Books on the later Wittgenstein

[ZeroNowhere]

Since a friend of mine started reading Wittgenstein, it seems he is a bit confused about his later writings (mainly the Philosophical Investigations and 'On Certainty'). Now, having read Wittgenstein, I would say this is quite understandable. Hell, Roger White's book on the Tractatus had helped me quite a bit with that. So, since we seem to have a few Wittgensteinians here (um, two, at least?), I'm wondering if there are any equivalents for his later texts. While I haven't yet read 'On Certainty', one would probably also help when I read it. Though I can probably help my friend on PI mostly, I wouldn't mind a book on that either (perhaps to get later on), since finding out about the development of W's thought, as well as the context, could still be quite interesting, and it would probably come in handy somewhere down the line anyhow. I recall Rosa using a book on 'On Certainty' as a reference for one of her essays, and after checking it seems to be a book by Moyal-Sharrock. Would that be worth reading, and even if so, do you have any criticisms of it? Or would there be something better? Merci.

Note: To clarify, this is not meant for debate on Wittgenstein's philosophy (or lack of it, as I believe Rosa puts it). I assumed it would be best to place it here, rather than the Literature forum or someplace, but if it would be more appropriate to move it there, I wouldn't mind.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Since a friend of mine started reading Wittgenstein, it seems he is a bit confused about his later writings (mainly the Philosophical Investigations and 'On Certainty'). Now, having read Wittgenstein, I would say this is quite understandable. Hell, Roger White's book on the Tractatus had helped me quite a bit with that. So, since we seem to have a few Wittgensteinians here (um, two, at least?), I'm wondering if there are any equivalents for his later texts. While I haven't yet read 'On Certainty', one would probably also help when I read it. Though I can probably help my friend on PI mostly, I wouldn't mind a book on that either (perhaps to get later on), since finding out about the development of W's thought, as well as the context, could still be quite interesting, and it would probably come in handy somewhere down the line anyhow. I recall Rosa using a book on 'On Certainty' as a reference for one of her essays, and after checking it seems to be a book by Moyal-Sharrock. Would that be worth reading, and even if so, do you have any criticisms of it? Or would there be something better? Merci.

Note: To clarify, this is not meant for debate on Wittgenstein's philosophy (or lack of it, as I believe Rosa puts it). I assumed it would be best to place it here, rather than the Literature forum or someplace, but if it would be more appropriate to move it there, I wouldn't mind.

There is still no book the equivalent of Roger White's book on the later Wittgenstein.

The very best there is Anthony Kenny's book "Wittgenstein" (Penguin Books), which deals with the Tractatus and the Investigations, but the sections on the latter are excellent.

However, here are a few recommendations;

The best studies to date of his philosophy of mathematics (and he spent 3/4s of his time in his later period on this topic, and declared it was his most important work) are these:

Shanker, S. (1987), Wittgenstein And The Turning-Point In The Philosophy Of Mathematics (State University of New York Press).

Marion, M. (1998), Wittgenstein, Finitism, And The Foundations Of Mathematics (Oxford University Press).

However, the best work on this is just about to be published by Juliet Floyd -- watch this space! When it is published, I'll let you know.

http://www.bu.edu/philo/faculty/floyd.html

However, although Wittgenstein's own use of language is not the least bit difficult, this topic does require some mathematical background.

The best on-line study is this:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-mathematics/

This is also excellent:

Glock, H-J. (1996), A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Blackwell).

This is also very good on the later Wittgenstein:

Stern, D. (1995), Wittgenstein On Mind And Language (Oxford University Press).

So is this:

McGinn, M. (1997), Routledge Philosophy Guidebook To Wittgenstein And The Philosophical Investigations (Routledge).

I don't think there is a book I can recommend on On Certainty.

If you need a list of specialist papers on Wittgenstein, just let me know.

