Suppression of real agenda of British appeasement policy of Hitler in western history

[Bankotsu]

What can the left do to promote the real history of British appeasement policy of Hitler in western history?

Real agenda of Chamberlain was to let Hitler expands eastwards and let him get into a war with the Soviet Union, but this history is suppressed in mainstream western history books, so what can the left do to promote the real history of British appeasement policy of Hitler in the western world?



The British strategy for dealing with Germany found initial expression in Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's 'appeasement' policy. The purpose of Chamberlain's 1938 Munich agreement to give the Sudetenland to Germany was, in fact, to push the Germans to the east and into confrontation with the Soviet Union.

//rwor.org/a/076/ww2-en.html



The leading faction of the British bourgeoisie, around Baldwin (later Chamberlain) and the Conservative Party, represented an ‘isolationist’ tendency, which foresaw that Britain’s involvement in a war against Germany would inevitably lead to the break up of the empire and the final eclipse of British power by America. It therefore sought to avoid getting British imperialism entangled in alliances that would drag it into a disastrous European war.


Up until the late 1930s, the ‘appeasers’ still hoped that German expansionism would be directed eastwards and therefore not directly threaten British imperialist interests; with any luck it would result in a war between Germany and Russia, thus removing two military rivals.

//en.internationalism.org/wr/283_churchill.htm



The term 'appeasement' was a misleading coinage from the start, designed to paper over what was in fact the active support and collusion of the British ruling class with a German regime it admired. It was not pacifism, and it was not them being chickenshit, and it was not an acknowledgment of the iniquities of the Versailles Treaty. It was not necessary to choose between imperialism and fascism, because there was no essential antagonism between them.

The war that eventually broke out was a continuation of a quarrel within capitalism, with regional powers eventually worried about Germany becoming the regional hegemon. The British ruling class was not morally or otherwise opposed to German expansion in the East. It's "free hand in the East" policy was not only to prevent the Hitler regime from imploding.

It was a reflection of the fact that the other colonial powers had long used Eastern Europe as a semi-colony, particularly shifting investment to it after the Russian Revolution. France and Germany competed for control of that region, particularly its extractive industries, while Britain played a 'balance of power' game, throwing its weight against whichever power threatened to dominate.

The "free hand" policy, although it aggravated the Americans, who were also anxious for access to markets in South Eastern Europe, continued right up until 15th March 1939. They even tried to sic the Nazis onto the Soviet Union. Chamberlain's hope after Munich was that the Nazis would attack Russia and destroy a "communist" state that was still pathologically feared and hated by British capital. They did not want a war with Germany that, it was feared, would "Bolshevise" Europe and eliminate a vital "bulwark" against communism. In the Winter of 1939-40, there was a last ditch effort by the Tories to breathe life into the "free hand" policy and launch an anti-Bolshevik crusade under the guise of "assistance" to Finland. This is what is called "appeasement".

//leninology.blogspot.com/2007/08/appeasement.html

[ComradeOm]

You may be interested in Finkel and Leibovitz's The Hitler-Chamberlain Collusion

[Bankotsu]

You may be interested in Finkel and Leibovitz's The Hitler-Chamberlain Collusion

Ya, heard of that book, but the western mainstream media and majority of western historians still insists on suppressing the true history of origins of WWII and continues to spread false propaganda to hoodwink people.

Victim countries like Russia or Poland don't try to suppress it of course.



Russian Foreign Intelligence Service declassifies Munich Agreement papers

The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR in Russian abbreviation) has declassified archive materials related to the 1938 Munich Agreement, which triggered the most dramatic events of the 20th century. Head of the SVR press office Sergei Ivanov allowed Yarmolenko to familiarize himself with the declassified documents.
"The declassified intelligence documents reflect the political processes which took place before and after the Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938, which is also called the 'Munich conspiracy,'" Ivanov explained.



Later, on November 25, Grippenberg reported his conversation with a British government member who assured him that Britain and France would not interfere in Germany's eastward expansion.



"Britain's position is as follows: let's wait until Germany and the U.S.S.R. get involved in a big conflict," the document reads.



//en.rian.ru/analysis/20080929/117271264.html




Munich secrets: declassified
//youtube.com/watch?v=4gH2raI-AiE&feature=channel

THE FALSIFIERS


The history falsifiers’ favorite argument, the one they keep juggling with, is the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. But the editors of The Wall Street Journal, a periodical posing as one of repute, should have known just what had preceded Moscow’s forced move in question. Prime Minister of the UK Neville Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier arrived in Munich by air on the 30th of September 1938 to meet Adolf Hitler and exchange his pledge not to attack the UK and France for blessing the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The infamously failed Munich conspiracy of the western politicians and the Nazi Fuehrer sought to make the German Army march against the Soviet Union.

In those days Moscow was pressing for forming an Anti-Hitler coalition and invited a British and French delegation to that end. The talks proved long and fruitless. London and Paris actually sabotaged the talks while urging the Fuehrer to attack the USSR. This is what made Moscow to take pre-emptive measures, to gain time and get ready for repelling the forthcoming German aggression.

//ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=47570&cid=170&p=03.07.2009



Statement by His Excellency Mr. Adam Daniel ROTFELD, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. Fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War:

We are told sometimes that the criminal plot of the two dictatorships – Stalin’s and Hitler’s – was legitimate under the international law of the time. What’s more, it constituted a justified or even essential defense in view of the Munich Agreement concluded in September 1938 among Nazi Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and France. That treaty was designed to channel German aggression eastward. True, it was a shameful Agreement conceived to appease the aggressor at the expense of Czechoslovakia.

//polandun.org/templates/statementRotfeld09may.html

The western mainstream press, the western history textbooks, they keep lying and lying and suppressing and suppressing on the truth of Britain's plot to smash up Germany and Soviet Union.

They keep lying and lying covering up facts and speading false propaganda, only certain countries and the left discusses the truth.

So how can we the left, those who knows the truth and are aware of it do to spread the message and defeat the false propaganda made by the western falsifiers of history?

[Invader Zim]

But why, we must ask our selves, if Britain did indeed want the Nazis to invade the Soviet Union, and the 'true' purpose of the appeasement policy was designed to facilitate this, why did the appeasement policy come to a swift end in 1939? If Chamberlain was bent on the destruction of the USSR, why do none of his private papers make this clear? Why do the records of the British security services (SIS, MI5, GC&CS, etc), which have recently been released, not make any mention of this as the real purpose of appeasement? Why did Anthony Eden, who had been Foreign Secretary and must have been privy to this policy, not sing it from the rooftops when he resigned from office in 1938 in protest of the appeasement policy?

The reason is quite simple, the claim is nonsense. Doubtless Chamberlain wished to avoid war, and would have much rather seen the USSR and Nazi Germany destroy each other allowing Britian and France to clean up, but the fact is that when Nazi Germany pushed the appeasement policy to breaking point, it did indeed break and war was declared. There is no getting away from that.

As for Soviet intelligence documents, it proves nothing; the majority of intelligence is notoriously unreliable. The only truly reliable foreign intelligence source from this period was signals intelligence, and that is why the biggest coup for soviet intelligence was when their spies provided them with Ultra decrypts.

[Bankotsu]

But why, we must ask our selves, if Britain did indeed want the Nazis to invade the Soviet Union, and the 'true' purpose of the appeasement policy was designed to facilitate this, why did the appeasement policy come to a swift end in 1939? If Chamberlain was bent on the destruction of the USSR, why do none of his private papers make this clear? Why do the records of the British security services (SIS, MI5, GC&CS, etc), which have recently been released, not make any mention of this as the real purpose of appeasement? Why did Anthony Eden, who had been Foreign Secretary and must have been privy to this policy, not sing it from the rooftops when he resigned from office in 1938 in protest of the appeasement policy?

The reason is quite simple, the claim is nonsense. Doubtless Chamberlain wished to avoid war, and would have much rather seen the USSR and Nazi Germany destroy each other allowing Britian and France to clean up, but the fact is that when Nazi Germany pushed the appeasement policy to breaking point, it did indeed break and war was declared. There is no getting away from that.

As for Soviet intelligence documents, it proves nothing; the majority of intelligence is notoriously unreliable. The only truly reliable foreign intelligence source from this period was signals intelligence, and that is why the biggest coup for soviet intelligence was when their spies provided them with Ultra decrypts.

I am surprised that there are some people here in this forum that had been misled by the western false propaganda, other forums yes, they brainwashed by propaganda, but this left wing forum I am surprised.

Chamberlain's plot was to instigate a war between Germany and Soviet Union by allowing Hitler to expand eastwards.

This is a historical fact.

See below source for history:



Any analysis of the motivations of Britain in 1938-1939 is bound to be difficult because different people had different motives, motives changed in the course of time, the motives of the government were clearly not the same as the motives of the people, and in no country has secrecy and anonymity been carried so far or been so well preserved as in Britain.

In general, motives become vaguer and less secret as we move our attention from the innermost circles of the government outward.

As if we were looking at the layers of an onion, we may discern four points of view:

(1) the anti-Bolsheviks at the center,

(2) the "three-bloc-world" supporters close to the center,

(3) the supporters of "appeasement," and

(4) the "peace at any price" group in a peripheral position.

The "anti-Bolsheviks," who were also anti-French, were extremely important from 1919 to 1926, but then decreased to little more than a lunatic fringe, rising again in numbers and influence after 1934 to dominate the real policy of the government in 1939.

