Robespierre2.0
23rd June 2009, 00:18
This is written by the CEO of a private intelligence agency, who happens to be a conservative,
but I think he makes some interesting points.
Stratfor
---------------------------
=20
THE IRANIAN ELECTION AND THE REVOLUTION TEST
By George Friedman
Successful revolutions have three phases. First, a strategically located =
single or limited segment of society begins vocally to express resentment, =
asserting itself in the streets of a major city, usually the capital. This =
segment is joined by other segments in the city and by segments elsewhere =
as the demonstration spreads to other cities and becomes more assertive, =
disruptive and potentially violent. As resistance to the regime spreads, =
the regime deploys its military and security forces. These forces, drawn =
from resisting social segments and isolated from the rest of society, turn =
on the regime, and stop following the regime's orders. This is what =
happened to the Shah of Iran in 1979; it is also what happened in Russia =
in 1917 or in Romania in 1989.
=20
Revolutions fail when no one joins the initial segment, meaning the =
initial demonstrators are the ones who find themselves socially isolated. =
When the demonstrations do not spread to other cities, the demonstrations =
either peter out or the regime brings in the security and military forces =
-- who remain loyal to the regime and frequently personally hostile to the =
demonstrators -- and use force to suppress the rising to the extent =
necessary. This is what happened in Tiananmen Square in China: The =
students who rose up were not joined by others. Military forces who were =
not only loyal to the regime but hostile to the students were brought in, =
and the students were crushed.
=20
A Question of Support
This is also what happened in Iran this week. The global media, =
obsessively focused on the initial demonstrators -- who were supporters of =
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's opponents -- failed to notice that =
while large, the demonstrations primarily consisted of the same type of =
people demonstrating. Amid the breathless reporting on the demonstrations, =
reporters failed to notice that the uprising was not spreading to other =
classes and to other areas. In constantly interviewing English-speaking =
demonstrators, they failed to note just how many of the demonstrators =
spoke English and had smartphones. The media thus did not recognize these =
as the signs of a failing revolution.
=20
Later, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke Friday and called out the Islamic =
Revolutionary Guard Corps, they failed to understand that the troops -- =
definitely not drawn from what we might call the "Twittering classes," =
would remain loyal to the regime for ideological and social reasons. The =
troops had about as much sympathy for the demonstrators as a small-town =
boy from Alabama might have for a Harvard postdoc. Failing to understand =
the social tensions in Iran, the reporters deluded themselves into =
thinking they were witnessing a general uprising. But this was not St. =
Petersburg in 1917 or Bucharest in 1989 -- it was Tiananmen Square.
=20
In the global discussion last week outside Iran, there was a great deal of =
confusion about basic facts. For example, it is said that the urban-rural =
distinction in Iran is not critical any longer because according to the =
United Nations, 68 percent of Iranians are urbanized. This is an important =
point because it implies Iran is homogeneous and the demonstrators =
representative of the country. The problem is the Iranian definition of =
urban -- and this is quite common around the world -- includes very small =
communities (some with only a few thousand people) as "urban." But the =
social difference between someone living in a town with 10,000 people and =
someone living in Tehran is the difference between someone living in =
Bastrop, Texas and someone living in New York. We can assure you that that =
difference is not only vast, but that most of the good people of Bastrop =
and the fine people of New York would probably not see the world the same =
way. The failure to understand the dramatic diversity of Iranian society =
led observers to assume that students at Iran's elite university somehow =
spoke for the rest of the country.=20
Tehran proper has about 8 million inhabitants; its suburbs bring it to =
about 13 million people out of Iran's total population of 70.5 million. =
Tehran accounts for about 20 percent of Iran, but as we know, the cab =
driver and the construction worker are not socially linked to students at =
elite universities. There are six cities with populations between 1 =
million and 2.4 million people and 11 with populations of about 500,000. =
Including Tehran proper, 15.5 million people live in cities with more than =
1 million and 19.7 million in cities greater than 500,000. Iran has 80 =
cities with more than 100,000. But given that Waco, Texas, has more than =
100,000 people, inferences of social similarities between cities with =
100,000 and 5 million are tenuous. And with metro Oklahoma City having =
more than a million people, it becomes plain that urbanization has many =
faces.