[ZeroNowhere]

Awesome, I suppose I'll see if I can find them in a library here which seems to have a pretty good section on philosophy, and decide which to get after that. Also, Wittgenstein spending lots of time on mathematics makes sense, if I recall correctly it's what got him into philosophy in the first place?
Any idea when Floyd's book could be coming out? Also, would any of the pdfs on the bottom of the page be worth reading, or go over the same subjects?
Also, I suppose it's a pity about 'On Certainty', but on the other hand, it shouldn't be too much of a problem to read it anyways. And yeah, I recall Kenny's book being recommended, I should probably pick it up next time I get some books.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, Juliet told me two years ago she was working flat out on it, but she did not say when it was coming out when I e-mailed her earlier this year. But, it can't be long.

[ZeroNowhere]

Fair enough, I suppose that I'll wait to buy a book on that subject. It would probably require quite a lot of time to write a good book on it, anyways.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, apparently she has been working on it for over ten years.

[ZeroNowhere]

Well, Clark Ashton Smith had worked for about 10 years on a book of poetry (mainly cutting and revising), so it would make sense that a good book on Wittgenstein could take longer. But yeah, hopefully she manages to get that off her back sometime soon, I suppose.

[gilhyle]

I wonder Rosa what is your view of

Stict Finitism by Charles F Kielkopf, Mouton 1970

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

It's quite good actually, but it's been superseded by later research, since Kielkopf did not have access to much of Wittgenstein's unpublished writings, which are now available.

However, his big mistake is to attribute a theory to Wittgenstein.

[gilhyle]

However, his big mistake is to attribute a theory to Wittgenstein.

of course :rolleyes:

Thanks for the opinion.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


of course

Your sarcasm is even less convincing than your attempt to saddle me with 'philosophical commitments'.

[Reclaimed Dasein]

Well, Clark Ashton Smith had worked for about 10 years on a book of poetry (mainly cutting and revising), so it would make sense that a good book on Wittgenstein could take longer. But yeah, hopefully she manages to get that off her back sometime soon, I suppose.
I'm tripping out with a massive fever (thanks Obama) and so I'm not exactly sure I should be trusted, but On Certain is very readable if you just understand the context. It's been years since I read it, but I think it's related to G.E. Moore's essay on certainty (I think that's the name). In it, Moore argues that certain propositions are indubitable. The one I remember most is "This is my arm." What Wittgenstein points out is that one is only certain of that proposition if one is certain of the proposition. In a particular context, one can be certain if you're talking about your arm if you're simply talking to a friend at a coffee shop. However, one would not be certain if one were looking at sillouttes of arms or your arm was blown of by a bouncing betty (second example is mine... GET IT MINE!?!). Anyway, Wittgenstein does his thing for the next X pages. It's pretty repetative, I think there was a tree involve... maybe rain too... Maybe check this out.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore/#6

or not.

[ZeroNowhere]

Yes, I just started reading it and it seems quite straightforward so far. The context is also fairly evident from the fact that W mentions Moore (that is the name, yes) quite often. He was discussing Moore's (and anybody else's) attempts to argue against radical skepticism, and instead seems to be going towards criticism of the question itself. It doesn't seem especially repetitive at present, though I can understand why one could find W's style repetitive in general.

[gilhyle]

Your sarcasm is even less convincing than your attempt to saddle me with 'philosophical commitments'.

Calm Rosa, I wasnt trying to bite, I just hadnt anticipated your angle...and should have; its predictable. Thats all - no insult was intended.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Calm Rosa, I wasnt trying to bite, I just hadnt anticipated your angle...and should have; its predictable. Thats all - no insult was intended.

And yet you disparage me here.

[gilhyle]

And yet you disparage me here.

Not intended

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Not intended

Then you have been 'not intending' it for well over three years.

[gilhyle]

Well, Rosa, I don't think so - I say about your ideas what I think about them; sometimes critical, sometimes actually complementary (you forget those bits). I adopt the same approach to your style of argument. When I find civil, I act civil, when I find uncivil, I try to ignore it and occasionally fail.

You do give the apperance of seeking an exaggerated dispensation for yourself in some regards, while yourself disparaging others - which is quite annoying and, remember, sometimes you boast of wanting to annoy people. So its not always easy to treat you with the politeness that is appropriate on this board.

its not tht easy to treat someone with respect who goes around charging one with being a mystic and - far worse - a supporter of the ruling class.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Well, Rosa, I don't think so - I say about your ideas what I think about them; sometimes critical, sometimes actually complementary (you forget those bits). I adopt the same approach to your style of argument. When I find civil, I act civil, when I find uncivil, I try to ignore it and occasionally fail.

