How did the British left respond to Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler to go east?

[Bankotsu]

How did the British left respond to Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler to go eastwards and thus instigate a war between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia?

When Neville Chamberlain came to power in May 1937, he began to execute a policy of resolving differences between Britain and Nazi Germany, allow Germany to expand eastwards into Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, obtain african colonies etc with the aim of appeasing Hitler's goals so as to get him to cooperate and join a four power pact with Britain, France, Italy and his Germany.

These actions were anti-Soviet in nature, designed to secure peace in western europe and at the same time direct German expansion eastwards against the Soviet, with the aim of bringing about a German-Soviet war.

Many communist and left wing groups opposed Chamberlain's appeasement policy as they understood the anti-Soviet nature behind that policy but what was the response of the british left wing groups at the time towards Chamberlain's policy?

Did they oppose or support?

Some left-wing propaganda criticising Chamberlain's policy of directing Hitler eastwards against Soviet Union in 1939:


German imperialism must either expand or explode The policy of Chamberlain, who speaks for monopoly capitalism in its most naked form, seeks to orient itself to this basic fact, and exhibits far more realism than the wishful-thinking dreams of the rest of the capitalist class.

As the slump progresses and the pressure on Hitler mounts up, Chamberlain, the self-styled “man of peace” seeks to clear the path for him into the Soviet Ukraine. By prolonging the hostilities with surreptitious intervention until both protagonists are sufficiently weakened, the “neutral” British vulture will be able to descend upon the battlefield and gorge itself...

April 1939

http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/win/vol02/no04/hitler.htm


Chamberlain’s policy of “appeasement” has been the attempt to direct Germany’s attack towards the Soviet Ukraine, and the agreement concluded at Munich seemed to leave the door open to this outcome. But a section of the British bourgeoisie held grave doubts as to whether Hitler would consent to the role laid down for him by Chamberlain. These doubts were voiced by Eden, Duff-Cooper, Churchill and Lloyd George, and were triumphantly vindicated by Hitler’s further move in seizing the remainder of Czechoslovakia and presenting demands to Poland...

June 1939

http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/win/vol02/no06/crossroads.htm


British reluctance masks a threat to Germany. And the reluctance to come to terms displayed by the Kremlin similarly masks a threat to the Western powers, a threat to support Germany in the coming war unless the Chamberlain plan to egg Germany on to attack Russia is positively and finally abandoned.

July 1939

http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/win/vol02/no07/danzig.htm
Mao Zedong sounded the alarm too:


Correspondent: What is the significance of the Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Soviet Union and Germany?



Mao Tse-tung: The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty is the result of the growing socialist strength of the Soviet Union and the policy of peace persistently followed by the Soviet government.

The treaty has shattered the intrigues by which the reactionary international bourgeoisie represented by Chamberlain and Daladier sought to instigate a Soviet-German war, has broken the encirclement of the Soviet Union by the German-Italian-Japanese anti-Communist bloc, strengthened peace between the Soviet Union and Germany, and safeguarded the progress of socialist construction in the Soviet Union...

Their aim was to step forward and intervene when the belligerents had worn each other out. In pursuit of this reactionary policy they sacrificed half of China to Japan, and the whole of Abyssinia, Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia to Italy and Germany. Then they wanted to sacrifice the Soviet Union.

This plot was clearly revealed in the recent Anglo-French-Soviet talks. They lasted for more than four months, from April 15 to August 23, during which the Soviet Union exercised the utmost patience. But, from start to finish, Britain and France rejected the principle of equality and reciprocity; they demanded that the Soviet Union provide safeguards for their security, but refused to do likewise for the Soviet Union and the small Baltic states, so as to leave a gap through which Germany could attack, and they also refused to allow the passage of Soviet troops through Poland to fight the aggressor.

That is why the talks broke down. In the meantime, Germany indicated her willingness to stop her activities against the Soviet Union and abandon the so-called Agreement Against the Communist International and recognized the inviolability of the Soviet frontiers; hence the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty. The policy of "non-intervention" pursued by international and primarily Anglo-French reaction is a policy of "sitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight", a downright imperialist policy of profiting at others' expense.

This policy was initiated when Chamberlain took office, reached its climax in the Munich agreement of September last year and finally collapsed in the recent Anglo-French-Soviet talks. From now on the situation will inevitably develop into one of direct conflict between the two big imperialist blocs, the Anglo-French bloc and the German-Italian bloc.

As I said in October 1938 at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of our Party, "The inevitable result of Chamberlain's policy will be like 'lifting a rock only to drop it on one's own toes'." Chamberlain started with the aim of injuring others only to end up by ruining himself. This is the law of development which governs all reactionary policies...

September 1, 1939

http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_17.htm



The plan of Britain, the United States and France was to egg Germany on to attack the Soviet Union, so that they themselves, "sitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight", could come down and take over after the Soviet Union and Germany had worn each other out.

The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty smashed this plot. In overlooking this plot and the schemes of the Anglo-French imperialists who connived at and instigated war and precipitated a world war, some of our fellow-countrymen have actually been taken in by the sugary propaganda of these schemers.

