Analytical Philosophy and identity?

[AnarchyIsOrder]

Since I'm currently reading through things by both existentialists and analytical philosophers, I'm curious as to what analytical philosophers (ie. Frege, Wittgenstein, Moore, etc) have said when it comes to identity. Or, at least, some of the more common ideas, or those held by some of the most prominent analytic philosophers, or by you if you follow in that tradition. I'm sure some may criticize the question itself, though.
What I mean is in relation to questions such as whether if somebody's entire body, except for the brain, is injured and dying, and a surgeon manages to transplant the brain into another body, did the person survive the accident. So, for example, one could hold that the brain (or memory and so on) determines identity, and thus hold that they did, or, alternatively, that 'identity' is created and recreated as time goes by (thus 'the same person doesn't cross a river twice', though I'm not sure I could see most analytic philosophers holding to that kind of thing, especially people influenced by Wittgenstein and so on, but in that case, what would they have which makes them the same person if they crossed the river, say, 50 years later?), or identity being social (so the answer would be maybe), and so on. So I suppose the question could be reframed, "What about a person makes them the same person through their lives?" (if you think they are, but as far as I know the phrase 'same person' would generally be used to imply that there is continuity, for example in 'are you the same person I saw dancing yesterday' or 'hey, you're the same person I used to hang out with in college') I'm still fairly agnostic on the question, however.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Neither Wittgenstein nor Frege had anything to say on this issue, and much of analytic philosophy has got bogged down in the last 30 years (since the work of Parfitt) over what are in effect science fiction fantasies.

My personal opinion is that the best work in this area has concentrated on 'relative identity' (invented by my old professor of logic, Peter Geach):

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-relative/

Although the suspicion is that this theory was invented in order to make the Christian Trinity comprehensible:

http://maverickphilosopher.powerblogs.com/posts/1187640895.shtml

It's not a topic that has interested me since the traditional approach trades on the idea that there is an a priori answer to this question which we could find if only we could devise the right verbal formula.

This is implausible unless one is a Christian, or a believer in post-death 'survival' -- or, indeed, if we believe that there are hidden secrets, which answer every question we have, and which lie under the surface of 'appearances', but which are accessible to thought/language alone.

[ZeroNowhere]

Although the suspicion is that this theory was invented in order to make the Christian Trinity comprehensible:Hm. Would you say that had a negative effect on the theory, or did it come about for those reasons, but still be fairly well formulated so that it can operate despite its roots?

Though yeah, this subject doesn't seem among the most interesting, but on the other hand I suppose that could just be because of the lack of quality of the debate on it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ZeroNowWhere:


Would you say that had a negative effect on the theory, or did it come about for those reasons, but still be fairly well formulated so that it can operate despite its roots?

Well, in its non-theoretical form, as a description of how we use words like 'same', 'similar', 'different', and 'identical', it is the best we have yet, in my view.

It's use in theology is an unfortunate spin-off; but then, the 'god'-botherers have always borrowed from philosophy where it suites them.

[ZeroNowhere]

Well, technically, they've often made philosophy as it suits them as well.
Though I suppose that at the least, it could allow one to apply the adjective 'interesting' to anything to do with this debate, so it's probably worth reading about. What do you mean by differentiating between its 'non-theoretical' and 'theoretical' form?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ZeroNoWhere:


What do you mean by differentiating between its 'non-theoretical' and 'theoretical' form?

Well. the theoretical form will try to explain why things have to be the way they are, in this case, why we have to use the vocabulary of identity in the way we do.

The non-theoretical version merely describes how we actually use our words.

[ZeroNowhere]

Fair enough. Is there a split between people who use each version, or is it mostly the theoretical or non-theoretical form used? I'm mainly curious here about what advocates of it would be worth reading, after the SEP article (since I generally find the original texts better at getting its point across than summaries, except in cases such as Ayn Rand and so on), since it would probably be more worthwhile reading somebody who only adhered to the non-theoretical version in order to figure out one's own views on the subject, though perhaps somebody writing about the theoretical version would also be worth reading sometime later, if only out of curiosity rather than clarifying my views on the matter.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ZeroNoWhere:


Is there a split between people who use each version, or is it mostly the theoretical or non-theoretical form used?

To be honest, the non-theoretical form has hardly had an airing up to now (as far as I am aware) -- philosophers (including alas Analytic Philosophers) are more inclined to invent and/or take more notice of philosophical theories (and this is because of their class position -- I have explained why this is so in other threads here).