In the earlier period the chief figures in this group were Lord Curzon, Lord D'Abernon, and General Smuts. They did what they could to destroy reparations, permit German rearmament, and tear down what they called "French militarism."
This point of view was supported by the second group, which was known in those days as the Round Table Group, and came later to be called, somewhat inaccurately, the Cliveden Set, after the country estate of Lord and Lady Astor. It included Lord Milner, Leopold Amery, and Edward Grigg (Lord Altrincham), as well as Lord Lothian, Smuts, Lord Astor, Lord Brand (brother-in-law of Lady Astor and managing director of Lazard Brothers, the international bankers), Lionel Curtis, Geoffrey Dawson (editor of The Times), and their associates. This group wielded great influence because it controlled the Rhodes Trust, the Beit Trust, The Times of London, The Observer, the influential and highly anonymous quarterly review known as The Round Table (founded in 1910 with money supplied by Sir Abe Bailey and the Rhodes Trust, and with Lothian as editor), and it dominated the Royal Institute of International Affairs, called "Chatham House" (of which Sir Abe Bailey and the Astors were the chief financial supporters, while Lionel Curtis was the actual founder), the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, and All Souls College, Oxford. This Round Table Group formed the core of the three-bloc-world supporters, and differed from the anti-Bolsheviks like D'Abernon in that they sought to contain the Soviet Union between a German-dominated Europe and an English-speaking bloc rather than to destroy it as the anti-Bolsheviks wanted. Relationships between the two groups were very close and friendly, and some people, like Smuts, were in both.

The anti-Bolsheviks, including D'Abernon, Smuts, Sir John Simon, and H. A. L. Fisher (Warden of All Souls College), were willing to go to any extreme to tear down France and build up Germany.



Their point of view can be found in many places, and most emphatically in a letter of August I l, 1920, from D'Abernon to Sir Maurice (later Lord) Hankey, a prot้g้ of Lord Esher who wielded great influence in the inter-war period as secretary to the Cabinet and secretary to almost every international conference on reparations from Genoa (1922) to Lausanne (1932). D'Abernon advocated a secret alliance of Britain "with the German military leaders in cooperating against the Soviet." As ambassador of Great Britain in Berlin in 1920-1926, D'Abernon carried on this policy and blocked all efforts by the Disarmament Commission to disarm, or even inspect, Germany (according to Brigadier J. H. Morgan of the commission)...


//real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/12.html#42




We from the left wing must adopt a clear mind and not be misled by the western false propaganda nonsense on historical issues.

[Bankotsu]

See also:




This event of March 1936, by which Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, was the most crucial event in the whole history of appeasement. So long as the territory west of the Rhine and a strip fifty kilometers wide on the east bank of the river were demilitarized, as provided in the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pacts, Hitler would never have dared to move against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.


He would not have dared because, with western Germany unfortified and denuded of German soldiers, France could have easily driven into the Ruhr industrial area and crippled Germany so that it would be impossible to go eastward.


And by this date, certain members of the Milner Group and of the British Conservative government had reached the fantastic idea that they could kill two birds with one stone by setting Germany and Russia against one another in Eastern Europe.



In this way they felt that the two enemies would stalemate one another, or that Germany would become satisfied with the oil of Rumania and the wheat of the Ukraine. It never occurred to anyone in a responsible position that Germany and Russia might make common cause, even temporarily, against the West. Even less did it occur to them that Russia might beat Germany and thus open all Central Europe to Bolshevism.


This idea of bringing Germany into a collision with Russia was not to be found, so far as the evidence shows, among any members of the inner circle of the Milner Group.



Rather it was to be found among the personal associates of Neville Chamberlain, including several members of the second circle of the Milner Group. The two policies followed parallel courses until March 1939. After that date the Milner Group’s disintegration became very evident, and part of it took the form of the movement of several persons (like Hoare and Simon) from the second circle of the Milner Group to the inner circle of the new group rotating around Chamberlain.



This process was concealed by the fact that this new group was following, in public at least, the policy desired by the Milner Group; their own policy, which was really the continuation of appeasement for another year after March 1939, was necessarily secret, so that the contrast between the Chamberlain group and the inner circle of the Milner Group in the period after March 1939 was not as obvious as it might have been.


In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against Russia, it was necessary to do three things:



(1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and Russia;



(2) to prevent France from honoring her alliances with these countries; and



(3) to hoodwink the English people into accepting this as a necessary, indeed, the only solution to the international problem.



The Chamberlain group were so successful in all three of these things that they came within an ace of succeeding, and failed only because of the obstinacy of the Poles, the unseemly haste of Hitler, and the fact that at the eleventh hour the Milner Group realized the implications of their policy and tried to reverse it...


//yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html


We must not be misled by western false propaganda but must defeat it and propagate the truth to others who have been brainwashed!

[ComradeOm]

...the fact is that when Nazi Germany pushed the appeasement policy to breaking point, it did indeed break and war was declared. There is no getting away from that.The mistake here is to assume that there was an "appeasement policy". The same sentence would, obviously enough, perfectly describe the eventual collapse of the Hitler-Chamberlain deal, if there was one in the first place. It was not British appeasement that failed but British efforts to divert Germany into Russia

Actually on this point I find Finkel's argument far more convincing than traditional histories - the authors suggest that it was the transfer of Ruthenia (deemed to be a focal point for any invasion of the Ukraine) to Hungary that convinced Chamberlain that Hitler had no intention of going for Moscow. Contrast his bland and pro-German speech of 15 March to the newly bellicose figure of 17 March. Chamberlain had written off Czechoslovakia long before the German coup so what caused his sudden shift in attitude?

