the north of Spain and in Gaul). So far he has mostly drawn his mercenaries from Spain and Africa. You are right about the mercenaries being uniquely motivated to fight Rome with vigor. I think Hannibal's personal qualities had a big role to play in that as well. There was never a mutiny against him by his troops, even at the worst of times. This should say enough to underscore his abilities as a leader, I think.

[ComradeOm]

A good thread but I'm not entirely sure if I'd ascribe to your central thesis. What struck me when I was reading up on the Republic a few years ago (granted, I only touched on Carthage) was that the Romans repeatedly lost battles and armies yet rarely lost wars. There's no question that the legions were capable fighting formations (although let's not forget that the Punic Wars predate the Marian Reforms) but what marks Rome's success in my mind is its ability to continually raise and field new armies following devastating setbacks such as Cannae

You rightly note that the basis of Carthage's economy was commercial but in the context of military tradition. I'd compare this with the more agrarian, and simply larger, Roman economy and suggest that it was this difference that gave rise to the latter's advantage in material. It was precisely this superiority that proved decisive - most notably it allowed Rome to continually have its armies and fleets destroyed yet continue to wage war. I mean, how many Roman armies were annihilated in the Second Punic War alone?

[manic expression]

I mean, how many Roman armies were annihilated in the Second Punic War alone?

The big losses, IIRC, in Italy: 20,000 at Trebia; 35,000 at Trasimene; 60,000 or so at Cannae.

The Romans at the time could count on 500,000 self-equipped able-bodied soldiers if needed during a war. Hannibal fought his way through a fifth of that. Considering those numbers, the fact that Hannibal was never decisively defeated in Italy (only at Zama, and only after the defection of the Nubians), is just awe-inspiring. I should add that the fact that the Romans didn't quit, and actually doubled their efforts after getting thrashed so badly time and again is also quite impressive to say the least.

I have to go, I'll try to post more on this later. Good posts all around!

[chegitz guevara]

And I really think that is the reason why Rome was able to win. Rome just refused to give up. Moral tends to falter at about 10% casualties, but Hannibal inflicted 20% causalities with his forces alone, and Rome just wouldn't stop. And when you talk about having to raise whole new armies to deal with him, obviously superior training isn't a factor. The Romans didn't have time to train new armies. What ultimately led to Hannibal's marginalization was a Roman General who could match him.

[MindYourself]

Although i don't have a very deep knowledge of the topic, i think the most decisive factors for the roman prevalence on the war was what ComradeOm mentioned before, which is actually Rome's greatest advantage : the ability to continuously renew their forces with competent battalions from the pool of the independent farmers of the italic allies of Rome ( a problem that almost 70 years ago Pyrrhus of Epirus had faced too and despite his many but costly victories was eventually forced to withdraw from Italy).

In addition, as far as Hannibal is concerned, i think that despite obviously being a military genius, given the lessons that could be learned from the Epirote campaign against the Romans which practically failed for the same reason IMO, his biggest mistake was that he wasn't from the start of his campaign prepared to besiege Rome. It was not until the spring of 207 b.c. that his brother Hasdrubal managed to cross the Alps with the necessary siege equipment but he was surrounded and having no communication with Hannibal he was defeated and eventually killed in a battle with terrible losses and consequences for the Carthaginians (battle of Metaurus).

What i would be very interested to know is how the Romans gained the upper hand in the sea however. Had the cost and the eventual failure of Hannibal's campaign had an impact on what naval force the carthaginians could field? Was Syracusae's contribution to the roman navy so important that perhaps Carthage should pay more attention on not losing this ally?

Pretty cool subject anyway.

[chimx]

You know what is sad? I used to think that following the 3rd Punic War Rome salted the earth of Carthage, making the soil infertile for generations. How badass is that? Salting the earth to fuck over generations upon generations to come. I just found out that is a myth.

[Black Dagger]

What do people think of Hannibal's decision not to push on for Rome after his run of resounding victories on the peninsular? Perhaps he had some idea about what was afoot - i.e. anticipating he may have to return to Carthage soon. I haven't actually read an explanation of that - by all accounts his victories were impressive, against greater numbers on enemy land, something like 15 years (?) fighting on enemy soil, in the heart of their empire, but he backs away from the killer blow? I guess perhaps he simply saw the limitation of his forces?