Winning the Election With or Without Fraud=20
We continue to believe two things: that vote fraud occurred, and that =
Ahmadinejad likely would have won without it. Very little direct evidence =
has emerged to establish vote fraud, but several things seem suspect.=20
For example, the speed of the vote count has been taken as a sign of =
fraud, as it should have been impossible to count votes that fast. The =
polls originally were to have closed at 7 p.m. local time, but voting =
hours were extended until 10 p.m. because of the number of voters in line. =
By 11:45 p.m. about 20 percent of the vote had been counted. By 5:20 a.m. =
the next day, with almost all votes counted, the election commission =
declared Ahmadinejad the winner. The vote count thus took about seven =
hours. (Remember there were no senators, congressmen, city council members =
or school board members being counted -- just the presidential race.) =
Intriguingly, this is about the same time in took in 2005, though =
reformists that claimed fraud back then did not stress the counting time =
in their allegations.=20
The counting mechanism is simple: Iran has 47,000 voting stations, plus =
14,000 roaming stations that travel from tiny village to tiny village, =
staying there for a short time before moving on. That creates 61,000 =
ballot boxes designed to receive roughly the same number of votes. That =
would mean that each station would have been counting about 500 ballots, =
or about 70 votes per hour. With counting beginning at 10 p.m., concluding =
seven hours later does not necessarily indicate fraud or anything else. =
The Iranian presidential election system is designed for simplicity: one =
race to count in one time zone, and all counting beginning at the same =
time in all regions, we would expect the numbers to come in a somewhat =
linear fashion as rural and urban voting patterns would balance each other =
out -- explaining why voting percentages didn't change much during the =
night.
=20
It has been pointed out that some of the candidates didn't even carry =
their own provinces or districts. We remember that Al Gore didn't carry =
Tennessee in 2000. We also remember Ralph Nader, who also didn't carry his =
home precinct in part because people didn't want to spend their vote on =
someone unlikely to win -- an effect probably felt by the two smaller =
candidates in the Iranian election.=20
=20
That Mousavi didn't carry his own province is more interesting. Flynt =
Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett writing in Politico make some =
interesting points on this. As an ethnic Azeri, it was assumed that =
Mousavi would carry his Azeri-named and -dominated home province. But they =
also point out that Ahmadinejad also speaks Azeri, and made multiple =
campaign appearances in the district. They also point out that Khamenei is =
Azeri. In sum, winning that district was by no means certain for Mousavi, =
so losing it does not automatically signal fraud. It raised suspicions, =
but by no means was a smoking gun.=20
=20
We do not doubt that fraud occurred during Iranian election. For example, =
99.4 percent of potential voters voted in Mazandaran province, a mostly =
secular area home to the shah's family. Ahmadinejad carried the province =
by a 2.2 to 1 ratio. That is one heck of a turnout and level of support =
for a province that lost everything when the mullahs took over 30 years =
ago. But even if you take all of the suspect cases and added them =
together, it would not have changed the outcome. The fact is that =
Ahmadinejad's vote in 2009 was extremely close to his victory percentage =
in 2005. And while the Western media portrayed Ahmadinejad's performance =
in the presidential debates ahead of the election as dismal, embarrassing =
and indicative of an imminent electoral defeat, many Iranians who viewed =
those debates -- including some of the most hardcore Mousavi supporters -- =
acknowledge that Ahmadinejad outperformed his opponents by a landslide.