Personally I find the accusation that a deal was reached at Munich to be unconvincing but I'm convinced that one (or at least 'an understanding') was being sought or that Chamberlain's anti-Communism seriously coloured his judgement. I don't think there's any question that British foreign policy in the pre-war years was both excessively pro-German and popular with a large swathe of the ruling class

[Bankotsu]

Actually on this point I find Finkel's argument far more convincing than traditional histories - the authors suggest that it was the transfer of Ruthenia (deemed to be a focal point for any invasion of the Ukraine) to Hungary that convinced Chamberlain that Hitler had no intention of going for Moscow.


Actually that Ruthenia thesis is wrong, see:



But the British public and the British government were two different things, and it is quite untrue to say that the latter learned Hitler's real ambitions in March 1939 and determined to oppose them.

Above all, it is completely wrong to say this of Chamberlain, who, more and more, was running foreign policy as his own personal business.

Hitler's real ambitions were quite clear to most men in the government even before Munich, and were made evident to the rest during that crisis, especially by the way in which the German High Command seized hundreds of villages in Czechoslovakia with overwhelming Czech populations and only small German minorities, and did so for strategic and economic reasons in the period October 1-10, 1938. But for the members of the government, the real turning point took place in January 1939, when British diplomatic agents in Europe began to bombard London with rumors of a forthcoming attack on the Netherlands and France. At that moment, appeasement in the strict sense ceased.

To the government the seizure of Czechoslovakia in March was of little significance except for the shock it gave to British opinion.

The government had already written off the rump of Czechoslovakia completely, a fact which is clear as much from their direct statements as by their refusal to guarantee that rump, and the attention given to other matters even when the seizure was known (as it was after March 11th).

For example, Lord Halifax sent President Roosevelt a long letter analyzing the international situation on January :4th; it is completely realistic about Hitler's outlook and projects, but Czechoslovakia is not mentioned; neither is appeasement.

Nevertheless, concessions to Germany continued. But now parallel with concessions went a real effort to build up a strong front against Hitler for the day when concessions would break down.



Moreover, concessions were different after March 17th because now they had to be secret.


They had to be secret because public opinion refused any longer to accept any actions resembling appeasement, but they were continued for several reasons.

In the first place British rearmament was slow, and concessions were given to win time.


In the second place the projects of the anti-Bolsheviks and "three-bloc-world" supporters demanded continued concessions.



In the third place, Chamberlain continued to work to achieve his seven-point settlement with Hitler in the hope that he could suddenly present it to the British electorate as a prelude to a triumphant General Election which he planned for the winter of 19391940.



Of these three causes, the first, to gain time for rearmament, was the least important, although it was the one most readily used to justify secret concessions when they were found out. This is clear from the nature of the concessions. These were frequently such as to strengthen Germany rather than to gain time for Britain.


The projects of the anti-Bolsheviks and the "three-bloc-world" supporters were too dangerous to admit publicly, but they were sufficiently well known in Berlin to lead to the belief, even in moderate circles, that Britain would never go to war for Poland.



For example, Weizsไcker, the German secretary of state, chided Nevile Henderson in June 1939 for abandoning his often-repeated statement that "England desired to retain the sea; the European Continent could be left to Germany." However, these two groups, although still active in 1939, and even in 1940, had not originally envisaged the complete destruction of Czechoslovakia or Poland.


They had expected that Hitler would get the Sudentenland, Danzig, and perhaps the Polish Corridor and that he would then be stabilized between the "oceanic bloc" and the Soviet Union, with contact with the latter across the Baltic States.


It was expected that a rump Czechoslovakia and a rump Poland would be able to survive between Germany and Russia, as Holland or Switzerland could survive between the oceanic bloc and Germany.


Moreover, the "three-bloc-world" supporters never wanted Hitler to drive southward either to the Adriatic or to the Aegean. Accordingly, although divided in respect to Romania and the Black Sea, they were determined to support Turkey and Greece against both Germany and Italy...

//real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#46

[Bankotsu]

Why did Anthony Eden, who had been Foreign Secretary and must have been privy to this policy, not sing it from the rooftops when he resigned from office in 1938 in protest of the appeasement policy?

Eden privately opposed the anti-Bolshevik's plan to let Hitler expand eastwards to destroy Russia.




Eden noted in his diary after talks with Hitler:"Only thing Hitler wants is Air Pact without limitation. Simon much inclined to bite at this....I had to protest and he gave up the idea.... Simon toys with the idea of letting Germany expand eastwards. I am strongly against. Apart from dishonesty it would be our turn next"(cited in Dutton 1994, 50)...


//books.google.com.sg/books?id=UyMXon0JmBsC&pg=PA107&lpg=PA107&dq=eden%27s+diary+1935+hitler+simon+&source=web&ots=A58iIH7xr6&sig=IChZUDHy4vJ-mJ8C112mq56Mfks&hl=en


This idea of bringing Germany into a collision with Russia was not to be found, so far as the evidence shows, among any members of the inner circle of the Milner Group.

Rather it was to be found among the personal associates of Neville Chamberlain, including several members of the second circle of the Milner Group.

The two policies followed parallel courses until March 1939. After that date the Milner Group’s disintegration became very evident, and part of it took the form of the movement of several persons (like Hoare and Simon) from the second circle of the Milner Group to the inner circle of the new group rotating around Chamberlain...

//yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

[Bankotsu]

If Chamberlain was bent on the destruction of the USSR, why do none of his private papers make this clear?

There are some statements I think for example:



As he declared in July 1937, if Britain 'could get on terms with the Germans I would not care a rap for Musso' because 'the best way of countering the...Ultimately, this meant direct negotiations with Germany 'to find out what she wants', while

'deciding ourselves the direction in which we can best afford to let her expand at the expense of others if we are willing to let her expand at all'...


//books.google.com.sg/books?id=rCQ7s9MjkkwC&pg=PA367&dq=neville+chamberlain+four+power+pact+1938&client=firefox-a&sig=PmbRKmNRJwwL3VGVDaT1ef1NhCw#PPA278,M1

[Bankotsu]

The reason is quite simple, the claim is nonsense. Doubtless Chamberlain wished to avoid war, and would have much rather seen the USSR and Nazi Germany destroy each other allowing Britian and France to clean up, but the fact is that when Nazi Germany pushed the appeasement policy to breaking point, it did indeed break and war was declared. There is no getting away from that.

Zim you are from Wales, so I assume that the agenda of Chamberlain wanting to instigate a German-Soviet war is suppressed there.

Some people in the west do mention it however:


A key factor in Britain and France's attitude towards Hitler was a desire to steer his ambitions eastwards and into war with Russia. In that way, it was hoped, the two perils could eliminate each other.

Stanley Baldwin, who preceded Chamberlain, was fairly frank. In 1936, he told Tory MPs alarmed about Hitler, that it would not 'break his heart' if the tensions in Europe led to 'the Nazis fighting the Bolshies'.


The diaries of Foreign Office chief Sir Alexander Cadogan, shine a light on Chamberlain's outlook.


The Russians had been calling for a strong stand against Hitler on every occasion he pushed forward his military ambitions - reintroducing conscription, occupying the Rhineland, annexing Austria and threatening Czechoslovakia.


On every occasion, the despairing Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov got the brush off from London on the grounds either that Soviet offers of aid were insincere or impractical.


Nevertheless the British chiefs of staff eventually came round to favouring what Cadogan called a 'whole hog alliance with Russia'.


He added, significantly, that the idea 'annoyed' Chamberlain. Cadogan himself was hostile to such an alliance, as was most of the establishment, constantly scared by the Communist bogey despite the party winning only one seat in 1935.

//dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1066952/Andrew-Alexander-Its-just-rich-risk-bank-meltdowns.html


Severely weakened by the Great Depression and in no position to make military threats, Chamberlain and Daladier hoped to push Hitler's ambitions eastward. The one unifying belief all four leaders shared was their fanatical hatred of the Soviet Union and anything remotely related to International Communism.



A strong and well-armed Nazi regime in Central Europe, they believed, was a necessary buffer to Soviet power. And with their own domestic economic crises and their labor unions going communist, France and England focused their attention not on the threat of fascism but on the growing influence of the Soviet Union. (Their positions on the Spanish Civil War bear this fact out.)



France and England hoped Germany would spark a shooting war with the Soviet Union and then they could sit back and watch the fascists and communists tear each other apart. It didn't work out that way.



//huffingtonpost.com/joseph-a-palermo/george-w-bush-and-appease_b_102039.html

[Invader Zim]

The mistake here is to assume that there was an "appeasement policy". The same sentence would, obviously enough, perfectly describe the eventual collapse of the Hitler-Chamberlain deal, if there was one in the first place. It was not British appeasement that failed but British efforts to divert Germany into Russia



This doesn't make any sense, if the idea was to push Nazi territorial ambitions eastwards then the nazi invasion of Poland would have been absolutely on target. Why declare war, ending the policy, when it was obviously working so well?


I am surprised that there are some people here in this forum that had been misled by the western false propaganda, other forums yes, they brainwashed by propaganda, but this left wing forum I am surprised.

The declaration of war on Germany, following the invasion of Poland is "western false propaganda"?

The fact is I've spent many hours in the archives looking at a related question to this one, and never seen a single scrap of evidence that supports your view.


Zim you are from Wales, so I assume that the agenda of Chamberlain wanting to instigate a German-Soviet war is suppressed there.

No, I've read this theory before; the problem with it is that it doesn't make any sense in the light of Britain's decision to go to war with Germany in 1939.

[Bankotsu]

Why declare war, ending the policy, when it was obviously working so well?

The fact is I've spent many hours in the archives looking at a related question to this one, and never seen a single scrap of evidence that supports your view.

See:



The German Foreign Ministry memorandum on this conversation makes it perfectly clear that the Germans did not misunderstand Halifax except, possibly, on the last point. There they failed to see that if Germany made war, the British Government would be forced into the war against Germany by public opinion in England.

The German diplomatic agents in London, especially the Ambassador, Dirksen, saw this clearly, but the Government in Berlin listened only to the blind and conceited ignorance of Ribbentrop.

As dictators themselves, unfamiliar with the British social or constitutional systems, the German rulers assumed that the willingness of the British Government to accept the liquidation of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland implied that the British Government would never go to war to prevent this liquidation.