These crafty politicians were not the least bit interested in checking aggression against Spain, against China, or against Austria and Czechoslovakia, on the contrary, they connived at aggression and instigated war, playing the proverbial role of the fisherman who set the snipe and clam at each other and then took advantage of both.

They euphemistically described their actions as "non-intervention", but what they actually did was to "sit on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight". Quite a number of people throughout the world have been fooled by the honeyed words of Chamberlain and his partners, failing to see the murderous intent behind their smiles, or to understand that the Soviet-German non-aggression treaty was concluded only after Chamberlain and Daladier had made up their minds to reject the Soviet Union and bring about the imperialist war. It is time for these people to wake up...

September 28, 1939


http://marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_19.htm

Snow: That seems a rather large order for Mr. Chamberlain. I wonder if you mean that, while fighting Germany, Chamberlain's real attention is centered upon the destruction of Russia? It appears to me that Chamberlain has got his hands full with Hitler for the present, without planning an even larger war against Russia. Would it not be logical for him to try to win Russia's friendship, if possible, in order to beat Hitler, even if he does have some designs on Stalin in the future? Do you mean that he formerly dreamed of diverting Hitler's attack toward the East, or that he is actively planning it now, or that he hopes to consummate such a front out of the present war?

Mao: He formerly dreamed of it, he actually plans it now, and he hopes to realize it later. Why? Because in front of Chamberlain there is not only the problem of Hitler, but also the problem of revolt in India, and among people in his own country, while the Soviet Union is the supporter of the colonial revolutions and the people's (revolutionary) movement in capaitalist countries themselves. Hence Roosevelt also sympathizes with Chamberlain...

September 26 1939

http://books.google.com/books?id=IvXIwkDPJg4C&pg=PA222&dq=chamberlain+mao+zedong+snow#PPA223,M1

[Bankotsu]

Stalin too was extremely unhappy with Chamberlain letting German expand eastwards, thus putting into danger the Soviet frontiers, he warned about a new world war at the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. on 10 March 1939:



Formally speaking, the policy of non-intervention might be defined as follows: "Let each country defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their victims."



But actually speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war.



The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work : not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet Union : to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this, to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents.


Cheap and easy!



Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force," and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings, and prompting them : "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." It must be admitted that this too looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor.


http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/03/10.htm


Stalin had already way back at the end of 1938 received intelligence reports on British policy of instigating a German-Soviet war:




"The declassified intelligence documents reflect the political processes which took place before and after the Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, which is also called the 'Munich conspiracy,'" Ivanov explained.


Soviet intelligence sources reported that many capitals closely watched the geopolitical situation in Europe after the conclusion of the Munich Agreement as well.



"As early as November 1938, diplomatic missions of a number of countries reported to their departments that Britain and France would not prevent Germany's eastward expansion," Ivanov said.



SVR veteran, Maj.-Gen. Lev Sotskov (Ret.), who sorted the archive documents, is confident that the Munich Agreement eventually destroyed the collective security system in Europe and led to the outbreak of WWII.
Sotskov served in the Foreign Intelligence Service since 1956 both abroad and in the central office. Now he is studying the archives on the history of intelligence. He wrote "Operation Tarantella" and "Unknown Separatism," and took part in the compilation of a collection of documents, entitled "Baltic Countries and Geopolitics."



Sotskov believes that the declassified documents make it possible to take a new and deeper look at the role the world leaders played in the late 1930s in Europe.



"The documents received after the Munich conspiracy are particularly valuable. They analyze the post-Munich situation in Europe and clearly show that Britain was trying to draw Germany and the Soviet Union into active hostilities," Sotskov emphasized in an interview with RIA Novosti...


Later, on November 25, Grippenberg reported his conversation with a British government member who assured him that Britain and France would not interfere in Germany's eastward expansion.



"Britain's position is as follows: let's wait until Germany and the U.S.S.R. get involved in a big conflict," the document reads...


http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080929/117271264.html
Stalin wasn't a fool, he had the intelligence assessments of Chamberlain's intentions.

Soviet propaganda poster about Munich: Chamberlain and Daladier act as traffic policemen; the sign-post reads 'Left - Western Europe, Right - USSR'



http://www.palgrave.com/masterseries/lowe/questions/image009.gif

Western powers direct Hitler to the east against USSR

http://www.palgrave.com/masterseries/lowe/questions/Q7.htm


So how did the british left respond to such policies by their government which were designed to bring about a war between Germany and the USSR?

[Bankotsu]

Some western press at the time also sounded out on Chamberlain's policy to let Germany expand eastwards against Soviet Russia:




Monday, Nov. 29, 1937

Tall, reedy, gentle, devoutly religious and pro-German is Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, Viscount Halifax of Monk Bretton in the West Riding of York, Baron Irwin of Kirby Underdale York, Knight of the Garter, onetime Viceroy of India (TIME, May u, 1931, et ante), today Lord President of the Council and Government Leader in the House of Lords. In London, the abrupt decision of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain that Lord Halifax should go to visit Adolf Hitler last week came more & more to be regarded as a "humiliation" to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who is not pro-German.

