Against materialist ontology

[black magick hustla]

First, I want to say that I accept marxist materialism as a paradigm in an insturmentalist fashion - i.e. it gives accurate predictions. In the same way I might accept quantum mechanics as a useful mathematical paradigm but not necessarily as an ontological perspective. My rejection of materialist ontology has very little to do with spiritual or religious leanings - I simply think all ontological questions are nonsense. I will try to demonstrate why a materialist ontology is problematic.

Materialism argues that everything is made of matter. The problem with this philosophical assumptions is that one feels in asking what is matter. It is necessary to ask such a question because philosophical blunders have a lot to do with confused language. Obviously the definition of matter is different for different contexts and thus, rather than defining it, it makes more sense to argue what is the historico-philosophical origins of the word´s usage in relation to Marxism.

Marxism is a direct outgrowth (and reaction) to enlightment thought. Similar it took its legitimacy from the scientific traditions that were prominent in the 19th century. So it makes sense to start with how thinkers in the enlightment period thought of matter, and then proceed with how scientists in the 19th century conceived it.

The best way to look at ¨matter* from enlightment period is taking a look at Newton. while Newton was not exactly a philosopher, his physical conception of the world influenced philosophers immensely. For example, it is well known Kant was an enthusiastic Newtonian. Newton was certainly not the classical materialist because he was religious. However, to Newton, the Universe was a giant machine - even if the machine was built by God. Thus in a way, his mechanistic conception of the universe was the seed for enlightment and 19th century materialism.

For Newton, matter was inherently corpruscular - i.e. it was made of tangible bodies. While Newton did not have a conception of atoms, the fact was that his dealt with extended bodies like planets, particles, etc. He even thought that light was made of tiny corpuscules. There was no place for objects lacking bodies like waves.
Materialism in enlightment thought was inherently °mechanistic". It followed from the metaphor of the machine - that the universe might be this gigantic machine and that its inner affairs - like those of a machine - follow a determined path. Machines are determinstic simply because we make them to be so - when we press a button, we certainly expect the machine to function in a certain predictable way. Similarly, to Newton, the Universe was this machine and the one that had pressed the initial button was God.

In the 19th century, matter was still corpruscular. The newtonian paradigm was so widespread to the point that when Maxwell wrote his treatsie on Electricity and Magnetism, he did not think of electromagnetic waves as ethereal entities with no concreteness whatsoever, as was thought with the advent of einsteinian relativity, but as mechanic waves that travelled on this extended body called the ether.

Furthermore, 19th century science, at least physical science, was built upon the metaphor of a universe as a machine. Laplace argued that one only needs to know the momentum vector and position of all particles at a given time to know the future of the Universe. Indeed, physicists were so sure about this wordview that by the turn of the 19th century, Max Planck was suggested to not study physics because "it was almost complete".

This was the philosophical/scientific world in which Marx lived and as such it makes sense to think of his materialism in relation to this world - a corpruscular, mechanical universe. Unfortunately, in this age, this is worldview makes absolutely no sense at all for several reasons. There are two blunders in this wordlview, one is philosophical, and the other simply is that this worldview is completely outdated.

The philosophical blunder existed since the inception of the kind of materialism Marx was raised with. One, ontological assumptions are pure apriorism. It demands someone to step outside the world and take a peek at it. We cannot step outside the world, both physically and/or linguistically, so every ontological assumption is synthetic apriori and thus nonsense. Ontological assumptions are not something that can be proven true or false. In this realm you can say anything. Its like arguing about the existence of God - requires someone to step outside the world to make such a judgement. So when one is talking in this ontological terms he or she is not saying anything. So arguments about the existence or non existence of God, or arguments about everything being material or immaterial, about invisible pink unicorns - are completely nonsensical.

Second, the only way the metaphor of a corpruscular, mechanical universe would work (which is more or less what Marx materialism is - matter is determined by other matter ad infinitum, like a machine) is if there was a God. Because if the universe is this orderly machine, rationally architectured for a certain purpose, then it must have been determined by a Mind. After all, if the machine was not made by a Mind then it would not be a machine at all. Because if we analyze the context in which the word machine is used, machines are made for something, and the only one that can determine what is the purpose of something is a mind. So the metaphor is empty. Rocks dont have a purpose, factory engines do.This is a big part of the reason why many prominent physicists were religious - from Newton to Einstein. The metaphor of the machine comes hand in hand with the enlightened view that the universe is law abiding and rational. One might argue that perhaps Marx did not meant this, but then what did he mean otherwise? Everything is matter is a very vague, almost empty statement. It only makes a little sense if we situate it in its appropiate context. Otherwise the whole materialist philosophy reduces to word play.

Finally this type of materialism is completely ahistorical. If Marx meant by materialism as a deterministic, corpruscular universe, in the way Newton and Maxwell might have thought of it, then there is no physical scientist today with that interpretation. In the worldview of quantum mechanics, elementary particles are not bodies with structures. Mathematically, they might contain values like momentum, spin, angular momentum, charge, etc, but no physicist today conceives them as little hard balls as how might have the universe been thought of 200 years ago. Even calling them particles at all might be a confusing statement in itself, because the way physicists conceive of them is as elements in this mathematical framework - i.e. wavefunctions in Hilbert Space. Dalton thought of the atom as a hard, physical ball - a very concrete, physically intuitive concept - not as a density function. Furthermore, there is very little space for the machine metaphor (even if we assume the Universe was created by a Mind) in quantum mechanics, because at its fundamental level, fundamental particles behave in probabilistic wavefunctions.

Readers might protest that I am being pedantic. They might say I am confining philosophical materialism into a very narrow definition. But then, what does one mean when one says that all aspects of the world are material?

[Hit The North]

Readers might protest that I am being pedantic.

I'd protest that you're simply mistaken and do not understand Marxist materialism which is not mechanical but dialectical.

As Engels writes:


The materialism of the 18th century was predominantly mechanical, because at that time, of all natural sciences, only mechanics, and indeed only the mechanics of solid bodies -- celestial and terrestrial -- in short, the mechanics of gravity, had come to any definite close. Chemistry at that time existed only in its infantile, phlogistic form. Biology still lay in swaddling clothes; vegetable and animal organisms had been only roughly examined and were explained by purely mechanical causes. What the animal was to Descarte, man was to the materialists of the 18th century -- a machine. This exclusive application of the standards of mechanics to processes of a chemical and organic nature -- in which processes the laws of mechanics are, indeed, also valid, but are pushed into the backgrounds by other, higher laws -- constitutes the first specific but at that time inevitable limitations of classical French materialism.
The second specific limitation of this materialism lay in its inability to comprehend the universe as a process, as matter undergoing uninterrupted historical development. This was in accordance with the level of the natural science of that time, and with the metaphysical, that is, anti-dialectical manner of philosophizing connected with it. Nature, so much was known, was in eternal motion. But according to the ideas of that time, this motion turned, also eternally, in a circle and therefore never moved from the spot; it produced the same results over and over again.
- Engels, The End of Classical German PhilosophySo, from the outset, Marxism is a critique of mechanical materialism.
In fact, it was the best of the utopian socialists who based their theories on mechanical materialism and Marx was at pains to distance his own work from this. The most concise expression of this can be found in Marx's notes which became the Theses on Feuerbach, but even as early as The Holy Family in 1844, Marx and Engels were settling their account with mechanical materialism: http://www.marx.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family/ch06_3_d.htm

Regarding your comments about ontology. I fail to see why ontological statements are necessarily nonsense. Typically, the discussion between a creationist and an evolutionist is an ontological discussion, which, despite the interlocutors sharing widely different ontologies, can make sense to both parties. If all ontological statements are equally nonsensical, how do we evaluate them?

Meanwhile, all research strategies are based on ontological assumptions, whether these are consciously acknowledged or not. Without these assumptions about what constitutes real objects or processes within our reality, we would be unable to derive epistemological positions (i.e. what constitutes real knowledge about the world).

[YKTMX]

I think Zizek is most convincing on this point.

The author, perhaps rightly, associates "materialist" (I think the additional word "ontology" is slightly redundant here since "materialist" already supposes an ontological framework for the world, whereas "idealist" conceptions 'build' ontological accounts "from nothing" - i.e. I think the phrase "a materialist ontology" sounds a bit like saying "the ocean is wet" - but I digress...) philosophical accounts with mechanistic "organicism" beloved of the Englightenment.

What a materialist account argues today, however, is not that the universe is some self-regulating "organism" filled to the brim with "stuff" that reproduces itself according to certain laws (although this view was partially correct and was progressive in its day). What materialists ought to argue is actually the opposite: that the universe is a big void, but a positively charged void.

As Zizek says, this is a conclusion supported by the theories of quantum mechanics, which say, and I'm not a scientist, that at the sub-atomic level, every tangible object is almost entirely made of space, of blackness, of nothing, of the holes in between things rather than the things themselves.

In other words, and here is where the dialectic is so useful (sorry, Rosa), a materialist account of the world does not seek to explain "why there is something rather than nothing" (a completely impossible question to answer, as the poster pointed out), but how the "big Nothing" must always, by definition, be defined against, be in contradiction with, actually existing matter. In this way, we deflate silly materialist notions of the "self-regulating body" of "universal laws", but avoid the pitfalls of idealist-bourgeois glorifications of the Eternal Subject who "makes the world" according to the patterns of his thought.

How is the void positively charged?

[Luís Henrique]

Materialism argues that everything is made of matter.

Does it?

Are there atoms of space or atoms of time? Atoms of vacuum, perhaps?

And about "things" like courage, dedication, desire, knowledge? Are they "made of matter" in the same sence that a house, a donkey, or a hill are made of matter? Or, if "everything is made of matter" and those things are not made of matter, does this imply that they don't exist?

Materialism, at least if we want it to have a minimal consequence, does not imply believing that "everything is made of matter" in any simple way.

Luís Henrique

[black magick hustla]

I'd protest that you're simply mistaken and do not understand Marxist materialism which is not mechanical but dialectical.

I knew someone like you would raise that concern. Ive read both documents and they dont disprove anything. Both documents are mostly sociological. The "dialectic" of marx is mainly concerned with historical and sociological issues - but in reality the whole worldview is similar to the one I mentioned. Or atleast, that is the worldview of most marxists and anarchists today. Just go to your neerest swp meeting and ask one of your pals.


, the discussion between a creationist and an evolutionist is an ontological discussion, which, despite the interlocutors sharing widely different ontologies, can make sense to both parties. If all ontological statements are equally nonsensical, how do we evaluate them?

Meanwhile, all research strategies are based on ontological assumptions, whether these are consciously acknowledged or not. Without these assumptions about what constitutes real objects or processes within our reality, we would be unable to derive epistemological positions (i.e. what constitutes real knowledge about the world).

I think this is not necessarily true. The main issue between creationists and evolutionists has nothing to do with ontology, but with the existence of macro-evolution, which is a descriptive aspect of reality. What I mean by this is that if hypothetically we had a time machine we could prove/disprove macro-evolution with utmost precision. Its a proposition you can compare with reality. Ontological propositions cannot be true or false.

It does not matter whether scientists play philosophy when doing research. In fact, if the ontological assuptions most scientists take for granted were true, we would be living in a platonic world of forms.


As Zizek says, this is a conclusion supported by the theories of quantum mechanics, which say, and I'm not a scientist, that at the sub-atomic level, every tangible object is almost entirely made of space, of blackness, of nothing, of the holes in between things rather than the things themselves.

As someone who studies physics and mathematics as a major in the university, this sounds pretty silly imo. I think this is the point I was raising of making this kind of philosophical propositions. In the subatomic level, its very difficult to have a physically intuitive conception - its all math. Remember the electron cloud that you say in highschool? In college, its not an electron cloud anymore, but a density function that is the solution to the schordinger wave equation.

For example, what if I tell you that the "space" is a property of this thing-in-themselves? I think the issue here is that perhaps it might be more useful to dissolve this ontological questions because then we end up trapped in confused language.


Materialism, at least if we want it to have a minimal consequence, does not imply believing that "everything is made of matter" in any simple way.

This is the best criticism right now. I think this is the problem of ontological assumptions though. This type of words and statements come out from certain linguistical contexts, and such it becomes problematic when you try to extrapolate them and make universal statements abut the world. Wikipedia defines materialism as "The philosophy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy) of materialism holds that the only thing that exists (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence) is matter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter), ", which can be subject to the same criticisms.

[YKTMX]

As someone who studies physics and mathematics as a major in the university, this sounds pretty silly imo. I think this is the point I was raising of making this kind of philosophical propositions. In the subatomic level, its very difficult to have a physically intuitive conception

Well, impossible I would say, not just "very difficult", although I'm struggling to see quite why that's a significant problem for a materialist "ontology". I wonder what part, in particular, you find "silly". I mean, is it Zizek's account of the findings of quantum mechanics you find "silly"? Or is it the findings themselves? Or is it the use of those findings to support a materialist "ontology"? I don't think describing something as a "philosophical proposition" is sufficient to debunk it.

I agree with you that ontological dilemmas of this sort i.e. of the kind dealing with the most abstract branch of metaphysics (as opposed to social or political ontology) are suspect, but I don't think they can be dismissed because they rest on "propositions". Any advance in theory or knowledge rests on propositions.


For example, what if I tell you that the "space" is a property of this thing-in-themselves?

Well, that's exactly what I was saying. The point is exactly that "space", or nothingness, is not "outside" a materialist "ontology", but constitutive of it.

[Hit The North]

I knew someone like you would raise that concern. Ive read both documents and they dont disprove anything.


Lol, someone like me? Well, I'd suggest they disprove your assertion that Marx held a mechanical conception of materialism.



Both documents are mostly sociological. The "dialectic" of marx is mainly concerned with historical and sociological issues - Yes, Marx's work is mostly sociological, so why do you ascribe a mechanical metaphysics to his thinking? Besides, as a form of social theorising, philosophy is best understood through sociology.


but in reality the whole worldview is similar to the one I mentioned.
Given you've decided all ontological statements are nonsense, you're the last one to be instructing others about what exists in reality!


Or atleast, that is the worldview of most marxists and anarchists today. Just go to your neerest swp meeting and ask one of your pals.
I agree that there is a tendency towards lapsing into mechancial conceptions of materialism amongst Marxists, both individually and collectively at certain times in history. Properly speaking, however, it is not the position true to Marxism. As for anarchists, because they reject the dialectic, they have no option except to embrace a crude materialism.


I think this is not necessarily true. The main issue between creationists and evolutionists has nothing to do with ontology, but with the existence of macro-evolution, which is a descriptive aspect of reality.
Evolution is not a mere description but an explanation. Moreover it is one which depends upon a certain ontological position which disallows divine intervention as the motive force in nature. I'm probably at fault for using a poor example. Nevertheless, the question of whether a creator God can be allowed to exist in the universe, alongside related supernatural phenomena, is an ontological question.


It does not matter whether scientists play philosophy when doing research. In fact, if the ontological assuptions most scientists take for granted were true, we would be living in a platonic world of forms.
I didn't suggest that scientists do play philosophy, merely that ontological assumptions underlie their explanations. In fact, given that much of science is to do with categorising things and processes in the world, I don't see how their endeavours can be separated from ontological concerns.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I'll add my comments on this thread when I get access to the internet again (in two or three weeks' time).

Right now, I have only limited access using a friend's computer.

[ComradeOm]

Marxism is a direct outgrowth (and reaction) to enlightment thought. Similar it took its legitimacy from the scientific traditions that were prominent in the 19th century. So it makes sense to start with how thinkers in the enlightment period thought of matter, and then proceed with how scientists in the 19th century conceived it.

The best way to look at ¨matter* from enlightment period is taking a look at Newton. while Newton was not exactly a philosopher, his physical conception of the world influenced philosophers immensely. For example, it is well known Kant was an enthusiastic Newtonian. Newton was certainly not the classical materialist because he was religious. However, to Newton, the Universe was a giant machine - even if the machine was built by God. Thus in a way, his mechanistic conception of the universe was the seed for enlightment and 19th century materialismExcept that it is not so simple; there were major divisions throughout the early 19thC with regards science in general. Newton, and specifically his 'mechanical materialism', was never overly popular in Germany (certainly he was not deified as in France and Britain) where it was the romantic Naturphilosophie that dominated. This was the tradition that Marx and Engels emerged from and its influence on them should not be underestimated. Indeed as late as the Anti-Duhring Engels was explicitly criticising Newton in favour of Kepler who was more favoured in German philosophical and scientific circles. So rather than being "raised with" some vulgar materialism Marx drew heavily from both Western materialism and German romanticism

[Janine Melnitz]

dada, you seem to be using a definition of "ontology" that's indistinguishable from "metaphysics". Ontology, as Bob pointed out, simply concerns what sorts of things can be said to exist, or in what sense things can be said to exist. The idea that this is unimportant is ridiculous -- when Margaret Thatcher said that "There is no society, only individuals and their families", this was a strictly ontological thesis. It was also empirically unfalsifiable; you can point to anything and call it "society", and zombie Maggie could say "Nope, individuals".

A vulgar empiricist would say that these arguments are therefore "meaningless"; I'd say it's of great practical importance whether society, individuals, species or planets are legitimate objects of thought and causal agents, and I don't think an important question can also be a meaningless one.

[black magick hustla]

Yes, Marx's work is mostly sociological, so why do you ascribe a mechanical metaphysics to his thinking? Besides, as a form of social theorising, philosophy is best understood through sociology.

:shrugs: My post was just a somewhat educated guess on what did Marx mean by "materialism". Maybe I was hasty. However, this words have a context, and that is why I was trying to think a little bit what might have Marx meant by making reference to the word "materialism". Because certainly, beyond talking about his "materialist" sociology, I am sure in the 19th century, there was certain baggage that such a word carried, including ontological questions about fundamental blocks of existance. For example, a 19th century reader when reading the word materialism in "historical materialism" might assume, beyond the marxs theory of history. that marx assumes about the universe the metaphysics that were normally associated with materialism at that time.

Regardless, the point about this thread, more than a historical analysis, is to debate what Marxists think of the word materialism nowadays. Its more relevant. and I think my assumption about most of marxists´ materialist metaphysics was correct.

[qute] Properly speaking, however, it is not the position true to Marxism[/quote]

well marxism isnt a platonic form, is it?


Nevertheless, the question of whether a creator God can be allowed to exist in the universe, alongside related supernatural phenomena, is an ontological question.

There is one conception of God which is not nonsense and whch can be argued for or against. It is the old concept of God as some sort of old man in the sky looking at us. For example Greek Gods. This one certainly does not exist. And I dont think this is a metaphysical statement, because these Gods were descriptive aspects of reality, that if you took a rocket and went to Olympus, you could hypothetically see.

However, most sophisticated theologists instead abstract "God" into this nonsense statement. You know, God is nature, God is substance, whatever nonsense. Obviously here it is just linguistical gymnastics and the whole debate is framed in confused language. Whether this God exists or not is like asking if god is infinity or not or other nonsense. This is kindof what the most sophisticated intelligent design folks use to dazzle their readership.


I didn't suggest that scientists do play philosophy, merely that ontological assumptions underlie their explanations. In fact, given that much of science is to do with categorising things and processes in the world, I don't see how their endeavours can be separated from ontological concerns.

That is why one has to analyze and think what things the scientists are saying are valid scientific propositions or not. Saying the the sun is the center of the solar system is a valid scientific proposition. Saying that gravitational pull is caused by curved spacetimes is not. Because spacetime is a mathematical manifold, not a real object. Most physicists probably assume space actually curves or whatever.


So rather than being "raised with" some vulgar materialism Marx drew heavily from both Western materialism and German romanticism
Perhaps. However, 19th century romantics didnt call themselves materialists. My assumption is based on what assumptions might a 19th century reader would do when reading the word "materialism".


Ontology, as Bob pointed out, simply concerns what sorts of things can be said to exist, or in what sense things can be said to exist.

Actually, ontology is concerned with all fundamental questions of being, including what are the fundamental blocks of existence.


"There is no society, only individuals and their families", this was a strictly ontological thesis.

It was strictly a nonsense statement. It is completely confused as all ontology is confused. She extracts "society", "individuals", and "family", from their regular ordinary linguistical context, making them devoid of meaning. A smart person, rather than just engaging her in the shitty ontological game, would dissolve the statement and point at why it is just sophistry and makes absolutely no sense.


A vulgar empiricist would say that these arguments are therefore "meaningless"; I'd say it's of great practical importance whether society, individuals, species or planets are legitimate objects of thought and causal agents, and I don't think an important question can also be a meaningless one.

No its not an important question because it is nonsense. We only feel like asking ourselves because we the ruling class framed the discussion of the world in their terms.

[Janine Melnitz]

It was strictly a nonsense statement. It is completely confused as all ontology is confused. She extracts "society", "individuals", and "family", from their regular ordinary linguistical context, making them devoid of meaning. A smart person, rather than just engaging her in the shitty ontological game, would dissolve the statement and point at why it is just sophistry and makes absolutely no sense.
Uh, no. Congrats on having read (of) Wittgenstein but that formula doesn't apply here. Saying "x does not exist", or "x, which you mistook for a real part of the world, is actually fictional" isn't outside the rules of any sane person's "language game". (This is sort of the point of Philosophical Investigations; a word's meaning doesn't depend on the existence of its referent.) Maggie wasn't in the business of talking over people's heads; she didn't stand in front of the British public and draw Lacanian mathemes on a whiteboard; she wasn't waving incense while chanting in Latin; everyone understood perfectly well what she meant. It was obvious, whether they agreed or not.

Maybe I'm not "a smart person" though! I'll be much obliged if you'd lay down some Analysis on Margaret's statement and show how it is incoherent (do spare me though if you're on some verificationist trip; in that case all the babble about "words out of linguistical context" was even more misplaced than I thought, and we can simply agree that you are bad at making sense). In the meantime drop the prolier-than-thou horseshit. Logical positivism isn't exactly...whatever sort of commonsense you imagine overall-clad, oilstained men are naturally endowed with (or would be, if not for that wily Hegel!). There's a reason nobody reads analytic philosophy.

[black magick hustla]

Uh, no. Congrats on having read (of) Wittgenstein but that formula doesn't apply here. Saying "x does not exist", or "x, which you mistook for a real part of the world, is actually fictional" isn't outside the rules of any sane person's "language game". (This is sort of the point of Philosophical Investigations; a word's meaning doesn't depend on the existence of its referent.)

First, it has nothing to do with the existence or inexistence of a reference to a denoting phrase. It has to do with painting this sort of universal claims with ontological brushes, because maggie´s silly proposition can only makes sense depending on what definition she might be using. What does she mean by individual, family - society? In this sort of universal claims, words are extracted form the ordinarly language games and that is why she can sound "right" (because exctracting this words from their ordinary contexts means she can virtually define them as however the hell she wants, kindof like theologists do with infinity, god etc). Its akin to saying, "there is no art, just paint". *There are no atoms, just elementary particles etc". She is being a politician using politician rhetorics, which most of the time is nonsense and just caters to the emotions. (like poetry).





Maybe I'm not "a smart person" though! I'll be much obliged if you'd lay down some Analysis on Margaret's statement and show how it is incoherent (do spare me though if you're on some verificationist trip; in that case all the babble about "words out of linguistical context" was even more misplaced than I thought, and we can simply agree that you are bad at making sense). In the meantime drop the prolier-than-thou horseshit. Logical positivism isn't exactly...whatever sort of commonsense you imagine overall-clad, oilstained men are naturally endowed with (or would be, if not for that wily Hegel!). There's a reason nobody reads analytic philosophy.


lol are you trying to insult me by insulting analytic philosophy? i dont care about analytic philosophy at all. i am a marxist, not a logical positivist

[Janine Melnitz]

First, it has nothing to do with the existence or inexistence of a reference to a denoting phrase. It has to do with painting this sort of universal claims with ontological brushes, because maggie´s silly proposition can only makes sense depending on what definition she might be using. What does she mean by individual, family - society?
This ambiguity is found in every single statement uttered in any natural language. It's you who claimed these words had a "regular ordinary linguistical context" -- how did she violate the regular ordinary rules?

Its akin to saying, "there is no art, just paint". *There are no atoms, just elementary particles etc".
Yeah, it is, and while both of those are untrue, neither is nonsensical. A statement following that structure could easily be true: I might imagine that I belong to social unit x; I might define social unit x as consisting of myself, a Honduran I haven't met/spoken to/learned the name of, and Michael Jackson's corpse. I would be wrong -- "There is no such thing as [social unit x], only [two] individuals and [an obvious fake constructed by the CIA]".

i am a marxist, not a logical positivist
Then you're using the wrong arguments.

[black magick hustla]

This ambiguity is found in every single statement uttered in any natural language. It's you who claimed these words had a "regular ordinary linguistical context" -- how did she violate the regular ordinary rules?

Well, words are used different in different language games. Universal l claims universalize these words, making them senseless. I would start by asking maggie what she means by individual, family, and society and then proceed to ask her why is her proposition true? Two tight friends might say "we are like a family". Family here would have a different sense than "The Hernandez family controls the buisness". As I said, politicians make intentionally this vague statemets, in the context were this big statements are said in such a vague way that they do not have a clear sense, as a method of framing the discourse in their favor.



Yeah, it is, and while both of those are untrue, neither is nonsensical. A statement following that structure could easily be true: I might imagine that I belong to social unit x; I might define social unit x as consisting of myself, a Honduran I haven't met or heard of, and Michael Jackson's corpse. I would be wrong -- "There is no such thing as [social unit x], only [two] individuals and [an obvious fake constructed by the CIA]".

Here you are already establishing a context and the sense is clear. You defined the social unit, and then proceeded to deny a true proposition that is necessarily true because it is analytical. (I.e. defining a=x and thus, if there is x, there is a. ).

Then you're using the wrong arguments.[/QUOTE]

[black magick hustla]

I am not using the wrong arguments. It was a marxian thesis that philosophy is "abstracted language" at first. I am simply embracing the communist project for the destruction of philosophy.

[black magick hustla]

And not every claim is ambigous like that. If there is a dead cat and I point at the cat and utter "the cat is dead", or "the cat is black" the sense of the proposition is quite clear.

[Janine Melnitz]

I didn't mean "wrong for a Marxist". You can use any kind of argument you like, and I don't care what you claim to be; it still makes no sense to fill a thread with positivist arguments (however misapplied) and then act like disses against positivism have nothing to do with you(r arguments).

Not every statement is ambiguous "like that"? Like what? If you're talking about type, yes, they all are; polysemousness lurks urrwhurr, though we're okay at navigating it. If you mean degree, you're right (though you still haven't said to what degree Thatcher's statement is ambiguous -- I actually think it's relatively pretty fucking straightforward), but how is that relevant? If we perfected language so that every word only meant one thing to everybody, her statement would still be an ontological one. Meaningful too.

Edit: wow! Something real fucking weird happened with the posts, and I only saw your last two, not the main one! Okay, you did explain how ambiguous Maggie's statement is, and you're being absurd; I could go "Oh but maybe the cat's not obviously dead, maybe you mean he's tired" hurf durf but we both know what you meant. Similarly it's obvious to pretty much everyone that Maggie didn't mean Mafia "families" or the Skull and Bones "society", come off it.

[Janine Melnitz]

You defined the social unit, and then proceeded to deny a true proposition that is necessarily true because it is analytical.
I conjured up a real social unit with my magic word powers? Or are you defining "truth" solely as analytical immediately after huffily protesting that you aren't into analytical philosophy? Fucking crap dude

[black magick hustla]

Edit: wow! Something real fucking weird happened with the posts, and I only saw your last two, not the main one! Okay, you did explain how ambiguous Maggie's statement is, and you're being absurd; I could go "Oh but maybe the cat's not obviously dead, maybe you mean he's tired" hurf durf but we both know what you meant. Similarly it's obvious to pretty much everyone that Maggie didn't mean Mafia "families" or the Skull and Bones "society", come off it.

dont be silly. What I meant is something along the lines of "Does she mean nobody gives a shit beyond the family unit and therefore there is not really a society?" or "The family unit has some transcendental moral value, to the point that society is irrelevant" and I could go on and on and on. There is nothing absurd about this. I dont think it is obvious at all. I dont know if she is doing some sort of sociological claim, moral claim, using metaphors, etc. Kindof like "freedom is an illusion", or shit like that.


I didn't mean "wrong for a Marxist". You can use any kind of argument you like, and I don't care what you claim to be; it still makes no sense to fill a thread with positivist arguments (however misapplied) and then act like disses against positivism have nothing to do with you(r arguments).

They are not positivist arguments. They do belong to philosophy of language, however. I obviously have read analytical philosophy and borrowed some of their stuff but I just find it silly that you tell me that nobody reads analytical philosophy as if i cared. besides its ridiculous because nobody reads any philosophy except gigantic dorks or philosophy students. the only people reading foucault are critical theory students or hipsters.


Or are you defining "truth" solely as analytical immediately after huffily protesting that you aren't into analytical philosophy?

lol, that is a relatively old kantian argument. i said that you established the context of "social unit" by defining it and thus denying the definition makes no sense analytically

[black magick hustla]

*I gave those examples of "family" i.e. "tight friends as family" or "buisness of the family" simply because the former might be used by mag in the sense "Individuals only love each other when they are of the same kin and thus there is not really a society" or perhaps she is using family as some sort of sociological unit, as it is in "hernandez family",

[Janine Melnitz]

"Individuals only love each other when they are of the same kin and thus there is not really a society" or perhaps she is using family as some sort of sociological unit, as it is in "hernandez family",You're nitpicking, as easily as I could nitpick the cat example (do you mean its brain activity stopped? Or just its heart? Or that it's only sick but it won't last the night? Or that it could last the night with help, and you're plotting its murder by neglect?), and pretending that this is analysis. Picking apart the word "family" works the exact same way regardless of what sentence it appears in -- this says nothing about the validity of the statement "x exists". And of course every word, every "x" can be given the same treatment as "family". If you deny the possibility that x's meaning could be satisfactorily reached, it follows that all statements -- not just the "universal" ones -- are meaningless.

Your treatments of the sentence itself (in which, magically, the nouns' meanings became stable, because we aren't semi-bright sixteen-year-olds -- are we? -- whose sense of cleverness at having discovered polysemy makes conversation impossible) are simply dishonest. You know who Margaret Thatcher is; that's part of the "linguistical context" here. Don't pretend that your "metaphorical" reading could possibly be what she meant.
I just find it silly that you tell me that nobody reads analytical philosophy as if i cared.Yeah I didn't say that as some personal zing out of nowhere dude. Re-read the previous two sentences? And yes, you've been playing the analytic philosopher from post one in this thread.
lol, that is a relatively old kantian argument. i said that you established the context of "social unit" by defining it and thus denying the definition makes no sense analyticallyI wasn't "denying the definition" you ninny. I said that nothing fitting that definition existed in the actual, real world, even though its proposed components do. You're not engaging with that because of course it raises questions about really existing things, and any talk about those is inevitably ontological; but you can't just ignore that part and do your anal. phil. bit on the rest, because you'd be attacking a statement that's trivially "true" in the analytic sense. So, to fool yourself into thinking you've come up with a brilliant "gotcha", you pretend I didn't even mention the real world, that I'm actually retarded enough to set up a definition and immediately "deny" it. Jesus dude, you're a mess and I think I'm done talking to you?

[Hit The North]

If dada had his way every statement would be followed by several hundred qualifying clauses before it met his standards of intelligibility. :ohmy:

[black magick hustla]

You're nitpicking, as easily as I could nitpick the cat example (do you mean its brain activity stopped? Or just its heart? Or that it's only sick but it won't last the night? Or that it could last the night with help, and you're plotting its murder by neglect?),
Yeah but everybody understands the example.It is a matter of "showing" and proving the proposition. Everybody understands it.



and pretending that this is analysis. Picking apart the word "family" works the exact same way regardless of what sentence it appears in -- this says nothing about the validity of the statement "x exists". And of course every word, every "x" can be given the same treatment as "family". If you deny the possibility that x's meaning could be satisfactorily reached, it follows that all statements -- not just the "universal" ones -- are meaningless.

And you whine about me going all logical positivist on you. Its not only a question of formal logic, because formal language is not an organic language, but the context something is said. Equally, some communist might say "there is not the people - only workers and capitalists". At first glance this is absolutely senseless - its a rhetorical device. SImilar to what professional politicians do, and I dare to say to what miss maggie did. However ive said variations of the same sentence, and people dont get it unless they are in the loop. "The cat is dead" is not a rhetorical device and its meaning is self evident if I see a cat dead, and I point at it and utter the proposition. In that context it makes absolute sense. I dont get why someone would say, there is no society, just individuals and family" at all.

I have no idea what maggie said. According to you I am retarded. Well, why dont you explain its meaning to a retard like me?


blah blah blah blah i am silly and angry blahblah calling dada names blahblahblah because he insults my precious philosophies and hegels and zizeks blahbablah and i need my way with word games to feel smart blahblahblah

i am sorry

[Luís Henrique]

And not every claim is ambigous like that. If there is a dead cat and I point at the cat and utter "the cat is dead", or "the cat is black" the sense of the proposition is quite clear.

And, of course, there is no such thing as "black"; only absence of light. But yes, we do say "cats are black", and it is perfectly understandable and verifiable (either the "cat is black", ie, its fur absorbs practically all photon that reach it, or the cat is yellow, calico, tabby, etc.)

The same goes for Thatcher's sentence; it is either true or false (or true on some levels and false in others), but it isn't ineherently nonsence. Where it comes closer to that is in getting families involved in it, for some misterious but probably electoral reason: if there are only individuals, and no societies, why would there be families (which are, after all, small societies)? And, if there are families, why wouldn't societies exist?

You could ask her: if there is no society, of what exactly are you Prime Minister? Of yourself or of your family?

Luís Henrique

[black magick hustla]

And, of course, there is no such thing as "black"; only absence of light. But yes, we do say "cats are black", and it is perfectly understandable and verifiable (either the "cat is black", ie, its fur absorbs practically all photon that reach it, or the cat is yellow, calico, tabby, etc.)

The same goes for Thatcher's sentence; it is either true or false (or true on some levels and false in others), but it isn't ineherently nonsence. Where it comes closer to that is in getting families involved in it, for some misterious but probably electoral reason: if there are only individuals, and no societies, why would there be families (which are, after all, small societies)? And, if there are families, why wouldn't societies exist?

You could ask her: if there is no society, of what exactly are you Prime Minister? Of yourself or of your family?

Luís Henrique

:shrugs: its in the same nature as "workingmen have no country". A logical positivist might say it is false, because clearly all of us "have countries" It is not false, however, it is senseless. It is in the same vein of "capitalism is a monster", etc. It does not mean this statements have no value, but they are not meant to be argued for or against because they are rhetorical. Clearly Maggie was being rhetorical. Do you think "God is dead" is a false proposition? Or "communists have no state"?. This issues are not meant to be argued. Its like arguing against poetry.