They did not see that the British Government might have to declare war to stay in office if public opinion in Britain were sufficiently aroused.

The British Government saw this difficulty and as a last resort were prepared to declare war but not to wage war on Germany.

...Only after the German Soviet Non-aggression Pact of 21 August 1939 did Halifax implement the unilateral guarantee to Poland with a more formal mutual assistance pact between Britain and Poland.

This was doneto warn Hitler that an attack on Poland would bring Britain into the war under pressure of British public opinion. Hitler, as usual, paid no attention to Britain.

Even after the German attack on Poland, the British government was reluctant to fulfill this pact and spent almost three days asking the Germans to return to negotiation. Even after the British were forced to declare war on Germany, they made no effort to fight, contenting themselves with dropping leaflets on Germany.

We now know that the German generals had moved so much of their forces to the east that they were gravely worried at the effects which might follow an Allied attack on western Germany or even an aerial bombing of the Ruhr...

//yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html

The text of Chamberlain's guarantee to Poland is of extreme importance. He said: "Certain consultations are now proceeding with other governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime, before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House [of Commons] that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power."

This was an extraordinary assurance. The British government since 1918 had resolutely refused any bilateral agreement guaranteeing any state in western Europe. Now they were making a unilateral declaration in which they obtained nothing but in which they guaranteed a state in eastern Europe, and they were giving that state the responsibility of deciding when that guarantee would take effect, something quite unprecedented.

A little thought will show that all these strange features really stultify the guarantee, and the net result was to leave the situation exactly where it had been before, except that a very severe warning had been conveyed in this fashion to Germany to use negotiation and not force.


If Germany used force against Poland, public opinion in Britain would force Britain to declare war whether there was a guarantee or not.



...The German invasion of Poland at 4:45 A. M. on September 1, 1939, did not by any means end the negotiations to make peace, nor, for that matter, did the complete collapse of Polish resistance on September 16-17.


Since these efforts were futile, little need be said of them except that France and Britain did not declare war on Germany until more than two days had elapsed. During this time no ultimatums were sent to Germany, but she was begged to withdraw her forces from Poland and open negotiations.



While Poland shuddered under the impact of the first Blitzkreig, British public opinion began to grumble, and even the government's supporters in Parliament became restive.



Finally, at 9:00 A. M. on September 3rd, Henderson presented to Schmidt, Hitler's interpreter, an ultimatum which expired at 11:00 A. M. In a similar fashion France entered the war at 6:00 P. M. on September 3rd.


//real-world-news.org/bk-quigley/13.html#46

[Bankotsu]

The pressure of public opinion forcing the Chamberlain government to intervene was also great in 1938 czech crisis, but Hitler didn't attack in 1938.

In 1939, Hitler did attack and Chamberlain was forced against his will to declare war.




Neville Chamberlain held a Cabinet meeting on 24th September 1938. Duff Cooper , First Lord of the Admiralty, wrote about it in his autobiography, Old Men Forget (1953)

It was then suggested that the Cabinet should adjourn, in order to give members time to read the terms and sleep on them, and that we should meet again the following morning. I protested against this. I said that from what the Prime Minister had told us it appeared to me that the Germans were still convinced that under no circumstances would we fight, that there still existed one method, and one method only, of persuading them to the contrary, and that was by instantly declaring full mobilisation.

I said that I was sure popular opinion would eventually compel us to go to the assistance of the Czechs; that hitherto we had been faced with the unpleasant alternatives of peace with dishonour or war.

I now saw a third possibility, namely war with dishonour, by which I meant being kicked into the war by the boot of public opinion when those for whom we were fighting had already been defeated.

//spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWmunich.htm

[ComradeOm]

This doesn't make any sense, if the idea was to push Nazi territorial ambitions eastwards then the nazi invasion of Poland would have been absolutely on target. Why declare war, ending the policy, when it was obviously working so well?Because Hitler never had any intention of following the British agenda. It was only after the fall of Czechoslovakia, and particularly the territorial transfers to Hungary, that the pressure on Chamberlain became overwhelming. Hence the abrupt turn - his supposed agreement with Hitler was in tatters

[Bankotsu]

Events in Britain after Hitler's attack:



On September 1, 1939, several German armies attacked Poland from the West, North and South-West. To justify this aggression, German propaganda faked a Polish "attack" on the radio station in the Upper Silesian town of Gleiwitz (now Gliwice, Poland) , and this was broadcast to the world. (After the war ended, it was found that the SS - Security Police - had used German convicts dressed in Polish uniforms, and murdered them after the "attack" to eliminate witnesses. The wooden radio tower still stands in Gliwice today).



The French and British governments delivered warning notes in Berlin on September 1, stating that if the German army did not withdraw from Poland, they would immediately fulfill their obligations to that country.


At the same time, however, the British government encouraged Mussolini to propose a great power conference, this time including Poland, and the French government supported this move.



On September 2, Mussolini informed the British that he was trying to get Hitler's consent, but thought he was unlikely to withdraw his forces from Poland unless he first got what he wanted. Hitler asked for time until midnight September 3, to answer Mussolini’s proposal. Meanwhile, German armed forces continued their attack on Poland.