The Yorkshire Post, owned by Mrs. Eden's family, did its best to sabotage Lord Halifax's visit. It was rebuked by the London Daily Telegraph (which is close to Mr. Chamberlain) for printing rumors that "There exist and are known to Germany to exist in this country [Britain] a "certain number of people—not all of them obscure [Halifax & friends]— who would be prepared to welcome a German campaign of territorial expansion in the East [Austria, Czechoslovakia, Russia] if by that means Germany could for the time being be diverted from exploiting her nuisance value in other directions...

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,758455,00.html


March 12, 1938

In my opinion they are mistaken. I have been more and more coming to the conclusion that at the basis of the foreign policy of the British reactionaries during the last five years have been hatred of Soviet Russia and fear of the growing force of organized labor in England and still more in France...

http://newdeal.feri.org/nation/na38146p292.htm


Chamberlain's plans to form a four power pact:


LONDON, April 17 1938 – With the Anglo-Italian agreement safely signed and almost universally approved, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain arrived in the far north of Scotland this morning to spend a vacation of almost a week as the guest of the Marquess of Londonderry. The Prime Minister is staying near Brora, a little seashore town in Sutherlandshire at the castle of Viscount Chaplin, Lady Londonderry’s brother.


The holiday will not only give Mr. Chamberlain a few days of fly-fishing but also enable him to prepare the next stage of his diplomatic effort toward a four-power settlement in Europe. In particular, Lord Londonderry may prove useful to the prime Minister in helping to revive the Anglo-German conversations begun by Viscount Halifax last November.


Lord Londonderry is probably the only influential Englishman who has direct private access to Field Marshal Hermann Goering and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. In the past he has corresponded frequently and frankly with Nazi leaders, and although he was shocked by the German seizure of Austria, he is still convinced that Great Britain must make a “deal” with Germany.

Can Get Information Discreetly

If the Prime Minister wishes to sound out the Germans discreetly on the possibility of an Anglo-German understanding, he can hardly do so more easily than by means of a letter from Lord Londonderry. There is not a particularly close personal friendship between Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Londonderry, and Mr. Chamberlain could have found more congenial fishing companions if fishing were all he had in mind.

The outlines of Mr. Chamberlain’s plans remain a mystery for the moment and may still be hidden after he returns to London. It is still difficult to visualize any Anglo-German bargain that would not give Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe and would not therefore be bitterly unpopular with a large section of opinion here and in France...

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2003445/posts


Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain promised in the House of Commons this week, as he asked approval for armed forces expenditure this year of $1,758,750,000 (see p. 18). In his house at No. 10 Downing Street, meanwhile, he had given swift impetus last week to negotiations for the Four-Power Pact which Britain, Germany, France and Italy will try to make (TIME, March 7), possibly admitting Poland to make it a Fiver.

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,759275,00.html


Criticism of Chamberlain's efforts to forge a four power bloc against the USSR:


Chamberlain’s announcement that he will strive to bring about a Four-Power pact among England, France, Germany and Italy – which, it is a foregone conclusion, Poland would join – shows that the second choice is being made and bears out the forecast of our political resolution.

Looking towards the Four-Power pact, Chamberlain would like to speed a reconciliation with Italy even before a settlement with Germany, if England can assure herself in advance that she will not be faced, in the quadruple alliance, by a solid front of the two fascist countries; if her former friendship with Italy can be established by weaning Mussolini from Hitler; then, England hopes, she will dominate the new alliance as she dominated the Anglo-French bloc in the past. The recognition of the Ethiopian conquest plus a few other trifles, would be a cheap price to pay for such a combination. As for Germany, an alliance with her would give Hitler a free hand in Central Europe and above all against the Soviet Union...

http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/ni/vol04/no03/editors2.htm

[rednordman]

I have not really got a right to post on this topic as Im not a scolar of history at all, but will give my bit anyway. I am not sure whether or not the British people actually realised what was going on at the time to be honest. Infact, I get the impression alot of them where even convinced that the UK would almost automatically take sides with the Soviet Union, because the Nazis and fascism where so bad. People didnt really know that much about Stalins Russia, and communism, and they where a rather huge 'unknown quantity' to alot of people.

I always remeber my nan telling me stories about them sending clothes and stuff for the young of the soviet union, but am not sure what time this was to be exact? (that could have been as far back as just after the civil war even).

Obviously there was alot of shock when hitler invaded to SU, but people probably didnt see the obvious link. I guess the wealthy would have been happy though. My grandad always stated that alot of them were fascists sympathisers (he is a hardline socialist though)

I know that alot of famous people became open about supporting the SU. According to Wiki, Charlie Chaplin (of all people!) even believed that the British should have sent more troops to the eastern front to help the Russians.

Sorry I couldnt have given you a more thorough and indepth answer there.

[Bankotsu]

Sorry I couldnt have given you a more thorough and indepth answer there.

Hope that some comrades in Britain can enlighten on the position of the left wing groups in Britain in that period.