[Luís Henrique]

:shrugs: its in the same nature as "workingmen have no country". A logical positivist might say it is false, because clearly all of us "have countries" It is not false, however, it is senseless.

I don't think so. It clearly means, "workers should not give their loyalty to any country". This is far from senseless.


It is in the same vein of "capitalism is a monster", etc.

Depends on what you mean with that. If you are underlining that capital reproduces independently of human will, yes, capital "is a monster".


It does not mean this statements have no value, but they are not meant to be argued for or against because they are rhetorical. Clearly Maggie was being rhetorical.

And yet such rhetoric had a clear political aim: to make clear her methodological individualism.


Do you think "God is dead" is a false proposition?

Yes, I do. Only living beings can "be dead". This is one level of interpretation.

No, I don't. The proposition actually means, "the faith in a supernatural omnipotent, benevolent creator no longer makes sence", and this is the case.

It depends on the interpretation I give to the proposition.


Or "communists have no state"?. This issues are not meant to be argued. Its like arguing against poetry.

Not so. They have a very material meaning, which has very material bearing in the very material class struggle. So we do argue them, and it makes perfect sence.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dada, much of what you say is on the right lines, even if I myself would express things differently. However, as the replies to you demonstrate, and as you now know, when you attack this form of philosophical consolation (philosophical materialism, and in this case, 'Dialectical Materialism'), you attract little other than hostility -- much of it irrational.

Far too many comrades prefer to remain trapped in a traditional world view, that is: from language (and/or from 'concepts') it is possible to derive fundamental 'truths' about nature and society.

As I noted in the summary to my Essay Two:


For over two thousand years traditional Philosophers have been playing on themselves and their audiences what can only be described as a series of complex verbal tricks. Since Greek times, metaphysicians have occupied themselves with deriving a priori theses solely from the meaning of a few specially-chosen (and suitably doctored) words. These philosophical gems have then been peddled to the rest of humanity, dressed-up as profound truths about fundamental aspects of reality -- peremptorily imposed on nature, almost invariably without the benefit of a single supporting experiment.

In fact, traditional theorists went further; their acts of linguistic legerdemain 'allowed' them to uncover Supertheses in the comfort of their own heads, doctrines they claimed revealed the underlying and essential nature of existence, which were supposedly valid for all of space and time. Unsurprisingly, discursive magic of this order of magnitude meshes rather well with ambient ruling-class forms-of-thought (for reasons that are explored in more detail here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm) and here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Rest_of_Summary_of_Twelve.htm)), chief among which is the belief that reality is rational.

Clearly, the idea that the world is rational must be forced onto nature; it cannot be read from it, since nature is not Mind. Nevertheless, it is far easier to rationalise the imposition of a hierarchical and grossly unequal class system on 'disorderly' workers if ruling-class ideologues can persuade one and all that the 'law-like' order of the natural world actually reflects, and is reflected in turn by the social order from which their patrons just so happen to benefit --, the fundamental aspects of which none may question.

Material reality may or may not be rational, but it is certainly rational for ruling-class "prize-fighters" to claim that it is.

Radical talk -- Conservative Walk

Even before the first dialecticians put pen to misuse, they found themselves surrounded on all sides by ideas drawn from this ancient tradition. Clearly, they faced a serious problem: if they imposed their ideas on nature in like manner, they could easily be accused of constructing a comparable form of Idealism. On the other hand, if they didn't do this, they wouldn't have a 'philosophical' theory of their own to lend weight to, and provide a bedrock for, their claim to lead the revolution. Confronted thus by traditional styles-of-thought (which they had no hand in creating, but in which they had been educated and which they were only too happy to appropriate), DM-theorists found there was no easy way out of this traditionalist minefield -- or at least none that managed to keep their theory the right side of Idealism.

Their solution was simple and effective: ignore the problem.

Or, at least, ignore it after a series of disarming denials had been made, like this:


"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976) Anti-Dühring, p.13.]

This is not to deny that dialecticians are aware of the Idealism implicit in traditional thought; on the contrary, their excuse for ignoring its pernicious influence on their own ideas is that the materialist flip they say they inflicted on Hegel is deemed capable of transforming theoretical dirt into philosophical gold.

However, flip or no flip, their own thought is still thoroughly traditional in style: it is dogmatic, a priori, and couched in jargon lifted straight from the Philosophers' Phrase Book. Even though few DM-theorists deny that traditional Philosophy itself is predominantly Idealist, not a single one has avoided copying its conservative approach to a priori knowledge.

So, despite the fact that dialecticians constantly claim that dialectics has not been imposed on nature -- for that would surely brand their theory "Idealist" -- they all invariably end up doing exactly that, imposing their theory on reality (proof here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2002.htm)). In so doing, they merely underline the fact that traditional thought has found a new batch of converts among erstwhile radicals.

Hence, in spite of frequent claims to the contrary, Marxist Philosophy has from its inception been remarkably traditional, if not disconcertingly conservative. Instead of trying to bury traditional theory, dialecticians have in fact done the opposite, indirectly praising it by emulating it.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Summary_of_Essay_Two.htm

Indeed, many of the above posts are further confirmation of that fact.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

YKTMX:


As Zizek says, this is a conclusion supported by the theories of quantum mechanics, which say, and I'm not a scientist, that at the sub-atomic level, every tangible object is almost entirely made of space, of blackness, of nothing, of the holes in between things rather than the things themselves.

In other words, and here is where the dialectic is so useful (sorry, Rosa), a materialist account of the world does not seek to explain "why there is something rather than nothing" (a completely impossible question to answer, as the poster pointed out), but how the "big Nothing" must always, by definition, be defined against, be in contradiction with, actually existing matter. In this way, we deflate silly materialist notions of the "self-regulating body" of "universal laws", but avoid the pitfalls of idealist-bourgeois glorifications of the Eternal Subject who "makes the world" according to the patterns of his thought.

Much as I hate to disagree with you, neither you, nor anyone else for that matter, has been able to show here, or anywhere else, that 'the dialectic' makes the slighest bit of sense, let alone help account for the physical and social world.

And, even if we needed such a theory, dialectics is so poor that it would not make the bottom of the reserve list of likely candidates.

I double dog dare you to show differently...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I'd protest that you're simply mistaken and do not understand Marxist materialism which is not mechanical but dialectical.

Well, Marx never called his materialism 'dialcectical', and we already know he abandoned 'the dialectic' as you lot understand it (if you do) by the time he wrote Das Kapital.


So, from the outset, Marxism is a critique of mechanical materialism.

Maybe so, but in the end Dialectical Marxism falls into more or less the same trap:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_01.htm

By introducing 'external contradictions' -- in conjunction with the yet-to-be-explained 'internal contradictions' --, dialecticians allowed 'god' back into the picture, among other things. [See the above link.]


I fail to see why ontological statements are necessarily nonsense. Typically, the discussion between a creationist and an evolutionist is an ontological discussion, which, despite the interlocutors sharing widely different ontologies, can make sense to both parties. If all ontological statements are equally nonsensical, how do we evaluate them?

This has in fact been explained here many times.

Ontological theses are a priori, which means their alleged 'truth' can be ascertained from language alone. Evidence thus drops out of the picture. Such theses are 'necessarily true', which means that not only can they not possibly be false, their denial, instead of affecting the world, merely affects the language used to express them. Hence, their alleged falsehood alters the meaning of the terms used. In which case, they cannot be false. But, if they cannot be false, then they cannot be true either (since to claim that something is false is to say it is not true). Indeed, to say that something is true is to say that it is not false; but we can have no idea of what the falsehood of these theses could possibly consist. In that case, we can have no idea what constitutes their truth.

So, no sense can be given either to their truth or their falsehood. Thus, they lack any sense, and since they are linguistically-based, no sense can be given to them. Thus they are non-sensical (that is, it is impossible to give them a sense without altering the meaning of the words they contain). This is of course why it is impossible to confirm or refute an ontological thesis with material evidence; their alleged truth or falsehood is independent of any (actual) material state of the world. That is why they have to be 'confirmed' by 'philosophical' not scientific means.

This argument is worked out in extensive detail here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm

The above is a short summary of that essay.

[Hit The North]

So you will need reminding of this next time you claim to be a materialist, as this claim necessarily incorporates an ontological view, does it not?

[black magick hustla]

not necessarily. to claim to be a historical materialist might imply that you accept historical materialism as a scientific paradigm. just because one might accept quantum mechanics as a scientific paradigm does not mean that you accept that reality is made of density functions in hilbert space

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


So you will need reminding of this next time you claim to be a materialist, as this claim necessarily incorporates an ontological view, does it not?

No, it does not. I'd be inclined to explain why this is so, but past experience has shown that you either ignore such assistance or forget it within minutes.

[gilhyle]

Ontology is not necessarily a priori, but that is beside the point. The point here is that materialism is not necessarily ontological.

However there are at least two ways to adopt a materialist stance without being ontological. One is essentially epistomological in character and is not really materialism at all. The other involves affirming materialism as a rejection of idealism.

To draw out the analogy with theism. If I affirm that all claims of the existence of a God are false, I am atheistic, not agnostic. Similarly, if I claim that all idealisms are false, I am affirming materialism. I am not just claiming that all idealisms are unproven or unprovable. I am saying they are wrong.

This is no more an ontological materialism than atheism need be a faith that there is no God. Both faith that there is no God and the affirmation of materialism as an ontology are mirror images of religious views, securlarised religious stances.

It would be absurd to suggest that we cannot reject the existence of God without adopting either agnosticism or an alternative based on faith. It is equally absurd to argue that we cannot reject all idealism without falling into ontological agnosticism or the ontological affirmation of materialism.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Ontology is not necessarily a priori, but that is beside the point.

Then it isn't an ontology.


It would be absurd to suggest that we cannot reject the existence of God without adopting either agnosticism or an alternative based on faith. It is equally absurd to argue that we cannot reject all idealism without falling into ontological agnosticism or the ontological affirmation of materialism.

And yet you have the cheek to claim that I cannot reject all philosophical theory as non-sensical without also advocating an alternative philosophical theory.

[gilhyle]

Then it isn't an ontology.


Then it isnt metaphysics. Not all ontology is metaphysics.


And yet you have the cheek to claim that I cannot reject all philosophical theory as non-sensical without also advocating an alternative philosophical theory.

I dont suggest that you cannot, I suggest that you do not. I share your ambition to reject philosophical theoy but your desire to reject it as 'non-sensical' forces you into philosophical commitments.

On the point relevant to this debate, it strikes me that my point can be made in the language of Douglas Walton: When Marxists enter into debate about the most general proposition of materialism v. idealism, they are involved in a 'persuasion dialogue' in which their main purpose as Marxists is to reveal their own commitments and to identify the commitments to which their opponents are tending. The affirmation of materialism is essential to achieving this 'maieutic effect', which for Marxists has an essentially political character.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Then it isnt metaphysics. Not all ontology is metaphysics.

Depends what you mean by 'metaphysics'.

Anyway, perhaps you can give us an example of an ontology that isn't either a priori or dogmatic.


I dont suggest that you cannot, I suggest that you do not. I share your ambition to reject philosophical theoy but your desire to reject it as 'non-sensical' forces you into philosophical commitments.

And you so suggest without the slightest bit of supporting evidence.

And my rejection of all of traditional philosophy as non-sensical is not itself a philosophical commitment, it is based on the observation that not one of the theses of traditional philosophy makes the slightest sense, nor can it be made to make sense. This is a defeasible conclusion, which you are quite at liberty to disprove.

So, if anything, my claim is empirical (but I prefer not to call it that), not philosophical.

However, I am much more sympathetic to the comments you make in your last paragraph, even if I'd put it differently.

[gilhyle]

perhaps you can give us an example of an ontology that isn't either a priori or dogmatic.

As so often, the kind of ontology which does not amount to metaphysics is quite trivial - ranging from the quite useless, such as 'Not all reality is cheese and onion crisps, but some is', to the apparently interesting (but really similar) 'withn reality there are differences'.


my rejection of all of traditional philosophy as non-sensical is not itself a philosophical commitment, it is based on the observation that not one of the theses of traditional philosophy makes the slightest sense, nor can it be made to make sense.

I suggest that it is important to reflect on how complex and loaded it is to say of any utterances that they do not make the slightest sense and how much more philosophical weight is borne by any further claim that some utterances cannot be made to make sense.

It is notable how rarely in ordinary conversation we seriously accuse each other of not making any sense (we do as hyperbole, but we dont mean it literally). That is with good reason; it is an incredibly strong claim with all sorts of consequences for our conception of human speech and agency. The idea that senseless utterances are widespread would really be quite a bizarre claim.

Accusations of literally not making sense came to prominence with Ayers and the logical positivists and all those folks and had very definite philosophical commitments involved in them. It is not clear how Wittgenstein or anyone else from that tradition can escape those commitments, just by saying they dont have philosophical commitments.

The point is that the claim is unnecessary. It claims more than it needs to claim, while conceding something which doesnt need to be conceded. It claims that propositions are senseless, when all that need by claimed is that they are unacceptable. It feels pressure to claim that they are senseless because it concedes that Marxists must win a rational debate on the basis of common frame of reference with its opponents - which it does not need to do. They need only reject those utterances as representing reactionary interests (assuming always that that is the sum total of the significance of those propositions and they have no scientific or otherwise compelling support - which Im assuming for the purpose of this comment.)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


As so often, the kind of ontology which does not amount to metaphysics is quite trivial - ranging from the quite useless, such as 'Not all reality is cheese and onion crisps, but some is', to the apparently interesting (but really similar) 'withn reality there are differences'.


1) And why is that an ontology as opposed to a partial inventory of the universe?

2) Who has ever held such an 'ontology'?

So, let me re-phrase my challenge: perhaps you can give us an example of an ontology actually put forward by someone, given the following quite standard characterisations of it:


Ontology (from the Greek ὄν, genitive ὄντος: of being <neuter participle of εἶναι: to be> and -λογία: science, study, theory) is the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence or reality in general, as well as of the basic categories of being and their relations. Traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontology deals with questions concerning what entities exist or can be said to exist, and how such entities can be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences.

Students of Aristotle first used the word 'metaphysica' (literally "after the physical") to refer to what their teacher described as "the science of being qua being" - later known as ontology. 'Qua' means 'in the capacity of': hence, ontology is inquiry into being in so much as it is being, or into being in general, beyond any particular thing which is or exists; and the study of beings insofar as they exist, and not insofar as, for instance, particular facts obtained about them or particular properties relating to them. Take anything you can find in the world, and look at it, not as a puppy or a slice of pizza or a folding chair or a president, but just as something that is. More specifically, ontology concerns determining what categories of being are fundamental and asks whether, and in what sense, the items in those categories can be said to "be".


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology


The branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ontology


noun

1.the branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of being, reality, or ultimate substance

http://www.yourdictionary.com/ontology


–noun 1. the branch of metaphysics that studies the nature of existence or being as such.

2. (loosely) metaphysics.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/ontology


n.

1. That department of the science of metaphysics which investigates and explains the nature and essential properties and relations of all beings, as such, or the principles and causes of being.

http://www.answers.com/topic/ontology-computer-science


Function: noun
Etymology: New Latin ontologia, from ont- + -logia -logy
Date: circa 1721
1 : a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature and relations of being
2 : a particular theory about the nature of being or the kinds of things that have existence

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ontology


ontology
\on*tol"o*gy\ (?), n. [gr. &?; the things which exist (pl.neut. of &?;, &?;, being, p. pr. of &?; to be) + -logy: cf.f. ontologie.] that department of the science of metaphysics which investigates and explains the nature and essential properties and relations of all beings, as such, or the principles and causes of being.
ontology
n : the metaphysical study of the nature of being and existence

http://dictionary.babylon.com/ontology

And in answer to this comment of mine:


my rejection of all of traditional philosophy as non-sensical is not itself a philosophical commitment, it is based on the observation that not one of the theses of traditional philosophy makes the slightest sense, nor can it be made to make sense.

you replied:


I suggest that it is important to reflect on how complex and loaded it is to say of any utterances that they do not make the slightest sense and how much more philosophical weight is borne by any further claim that some utterances cannot be made to make sense.

It is notable how rarely in ordinary conversation we seriously accuse each other of not making any sense (we do as hyperbole, but we don't mean it literally). That is with good reason; it is an incredibly strong claim with all sorts of consequences for our conception of human speech and agency. The idea that senseless utterances are widespread would really be quite a bizarre claim.

Accusations of literally not making sense came to prominence with Ayers and the logical positivists and all those folks and had very definite philosophical commitments involved in them. It is not clear how Wittgenstein or anyone else from that tradition can escape those commitments, just by saying they don't have philosophical commitments.

I have highlighted what I take to be your key claim, since we are not engaged, here, in this thread, in an 'ordinary conversation', and neither do human beings in general, in 'ordinary conversation', advance metaphysical/ontological propositions.

Systematic indulgence in the latter black art is, as well you know, confined to the writings of traditional philosophers, about whom Marx wrote:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.

German Ideology, p.118.

A distorted language is, of course, one that fails to make sense.

And Wittgenstein managed to escape the philosophical commitments of the Logical Positivists (who were, as you failed to note, trying to copy him in this regard, not the other way round as you imply) since he was not advancing a theory.

On that, see the following:

Kuusela, O. (2005), 'From Metaphysics And Philosophical Theses To Grammar: Wittgenstein's Turn', Philosophical Investigations 28, 2, pp.95-133.

--------, (2006), 'Do Concepts Of Grammar And Use In Wittgenstein Articulate A Theory Of Language Or Meaning', Philosophical Investigations 29, 4, pp.309-41.

--------, (2008), The Struggle Against Dogmatism. Wittgenstein And The Concept Of Philosophy (Harvard University Press).


The point is that the claim is unnecessary. It claims more than it needs to claim, while conceding something which doesnt need to be conceded. It claims that propositions are senseless, when all that need by claimed is that they are unacceptable. It feels pressure to claim that they are senseless because it concedes that Marxists must win a rational debate on the basis of common frame of reference with its opponents - which it does not need to do. They need only reject those utterances as representing reactionary interests (assuming always that that is the sum total of the significance of those propositions and they have no scientific or otherwise compelling support - which Im assuming for the purpose of this comment.)

Again, not so. According to Marx, quoted above, this sort of critique is central to Marxsim.

[gilhyle]

On the first point you make, while within philosophy ontology is commonly seen as part of metaphysices, this is a loaded assumption neither you nor I are under any are under any obligation to comply with. Ontology is a more general category than metaphysics - generalstatements about the nature of existence. These are not necessarily metaphysical. Thats all Im saying - Im not claiming that there is any philosophical ontology which is not metaphysical, that has nothing to do with my point.

On the second point you make, the issue is whether "a distorted language is, of course, one that fails to make sense." Not only do I think that Marx never suggested that the distorted language he was speaking of did not make sense - rather his comments derive directly from Feuerbach's methodolgy of inverting distorted language to show the 'essence' of the langauge being studied. It is actually essenntial to this anthropological process is that the the language has a meaning - it is the inversion of its meaning ( for which inversion to be done there must be a meaning )which allows the essence to be revealed.


According to Marx, quoted above, this sort of critique is central to Marxsim

I cant think of one occasion where Marx seriously accused anyone of uttering nonsense. If there are some, they are few and far between.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


On the first point you make, while within philosophy ontology is commonly seen as part of metaphysices, this is a loaded assumption neither you nor I are under any are under any obligation to comply with. Ontology is a more general category than metaphysics - generalstatements about the nature of existence. These are not necessarily metaphysical. Thats all Im saying - Im not claiming that there is any philosophical ontology which is not metaphysical, that has nothing to do with my point.

So, the bottom line is that you want to re-define this word to save face.


On the second point you make, the issue is whether "a distorted language is, of course, one that fails to make sense." Not only do I think that Marx never suggested that the distorted language he was speaking of did not make sense - rather his comments derive directly from Feuerbach's methodolgy of inverting distorted language to show the 'essence' of the langauge being studied. It is actually essenntial to this anthropological process is that the the language has a meaning - it is the inversion of its meaning ( for which inversion to be done there must be a meaning )which allows the essence to be revealed.

Marx might not have sugested this, but his use of that word does. Moreover, he did not use the word 'invert' here.


I cant think of one occasion where Marx seriously accused anyone of uttering nonsense. If there are some, they are few and far between.

And I did not suggest he did; but I am accusing metaphysicians (including ontoligists) of doing this.

[gilhyle]

Marx might not have sugested this, but his use of that word does

Well the point is that it would not have suggested that to his contemporaries, which we can see by considering the philosohpical/literary context within which he wrote. Suggestions that utterances were non-sense were then not made.

They are not made now in common conversation.

They are made within philosophical discourse, but it requires commitments to views on meaning which are philosophical in character to justify and explain them.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Well the point is that it would not have suggested that to his contemporaries, which we can see by considering the philosohpical/literary context within which he wrote. Suggestions that utterances were non-sense were then not made.

Once more I did not suggest that they would have made this inference, since it would involve them in a use of a later idiom. But it is a reasonable inference for us to make now: that distorted langauge is without sense.

You might as well criticise Hegel for quoting Aristotle and then drawing anachronistic consequences from it.


They are not made now in common conversation.

They are made within philosophical discourse, but it requires commitments to views on meaning which are philosophical in character to justify and explain them.

'Philosophical' in Wittgenstein's new use of that word -- Ok, I agree.

And that is what I have done -- but you refuse to read it.

[Hit The North]

gilhyle's point is well made. Rosa's conception of common speech is committed to a view of meaning which is completely scholastic. Her version of common speech is not spoken by anyone in real life. She presents a model of social discourse which is entirely informed by the prejudices of analytical philosophy. The idea that the manner in which ordinary people speak to each other and construct meanings from each other is tied to the rigid logic of meaning she applies is the real nonsense.

So, for instance, she once posted a scenario by one of her supporters where some hapless (mystic) Marxist is talking to a worker about his dispute. The Marxist finally says to the worker, "Mate, that's the contradiction of the system we live under." Suddenly, from the periphery of everyone's vision, a stranger pulls up a chair. She leans in and looks the Marxist square in the eye. "What do you mean, 'the contradiction of the system?'" The Marxist replies, "We do all the work and they take all the money!" Our stranger, who is really a great philosopher, well versed in formal logic, leans back in her chair and smiles. "What apriori nonsense you mystics spout!" she snarls. "That isn't a contradiction, you ignoramus."

In Rosa's fantasy everyone laughs at the stupid Marxist and sit nodding in furious agreement as she explains why he is so clueless and dense and petite bourgeois. The worker who was originally in conversation with the Marxist, turns to him and says, "You bloody moron. I was reading Wittengstein's Blue Books last night and the philosopher makes a good point." The Marxist leaves, properly driven out by their collective derision, and eventually joins the Church.

But in reality, after the whole history of philosophy and the great breakthroughs of Frege have been laid before them, everybody turns away from the philosopher and continue talking about the dispute.

The problem with Rosa is that there are political conversations to be had, but she just wants to talk about philosophy.

Rosa and marmot assume that ontology is nonsense because it is apriori. But sometimes the apriori is useful. Drawing a line between what you think actually exists and separating it from things you believe to be fantasy is useful for constructing any research project. Besides, given that most people who think about ontology have not been born with some conception of it, but adopt one of a number of competing explanations which accord with their lived experiences, means that the adoption of ontologies is not apriori.

Actually, it's largely a political decision.


Originally posted by Rosa
But it is a reasonable inference for us to make now: that distorted langauge is without sense.Then you have a problem because ordinary language is distorted.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Rosa's conception of common speech is committed to a view of meaning which is completely scholastic. Her version of common speech is not spoken by anyone in real life. She presents a model of social discourse which is entirely informed by the prejudices of analytical philosophy. The idea that the manner in which ordinary people speak to each other and construct meanings from each other is tied to the rigid logic of meaning she applies is te real nonsense.

Translated, this reads: 'I can't answer Rosa, so I'll just label her alleged view, and then ignore her argument'.

In addition, your 'summary' of my ideas is as prejudicial as it is incorrect. Nowhere do you actually quote my views, which is significant in itself.


So, for instance, she once posted a scenario by one of her supporters where some hapless (mystic) Marxist is talking to a worker about his dispute. The Marxist finally says to the worker, "Mate, that's the contradiction of the system we live under." Suddenly, from the periphery of everyone's vision, a stranger pulls up a chair. She leans in and looks the Marxist square in the eye. "What do you mean, 'the contradiction of the system?'" The Marxist replies, "We do all the work and they take all the money!" Our stranger, who is really a great philosopher, well versed in formal logic, leans back in her chair and smiles. "What apriori nonsense you mystics spout!" she snarls. "That isn't a contradiction, you ignoramus."

Where did I post this? It seems you are now so desperate that you have to resort to downright lying. Nowhere have I ever said anything that remotely resembles this, nor would I. No wonder you failed to post a link.


In Rosa's fantasy everyone laughs at the stupid Marxist and sit nodding in furious agreement as she explains why he is so clueless and dense and petite bourgeois. The worker who was originally in conversation with the Marxist, turns to him and says, "You bloody moron. I was reading Wittengstein's [Ooops, you can't spell W's name! You must be pissed again!] Blue Books last night and the philosopher makes a good point." The Marxist leaves, properly driven out by their collective derision, and eventually joins the Church.

This is, of course, your fantasy.


But in reality, after the whole history of philosophy and the great breakthroughs of Frege have been laid before them, everybody turns away from the philosopher and continue talking about the dispute.

The problem with Rosa is that there are political conversations to be had, but she just wants to talk about philosophy.

This is the Philosophy section, may I remind you.

If I talked anything else here, you, the alleged mod of philosophy, would move my posts. Now, you complain I am posting philosophy! You seem to be getting more desperate by the minute.


Rosa and marmot assume that ontology is nonsense because it is apriori. But sometimes the apriori is useful. Drawing a line between what you think actually exists and separating it from things you believe to be fantasy is useful for constructing any research project. Besides, given that most people who think about ontology have not been born with some conception of it, but adopt one of a number of competing explanations which accord with their lived experiences, means that the adoption of ontologies is not apriori.

Who said everything a priori is non-sense? Not I.

What you need to learn to do is address my actual arguments not figments of your increasingly confused and desperate mind. [But, I suspect you know far too little logic and/or modern philosophy to do that -- hence your desperate lying response.]

Perhaps you can give us an example of an ontology that isn't a priori? I asked Gil, but as usual, he/she bottled it.

Moreover, you seem to be confusing a scientific inventory with ontology, as it seems does Gil. I suspect that you are, once more, well out of your depth here, hence your resort to fabulation.


Then you have a problem because ordinary language is distorted.

If so, either Marx was mistaken, or you are.

I know who I believe.

After all, we already know you tell lies.

[black magick hustla]

apriori.

They are senseless because they are apriori and synthetic. analytic statements are not senseless. saying all bachelors are unmarried is not senseless. mathematics are also analytic apriori.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

dada, may I suggest you familiarise yourself with Wittgenstein on this?

[black magick hustla]

on math?

[black magick hustla]

on math?
on math, or on tautologies? ive heard wittgenstein said tautologies are senseless because they dont say anything about the world?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

About analytic propositions.

For W, mathematical propositions express rules, so they are neither analytic, synthetic nor a priori.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-mathematics/

[Hit The North]

Translated, this reads: 'I can't answer Rosa, so I'll just label her alleged view, and then ignore her argument'.



So now it is you putting words into other people's mouths?


In addition, your 'summary' of my ideas is as prejudicial as it is incorrect. Nowhere do you actually quote my views, which is significant in itself. Rubbish. Most of your arguments are based on the accusation that ordinary language is being distorted. The point I'm making is that you derive your concept of 'ordinary language' from philosophy, not from an examination of how ordinary people converse.



Where did I post this? It seems you are now so desperate that you have to resort to downright lying. Unless I dreamt it, you once posted a lampoon of dialectical Marxism, allegedly written by one of your collaborators or supporters. It involved a discussion between the Marxist and a worker.


Nowhere have I ever said anything that remotely resembles this, nor would I. Of course not, I'm counter-lampooning.


No wonder you failed to post a link.
It was a while ago and I'm too busy to trawl through the back catalogue of our interminable dispute.


This is, of course, your fantasy.
It's a fantasy I'm projecting onto you.



This is the Philosophy section, may I remind you.

If I talked anything else here, you, the alleged mod of philosophy, would move my posts. Now, you complain I am posting philosophy! You seem to be getting more desperate by the minute.
Of course. My point is that you generally only want to talk philosophy and engage in pedantry when there are political tasks to be done. So, for instance, your disagreement over the use of the word "contradiction" presents an obstacle to allowing you to work in an organisation you claim to share 99.99% of your views with. In other words, you withhold your active participation as a revolutionary for the sake of a .01% difference of opinion. This is where your search for analytical purity leads you.



Who said everything a priori is non-sense? Not I. Who said you did? I claimed that you argued that:
Rosa and marmot assume that ontology is nonsense because it is apriori. So I did not claim about you what you think I claimed.


What you need to learn to do is address my actual arguments not figments of your increasingly confused and desperate mind. Oh, the irony.


Perhaps you can give us an example of an ontology that isn't a priori? I asked Gil, but as usual, he/she bottled it. I don't have to, as my claim isn't that ontological claims are not a priori but that just because they are, doesn't mean they are nonsense. In fact, I would argue that ontological claims can be useful when they invite posteriori confirmation through research and study.


Moreover, you seem to be confusing a scientific inventory with ontology, as it seems does Gil.
Possibly. I can't speak for gil, but I get my knowledge of ontology through social science, specifically sociology.


If so, either Marx was mistaken, or you are.
I don't recall Marx claiming that ordinary language was immune from ideological distortion. In fact, given that he argues that workers live in a state of alienation within capitalism, it would be unlikely that he would claim such a thing.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


So now it is you putting words into other people's mouths?

You've got no room to complain -- you were the original liar, here.


Of course not, I'm counter-lampooning.

Otherwise known as 'lying'.


It's a fantasy I'm projecting onto you.

Agreed: your fantasy.


Of course. My point is that you generally only want to talk philosophy and engage in pedantry when there are political tasks to be done. So, for instance, your disagreement over the use of the word "contradiction" presents an obstacle to allowing you to work in an organisation you claim to share 99.99% of your views with. In other words, you withhold your active participation as a revolutionary for the sake of a .01% difference of opinion. This is where your search for analytical purity leads you.

Well, we already know that you disagree with Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Cliff, Harman and Callinicos on the use of this word -- so, once more, you have little room to complain.


Who said you did? I claimed that you argued that:


Rosa and marmot assume that ontology is nonsense because it is apriori.

So I did not claim about you what you think I claimed.

Alas for you, your 'inference' only works if you think it's a sufficient condition for something to be nonsense that it is a priori (and, as you'd know if you knew any logic, sufficient conditions are connected with the use of the quantifier 'every') -- as in 'Every a priori proposition is nonsensical'. Your 'inference' cannot work otherwise.

In other words, you do not even seem to understand the implications of your own lies.

Your sloppy approach to logic and language has tripped you up yet again.


Oh, the irony.

Indeed, and the laugh is on you.


I don't have to, as my claim isn't that ontological claims are not a priori but that just because they are, doesn't mean they are nonsense. In fact, I would argue that ontological claims can be useful when they invite posteriori confirmation through research and study.

But, we have just seen that your own inference suggests that this is indeed what you believe (if you actually know what you believe, that is).

So, once your brain has cleared (if it ever does), can we have an example of an ontology that is not a priori?


Possibly. I can't speak for gil, but I get my knowledge of ontology through social science, specifically sociology.

Then you are using the word 'ontology' in a new and as yet unspecified sense.

But what is it?


I don't recall Marx claiming that ordinary language was immune from ideological distortion. In fact, given that he argues that workers live in a state of alienation within capitalism, it would be unlikely that he would claim such a thing.

Then what was the point of him claiming this:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.

He deliberately contrasts ordinary language with the distorted language that philosophers use. The contrast would be lost if ordinary language were capable of being distorted in the way you suggest.

But, let's assume you are right; can you give us an example of ordinary language that is 'distorted'?

Furthermore, if you are right, and what you say is in ordinary language (as it seems to be), then it too must be ideologically-distorted. In which case, we cannot take it at its face value. If not, what are you really trying to say? [And you can't answer that question in ordinary language, otherwise the same question will only arise once more.]

On the other hand, if what you say is not in ordinary language, what form of language is it in?

Again, if it isn't in ordinary language, you will need to translate it for us -- into ordinary language so we can understand your point.

Alas, just as soon as you do that, your words will be distorted, and we are back to where we were a few paragraphs back.

In short, it is not possible to attack ordinary language in the way you think you have (saying it is distorted -- just as ruling-class theorists have done since at least Plato's day), since such an attack will always back-fire on you.

Finally, Marx never said ordinary language was distorted; he specifically said philosophical language was. And he underlined this in his attack on Hegel:


"The mystery of critical presentation…is the mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction….

"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy -- I am declaring that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -- 'Fruit'…. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -- 'Fruit'….

"Having reduced the different real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -- 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….

"The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind…. When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of 'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute Fruit'.

"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….

"It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit'.

"In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975) The Holy Family, pp.72-75. Emphases added.]

Which analysis agrees 100% with my own:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

[gilhyle]

Bit short of time here (come back on some of the other stuff later) But for now:
it is a reasonable inference for us to make now: that distorted langauge is without sense.

From this - attempting to understand your stance - I think I am correct in concluding that your argument is to first observe that Marx identifies distorted language and you, rather than Marx, then conclude that such 'distorted language' is without sense because a


distorted language is, of course, one that fails to make sense.

OK this is a bit clearer (if it is a correct understanding). The problem with it is that it is not at all clear that a distorted language fails to make sense. It is, of course, possible to imagine a form of distortion which leads to language ceasing to make sense. Equally, however, it is quite possible to imagne distortions of language which do not cause a complete cessation of meaning.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


From this - attempting to understand your stance - I think I am correct in concluding that your argument is to first observe that Marx identifies distorted language and you, rather than Marx, then conclude that such 'distorted language' is without sense because a


distorted language is, of course, one that fails to make sense.

OK this is a bit clearer (if it is a correct understanding). The problem with it is that it is not at all clear that a distorted language fails to make sense. It is, of course, possible to imagine a form of distortion which leads to language ceasing to make sense. Equally, however, it is quite possible to imagne distortions of language which do not cause a complete cessation of meaning.

Well, I have very kindly worked out the details for you and the rest of humanity; it's hardly my fault if you refuse to read it.