The British Cabinet met at 4 p.m. September 2. Halifax reported Mussolini’s information and proposed the deadline for Hitler’s answer to the British and French notes be set at midnight September 3.



The Cabinet preferred midnight the same day, Sept. 2, but left the "coordination" of French and British action to Halifax.



That evening, September 2, Chamberlain spoke in the House of Commons and Halifax in the House of Lords.

They stated that if German forces withdrew from Poland, then the British government would treat the situation as if nothing had happened, and would support Polish-German negotiations, or a wider conference. They did not give a deadline for Hitler’s answer to the British note.

The staid House of Lords heard Halifax in silence, but there was uproar in the House of Commons.


Chamberlain was told that he must report to the House the next day by 11 a.m. There was a revolt in the Cabinet too.

Therefore, on the night of September 2, Chamberlain told the French government that Britain had to act, and instructed Ambassador Henderson to deliver a note to Ribbentrop the next day at 9 a.m. demanding an answer by 11 a.m. Henderson did so, and the French ambassador delivered a note demanding an answer by 5 p.m.



When there was no answer from Hitler by 11 a.m. Chamberlain spoke on the radio stating that Britain was at war with Germany. The French government stated the same at 5 p.m. Thus, the German attack on Poland and Polish resistance brought about the outbreak of World War II.


//web.ku.edu/~eceurope/hist557/lect16.htm


After Hitler invaded Poland, there was immense pressure and momentum for Chamberlain to fulfill the guarantee given to Poland and declare war.

If Chamberlain did not declare war, there would had been a lost of face for british prestige.


This was the key factor that many western historians did not point out.

[Bankotsu]

Also:


The British goal was to embroil the Soviet Union in a war of annihilation with Nazi Germany and for the Soviet Union to begin such a war on its own territory, in other words in the most disadvantageous circumstances.



For the same reason the Western Powers had refused to grant guarantees to the Baltic states against 'indirect' aggression, thus leaving the way open for Germany to sponsor the overtly fascist elements in their right wing governments into coups, resulting in these Soviet neighbours falling into German hands.


And all the while the Moscow talks were still dragging on, Chamberlain orchestrated his secret talks with the Germans...

Only in 1971 did incontrovertible evidence appear proving that Halifax received on 18 August the Washington ambassador's telegram warning of the impending conclusion of a German-Soviet Non-aggression Treaty- that is, the day after it was sent.


This revelation made it finally impossible to suggest, as several generations of historians and publicists have tried to, that it was the Soviet Union which ditched the Moscow talks and made war inevitable. But in reality the circumstantial evidence of British duplicity was undeniable from the start.


The collapse of the Moscow talks meant that the last obstacle to Hitler's next move in the grand design for European and world domination had been removed.



On September 1st German units crossed the Polish border. Chamberlain and Daladier made last desperate efforts to involve Mussolini in some form of 'mediation' before public opinion forced the two governments to declare war on Germany on 3 September.


There now commenced what the French called 'drole de guerre', the phoney war...

columbia.edu/~lnp3/mark_jones/appeasement.htm

[Bankotsu]

Kissinger's views, saying that Chamberlain should had more courage and stuck to his original plans and not give in to public pressure:




Beijing, February 18, 1973, 2:43–7:15 p.m.

Talks between Chou En-lai, Premier of China and Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs:

PM Chou: Originally Western Europe had hoped that Germany would go eastwards.

Dr. Kissinger: Western Europe.

PM Chou: At Munich.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, at Munich. Western Europe had very superficial leaders. They didn’t have the courage to pursue any policy towards a conclusion. Once they had done Munich it made no sense to fight for Poland. But that is a different issue. And I don’t blame Stalin, because from his point of view he gained himself the essential time.

PM Chou: But there was one weak point, that they were not sufficiently prepared.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

PM Chou: They did make preparations but they were not entirely sufficient. And in Zhukov’s memoirs he also touched upon this. Have you read this?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And they deployed their forces too far forward.

PM Chou: Also scattered in three directions.


state.gov/documents/organization/100320.pdf
state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii/

[Bankotsu]

You may be interested in Finkel and Leibovitz's The Hitler-Chamberlain Collusion

There are many facts in that book, giving details and evidence of british agenda of letting Hitler go east and destroy bolshevism in USSR. But the Ruthenia thesis is in error.

These facts are usually suppressed in the west and covered up while a completely false presentation of history is given designed to hoodwink people during the cold war.

You can't tell people in the west that the USSR are the bads guys while at the same time teach them in schools that the western powers connived to set Hitler against Stalin in order to instigate war.



In Our Time: The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion


//amazon.com/Our-Time-Chamberlain-Hitler-Collusion/dp/0853459991


In their neglected book In Our Time: The Chamberlain-Hitler Collusion (to which I should confess I wrote the introduction), Clement Leibovitz and Alvin Finkel deploy an arsenal of documents to argue that sympathy for the Nazi Party prevailed in the highest British circles even after the declaration of war in September of 1939.

It wasn't at all that the British rightists were vacillating and pacifistic—an absurd notion to begin with.