As far as I know british prime minister Edward Health told Chairman Mao that he opposed Chamberlain's efforts to let Hitler go east:




Heath: I think the Soviet Union has a lot of troubles. They are facing domestic economic difficulties and agricultural predicament, and there are also differences within the leadership, over questions of tactics and timing, not over long-term strategy.

Mao: I think the Soviet Union is busy with its own affairs and unable to deal with Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, China and the Pacific. I think it will lose.

Heath: However, its military strength is continually augmented. Although the Soviet Union has encountered troubles at many places in the world, its strength is continuing to grow. Therefore, we deem this to be the principal threat. Does the Chairman think the Soviet Union constitutes a menace to China?

Mao: We are prepared for it to come, but it will collapse if it comes. It has only a handful of troops, and you Europeans are so frightened of it!

Some people in the West are always trying to direct this calamity toward China.

Your senior, Chamberlain, and also Daladier of France were the ones who pushed Germany eastward.

Heath: I opposed Mr. Chamberlain then.

http://english.pladaily.com.cn/special/mao/txt/w24.htm

[Bankotsu]

More interesting discussions on Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Hitler to go east:




Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.

Talks between Mao Zedong and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs:

...Chairman Mao: (Pointing at Dr. Kissinger) They are uniting and the Soviet Union wants the Communist Party to get into office. I don’t like their Communist party, just like I don’t like your Communist party. I like you, but not your Communist party. (Laughter)

In the West you always historically had a policy, for example, in both World Wars you always began by pushing Germany to fight against Russia.

Dr. Kissinger: But it is not our policy to push Russia to fight against China, because the danger to us of a war in China is as great as a war in Europe.

Chairman Mao: (Before Dr. Kissinger’s remarks are translated, he makes remarks in Chinese and counts on his fingers. Miss Tang then translates Dr. Kissinger’s remarks and after that Chairman Mao’s remarks.)

What I wanted to say is whether or not you are now pushing West Germany to make peace with Russia and then push Russia eastward. I suspect the whole of the West has such an idea, that is to push Russia eastward, mainly against us and also Japan. Also probably towards you, in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.

Dr. Kissinger: We did not favor this policy. We preferred the German opposition party which did not pursue this policy. (Chairman Mao, smoking a cigar, offers cigars to Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Lord who decline.)...


http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100320.pdf
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii/


Beijing, February 18, 1973, 2:43–7:15 p.m.

Talks between Chou En-lai, Premier of China and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs:

PM Chou: Originally Western Europe had hoped that Germany would go eastwards.

Dr. Kissinger: Western Europe.

PM Chou: At Munich.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, at Munich. Western Europe had very superficial leaders. They didn’t have the courage to pursue any policy towards a conclusion. Once they had done Munich it made no sense to fight for Poland. But that is a different issue. And I don’t blame Stalin, because from his point of view he gained himself the essential time.

PM Chou: But there was one weak point, that they were not sufficiently prepared.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

PM Chou: They did make preparations but they were not entirely sufficient. And in Zhukov’s memoirs he also touched upon this. Have you read this?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And they deployed their forces too far forward.

PM Chou: Also scattered in three directions.

Dr. Kissinger: So, but the basic point that I want to make is not to debate history but to say the lessons of both wars are that once a big war starts its consequences are unpredictable, and a country which encourages a big war in the hope that it can calculate its consequences is likely to produce a disaster for itself. The Germans had made very careful plans in World War I, and they had exercised them for 30 years, but when the war . . .

PM Chou: You mean after the Pact of Berlin?

Dr. Kissinger: World War I—1914—the Schlieffen Plan.

PM Chou: You mean after the Treaty of Berlin.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, after 1878, yes, that’s right. But they had exercised the Schlieffen Plan every year after 1893, for 21 years, and they had calculated everything except the psychological strain on a commander under battle conditions. So they thought they were starting a 6-months war and they wound up with a 4-year war. Not one European leader in 1914, if he had known what the world would look like in 1918, would have gone to war. And nor would Hitler in 1939. Let us apply it to the current situation, these observations. If one analyzes the problem of pushing the Soviet Union toward the East, or maybe you trying to push it towards the West . . .

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100320.pdf
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii/


Beijing, October 20, 1975, 4:15–6:35 p.m.

Talks between Teng Hsiao-p’ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People’s Republic of China and Henry Kissinger


Secretary Kissinger: What things?

Vice Premier Teng: Well, problems of various descriptions [mentioned] earlier.

By recalling history, I mean the period prior to the Second World War—the period 1936 to 1939, which is particularly worthwhile to recall. The Doctor studies history and I think is more knowledgable than I.

As I understand, the Doctor once said that in actuality the Soviet Union has gone beyond the Rhineland. This shows that the Doctor has made a study of it. After the Germans entered into the Rhineland you may recall what was the attitude of the British and French, and what was the policy pursued by Chamberlain and Daladier.

They pursued a policy of appeasement towards Hitler, and shortly after that the Munich agreement was concluded.

In pursuing such policies the purpose of Chamberlain and Daladier was obvious. They wanted to direct the peril Eastward, and their first aim was to appease Hitler so that he would not take rash actions. Their second aim was to direct the peril toward the East. The stark historical realities have brought out the failure of the policies carried out by Chamberlain and Daladier. Their policies have gone to the opposite of their wishes. They neither got international peace and stability nor achieved their purpose of directing the peril of Hitler to the East...