[Janine Melnitz]

Of course. My point is that you generally only want to talk philosophy and engage in pedantry when there are political tasks to be done. So, for instance, your disagreement over the use of the word "contradiction" presents an obstacle to allowing you to work in an organisation you claim to share 99.99% of your views with. In other words, you withhold your active participation as a revolutionary for the sake of a .01% difference of opinion. This is where your search for analytical purity leads you.Well, we already know that you disagree with Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Cliff, Harman and Callinicos on the use of this word -- so, once more, you have little room to complain.
Intentionally missing the point makes me :( . Bob doesn't derail conversation about real political struggles (on non-Philosophy boards, in the LT comment boxes) whenever someone casually uses a word he associates with a less-than-useful ontology or whatever, nor have I seen him seriously put forth the claim that a revolution is doomed if its members admire Wittgenstein. Clearly he has "room to complain" about such behavior.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JM:


Bob doesn't derail conversation about real political struggles (on non-Philosophy boards, in the LT comment boxes) whenever someone casually uses a word he associates with a less-than-useful ontology or whatever, nor have I seen him seriously put forth the claim that a revolution is doomed if its members admire Wittgenstein. Clearly he has "room to complain" about such behavior.

I am sorry, and I looked several times, but I failed to see a substantive point in here anywhere -- certainly one directed against anything I have posted at RevLeft, or anywhere else, for that matter.

But, I note, once again, that personal atacks on me have been substituted for reasoned argument.

And it is not hard to see why.


Intentionally missing the point makes me [sad]

Indeed, the mystics here constantly do precisely this; or perhaps better: they are more concerned to distract attention from their plight, and tell lies (like BTB, here), than they are to engage in careful debate.

[Janine Melnitz]

I am sorry, and I looked several times, but I failed to see a substantive point in here anywhere
For a Marxist, and indeed for someone so vigorously against philosophy of any sort, "Substantive" means foremost that which pertains to real practice, not to silly and irrelevant polemics.

You'll say "But this is the philosophy board!!!!" and I do think this board can be a lot of fun, but unless you're a high schooler with ambitions to become a humanities prof. instead of a revolutionary, that's all it possibly can be: fun. This board is fun when used to introduce new concepts and topics and, yes, poke holes in ones you think are lame. You are not fun; I realize you get a huge fucking charge out of @[email protected]+1c$, enough to fuel your website, millions of posts in this forum and others, etc., but nobody's having fun dealing with you. If, on the music board, people often disparage this or that genre or artist, if sometimes this leads to involved debate, nobody there has spent years monomaniacally launching attacks on anything that isn't Spandau Ballet. I mean let's say this imaginary person has mathematically and empirically proven that Spandau Ballet really is better than any other music; this would be incredibly interesting, in fact, not least due to its casting the question of "taste" in an entirely new light. If, though, in every thread referring to any other band or genre, they were the first to post, and if that post always included words like "philistine charlatans", some algebra, and implications that those who listen to dubstep are leading Marxism down the primrose path to utter annihilation, people would rightly be calling for this person's ban, regardless of how correct the "substantive" arguments.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JM:


For a Marxist, and indeed for someone so vigorously against philosophy of any sort, "Substantive" means foremost that which pertains to real practice, not to silly and irrelevant polemics.

So, you too cannot respond to my demoltion of this 'theory', but must resort to petty personal attacks.


You'll say "But this is the philosophy board!!!!" and I do think this board can be a lot of fun, but unless you're a high schooler with ambitions to become a humanities prof. instead of a revolutionary, that's all it possibly can be: fun. This board is fun when used to introduce new concepts and topics and, yes, poke holes in ones you think are lame. You are not fun; I realize you get a huge fucking charge out of @[email protected]+1c$, enough to fuel your website, millions of posts in this forum and others, etc., but nobody's having fun dealing with you. If, on the music board, people often disparage this or that genre or artist, if sometimes this leads to involved debate, nobody there has spent years monomaniacally launching attacks on anything that isn't Spandau Ballet. I mean let's say this imaginary person has mathematically and empirically proven that Spandau Ballet really is better than any other music; this would be incredibly interesting, in fact, not least due to its casting the question of "taste" in an entirely new light. If, though, in every thread referring to any other band or genre, they were the first to post, and if that post always included words like "philistine charlatans", some algebra, and implications that those who listen to dubstep are leading Marxism down the primrose path to utter annihilation, people would rightly be calling for this person's ban, regardless of how correct the "substantive" arguments.

If you want 'fun' may I suggest you go to the cinema, a rock concert, or even the pub.

Don't waste your 'valuable talents' here.

This site is for serious revolutionaries, not 'fun-seekers'.

[Hit The North]

Originally posted by the troll Rosa
This site is for serious revolutionaries, not 'fun-seekers'.

But you're not a serious revolutionary. That's the point Janine is making. You withhold your revolutionary activity on the basis of an abstract philosophical disagreement. This is not the attitude of a serious revolutionary.

[Janine Melnitz]

For a Marxist, and indeed for someone so vigorously against philosophy of any sort, "Substantive" means foremost that which pertains to real practice, not to silly and irrelevant polemics.So, you too cannot respond to my demoltion of this 'theory', but must resort to petty personal attacks.
Stop pretending I have any interest in your arguments. They may be right. I don't care.

These aren't "petty personal attacks" any more than your claim that dialectics is the ruin of Marxism is "personal" (right?); no more "petty" than any critique of real, material conduct. I'm not talking about your mom, I'm talking about what you actually do, your practical activity (such as it is).

This site is for serious revolutionaries, not 'fun-seekers'.
I think most creatures with a spine belong to the latter category. As for the former, I've tried to explain why you're not playing that role here at all.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


But you're not a serious revolutionary. That's the point Janine is making. You withhold your revolutionary activity on the basis of an abstract philosophical disagreement. This is not the attitude of a serious revolutionary.

But, anyone who can post this rubbish isn't either:


So, for instance, she once posted a scenario by one of her supporters where some hapless (mystic) Marxist is talking to a worker about his dispute. The Marxist finally says to the worker, "Mate, that's the contradiction of the system we live under." Suddenly, from the periphery of everyone's vision, a stranger pulls up a chair. She leans in and looks the Marxist square in the eye. "What do you mean, 'the contradiction of the system?'" The Marxist replies, "We do all the work and they take all the money!" Our stranger, who is really a great philosopher, well versed in formal logic, leans back in her chair and smiles. "What apriori nonsense you mystics spout!" she snarls. "That isn't a contradiction, you ignoramus."

In Rosa's fantasy everyone laughs at the stupid Marxist and sit nodding in furious agreement as she explains why he is so clueless and dense and petite bourgeois. The worker who was originally in conversation with the Marxist, turns to him and says, "You bloody moron. I was reading Wittengstein's Blue Books last night and the philosopher makes a good point." The Marxist leaves, properly driven out by their collective derision, and eventually joins the Church.

So, looks like the frying pan is trying to criticise the sterilisng dish...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JM:


Stop pretending I have any interest in your arguments. They may be right. I don't care.

Out of your depth, eh?


These aren't "petty personal attacks" any more than your claim that dialectics is the ruin of Marxism is "personal" (right?); no more "petty" than any critique of real, material conduct. I'm not talking about your mom, I'm talking about what you actually do, your practical activity (such as it is).

I may or may not make personal attacks, but I also try to reason first (as I did when BTB first appeared here in 2006 -- but from the start he showed he was more interested in lying and abusing me than in arguing -- a bit like you -- so now, all he gets is contempt from me, and more abuse in return than he gives me) -- but all you do is indulge in personal attacks, and shy away from argument, preferring 'fun' instead, so you have no room to complain if I treat you like the other mystics here (who all do the same as BTB).


I think most creatures with a spine belong to the latter category. As for the former, I've tried to explain why you're not playing that role here at all.

In a post that did not relate to anything I have argued here, or anywhere else.

So, you too are a liar.

In fact, this is the only way that you mystics can defend your loopy 'theory'.

[black magick hustla]

I think some of you people are being rather dishonest. I dont necessarily think the demolition of dialectics is of uptmost importance, but there is a practical aspect to it. It is no wonder why the worst of the stalinists immerse themselves in the most vague, abstract, nonsensical way in dialectics. Mao justified from the KMT to shaking the hands of Nixon with dialectics. Now, one might say this are "fake" dialectics. I think the vagueness of the language makes it prone to justify everything.

I think its rather telling that you people get so mad when someone challenges this.

[Janine Melnitz]

Out of your depth, eh?
I've explained before why I don't bother reading your arguments in the first place. If word came out that timecube.com was filled with genuinely revolutionary ideas, I wouldn't bother going there to dig them up myself -- I'd wait until a writer who wasn't an insane crank explicated them and read that.

I may or may not make personal attacks, but I also try to reason first
Why? Where's your methodological materialism? If you've concluded that philosophy is bourgie fluff, then there's no point in playing Young Hegelian and "refuting" it over and over again. At least, no practical point; I can only conclude then that you are yourself indulging in a rather perverse kind of "fun" (perverse because profoundly antisocial, enjoyable only for you).

In a post that did not relate to anything I have argued here, or anywhere else.

So, you too are a liar.
Bizarre. Explain how focusing on the character and practical value of someone's actions rather than their airy-fairy opinions (NB: not pretending that the former is a "criticism" of the latter, but ignoring the latter completely as irrelevant) constitutes "lying".

In fact, this is the only way that you mystics can defend your loopy 'theory'.
Are you illiterate? I'm obviously not defending any theory. I'm not super-committed to dialectical philosophy, I just find it interesting -- and I meant it when I said a while back that if anyone even slightly more tolerable than you were putting forth your arguments, it's possible I'd even be won over to them.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JM:


I've explained before why I don't bother reading your arguments in the first place. If word came out that timecube.com was filled with genuinely revolutionary ideas, I wouldn't bother going there to dig them up myself -- I'd wait until a writer who wasn't an insane crank explicated them and read that.

As I said, you are more interested in personal abuse than in debate.


Why? Where's your methodological materialism? If you've concluded that philosophy is bourgie fluff, then there's no point in playing Young Hegelian and "refuting" it over and over again. At least, no practical point; I can only conclude then that you are yourself indulging in a rather perverse kind of "fun" (perverse because profoundly antisocial, enjoyable only for you).

Where have I "concluded that philosophy is bourgie fluff"?

Ok, don't read my posts/essays, but then don't make stuff up about my ideas either.

And, I have explained here many times why I attack traditional philosophy, and dialectics. May I suggest you do a search, and then refuse to read that too.




Bizarre. Explain how focusing on the character and practical value of someone's actions rather than their airy-fairy opinions constitutes "lying".

Not so, you make stuff up about my ideas (the latest example can be found above), and then complain when I point this out.

So, liar you are, and an ignorant one, at that.


Are you illiterate?

Slightly less so that you, it seems.

Why? Well, consider this comment of yours:


I'm obviously not defending any theory. I'm not super-committed to dialectical philosophy, I just find it interesting -- and I meant it when I said a while back that if anyone even slightly more tolerable than you were putting forth your arguments, it's possible I'd even be won over to them.

Note what I said:


In fact, this is the [I]only way that you mystics can defend your loopy 'theory'.

In other words, this is the only way you can do this, not that this is the way you in fact do this, or have ever done this.

Compare that with this:


In fact, this is the only way that you can learn the piano.

This neither suggests you want to learn this instrument, have started lessons, or even that you have a piano.

That is why I chose 'only' -- but then you'd have to be literate to know that.

[gilhyle]

I have very kindly worked out the details for you and the rest of humanity; it's hardly my fault if you refuse to read it.

Indeed you have and my point was that that 'detail' involves philosophical commitments.

You argue that Marx

deliberately contrasts ordinary language with the distorted language that philosophers use. The contrast would be lost if ordinary language were capable of being distorted in the way you suggest.


this is an unusal claim whichi it requires philosophical commitments to support.

As ro ontology, you unfrotunately say


I asked Gil, but as usual, he/she bottled it.


Yea since its not a very interesting discussion (I pointed out at the beginning that my point that not all ontologies are a priori is not very important) and given your accusing me of wanting to avoid loosing face (an embarrassingly childish accusation) I was happy to draw a veil over the whole matter, as little hangs on it forthe purposes of this thread. However, if you really want I’ll make one or two more comments.
Rosa, you raised the question of whether I have just invented the usage of the term I suggest. Worth noting first that t is entirely legitimate to invent a usage of a term . Tom Gruber and Jacob Lorhard, for example, have both invented usages for the term ‘ontology’ which have stuck. So the accusation of having invented a usage is not an accusation that necessarily carries any opprobrium Nevertheless, I have not quite invented a usage for the term. What I have done is to emphasise a minor usage (mostly confined to Geography but in principle open to anyone) in order to draw out a hidden philosophical commitment in the dominant alternative usage.
Rosa, you have quoted various dictionary definitions. But that process is virtually circular – allowing for a bit of inaccuracy on the part of the writers of those dictionary definitions. The virtual circularity comes from your choice of definitions; you choose the definitions which concern the use of ontology in philosophy in order to show that ontology is a term within metaphysics. All definitions of the usage of the term within philosophy will, by definition, show the term as being used within philosophy. Since its use within metaphysics is the most widespread within philosophy, it is inevitable that that will be central to definitions within philosophy. You have not, however, referred to the use of the term within information science or geography .
My point is that there is a potential general use of the term ontology which covers any study of the nature of being by class or type or category. It is an imposition by philosophy upon us to assert for itself an hegemony over the study of the nature of being. We should no more accept this presumption on the part of philosophy than we would accept such a presumption on the part of theology. Various studies in particle physics and cosmology also have an ontological character which the definitions to which you refer bypass. The hegemony of philosophy is well reflected in its ability to squeeze to the margins any non-philosophical usage of the term – we do not have to accept it.
But I would also suggest that there are some inaccuracies in the definitions you cite. It is notable also that the definitions which you quote give insufficient regard to the usage of the term ‘ontological’ in the Husserlian tradition where ontology is indeed sometimes (and maybe always) a priori but is not part of metaphysics. I might also argue that there are some key general statements about reality in Kant which may be a priori but are not metaphysics. And of course, we should also acknowledge that there is an Hegelian aspect to this question. This is, of course controversial, as discussed in the easily googled Stanford entry on Hegel. On at least one interpretation (not yours I suspect) Hegel’s work aspires to a non-metaphysical ontology generated from a kind of transcendental logic, rather than from a priori metaphysics.
This article is worth a read on some related matters:
http://www-personal.arts.usyd.edu.au/paureddi/Logic&OntologyinHegel.pdf
The important point (in so far as there is one) in this discussion is that it is possible to come to general ideas of the nature of being without falling into purely a priori speculation and it is certainly possible to express views on the nature of being which, while substantially a priori, are not metaphysics. Thus I have argued in this thread that Marxists should affirm materialism – but not as a metaphysical doctrine, rather as a critical rejection of the various forms of idealism, just as – and I add this only for completeness and not wishing to divert the thread to this matter – Marxism affirms dialectics as a critical rejection of reductionism etc., but not as an epistemological doctrine. In both cases the affirmation occurs only because the alternative is pressed. The alternatives are pressed for ideological purposes as philosophical doctrines (i.e as rational grounds for certainty or commitment) and, thus, the affirmation of both (dialectics and materialism) takes place as part of a critical rejection of all philosophical commitments which is in turn justified only by being conjoined to or occurring within a political practice of which those critical stances are themselves epiphenomena.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Indeed you have and my point was that that 'detail' involves philosophical commitments.

You argue that Marx


deliberately contrasts ordinary language with the distorted language that philosophers use. The contrast would be lost if ordinary language were capable of being distorted in the way you suggest.

this is an unusual claim which it requires philosophical commitments to support.

1) Precisely what 'philosophical commitments' have I ever made or advanced? Or are you more concerned to issue a priori pronouncements, not backed up with any evidence, about my work?

Indeed, we already know you do this, as I have pointed out several times -- but still you advance these wild allegations.

2) Precisley what 'philosophical commitments' does this comment of mine require? Again, you do not say -- and I doubt you can, otherwise you would have told us at some point in the last three years (since you have been saying things like this).


Yea since its not a very interesting discussion (I pointed out at the beginning that my point that not all ontologies are a priori is not very important) and given your accusing me of wanting to avoid loosing face (an embarrassingly childish accusation) I was happy to draw a veil over the whole matter, as little hangs on it for the purposes of this thread. However, if you really want I’ll make one or two more comments

If it's not all that 'interesting', what the hell are you doing posting in a thread that is about ontology?


Rosa, you raised the question of whether I have just invented the usage of the term I suggest. Worth noting first that t is entirely legitimate to invent a usage of a term . Tom Gruber and Jacob Lorhard, for example, have both invented usages for the term ‘ontology’ which have stuck. So the accusation of having invented a usage is not an accusation that necessarily carries any opprobrium Nevertheless, I have not quite invented a usage for the term. What I have done is to emphasise a minor usage (mostly confined to Geography but in principle open to anyone) in order to draw out a hidden philosophical commitment in the dominant alternative usage.
Rosa, you have quoted various dictionary definitions. But that process is virtually circular – allowing for a bit of inaccuracy on the part of the writers of those dictionary definitions. The virtual circularity comes from your choice of definitions; you choose the definitions which concern the use of ontology in philosophy in order to show that ontology is a term within metaphysics. All definitions of the usage of the term within philosophy will, by definition, show the term as being used within philosophy. Since its use within metaphysics is the most widespread within philosophy, it is inevitable that that will be central to definitions within philosophy. You have not, however, referred to the use of the term within information science or geography .
My point is that there is a potential general use of the term ontology which covers any study of the nature of being by class or type or category. It is an imposition by philosophy upon us to assert for itself an hegemony over the study of the nature of being. We should no more accept this presumption on the part of philosophy than we would accept such a presumption on the part of theology. Various studies in particle physics and cosmology also have an ontological character which the definitions to which you refer bypass. The hegemony of philosophy is well reflected in its ability to squeeze to the margins any non-philosophical usage of the term – we do not have to accept it.
But I would also suggest that there are some inaccuracies in the definitions you cite. It is notable also that the definitions which you quote give insufficient regard to the usage of the term ‘ontological’ in the Husserlian tradition where ontology is indeed sometimes (and maybe always) a priori but is not part of metaphysics. I might also argue that there are some key general statements about reality in Kant which may be a priori but are not metaphysics. And of course, we should also acknowledge that there is an Hegelian aspect to this question. This is, of course controversial, as discussed in the easily googled Stanford entry on Hegel. On at least one interpretation (not yours I suspect) Hegel’s work aspires to a non-metaphysical ontology generated from a kind of transcendental logic, rather than from a priori metaphysics.

1) I quoted those other sources since they reflect the etymology of this word, and its use by those who introduced it.

2) It seems to me from the above that, as I pointed out in an earlier post, you are not interested in ontology, but in 'ontology' a term you have clearly confused with a scientific inventory of some sort.

But this is no more relevant to this thread than would be the comments of someone who insisted on posting their opinion about a high street institution of capitalist theft (a bank) in response to someone else who requested information about the side of a river (a bank)!

And thanks for this link:


http://www.anonym.to/?http://www-personal.arts.usyd.edu.au/paureddi/Logic&OntologyinHegel.pdf

I will read this paper with more care and attention than you read the links I post -- that is, if you read them (which I doubt).

However, a quick glance suggests that this author has made the usual mistakes -- which I have exposed here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

But, I will assume I am wrong until I have read it -- even if only to provide you with a good example.


The important point (in so far as there is one) in this discussion is that it is possible to come to general ideas of the nature of being without falling into purely a priori speculation and it is certainly possible to express views on the nature of being which, while substantially a priori, are not metaphysics. Thus I have argued in this thread that Marxists should affirm materialism – but not as a metaphysical doctrine, rather as a critical rejection of the various forms of idealism, just as – and I add this only for completeness and not wishing to divert the thread to this matter – Marxism affirms dialectics as a critical rejection of reductionism etc., but not as an epistemological doctrine. In both cases the affirmation occurs only because the alternative is pressed. The alternatives are pressed for ideological purposes as philosophical doctrines (i.e. as rational grounds for certainty or commitment) and, thus, the affirmation of both (dialectics and materialism) takes place as part of a critical rejection of all philosophical commitments which is in turn justified only by being conjoined to or occurring within a political practice of which those critical stances are themselves epiphenomena.

I have highlighted the important part of your comment, about which I reply:

1) But, this is precisely the a priori, dogmatic method you tell us in the next breath Hegel eschewed!

2) It is relatively easy to show that Hegel was happy to indulge in a priori speculation about the nature of all being. Only those concerned to defend this mystical, ruling-class hack would even think to twist his words in order to deny this.

May I suggest you consult Glenn Magee's book for the relevant texts?

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Hegel-Hermetic-Tradition-Glenn-Alexander/dp/0801438721

Introduction here:

http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/magee.htm

However, since your only 'evidence' supporting your attempt to defend this logical and philosophical incompetent (Hegel) is that paper to which you linked, I will have to read it before I can comment any further.

And we really do not need to do this:


Thus I have argued in this thread that Marxists should affirm materialism – but not as a metaphysical doctrine, rather as a critical rejection of the various forms of idealism

1) We have yet to see what you mean by 'materialism'; if it is anything like the traditional, dialectical materialist version, then it will be a priori and metaphysical.

2) It is sufficient for us genuine materialists to expose the non-sensical nature of all forms of idealism (including the fourth-rate version that goes by the name 'dialectical materialism'), and then promote the scientific nature of historical materialism.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, I have read that paper, and see that my initial reaction to it was hasty and incorrect. This is an excellent paper in several respects: In the way it 1) relates the concerns of earlier and later logicians to those that exercised Hegel; 2) Analyses Hegel's attempt to resolve problems he perceived in Aristotle's conception of the subject-predicate form, and Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions, connected with the unity of apperception, and 3) In the way it inadvertently confirms Marx's judgement:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.

In other words, Redding inadvertently confirms that Marx was right when he diagnosed the core problem with all such traditional thought: it is based on distorted language, something Redding just does not consider (but it is obvious that this is the central problem on every page of this paper).

Moreover, the paper does not subject what I have called 'Spinoza's Greedy Principle' ('every determination is also a negation' -- why I call it this, we will have to pass over for now), which he correctly also sees in Kant, to any sustained criticism, or any at all, and thus he lets Hegel get away with what are some very basic errors --- but then this is not really surprising since Redding is keen mainly to explain Hegel's reasoning, not critically evaluate it.

The main problem I have with this (that is, over and above underlining Marx's perceptive evaluation of this entire way of doing philosophy -- that is, the attempt to derive fundamental truths about reality from distorted language) is that Redding totally ignores Hegel's own derivation of contradictions from the so-called 'law of identity' and from the structure of subject-predicate sentences, and this is where Hegel's weak grasp of logic is most apparent.

Finally, I fail to see how this paper supports anything you had to say about ontology, or even 'ontology'.

Anyway, there is much that is excellent in this paper, and I can only thank you once again for bringing it to my attention -- for it underlines the criticisms I myself make of Hegel and traditional Philosophy -- and, indeed, of all those who think he (Hegel) has anything valuable to say.

[gilhyle]

Im short of time here - sorry. But here is an ontological claim by Wittgenstein of clear philosphical character


As Wittgenstein says at (WVC 34, Ft. #1), “[n]umbers are not represented by proxies; numbers are there.” This means not only that numbers are there in the use, it means that the numerals are the numbers, for “[a]rithmetic doesn't talk about numbers, it works with numbers” (PR §109).

Here is a clear philosophical claim by Wittgenstein relating to epistemology:


To maintain this position, Wittgenstein distinguishes between (meaningful, genuine) mathematical propositions, which have mathematical sense, and meaningless, senseless (‘sinnlos’) expressions by stipulating that an expression is a meaningful (genuine) proposition of a mathematical calculus iff we know of a proof, a refutation, or an applicable decision procedure [(PR §151), (PG 452), (PG 366), (AWL 199-200)]. “Only where there's a method of solution [a “logical method for finding a solution”] is there a [mathematical] problem,” he tells us (PR §§149, 152; PG 393). “We may only put a question in mathematics (or make a conjecture),” he adds (PR §151), “where the answer runs: ‘I must work it out’.”

Quotations are taken from

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein-mathematics/

Id like to go back over your response to that paper when I have some more time.


If it's not all that 'interesting', what the hell are you doing posting in a thread that is about ontology?


Its not interesting in the sense that any discussion at this level just becomes like a an endless game of 'yes' / 'no' - its not resolvable or even capable of any real progression. The point is, if one imagines what Hegel tried to do not as metaphysics but as a generalised transcendental logic then the question which arises is the sense in which Marx continues that project in an inverted form - I know you dont accept that formula of intellectual inheritance, but I mention it here just as a shorthand.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil (after a hasty and clearly panicky internet search, quoting Wittgenstein):



As Wittgenstein says at (WVC 34, Ft. #1), “[n]umbers are not represented by proxies; numbers are there.” This means not only that numbers are there in the use, it means that the numerals are the numbers, for “[a]rithmetic doesn't talk about numbers, it works with numbers” (PR §109).

Here is a clear philosophical claim by Wittgenstein relating to epistemology:


To maintain this position, Wittgenstein distinguishes between (meaningful, genuine) mathematical propositions, which have mathematical sense, and meaningless, senseless (‘sinnlos’) expressions by stipulating that an expression is a meaningful (genuine) proposition of a mathematical calculus iff we know of a proof, a refutation, or an applicable decision procedure [(PR §151), (PG 452), (PG 366), (AWL 199-200)]. “Only where there's a method of solution [a “logical method for finding a solution”] is there a [mathematical] problem,” he tells us (PR §§149, 152; PG 393). “We may only put a question in mathematics (or make a conjecture),” he adds (PR §151), “where the answer runs: ‘I must work it out’."

1) You clearly failed to note that Wittgenstein calls these "grammatical remarks" -- and I have posted references to texts that will explain this notion to you (but, unlike me, you refuse to read links posted by me here to help you escape your hermetic dungeon).

2) But even if you were right, I asked for evidence that I (not Wittgenstein) have adopted several philosophical commitments. Now, either a) You have no evidence (but still prefer to impose your a priori ideas even on me, let alone on the rest of the world, like Hegel, Engels and Lenin did); or b) You think I am Wittgenstein (!!) -- thanks for the compliment --; or c) You can't read --; or d) All three.


Its not interesting in the sense that any discussion at this level just becomes like a an endless game of 'yes' / 'no' - its not resolvable or even capable of any real progression. The point is, if one imagines what Hegel tried to do not as metaphysics but as a generalised transcendental logic then the question which arises is the sense in which Marx continues that project in an inverted form - I know you dont accept that formula of intellectual inheritance, but I mention it here just as a shorthand.

Well, it's not interesting since you are concerned to discuss 'ontology' -- a term you have yet to explain --, and not ontology, as I have pointed out to you several times.

But we already know you can't read...

And, I'd like to see the proof that Marx saw things your way -- especially when he went out of his way to indicate the opposite.

[gilhyle]

And, I'd like to see the proof that Marx saw things your way -- especially when he went out of his way to indicate the opposite.

Rosa these seems like a quite bizarre comment to me. You brought Marx into the matter by referring to his use of a concept of distorted language. You then clarified that you (not he) believe that distortion of language leads to non sense. You accepted ( I thought) that he did not charge people in the manner you do with uttering non sense. My understanding was that you saw your approach as a clarification of his, i.e. as bringing out what his view supposedly must amount to.

By contrast I argued that Marx's concept of a distorted language was situationed within the practice established by Feuerbach of arguing that human beings were engaged in systematic inversions of subject-predicate relations to hide material relations and see them in idealist terms. That is the sense in which the use of language was 'distorted'. This concept of distorted language is one which requires the distorted language to have a meaning - it has to have a meaning because it serves either a religious, ideological or political purpose. The point is that it doesnt have the meaning justified by the underlying reality.

This I suggest is a reasonable, credible reading of what Marx wrote, placing him in the context of the intellectual traditions of his time, frim which he developed.

owever, the question of what Marx believed is less relevant here than the question of whether your views have philosophical implications

I used your link to come up with a couple of quotes simply because you were accusing people of not reading your links. The fact that Wittgenstein may or may not have called such stances a grammar doesnt make them a grammar. This is not a credible label for such claims. The second quotation was, for example, a clear claim as to the nature of meaning. This is epistemology ..... no getting away from it. Even Kuusela's view - which you seem to like - that there can be a practice of philosophy which is solely the act of clarification (a sort of Descartian disingenuity), is itself a philosophical stance. The idea that there can be such a thing as a process of 'clarification' requires the belief in an unproblematic common ground by reference to which such clarifications can be carried out. This is not only a definite, rationalist stance but one which runs counter to Marxism's understanding of how class struggle makes just such a common ground for rational debate impossible


it's not interesting since you are concerned to discuss 'ontology' -- a term you have yet to explain --, and not ontology

The purpose of the link was to link to an attempt to explain how Hegel could have had an (admittedly idealist) ontology which was not metaphysics in the way understood in the various definitions you have previously quoted. Let me cite a relevant part.


For Hegel, then, the categories do not simply reveal the form of thought that is able to be conceived apart from and opposed to the world, they reveal the structure of the world itself, and so in this way the extension of Kant's critical approach is meant to restore the substantive content to philosophy by undermining that residually dogmatically metaphysical assumptions responsible for Kant's denial of it. But of course the type of ontology restored could not be that original type susceptible to Kant's critique - it must be a new post-critical form
P.3 http://www-personal.arts.usyd.edu.au/paureddi/Logic&OntologyinHegel.pdf

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Rosa these seems like a quite bizarre comment to me. You brought Marx into the matter by referring to his use of a concept of distorted language. You then clarified that you (not he) believe that distortion of language leads to non sense. You accepted ( I thought) that he did not charge people in the manner you do with uttering non sense. My understanding was that you saw your approach as a clarification of his, i.e. as bringing out what his view supposedly must amount to.

Well, that is why I used a weaker word: 'indicated', and I quoted (in an earlier reply) another passage from The Holy Family (re-posted below) that supported my contention.

The point is, however, and whether I am right or wrong in recruiting Marx to my cause, you have yet to show where, if anywhere, Marx argues the way you say he does, or adopts an 'ontology' or even an ontology.

So, far from it being the case that my claims are 'bizarre', they are still quite reasonable, while your view has to appeal to the distorted language Marx deprecated.

But then you say this:


By contrast I argued that Marx's concept of a distorted language was situationed within the practice established by Feuerbach of arguing that human beings were engaged in systematic inversions of subject-predicate relations to hide material relations and see them in idealist terms. That is the sense in which the use of language was 'distorted'. This concept of distorted language is one which requires the distorted language to have a meaning - it has to have a meaning because it serves either a religious, ideological or political purpose. The point is that it doesnt have the meaning justified by the underlying reality.

This I suggest is a reasonable, credible reading of what Marx wrote, placing him in the context of the intellectual traditions of his time, from which he developed.

Well, Marx specifically says it is the philosophers who do this, so I do not know why you rope in humanity in general here, especially when he excuses 'the ordinary man' in the Holy Family passage I quoted.

Here it is again:


"The mystery of critical presentation…is the mystery of speculative, of Hegelian construction….

"If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea 'Fruit', if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea 'Fruit', derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then -- in the language of speculative philosophy -- I am declaring that 'Fruit' is the 'Substance' of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea -- 'Fruit'…. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is 'the substance' -- 'Fruit'….

"Having reduced the different real fruits to the one 'fruit' of abstraction -- 'the Fruit', speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from 'the Fruit', from the Substance to the diverse, ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea 'the Fruit' as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction….

"The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of 'the Fruit', this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind…. When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, 'the Fruit', to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of 'the Fruit' in all the manifestations of its life…that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each of them 'the Fruit' realizes itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of 'the Absolute Fruit'.

"The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary. He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects, the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind 'the Fruit'….

"It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, 'the Fruit'.

"In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject, as an inner process, as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method." [Marx and Engels (1975a), pp.72-75. Bold added.]

You will note that Marx depicts the language these philosophers use as "mysterious", and the results are "supernatural", and that ordinary folk do not proceed this way.

In a different idiom, this is very close to what I have said.

But, it's a couple of parsecs away from the sort of things you continually say.

Moreover, to distort something is not to invert it.

Unless, of course, you mean 'invert' and not invert, like you mean 'ontology' and not ontology.


However, the question of what Marx believed is less relevant here than the question of whether your views have philosophical implications

I used your link to come up with a couple of quotes simply because you were accusing people of not reading your links. The fact that Wittgenstein may or may not have called such stances a grammar doesnt make them a grammar. This is not a credible label for such claims. The second quotation was, for example, a clear claim as to the nature of meaning. This is epistemology ..... no getting away from it. Even Kuusela's view - which you seem to like - that there can be a practice of philosophy which is solely the act of clarification (a sort of Descartian disingenuity), is itself a philosophical stance.

Ah, but Wittgensteinians like my good self, and Kuusela, are using the word "Philosophy" in a new sense, as Wittgenstein himself indicated, and as I (and Kuusela) have also affirmed.

And I have explained that sense to you several times.

Now, if you can use 'ontology' in a different way to its normal use, all the while refusing to tell us what it means, while we actually tell you what we mean, then you have no grounds for complaint.

What we say we are not doing is traditional philosophy (i.e., the systematic attempt to uncover hidden truths about fundamental aspects of reality, derived from distorted language -- a sort of Superscience -- just like Plato, Descartes, Hume, Leibniz, Hegel, Engels, Lenin... did); indeed, in bringing philosophical language back from its metaphysical to its ordinary use, we are doing what both Wittgenstein and Marx suggested we should do -- deflate such pretension.

Anyway, we still await examples taken from my work where you think I am doing some philosophy (understood in the traditional sense mentioned above).

You have been saying this for over three years now, and despite being asked many times to produce examples, you invariably back off, only to re-surface a few months later with the same baseless allegations.

I can safely predict you will now do the same. See you in a few months, then...

Finally, sure Wittgenstein says he is engaged upon a grammatical investigation, but you deny he is.

On what basis?


The idea that there can be such a thing as a process of 'clarification' requires the belief in an unproblematic common ground by reference to which such clarifications can be carried out. This is not only a definite, rationalist stance but one which runs counter to Marxism's understanding of how class struggle makes just such a common ground for rational debate impossible

The 'common ground' as you put it is ordinary language. and that is not, nor does it contain, a philosophical theory.

And I agree with you that this involves the class struggle: i.e., us genuine materialists championing the language of the working class versus you mystics championing the language and 'theories' of boss-class hacks, while you (but especially BTB) denigrate the vernacular.

I am not sure you know which side you are on.

I know I know.


The purpose of the link was to link to an attempt to explain how Hegel could have had an (admittedly idealist) ontology which was not metaphysics in the way understood in the various definitions you have previously quoted. Let me cite a relevant part.

Well, Hegel himself denied he was doing metaphysics, since he defined it in his own rather idiosyncratic way (which has since been copied uncritically by Marxist dialecticians).

As Houlgate points out:


"Metaphysics is characterised in the Encyclopedia first and foremost by the belief that the categories of thought constitute 'the fundamental determinations of things'....

"The method of metaphysical philosophy, Hegel maintains, involves attributing predicates to [certain, RL] given subjects, in judgements. Moreover just as the subject-matter of metaphysics consists of distinct entities, so the qualities to be predicated of those entities are held to be valid by themselves.... Of any two opposing predicates, therefore, metaphysics assumes that one must be false if the other is true.