If I were to write on this, the non-theoretical direction would be the way I'd go about it.

In fact, I have already tried out parts of it here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2006.htm

[The above essay is an extended criticism of Trotsky's lamentably poor comments on the so-called 'law of identity', and indirectly also those of Hegel and other dialecticans who have written on this. In order to do this, I have tried to use/describe the way we actually use words for identity/equality.]

[ZeroNowhere]

Hm, that is a pity. Oh well, I suppose I'll just have to look for the rational kernel. Well, and read that essay.

[AnarchyIsOrder]

Thank you, I'll look at the article and the essay you wrote. Anyways, somebody I know had proposed a theory along these lines in an essay, which I found interesting: Rather than searching for an 'essential self', as there is none (also some references to Wittgenstein's family relations ideas and so on), we should look at identity, which is formed socially, through interaction and intercourse. So, for example, whether the person in the story had survived would depend on whether people referred to it as being a new person or whoever the body had belonged to. That people are referred to as separate 'selves' (at least, in the sense of yourself, himself, myself, etc) is traceable to the language used, rather than some essence they have (after all, does one check somebody's soul to make sure who they are before referring to them as such?). So, for example, when born, people are named and established as a certain person, so that even if they were to turn from a xenophobic Nazi to a pacifist hippy (along with corresponding changes in appearance, hence body, as well as the brain), they would still be called the same thing. Of course, they themselves can change their name, for example, or go somewhere where they are not known (but we would still refer to them as the same person if we knew, though I suppose that could be understandable in the sense that that is how the language is used. This also would have to count as another 'identity', in order to take into account how we refer to 'taking on a false identity' and so on). A narrow use of 'identity' (as in when one identifies somebody) is used in order not to bring, for example, taste in music and such into it

Now, while this does seem to have some glaring flaws, it does seem like an interesting way to approach the question. On the other hand, for a problem that could afflict any ideas formed on this basis (rather than just this one), how could one say that a person (or two people) without a language couldn't still be sure that they themselves, as well as each other, were still the same people? Well, discounting Snatchers. They may not be able to express it, but nevertheless, why not?

Also, what would be a response by the 'non-theoretical' view to questions such as the one about the car accident in the original post, whether a brain in a vat is still the person it belonged to, and so on?

And I should probably start reading the essay now.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

AnarchyIsOrder:


Thank you, I'll look at the article and the essay you wrote. Anyways, somebody I know had proposed a theory along these lines in an essay, which I found interesting: Rather than searching for an 'essential self', as there is none (also some references to Wittgenstein's family relations ideas and so on), we should look at identity, which is formed socially, through interaction and intercourse. So, for example, whether the person in the story had survived would depend on whether people referred to it as being a new person or whoever the body had belonged to. That people are referred to as separate 'selves' (at least, in the sense of yourself, himself, myself, etc) is traceable to the language used, rather than some essence they have (after all, does one check somebody's soul to make sure who they are before referring to them as such?). So, for example, when born, people are named and established as a certain person, so that even if they were to turn from a xenophobic Nazi to a pacifist hippy (along with corresponding changes in appearance, hence body, as well as the brain), they would still be called the same thing. Of course, they themselves can change their name, for example, or go somewhere where they are not known (but we would still refer to them as the same person if we knew, though I suppose that could be understandable in the sense that that is how the language is used. This also would have to count as another 'identity', in order to take into account how we refer to 'taking on a false identity' and so on). A narrow use of 'identity' (as in when one identifies somebody) is used in order not to bring, for example, taste in music and such into it

Well, with all due respect to your friend, this sounds like a theory in social psychology, not philosophy.


Also, what would be a response by the 'non-theoretical' view to questions such as the one about the car accident in the original post, whether a brain in a vat is still the person it belonged to, and so on?

A brain in a vat cannot be a person, unless you think people are their brains. But that is just the fallacy of division:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallacy_of_division

You might find my essay disappointing, since (1) it is about the logic of identity propositions, not personal identity and (2) it is entirely negative. I explain why here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2001.htm

Use the 'Quick Links' at the top to go to section (3), Heads in the Sand.

[ZeroNowhere]

It sounds somewhat influenced by social constructionism. Which, I suppose, is influenced by analytical philosophy to some extent, so I suppose there's some (rather indirect) connection.