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100322.pdf
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii/

[Bankotsu]

World War II came as the biggest disaster throughout world history. It taught the current generation and those to come their biggest lesson, said Mr. Putin. "We must remember that lesson, and make necessary conclusions out of it so as to build a safe up-to-date world, and arrange relations between countries on certain patterns."

As the President turned to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, he made an emphatic remark:

"We ought to view all things in their historical context. References are often made to, say, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which is alleged to result in a plot between Soviet Russia-that is, the Soviet Union-and Hitler's Germany, and eventually bring the Baltic countries' annexation.

"What can I say on that score? We ought to regard it all in its historical context. I dare ask you to get back to the developments of September 1938, when notorious agreements were signed in Munich between nazi Germany and West European countries. They came down into history, later on, and are often referred to as 'the Munich plot'."

The agreements exposed Czechoslovakia to nazi Germany to be devoured. Western partners, in a way, showed Hitler where he ought to turn to satisfy his skyrocketing ambitions. That was the eastward direction, stressed the President.

http://en.rian.ru/onlinenews/20050222/39702785.html



Statement by His Excellency Mr. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War:

We are told sometimes that the criminal plot of the two dictatorships – Stalin’s and Hitler’s – was legitimate under the international law of the time. What’s more, it constituted a justified or even essential defense in view of the Munich Agreement concluded in September 1938 among Nazi Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France. That treaty was designed to channel German aggression eastward. True, it was a shameful Agreement conceived to appease the aggressor at the expense of Czechoslovakia.

http://www.polandun.org/templates/statementRotfeld09may.html



While all this was going on, the remorseless wheels of appeasement were grinding out of existence one country after another. The fatal loss was Czechoslovakia. This disaster was engineered by Chamberlain with the full co-operation of the Milner Group...

Up to that day, Hitler had made no demand to annex the Sudeten area, although on 12 September he had for the first time asked for “self-determination” for the Sudetens. Konrad Henlein, Hitler’s agent in Czechoslovakia and leader of the Sudeten Germans, expressed no desire “to go back to the Reich” until after 12 September. Who, then, first demanded frontier rectification in favor of Germany ? Chamberlain did so privately on 10 May 1938...

The fraudulent nature of the Munich crisis appears throughout its history. We might mention the following...

To frighten the British people, the British government circulated stories about the strength of the German Army and Air Force which were greatly exaggerated...

All of this evidence and much more would seem to support the theory of a “Munich plot”—that is, the theory that the British government had no intention or desire to save Czechoslovakia in 1938 and was willing or even eager to see it partitioned by Hitler, and only staged the war scare of September in order to make the British people accept this abuse of honor and sacrifice of Britain’s international position....

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html




Two weeks after Munich, Baldwin said in a conversation with Lord Hinchingbrooke: "Can't we turn Hitler East? Napoleon broke himself against the Russians. Hitler might do the same".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stanley_Baldwin#Later_life

[Jonnydraft]

Stalin too was extremely unhappy with Chamberlain letting German expand eastwards, thus putting into danger the Soviet frontiers, he warned about a new world war at the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. on 10 March 1939:

Stalin wasn't a fool, he had the intelligence assessments of Chamberlain's intentions.

Did he warn of this before or after the the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that secretly carved up Poland?

[Bankotsu]

Did he warn of this before or after the the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that secretly carved up Poland?

Stalin made the speech on 10 March 1939, German-Soviet Pact was signed on 23 August 1939. Between this period, Stalin tried to push for an alliance between Britain, France, and USSR to stop German aggression but Britain insisted on forming an alliance with Hitler, giving concessions to Hitler in order to push Germany eastwards to destroy the USSR, so Stalin didn't really have much options but to do a pact with Hitler to buy peace on his western frontier. Japan was attacking USSR in the east at that time.

Read all of it in detail here:




The efforts of the Chamberlain group to continue the policy of appeasement by making economic and other concessions to Germany and their efforts to get Hitler to agree to a four-power pact form one of the most shameful episodes in the history of recent British diplomacy.



These negotiations were chiefly conducted through Sir Horace Wilson and consisted chiefly of offers of colonial bribes and other concessions to Germany. These offers were either rejected or ignored by the Nazis...


It was not possible to conceal these activities completely from the public, and, indeed, government spokesmen referred to them occasionally in trial balloons.

On 3 May, Chamberlain suggested an Anglo-German non-aggression pact, although only five days earlier Hitler had denounced the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935 and the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1934.

As late as 28 August, Sir Nevile Henderson offered Germany a British alliance if she were successful in direct negotiations with the Poles.This, however, was a personal statement and probably went further than Halifax would have been willing to go by 1939.

Halifax apparently had little faith in Chamberlain’s ability to obtain any settlement with the Germans. If, by means of another Munich, he could have obtained a German-Polish settlement that would satisfy Germany and avoid war, he would have taken it.