Metaphysical philosophy is thus described by Hegel as 'either/or' thinking because it treats predicates or determinations of thought as mutually exclusive, 'as if each of the two terms in an anti-thesis...has an independent, isolated existence as something substantial and true by itself.' The world either has a beginning and end in time or it does not; matter is either infinitely divisible or it is not; man is either a rigidly determined being or he is not. In this mutual exclusivity, Hegel believes, lies the dogmatism of metaphysics. In spite of the fact that metaphysics deals with infinite objects, therefore, these objects are rendered finite by the employment of mutually exclusive, one-sided determinations -- 'categories the limits of which are believed to be permanently fixed, and not subject to any further negation.'" [Houlgate (2004), pp.100-01.]

Houlgate, S. (2004), Hegel, Nietzsche And The Criticism Of Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press).

So, like you and 'ontology', Hegel is interested in criticising 'metaphysics' not metaphysics as such, but it is quite plain that Hegel himself is doing metaphysics, if we rely on a more traditional understanding of that word.

You quote this, however:


For Hegel, then, the categories do not simply reveal the form of thought that is able to be conceived apart from and opposed to the world, they reveal the structure of the world itself, and so in this way the extension of Kant's critical approach is meant to restore the substantive content to philosophy by undermining that residually dogmatically metaphysical assumptions responsible for Kant's denial of it. But of course the type of ontology restored could not be that original type susceptible to Kant's critique - it must be a new post-critical form

Well, this just confirms Hegel was indeed doing metaphysics, but that his ontology was a new form of ontology, not at all like Kant's (even if it was related to it).

The only puzzle is why you still think this supports your view!

[gilhyle]

I accept that you use 'philosopy' in an idiosyncratic manner. My point is merely that when you then say that you do not have philosophical commitments, readers need to be clear that this does not mean that you do not have philosophical commitments, but only that you do not have philosophical commitments according to this narrow defintion of philosophy.


What we say we are not doing is traditional philosophy (i.e., the systematic attempt to uncover hidden truths about fundamental aspects of reality, derived from distorted language -- a sort of Superscience -- just like Plato, Descartes, Hume, Leibniz, Hegel, Engels, Lenin... did); indeed, in bringing philosophical language back from its metaphysical to its ordinary use, we are doing what both Wittgenstein and Marx suggested we should do -- deflate such pretension.


But even this raises issues. A question for you : do you consider the ontology in the Tractatus to be metaphysics ?
http://www.formalontology.it/wittgensteinl.htm

What, I wonder, would you think of Jerzy Perzasnowski’s definition of ontology as the “general theory of possibility”. He argues the following, reversing the relationship you suggest (i.e. your suggestion that ontology is part of metaphysics):


"The general question of Ontology, Leibnizian in spirit, is: How what is possible is possible?, whereas the general question of Metaphysics is: How what is real, or exists, is possible? Clearly, Metaphysics, by definition, is a particular Ontology.”http://www.formalontology.it/perzanowskij.htm

If metaphysics is a particular ontology then not all ontologies must be metaphysics – right or wrong, I aint making this up, as you have needlessly suggested in a previous post..

This site revises the Aristotelean concept of Ontology by reference to Leibniz, Bolzano, Husserl and Meinong. Without agreeing with its perspectives, it illustrates well my point that there is usage of ontology’ which is not metaphysical.

It is notable that your view that ontology is part of metaphysics is a characteristically analytical philosophical view (situating you, once again, in proximity to that tradition) and on this site, the quotation from Jaquette’s Ontology illustrates that view.

The controversy about what ontology is is set out here:
http://www.formalontology.it/ontology-definitions-one.htm
and here:
http://www.formalontology.it/ontology-definitions-two.htm


Hegel himself denied he was doing metaphysics, since he defined it in his own rather idiosyncratic way

I agree with this in so far as it goes. But he is not doing metaphysics in the traditional way and a good way to make the distinction is to say that he has an ontology which he does not see as part of metaphysics but as post-critical.


Finally, sure Wittgenstein says he is engaged upon a grammatical investigation, but you deny he is.

On what basis?


The idea that philosophical practice is about perceiving what Wittgenstein call “facts of Grammar” lacks credibility. The conception of ‘grammar’ which would underlie such a view is very far away from what grammar is normally understood to involve. For example in the Blue Books, Wittgenstein says the following:
....to explain my criterion for another person's having toothache is to give a grammatical explanation about the word 'toothache' and in this sense, an explanation concerning the meaning of the word 'toothache'

This is not ‘grammar’ as it is usually understood. What Wittgenstein is doing here is extending the concept of grammar into the terrain conventionally covered within language teaching theory by the term ‘vocabulary’.

It is widely acknowledged that this use of the term ‘grammar’ is idiosyncratic, for example: “This broadening of the meaning of the word 'grammar' to include meaning (sense and nonsense) is Wittgenstein's own.”
http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwitt1.html

I wont go into this in detail, but Wittgenstein does that in order to use the term ‘grammar’ where he should use a term such as ‘transcendental logic’ – see Redding. By using the neutral term ‘grammar’, he gives the impression that he is writing without making philosophical commitments. But he is not – as the occasional usage by Wittgensteinians of the more accurate term ‘philosophical grammar’ makes clear.

The use of the term ‘grammar’ by Wittgenstein is a demonstrative way of underlining his philosophical commitment to clarification as a legitimate and fruitful exercise – an independent project in his mind which he believed could be pursued extensively without political implications to resolve many issues in human thinking and language usage. Thus the use of the term ‘grammar’ in a new way reflects Wittgenstein’s rationalism.

The underlying problem here relates to your highly prescriptive use of the concept of nonsense or senselessness.

Famously, of course, Wittgenstein at the end of the Tractatus described his own propositions in that work as senseless, while he validated a process of engagement with senseless propositions as part of a process of attaining clarity in the same remark.

How seriously anyone can take that kind of concept of clarification is really debateable. It seems as if he wants to have his cake and eat it. It is hard to see how the process of clarification works if the propositions are not understood. However, it might be explained away if one interprets Wittgenstein as believing that sense, more or less, only attaches to factual claims and this – despite appearances - is quite a narrow definition.

Notice the pattern - the term 'philosophy' has been redefined, the term 'grammar' has been redefined, the term 'sense' has been strictly defined. In all these ways, Wittgenstein makes philosophical commitments by the way he redefines key terms. And you follow him in this technical usage which exists only in the context of the practice of his philosophy. You ask what philosophical commitments you have. Are these not they ?

However,, leaving that aside, there is a second issue (and we are somewhat conflating the discussion of these two issues of whether your stance is philosophical and whether it is defensible. For good measure the third issue of what Marx thought has got mixed in as well. ) Considering the question of whether this use of senseless is defensible, it is a usage which does suggest that senseless propositions can have an elucidatory function which means that to describe a proposition as senseless is not necessarily to condemn it. The relevant extract from the Tractatus reads “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them.” This, it seems to me, creates a particular challenge for your use of the concept of senselessness. As I understand your work, to argue that dialectics is senseless is critical to your claim that it has no use for revolutionaries. Yet for Wittgenstein, propositions could be useful and senseless.

Wittgenstein had an idea that there are things which can be shown, displayed, elucidated by senseless use of language (see his views on religious language) which means that it would be incorrect for any Wittgensteinian to condemn language usage as senseless, rather a Wittgensteinian should be happy to categorise certain usage as senseless – not to condemn it but to situate it. Doing things with language is a key concept for the mature Wittgenstein.
He had a stronger claim which did – in his view condemn a set of propositions – namely that they are useless. This was his view of Set Theory. As I see it, Rosa, your criticism of dialectics may be a two stage one in which you seek to establish first that dialectics is senseless and second that it is useless. We get stuck time and time again on the claim that such generalities are senseless, whereas the significant question is in what sense they are or can be useful. If one were to focus on that question, your opponents would not be forced to focus on rejecting your claim of senselessness, which is a deeply philosophical claim. Rather the focus could be on the practical question of what use either dialectics or general ontological claims can have Marxists. Now that is an interesting question, far from easily answered !
You might respond that if the claims are senseless how can that be ignored ? I agree – if it were so. But it isn’t. True senselessness is rare. I acknowledge that language can have a primarily demonstrative role in which the degree of sense can be particularly low (I treat meaning as a continuum rather than something which is either present or absent: that is the significance of the presence in speech of vagueness). I am happy to characterise – for example – religious language as having a demonstrative or elucidatory role which it can fulfil while not quite making sense. But, as Feuerbach showed, this demonstrative role relies on inverted or distorted relationships of meaning (metaphor/analogy/reversal of terms etc) as they would occur in what would be quite sensible empirical claims. Marx went on to show that those inverted relationships were themselves best understood not merely in terms of the sensible descriptive usages which they invert, but also in terms of the social relations which their inversion serves. To work that out requires close attention to be paid to the particular meaning of the inverted or ideological usage.


to distort something is not to invert it.


To distort something is not necessarily to invert it. But Feuerbach's theory - which Marx follows in The Holy Family (but thereafter dropped or rather significantly revised) + is that there is a type of inversion of ordinary language which constitutes religious language.

If one categorises such usage as senseless, one closes off the possibility of that kind of ideological analysis. Consequently I think Wittgenstein in error in moving from recognising the elucidatory character of certain usages to the conclusion that they are senseless. The propositions of the Tractatus are not senseless.
By the same token, I believe that general ontological claims can be made. They will make limited sense. But they have an elucidatory (and demarcatory – if there is such a word!) purpose. They are not necessarily a priori – rather they are provisional, being incompletely supported by evidence. They are also not necessarily metaphysical – rather they are critical, embodying the rejection of idealist claims and the refusal to fall into ontological agnosticism.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


I accept that you use 'philosophy' in an idiosyncratic manner. My point is merely that when you then say that you do not have philosophical commitments, readers need to be clear that this does not mean that you do not have philosophical commitments, but only that you do not have philosophical commitments according to this narrow definition of philosophy.

And I am up-front about this when asked, as I have been with you for the last three years. The only problem is that, after I have told you, you disappear for a while, and then come back a few weeks/months later and make the same allegations, as if I had said nothing.

And I have made this point to you several times, too!


But even this raises issues. A question for you : do you consider the ontology in the Tractatus to be metaphysics ?
http://www.formalontology.it/wittgensteinl.htm

There is no ontology in the Tractatus.


What, I wonder, would you think of Jerzy Perzasnowski's definition of ontology as the “general theory of possibility”. He argues the following, reversing the relationship you suggest (i.e. your suggestion that ontology is part of metaphysics):

He is quite at liberty to re-define this word as he sees fit, but then we will still need a word for the traditional study of Being and what exists (the old meaning of ontology); so, this will only have put off the evil day, by simply substituting a typographically identical word for original.

Anyway, I am pretty sure that the OP did not intend this meaning of 'ontology', and that is what this thread is about -- something that has yet to dawn on you.


If metaphysics is a particular ontology then not all ontologies must be metaphysics – right or wrong, I aint making this up, as you have needlessly suggested in a previous post..

No, ontology is a branch of metaphysics (and is therefore a priori and dogmatic); I am not sure what 'ontology' (your word, or that of the guy you mentioned) is a branch of, since you refuse to tell us what you mean by this term.


This site revises the Aristotelian concept of Ontology by reference to Leibniz, Bolzano, Husserl and Meinong. Without agreeing with its perspectives, it illustrates well my point that there is usage of 'ontology’ which is not metaphysical.

I agree, there is indeed as use of 'ontology' that is whatever you want it to be (the cat's mother, if that pleases you), but as I said earlier, in relation to this thread:


But this is no more relevant to this thread than would be the comments of someone who insisted on posting their opinion about a high street institution of capitalist theft (a bank) in response to someone else who requested information about the side of a river (a bank)!

So, my comments about ontology (not 'ontology') still stand.


It is notable that your view that ontology is part of metaphysics is a characteristically analytical philosophical view (situating you, once again, in proximity to that tradition) and on this site, the quotation from Jaquette’s Ontology illustrates that view.

Not so, as you admitted earlier, it is in fact a traditional interpretation of this word -- about which you commented as follows:


This site revises the Aristotelian concept of Ontology

which 'concept' has dominated philosophy ever since, and still does.

Anyway, this new 'understanding' of 'ontology' strikes me as no less a priori and dogmatic -- and thus no less metaphysical.


The controversy about what ontology is is set out here:
http://www.formalontology.it/ontolog...itions-one.htm
and here:
http://www.formalontology.it/ontolog...itions-two.htm

Yes, I am aware of this alleged controversy -- everything in traditional philosophy is controversial -- that's part of the reason no progress has been made in 2400 years of this ruling-class, systematic waste of time.


But he is not doing metaphysics in the traditional way and a good way to make the distinction is to say that he has an ontology which he does not see as part of metaphysics but as post-critical.

In fact, he (Hegel) is doing traditional metaphysics in his own 'new' way -- that is, by throwing a load of impenetrable jargon at the subject.


The idea that philosophical practice is about perceiving what Wittgenstein call “facts of Grammar” lacks credibility. The conception of ‘grammar’ which would underlie such a view is very far away from what grammar is normally understood to involve. For example in the Blue Books, Wittgenstein says the following:
....to explain my criterion for another person's having toothache is to give a grammatical explanation about the word 'toothache' and in this sense, an explanation concerning the meaning of the word 'toothache'

I agree, Wittgenstein is not using the word 'grammar' in its usual sense; who said he was? Not me.

So, all this is wasted effort:


This is not ‘grammar’ as it is usually understood. What Wittgenstein is doing here is extending the concept of grammar into the terrain conventionally covered within language teaching theory by the term ‘vocabulary’.

It is widely acknowledged that this use of the term ‘grammar’ is idiosyncratic, for example: “This broadening of the meaning of the word 'grammar' to include meaning (sense and nonsense) is Wittgenstein's own.”
http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwitt1.html

I wont go into this in detail, but Wittgenstein does that in order to use the term ‘grammar’ where he should use a term such as ‘transcendental logic’ – see Redding. By using the neutral term ‘grammar’, he gives the impression that he is writing without making philosophical commitments. But he is not – as the occasional usage by Wittgensteinians of the more accurate term ‘philosophical grammar’ makes clear.

The use of the term ‘grammar’ by Wittgenstein is a demonstrative way of underlining his philosophical commitment to clarification as a legitimate and fruitful exercise – an independent project in his mind which he believed could be pursued extensively without political implications to resolve many issues in human thinking and language usage. Thus the use of the term ‘grammar’ in a new way reflects Wittgenstein’s rationalism

And, I'd like to see you justify your substitution of 'transcendental logic' for his use of 'grammar'.

And, you keep saying he has 'philosophical commitments', but apart from merely repeating this allegation, you continually fail to say what these are.


The use of the term ‘grammar’ by Wittgenstein is a demonstrative way of underlining his philosophical commitment to clarification as a legitimate and fruitful exercise – an independent project in his mind which he believed could be pursued extensively without political implications to resolve many issues in human thinking and language usage. Thus the use of the term ‘grammar’ in a new way reflects Wittgenstein’s rationalism.

He does not have a 'philosophical commitment' to "clarification as a legitimate and fruitful exercise", since this is not a philosophical commitment to begin with -- unless you can show otherwise. Simply saying it is is insufficient

in earlier threads, you showed a tendency to argue that practically anything, even the rejection of traditional philosophy, was also to do philosophy.

As I pointed out to you then, this would imply that to fight capitalism, and to expose it as a rapacious and unstable system, for example, was itself to be a supporter of capitalism!

That's how crazy your view is.

And Wittgenstein is not a rationalist -- I challenge you to show otherwise.

In fact, there is far more evidence he was an empiricist (see the work of John Cook, for example) -- but I deny he was even this.

[We can debate this in another thread -- if you can bring yourself to stop de-railing this one by making it all about me and/or Wittgenstein, and not about materialist ontology!]


The underlying problem here relates to your highly prescriptive use of the concept of nonsense or senselessness.

In fact, in Essay One, I admit this -- and I explain why I adopt this stance.

But, as usual, you mouth off about my work without having read it!


Famously, of course, Wittgenstein at the end of the Tractatus described his own propositions in that work as senseless, while he validated a process of engagement with senseless propositions as part of a process of attaining clarity in the same remark.

As usual, once more, your sloppy approach to Wittgenstein means you attribute to him a view he did not hold, for he said that anyone who understood his work would see that his propositions were Unsinnig -- nonsense -- that is, incapable of expressing a sense, a fact of the matter -- not that they were gibberish.

And, he did not use "senseless" (Sinnloss) here and he did not say his work was senseless. There is a big difference between these two words, since he held that mathematical and logical propositions were senseless, not Unsinnig. And, who doubts that these propositions can be understood?


How seriously anyone can take that kind of concept of clarification is really debateable. It seems as if he wants to have his cake and eat it. It is hard to see how the process of clarification works if the propositions are not understood. However, it might be explained away if one interprets Wittgenstein as believing that sense, more or less, only attaches to factual claims and this – despite appearances - is quite a narrow definition.

Again, your sloppy approach to Wittgenstein means that the above is directed at a straw man, not at Wittgenstein, or me.

And, you fail to note that he is using sense (Sinn) in a way that is analogous to the way Frege used it, so he is debating with that tradition, not the radically confused tradition from which you hale.

Anyway, in his later work he came to see that this was a narrow way of viewing things --, so Wittgenstein is over 70 years ahead of you!

In other words, you seem more concerned to slay the already slain than address the theme of this thread.

And I won't comment on the following waste of space, since it labours under the same confusion:


However, leaving that aside, it does suggest that senseless propositions can have an elucidatory function which means that to describe a proposition as senseless is not necessarily to condemn it. The relevant extract from the Tractatus reads “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them.” This, it seems to me, creates a particular challenge for your use of the concept of senselessness. As I understand your work, to argue that dialectics is senseless is critical to your claim that it has no use for revolutionaries. Yet for Wittgenstein, propositions could be useful and senseless.
Wittgenstein had an idea that there are things which can be shown, displayed, elucidated by senseless use of language (see his views on religious language) which means that it would be incorrect for any Wittgensteinian to condemn language usage as senseless, rather a Wittgensteinian should be happy to categorise certain usage as senseless – not to condemn it but to situate it. Doing things with language is a key concept for the mature Wittgenstein.
He had a stronger claim which did – in his view condemn a set of propositions – namely that they are useless. This was his view of Set Theory. As I see it, Rosa, your criticism of dialectics may be a two stage one in which you seek to establish first that dialectics is senseless and second that it is useless. We get stuck time and time again on the claim that such generalities are senseless, whereas the significant question is in what sense they are or can be useful. If one were to focus on that question, your opponents would not be forced to focus on rejecting your claim of senselessness, which is a deeply philosophical claim. Rather the focus could be on the practical question of what use either dialectics or general ontological claims can have Marxists. Now that is an interesting question, far from easily answered !
You might respond that if the claims are senseless how can that be ignored ? I agree – if it were so. But it isn’t. True senselessness is rare. I acknowledge that language can have a primarily demonstrative role in which the degree of sense can be particularly low (I treat meaning as a continuum rather than something which is either present or absent: that is the significance of the presence in speech of vagueness). I am happy to characterise – for example – religious language as having a demonstrative or elucidatory role which it can fulfil while not quite making sense. But, as Feuerbach showed, this demonstrative role relies on inverted or distorted relationships of meaning (metaphor/analogy/reversal of terms etc) as they would occur in what would be quite sensible empirical claims. Marx went on to show that those inverted relationships were themselves best understood not merely in terms of the sensible descriptive usages which they invert, but also in terms of the social relations which their inversion serves. To work that out requires close attention to be paid to the particular meaning of the inverted or ideological usage.

Indeed, if this were an undergraduate essay, it would fail!

And Marx was concerned to attack the German Ideology (hence the title of the book!) -- he was not speaking about anything more general; so much of the above is doubly a waste of space!


You might respond that if the claims are senseless how can that be ignored ? I agree – if it were so. But it isn’t. True senselessness is rare. I acknowledge that language can have a primarily demonstrative role in which the degree of sense can be particularly low (I treat meaning as a continuum rather than something which is either present or absent: that is the significance of the presence in speech of vagueness). I am happy to characterise – for example – religious language as having a demonstrative or elucidatory role which it can fulfil while not quite making sense. But, as Feuerbach showed, this demonstrative role relies on inverted or distorted relationships of meaning (metaphor/analogy/reversal of terms etc) as they would occur in what would be quite sensible empirical claims. Marx went on to show that those inverted relationships were themselves best understood not merely in terms of the sensible descriptive usages which they invert, but also in terms of the social relations which their inversion serves. To work that out requires close attention to be paid to the particular meaning of the inverted or ideological usage.

No, my response is that the above is a pointless exercise in the use of irrelevant language, which has nothing to do with anything Wittgenstein had to say, nor with anything I have said.

And I note you have to add the word 'distort' to Feuerbach's views, too!


To distort something is not necessarily to invert it. But Feuerbach's theory - which Marx follows in The Holy Family (but thereafter dropped or rather significantly revised) + is that there is a type of inversion of ordinary language which constitutes religious language.

I agree, but, and once more:

'Distort' is not the same as 'invert'.


If one categorises such usage as senseless, one closes off the possibility of that kind of ideological analysis. Consequently I think Wittgenstein in error in moving from recognising the elucidatory character of certain usages to the conclusion that they are senseless. The propositions of the Tractatus are not senseless.
By the same token, I believe that general ontological claims can be made. They will make limited sense. But they have an elucidatory (and demarcatory – if there is such a word!) purpose. They are not necessarily a priori – rather they are provisional, being incompletely supported by evidence. They are also not necessarily metaphysical – rather they are critical, embodying the rejection of idealist claims and the refusal to fall into ontological agnosticism.

Once again, your sloppy attention to detail means the above is yet another waste of space.

And, I have explained (in ordinary terms, in other threads) why the conclusion you attempt to draw in the last paragraph is misguided.

Hence, you need to address what I have actually said, not what randomly enters your fevered and Hermetically compromised brain.

And: once more, what philosophical commitments have I (not Wittgenstein) expressed, presupposed or implied?

As I predicted in my last post, you dodged this challenge yet again.

As I predict once more you will continue to do...

[gilhyle]

And I am up-front about this when asked,

Yes you are.


There is no ontology in the Tractatus.

This is a philosophical commitment - not in your sense of philosophy but in the traditional sense.


I am pretty sure that the OP did not intend this meaning of 'ontology', and that is what this thread is about

What I am suggesting is that this thread should consider the possibility of coming to generalisations about being on a basis other than traditional metaphysical speculation - seems to me a highly relevant suggestion.


He does not have a 'philosophical commitment' to "clarification as a legitimate and fruitful exercise", since this is not a philosophical commitment to begin with -- unless you can show otherwise. Simply saying it is is insufficient


And doesnt this just go around in circles ? I say it is a philosophical commitment, you say it isnt. Where the point of debate around which this can be resolved ? I don't think there is one in this society. I don't believe Marxists accept that the Enlightenment project of rational reflection to establish a basis for communication or consensus is viable. I reject that, but I do so - in the end - arbitrarily solely deriving from my rejection of the dominant ideology. You think in ordinary language there is basis for conducting such clarifications. You even think you find in The Holy Family a confirmation that Marx shared this view. I think that in The German Ideology Marx revised and rejected that view. But in the end of the day, what Marx thought is only a by the way - what really matters is what is the approach most appropriate for revolutionaries.


in earlier threads, you showed a tendency to argue that practically anything, even the rejection of traditional philosophy, was also to do philosophy.

I believe that the rejection of philosophy cannot be based on an internal critique of philosophical stances but must be based on an external critique - in essence an existential positioning divorced from philosophical practice. As Marx did from 1846 on


And, who doubts that these propositions can be understood?


To consider them nonsense but capable of being understood is a definite philosophical stance - in the traditional sense of philosophy.


Marx was concerned to attack the German Ideology (hence the title of the book!)

Small point - the title was not the title given by Marx, but was given by Soviet editors referring to a comment in a letter.


I note you have to add the word 'distort' to Feuerbach's views,

Are you suggesting that Feuerbach did not believe that religious usage was a distortion ?


And: once more, what philosophical commitments have I (not Wittgenstein) expressed, presupposed or implied?


Your philosophical commitments are to the standing of your own work as not being, in an arguable way, philosophy, as being clarification as being a poseriori etc, your views on logic etc - they are endless - assuming only that we use a traditional term philosophy.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


This is a philosophical commitment - not in your sense of philosophy but in the traditional sense.

What!? Denying there is an ontology in the Tractatus is a 'philosophical commitment'? You'll be telling us that the weather forecast is a 'philosophical commitment' next!


What I am suggesting is that this thread should consider the possibility of coming to generalisations about being on a basis other than traditional metaphysical speculation - seems to me a highly relevant suggestion.

In other words, as I noted, you want us to debate 'ontology', not ontology.

Fine, start your own thread. Stop cluttering this one up with your irrelevant musings.


And doesn't this just go around in circles ? I say it is a philosophical commitment, you say it isn't. Where the point of debate around which this can be resolved ? I don't think there is one in this society. I don't believe Marxists accept that the Enlightenment project of rational reflection to establish a basis for communication or consensus is viable. I reject that, but I do so - in the end - arbitrarily solely deriving from my rejection of the dominant ideology.

But, you include everything as a 'philosophical commitment', so you use of this term is far too indiscriminate -- and this compounded by the fact that you refuse to tell us what counts as a 'philosophical commitment' and what does not.

And, we have yet to see you produce an example from my work (but see below) that exhibits a 'philosophical commitment' -- you seem to think that concentrating on Wittgenstein is enough.

Except you say this:


You think in ordinary language there is basis for conducting such clarifications. You even think you find in The Holy Family a confirmation that Marx shared this view. I think that in The German Ideology Marx revised and rejected that view. But in the end of the day, what Marx thought is only a by the way - what really matters is what is the approach most appropriate for revolutionaries

I have nowhere said this, and I defy you to show otherwise.

What I have said, alongside Marx and Wittgenstein, is that we should return the language of traditional philosophy to the vernacular; on doing that we invariably see the sort of metaphysics that has colonised your brain fall apart.

This is in no way philosophical, since I am advocating no philosophical theses, theories or truths -- again, I challenge you to show otherwise.

As I have said, several times: your sort of view would classify anti-capitalists as supporters of the capitalist system!

You keep ignoring this point -- in your unenviable position, I'd do the same.

And, as far as your 'innovative' re-interpretation of Marx is concerned, we'll need more than just your say-so in order to accept it -especially since it runs counter to what he actually said.

A nice ideological inversion on your part, I reckon.


I believe that the rejection of philosophy cannot be based on an internal critique of philosophical stances but must be based on an external critique - in essence an existential positioning divorced from philosophical practice. As Marx did from 1846 on

Except, he concluded that philosophy was based on linguistic distortion. So, once more, you ignore what he actually says in order to make your flights-of-fancy seem to work.


To consider them nonsense but capable of being understood is a definite philosophical stance - in the traditional sense of philosophy.

I do not treat metaphysical propositions as nonsense, but as non-sense, a clear distinction I introduced in Essay One, and elaborated at great length in Essay Twelve Part One.

If you spent more time finding out what I actually believe, instead of trying to guess what I believe, I might have more respect for your opinions.

Of course, you do not have to find out what my beliefs are -- but then, as I have said to you literally dozens of times already, you need to stop making stuff up about me and my ideas.

And, it isn't a 'philosophical stance' saying that nonsense can be understood, it is something we do as a matter of course. It is a pre-reflective skill we all bring to the words we use.

If you want examples of this skill (but you only have to reflect on your own use of language to see this for yourself -- something you seem incapable of doing at times) you only have to beg...

Anyway, you reveal your incapacity to read my posts once again. Here is my earlier comment on the propositions of mathematics and logic:


And, he did not use "senseless" (Sinnloss) here and he did not say his work was senseless. There is a big difference between these two words [added in this thread: i.e., between Sinnloss and Unsinnig], since he held that mathematical and logical propositions were senseless, not Unsinnig. And, who doubts that these propositions can be understood?

Notice, I said that such propositions are not nonsense (Unsinnig) but senseless (Sinnloss) -- and yet they can be understood -- and that is a fact not a philosophical thesis (I am assuming here that you know that we can understand mathematical propositions, for example -- in your present confused state of mind, however, I fear I might be attributing to you knowledge you do not possess).

But what did you do? You substituted my word 'senseless' for your word 'nonsense':


Me referring to the senseless propositions of mathematics and logic:


And, who doubts that these propositions can be understood?

You, getting your knickers in a twist again:

To consider them nonsense but capable of being understood is a definite philosophical stance - in the traditional sense of philosophy.

Again my sentence was in relation to the senseless propositions of the Tractatus -- i.e., those of mathematics and logic.

So, not only do you confuse my use of 'senseless' with your use of 'nonsense', you confuse Wittgenstein's use of 'nonsense' with your use of 'senseless' (in you last post but one -- as I pointed out).

May I suggest you take a few weeks off to allow your clouded brain to clear?


Small point - the title was not the title given by Marx, but was given by Soviet editors referring to a comment in a letter.

And they did that because it was clear to them that this was indeed Marx's target.


Are you suggesting that Feuerbach did not believe that religious usage was a distortion ?

I am not suggesting anything other than that you have inserted a word into Feuerbach's work that I question is there.

Unless, of course, you can show otherwise...

It's your choice of word (in Feuerbach) -- so, justify it's use by a direct quotation from Feuerbach, or withdraw your claim.

Notice, I back up the things I say about Marx with quotes.

You should look and learn.


Your philosophical commitments are to the standing of your own work as not being, in an arguable way, philosophy, as being clarification as being a posteriori etc, your views on logic etc - they are endless - assuming only that we use a traditional term philosophy.

Yet, you quote not one passage from my work that supports this latest set of fibs.

And no wonder, you made this batch up, too!

And I note once more, you are more interested in making me and my beliefs (which you largely invent anyway), and those of Wittgenstein, the centre of attention in this thread, but not materialist ontology.

[Luís Henrique]

Im short of time here - sorry. But here is an ontological claim by Wittgenstein of clear philosphical character


numbers are not represented by proxies; numbers are there.

arithmetic doesn't talk about numbers, it works with numbers.

This is not only philosophical, but quite ontological. And, more than philosophical and ontological, it is bullshit. Numbers are relations, they don't have a material existence. Being relations, they only "exist" on the perception of someone. There "aren't" five stars in the Southern Cross until someone relates them to their fingers and calls it "five".

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


This is not only philosophical, but quite ontological. And, more than philosophical and ontological, it is bullshit. Numbers are relations, they don't have a material existence. Being relations, they only "exist" on the perception of someone. There "aren't" five stars in the Southern Cross until someone relates them to their fingers and calls it "five".

On the contrary, this is a grammatical, not an ontological claim.

And how are numbers relations? [Perhaps you need to start another thread on this.]

And where does Wittgenstein say that numbers have a 'material existence' -- numerals certainly do.

May I suggest you read Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic on this:


Being relations, they only "exist" on the perception of someone. There "aren't" five stars in the Southern Cross until someone relates them to their fingers and calls it "five".

There he subjects this psychologistic view, and others, to devastating criticism.

Are you suggesting there aren't five objects there until someone says there are?

If so, what on earth did he/she count?

[Luís Henrique]

On the contrary, this is a grammatical, not an ontological claim.

It doesn't seem so. It is a statement on the existence of numbers.


And how are numbers relations?Well, how not? Even the most elementary arithmetic operation, counting, is relating quantities to a series of names.


And where does Wittgenstein say that numbers have a 'material existence' -- numerals certainly do.

So, if he identifies numbers and numerals, it follows.


Are you suggesting there aren't five objects there until someone says there are?

The objects cannot be changed by the existence or inexistence of a counter. But the "number" does not exist outside of the counting.


If so, what on earth did he/she count?

The stars, obviously. What do we call stars? Those objects. Does that mean that the name "star" existed previously to language?

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


It is a statement on the existence of numbers.

And if you knew anything about the philosophy of mathematics, you'd know that 'existence' here means 'can be constructed'.

So, nothing metaphysical here, just a mundane comment about proof theory.


Well, how not? Even the most elementary arithmetic operation, counting, is relating quantities to a series of names.

I think you are confusing the activity of counting with numbers.


So, if he identifies numbers and numerals, it follows.

Where did I say he did?

Are you Gilhyle in disguise by any chance? He/she can't read either.


The objects cannot be changed by the existence or inexistence of a counter. But the "number" does not exist outside of the counting.

Who said they could? But if there weren't five there before they were counted, then the person involved miscounted.

And numbers most certainly exist outside of counting. Have you tried to count, say, the complex numbers (or even the Reals)?

[And I am using 'exist' here in the sense I mentioned above.]


The stars, obviously. What do we call stars? Those objects. Does that mean that the name "star" existed previously to language?

No, but they existed before we called them stars, and these five stars did too -- or, once more, he/she miscounted.

But, if you want to debate this, start a new thread.

This one, as you pointed out to BTB, is about materialist ontology.

[Luís Henrique]

And if you knew anything about the philosophy of mathematics, you'd know that 'existence' here means 'can be constructed'.

Maybe, but this was not what was written.


Who said they could? But if there weren't five there before they were counted, then the person involved miscounted.

Look, number is a logical concept. Logic cannot exist outside of mind. If they were five before someone was able to count them, whose is the mind in which such number existed?


And numbers most certainly exist outside of counting. Have you tried to count, say, the complex numbers (or even the Reals)?

All numbers are constructed on the basis of natural numbers, which certainly are "countable".


But, if you want to debate this, start a new thread.

This one, as you pointed out to BTB, is about materialist ontology.

Mkay, what is the ontological status of numbers? What does it mean to say that they "exist"? What does it mean to say that they "are" in the numerals? How are those not ontological questions?

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Maybe, but this was not what was written.

You do not know what was written here, since this passage was taken from a longer argument.


Look, number is a logical concept. Logic cannot exist outside of mind. If they were five before someone was able to count them, whose is the mind in which such number existed?

How do you know number is a 'logical concept'?

It was a relation earlier (do make your mind up!).

And if numbers exist 'in the mnd', then when you say there are 'five stars', no one else can agree with you, since they do not have access to your mind.

And, as I noted, these five stars existed before you and your mind were thought of.


All numbers are constructed on the basis of natural numbers, which certainly are "countable".

Ok, construct a Real Number (say, π^e) for us on the basis of the natural numbers.

[There is an ancient theorem, dating form the days of Pythagoras, that shows that not even the irrationals can be so constructed:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Square_root_of_2]


Mkay, what is the ontological status of numbers? What does it mean to say that they "exist"? What does it mean to say that they "are" in the numerals? How are those not ontological questions?

Fine.

[gilhyle]

There is no ontology in the Tractatus.


Can I suggest:


A very brief account of the Tractatus ontology is as follows: The world is the totality of facts, facts are constituted by states of affairs consisting of objects standing in relations to each other. Objects are simples, the rest consists of complex items (states of affairs, facts, situations, the world): What is complex has a structure, i.e. the way objects hang together in the item and the stuff (or substance), i.e. a collection of objects included in the item: The object is the item which is constant; fixed and necessary, whereas the configuration of objects (complex item!) is the item which is changeable and contingent. Which configuration is possible is determined by internal (essential) properties of objects entering into a given configuration, by their nature.