It was that they thought they could save their empire by a tactical alliance with Berlin. One simple proof of this can be adduced: British colonial and naval officials were historically very jealous of their country's predominance in the Mediterranean, which extended from the Strait of Gibraltar to the shores of Palestine. Mussolini's maritime challenge to this hegemony was vastly strengthened by Franco's advance in Spain, and British ships visiting Republican ports were actually sunk by Italian planes and submarines during the Spanish Civil War. Yet the cheers for Franco on the Tory benches never died away. Quite obviously, these people thought they saw in fascism a future ally and not a future rival.

//theatlantic.com/issues/2002/04/hitchens.htm


The book reviewed below proves beyond any doubt that anti-communism by the capitalist powers of Europe made WWII and the Holocaust inevitable. the "Allies" -- especially Britain and France -- encouraged Hitler's rise and takeover of the Rheinland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia in the hopes that the Nazis would attack and overthrow the then-communist Soviet Union.

It also shows how the Soviet government, under Stalin, tried time and again to get an agreement of "collective security" against the Nazis with the major European powers, but was always turned down. Dr Libovitz has read all the relevant memoirs and diplomatic records of the time, and quotes from them at length.
The degree of racism and cynicism expressed by the capitalist politicians of Europe, as they encouraged Hitler to seek an empire in the East, is breathtaking!

This is the history you won't learn in school; that's carefully hidden away.


And it's not a "conspiracy theory" -- it is thoroughly, exhaustively documented, and conclusions reached solely on the basis of the evidence. Read it!

//chss.montclair.edu/English/furr/leibovitzrev.html
The people in the western countries are being lied to.

We from the left wing must expose lies and spread the truth!

The truth in this internet age cannot be suppressed any longer.

The true story must be told.

[Bankotsu]

Another book dealing with the topic:



A very important book, Hitler’s Spy Chief: The Wilhelm Canaris Mystety, was published in November, 2005. It received very little attention but it contained some very interesting new information about the relationship between the British government and Nazi Germany.

The author, Richard Bassett, found some very interesting documents that helps to explain the peace negotiations that went on between the two governments. Bassett shows that in July, 1938, a powerful group from within Nazi Germany that included Canaris, were on the verge of overthrowing Hitler because they feared war with Britain and France. The British government became aware of this plot. However, they were determined that Hitler should not be removed from power. The reason, they were expecting Hitler to destroy communism in the Soviet Union.

Bassett argues that this was the reason the Neville Chamberlain decided to fly out to meet Hitler the day before the German Army intended to invade Czechoslovakia. He had never flown before, took no interpreter and did not speak German. By doing a deal with Hitler over Czechoslovakia he prevented the coup from taking place. Hitler did of course eventually head east but because of the Labour Party and Conservatives led by Winston Churchill, Chamberlain’s backfired when the House of Commons forced him to declare war on Germany over Poland.

//educationforum.ipbhost.com/index.php?showtopic=7149

HITLER'S SPY CHIEF: The Wilhelm Canaris Mystery

//amazon.com/Hitlers-Spy-Chief-Military-Paperbacks/dp/0304367184

[Bankotsu]

Also:


The last piece of evidence which we might mention to support the theory—not of a plot, perhaps, but that the Munich surrender was unnecessary and took place because Chamberlain and his associates wanted to dismember Czechoslovakia—is even more incriminating.

As a result of the inadequate rearmament of Germany, a group of conservatives within the regime formed a plot to liquidate Hitler and his close supporters if it appeared that his policy in Czechoslovakia would result in war. This group, chiefly army officers, included men on the highest level of government.

In the group were Colonel General Ludwig Beck (Chief of the General Staff), Field Marshal von Witzleben, General Georg Thomas, Carl Friedrich Goerdeler (Mayor of Leipzig in 1930-1936), Ulrich von Hassell (ex-Ambassador to Italy), Johannes Popitz (Prussian Minister of Finance), and Paul Schmidt (Hitler’s private interpreter).

This group formed a plot to kill Hitler and remove the Nazis from power. The date was set eventually for 28 September 1938. Lord Halifax, on 5 September 1938, was informed of the plot by Theodore Kordt, the German charge d’affaires in London, whose brother, Erich Kordt, chief of Ribbentrop’s office in the Foreign Ministry, was one of the conspirators.

The message which Kordt gave to Halifax begged the British government to stand fast with Czechoslovakia in the Sudeten crisis and to make perfectly clear that Britain would go to war if Germany violated Czechoslovakian territory. The plot was canceled at noon on 28 September, when the news reached Berlin that Chamberlain was going to Munich. It was this plot which eventually, after many false starts, reached fruition in the attempt to assassinate Hitler on 20 July 1944...

All of this evidence and much more would seem to support the theory of a “Munich plot”—that is, the theory that the British government had no intention or desire to save Czechoslovakia in 1938 and was willing or even eager to see it partitioned by Hitler, and only staged the war scare of September in order to make the British people accept this abuse of honor and sacrifice of Britain’s international position.

The efforts which the British government made after Munich to conceal the facts of that affair would support this interpretation.

//yamaguchy.netfirms.com/7897401/quigley/anglo_12b.html