It was the hope of such an agreement that prevented him from making any real agreement with Russia, for it was, apparently, the expectation of the British government that if the Germans could get the Polish Corridor by negotiation, they could then drive into Russia across the Baltic States.

For this reason, in the negotiations with Russia, Halifax refused any multilateral pact against aggression, any guarantee of the Baltic States, or any tripartite guarantee of Poland.

Instead, he sought to get nothing more than a unilateral Russian guarantee to Poland to match the British guarantee to the same country.

This was much too dangerous for Russia to swallow, since it would leave her with a commitment which could lead to war and with no promise of British aid to her if she were attacked directly, after a Polish settlement, or indirectly across the Baltic States.

Only after the German Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 21 August 1939 did Halifax implement the unilateral guarantee to Poland with a more formal mutual assistance pact between Britain and Poland. This was done to warn Hitler that an attack on Poland would bring Britain into the war under pressure of British public opinion. Hitler, as usual, paid no attention to Britain.

Even after the German attack on Poland, the British government was reluctant to fulfill this pact and spent almost three days asking the Germans to return to negotiation. Even after the British were forced to declare war on Germany, they made no effort to fight, contenting themselves with dropping leaflets on Germany. We now know that the German generals had moved so much of their forces to the east that they were gravely worried at the effects which might follow an Allied attack on western Germany or even an aerial bombing of the Ruhr...

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

Extremely detailed narrative of the diplomacy in 1939; the charade of Polish assistance, Britain's secret talks with Germany to form an alliance with Germany, carve up spheres of influence in europe, Stalin's efforts to secure a triple alliance which failed which eventually resulted into the compromise with Hitler to buy time:




In the face of this misunderstanding and hatred on the part of Hitler, and in the full knowledge that he had every intention of attacking Poland, Britain made no real effort to build up a peace front, and continued to try to make concessions to Hitler.

Although the British unilateral guarantee to Poland was made into a mutual guarantee on April 6, Poland guaranteed Britain's "independence" in exactly the same terms as Britain had guaranteed that of Poland on March 31st. No British-Polish alliance was signed until August 2sth, the same day on which Hitler ordered the attack on Poland to begin on August 26th.

Worse than this, no military agreements were made as to how Britain and Poland would cooperate in war. A British military mission did manage to get to Warsaw on July 19th, but it did nothing. Furthermore, economic support to rearm Poland was given late, in inadequate amounts, and in an unworkable form. There was talk of a British loan to Poland of ฃ100 million in May; on August 1st Poland finally got a credit for $8,163,300 at a time when all London was buzzing about a secret loan of ฃ1,000,000,000 from Britain to Germany...

In the light of these facts the British efforts to reach a settlement with Hitler, and their reluctance to make an alliance with Russia, were very unrealistic...

The Russians did not reject the British suggestion of April 1939, but agreed to guarantee Poland and Romania if the guarantee were extended to all the states on their western frontier, including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, and if it were accompanied by a mutual-assistance pact of Britain, France, and Russia and by a military convention in which each state specified what it would do if the pact came into effect.

This offer was a much greater concession than the British' seemed to appreciate, since it meant that Russia was guaranteeing its renunciation of all the territory in these six states which it had lost to them since 1917.


Instead of accepting the offer, the British began to quibble. They refused to guarantee the Baltic States on the ground that these states did not want to be guaranteed, although they had guaranteed Poland on March 31st when J๓zef Beck did not want it and had just asked the Soviet Union to guarantee Poland and Romania, neither of whom wanted a Soviet guarantee.



When the Russians insisted, the British countered by insisting that Greece, Turkey, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland must also be guaranteed. In place of the alliance which Russia wanted, to protect itself against having to fight Germany alone, Britain suggested that the Russian guarantee would become valid only if Britain and France took action to fulfill their own guarantee first.


France and Russia were both pushing Britain to form a Triple Alliance, but Britain was reluctant.
Churchill and Lloyd George were pushing in the same direction, but Chamberlain fought back on the floor of the House, refusing to "help to form or to join any opposing blocs." He also refused to send a cabinet minister to negotiate in Moscow, and refused Eden's offer to go. Instead, he sent William (later Lord) Strang, a second-rank Foreign Office official, and only on June 14th. Moreover. the British delayed the discussions to the great irritation of the Soviet leaders, although verbally they were always insisting on speed.

To show its displeasure, the Soviet Union on May 3rd replaced Litvinov with Molotov as foreign minister. This should have been a warning. Litvinov knew the West and was favorable to democracy, to collective security, and to the Western Powers.


As a Jew, he was anti-Hitler. Molotov was a contrast from every point of view, and could not have been impressed with British sincerity when he had to negotiate with Strang rather than with Halifax or Eden...


http://real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#46

Most of above information and interpretation of events is suppressed in western historiography, all covered up to hide the true story that was taking place behind the scenes, so it would be very well for students of history to study the sources I gave in order to reach a true and clear understanding of history.

[Bankotsu]

Although much of Britain's plots to instigate war between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia is suppressed in western history, communists and left wing history is fully and completely aware of the true history, for example below source by Ludo Martens:





In March 1939, the Soviet Union began negociations to form an anti-fascist alliance. Great Britain and France allowed time to pass, maneuvered. By this attitude, the two great `democracies' made Hitler understand that he could march against Stalin without being worried about the West.