You complain:


you refuse to tell us what counts as a 'philosophical commitment' and what does not.



How should this be done ? Definition is neither a prerequisite for legitimate usage nor is the absence of definition a test of anything very much. Descriptions mutate into definitions only in the presence of an authoritative community or analytic relations. The former are invariably arbitrary and not in themselves compelling – only communal authority makes them compelling. It is the point about ideas relating to Marxism that no such authority can exist within capitalist society. The insistence on definition consequently tends to take on the character of insisting on importing into Marxism elements of the dominant ideology. You should reflect on whether either verbal or ostensive definition is practical before demanding it. There are, after all, many words that in Wittgensteinian terms, have no grammar – “beauty”. The point is made by a Mr. Angelo conveniently:
“What is clear is that Wittgenstein's philosophy has nothing to say to Socrates except: Stop asking these questions! (CV 61 [MS 134 143: 13.-14.4.1947 § 4])”
http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logwitt6.html#signs-without-grammatical-definitions

So at most what I give you is, in effect, an ostensive definition - philosophy is what philosophers distinctively do and what you do is part of that. You are committed to it.

So you say


it isn't a 'philosophical stance' saying that nonsense can be understood, it is something we do as a matter of course. It is a pre-reflective skill we all bring to the words we use.


Let us assume that it is correct that we actually do 'understand' 'nonsense'; if we do, that is an act, what you are doing in part is relying on a theory of how that happens. The theory is the philosophy, the activity is merely a fact.


I have nowhere said this, and I defy you to show otherwise.


I dont need to be defied. I am happy to be corrected. I understood your reading of the Holy Family quote of which you are so fond, to involve you in believing that by dissolving philosophical language into ordinary language that philosophical language could be seen as manifestations of ordinary life. However, feel free to clarify the matter for me.


I am not suggesting anything other than that you have inserted a word into Feuerbach's work that I question is there.


Lets not be pedantically silly - whether the word occurs is not the point. the word is merely the sign of a concept which can be expressed in a varierty of forms of words. BTW I didnt insert it anywhere. I wouldnt be bothered even doing the word search; the point is one of substance not of form. The substantial issue is whether Feuerbach had the same view Marx had in the Holy Family - if Feuerbach also believed that it was possible to undo the delusions of philosophy by a process of translation of the philosophical usage - reversing the relationship of subject and predicate.....and they both had that view. Thus, for example David Brudney (the first book I opened, on the first page I opened in the section on Feuerbach !) states that Feuerbach claims that "Religious beliefs represent a distortion of human feeling and perception." P.79)...Oh look the word 'distortion' !

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Can I suggest:


A very brief account of the Tractatus ontology is as follows: The world is the totality of facts, facts are constituted by states of affairs consisting of objects standing in relations to each other. Objects are simples, the rest consists of complex items (states of affairs, facts, situations, the world): What is complex has a structure, i.e. the way objects hang together in the item and the stuff (or substance), i.e. a collection of objects included in the item: The object is the item which is constant; fixed and necessary, whereas the configuration of objects (complex item!) is the item which is changeable and contingent. Which configuration is possible is determined by internal (essential) properties of objects entering into a given configuration, by their nature.

Wherever you got this from, it is incorrect, since Wittgenstein himself said that these 'objects' were logical -- hence this in not an ontology. We already know you cannot tell the difference between Wittgenstein's use of Unsinnig and Sinnloss -- so you are not the most reliable commentator on Wittgenstein the world has ever seen.

May I suggest you read this (it will put you straight):

Roger White (2006), Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Continuum).

And you are still fixated on Wittgenstein, not the topic of this thread.


How should this be done ? Definition is neither a prerequisite for legitimate usage nor is the absence of definition a test of anything very much. Descriptions mutate into definitions only in the presence of an authoritative community or analytic relations. The former are invariably arbitrary and not in themselves compelling – only communal authority makes them compelling. It is the point about ideas relating to Marxism that no such authority can exist within capitalist society. The insistence on definition consequently tends to take on the character of insisting on importing into Marxism elements of the dominant ideology. You should reflect on whether either verbal or ostensive definition is practical before demanding it. There are, after all, many words that in Wittgensteinian terms, have no grammar – “beauty”. The point is made by a Mr. Angelo conveniently:

“What is clear is that Wittgenstein's philosophy has nothing to say to Socrates except: Stop asking these questions! (CV 61 [MS 134 143: 13.-14.4.1947 § 4])”
http://www.roangelo.net/logwitt/logw...al-definitions

This is yet more wasted effort. The bottom line of which is that we are still waiting for you to produce a single example that shows I have 'philosophical commitments'.

We have only been waiting for this for three years or more.

And where have I asked for a definition?

Are you this dislocated from reality in your daily life? If so I fear for your safety.


Let us assume that it is correct that we actually do 'understand' 'nonsense'; if we do, that is an act, what you are doing in part is relying on a theory of how that happens. The theory is the philosophy, the activity is merely a fact.

No theory required, as I noted earlier -- any more than we need a theory to understand, say, the Gettysburg Address.

And I'll explain why if you ask real nice...

[Except, you will forget what I have said to you within days, and will be asking the same pig-ignorant questions again within months -- and we know this for sure, since that is what has happened here at RevLeft several times already over the last three years. I sometimes wonder if you can remember how to walk!]

You have yet to show that this relies on such a theory -- once more, just repeating yourself does not constitute an argument.

And I use the word 'non-sense', not 'nonsense', remember -- this is explained in Essay One and Essay Twelve Part One.

Please feel free to ignore that too...

Earlier, you said this:


You think in ordinary language there is basis for conducting such clarifications. You even think you find in The Holy Family a confirmation that Marx shared this view. I think that in The German Ideology Marx revised and rejected that view. But in the end of the day, what Marx thought is only a by the way - what really matters is what is the approach most appropriate for revolutionaries

And in response to my challenge:


I have nowhere said this, and I defy you to show otherwise.

You replied:


I don't need to be defied. I am happy to be corrected. I understood your reading of the Holy Family quote of which you are so fond, to involve you in believing that by dissolving philosophical language into ordinary language that philosophical language could be seen as manifestations of ordinary life. However, feel free to clarify the matter for me.

See, even you now admit that I have never said this:


You think in ordinary language there is basis for conducting such clarifications

So, we are still waiting for an example, drawn from my work (not Wittgenstein's), where I rely on a 'philosophical commitment'.


Lets not be pedantically silly - whether the word occurs is not the point. the word is merely the sign of a concept which can be expressed in a variety of forms of words. BTW I didn't insert it anywhere. I wouldn't be bothered even doing the word search; the point is one of substance not of form. The substantial issue is whether Feuerbach had the same view Marx had in the Holy Family - if Feuerbach also believed that it was possible to undo the delusions of philosophy by a process of translation of the philosophical usage - reversing the relationship of subject and predicate.....and they both had that view. Thus, for example David Brudney (the first book I opened, on the first page I opened in the section on Feuerbach !) states that Feuerbach claims that "Religious beliefs represent a distortion of human feeling and perception." P.79)...Oh look the word 'distortion' !

So, you now admit that this word does not occur in Feuerbach -- which means once more that you have been caught making stuff up.

And does Brudney actually quote Feuerbach?

If not, what is the relevance of this reference?

[Luís Henrique]

You do not know what was written here, since this passage was taken from a longer argument.

Anyway, "numbers exist" but the are not made of matter, like objects, nor othewise empirical, as space or time. They are also not a sensuous quality of objects, such as colour. In fact, you say that "number exists" means "numbers can be constructed". By whom? If numbers "can be constructed", who "constructs" the number five, if not some rational mind? If, as we know, rational minds only exist after a very complex evolutionary process, did "numbers exist", ie, could numbers "be constructed" before humans (or equivalent intelligent aliens) came into being? Does God exist?


It was a relation earlier (do make your mind up!).

Rosa Lichtenstein is a woman. Rosa Lichtenstein is a poster in RevLeft. Why can't I make my mind up? Because she is both.


And if numbers exist 'in the mnd', then when you say there are 'five stars', no one else can agree with you, since they do not have access to your mind.

Unless, of course, minds share something that should be put into the equation.


And, as I noted, these five stars existed before you and your mind were thought of.

The stars existed. If "numbers exist" means "numbers can be constructed", then either the number five didn't exist before minds existed, or God exists.


Ok, construct a Real Number (say, π^e) for us on the basis of the natural numbers.

OK, I wouldn't know how to do it. If it is impossible, how do we know it is a number?


There is an ancient theorem, dating form the days of Pythagoras, that shows that not even the irrationals can be so constructed:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Square_root_of_2] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Square_root_of_2%5D)

Erm, the square root of 2 is 2^(1/2). Both 1 and 2 are natural numbers.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Anyway, "numbers exist" but the are not made of matter, like objects, nor otherwise empirical, as space or time. They are also not a sensuous quality of objects, such as colour. In fact, you say that "number exists" means "numbers can be constructed". By whom? If numbers "can be constructed", who "constructs" the number five, if not some rational mind? If, as we know, rational minds only exist after a very complex evolutionary process, did "numbers exist", ie, could numbers "be constructed" before humans (or equivalent intelligent aliens) came into being? Does God exist?

Your comments about 'rational minds' also apply to colours, tastes and smells.

And there was surely only one moon of the earth before human beings evolved.


Rosa Lichtenstein is a woman. Rosa Lichtenstein is a poster in RevLeft. Why can't I make my mind up? Because she is both.

But relations are not concepts.


Unless, of course, minds share something that should be put into the equation.

But this does not affect the fact that if numbers 'exist in the mind' no one would be able to communicate them to one another.


The stars existed. If "numbers exist" means "numbers can be constructed", then either the number five didn't exist before minds existed, or God exists.

The comment, "Numbers exist" was not meant to be a general comment about all number propositions; it was directed at answering an objection of yours, which was in turn confined to the particular circumstances you raised.

And, when I said that there were five stars before they were counted, I did not say the number five existed before it was counted in relation to these stars. I chose my words carefully, so you need to read what I say more carefully.

All I said was that there were five stars before they were counted. [No use of 'exist' in there anywhere.]

And that must be the case, or the one who did the counting would not be able to tell if he/she had counted correctly.

[And, he/she could make the number up, and no one would be able to object -- for this number only exists 'in the head' of the one doing the counting, according to you.]

Hence, this response of yours is misguided; it is not directed at what I actually said.


OK, I wouldn't know how to do it. If it is impossible, how do we know it is a number?

Because we can use a rule to calculate it as an infinite, non-recurring decimal.


Erm, the square root of 2 is 2^(1/2). Both 1 and 2 are natural numbers.

You are confusing a shorthand '2^(1/2)' with a rule for generating this decimal expansion.

A similar confusion would be to say, for example: "Hitler can't be dead, look here he is: 'Hitler'."

This shorthand arises from the rule for adding indices when we multiply powers raised on the same base (as I am sure you know):

So: 2^(1/2) x 2^(1/2) =2^(1/2+1/2) = 2^1 = 2.

From this: (2^(1/2))^2 = 2, so, if we take the positive root of both sides we obtain the result that 2^(1/2) = sq root of 2.

But, both 'the sq root of 2' and 2^(1/2) are abbreviations for this infinite, non-recurring decimal, they do not tell us how it can be generated.

Now, Pythagoras's proof showed that whatever it is, the sq root of 2 is not equal to the ratio of two integers. In that case, it cannot be constructed from the integers.

The same is true of the sq root of any prime number, and any composite number that cannot be expressed as the product of perfect squares.

[gilhyle]

Wittgenstein himself said that these 'objects' were logical

Saying that these 'objects' are logical does not resolve the matter at all - thats the point. Wittgenstein has redefined 'philosophical' and 'grammatical', hashe not also redefined 'logical' so as to include matters which many others would consider 'ontological', ie as general statements about classes of things of which the world is made up.


And I'll explain why if you ask real nice...


Please do.


And where have I asked for a definition?


My point was that you can have an ostensive definition - philosophy is what philosophers distinctively do. What more do you want ?


we are still waiting for an example, drawn from my work (not Wittgenstein's), where I rely on a 'philosophical commitment'.


My response to this is that your work clearly stands within the discipline of philosophy, this is evident from your bibliographies and your forms of argument.


And does Brudney actually quote Feuerbach?

If not, what is the relevance of this reference?

The relevance is this : it shows that a credible commentator, Brudeny believes that Feuerbach's view of religious language involves the ideas of both an inversion and a distortion. That is what I originally suggested and which you called into question. Referring to a credible comentator is a short hand - particularly effective where the matter in hand is uncontroversial ; Im not aware of any Feuerbach commentator who doesnt think that Feuerbach's view of religious language (and philosophical language - although there is a difference in Feuerbach's view of each) involves a claim by Feuerbach that religious language distorts common usage (in his case linked to a concept of our true natural feelings which ordinary language expresses in the absence of such distortions). This is really quite uncontroversial.


And I use the word 'non-sense', not 'nonsense', remember

Well Buddhists and Robert M Prisig use the word no-thing instead of nothing - so what ? All that does is to shift the issue to whether this new term has a distinct meaning


See, even you now admit that I have never said this:


Quote:
You think in ordinary language there is basis for conducting such clarifications /quote

I am happy to have regard to your suggestion that you may not have said this or intended it - but I am also unclear how you could not have said this....so I await your explanation, which would be helpful to me.

You continue to see my point as beside the point. But in doing that you disregard some significant developments in the history of your discipline in the early 19th century (which continue to impact as the formalontology website indicates) The point of the Redding article is that it articulates the significance of that development for formal logic and thus allows that transcendental/critical perspective to be situated relative to the alternative Fregean/Wittgensteinian perspective from which you come.

But let me deal with the point again as directly as I can in order to try to make it a bit clearer – and possibly, thereby, to reduce your sense of frustration at what you see as irrelevant matters. Let me quote from the Standford dictionary,



“....For Kant, transcendental logic was the logic governing the thought of finite thinkers like ourselves, whose cognition was constrained by the necessity of applying general discursive concepts to the singular contents given in sensory intuitions, and he kept open the possibility that there could be a kind of thinker not so constrained — God, whose thought could apply directly to the world in a type of “intellectual” intuition.

Again, opinions divide as to how Hegel's approach to logic relates to that of Kant. Traditionalists see Hegel as treating the finite thought of individual human discursive intellects as a type of “distributed” vehicle for the classically conceived infinite and intuitive thought of God. Non-traditionalists, in contrast, see the post-Kantians as removing the last residual remnant of the mythical idea of transcendent godly thought from Kant's approach. On their account, the very opposition that Kant has between finite human thought and infinite godly thought is suspect, and the removal of this mythical obstacle allows an expanded role for “transcendental content.”

Regardless of how we interpret this however, it is important to grasp that for Hegel logic is not simply a science of the form of our thoughts but is also a science of actual “content” as well, and as such is a type of ontology. Thus it is not just about the concepts “being,” “nothing,” “becoming” and so on, but about being, nothing, becoming and so on, themselves. This in turn is linked to Hegel's radically non-representationalist (and in some sense “direct realist” ) understanding of thought. The world is not “represented” in thought by a type of “proxy” standing for it, but rather is presented, exhibited, or made manifest in it. (In recent analytic philosophy, John McDowell in his Mind and World has presented an account of thought with this type of character, and has explicitly drawn a parallel to the approach of Hegel.) ....

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/


If we accept this as a reasonable summary and then combine this with Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, transposing subject and substance, then we can see Kant’s conception of God as the being defined by his capacity for unconstrained, infinite thinking becoming Marx’s concept of the capacity for humans to think in a provisional manner (which he then so brilliantly brings to fruition in Kapital).

With that perspective, if we then look at the kind of logic Hegel did, then his non-representationalist conceptualisation of thought (assuming it transfers to Marx) becomes not the perspective of the absolute, but the provisional schema (rules of thumb/heuristics) which people can actually use to overcome the limitations on their thinking.

The Marxist conception of this is not of how individuals as problem solvers develop such schema, but how social movements do so. Why is that ? In the process the conceptualisation of the limits on human thinking has also been transformed. Instead of thinking of those limitations as limitations imposed by our finite character as individual thinkers (the limitations articulated by Hume), we come to see that that isn’t the point at all. The limitations are primarily social and historical.

In that way, Hegel’s transcendentalist methodology is transformed from being the perspective of the absolute, speculatively reconstructed from the historical pattern of thought, into the perspective of class at a particular period in history, provisionally formulated on the basis of reviewing the historical pattern of class struggle and social development and its mirroring in the history of thought.
What that means for the original question asked in this thread, i.e:


what does one mean when one says that all aspects of the world are material?

is that we come to see the possibility of taking a provisional stance in relation to ontological questions, a provisional stance formulated by the critical review of the role of ontological issues in social development.

As against this, then, from within the discipline of philosophy comes the reaffirmation of the neo-Humean perspective on the finiteness of the thinker – in a new form, of course, because the discipline has moved on from Hume. For such people the whole construction of provisional views on this non-representationalist social basis is misconceived. For that discipline there is only faith and Knowledge (usually science). To them, this all seems like faith-based mysticism or traditional metaphysics.

In Wittgenstein’s case, there is that which cannot be spoken of. Yet it is exactly by speaking of that which cannot be spoken of that the Marxist as I understand him/her, articulates perspectives which can illuminate a revolutionary practice.

By contrast, left wingers from within that philosophical tradition will say you don’t need all this. The materialist conception of history and Marxist political economy and all the rest of it can be articulated as scientific proposals in the conventional manner. A socially significant implication of that which is often drawn is that those ideas can and should make their way – for better or worse – within the academic disciplines to which they relate – sociology, economics, historiography etc. This is logical if you think that the character of those Marxist ideas is ‘scientific’ in the same way as those disciplines. It is logical if you believe the Marxist positions share a common methodological foundation and a common subject matter. (There are of course variations on this which acknowledge some obstacles to inter-communicability between Marxism and such academic disciplines.)

Those attracted to this kind of view, in turn, tend to like versions of Marxist ideas which facilitate that measurement of Marxist ideas by reference to academic disciplines. For example, those with this philosophical perspective tend to like Sraffian versions of Marxist political economy with its Ricardian emphasis on empirically testable formulations of the Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to fall etc. They tend to sociological definitions of the idea of ‘Class’. They tend to think the materialist conception of history should find its place within the methodological frameworks which drive conventional academic history ( and should be influential by improving those methodological frameworks. When it comes to ontology, they will tend to either an epistemological agnosticism (or occasionally to the kind of crude materialism which drives someone like Richard Dawkins). Their model of the role of theory becomes the University’s model of theory – theory is clarification by the progress of science and the spread of knowledge through education. By contrast, they tend to take the Enlightenment view of history, as driven by light and darkenss – by superstition (faith) and its eternal fight with science. It is only a small step to identify the former with ruling elites across the ages seeking to befuddle the masses and the educators and radicals who fight for the clarity of ordinary life and scientific understanding.

What is interesting about this is how by this simple philosophical commitment, such thinkers have ended up adopting hook line and sinker the fundamental ideology of the progressive bourgeoisie – because that is what this model of the trans-epochal struggle between mysticism and science is. What is also interesting is its impact – its impact is oppressive: telling revolutionaries that certain general theories are forbidden and, further, that their theories must (more or less) succumb to the collective review by the academic sciences which are so damaged by the dominant ideology. Thus this philosophy becomes a reactionary political weapon, a cuckoo for the ruling class within the Marxist tradition – notwithstanding the best intentions of its supporters.
By contrast the alternative no-representationalist, social perspective uses provisional methodologies particular to a revolutionary science (as distinct from ones trapped within the dominant ideology (not a fatal entrapment, by the way) to identify what is particular to the ideological struggles within capitalism. This perspective emphasises the CONTRAST between the struggles of the working class within capitalist society and the oppressed in pre-captialist societies. It emphasises the complete inadequacy of the processes of clarification (of scientific progress and education). It emphaises the need for conceptual frameowrks which are not open to empirical verification in oder to understand the underlying reality of the tasks faced by the class. It emphasises the need to suobordinate theory to practice and formulate theories which serve practice (obviously without being false). Thus it looks at the history of the questions of ontology, in particular the incoherence of crude materialisms, the inconsistency of idealism with science and the political significance of certain ontologies and it denies the truth of those which have a reactionary political effect.

This seems to those trapped in the other tradition to commit the genetic fallacy – but that is merely the mirror of the original dispute – between those who see the necessary limitations on our finitude as thinkers as significant and those who see that it is the social constraints on understanding which are really significant. Of course we must seek to say what is true and not just what serves our purpose. The issue is that we never are really just deciding what is true; rather within the class of all propositions which are defensible at any given time, we are actually picking which ones to go for given, inter alia, their social implications. It is wrong to think of us as caught in a simple choice between true and false propositions. Neither human understanding in general nor science operate that way. More often than not, our affirmations are underdetermined by the available evidence. (Where they are not so underdetermined, the difficult challenges don’t arise).

This is evidently the case with the general questions of ontology. We can choose to sit on the fence, we can choose to go back to traditional metaphysical methods (virtually no one does that today – which is why it is traditional metaphysics which is the red herring in this discussion), we can choose to make a faith based affirmation or we can choose to make an affirmation based on a materialist understanding of the history of the issue. Where we do that, we do it provisionally. In the latter case, we adopt ontological propositions in a non-metaphysical way. Thats my answer to the original question

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gilhyle:


Saying that these 'objects' are logical does resolve the matter at all - that's the point.

Ah, but it does. This is no more an ontology than, say, a mathematical proof is.


Please do.

Think about reading a novel by, say, Tolkien. It will contain many passages that are non-sense. But, that will not stop you understanding it/them.


My point was that you can have an ostensive definition - philosophy is what philosophers distinctively do. What more do you want ?

Maybe so, maybe not -- but you implied that I had mentioned this word, when I hadn't.


My response to this is that your work clearly stands within the discipline of philosophy, this is evident from your bibliographies and your forms of argument.

As I predicted, you have advanced this baseless allegation yet again; the only thing I got wrong is that I said you'd do this in a few months time, not within the next 24 hours!

So, if my work is 'clearly' philosophical', you should find it easy proving it. In that case, where is your proof, where is even one quotation from my work which confirms this accusation?

In other words, you are content only to advance wild allegations -- you have no intention of backing them up with evidence. You even make stuff up about Feuerbach!

As I said, it is obvious that you are happy to make a priori and dogmatic pronouncements about my work, just as you are happy to make them about nature and society.


The relevance is this : it shows that a credible commentator, Brudney believes that Feuerbach's view of religious language involves the ideas of both an inversion and a distortion. That is what I originally suggested and which you suggested. Referring to a credible commentator is a short hand - particularly effective where the matter in hand is uncontroversial ; Im not aware of any Feuerbach commentator who doesn't think that Feuerbach's view of religious language (and philosophical language - although there is a difference in Feuerbach's view of each) involves a claim by Feuerbach that religious language distorts common usage (in his case linked to a concept of our true natural feelings which ordinary language expresses in the absence of such distortions). This is really quite uncontroversial

In other words, neither you nor Brudney can find this word in Feuerbach's work -- and yet you are still happy to impose this word on Feuerbach, just as you are happy to impose your own opinions on my work, and make baseless allegations about it.

At least you are a consistent dissembler.

Once more, for you and Brudney: to invert is not to distort.

For Marx, religious sentiment does the former, philosophical obfuscation does the latter.

And now a rare flash of honesty from you:


I admit that you may not have said this - but I am also unclear how you could not have said this....so I await your explanation.

I have not said it since it does not represent my views; but no doubt, as you have been doing for the last three years, you will continue to attribute to me ideas I do not hold, preferring to make stuff up about my work than to consult it.

And, because you continually to do this, I will continue to treat you with little other than contempt.


You continue to see my point as beside the point. But in doing that you disregard some significant developments in the history of your discipline in the early 19th century (which continue to impact as the formal ontology website indicates) The point of the Redding article is that it articulates the significance of that development for formal logic and thus allows that transcendental/critical perspective to be situated relative to the alternative Fregean/Wittgensteinian perspective from which you come.

But, what has to do with what the OP asked? He did not begin a thread entitled 'What is the current status of Formal Ontology?'

So, your comments are still irrelevant to the topic of this thread.

Especially the stuff you keep making up about me and Wittgenstein: your main concern.

Ah, but you then quote this:


what does one mean when one says that all aspects of the world are material?

Why you quote this is unclear, since this has nothing to do with formal ontology, either -- nor with anything Hegel had to say.

I searched through the following impenetrable set of paragraphs, but could not see where you show otherwise (you need to learn to put gaps between your paragraphs. I have inserted them to show you how it's done. I have also corrected your spelling errors.).


But let me deal with the point again as directly as I can in order to try to make it a bit clearer – and possibly, thereby, to reduce your sense of frustration at what you see as irrelevant matters. Let me quote from the Stanford dictionary,

“....For Kant, transcendental logic was the logic governing the thought of finite thinkers like ourselves, whose cognition was constrained by the necessity of applying general discursive concepts to the singular contents given in sensory intuitions, and he kept open the possibility that there could be a kind of thinker not so constrained — God, whose thought could apply directly to the world in a type of “intellectual” intuition. Again, opinions divide as to how Hegel's approach to logic relates to that of Kant. Traditionalists see Hegel as treating the finite thought of individual human discursive intellects as a type of “distributed” vehicle for the classically conceived infinite and intuitive thought of God. Non-traditionalists, in contrast, see the post-Kantians as removing the last residual remnant of the mythical idea of transcendent godly thought from Kant's approach. On their account, the very opposition that Kant has between finite human thought and infinite godly thought is suspect, and the removal of this mythical obstacle allows an expanded role for “transcendental content.”

Regardless of how we interpret this however, it is important to grasp that for Hegel logic is not simply a science of the form of our thoughts but is also a science of actual “content” as well, and as such is a type of ontology. Thus it is not just about the concepts “being,” “nothing,” “becoming” and so on, but about being, nothing, becoming and so on, themselves. This in turn is linked to Hegel's radically non-representationalist (and in some sense “direct realist” ) understanding of thought. The world is not “represented” in thought by a type of “proxy” standing for it, but rather is presented, exhibited, or made manifest in it. (In recent analytic philosophy, John McDowell in his Mind and World has presented an account of thought with this type of character, and has explicitly drawn a parallel to the approach of Hegel.) ....”

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel/

If we accept this as a reasonable summary and then combine this with Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel, transposing subject and substance, then we can see Kant’s conception of God as the being defined by his capacity for unconstrained, infinite thinking becoming Marx’s concept of the capacity for humans to think in a provisional manner (which he then so brilliantly brings to fruition in Kapital).

With that perspective, if we then look at the kind of logic Hegel did, then his non-representationalist conceptualisation of thought (assuming it transfers to Marx) becomes not the perspective of the absolute, but the provisional schema (rules of thumb/heuristics) which people can actually use to overcome the limitations on their thinking.

The Marxist conception of this is not of how individuals as problem solvers develop such schema, but how social movements do so. Why is that ? In the process the conceptualisation of the limits on human thinking has also been transformed. Instead of thinking of those limitations as limitations imposed by our finite character as individual thinkers (the limitations articulated by Hume), we come to see that that isn’t the point at all. The limitations are primarily social and historical.

In that way, Hegel’s transcendentalist methodology is transformed from being the perspective of the absolute, speculatively reconstructed from the historical pattern of thought, into the perspective of class at a particular period in history, provisionally formulated on the basis of reviewing the historical pattern of class struggle and social development and its mirroring in the history of thought.

What that means for the original question asked in this thread, i.e.:


what does one mean when one says that all aspects of the world are material?

is that we come to see the possibility of taking a provisional stance in relation to ontological questions, a provisional stance formulated by the critical review of the role of ontological issues in social development.

As against this, then, from within the discipline of philosophy comes the reaffirmation of the neo-Humean perspective on the finiteness of the thinker – in a new form, of course, because the discipline has moved on from Hume. For such people the whole construction of provisional views on this non-representationalist social basis is misconceived. For that discipline there is only faith and Knowledge (usually science). To them, this all seems like faith-based mysticism or traditional metaphysics.

In Wittgenstein's case, there is that which cannot be spoken of. Yet it is exactly by speaking of that which cannot be spoken of that the Marxist as I understand him/her, articulates perspectives which can illuminate a revolutionary practice.

By contrast, left wingers from within that philosophical tradition will say you don’t need all this. The materialist conception of history and Marxist political economy and all the rest of it can be articulated as scientific proposals in the conventional manner. A socially significant implication of that which is often drawn is that those ideas can and should make their way – for better or worse – within the academic disciplines to which they relate – sociology, economics, historiography etc. This is logical if you think that the character of those Marxist ideas is ‘scientific’ in the same way as those disciplines. It is logical if you believe the Marxist positions share a common methodological foundation and a common subject matter. (There are of course variations on this which acknowledge some obstacles to inter-communicability between Marxism and such academic disciplines.)

Those attracted to this kind of view, in turn, tend to like versions of Marxist ideas which facilitate that measurement of Marxist ideas by reference to academic disciplines. For example, those with this philosophical perspective tend to like Sraffian versions of Marxist political economy with its Ricardian emphasis on empirically testable formulations of the Law of the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to fall etc. They tend to sociological definitions of the idea of ‘Class’. They tend to think the materialist conception of history should find its place within the methodological frameworks which drive conventional academic history ( and should be influential by improving those methodological frameworks. When it comes to ontology, they will tend to either an epistemological agnosticism (or occasionally to the kind of crude materialism which drives someone like Richard Dawkins). Their model of the role of theory becomes the University’s model of theory – theory is clarification by the progress of science and the spread of knowledge through education. By contrast, they tend to take the Enlightenment view of history, as driven by light and darkens – by superstition (faith) and its eternal fight with science. It is only a small step to identify the former with ruling elites across the ages seeking to befuddle the masses and the educators and radicals who fight for the clarity of ordinary life and scientific understanding.

What is interesting about this is how by this simple philosophical commitment, such thinkers have ended up adopting hook line and sinker the fundamental ideology of the progressive bourgeoisie – because that is what this model of the trans-epochal struggle between mysticism and science is. What is also interesting is its impact – its impact is oppressive: telling revolutionaries that certain general theories are forbidden and, further, that their theories must (more or less) succumb to the collective review by the academic sciences which are so damaged by the dominant ideology. Thus this philosophy becomes a reactionary political weapon, a cuckoo for the ruling class within the Marxist tradition – notwithstanding the best intentions of its supporters.

By contrast the alternative no-representationalist, social perspective uses provisional methodologies particular to a revolutionary science (as distinct from ones trapped within the dominant ideology (not a fatal entrapment, by the way) to identify what is particular to the ideological struggles within capitalism. This perspective emphasises the CONTRAST between the struggles of the working class within capitalist society and the oppressed in pre-capitalist societies. It emphasises the complete inadequacy of the processes of clarification (of scientific progress and education). It emphasises the need for conceptual frameworks which are not open to empirical verification in odder to understand the underlying reality of the tasks faced by the class. It emphasises the need to subordinate theory to practice and formulate theories which serve practice (obviously without being false). Thus it looks at the history of the questions of ontology, in particular the incoherence of crude materialisms, the inconsistency of idealism with science and the political significance of certain ontologies and it denies the truth of those which have a reactionary political effect.

This seems to those trapped in the other tradition to commit the genetic fallacy – but that is merely the mirror of the original dispute – between those who see the necessary limitations on our finitude as thinkers as significant and those who see that it is the social constraints on understanding which are really significant. Of course we must seek to say what is true and not just what serves our purpose. The issue is that we never are really just deciding what is true; rather within the class of all propositions which are defensible at any given time, we are actually picking which ones to go for given, inter alia, their social implications. It is wrong to think of us as caught in a simple choice between true and false propositions. Neither human understanding in general nor science operate that way. More often than not, our affirmations are underdetermined by the available evidence. (Where they are not so underdetermined, the difficult challenges don’t arise).

The only comment I can make here is (as I have noted several times): you seem to be fixated on 'ontology' and not on ontology.
In that case, the above is just yet more wasted effort.

However, this is worthy of comment:


In Wittgenstein’s case, there is that which cannot be spoken of. Yet it is exactly by speaking of that which cannot be spoken of that the Marxist as I understand him/her, articulates perspectives which can illuminate a revolutionary practice.

But, for the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, 'what cannot be spoken of' is the mystical. So, it is interesting to see you confirm that you are concerned to introduce the mystical into Marxism, which helps explain why you think there is anything worth bothering with in Hegel and other ruling-class hacks.

And you wonder why I call you lot 'mystics'


This is evidently the case with the general questions of ontology. We can choose to sit on the fence, we can choose to go back to traditional metaphysical methods (virtually no one does that today – which is why it is traditional metaphysics which is the red herring in this discussion), we can choose to make a faith based affirmation or we can choose to make an affirmation based on a materialist understanding of the history of the issue. Where we do that, we do it provisionally. In the latter case, we adopt ontological propositions in a non-metaphysical way. That's my answer to the original question

In fact, I prefer to take Marx's advice, ignoring the sort of gobbledygook that has you in its thrall -- and return metaphysics to ordinary language, in order to show it up for the non-sense it is.

But, it's nice to see you prefer mysticism to Marxism.

[Luís Henrique]

Your comments about 'rational minds' also apply to colours, tastes and smells.

mmmno, I don't think so. There is an objective aspect of these things - lenghtwave and chemical composition - that's independent of mind; there is another aspect that involves sentience, not necessarily rationality.


And there was surely only one moon of the earth before human beings evolved.

Sure. This however is not the point of contention; the point of contention is whether the number one existed before rational minds evolved.


But relations are not concepts.

No, they aren't. But that's not the point; the point is, is there no overlapping between relations and concepts?


But this does not affect the fact that if numbers 'exist in the mind' no one would be able to communicate them to one another.

Unless minds share something else. In this case, logic.


The comment, "Numbers exist" was not meant to be a general comment about all number propositions; it was directed at answering an objection of yours, which was in turn confined to the particular circumstances you raised.

And, when I said that there were five stars before they were counted, I did not say the number five existed before it was counted in relation to these stars. I chose my words carefully, so you need to read what I say more carefully.

All I said was that there were five stars before they were counted. [No use of 'exist' in there anywhere.]

Ah, fine. There were five stars before they were counted. No doubt. But the number five didn't exist, ie, it could not be constructed. Numbers are logical objects, they cannot exist (be constructed) outside of a logic, logics can only exist in minds.

And this discussion refers to Wittgenstein's notion of "existence" of numbers, not yours:


numbers are not represented by proxies; numbers are there.

arithmetic doesn't talk about numbers, it works with numbers.