What, a bit like we might forget about a few grams of cyanide in a glass of Cola?

You also forget that you have been making stuff up about me for over three years, and I can safely predict you will continue to do this for another three.


You do give the apperance of seeking an exaggerated dispensation for yourself in some regards, while yourself disparaging others - which is quite annoying and, remember, sometimes you boast of wanting to annoy people. So its not always easy to treat you with the politeness that is appropriate on this board.

I give as good as I get, often worse, and I treat with unremitting contempt comrades like you who consistently lie about me, as you have been told several times.

So, stop whimpering.


its not tht easy to treat someone with respect who goes around charging one with being a mystic and - far worse - a supporter of the ruling class.

But you began to treat me with disrespect before I called you anything.

And, you can easily put a halt to it: stop retailing mystical, ruling-class theories at RevLeft.

[ZeroNowhere]

This discussion seems to be going into an area more fit for Chit Chat or personal messages or something of the sort.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, Gilhyle likes to make everything about me -- so what can you do?

[gilhyle]

This discussion seems to be going into an area more fit for Chit Chat or personal messages or something of the sort.

Yea guess your right.

[Luís Henrique]

This discussion seems to be going into an area more fit for Chit Chat or personal messages or something of the sort.

This, too, was predictable.

Luís Henrique

[AnarchyIsOrder]

On the later Wittgenstein, I have heard that his private language argument is very powerful in 'dissolving' solipsism, 'cogito ergo sum', idealism and so on, but I don't really see it. Generally, from what I've found, I've only found assertions that it is necessary for said theories that private language exists, but I don't really see why, for example, Descartes' idea, "I think, therefore I am", necessitates a private language.

Also, I note that he commented on Plato at least once, did he ever write something contending the philosophical ideas expressed in, say, 'Republic' (admittedly not a huge amount, but there is some. Also philosopher kings) or 'Theaetetus'? As it is, Plato is one of the most prominent philosophers, so I would expect him to have written about his ideas at least indirectly once or twice. I've read the works and, while I'm fairly skeptical about quite a lot, it would probably be helpful to read some counter-arguments and so on. I suppose another Wittgensteinian (though not Kripke and so on, I would say) would also suffice.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

AnarchyIsOrder:


On the later Wittgenstein, I have heard that his private language argument is very powerful in 'dissolving' solipsism, 'cogito ergo sum', idealism and so on, but I don't really see it. Generally, from what I've found, I've only found assertions that it is necessary for said theories that private language exists, but I don't really see why, for example, Descartes' idea, "I think, therefore I am", necessitates a private language.

Well, the Private Language Argument wasn't intended by Wittgenstein as a criticism of Descartes's argument, but of the possibility of someone totally divorced from social interaction being able to develop their own language with its attendant rules.

Of course, it is possible to use Wittgenstein's method (and particulary that found in 'On Certainty) to show Descartes's systematic method of doubt to be totally misguided, and its results non-sensical.

I have indicated how and why, for example, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/certaini-t70369/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/can-you-prove-t79757/index.html


As it is, Plato is one of the most prominent philosophers, so I would expect him to have written about his ideas at least indirectly once or twice. I've read the works and, while I'm fairly skeptical about quite a lot, it would probably be helpful to read some counter-arguments and so on. I suppose another Wittgensteinian (though not Kripke and so on, I would say) would also suffice.

Well, Wittgenstein rarely mentioned Plato, and even then he confined his comments to Socrates. Later Wittgensteinians have by-and-large tended to ignore Plato, and have merely discussed a few of his ideas. They concentrate mainly on Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume -- or more recent analytical philosophers (like Frege, Russell, Moore, Carnap, Quine, Ryle, Davidson...).

The reason they ignored Plato is probably because the majority of Plato's arguments are a joke -- but that is just my guess.

[ZeroNowhere]

Eh, to be fair, references to Socrates would also probably count as references to Plato to some extent.