From June to August 1939, secret British-German talks took place: in exchange for guaranteeing the integrity of the British Empire, the British would allow Hitler to act freely in the East.

On July 29, Charles Roden Buxton of the Labour Party fulfilled a secret mission for Prime Minister Chamberlain to the German Embassy. The following plan was elaborated:

`Great Britain would express her willingness to conclude an agreement with Germany for a delimitation of spheres of interest ....

`1) Germany promises not to interfere in British Empire affairs.

`2) Great Britain promises fully to respect the German spheres of interest in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. A consequence of this would be that Great Britain would renounce the guarantees she gave to certain States in the German sphere of interest. Great Britain further promises to influence France to break up her alliance with the Soviet union and to give up her ties in Southeastern Europe.

`3) Great Britain promises to give up the present negotiations for a pact with the Soviet Union.'

The Soviet intelligence services ensured that Stalin was aware of these maneuvers.

In August 1939, negociations between Britain, France and the Soviet Union entered their final phase. But the two Western powers sent second rank delegations to Moscow, with no mandate to finalize an accord. Voroshilov insisted on binding, precise engagements so that should there be renewed German aggression, the allies would go to war together. He wanted to know how many British and French divisions would oppose Hitler should Germany invade the Soviet Union.

He received no response. He also wanted to draw up an accord with Poland so that the Soviet troops could engage the Nazis on Polish soil in case of German aggression. Poland refused, thereby making any possible accord effective.
Stalin understood perfectly that France and Britain were preparing a new Munich, that they were ready to sacrifice Poland, encouraging Hitler to march on the Soviet Union.

Harold Ickes, U.S. Secretary of the Interior, wrote at the time in his journal:


`(England) kept hoping against hope that she could embroil Russia and Germany with each other and thus escape scot-free herself.'

The Soviet Union was facing the mortal danger of a single anti-Soviet front consisting of all the imperialist powers. With the tacit support of Britain and France, Germany could, after having occupied Poland, continue on its way and begin its blitzkrieg against the USSR, while Japan would attack Siberia.

At the time, Hitler had already reached the conclusion that France and Britain had neither the capacity nor the will to resist. He decided to grab Western Europe before attacking the USSR.

On August 20, Hitler proposed a non-aggression pact to the Soviet Union.

Stalin reacted promptly, and the pact was signed on August 23.

On September 1, Hitler attacked Poland. Britain and France were caught in their own trap. These two countries assisted in all of Hitler's adventures, hoping to use him against the Soviet Union.

Right from 1933, they never stopped speaking in praise of Hitler's battle against Communism. Now they were forced to declare war against Germany, although they had no intention of doing so in an effective manner. Their rage exploded in a virulent anti-Communist campaign: `Bolshevism is fascism's natural ally'. Half a century later, this stupid propaganda is still be found in school books as an unquestioned truth. However, history has shown that the Germano-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was a key for victory in the anti-fascist war. This may seem paradoxical, but the pact was a turning point that allowed the preparation of the necessary conditions for the German defeat...

At the same time, Stalin spoke with great insight to Zhukov:

`The French Government headed by Daladier and the Chamberlain Government in Britain have no intention of getting seriously involved in the war with Hitler. They still hope to incite Hitler to a war against the Soviet Union. By refusing in 1939 to form with us an anti-Hitler bloc, they did not want to hamper Hitler in his aggression against the Soviet Union. Nothing will come of it. They will have to pay through the nose for their short-sighted policy.'

http://www.plp.org/books/Stalin/node131.html#SECTION001210000000000000000

[Led Zeppelin]

Can you please stop using the huge red bold font?

Just use the regular bold or italics to emphasize, it's less distracting.

[Bankotsu]

The Soviet Union long time ago way back in 1948 published a propaganda pamphlet to sell its version of the origins of WWII and the western powers agenda of pushing Nazi Germany eastwards to destroy the USSR.

During the cold war period, the USSR's interpretation of history was dismissed as nothing but communist false propaganda and suppressed in the west.

Although it is quite true to say that the USSR did covered up some historical events and suppressed and distorted facts, the narrative as presented below is indeed true and is completely and totally supported by facts. For obvious reasons even till today, the truth is suppressed in the west.

Here is the source of the full text:




Falsifiers Of History

Foreign Languages Publishing House (USSR), 1948

Foreward

At the end of January the State Department of the United States of America in collaboration with the British and French Foreign Offices published a collection of reports and diary records of Hitler diplomatic officials under the mysterious title: “Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941.”

We learn from the preface to the collection that as early as the summer of 1946 the Governments of the U.S.A., Great Britain and France agreed among themselves to publish materials from the archives of the German Foreign Office relating to the period 1918-1945 which had been seized in Germany by the American and British military authorities. It is noteworthy that the materials published in the collection pertain only to the period 1939-1941.

The materials relating to the preceding years and in particular to the Munich period, have not been included by the U.S. State Department and thus concealed from the knowledge of the world. This, of course, is not accidental, and was done with a purpose which is quite alien to an objective and honest treatment of historical truth.