Now, these may have been taken out of context; but in themselves they seem to be ontological statements that imply that numbers can be reduced to numerals. They seem also contradictory to Frege's distinctions:


It is possible, of course, to operate with figures mechanically, just like it is possible to speak like a parrot: but that hardly deserves the name of thought. It only becomes possible at all after mathematical notation has, as a result of genuine thought, been so developed that it does the thinking for us, so to speak.

This seems to point to an irreductibility of numbers to numerals. As does his critique of Stricker's position.

Now, of course, those sentences of Wittgenstein may have been taken out of context, and perhaps in the proper context they may mean a different thing. What is the context, and how does it clarify Wittgenstein's thought in another direction?


Because we can use a rule to calculate it as an infinite, non-recurring decimal.

Well, of course. Are non-recurring decimals necessarily numbers?

There is a line of thought among mathematicians that belives that numbers of the kind i, where i^2= -a, a being a positive real, are in fact not numbers, but merely (if I recall correctly) "operators". In fact, it can be argued that only non-negative integers are numbers; all the others result of manipulations of integers - kind of mathematical midrashin to fill the gaps when we come to "absurd" things like x=1-4 (negative numbers), x=1/2 (rational numbers), x=2^(1/2) (irrational numbers), x=-1^(1/2) (imaginary and complex numbers), etc.

All this, of course, is ontology.


You are confusing a shorthand '2^(1/2)' with a rule for generating this decimal expansion.

A similar confusion would be to say, for example: "Hitler can't be dead, look here he is: 'Hitler'."

This shorthand arises from the rule for adding indices when we multiply powers raised on the same base (as I am sure you know):

So: 2^(1/2) x 2^(1/2) =2^(1/2+1/2) = 2^1 = 2.

From this: (2^(1/2))^2 = 2, so, if we take the positive root of both sides we obtain the result that 2^(1/2) = sq root of 2.

But, both 'the sq root of 2' and 2^(1/2) are abbreviations for this infinite, non-recurring decimal, they do not tell us how it can be generated.

Hm, no.

Evidently, irrational numbers are irrational, ie, they cannot be expressed as this kind of relation: a/b, where a and b are integers. For similar reasons, they have also been named "incommensurable". Why isn't potentiation a relation?


Now, Pythagoras's proof showed that whatever it is, the sq root of 2 is not equal to the ratio of two integers. In that case, it cannot be constructed from the integers.

By the process of division, no. It must be possible to construct them geometrically, though.

Anyway, you have said that "numbers exist" means "numbers can be constructed". So, either 2^(1/2) can be constructed, or it doesn't exist.

(We know, of course, it can be constructed, because if x^2 is a number, then x must also be a number. Ergo, since (2^(1/2))^2 is two, 2^(1/2) is a number. Even if it cannot be expressed as a/b where both a and b are integers. But the method to construct those numbers is potentiation - or is there another one?)

Luis Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


mmmno, I don't think so. There is an objective aspect of these things - lenghtwave and chemical composition - that's independent of mind; there is another aspect that involves sentience, not necessarily rationality.

Equally, there are 'objective' (but I do not like this word) features of reality, namely, in this case, these five stars.


This however is not the point of contention; the point of contention is whether the number one existed before rational minds evolved.

You keep mentioning the 'existence' of this or that number, when, if we want to talk about objects we do not say this. We say things like: there is only one satellite of the planet earth, the moon.

So, with no mention of the 'existence' or otherwise of the number one, it is true to say that there was only one moon of the earth before we evolved. Or are you suggesting it is false to say this?


Unless minds share something else. In this case, logic.

But, this just pushes the same problem back onto logic. And how can you determine if we share 'the same logic'. This is the same question as 'How do you know we all share the same 'mental' concept of number?'

But anyway, what has logic got to do with this? People were counting long before Aristotle was born, and these five stars were in outer space before we began to think.


There were five stars before they were counted. No doubt. But the number five didn't exist, ie, it could not be constructed. Numbers are logical objects, they cannot exist (be constructed) outside of a logic, logics can only exist in minds.

Once more, why do you insist on using the inappropriate clause 'numbers did/did not exist'.

If you agree there were five stars before they were counted, then numbers cannot be 'mental objects', nor can they be 'concepts'.

If they were, you'd have to believe that concepts accompanied the stars before they were counted!


And this discussion refers to Wittgenstein's notion of "existence" of numbers, not yours:

Originally Posted by Wittgenstein [is he still alive!!?]


numbers are not represented by proxies; numbers are there.

arithmetic doesn't talk about numbers, it works with numbers.

Now, these may have been taken out of context; but in themselves they seem to be ontological statements that imply that numbers can be reduced to numerals. They seem also contradictory to Frege's distinctions:

Originally Posted by Frege [is he still alive too!]


It is possible, of course, to operate with figures mechanically, just like it is possible to speak like a parrot: but that hardly deserves the name of thought. It only becomes possible at all after mathematical notation has, as a result of genuine thought, been so developed that it does the thinking for us, so to speak.

This seems to point to an irreducibility of numbers to numerals. As does his critique of Stricker's position.

1) Wittgenstein is alluding to the fact that mathematicians use numbers in their work, as we do in every day life, but their physical manifestation appears in the shape of numerals, but that is no more to confuse numerals with numbers that it is to confuse George W Bush with the name 'George W Bush' when we use his name.

2) Wittgenstein recognised Frege had made major advances in the philosophy of mathematics, but he also had profound criticisms to make of his work. Foremost among which was that Frege, and others (including you) want to impose certain verbal forms on our talk about numbers. Wittgenstein wanted to emphasise the wide variety of ways that number words feature in language, and this is the best clue we have as to what we take their nature to be -- as opposed to imposing on them an a priori set of concepts, which is what you seem to want to do.

So, you keep trying to impose 'numbers exist/do not exist' on the words I use. It is perfectly clear what 'there were five stars before they were counted' means -- you should resist the temptation now to impose an unnatural way of speaking on this, especially one that prompts you then to impose a single nature on them (ie., that they 'exist' only in the mind).

3) Finally, these are not ontological statements any more than this would be: to talk about George W Bush, you normally have to use his name, or a definite description of him.

Wittgenstein is merely describing what mathematicians actually do (whether or not you agree that this is what they do), not legislating for all of reality, which is what an ontology is.


Well, of course. Are non-recurring decimals necessarily numbers?

Well, if you mean that these are not integers, I agree, but mathematicians have, over the centuries, widened the meaning of 'number', and so these decimals are numbers.

Naturally, you are at liberty to question the decisions they have taken, but you are not likely to win many supporters among mathematicians.

And you might have a problem connecting the integers with the Reals, since they occupy the mathematical space between them, and the fact that an infinite numbers of Reals are also integers -- for example 2.00000000...

Moreover we use both to measure, weigh and time things.


There is a line of thought among mathematicians that believes that numbers of the kind i, where i^2= -a, a being a positive real, are in fact not numbers, but merely (if I recall correctly) "operators". In fact, it can be argued that only non-negative integers are numbers; all the others result of manipulations of integers - kind of mathematical midrashin to fill the gaps when we come to "absurd" things like x=1-4 (negative numbers), x=1/2 (rational numbers), x=2^(1/2) (irrational numbers), x=-1^(1/2) (imaginary and complex numbers), etc.

Er, i^2 = -1, surely!

And, negative numbers were introduced so that merchants could account for with debt, and allow scientists to deal with temperatures below zero -- and these developments were resisted by theological realists, who declared that 'god' had no made these .numbers', so they were of the 'devil'.

Sure you can argue the way you do, but it would fracture the mathematics of number for no real gain.

But, once more, there is nothing to stop you arguing this. The ancients didn't have the number zero, and the Greeks did not regard one as a number.

But apart from terminological revision, is anything really gained by all this re-labelling?


All this, of course, is ontology.

No, its called 'mathematics'.


Why isn't potentiation a relation?

What relation do you have in mind?


By the process of division, no. It must be possible to construct them geometrically, though.

Indeed, but then no rational number can be attributed to such a length, which is what threw the Pythagoreans into such a panic.


Anyway, you have said that "numbers exist" means "numbers can be constructed". So, either 2^(1/2) can be constructed, or it doesn't exist.

But, it can be constructed algebraically, and that is what allows us to extend the decimal expansion as far as we wish.

And, as I noted before, the locution 'numbers exist' can be replaced only in certain contexts by 'they can be constructed'.

I have committed myself to no more than this, so you need to stop throwing this back at me as if I thought it were a universal rule of translation.


(We know, of course, it can be constructed, because if x^2 is a number, then x must also be a number. Ergo, since (2^(1/2))^2 is two, 2^(1/2) is a number. Even if it cannot be expressed as a/b where both a and b are integers. But the method to construct those numbers is potentiation - or is there another one?)

But, x cannot be a number, it's a variable.

You desperately need to read Frege -- overnight, 2500 years of work on the nature of number became obsolete when he published The Foundations of Arithmetic, the single most important book ever written on this subject -- even to this day.

And there are numerous ways of constructing the irrationals, for example, using Leibniz's rule:

e = (1 + 1/n)^n; as n is allowed to become indefinitely large, this approaches e.

[gilhyle]

But, what has to do with what the OP asked? He did not begin a thread entitled 'What is the current status of Formal Ontology?'

So, your comments are still irrelevant to the topic of this thread.

Especially the stuff you keep making up about me and Wittgenstein: your main concern.

Ah, but you then quote this:



what does one mean when one says that all aspects of the world are material?
Why you quote this is unclear,.....



For the simple reason that it is actually the question froim Dada which initiated this thread.

As to the rest, I can find nothing in what you say other than that you dont like what I said....which we both know. So thats that.

[PRC-UTE]

gilhyle just pwned that troll.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


For the simple reason that it is actually the question froim Dada which initiated this thread.

Inceed, but then it is still unlcear why you quoted it since you post is not about what he asked.


As to the rest, I can find nothing in what you say other than that you dont like what I said....which we both know. So thats that.

So, see you in a few months time when you will once again advance the same baseless allegations about me, and then refuse to post any evidecne supporting what you say.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

PRC-UTE:


gilhyle just pwned that troll.

What, by attributing to me ideas I do not hold, but then, instead of providing evidence substantiating such fibs, quoting Wittgenstein (!), inventing words he/she wrongly attributed to Feuerbach, confusing two technical terms from Wittgenstein's work, focussing on 'ontology and not on ontology...?

But, I do not expect anything else from you toadying supporters of boss-class theory -- and one you, PRC, coward that you are, cannot defend.

[PRC-UTE]

PRC-UTE:
But, I do not expect anything else from you toadying supporters of boss-class theory -- and one you, PRC, coward that you are, cannot defend.

LOL you've said that many times yet it's rubbish. (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1271560&postcount=29)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^ And yet you can't defend this 'theory', and so, sad character that you are, you just troll any thread in which I post.

If it is rubbish, then it should be easy for you to show that it is -- well, big mouth, what are you waiting for?

[PRC-UTE]

^^^ And yet you can't defend this 'theory', and so, sad character that you are, you just troll any thread in which I post.

Em...I think you're describing yourself actually. I don't "just troll any thread in which" you post because I don't care enough to bother. That sounds a lot like someone else that will turn almost any topic into a rant about dialectics.

"And yet you can't defend this 'theory'" and yet I just linked to a collection of links where I have you lying troll.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

PRC-UTE:


Em...I think you're describing yourself actually. I don't "just troll any thread in which" you post because I don't care enough to bother. That sounds a lot like someone else that will turn almost any topic into a rant about dialectics.

Or, like you, a cowardly 'rant' about me.


"And yet you can't defend this 'theory'" and yet I just linked to a collection of links where I have you lying troll.

Sorry, for once I did not check this link -- I will do so now, and get back to you.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, I have checked that link, and the links you posted there -- most of your 'brave replies' were either one-liners or one or two short paragraphs long, and many weren't even made in reply to me!

And, in that thread, I posted this reply to you in turn:


PRC:


I don't know what you're on, but I've talked to you about this issue, including the very issue of contradiction before.

1) I am in fact on fresh air; I recommend it over the opiate you have imbibed from dialectics.

2) You haven't, to the best of my recollection, debated 'contradictions' with me before. I checked those links and they either skirt the issue, raise other issues or make the usual mistakes that I have exposed (which you can find at the links I posted in my last reply to you).

So, we still await a clear account of 'dialectical contradictions' (and we have only been doing this for 200 years). Gilhyle and Luis Henrique were the last two to make a serious attempt to do this here, but they had to limp from the field badly bruised. In fact, Gilhyle has not shown his/her face here since.


I like how you backpeddle on 'ordinary language werkz better'

In what way did I 'backpeddle'?


Is this an attempt at satire, where you say absurd things like "marx didn't mean what he wrote" to provoke a reaction, Ali G style?

Well, if you actullay read what he wrote, you will see that he and I see eye-to-eye on this.

If you think otherwise, let's see your arguments/proof.


Oh, and here's a few links to where I talked to you about dialectics in the past. Most of these are directly responding to you, even though you claim I never did (another example of your interesting grasp on reality):

Thanks for that, but your 'responses' to me were patchy and not consistent, and not like they are now. So, I stand by my claim that I have stung you into action by calling you a 'scaredy-cat'.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1271703&postcount=31

So, your 'defence ' of this 'theory' of yours is rather pathetic.

In that case, I repeat my claim, with one small change:

You can't defend this 'theory' of yours, but prefer to troll my posts instead.

[gilhyle]

Lh Said this
Quote:
All numbers are constructed on the basis of natural numbers, which certainly are "countable".
To whch Rosa replied:


Ok, construct a Real Number (say, π^e) for us on the basis of the natural numbers.

To which LH replied

Quote:
OK, I wouldn't know how to do it. If it is impossible, how do we know it is a number?
And to that Rosa replied


Because we can use a rule to calculate it as an infinite, non-recurring decimal.


To Which LH replied:


There is a line of thought among mathematicians that belives that numbers of the kind i, where i^2= -a, a being a positive real, are in fact not numbers, but merely (if I recall correctly) "operators". In fact, it can be argued that only non-negative integers are numbers; all the others result of manipulations of integers - kind of mathematical midrashin to fill the gaps when we come to "absurd" things like x=1-4 (negative numbers), x=1/2 (rational numbers), x=2^(1/2) (irrational numbers), x=-1^(1/2) (imaginary and complex numbers), etc.........Anyway, you have said that "numbers exist" means "numbers can be constructed". So, either 2^(1/2) can be constructed, or it doesn't exist.

(We know, of course, it can be constructed, because if x^2 is a number, then x must also be a number. Ergo, since (2^(1/2))^2 is two, 2^(1/2) is a number. Even if it cannot be expressed as a/b where both a and b are integers. But the method to construct those numbers is potentiation - or is there another one?)

To which Rosa replied:


But, x cannot be a number, it's a variable.

You desperately need to read Frege -- overnight, 2500 years of work on the nature of number became obsolete when he published The Foundations of Arithmetic, the single most important book ever written on this subject -- even to this day.

And there are numerous ways of constructing the irrationals, for example, using Leibniz's rule:

e = (1 + 1/n)^n; as n is allowed to become indefinitely large, this approaches e.

It seems to me that this discussion maY have got diverted from the original idea that all numbers are constructed 'on the basis of' natural numbers to the proposition that all numbers can be constructed from natural numbers. Unicorns cannot be constructed from any actual animals, and yet are clearly 'constructed' on the basis of actual animals.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


It seems to me that this discussion maY have got diverted from the original idea that all numbers are constructed 'on the basis of' natural numbers to the proposition that all numbers can be constructed from natural numbers. Unicorns cannot be constructed from any actual animals, and yet are clearly 'constructed' on the basis of actual animals.

So, you think unicorns are like numbers?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

In relation to several of the things that Gilhyle has said in this thread (that is, that Hegel was not indulging in metaphysics and/or ontology, quoting at least one Hegel scholar to that effect), I think it is worth posting the following passage from the Introduction to Glenn Magee's Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition (published at the Marxist Internet Archive (http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/magee.htm)):


4. Hegel: A Metaphysical View

Given the evidence for Hegel’s place in the Hermetic tradition, it seems surprising that so few Hegel scholars acknowledge it. The topic is often dismissed as unimportant or uninteresting (it is neither). Usually, it is treated as relevant only to Hegel’s youth (which is false). Surely one reason for this attitude is disciplinary specialization. Few scholars of the history of philosophy ever study Hermetic thinkers. Another reason is the recent tendency among influential Hegel scholars to argue that it is wrong-headed to treat Hegel as having any serious interest in metaphysics or theology at all, let alone the sort of exotic metaphysics and theology that we find in Hermeticism. This is the so-called “non-metaphysical reading” of Hegel. As Cyril O'Regan has pointed out, it goes hand in hand with an “anti-theological” reading. For instance, David Kolb writes, “I want most of all to preclude the idea that Hegel provides a cosmology including the discovery of a wondrous new superentity, a cosmic self or a world soul or a supermind.” But this is exactly what Hegel does.

The phrase “non-metaphysical reading” seems to have originated with Klaus Hartmann who, in his influential 1972 article “Hegel: A NonMetaphysical View,” identified Hegel’s system as a “hermeneutic of categories.” Other well-known proponents of Hartmann’s approach include Kenley Royce Dove, William Maker, Terry Pinkard, and Richard Dien Winfield.

The non-metaphysical/anti-theological reading relies on ignoring or explaining away the many frankly metaphysical, cosmological, theological, and theosophical passages in Hegel’s writings and lectures. Thus the non-metaphysical reading is less an interpretation of Hegel than a revision. Its advocates sometimes admit this — Hartmann, for instance — but more often than not they offer their “reading” in opposition to other interpretations of what Hegel meant. It is, furthermore, no accident that the same authors finish out their “interpretation” by tacking a left-wing politics onto Hegel, for they are, in fact, the intellectual heirs of the nineteenth-century “Young Hegelians” who also gave non-metaphysical, anti-theological “interpretations” of Hegel. The non-metaphysical reading is simply Hegel shorn of everything offensive to the modern, secular, liberal mind. This does not, however, imply that I am offering an alternative “right Hegelian” reading of Hegel. I am simply reading Hegel. In so doing, I hope to contribute to the “nonpartisan, historical and textual analysis” of Hegel’s thought called for by Louis Dupré.

Such a reading, I am convinced, places Hegel’s philosophy squarely in the tradition of classical metaphysics. In this view, I am in accord with the broadly “ontotheological” interpretation of Hegel offered by Martin Heidegger, who coined the term, and by such scholars as Walter Jaeschke, Emil Fackenheim, Cyril O'Regan, Malcolm Clark, Albert Chapelle, Claude Bruaire, and Iwan Iljin. “Ontotheology” refers to the equation of Being, God, and logos. Hegel’s account of the Absolute is structurally identical to Aristotle’s account of Being as Substance (ousia): it is the most real, independent, and self-sufficient thing that is. Hegel identifies the Absolute with God, and does so both in his public statements (his books and lectures) and in his private notes — and with a straight face, without winking at us. Hegel does not offer the categories of his Logic as mere “hermeneutic devices” but as eternal forms, moments or aspects of the Divine Mind (Absolute Idea). He treats nature as “expressing” the divine ideas in imperfect form. He speaks of a “World Soul” and uses it to explain how dowsing and animal magnetism work. He structures his entire philosophy around the Christian Trinity, and claims that with Christianity the “principle” of speculative philosophy was revealed to mankind.” He tells us — again with a straight face — that the state is God on earth.

I see no reason not to take Hegel at his word on any of this. I am interested only in what Hegel thought, not in what he ought to have thought. To be sure, Hegel’s appropriation of classical metaphysics and Christianity is transformative; Hegel is no ordinary believer. But his metaphysical and religious commitments are not exoteric. He believes that his Absolute and World Soul, and so forth, are real beings; they are just not real in the sense in which traditional, pious “picture-thinking” conceives of them. If Hegel departs from the metaphysical tradition in anything, it is in dispensing with its false modesty. Hegel does not claim to be merely searching for truth. He claims that he has found it.

I think that just about says it all.

However, Magee does not leave it there; the rest of his book is aimed at showing how the above is the correct reading of Hegel.

[gilhyle]

So, you think unicorns are like numbers?Of course not like all numbers, but you were not talking about all numbers. My point was that it is possible for a mechanism of analogy to play a significant role in relating mathematical forms of thought to their material basis. If I were correct in that, it would not be possible to compute certain non-natural numbers from natural numbers, but it would still be legitimate to say of those non-natural numbers that they originate in natural numbers and, consequently in the material relations from which those natural numbers derive.

As to the Hermetic tradition - not quite sure what that has to do with this, but anyway I will take it as it comes. I have no doubt that Hegel took significant personal inspiration from the hermetic tradition. However, as the Duke of Wellington once said, if you are born in a barn that doesnt necessarily make you a horse. What those who wish to characterise Hegel as metaphysical need to explain is his writing on scepticism and the key role that had in his intellectual development.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Of course not like all numbers, but you were not talking about all numbers. My point was that it is possible for a mechanism of analogy to play a significant role in relating mathematical forms of thought to their material basis. If I were correct in that, it would not be possible to compute certain non-natural numbers from natural numbers, but it would still be legitimate to say of those non-natural numbers that they originate in natural numbers and, consequently in the material relations from which those natural numbers derive.

Take this up with LH, since it was his idea.


As to the Hermetic tradition - not quite sure what that has to do with this, but anyway I will take it as it comes. I have no doubt that Hegel took significant personal inspiration from the hermetic tradition. However, as the Duke of Wellington once said, if you are born in a barn that doesnt necessarily make you a horse. What those who wish to characterise Hegel as metaphysical need to explain is his writing on scepticism and the key role that had in his intellectual development.

Indeed, that is what Magee does.

And the evidence that Hegel situated himself in the Hermetic traidtion is overwhelming (Magee's whole book is largely devoted to this task); Hegel even admits it himself in his praise for the influential Hermeticist, Jacob Boehme:


G. W. F. Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy

B. JACOB BOEHME.

WE now pass on from this English Lord Chancellor, the leader of the external, sensuous method in Philosophy, to the philosophus teutonicus, as he is called - to the German cobbler of Lusatia, of whom we have no reason to be ashamed. It was, in fact, through him that Philosophy first appeared in Germany with a character peculiar to itself: Boehme stands in exact antithesis to Bacon. He was also called theosophus teutonicus, just as even before this philosophia teutonica was the name given to mysticism.(1) This Jacob Boehme was for long forgotten and decried as being simply a pious visionary; the so-called period of enlightenment, more particularly, helped to render his public extremely limited. Leibnitz thought very highly of him, but it is in modern times that his profundity has for the first time been recognized, and that he has been once more restored to honour. It is certain, on the one hand, that he did not merit the disdain accorded him; on the other, however, he did not deserve the high honour into which he was elevated. To call him an enthusiast signifies nothing at all. For if we will, all philosophers may be so termed, even the Epicureans and Bacon; for they all have held that man finds his truth in something else than eating and drinking, or in the common-sense every-day life of wood-cutting, tailoring, trading, or other business, private or official. But Boehme has to attribute the high honour to which he was raised mainly to the garb of sensuous feeling and perception which he adopted; for ordinary sensuous perception and inward feeling, praying and yearning, and the pictorial element in thought, allegories and such like, are in some measure held to be essential in Philosophy. But it is only in the Notion, in thought, that Philosophy can find its truth, and that the Absolute can be expressed and likewise is as it is in itself. Looked at from this point of view, Boehme is a complete barbarian, and yet he is a man who, along with his rude method of presentation, possesses a deep, concrete heart. But because no method or order is to be found in him, it is difficult to give an account of his philosophy.

Jacob Boehme was born in 1575 of poor parents, at Altseidenburg, near Görlitz, in Upper Lusatia. In his youth he was a peasant boy who tended the cattle. He was brought up as a Lutheran, and always remained such. The account of his life which is given with his works was drawn up by a clergyman who knew him personally, from information given by Boehme himself. Much is there related as to how he attained to more profound knowledge and wisdom by means of certain experiences through which he passed. Even when a herd tending the cattle, as he tells of himself, he had these wonderful manifestations. The first marvellous awakening that occurred to him took place in a thicket in which he saw a cavern and a vessel of gold. Startled by the splendour of this sight he was inwardly awakened from a dull stupor, but afterwards he found it was impossible for him to discover the objects of his vision. Subsequently he was bound apprentice to a shoemaker. More especially "was he spiritually awakened by the words: 'Your heavenly Father will give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him' (Luke xi. 13), so that, desiring to come to a knowledge of the truth, and yet retaining the simplicity of his mind, he prayed and sought, and knocked, fervently and earnestly, until, while travelling about with his master, he was, through the influence of the Father in the Son, spiritually transported into the glorious pence and the Sabbath of the soul, and thus his request was granted. According to his own account, he was then surrounded with divine light, and for seven days he remained in the supremest divine contemplation and joy." His master for this dismissed him, saying he could not keep in his service "house-prophets such as he was." After that he lived at Görlitz. In 1594 he rose in his trade to be master, and married. Later on, "in the year 1600, and in the twenty-fifth year of his age, once more" the light broke upon him in a second vision of the same kind. He tells that he saw a brightly scoured pewter dish in the room, and "by the sudden sight of this shining metal with its brilliant radiance" he was brought (into a meditation and a breaking free of his astral mind) "into the central point of secret nature," and into the light of divine essence. "He went out into the open air in order that he might rid his brain of this hallucination, and none the less did he continue all the more clearly as time went on to experience the vision in this way received. Thus by means of the signatures or figures, lineaments, and colours which were depicted, he could, so to speak, look into the heart and inmost nature of all creatures (in his book De signatura rerum this reason which was impressed upon him is found and fully explained); and for this he was overwhelmed with joy, thanked God, and went peacefully about his affairs." Later on he wrote several works. He continued to pursue his handicraft at Görlitz, and died at the same place in 1624, being then a master shoemaker.(2)

His works are especially popular with the Dutch, and for that reason most of the editions are issued from Amsterdam, though they were also surreptitiously printed in Hamburg. His first writing is the "Aurora" or "Morgenröthe im Aufgange," and this was followed by others; the work "Von den drei Principien," and another "Vom dreifachen Leben des Menschen," are, along with several others, the most noteworthy. Boehme constantly read the Bible, but what other works he read is not known. A number of passages in his works, however, prove that he read much - evidently mystical, theosophic, and alchemistic writings for the most part, and he must certainly have included in his reading the works of Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, known as Paracelsus, a philosopher of a somewhat similar calibre, but much more confused, and without Boehme's profundity of mind. He met with much persecution at the hands of the clergy, but he aroused less attention in Germany than in Holland and England, where his writings have been often printed.(3) In reading his works we are struck with wonder, and one must be familiar with his ideas in order to discover the truth in this most confused method of expression.

The matter of Jacob Boehme's philosophy is genuinely German; for what marks him out and makes him noteworthy is the Protestant principle already mentioned of placing the intellectual world within one's own mind and heart, and of experiencing and knowing and feeling in one's own self-consciousness all that formerly was conceived as a Beyond. Boehme's general conceptions thus on the one hand reveal themselves as both deep and sound, but on the other, with all his need for and struggle after determination and distinction in the development of his divine intuitions of the universe, he does not attain either to clearness or order. There is no systematic connection but the greatest confusion in his divisions - and this exists even in his tables,(4) in which three numbers are made use of.

I.What God is beside nature and Creation.

II. Separability: Mysterium The first Principium.

God in Love. magnum. God in Wrath.


III.God in wrath and love.

Here nothing definite to hold the moments asunder is shown, and we have the sense of merely doing it by effort; now these and now other distinctions are set forth, and as they are laid down disconnectedly, they again come into confusion.

The manner and system which Boehme adopts must accordingly be termed barbarous; the expressions used in his works prove this, as when, for example, he speaks of the divine Salitter, Marcurius, &c. As Boehme places the life, the movement of absolute existence in the heart, so does he regard all conceptions as being in a condition of actuality; or he makes use of actuality as Notion, that is to say he forcibly takes natural things and sensuous qualities to express his ideas rather than the determinations of the Notion. For instance, sulphur and suchlike are not to him the things that we so name, but their essence; or the Notion has this form of actuality. Boehme's profoundest interest is in the Idea and he struggles hard to express it. The speculative truth which he desires to expound really requires, in order to be comprehended, thought and the form of thought. Only in thought can this unity be comprehended, in the central point of which his mind has its place; but it is just the form of thought that is lacking to him. The forms that he employs are really no longer determinations of the Notion at all. They are on the one hand sensuous, chemical determinations, such qualities as acid, sweet, sour, fierce; and, on the other, emotions such as wrath and love; and, further, tincture, essence, anguish, &c. For him these sensuous forms do not, however, possess the sensuous significance which belongs to them, but he uses them in order to find expression for his thought. It is, however, at once clear to us how the form of manifestation must necessarily appear forced, since thought alone is capable of unity. It thus appears strange to read of the bitterness of God, of the Flagrat, and of lightning; we first require to have the Idea, and then we certainly discern its presence here. But the other side is that Boehme utilizes the Christian form which lies nearest to him, and more especially that of the Trinity, as the form of the Idea: he intermingles the sensuous mode and the mode of popularly conceived religion, sensuous images and conceptions. However rude and barbarous this may on the one hand be, and however impossible it is to read Boehme continuously, or to take a firm grasp of his thoughts (for all these qualities, spirits and angels make one's head swim), we must on the other hand recognize that he speaks of everything as it is in its actuality, and that he does this from his heart. This solid, deep, German mind which has intercourse with what is most inward, thus really exercises an immense power and force in order to make use of actuality as Notion, and to have what takes place in heaven around and within it. Just as Hans Sachs represented God, Christ and the Holy Ghost, as well as patriarchs and angels, in his own particular manner and as ordinary people like himself, not looking upon them as past and historic, so was it with Boehme.

To faith spirit has truth, but in this truth the moment of certainty of self is lacking. We have seen that the object of Christianity is the truth, the Spirit; it is given to faith as immediate truth. Faith possesses the truth, but unconsciously, without knowledge, without knowing it as its self-consciousness; and seeing that thought, the Notion, is necessarily in self-consciousness - the unity of opposites with Bruno - this unity is what is pre-eminently lacking to faith. Its moments as particular forms fall apart, more especially the highest moments - good and evil, or God and the Devil. God is, and the Devil likewise; both exist for themselves. But if God is absolute existence, the question may be asked, What absolute existence is this which has not all actuality, and more particularly evil within it? Boehme is hence on one side intent on leading the soul of man to the divine life, on inducing the soul to pay attention to the strife within itself, and make this the object of all its work and efforts; and then in respect of this content he strives to make out how evil is present in good - a question of the present day. But because Boehme does not possess the Notion and is so far back in intellectual culture, there ensues a most frightful and painful struggle between his mind and consciousness and his powers of expression, and the import of this struggle is the profoundest Idea of God which seeks to bring the most absolute opposites into unity, and to bind them together - but not for thinking reason. Thus if we would comprehend the matter, Boehme's great struggle has been - since to him God is everything - to grasp the negative, evil, the devil, in and from God, to grasp God as absolute; and this struggle characterizes all his writings and brings about the torture of his mind. It requires a great and severe mental effort to bring together in one what in shape and form lie so far asunder; with all the strength that he possesses Boehme brings the two together, and therein shatters all the immediate significance of actuality possessed by both. But when thus he grasps this movement, this essence of spirit in himself, in his inward nature, the determination of the moments simply approaches more nearly to the form of self-consciousness, to the formless, or to the Notion. In the background, indeed, there stands the purest speculative thought, but it does not attain to an adequate representation. Homely, popular modes of conception likewise appear, a free outspokenness which to us seems too familiar. With the devil, particularly, he has great dealings, and him he frequently addresses. "Come here," he says, "thou black wretch, what dost thou want? I will give thee a potion."(5) As Prospero in Shakespeare's "Tempest"(6) threatens Ariel that he will "rend an oak and peg him in his knotty entrails . . . twelve winters," Boehme's great mind is confined in the hard knotty oak of the senses - in the gnarled concretion of the ordinary conception - and is not able to arrive at a free presentation of the Idea.

I shall shortly give Boehme's main conceptions, and then several particular forms which he in turn adopts; for he does not remain at one form, because neither the sensuous nor the religious can suffice. Now even though this brings about the result that he frequently repeats himself, the forms of his main conceptions are still in every respect very different, and he who would try to give a consistent explanation of Boehme's ideas, particularly when they pass into further developments, would only delude himself in making the attempt. Hence we must neither expect to find in Boehme a systematic presentation nor a true method of passing over into the individual. Of his thoughts we cannot say much without adopting his manner of expression, and quoting the particular passages themselves, for they cannot otherwise be expressed. The fundamental idea in Jacob Boehme is the effort to comprise everything in an absolute unity, for he desires to demonstrate the absolute divine unity and the union of all opposites in God. Boehme's chief, and one may even say, his only thought - the thought that permeates all his works - is that of perceiving the holy Trinity in everything, and recognizing everything as its revelation and manifestation, so that it is the universal principle in which and through which everything exists; in such a way, moreover, that all things have this divine Trinity in themselves, not as a Trinity pertaining to the ordinary conception, but as the real Trinity of the absolute Idea. Everything that exists is, according to Boehme, this three-fold alone, and this three-fold is everything.(7) To him the universe is thus one divine life and revelation of God in all things, so that when examined more closely, from the one reality of God, the sum and substance of all powers and qualities, the Son who shines forth from these powers is eternally born; the inward unity of this light with the substance of the powers is Spirit. Sometimes the presentation is vague, and then again it is clearer. What comes next is the explanation of this Trinity, and here the different forms which he uses to indicate the difference becoming evident in the same, more especially appear.