Any ideas? I mean, the historical account i received essentially regarded this as a 'mistake' (not pushing on Rome), but it's pretty biased by hindsight - basically after not pushing on Rome, and having their reinforcements headed by Hannibals brother (who's head was subsequently cut off and catapulted into Hannibal's camp!) routed by the Romans after crossing the Alps, they just sort of maurauded aimlessly (?) across the Roman countryside. The implication being that the Romans simply wore them down by attrition, hitting at their supplies etc. trying to starve or demoralise them into capitulation. With Hannibal not conceding but eventually being forced to flee to face the Roman threat on Carthage.

[Dimentio]

Although i don't have a very deep knowledge of the topic, i think the most decisive factors for the roman prevalence on the war was what ComradeOm mentioned before, which is actually Rome's greatest advantage : the ability to continuously renew their forces with competent battalions from the pool of the independent farmers of the italic allies of Rome ( a problem that almost 70 years ago Pyrrhus of Epirus had faced too and despite his many but costly victories was eventually forced to withdraw from Italy).

In addition, as far as Hannibal is concerned, i think that despite obviously being a military genius, given the lessons that could be learned from the Epirote campaign against the Romans which practically failed for the same reason IMO, his biggest mistake was that he wasn't from the start of his campaign prepared to besiege Rome. It was not until the spring of 207 b.c. that his brother Hasdrubal managed to cross the Alps with the necessary siege equipment but he was surrounded and having no communication with Hannibal he was defeated and eventually killed in a battle with terrible losses and consequences for the Carthaginians (battle of Metaurus).

What i would be very interested to know is how the Romans gained the upper hand in the sea however. Had the cost and the eventual failure of Hannibal's campaign had an impact on what naval force the carthaginians could field? Was Syracusae's contribution to the roman navy so important that perhaps Carthage should pay more attention on not losing this ally?

Pretty cool subject anyway.

The Carthaginians feared the Roman navy too much to dare to engage it. Roman naval tactics developed in the First Punic War was to use a hook to neutralise the Carthaginian ships and then simply walk onboard their ships and slaughter their crews. While the Carthaginians still could defeat the Romans at sea, it would not be worth it. That was why they couldn't land an army (or oppose Scipio's invasion).

[ComradeOm]

What do people think of Hannibal's decision not to push on for Rome after his run of resounding victories on the peninsular?I'm going entirely from memory here, so don't quote me on this, but IIRC the common consensus was that Hannibal lacked the siege equipment or logistical base required to invest Rome. This would have been a major operation, most likely taking months. Much of his campaigning in the south of the peninsula was directed at establishing such a base, by winning over Rome's Italian allies, but events proved that he just didn't have the resources for that sort of campaigning. He was able to score many tactical successes but these did not lead to victory. One reason why I think Hannibal's reputation as a general is often overblown - he committed himself to a campaign without clear strategic objectives

[Black Dagger]

Yeah that's something i didn't understand - and wasn't explained satisfactorily IMO. Basically the argument was that he 'hated' the Romans, even as a young boy he took a blood oath to 'DESTROY ROME!' etc. - they made it sound like a war of genocide :confused: That he did it largely because he hated rome and wanted to destroy their civilisation. I guess even though i don't have a background in ancient history i still found that to be fairly unconvincing. I mean, they mentioned the economic/political regional rivarly between Rome and Carthage (which is obviously a facet of it), and the first Punic War - but only really in passing, or briefly, before they went on about how much Hannibal hated Rome. It's just yeah, reading what you're saying and what ive already heard before just makes his campaign even more puzzling in terms of strategic objectives. I mean, if he just wanted to kill romans and loot italy he achieved that - but surely if you're going to attempt one of the most daring military invasions in history - against the peninsular itself - that your goal would in the least be to subdue Rome, to force them into a peace treaty? Otherwise it's a very very big risk to take, and with a very small chance of survival :P

[Dimentio]

Hannibal was tied by the rulers of Carthage. He was not a king who had all the state behind him, but a general who had to obey the orders from the civilian leadership of the city. Carthage was, like Rome, an oligarchic republic.

And like in Rome, the Carthaginian elite feared a family which was too successful. For a long time, the rulers of Carthage denied sending reinforcements to Hannibal, to not strengthen the Barciid family.