In order to provide some manner of justification in the eyes of the public for this unilateral publication of a collection of unverified and arbitrarily chosen records of Hitler officials, the British and American press circulated the story that “the Russians had rejected the proposal of the West to publish jointly a full account of Nazi diplomacy.”

This assertion of British and American circles does not correspond to the facts...


How the Preparations for German Aggression Began


...What would have happened if the United States had not financed Hitler Germany’s heavy industry, and if Britain and France had not rejected collective security, but, on the contrary, had together with the Soviet Union organized collective resistance to German aggression?...

Not a Struggle Against German Aggression But a Policy of Isolating the U.S.S.R.

...The entire conduct of Britain and France left no doubt that this unparalleled act of treachery on the part of the British and French Governments toward the Czechoslovak people and the Czechoslovak Republic was not a mere episode in the policy of Britain and France, but, on the contrary, was a major link in their policy of directing Hitler aggression against the Soviet Union...


Isolation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact


...In June 1939 British representatives had already inaugurated strictly confidential negotiations with Germany through Hitler’s commissioner for the four-year plan, Wohltat, who was then in London. He had talks with Minister of Overseas Trade Hudson and Chamberlain’s closest adviser, G. Wilson. The substance of those June negotiations is still buried in the secrecy of the diplomatic archives. But in July Wohltat paid another visit to London and the negotiations were resumed. The substance of this second round of negotiations is now known from captured German documents in the possession of the Soviet Government, which will shortly be made public...

Creation of an “Eastern” Front, Germany’s Attack Upon the U.S.S.R., the Anti-Hitler Coalition and the Question of Inter-Allied Obligations


Meanwhile, as Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons on March 19,
“preparations for the expedition were carried on with all rapidity, and at the beginning of March the expedition was ready to leave ... two months before Mannerheim had asked for it to arrive.”

Chamberlain added that this force numbered 100,000 men.

At the same time the French Government was preparing a first expeditionary corps of 50,000 men, which was to be sent to Finland via Narvik.

The British and French rulers, be it remarked, were engaging in these belligerent activities at the time of the “phoney war,” when Britain and France were absolutely inactive on the front against Hitler Germany.
But military assistance to Finland against the Soviet Union was only part of a broader scheme of the British and French imperialists.

The above-quoted White Paper of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs contains a document penned by Swedish Foreign Minister Gunther. In this document we read that

“the dispatch of this force is part of the general plan of an attack upon the Soviet Union” and that, “beginning March 15, this plan will be put into effect against Baku and still earlier through Finland.” 34 (http://web.archive.org/web/20050616080438/http://agitprop.org.au/lefthistory/1948_falsifiers_of_history.php#34)
Henri de Kerillis, in his book, “De Gaulle dictateur,” wrote the following about this plan:

“According to this plan, the main features of which were explained to me by Paul Reynaud 35 (http://web.archive.org/web/20050616080438/http://agitprop.org.au/lefthistory/1948_falsifiers_of_history.php#35) in a letter, which is in my possession, the motorized expeditionary corps, after landing in Finland through Norway, would quickly disperse Russia’s disorganized hordes and march on Leningrad. . .” 36 (http://web.archive.org/web/20050616080438/http://agitprop.org.au/lefthistory/1948_falsifiers_of_history.php#36)

(http://web.archive.org/web/20050616080438/http://agitprop.org.au/lefthistory/1948_falsifiers_of_history.php#36) This plan was drawn up in France by de Gaulle and General Weygand who was then in command of the French troops in Syria and who boasted that:

“with certain reinforcements and 200 aircraft he would seize the Caucasus and enter into Russia as a knife cuts butter.”

It is also known that in 1940 the French GeneraI Gamelin worked out a plan of military operations by the British and French against the U.S.S.R., in which special stress was laid on bombing Baku and Batumi.

The preparations of the British and French rulers for an attack upon the U.S.S.R. were in full blast. The General Staffs of Britain and France were working diligently on the plans for the attack. These gentry, instead of waging the war against Hitler Germany, wanted to start war against the Soviet Union...

http://web.archive.org/web/20050616080438/agitprop.org.au/lefthistory/1948_falsifiers_of_history.php
http://www.shunpiking.com/ol0207/0207-Non-agres-USSR-ger.htm


See also:

Russia’s Secret Documents on Munich
http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/ni/vol14/no05/coben.htm


The whole memorandum and other valuable documents of this period will be found in USSR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War (5 vols., 1948-1949), Vol. I, November 1937-1938. From the Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13-45. The authenticity of these documents was challenged by an “unnamed spokesman” for the British Foreign Office when they were first issued, butI am informed by the highest American authority on the captured German documents that the ones published by the Russians are completely authentic...

http://www.yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

[Bankotsu]

Hey, I am surprised that there had been not much reaction to this thread from the members of this site that are from the west, why is this so?

Because of the suppressed nature of the information in this thread in the west, I though that there would had been more reaction and debate on this issue.

But so far no.

Comrades from the west, what are your reactions to the information in this thread and the suppression of it in western historiography? Thanks.