The reason they ignored Plato is probably because the majority of Plato's arguments are a joke -- but that is just my guess.To be honest, I'm not entirely sure why Plato is as highly regarded as he is as a philosopher (I have heard of very few Philosophy courses where he isn't required reading, for example). Though I'm sure Wittgenstein would have appreciated the cave analogy.


Later Wittgensteinians have by-and-large tended to ignore Plato, and have merely discussed a few of his ideas. They concentrate mainly on Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and HumeTo be honest, out of those four, I haven't really explored Hume's thought much, any recommendations as to critiques and such to read alongside/after his own works? I also heard that he was fairly close to W on some issues, as well as not being a huge fan of Hegel and co. and so on,, but I'll probably be able to pick up on that in the reading. On the other hand, I've also heard that his mistakes are mostly quite blatant, so...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ZeroNoWhere:


Eh, to be fair, references to Socrates would also probably count as references to Plato to some extent.

Indeed, I hope that was clear form what I posted.


To be honest, I'm not entirely sure why Plato is as highly regarded as he is as a philosopher (I have heard of very few Philosophy courses where he isn't required reading, for example). Though I'm sure Wittgenstein would have appreciated the cave analogy.

It's his appropriation by the Christian Church that explains much of this; among academic Platonists, ancient, medieval, renaissance and modern, he was/is regarded as some sort of a divinity -- "The Divine Plato" (supposed to have been educated in the 'word of god' by an attic (Greek) version of Moses, called 'Moscus').

http://www.coronetbooks.com/books/a/atti2756.html

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KU-DlTyatj8C&pg=PA31&lpg=PA31&dq=Attic+Moses&source=bl&ots=0Hnamf24lc&sig=30TboeqBHmkNgX-V6qOoVjEjW6c&hl=en&ei=qZaVSundBNzMjAee6dj0DQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6#v=onepage&q=Attic%20Moses&f=false

But, we do not have copies of Plato's mature, theoretical work; it hasn't survived. The Socratic dialogues represent popularisations. Since Aristotle thought highly of him, we can conclude that this missing work is enough to seal his reputation in the history of the subject.

I once asked my old professor of logic (Peter Geach, who was himself a pupil and friend of Wittgenstein) what Wittgenstein's opinion of Frege was, and he replied that it was how he imagined Aristotle spoke of Plato.

However, for me, Wittgenstein's comment that it's Plato's errors that are important since they illustrate how all traditional philosophers tend to go wrong, is what is significant.

When asked why philosophy hasn't advanced since Plato's day, he replied; "How do you think Plato was able to get that far?", indicating that theorists still make the same sort of errors.


To be honest, out of those four, I haven't really explored Hume's thought much, any recommendations as to critiques and such to read alongside/after his own works? I also heard that he was fairly close to W on some issues, as well as not being a huge fan of Hegel and co. and so on,, but I'll probably be able to pick up on that in the reading. On the other hand, I've also heard that his mistakes are mostly quite blatant, so...

Kripke brings this out somewhat in his discussion of the 'community view' (in relation to following a rule), so does Martin Kusch and David Bloor -- that is, that we follow rules the way we do because we are habituated by our socialisation to do so -- relying of Hume's ideas in this area (i.e., on habit).

Kripke, S. (1982), Wittgenstein On Rules And Private Language (Blackwell).

Kusch, M. (2004a), 'Rule Scepticism And The Sociology Of Scientific Knowledge', Social Studies of Science, 34, 4, pp.571-91.
--------, (2005), 'Fodor v. Kripke: Semantic Dispositionalism, Idealization And Ceteris Paribus Clauses', Analysis 65, 2, pp.156-64.
--------, (2006), A Sceptical Guide To Meaning And Rules. Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein (Acumen).

Bloor, D. (1997), Wittgenstein, Rules And Institutions (Routledge).

However, the above are far too sceptical in their interpretation of Wittgenstein on rules, but this is not the place to go into that.

The best response I have read to this sort of approach to Wittgenstein is to be found in Guy Robinson's essays:

Robinson, G. (2003), Philosophy And Mystification. A Reflection On Nonsense And Clarity (Fordham University Press).

This is a book I cannot recommend too highly.