In the Aurora, the "Root or Mother of Philosophy, Astrology and Theology," he gives a method of division in which he places these sciences in proximity, and yet appears merely to pass from one to the other without any clear definition or determination. "(1) In Philosophy divine power is treated of, what God is, and how in the Being of God, nature, stars, and Elementa are constituted; whence all things have their origin, what is the nature of heaven and earth, as also of angels, men and devils, heaven and hell and all that is creaturely, likewise what the two qualities in nature are, and this is dealt with out of a right ground in the knowledge of spirit, by the impulse and motion of God. (2) In astrology the powers of nature, of the stars and elements, are treated of, and how all creatures proceed from them, how evil and good are through them effected in men and animals. (3) In theology the kingdom of Christ is dealt with, as also its nature, and how it is set in opposition to hell, and how in nature it wars with the kingdom of darkness."(8)

1. What comes first is God the Father; this first is at once divided in itself and the unity of both its parts. "God is all," he says, "He is the Darkness and the Light, Love and Anger, Fire and Light, but He calls Himself God only as to the light of His love. There is an eternal Contrarium between darkness and light; neither comprehends the other and neither is the other, and yet there is but one essence or substance, though separated by pain; it is likewise so with the will, and yet there is no separable essence. One single principle is divided in this way, that one is in the other as a nothing which yet exists; but it is not manifest in the property of that thing in which it is."(9) By anguish is expressed that which we know as the absolute negativity - that is the self-conscious, self-experienced, the self-relating negativity which is therefore absolute affirmation. All Boehme's efforts were directed towards this point; the principle of the Notion is living in him, only he cannot express it in the form of thought. That is to say, all depends on thinking of the negative as simple, since it is at the same time an opposite; thus anguish [Qual] is the inward tearing asunder and yet likewise the simple. From this Boehme derives sources or springs [Quellen], a good play on the words. For pain [die Qual], this negativity, passes into life, activity, and thus lie likewise connects it with quality, [Qualität], which he makes into Quallity.(10) The absolute identity of difference is all through present to him.

a. Boehme thus represents God not as the empty unity, but as this self-separating unity of absolute opposites; one must not, however, here expect a clearly defined distinction. The first, the one, the Father, has likewise the mode of natural existence; thus, like Proclus, he speaks of this God being simple essence. This simple essence he calls the hidden; and he therefore names it the Temperamentum, this unity of what is different, in which all is tempered. We find him also calling it the great Salitter - now the divine and now the natural Salitter - as well as Salniter. When he talks of this great salitter as of something known to us, we cannot first of all conceive what it means. But it is a vulgar corruption of the word sal nitri, saltpetre (which is still called salniter in Austria), i.e. just the neutral and in truth universal existence. The divine pomp and state is this, that in God a more glorious nature dwells, trees, plants, &c. "In the divine pomp or state two things have principally to be considered; salitter or the divine power, which brings forth all fruits, and marcurius or the sound."(11) This great salitter is the unrevealed existence, just as the Neo-Platonic unity is without knowledge of itself and likewise unrecognized.

b. This first substance contains all powers or qualities as not yet separated; thus this salitter likewise appears as the body of God, who embraces all qualities in Himself. Quality thus becomes an important conception, the first determination with Boehme; and he begins with qualities in his work "Morgenröthe im Aufgang." He afterwards associates with this the conferring of quality, and in the same place says: "Quality is the mobility, boiling, springing, and driving of a thing." These qualities he then tries to define, but the account he gives of them is vague. "As for example heat which burns, consumes and drives forth all whatsoever comes into it which is not of the same property; and again it enlightens and warms all cold, wet, and dark things; it compacts and hardens soft things. It contains likewise two other kinds in it, namely Light and Fierceness" (Negativity); "of which the light or the heart of the heat is in itself a pleasant, joyful glance or lustre, a power of life . . . and a source of the heavenly kingdom of joy. For it makes all things in this world living and moving; all flesh, trees, leaves, and grass grow in this world, as in the power of the light, and have their light therein, viz. in the good. Again, it contains also a fierceness or wrath which burns, consumes and spoils. This wrath or fierceness springs, drives, and elevates itself in the light, and makes the light movable. It wrestles and fights together in its two-fold source. The light subsists in God without heat, but it does not subsist so in nature. For all qualities in nature are one in another, in the same manner as God is all. For God" (the Father) "is the Heart." On another occasion (Vom dreifachen Leben des Menschen, chap. iv. § 68, p. 881) the Son is the heart of God; and yet again the Spirit is called the heart (Morgenröthe, chap. ii. § 13, p. 29) "or fountain of nature, and from Him comes all. Now heat reigns and predominates in all powers in nature and warms all, and is one source or spring in all. But the light in the heat gives power to all qualities, for that all grow pleasant and joyful." Boehme goes over quite a list of qualities: cold, hot, bitter, sweet, fierce, acid, hard, dense, soft qualities, sound, etc. "The bitter quality is in God also, but not in that manner as the gall is in man, but it is an everlasting power, in an elevating, triumphing spring or source of joy. All the creatures are made from these qualities, and live therein as in their mother."(12)

"The virtues of the stars are nature itself. Everything in this world proceeds from the stars. That I shall prove to you if you are not a blockhead and have a little reason. If the whole Curriculum or the whole circumference of the stars is considered, we soon find that this is the mother of all things, or the nature from which all things have arisen and in which all things stand and live, and through which all things move. And all things are formed from these same powers and remain eternally therein." Thus it is said that God is the reality of all realities. Boehme continues: "You must, however, elevate your mind in the Spirit, and consider how the whole of nature, with all the powers which are in nature, also extension, depth and height, also heaven and earth and all whatsoever is therein, and all that is above the heavens, is together the Body and Corporeity of God; and the powers of the stars are the fountain veins in the natural Body of God, in this world. You must not conceive that in the Body of the stars is the whole triumphing Holy Trinity, God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. But we must not so conceive as if God was not at all in the Corpus or Body of the stars, and in this world. . . . Here now the question is, From whence has heaven, or whence borrows it this power, that it causes such mobility in nature? Here you must lift up your eyes beyond nature into the light, holy, triumphing, divine power, into the unchangeable holy Trinity, which is a triumphing, springing, movable Being, and all powers are therein, as in nature: of this heaven, earth, stars, elements, devils, angels, men, beasts, and all have their Being; and therein all stands. When we nominate heaven and earth, stars and elements, and all that is therein, and all whatsoever is above the heaven, then thereby is nominated the total God, who has made Himself creaturely in these abovementioned" many "Beings, in His power which proceedeth forth from Him."(13)

c. Boehme further defines God the Father as follows: "When we consider the whole nature and its property, then we see the Father: when we behold heaven and the stars, then we behold His eternal power and wisdom. So many stars as stand in the whole heaven, which are innumerable, so manifold and various is the power and wisdom of God the Father. Every star differs in its quality." But "you must not conceive here that every power which is in the Father stands in a peculiar severed or divided part and place in the Father, as the stars do in heaven. No, but the Spirit shows that all the powers in the Father," as the fountainhead, "are one in another as one power." This whole is the universal power which exists as God the Father, wherein all differences are united; "creaturely" it, however, exists as the totality of stars, and thus as separation into the different qualities. "You must not think that God who is in heaven and above the heaven does there stand and hover like a power and quality which has in it neither reason nor knowledge, as the sun which turns round in its circle and shoots forth from itself heat and light, whether it be for benefit or hurt to the earth and creatures. No, the Father is not so, but He is an All-mighty, All-wise, All-knowing, All-seeing, All-hearing, All-smelling, All-tasting God, who in Himself is meek, friendly, gracious, merciful, and full of joy, yea Joy itself."(14)

Since Boehme calls the Father all power, he again distinguishes these as the seven first originating spirits.(15) But there is a certain confusion in this and no thought-determination, no definite reason for there being exactly seven - such precision and certainty is not to be found in Boehme. These seven qualities are likewise the seven planets which move and work in the great Salitter of God; "the seven planets signify the seven spirits of God or the princes of the angels." But they are in the Father as one unity, and this unity is an inward spring and fermentation. "In God all spirits triumph as one spirit, and a spirit ever calms and loves the others, and nothing exists excepting mere joy and rapture. One spirit does not stand alongside the others like stars in heaven, for all seven are contained within one another as one spirit. Each spirit in the seven spirits of God is pregnant with all seven spirits of God;" thus each is in God itself a totality. "One brings forth the other in and through itself;" this is the flashing forth of the life of all qualities.(16)

2. As what came first was the source and germ of all powers and qualities, what comes second is process. This second principle is a very important conception, which with Boehme appears under very many aspects and forms, viz. as the Word, the Separator, Revelation - speaking generally the "I," the source of all difference, and of the will and implicit Being which are in the powers of natural things; but in such a way that the light therein likewise breaks forth which leads them back to rest.

a. God as the simple absolute existence is not God absolutely; in Him nothing can be known. What we know is something different - but this "different" is itself contained in God as the perception and knowledge of God. Hence of the second step Boehme says that a separation must have taken place in this temperament. "No thing can become manifest to itself without opposition; for if it has nothing to withstand it, it always goes forward on its own account and does not go back within itself. But if it does not go back into itself as into that from which it originally arose, it knows nothing of its original state." Original state [Urstand] he makes use of for substance; and it is a pity that we cannot use this and many other striking expressions. "Without adversity life would have no sensibility nor will nor efficacy, neither understanding nor science. Had the hidden God who is one solitary existence and will not of His own will brought Himself out of Himself, out of the eternal knowledge in the Temperamento, into divisibility of will, and introduced this same element of divisibility into an inclusiveness" (Identity) "so as to constitute it a natural and creaturely life, and had this element of separation in life not come into warfare, how was the will of God which is only one to be revealed to Himself? How could a knowledge of itself be present in a solitary will?"(17) We see that Boehme is elevated infinitely above the empty abstraction of the highest reality, etc.

Boehme continues: "The commencement of all Beings is the Word as the breath of God, and God has become the eternal One of eternity and likewise remains so in eternity. The Word is the eternal beginning and remains so eternally, for it is the revelation of the eternal One through and by which the divine power is brought into one knowledge of somewhat. By the Word we understand the revealed will of God: by the Word we mean God the hidden God, from whom the Word eternally springs forth. The Word is the efflux of the divine One, and yet God Himself as His revelation." 7`(@H is more definite than Word, and there is a, delightful double significance in the Greek expression indicating as it does both reason and speech. For speech is the pure existence of spirit; it is a thing which when once heard goes back within itself. "What has flowed out is wisdom, beginning and cause of all powers, colours, virtue and qualities."(18)

Of the Son Boehme says: "The Son is" of the Father and "in the Father, the heart of the Father or light, and the Father beareth him ever, from eternity to eternity." Thus "the Son is" indeed "another Person from the Father, though no other," but the same "God as the Father," whose image he is.(19) "The Son is the Heart" or the pulsating element "in the Father; all the powers which are in the Father are the propriety of the Father; and the Son is the heart or the kernel in all the powers in the whole Father, and he is the cause of the springing joy in all powers in the whole Father. From the Son the eternal joy rises and springs in all the powers of the Father, as the sun does in the heart of the stars. It signifies the Son, as the circle of the stars signifies the manifold powers of the Father; it lightens the heavens, the stars and the deep above the earth, working in all things that are in this world; it enlightens and gives power to all the stars and tempers their power. The Son of God is continually generated from all the powers of his Father from eternity, just as the sun is born of the stars; He is ever born and is not made, and is the heart and lustre shining forth from all powers. He shines in all powers of the Father, and his power is the moving, springing joy in all the powers of the Father, and shines in the whole Father as the sun does in the whole world. For if the Son did not shine in the Father, the Father would be a dark valley; for the Father's power would not rise from eternity to eternity, and so the divine Being would not subsist."(20) This life of the Son is an important matter; and in regard to this issuing forth and manifestation Boehme has likewise brought forward the most important assertions.

b. "From such a revelation of powers in which the will of the eternal One contemplates itself, flows the understanding and the knowledge of the something [Ichts], since the eternal will contemplates itself in the something [Ichts]." "Ichts" is a play upon the word "Nichts" (nothing), for it is simply the negative; yet it is at the same time the opposite of nothing, since the Ich (Ego) of self-consciousness is contained in it. The Son, the something, is thus "I," consciousness, self-consciousness: God is not only the abstract neutral but likewise the gathering together of Himself into the point of Being-for-self. The "other" of God is thus the image of God. "This similitude is the Mysterium magnum, viz. the creator of all beings and creatures; for it is the separator" (of the whole) "in the efflux of the will which makes the will of the eternal One separable - the separability in the will from which powers and qualities take their rise." This separator is "constituted the steward of nature, by whom the eternal will rules, makes, forms and constitutes all things." The separator is effectuating and self-differentiating, and Boehme calls this "Ichts," likewise Lucifer, the first-born Son of God, the creaturely first-born angel who was one of the seven spirits." But this Lucifer has fallen and Christ has come in his place."(21) This is the connection of the devil with God, namely other-Being and then Being-for-self or Being-for-one, in such a way that the other is for one; and this is the origin of evil in God and out of God. This is the furthest point of thought reached by Jacob Boehme. He represents this Fall of Lucifer as that the "Ichts," i.e. self-knowledge, the "I" [Ichheit] (a word which we find used by him), the inward imagining of self, the inward fashioning, of self (the being-for-self), is the fire which absorbs all things. This is the negative side in the separator, the anguish; or it is the wrath of God. This divine wrath is hell and the devil, who through himself imagines himself into himself. This is very bold and speculative; Boehme here seeks to show in God Himself the sources of the divine anger. He also calls the will of the something ["Ichts"] self-hood; it is the passing over of the something ["Ichts"] into the nothing [Nichts], the "I" imagining itself within itself. He says: "Heaven and hell are as far removed from one another as day and night, as something and nothing." Boehme has really here penetrated into the utmost depths of divine essence; evil, matter, or whatever it has been called, is the I = I, the Being-for-self, the true negativity. Before this it was the nonens which is itself positive, the darkness; but the true negativity is the "I." It is not anything bad because it is called the evil; it is in mind alone that evil exists, because it is conceived therein as it is in itself. "Where the will of God willeth in anything, there God is manifested, and in that manifestation the angels also dwell; but where God in any thing willeth not with the will of the thing, there God is not manifested to it, but dwelleth" (there) "in Himself without the co-operating of the thing;" in that case that thing is its own will, and there the devil dwelleth and all whatever is without God."(22)

Boehme in his own way sets forth the form assumed in this process in a pictorial manner. This "Separator deduces qualities from itself, from which the infinite manifold arises, and through which the eternal One makes itself perceptible " (so that it is for others) "not according to the unity, but in accordance with the efflux of the unity." Implicit Being and the manifold are absolutely opposed through the Notion, which Boehme did not have: Being-for-self implies Being-for-another and retrogression into the opposite. Boehme sways backwards and forwards in apparent contradictions, and does not well know how to find a way out of the difficulty. "But the efflux is carried on to the greatest extreme possible, to the generation of fire" - dark fire without light, darkness, the hidden, the self;(23) - "in which fiery nature," however, since this fire rises and shoots up, "the eternal One becomes majestic and a light," and this light which there breaks forth is the form which the other principle assumes. This is the return to the One. "Thereby" (through fire) "the eternal power becomes desirous and effectual and" (fire) "is the original condition" (essence) "of the sensitive" (feeling) "life, where in the Word of power an eternal sensitive life first takes its origin. For if life had no sensitiveness, it would have no will nor efficacy; but pain" - anguish, suffering - first "makes it" (all life) "effectual and endows it with will. And the light of such kindling through fire makes it joyous, for it is an anointment," joy and loveliness "of painfulness."(24)

Boehme turns this round in many ways in order to grasp the something [Ichts], the Separator, as it "rises"(25) from the Father. The qualities rise in the great Salitter, stir, raise, and move [rügen] themselves. Boehme has there the quality of astringency in the Father, and he then represents the process of the something [Ichts] as a sharpness, a drawing together, as a flash of lightning that breaks forth. This light is Lucifer. The Being-for-self, the self-perception, is by Boehme called the drawing together into a point. That is astringency, sharpness, penetration, fierceness; to this pertains the wrath of God, and here Boehme in this manner grasps the "other" of God in God Himself. "This source can be kindled through great motion or elevation. Through the contraction the creaturely Being is formed so that a heavenly Corpus may be" intelligibly "formed. But if it" - the sharpness - "be kindled through elevation, which those creatures only can do which are created out of the divine Salitter, then it is a burning source-vein of the wrath of God. The flash is the mother of light; for the flash generates the light, and is the Father of the fierceness; for the fierceness abides in the flash as a seed in the father, and that flash generates also the tone or sound" - the flash is, speaking generally, the absolute generator. The flash is still connected with pain; light is what brings intelligence. The divine birth is the going forth of the flash, of the life of all qualities.(26) This is all from the Aurora.

In the Quæstionibus theosophicis Boehme makes particular use of the form of Yes and No for the separator, for this opposition. He says: "The reader must know that in Yes and No all things consist, whether divine, devilish, earthly, or what they may be called. The One as the Yes is pure power and life, and it is the truth of God or God Himself. He would be unknowable in Himself, and in Him there would be no joy nor elevation, nor feeling" - life - "without the No. The No is a counter-stroke of the Yes, or of the truth" (this negativity is the principle of all knowledge, comprehension), "that the truth may be manifest and be a something wherein there is a contrarium in which there is the eternal love, moving, feeling, and willing, and demanding to be loved. And yet we cannot say that the Yes is separated from the No, and that they are two things in proximity; for they are only one thing, but they separate themselves into two beginnings and make two centra, where each works and wills in itself. Without those two, which are continually in strife, all things would be a nothing, and would stand still without movement. If the eternal will did not itself flow from itself and introduce itself into receptibility, there would be no form nor distinction, for all powers would" then "be one power. Neither could there be understanding in that case, for the understanding arises" (has its substance) "in the differentiation of the manifold, where one property sees, proves and wills the others. The will which has flowed out wills dissimilarity, so that it may be distinguished from similarity and be its own something - and that something may exist, that the eternal seeing may see and feel. And from the individual will arises the No, for it brings itself into ownness, i.e. receptivity of self. It desires to be something and does not make itself in accordance with unity; for unity is a Yes which flows forth, which ever stands thus in the breathing forth of itself, being imperceptible; for it has nothing in which it can find itself excepting in the receptivity of the dissentient will, as in the No which is counterstroke to the Yes, in which the Yes is indeed revealed, and in which it possesses something which it can will. And the No is therefore called a No, because it is a desire turned inwards on itself, as if it were a shutting up into negativity. The emanated seeking will is absorbent and comprehends itself within itself, from it come forms and qualities. (1) Sharpness, (2) Motion, (3) Feeling. (4) The fourth property is Fire as the flash of light; this rises in the bringing together of the great and terrible sharpness and the unity. Thus in the contact a Flagrat [Schrack] results, and in this Flagrat [Schrack] unity is apprehended as being a Flash or Gleam, an exulting joy." That is the bursting forth of the unity. "For thus the light arises in the midst of the darkness, for the unity becomes a light, and the receptivity of the carnal will in the qualities becomes a Spirit-fire which has its source and origin out of the sharp, cold astringency. And according to that, God is an angry" and "jealous God," and in this we have evil. "(a) The first quality of the absorption is the No; (b) Sharpness; (c) Hardness; (d) Feeling; (e) the source of fire, hell or hollowness, Hiddenness. (5) The fifth quality, Love, makes in the fire, as in pain, another Principium as a great fire of love."(27) These are the main points under the second head. In such depths Boehme keeps struggling on, for to him conceptions are lacking, and there are only religious and chemical forms to be found; and because he uses these in a forced sense in order to express his ideas, not only does barbarism of expression result, but incomprehensibility as well.

c. "From this eternal operation of the sensation the visible world sprang; the world is the Word which has flowed forth and has disposed itself into qualities, since in qualities the particular will has arisen. The Separator has made it a will of its own after such a fashion."(28) The world is none other than the essence of God made creaturely.(29) Hence "if thou beholdest the Deep" of the heavens, "the Stars, the Elements and the Earth," and what they have brought forth, "then thou" certainly "comprehendest not with thy eyes the bright and clear Deity, though indeed it is" likewise "there and in them." Thou seest only their creaturely manifestation. "But if thou raisest thy thoughts and considerest . . . God who rules in holiness in this government or dominion, then thou breakest through the heaven of heavens and apprehendest God at His holy heart. The powers of heaven ever operate in images, growths and colours, in order to reveal the holy God, so that He may be in all things known."(30)

3. Finally what comes third in these threefold forms is the unity of the light, of the separator and power: this is the spirit, which is already partially implied in what has preceded. "All the stars signify the power of the Father, and from them issues the sun" (they make themselves a counterstroke to unity). "And from all the stars there goes forth the power which is in every star, into the Deep, and the power, beat and shining of the sun goes likewise into the Deep" - back to the stars, into the power of the Father. "And in the Deep the power of all stars, together with the heat and lustre of the sun, are all but one thing, a moving, boiling Hovering, like a spirit or matter. Now in the whole deep of the Father, externally without the Son, there is nothing but the manifold and unmeasurable or unsearchable power of the Father and the Light of the Son. The Light of the Son is in the Deep of the Father a living, all-powerful, all-knowing, all-hearing, all-seeing, all-smelling, all-tasting, all-feeling Spirit, wherein is all power, splendour, and wisdom, as in the Father and the Son."(31) That is Love, the softener of all powers through the light of the Son. We see that the sensuous element thus pertains to this.

Boehme really has the idea that "God's essence" (which has proceeded from the eternal deep as world) "is thus not something far away which possesses a particular position or place, for" essence, "the abyss of nature and creation, is God Himself. Thou must not think that in heaven there was some manner of Corpus" - the seven spirits generate this Corpus or heart - "which above all other things is called God. No; but the whole divine power which itself is heaven and the heaven of all heavens, is so generated, and that is called God the Father; of whom all the holy angels are generated, in like manner also the spirit of all men. Thou canst name no place, either in heaven or in this world, where the divine birth is not. The birth of the divine Trinity likewise takes place in thine own heart; all three persons are generated in thy heart, God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. In the divine power everywhere we find the fountain spring of the divine birth; and there already are all the seven qualifying or fountain spirits of God, as if thou wouldst make a spacious creaturely circumscribed circle and hadst the deity therein."(32) In every spirit all are contained.

To Boehme this trinity is the complete universal life in each individual, it is absolute substance. He says: "All things in this world are according to the similitude of this ternary. Ye blind Jews, Turks, and Heathens, open wide the eyes of your mind: I will show you, in your body, and in every natural thing, in men, beasts, fowls, and worms, also in wood, stone, leaves, and grass, the likeness of the holy ternary in God. You say, there is but one Being in God, and that God has no Son. Open your eyes and consider your selves: man is made according to the similitude and out of the power of God in his ternary. Behold thy inward man, and then thou wilt see it most plainly and clearly, if thou art not a fool and an irrational beast. Therefore observe, in thy heart, in thy veins, and in thy brain, thou hast thy spirit; and all the powers which move in thy heart, in thy veins, and in thy brain, wherein thy life consists, signify God the Father. From that power springs up [gebäret] thy light, so that thou seest, understandest, and knowest in the same power what thou art to do; for that light glimmers in thy whole body; and the whole body moves in the power and knowledge of the light; this is the Son which is born in thee." This light, this seeing and understanding, is the second determination; it is the relationship to itself. "Out of thy light goes forth into the same power, reason, understanding, skill, and wisdom, to govern the whole body, and to distinguish all whatsoever is externally without the body. And both these are but one in the government of thy mind, viz. thy spirit, which signifies God the Holy Ghost. And the Holy Ghost from God rules in this spirit in thee, if thou art a child of light and not of darkness. Now observe: in either wood, stone, or herbs there are three things contained, neither can anything be generated or grow, if but one of the three should be left out. First, there is the power, from which a body comes to be, whether wood, stone, or herbs; after that there is in that" thing "a sap which is the heart of the thing. And thirdly there is in it a springing, flowing power, smell, or taste, which is the spirit of the thing whereby it grows and increases. Now if any of these three fail, the thing cannot subsist."(33) Thus Boehme regards everything as this ternary.

When he comes into particulars we see that he is obscure; from his detailed explanations there is therefore not much to be derived. As showing his manner of apprehending natural things I shall give one more example of the manner in which, in the further working out of the existence of nature as a counterstroke to the divine knowledge, he makes use of what we call things as Notions (supra, p. 192). The creaturely, he says, has "three kinds of powers or Spiritus in different Centis, but in one Corpore. (") The first and external Spiritus is the coarse sulphur, salt and Mercurius, which is a substance of four elements" (fire, water, earth, air) "or of the stars. It forms the visible Corpus according to the constellation of the stars or property of the planets and now enkindled elements - the greatest power of the Spiritus mundi. The Separator makes the signature or sign" - the self. The salt, the salitter, is approximately the neutral: mercury [Merk or Mark] the operating, unrest as against nourishment; the coarse sulphur, the negative unity. ($) "The other Spiritus is found in the oil of sulphur, the fifth essence, viz. a root of the four elements. That is the softening and joy of the coarse, painful spirit of sulphur and salt; the real cause of growing life, a joy of nature as is the sun in the element"-the direct principle of life. "In the inward ground of that coarse spirit we see a beautiful, clear Corpus in which the ideal light of nature shines from the divine efflux." The outward separator signs what is taken up with the shape and form of the plant which receives into itself this coarse nourishment. (() "What comes third is the tincture, a spiritual fire and light; the highest reason for which the first separation of qualities takes place in the existence of this world. Fiat is the Word of each thing and belongs according to its peculiar quality to eternity. Its origin is the holy power of God. Smell [Ruch] is the sensation of this tincture. The elements are only a mansion and counterstroke of the inward power, a cause of the movement of the tincture."(34) Sensuous things entirely lose the force of sensuous conceptions. Boehme uses them, though not as such, as thought-determinations; that constitutes the hard and barbarous element in Boehme's representations, yet at the same time this unity with actuality and this present of infinite existence.

Boehme describes the opposition in creation in the following way. If nature is the first efflux of the Separator, two kinds of life must yet be understood as in the counterstroke of the divine essence; beyond that temporal one there is an eternal, to which the divine understanding is given. It stands at the basis of the eternal, spiritual world, in the Mysterium Magnum of the divine counterstroke (personality) - a mansion of divine will through which it reveals itself and is revealed to no peculiarity of personal will. In this centrum man has both lives in himself, he belongs to time and eternity. He is (") universal in the "eternal understanding of the one good will which is a temperament; ($) the original will of nature, viz. the comprehensibility of the Centra, where each centrum in the divisibility shuts itself in one place to egotism and self-will as a personal Mysterium or mind. The former only requires a counterstroke to its similarity; this latter, the self-generated natural will also requires in the place of the egotism of the dark impression a likeness, that is a counterstroke through its own comprehensibility; through which comprehension it requires nothing but its corporality as a natural ground." Now it is this "I," the dark, pain, fire, the wrath of God, implicitude, self-comprehension, which is broken up in regeneration; the I is shattered, painfulness brought into true rest - just as the dark fire breaks into light.(35)

Now these are the principal ideas found in Boehme; those most profound are (") the generating of Light as the Son of God from qualities, through the most living dialectic; ($) God's diremption of Himself. Barbarism in the working out of his system can no more fail to be recognized than can the great depths into which he has plunged by the union of the most absolute opposites. Boehme grasps the opposites in the crudest, harshest way, but he does not allow himself through their unworkableness to be prevented from asserting the unity. This rude and barbarous depth which is devoid of Notion, is always a present, something which speaks from itself, which has and knows everything in itself. We have still to mention Boehme's piety, the element of edification, the way in which the soul is guided in his writings. This is in the highest degree deep and inward, and if one is familiar with his form these depths and this inwardness will be found. But it is a form with which we cannot reconcile ourselves, and which permits no definite conception of details, although we cannot fail to see the profound craving for speculation which existed within this man.

1. Jacob Böhme's Leben und Schriften (in his Works, Hamburg, 1715, 4), No. I. § 18, pp. 11, 12; No. V., § 2, p. 54 and the title-page; No. I. § 57, pp. 27, 28.

2. Jacob Böhme's Leben und Schriften, No. I. 2-4, pp. 3, 4; § 6, 7, p. 5; § 10, 11, pp. 7, 8; § 28, 29, pp. 17, 18.

3. Jacob Böhme's Leben und Schriften, No. VI. § 3-8, pp. 81-87; No. I. § 12-17, pp. 8-11.

4. Theosophische Sendbriefe, 47th Letter (Werke, Hamburg, 1715, 4), p. 3879.

5. Trostschrift von vier Complexionen, § 43-63, pp. 1602-1607.

6. Act I. Scene 2.

7. Von Christi Testament der heiligen Taufe, Book II. chap. i. § 4-5, pp. 2653, 2654.

8. Morgenröthe im Aufgang, Preface, § 84, 85, 88, p. 18.

9. Von wahrer Gelassenheit, chap. ii. § 9, 10, p. 1673.

10. Von den drei Principien göttlichen Wesens, chap. x. § 42, p. 470.

11. Von der Gnadenwahl, chap. i. § 3-10, pp. 2408-2410; chap. ii. § 9, p. 2418; § 19, 20, p. 2420; Schlüssel der vornehmsten Puncten und Wörter, § 2, p. 3668; § 145, 146, pp. 3696, 3697; Morgenröthe, chap. iv. § 9-21, pp. 49-51; chap. xi. § 47, pp. 126, 127, etc.

12. Morgenröthe, chap. i. § 3-7, 9-24, pp. 23-27; chap. ii. § 38-40, pp. 34, 35; § i. p. 28 [see Law's translation].

13. Morgenröthe, chap. ii. § 8, 14-18, 31-33, pp. 29-34 [see Laws' translation].

14. Morgenröthe, chap. iii. § 2, 8-11, pp. 36-38.

15. Morgenröthe, chap. iv. § 5, 6, p. 48; chap. viii. § 15-chap. xi. 46, pp. 78-126.

16. Morgenröthe, chap. iii. § 18, p. 40; chap. x. § 54, p. 115; § 39, 40, p. 112; chap. xi. § 7-12, pp. 119, 120.

17. Von göttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. i. § 8-10, p. 1739

18. Von göttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. iii. § 1-3, pp. 1755, 1756

19. Morgenröthe, chap. iii § 33-35, p. 44 (cf. Rixner: Handbuch d. Gesch. D. Philos. Vol. II. Appendix, p. 106, § 7).

20. Morgenröthe, chap. iii. § 15, 18-22, pp. 39-41.

21. Von göttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. iii, § 4, 5, p. 1756, § 12, p. 1758; Morgenröthe, chap. xii. § 99-107, p. 149, 150; chap. xiii. § 92-104, 31-52, pp. 166-168, 157-160; chap. xiv. § 36, p. 178; Von den drei Principien göttlichen Wesens, chap. iv. § 69, p. 406; chap. xv. § 5, 543, 544.

22. Morgenröthe, chap. xiii. § 53-64, pp. 160-162; Vierzig Fragen von der Seele, XII. § 4, p. 1201; Von sechs theosophischen Puncten, V. 7, § 3, p. 1537; Von wahrer Gelassenheit, chap. i. § 1-7, pp. 1661-1663; Von göttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. i. § 23-26, pp. 1742, 1743; Von der Geburt und Bezeichnung allor Wesen, chap. xvi. § 49, p. 2391; Vom übersinnlichen Leben, § 41, 42, p. 1696 [see Law's translation].

23. Von der Menschwerdung Jesu Christi, Pt. I. chap. v. § 14 p. 1323; Von den drei Principien göttlichen Wesens, chap. x. § 43, p. 470.

24. Von göttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. iii. § 11, p. 1757.

25. Infra, p. 213.

26. Morgenröthe, chap. viii. § 15-20, pp. 78, 79; chap. x. § 38, p. 112; chap. xiii. § 69-91, pp. 162-166; chap xi. § 5-13, pp. 119, 120.

27. 177 Fragen von göttlicher Offenbarung, III. § 2-5, 10-16, pp. 3591-3595.

28. Von göttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. iii. § 12, 14, pp. 1757, 1758

29. Rixner: Handbuch d. Gesch. d. Philos. Vol. II. Appendix, p. 108, § 5 (from Boehme's Morgenröthe, chap. ii. § 16, pp. 30, 31; § 33, p. 34).

30. Morgenröthe, chap. xxiii. § 11, 12, pp. 307, 308 (cf. Rixner: Handb. d. Gesch. d. Philos. Vol. II. Appendix, p. 108, § 5); Theosophische Sendbriefe, I. § 5, p. 3710.

31. Morgenröthe, chap. iii. § 29, 30, p. 43 [see Law's translation].

32. Von göttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. iii. § 13, p. 1758; Morgenröthe, chap. x. § 55, 60, 58, pp. 115, 116 (chap. xi. § 4, p. 118).

33. Morgenröthe, chap. iii. § 36-38, 47, pp. 44-46 [see Law's translation].

34. Von göttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. i. § 33, p. 1745; chap. ii. § 29, p. 1754; chap. iii. § 15, 18-24, 27, 29, pp. 1758-1761; Von den drei Principien göttlichen Wesens, chap. viii. § 5, p. 433; Mysterium Magnum, oder Erklärung des ersten Buchs Mosis, chap. xix. § 28, pp. 2830, 2831.

35. Von göttlicher Beschaulichkeit, chap. i. § 23-39, pp. 1742-1746; chap. ii. § 1-13, 15-30, pp. 1747-1754.

Bold added.

http://www.class.uidaho.edu/mickelsen/texts/Hegel%20-%20Hist%20Phil/boehme.htm

In fact he devoted more space to this mystic than almost anyone else.

More details here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Summary_of_Essay_Fourteen_Part_One.htm

[gilhyle]

Indeed he did, but what does that show ? It does indeed show, as you put it, that he 'situated' himself in relation to that tradition. But then one must also consider how he situated himself within the more recent tradition of transcendental critique, which rejected all metaphysical speculation.

What Hegel does is to use the hermetic tradition in order to inform a process of speculation carried out within the constraints of the Empiricist critique of metaphysical thinking. Of course the Empiricists (Hume in particular) thought that their critique invalidated all such speculation. But Kant showed that it was possible to speculate on certain transcendental matters without breaching the constraints identified by Hume. Hegel simply believed that a lot more such non-metaphysical transcendental speculation was possible than Kant suggested - and he used the hermetic tradition to inspire his speculations in that regard.

thus he was situated in relation to that tradition, but did not reiterate its methodology of metaphysical speculation. Rather he sought to articulate an ontology which was not metaphysical but phenomenological.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Indeed he did, but what does that show ? It does indeed show, as you put it, that he 'situated' himself in relation to that tradition. But then one must also consider how he situated himself within the more recent tradition of transcendental critique, which rejected all metaphysical speculation.

It shows Hegel was situated in a mystical, ruling-class tradition, wherein theorists thought they could derive fundamental truths about reality, unavailable to the senses, which relates to a world anterior to appearances, and which is more real than the material world we see around us, from thought/distorted language alone.


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.

And this is what latter-day closet-Hermeticists, like Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and Trotsky (and you), etc., have learnt from Hegel and ruling-class thought, thus ensuring that Marx's words also apply to them (and you):


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch... [Marx and Engels (1970), The German Ideology, pp.64-65

Bold added.

But we already know that such class-treachery is of no concern to you.


What Hegel does is to use the hermetic tradition in order to inform a process of speculation carried out within the constraints of the Empiricist critique of metaphysical thinking. Of course the Empiricists (Hume in particular) thought that their critique invalidated all such speculation. But Kant showed that it was possible to speculate on certain transcendental matters without breaching the constraints identified by Hume. Hegel simply believed that a lot more such non-metaphysical transcendental speculation was possible than Kant suggested - and he used the hermetic tradition to inspire his speculations in that regard.

thus he was situated in relation to that tradition, but did not reiterate its methodology of metaphysical speculation. Rather he sought to articulate an ontology which was not metaphysical but phenomenological.

Not according to Magee -- and not according to Hegel, as he points out.

But, whether or not you are right, the comments I made above still apply to him, and derivatively to you.

[gilhyle]

You might like to develop that thought into a criticism of Redding.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


You might like to develop that thought into a criticism of Redding.

I have already bought his book: Hegel's Hermeneutics.

So, I might...

[Luís Henrique]

So, you think unicorns are like numbers?

I am pretty sure that, for a good Pythagorean, an irrational number is actually quite worse than a unicorn.