If Hannibal would have had more support from the politicians at home, he could very well have inflicted more damage on Rome. But he had not that support, since the leaders were too afraid of losing their own positions and seeing Hannibal or one of his brothers install themselves as kings of Carthage.

[Dean]

I'm reading a book on the history of ancient Rome and just finished the chapter on the Punic Wars. It seems as though Rome was able to win the first Punic War not by being superior materially, but by being superior in terms of tactics (especially on land) and experience. Also, having a regular army as opposed to mercenaries was a big contributing factor as well (this enabled the experience factor to have great importance).

Carthage was, in terms of finance and economic means, far superior to Rome. They had a monopoly on most of the Meditterenean area for decades and made ample use of this. Many tribes and city-states on the coast of Spain, in North-Africa as a whole (up to Egypt) and the islands of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica were under their domination. This was one of the most important reasons for Rome to initiate the war, since they wanted to take control of these islands, especially the one bordering Italy's southern region, Sicily.

Since Carthage was at this point a regional superpower and was superior to Rome in terms of finance and economy, it comes as a surprise to some that Rome managed to win. But when you know the history of Carthage and Rome, specifically their military history, it's not really that surprising that Rome was able to outmaneuver, out man, and overpower the Carthaginians. Carthage was first and foremost a financial, commerce-based empire. Trade was the most important factor to them, and in this they excelled. Throughout their history the Carthaginians used their overwhelming economic power to subdue their foes, mostly by means of mercenaries. The problem with this type of warfare is that it doesn't add on to the military tradition of 'army', simply because it is non-existent. Yes, the generals and officers do gain experience and this is one of the reasons Carthage was able to produce such great leaders as Hamilcar Barca, Hasdrubal and, of course, Hannibal (by the time Hamilcar and his son Hannibal took over the reigns of the military, this problem started to be tackled, which explains their success after the loss of the First Punic War), but without a regular army force which is trained and experienced in action, you won't be able to win a war against Rome.

The Romans had a completely different military history. Their military specialization lay not in mercenaries and overwhelming the foe through economic power, but in stamping out a regular, experienced, well-trained and well-equipped army; the famous Legions of Rome. In the field, the Legions could overpower the Carthaginians with ease. Only the excellent abilities of the Carthaginian military leadership gave them some victories during the first Punic War, the most important and well-known being those of Hamilcar.

Only in one respect did the Carthaginians have a lead over the Romans at the outbreak of the first Punic War; on the sea. Carthage's naval forces were virtually unopposed by the Romans during the first years of the war, simply because the Romans had no navy. Regular lootings and privateering along Italy's coast were an easy way to gain money and resources, while also striking fear into the Romans. Of course their superiority in this respect also helped them maintain their islands. The Romans were unable to stage a successful siege of the coastal cities because they were not able to block supplies to them by sea.

I'll write more on this later, just thought I'd start up a discussion on this.

Don't forget the famous "Ravens:" bridges that crashed down on enemy vessels to make a naval battle an infantry battle.

[manic expression]

What do people think of Hannibal's decision not to push on for Rome after his run of resounding victories on the peninsular?

ComradeOm got it right in my opinion. The city of Rome could levy 40,000 soldiers from its population, the exact equal of Hannibal's forces after Cannae. As ComradeOm said, Hannibal had no siege equipment to assault the impressive walls, and it would've taken some time to build them outside the gates.

We also need to remember that entire Roman armies from around Italy would, given the time necessary to build siege weapons, have been able to fall on Hannibal's rear during the siege. Hannibal would have had 40,000 extremely defiant Roman denizens fighting for their city (and the city walls) on one side, and at least the same number (almost surely far more) of greatly motivated Roman soldiers on the other. It would have been a death trap at best.

Also, in my opinion, Hannibal's greatest talents were in the field, not before city walls: the most important force in Hannibal's army, Hannibal, would have been mostly neutralized when faced with such daunting odds in the siege of Rome.

Dodge said it best when he stated that Hannibal's decision to not besiege Rome remains among his best shows of generalship.


One reason why I think Hannibal's reputation as a general is often overblown - he committed himself to a campaign without clear strategic objectives

Well, he consistently tried to divide the Italian allies from Rome, which would have probably hamstrung Rome in the geopolitics of the day. That was likely his strategic goal, but he was frustrated by this because loyalty to (or fear of) the Romans was quite high in Italy. It's not like Hannibal could dictate the conditions of the war.