A unicorn doesn't exist, but it is evidently a logical possibility - there is nothing absurd into the notion of a horse with horns in itself.

Irrational numbers are numbers that have no common measure with the unity; how does one actually conceive such absurd?

... and yet, they "exist" and are a direct consequence of Pythagoras' thought.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Oh, and we may not be able to "construct" irrationals from rationals, but we certainly can "construct" rationals from (some) irrationals:

2^(1/2)*2^(1/2) = 2

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Sure, but so what?

[Luís Henrique]

Sure, but so what?

Don't you find it curious that a trivial integer like 2 is the "product" of two irrationals?

Evidently, while 2^(1/2) is incommensurable with 2, it is not incommensurable with it itself; indeed, (2^(1/2)/(2^(1/2) = 1. Yet the product of it by itself is incommensurable with it...

Like if you could breed horses from unicorns.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

And you might have a problem connecting the integers with the Reals, since they occupy the mathematical space between them, and the fact that an infinite numbers of Reals are also integers -- for example 2.00000000...

Ah, but the number of Reals is different from the number of Integers (or Rationals). Aleph-1 vs Aleph-0, if I correctly recall. So, yes, there is a disconnection between the two sets; it is impossible to put reals into a biunivocal relation with integers. In other words, unlike integers, reals are not countable.


And, negative numbers were introduced so that merchants could account for with debt, and allow scientists to deal with temperatures below zero -- and these developments were resisted by theological realists, who declared that 'god' had no made these .numbers', so they were of the 'devil'.

Sure, and Pythagoras and his school made what was possible to hide their own discovery of irrationals.


But, x cannot be a number, it's a variable.

In fact, it is not a variable, but a letter. In fact, it is not a letter, but some ink on a paper (or pixels on a screen). In fact, it is not ink, but atoms of this or that.

Evidently, variables can be numbers; they can be any numbers we wish.

y = x^2

If x is 0, then y is 0; if x is 1, then y is 1; if x is 2, then y is 4.


And there are numerous ways of constructing the irrationals, for example, using Leibniz's rule:

e = (1 + 1/n)^n; as n is allowed to become indefinitely large, this approaches e.

Ah, but this pressuposes e.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Don't you find it curious that a trivial integer like 2 is the "product" of two irrationals?

Not really.


Ah, but the number of Reals is different from the number of Integers (or Rationals). Aleph-1 vs Aleph-0, if I correctly recall. So, yes, there is a disconnection between the two sets; it is impossible to put reals into a biunivocal relation with integers. In other words, unlike integers, reals are not countable.

This depends on Cantor's ridiculous diagonal argment:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Godel_letter.htm


In fact, it is not a variable, but a letter. In fact, it is not a letter, but some ink on a paper (or pixels on a screen). In fact, it is not ink, but atoms of this or that.

That's like saying "In fact Luis Henrique is not a name it's two words".

Notice, I did not use quotation marks -- so, you are confusing use and mention here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use%E2%80%93mention_distinction


Evidently, variables can be numbers; they can be any numbers we wish.

y = x^2

If x is 0, then y is 0; if x is 1, then y is 1; if x is 2, then y is 4.

Yes, so?


Ah, but this pressuposes e.

Indeed, but e was originally constructed for a particular purpose, or, rather it was the result of a particular problem mathematicians set themselves.

Look, can we start a different thread if you want to discuss the philosophy of mathematics?

[Luís Henrique]

This depends on Cantor's ridiculous diagonal argment:

So exactly what do you mean? That there aren't more than one transfinite numbers? That the number of Reals is identical to the number of Rationals?


Yes, so?

So, exactly what were you doing when you pompously stated that


But, x cannot be a number, it's a variable.

Mere intellectual terrorism? Trying to scare others from the discussion?


Indeed, but e was originally constructed for a particular purpose, or, rather it was the result of a particular problem mathematicians set themselves.

So it was. Anyway, the method you proposed is a method to reach an already known number, or, rather, to set that number as a limit of an equation when n tends to infinite. The origin of e was not that, so it was not originally constructed in that way.


Look, can we start a different thread if you want to discuss the philosophy of mathematics?

I see no reason why.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


So exactly what do you mean? That there aren't more than one transfinite numbers? That the number of Reals is identical to the number of Rationals?

No, the argument is a load of rubbish, and so is Cantor's contruction of the transfinite cardinals.


So, exactly what were you doing when you pompously stated that


Originally Posted by the same Rosa Lichtenstein

But, x cannot be a number, it's a variable.

Mere intellectual terrorism? Trying to scare others from the discussion?

Just trying in my own sweet way to counter your sloppy use of language.


Anyway, the method you proposed is a method to reach an already known number, or, rather, to set that number as a limit of an equation when n tends to infinite. The origin of e was not that, so it was not originally constructed in that way.

Indeed, but my point was that, howsoever it was invented, it can be constructed.


I see no reason why.

One reason: I propose to respond to no more of your posts on mathematics in this thread.

[Luís Henrique]

Just trying in my own sweet way to counter your sloppy use of language.

Don't lie.


One reason: I propose to respond to no more of your posts on mathematics in this thread.In your "own sweet way", you claim victory when others do that, with stupid comments of the "again unable to counter my arguments" kind.

That very much sums up your "sweet own way": nitpick when possible, outrightly lie when not, and accuse others of being unable to argue with you when they become unable to stand your lack of intellectual integrity.

Have a good night.

Luís Henrique

[Devon]

This thread is violent, as far as I can see. Inevitable, I suppose. But to express my opinion, I am a physicalist, a term I prefer. I haven't read anything on Marxism though. Doesn't seem like it has anything to do with materialism though, Marxism is an economic theory.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Devon:


Doesn't seem like it has anything to do with materialism though, Marxism is an economic theory.

Well, our economic theory is all part of historical materialism, a scientific theory that links the social forms human beings have developed (aristocratic/slave, and later, feudal society, then the the capitalist system, and so on) with the way those who control society (the ruling class) organise the labour force (the working clas) and the production of wealth.

So, the way we use the word "materialism" is not quite the same as the way physicists use it, or used to use it.

The 'violence' you refer to arises from the fact that I am challenging mystical ideas (invented by Hegel) that have been imported in Marxism by some of its founders (Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, etc.), something that later came to be called 'dialectical materialism', which challenge of mine is being resisted since dialectical Marxists, for all their pretence to be scientific, and their alleged adoption of universal change, do not appreciate scientific change. So, like the Roman Catholics who attacked Galileo, they attack me -- and then complain when I defend mysself equally forcefully, as you can see from Luis's post above.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Luis -- apologies, I have only just seen this:


In your "own sweet way", you claim victory when others do that, with stupid comments of the "again unable to counter my arguments" kind.

That very much sums up your "sweet own way": nitpick when possible, outrightly lie when not, and accuse others of being unable to argue with you when they become unable to stand your lack of intellectual integrity.

Have a good night.

I take it that this means you cannot answer my arguments.

No surprise there, then...

[red cat]

LH:



No, the argument is a load of rubbish, and so is Cantor's contruction of the transfinite cardinals.





I want a clarification.
Please don't back off after making such claims.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


I want a clarification.
Please don't back off after making such claims.

And who the hell are you to demand?

[red cat]

Red Cat:



And who the hell are you to demand?

Who the hell are you to make arbitrary statements concerning things you don't have the least idea about?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


Who the hell are you to make arbitrary statements concerning things you don't have the least idea about?

Not only have I a mathematics degree, I have studied logic to MPhil level.

So you can naff off.

Check this out:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Godel_letter.htm

[red cat]

Red Cat:



Not only have I a mathematics degree, I have studied logic to MPhil level.

So you can naff off.

Check this out:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Godel_letter.htm

Why don't you specifically state the cause of your rejection of Cantor's diagonalization, instead of referring to other sites?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


Why don't you specifically state the cause of your rejection of Cantor's diagonalization, instead of referring to other sites?

Because this thread is not about Cantor, and the 'other site' is in fact my site.

[red cat]

Red Cat:



Because this thread is not about Cantor, and the 'other site' is in fact my site.

Well, since you have claimed that Cantor's argument is "ridiculous", it will be appropriate for the readers to think that you have a suitable argument to negate it.

Your sources indicate that Cantor's diagonalization is a case of self referencing, which it is clearly not, because we start with two well defined sets and prove that one is properly contained in the other, without using the type of recursion present in cases of self referencing, such as Russell's paradox.

[Paul Cockshott]

This was the philosophical/scientific world in which Marx lived and as such it makes sense to think of his materialism in relation to this world - a corpruscular, mechanical universe. Unfortunately, in this age, this is worldview makes absolutely no sense at all for several reasons. There are two blunders in this wordlview, one is philosophical, and the other simply is that this worldview is completely outdated.

The philosophical blunder existed since the inception of the kind of materialism Marx was raised with. One, ontological assumptions are pure apriorism. It demands someone to step outside the world and take a peek at it. We cannot step outside the world, both physically and/or linguistically, so every ontological assumption is synthetic apriori and thus nonsense. Ontological assumptions are not something that can be proven true or false. In this realm you can say anything. Its like arguing about the existence of God - requires someone to step outside the world to make such a judgement. So when one is talking in this ontological terms he or she is not saying anything. So arguments about the existence or non existence of God, or arguments about everything being material or immaterial, about invisible pink unicorns - are completely nonsensical.

The key ontological position in materialism is that the universe exists independently of the knowing subject, and that knowing subjects are an effect of the world rather than vice-versa. This is what Lenin is constantly emphasising in Materialism and Empirocriticism.

This ontological position is not affected by the discovery of fields, wave particle duality etc.

[Paul Cockshott]

[QUOTE=Luís Henrique;1523348

Look, number is a logical concept. Logic cannot exist outside of mind. If they were five before someone was able to count them, whose is the mind in which such number existed?



[/QUOTE]

As a one time computer designer I have to question that.
How do you think we are communicating except by use of logic circuits?

[Paul Cockshott]

Your links on this look interesting. I know that there has been considerable debate on this associated with the supposed 'hyper-computation' .
Do you reject the use of a diagonal argument in Turings Entscheidungs Problem paper?
There are obviously other proofs that do not rest on the diagonal argument.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red Cat:


Well, since you have claimed that Cantor's argument is "ridiculous", it will be appropriate for the readers to think that you have a suitable argument to negate it.

Your sources indicate that Cantor's diagonalization is a case of self referencing, which it is clearly not, because we start with two well defined sets and prove that one is properly contained in the other, without using the type of recursion present in cases of self referencing, such as Russell's paradox.

1. I was responding to a claim LH made.

2. You cannot possibly have followed up all the 'sources' I gave, most of which do not allege what you say.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul Cockschott:


Do you reject the use of a diagonal argument in Turings Entscheidungs Problem paper?
There are obviously other proofs that do not rest on the diagonal argument.

Well, I do not want to enter into a debate on this in this thread -- but, as you will see from some of the references I gave, I am in fact making a fundamental challenge to much of post-Cantorean mathematics, and not just the diagonal argument.

[Paul Cockshott]

Well, I do not want to enter into a debate on this in this thread -- but, as you will see from some of the references I gave, I am in fact making a fundamental challenge to much of post-Cantorean mathematics, and not just the diagonal argument.

I am sympathetic to the thrust of your critique. I also approve of the Delaney link you post for its reassertion of the Aristotelean distinction between potential and actual infinities.
There is a regrettable tendency among some theorists at present to believe that one can actualise infinities, with concepts such as the accelerated TM, or TMs orbiting black holes.

These suggestions are, I believe, just so much dross which materialists should argue against. See http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/%7Ewpc/reports/tcsa.pdf

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for the link. I'll read your paper with interest, but it crosses into areas of mathematics outside my own area of competence.

[Luís Henrique]

How do you think we are communicating except by use of logic circuits?
We are communicating by using logic circuits.

If I may rephrase my sentence,

Logic cannot exist outside of logic circuits. If they were five before someone was able to count them, whose were the logic circuits in which such number existed?

I have a materialist conception of mind.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


I have a materialist conception of mind.

Then you are just a neo-Cartesian.

[Luís Henrique]

1. I was responding to a claim LH made.
By your habitual use of ad hominems and unwarranted attacks.


The 'violence' you refer to arises from the fact that I am challenging mystical ideas (invented by Hegel) that have been imported in Marxism by some of its founders (Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, etc.), something that later came to be called 'dialectical materialism', which challenge of mine is being resisted since dialectical Marxists, for all their pretence to be scientific, and their alleged adoption of universal change, do not appreciate scientific change. So, like the Roman Catholics who attacked Galileo, they attack me -- and then complain when I defend mysself equally forcefully, as you can see from Luis's post above.

This is, of course, a blatant lie. My behaviour in this thread has been quite irreprehensible, until you recurred to intellectual dishonesty, by claiming that


But, x cannot be a number, it's a variable.

Which, anyway, is typical of your debate methods. That include, by the way, the systematical disqualification of other posters when they write something you do not understand (in which case you claim they are drunk or worse) or when they do not understand what you post (in which case you claim victory, stating that they are so obtuse they cant understand what you write).

Nothing of this has anything to do with dialectics.

That kind of intellectual lack of integrity would warrant much more violence than what was contained in my long ignored post.

*********************

You may or may not be right about Cantor; you havent posted here an effective demonstration that his diagonal argument is wrong. On the other hand, the fact that the infinity of real numbers is different from the infinity of rational numbers does not seem to rely necessarily on Cantors diagonal argument; Russel gives a nice demonstration of it without resorting (that I can see) to Cantor.

You brought Cantor into the discussion (probably as an attempt to scare away the opposition, out of a sheer demonstration of erudition), and are now dodging legitimate questions about your refutation of his diagonal argument by stating that the thread is not about Cantor. It is again typical of your intellectual dishonesty.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


By your habitual use of ad hominems and unwarranted attacks.You mean, like this one?

LH, working himself into a right old dialectical tantrum:


Me:


The 'violence' you refer to arises from the fact that I am challenging mystical ideas (invented by Hegel) that have been imported in Marxism by some of its founders (Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, etc.), something that later came to be called 'dialectical materialism', which challenge of mine is being resisted since dialectical Marxists, for all their pretence to be scientific, and their alleged adoption of universal change, do not appreciate scientific change. So, like the Roman Catholics who attacked Galileo, they attack me -- and then complain when I defend mysself equally forcefully, as you can see from Luis's post above.This is, of course, a blatant lie. My behaviour in this thread has been quite irreprehensible, until you recurred to intellectual dishonesty, by claiming that


But, x cannot be a number, it's a variable.Which, anyway, is typical of your debate methods. That include, by the way, the systematical disqualification of other posters when they write something you do not understand (in which case you claim they are drunk or worse) or when they do not understand what you post (in which case you claim victory, stating that they are so obtuse they cant understand what you write).

Nothing of this has anything to do with dialectics.

That kind of intellectual lack of integrity would warrant much more violence than what was contained in my long ignored post.But, x is still not a number, no matter how that upsets you.

Threats now:


That kind of intellectual lack of integrity would warrant much more violence than what was contained in my long ignored post.

You may or may not be right about Cantor; you havent posted here an effective demonstration that his diagonal argument is wrong. On the other hand, the fact that the infinity of real numbers is different from the infinity of rational numbers does not seem to rely necessarily on Cantors diagonal argument; Russel gives a nice demonstration of it without resorting (that I can see) to Cantor.

You brought Cantor into the discussion (probably as an attempt to scare away the opposition, out of a sheer demonstration of erudition), and are now dodging legitimate questions about your refutation of his diagonal argument by stating that the thread is not about Cantor. It is again typical of your intellectual dishonesty.All because you can't understand the references I gave; which just goes to show you should not enter into areas of discussion way outside your area of comptetence.

And Russell's 'proof' is no less defective.

But, you have derailed this thread enough as it is (something you continually complain that I do -- so I suppose it's Ok when you do it).

[Luís Henrique]

But, x is still not a number, no matter how that upsets you.

x+5=37

How's x not a number here?

(Remembering that you didn't state that x isn't a number, but that "x can not be a number".)



Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Then you are just a neo-Cartesian.

More ignorant bullshit. Cartesians do not have a materialist concept of mind.

Luís Henrique

[Paul Cockshott]

x+5=37

How's x not a number here?

(Remembering that you didn't state that x isn't a number, but that "x can not be a number".)


Luís Henrique

x is of type ref number

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


How's x not a number here?

Because x is a variable that takes number as values, and only one of these is the solution to this equation, the rest are not.


Your sex is immaterial to me.

Still, I reckon you'd make a good woman beater.


Liar. I never threatened you physically.

What sort of 'violence' did you threaten, then? The abstract sort?


Idiot.

I still struggle to reach your level of imbecility, though.

And as if to prove it, you kindly post this:


More ignorant bullshit. Cartesians do not have a materialist concept of mind.

Which is why I did not call you a Cartesian.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul Cockshott:


x is of type ref number

You must have read Frege on this, surely?

[Luís Henrique]

What sort of 'violence' did you threaten, then? The abstract sort?
Of what kind of violence was Devon talking about whe s/he wrote this:


This thread is violent, as far as I can see.

Of that kind of violence I stated you deserve far more than you actually get from me.

But of course, you read it as you like it, even if it implies slandering comrades.

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

Because x is a variable that takes number as values, and only one of these is the solution to this equation, the rest are not.
Which means that in a particular equation (that has one solution), x stands for one and only one number. Which means that in that context it is a number.

Now let's put this into context.

In what context did you state that "x cannot be a number"? Responding to this:


(We know, of course, it can be constructed, because if x^2 is a number, then x must also be a number. Ergo, since (2^(1/2))^2 is two, 2^(1/2) is a number. Even if it cannot be expressed as a/b where both a and b are integers. But the method to construct those numbers is potentiation - or is there another one?)

So let's be clear: You hadn't an answer to my question, so you choose to nitpick about my choice of words (unsuprisingly since you are the imbecile that acused me of not knowing what a triangle is because I stated that triangles have three sides). But it is quite evident that "if x^2 is a number, then x must also be a number" refers exactly to the context in which x is a number, ie, the solution of an equation.

Duh.

Luís Henrique

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul Cockshott:



You must have read Frege on this, surely?
Afraid not, it was drummed into me at my first industrial job from the Algol 68 Reference Manual, back in 77. But van Wijngaarden may have read Frege?

[Paul Cockshott]

We do seem to have drifted a bit from discussing Materialist Ontology.

[Paul Cockshott]

So let's be clear: You hadn't an answer to my question, so you choose to nitpick about my choice of words (unsuprisingly since you are the imbecile that acused me of not knowing what a triangle is because I stated that triangles have three sides). But it is quite evident that "if x^2 is a number, then x must also be a number" refers exactly to the context in which x is a number, ie, the solution of an equation.
That would only be the case if the operation of squaring, and by extension the multiplication operator in general is closed with respect to the type in question.

It is not necessarily true for all type systems.

If we use a dimensioned type system as is standard in physics then it is not a safe assumption. v^2 is of a different type from v and one must not mix them up.

[Luís Henrique]

If we use a dimensioned type system as is standard in physics then it is not a safe assumption. v^2 is of a different type from v and one must not mix them up.
Sure, but in a dimensioned system variables do not stand for numbers. So in fact if v is a velocity, then v^2 is not a number (and neither a velocity). And if v^2 is a velocity, then v is neither a number nor a velocity, but v^2 wasn't a number (but a velocity instead) in the first place.

In the context, we were discussing arythmetics, not physics.

It does not the change the fact that Rosa Licthenstein was being intellectually dishonest.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Of that kind of violence I stated you deserve far more than you actually get from me.

Ah, but you added:


That kind of intellectual lack of integrity would warrant much more violence than what was contained in my long ignored post.

And when I said this:


Yes, I can just see you as a woman-beater.

You did not deny it, but added:


Your sex is immaterial to me.

Now, you may be trying nervously to back-track here, but we have your incriminating words.


Which means that in a particular equation (that has one solution), x stands for one and only one number. Which means that in that context it is a number.

No, what happens is that the linguistic function 'x + 5 = 37', which maps, say, the integers onto the integers, gives the value true when x is replaced by '32', false otherwise. But x cannot become a number since it is a letter variable.

You are confusing substiution with identity.


So let's be clear: You hadn't an answer to my question, so you choose to nitpick about my choice of words (unsuprisingly since you are the imbecile that acused me of not knowing what a triangle is because I stated that triangles have three sides). But it is quite evident that "if x^2 is a number, then x must also be a number" refers exactly to the context in which x is a number, ie, the solution of an equation.

In fact, I did answer it. Perhaps your eyes need testing?

And, of course, triangles do not have three sides.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul Cockshott:


We do seem to have drifted a bit from discussing Materialist Ontology.

I did try to tell LH a few pages back, but he has a bee in his bonnet, and won't be told.

[Luís Henrique]

No, what happens is that the linguistic function 'x + 5 = 37', which maps, say, the integers onto the integers, gives the value true when x is replaced by '32', false otherwise. But x cannot become a number since it is a letter variable.

You are confusing substiution with identity.
Not so; I just know that in everyday language the verb "to be" can be used to denote the relation of substitution.

Luís Henrique

[Bright Banana Beard]

Rosa even attacks his/her own word, which it is so fucking hilarious. :laugh:

[Paul Cockshott]

Ok, that, the dimensioned types, was just an example.
What you are saying though is that given a function ( in this case squaring ) that we know a set is closed under, then the domain is to be extended to the whole transitive closure of the inverse function - taking the square root.

Well historically that was done twice in going from the integers to the reals and then from the reals to the complex numbers, but in both cases these were major innovations. It was by no means obvious that because -2 was a number, that we could could set x^2=-2 and deduce that there exists an x = 0, 1.41421...i which is also a number.
One could just as easily have said that there was no number which when multiplied by itself would yield -2.

[Luís Henrique]

Ok, that, the dimensioned types, was just an example.

Fine. The relevance of this for the discussion of materialist ontology, however, is that numbers are actually abstractions. In an universe devoid of minds/logical circuits, there may be three rocks, two bananas, or eleven planets. But those are all dimensioned; "pure" numbers are abstractions that only exist in minds/logical circuits. There is nothing "mystical" about that.


What you are saying though is that given a function ( in this case squaring ) that we know a set is closed under, then the domain is to be extended to the whole transitive closure of the inverse function - taking the square root.

Well historically that was done twice in going from the integers to the reals and then from the reals to the complex numbers, but in both cases these were major innovations. It was by no means obvious that because -2 was a number, that we could could set x^2=-2 and deduce that there exists an x = 0, 1.41421...i which is also a number.
One could just as easily have said that there was no number which when multiplied by itself would yield -2.Yes, of course. Those were pivotal extensions of mathematics, and both were cause of some infighting among mathematicians.

It wasn't also obvious that 1/2 or 1-2 were numbers; as Rosa herself points out, there were people who believed that God only created positive integers, being the other numbers creations of the devil. Both were also major inovations and pivotal extensions of mathematics.

All in all, if I can "construct" -1 by means of subracting a positive integer from another positive integer, or 1/2 by dividing a positive integer by another, I don't see how using relative rationals to reach 2^(1/2) or -1^(1/2) is any less of a construction.

Luís Henrique

[Paul Cockshott]

[QUOTE=Luís Henrique;1553200]Fine. The relevance of this for the discussion of materialist ontology, however, is that numbers are actually abstractions. In an universe devoid of minds/logical circuits, there may be three rocks, two bananas, or eleven planets. But those are all dimensioned; "pure" numbers are abstractions that only exist in minds/logical circuits. There is nothing "mystical" about that.[\QUOTE]
I agree with that in general, though I would put the key emphasis on
the way that computational systems are material setups that are
used to model other parts of the material reality.

I view maths as a technology for modeling and for the maintainance of social relations.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BR:


Rosa even attacks his/her own word, which it is so fucking hilarious.

Like what, exactly?

[Luís Henrique]

He may be referring to your inconsistence in following the 'words only have a meaning in context' thing. For it is obvious that when it suits you, you take words out of context to avoid discussing their actual content.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


He may be referring to your inconsistence in following the 'words only have a meaning in context' thing. For it is obvious that when it suits you, you take words out of context to avoid discussing their actual content.

Of course, you are trading on an ambiguity in the meaning of "context" here, but perhaps you are not used to thinking consistently...

[Luís Henrique]

Of course, you are trading on an ambiguity in the meaning of "context" here
Can you explain that?

Luís Henrique

[Luís Henrique]

And as you cannot explain what the ambiguity of the word "context" is that I would be trading on, I will explain you why it doesn't matter.

1+1=2

I hope we can agree with that?

x=2

According to you, those are completely different relations: in the first mathematical expression, the sign '=' is being used to say that two number (1+1 and 2) are the same; in the second expression, the same sign is being used to express the idea that the variable x represents the number 2.

Now, evidently, this very technical, very professional sign can be, and is, used to signify different things, depending on the context. Which context, Professor Lichtenstein? Sintactical or accidental? Enlighten us, please.

But if we use "everyday language" to express the same ideas, like in,

- one plus one is two
- x is two

the verb "to be", here has the same plurality of meanings, depending on exactly the same kind of context (accidental or syntactic, Professor Lichtenstein?) than the sign '=' in the previous mathematic expressions. So really, Professor Rosa, invent some other argument, because "trading in ambiguity" doesn't hold here.

Which is, of course, the reason why instead of explaining your point, you resort to renewed slander.

Luís Henrique

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


No, but I will again argue that you are intellectually dishonest.

Ah, I see you have adopted a change of tactics; from threats to abuse.


And, as a coward that you are, you aren't taking this shit into the CC, but are not above using it against me repeatedly. Which is enough; I'm going to take it to the CC myself.

I'm the coward, when I was the one who was threatened?


And as you cannot explain what the ambiguity of the word "context" is that I would be trading on, I will explain you why it doesn't matter.

1+1=2

I hope we can agree with that?

x=2

Eh?


According to you, those are completely different relations: in the first mathematical expression, the sign '=' is being used to say that two number (1+1 and 2) are the same; in the second expression, the same sign is being used to express the idea that the variable x represents the number 2.

I passed no opinion here, so how can this be "according" to me?


Now, evidently, this very technical, very professional sign can be, and is, used to signify different things, depending on the context. Which context, Professor Lichtenstein? Sintactical or accidental? Enlighten us, please.

But if we use "everyday language" to express the same ideas, like in,

- one plus one is two
- x is two

the verb "to be", here has the same plurality of meanings, depending on exactly the same kind of context (accidental or syntactic, Professor Lichtenstein?) than the sign '=' in the previous mathematic expressions. So really, Professor Rosa, invent some other argument, because "trading in ambiguity" doesn't hold here.

Which is, of course, the reason why instead of explaining your point, you resort to renewed slander.

An interesting combination of confused, baby mathematics and abuse.

Still wildly off topic, though.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

NHIA:


If there's any hope for this forum, Rosa will be banned.

Still can't respond to my demolition of your mystical 'theory', I see.

No wonder you want me banned.

[Paul Cockshott]

LH:



Ah, yet more off-topic abuse.

At least you are consistent.
On the topic both of you

[Paul Cockshott]

And as you cannot explain what the ambiguity of the word "context" is that I would be trading on, I will explain you why it doesn't matter.

1+1=2

I hope we can agree with that?

x=2

According to you, those are completely different relations: in the first mathematical expression, the sign '=' is being used to say that two number (1+1 and 2) are the same; in the second expression, the same sign is being used to express the idea that the variable x represents the number 2.

Luís Henrique

Problem is the missing deref in front of x, when mechanising you insert it

[Luís Henrique]

Problem is the missing deref in front of x, when mechanising you insert it

Sorry, I dont follow you.

Luís Henrique

[Paul Cockshott]

Everyday maths notation is relatively informal. If you formalise it to run on a computer you realise that the occurence of a variable x is not equivalent to a number, one has to re-write this internally as
^x = 2
in words: fetch the number that x refers to and see if this is 2

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul, this might be how you mean this in computer science, but it is not how it is interpreted in mathematics.

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul, this might be how you mean this in computer science, but it is not how it is interpreted in mathematics.
I would have thought that any interpreter, human or mechanical has to perform an equivalent operation, they have to go from the symbol x to what the symbol represents in order to evaluate the expression x=2

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul Cockshott:


I would have thought that any interpreter, human or mechanical has to perform an equivalent operation, they have to go from the symbol x to what the symbol represents in order to evaluate the expression x=2

This is like saying that if you play chess and move a wooden object (say the queen) 2cm forwards you are doing the same as if someone moves a piece of ordinary wood 2cm forward. In one sense you are, but in another, you aren't.

Same here.

[Luís Henrique]

I would have thought that any interpreter, human or mechanical has to perform an equivalent operation, they have to go from the symbol x to what the symbol represents in order to evaluate the expression x=2
Exactly; the difference being that a human being is able to interpret context, while a mechanical/eletronic interpreter isn't (or at least not to the same extent).

Luís Henrique

[Paul Cockshott]

Exactly; the difference being that a human being is able to interpret context, while a mechanical/eletronic interpreter isn't (or at least not to the same extent).

Luís Henrique

I dont think that is true.

As far as I am aware all programming languages in practical use are context sensitive.
I would not treat regular grammars used in pattern matching as programming languages.

Certainly any programming language capable of dealing with expressions like x=2 will be context sensitive. It will depend on a prior, or posterior definition of x.

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul Cockshott:



This is like saying that if you play chess and move a wooden object (say the queen) 2cm forwards you are doing the same as if someone moves a piece of ordinary wood 2cm forward, they are doing 'the same thing'. In one sense they are, but in another, they aren't.

Same here.
I am not quite sure what point you are making here.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I am saying that when you say these things are "equivalent" it depends on what you mean.

[Luís Henrique]

I dont think that is true.

As far as I am aware all programming languages in practical use are context sensitive.
I would not treat regular grammars used in pattern matching as programming languages.

Certainly any programming language capable of dealing with expressions like x=2 will be context sensitive. It will depend on a prior, or posterior definition of x.

This is what Rosa was referring to as "ambiguity" of the word "context". Programming languages will be sensitive to internal context, but hardly to external context.

Luís Henrique

[Paul Cockshott]

This is what Rosa was referring to as "ambiguity" of the word "context". Programming languages will be sensitive to internal context, but hardly to external context.

Luís Henrique

I think we are now approaching, in our discussion, what I take to be a fundamental distinction between a modern materialist approach to these questions and the older
idealistic views.

I am using the term context in the sense that Chomsky does in his heirarchy of generative grammars. Recall that Chomsky was concerned initially with explaining human languages, but that in order to do this he studied the formal properties of grammars as such. His categories have been proven useful subsequently for the analysis of formal languages.

Now the question arises as to what constitutes 'internal' and what is 'external' context.
When a mathematician is working on a problem they have only a limited part of the page that they are working on in view. They will remember what some of the variables are supposed to represent, but the number of such variables that they remember will be limited, by virtue of the falibility of human memory. In order to handle any complex problem they rely on external material aids : paper, pencils, blackboards, chalk. These constitute from the standpoint of the brain of the mathematician the 'external context' of the particular part of the equation that they are currently workingon. Thus when the mathematician looks at a formula and finds a variable in it : x, iota, psi etc, she has to refer to other parts of the blackboard to check what these variables refer to.

A computer does the same thing, but one may say that for the computer it is all 'internal context' because the computer has a much bigger memory for formulae than we have. But if we divide the computer as Turing did, into a central unit with limited internal state and an external memory ( his tape, or the ram chip of a modern machine ), then the operations that have to be performed are the same.

This is not surprising because, when inventing the computer as we know it today, Turing modelled it closely on what human mathematicians did. The tape or ram chip corresponds to the external material store that humans use : paper or blackboard.

What we have are two material systems: humans with paper, cpus with ram chips, but both have to perform the same set of operations to solve a mathematical problem.
This is not obvious to us at first, since we are not used to performing a sort of Taylor analysis of intellectual work. Prior to Turing it was thought that intellectual and manual work were quite distinct. What Turing does is bring out that even maths is a form of
manual labour.

[Luís Henrique]

I think we are now approaching, in our discussion, what I take to be a fundamental distinction between a modern materialist approach to these questions and the older
idealistic views.

I am using the term context in the sense that Chomsky does in his heirarchy of generative grammars. Recall that Chomsky was concerned initially with explaining human languages, but that in order to do this he studied the formal properties of grammars as such. His categories have been proven useful subsequently for the analysis of formal languages.

Now the question arises as to what constitutes 'internal' and what is 'external' context.
When a mathematician is working on a problem they have only a limited part of the page that they are working on in view. They will remember what some of the variables are supposed to represent, but the number of such variables that they remember will be limited, by virtue of the falibility of human memory. In order to handle any complex problem they rely on external material aids : paper, pencils, blackboards, chalk. These constitute from the standpoint of the brain of the mathematician the 'external context' of the particular part of the equation that they are currently workingon. Thus when the mathematician looks at a formula and finds a variable in it : x, iota, psi etc, she has to refer to other parts of the blackboard to check what these variables refer to.

A computer does the same thing, but one may say that for the computer it is all 'internal context' because the computer has a much bigger memory for formulae than we have. But if we divide the computer as Turing did, into a central unit with limited internal state and an external memory ( his tape, or the ram chip of a modern machine ), then the operations that have to be performed are the same.

This is not surprising because, when inventing the computer as we know it today, Turing modelled it closely on what human mathematicians did. The tape or ram chip corresponds to the external material store that humans use : paper or blackboard.

What we have are two material systems: humans with paper, cpus with ram chips, but both have to perform the same set of operations to solve a mathematical problem.
This is not obvious to us at first, since we are not used to performing a sort of Taylor analysis of intellectual work. Prior to Turing it was thought that intellectual and manual work were quite distinct. What Turing does is bring out that even maths is a form of manual labour.
I agree with what you are saying, except the distinction you make on internal vs external context. To me, all those "external material aids : paper, pencils, blackboards, chalk" consist of internal context, as long as they are part of the discourse.

What I call "external context" is different, because it is of a non discoursive nature.

So, for instance, a sentence like:


This is John, and that is Bob.

depends on context; if it is inserted in a literary work, the context is given by the rest of the text. But if it is said in a conversation, it will depend on which man has entered the place first, or is first shaking hands with the interpreter, or (in a Western culture) is to the left of the interpreter, etc. This is what I would call "external context" or "non-textual context". This is what I am saying that computers are not (yet; I don't think there is something that computers cannot interpretate as they become more technologically advanced) able to interpretate.

Luís Henrique

[Paul Cockshott]

Fair enough for general discussions in natural language. Discussions about mathematical proofs are much more constrained, and more amenable to handling mechanically.

[Luís Henrique]

Fair enough for general discussions in natural language. Discussions about mathematical proofs are much more constrained, and more amenable to handling mechanically.

Certainly. As we are discussing here about ontology in natural language, and not making mathematical proofs, it seems that we need to act like human beings, not like computers. Which means that we use our ability to understand context, and not pretend that our ability to understand context is as limited as a computer's.

Luís Henrique