=20
Mousavi persuasively detailed his fraud claims Sunday, and they have yet =
to be rebutted. But if his claims of the extent of fraud were true, the =
protests should have spread rapidly by social segment and geography to the =
millions of people who even the central government asserts voted for him. =
Certainly, Mousavi supporters believed they would win the election based =
in part on highly flawed polls, and when they didn't, they assumed they =
were robbed and took to the streets.=20
But critically, the protesters were not joined by any of the millions =
whose votes the protesters alleged were stolen. In a complete hijacking of =
the election by some 13 million votes by an extremely unpopular candidate, =
we would have expected to see the core of Mousavi's supporters joined by =
others who had been disenfranchised. On last Monday, Tuesday and =
Wednesday, when the demonstrations were at their height, the millions of =
Mousavi voters should have made their appearance. They didn't. We might =
assume that the security apparatus intimidated some, but surely more than =
just the Tehran professional and student classes posses civic courage. =
While appearing large, the demonstrations actually comprised a small =
fraction of society.=20
=20
Tensions Among the Political Elite
All of this not to say there are not tremendous tensions within the =
Iranian political elite. That no revolution broke out does not mean there =
isn't a crisis in the political elite, particularly among the clerics. But =
that crisis does not cut the way Western common sense would have it. Many =
of Iran's religious leaders see Ahmadinejad as hostile to their interests, =
as threatening their financial prerogatives, and as taking international =
risks they don't want to take. Ahmadinejad's political popularity in fact =
rests on his populist hostility to what he sees as the corruption of the =
clerics and their families and his strong stand on Iranian national =
security issues.=20
=20
The clerics are divided among themselves, but many wanted to see =
Ahmadinejad lose to protect their own interests. Khamenei, the supreme =
leader, faced a difficult choice last Friday. He could demand a major =
recount or even new elections, or he could validate what happened. =
Khamenei speaks for a sizable chunk of the ruling elite, but also has had =
to rule by consensus among both clerical and non-clerical forces. Many =
powerful clerics like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani wanted Khamenei to =
reverse the election, and we suspect Khamenei wished he could have found a =
way to do it. But as the defender of the regime, he was afraid to. Mousavi =
supporters' demonstrations would have been nothing compared to the =
firestorm among Ahmadinejad supporters -- both voters and the security =
forces -- had their candidate been denied. Khamenei wasn't going to flirt =
with disaster, so he endorsed the outcome.
=20
The Western media misunderstood this because they didn't understand that =
Ahmadinejad does not speak for the clerics but against them, that many of =
the clerics were working for his defeat, and that Ahmadinejad has enormous =
pull in the country's security apparatus. The reason Western media missed =
this is because they bought into the concept of the stolen election, =
therefore failing to see Ahmadinejad's support and the widespread =
dissatisfaction with the old clerical elite. The Western media simply =
didn't understand that the most traditional and pious segments of Iranian =
society support Ahmadinejad because he opposes the old ruling elite. =
Instead, they assumed this was like Prague or Budapest in 1989, with a =
broad-based uprising in favor of liberalism against an unpopular =
regime.=20
=20
Tehran in 2009, however, was a struggle between two main factions, both of =
which supported the Islamic republic as it was. There were the clerics, =
who have dominated the regime since 1979 and had grown wealthy in the =
process. And there was Ahmadinejad, who felt the ruling clerical elite had =
betrayed the revolution with their personal excesses. And there also was =
the small faction the BBC and CNN kept focusing on -- the demonstrators in =
the streets who want to dramatically liberalize the Islamic republic. This =
faction never stood a chance of taking power, whether by election or =
revolution. The two main factions used the third smaller faction in =
various ways, however. Ahmadinejad used it to make his case that the =
clerics who supported them, like Rafsanjani, would risk the revolution and =
play into the hands of the Americans and British to protect their own =
wealth. Meanwhile, Rafsanjani argued behind the scenes that the unrest was =
the tip of the iceberg, and that Ahmadinejad had to be replaced. Khamenei, =
an astute politician, examined the data and supported Ahmadinejad.
=20
Now, as we saw after Tiananmen Square, we will see a reshuffling among the =
elite. Those who backed Mousavi will be on the defensive. By contrast, =
those who supported Ahmadinejad are in a powerful position. There is a =
massive crisis in the elite, but this crisis has nothing to do with =
liberalization: It has to do with power and prerogatives among the elite. =
Having been forced by the election and Khamenei to live with Ahmadinejad, =
some will make deals while some will fight -- but Ahmadinejad is =
well-positioned to win this battle.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with =
attribution to www.stratfor.com.
but I think he makes some interesting points.
Stratfor
---------------------------
=20
THE IRANIAN ELECTION AND THE REVOLUTION TEST
By George Friedman
Successful revolutions have three phases. First, a strategically located =
single or limited segment of society begins vocally to express resentment, =
asserting itself in the streets of a major city, usually the capital. This =
segment is joined by other segments in the city and by segments elsewhere =
as the demonstration spreads to other cities and becomes more assertive, =
disruptive and potentially violent. As resistance to the regime spreads, =
the regime deploys its military and security forces. These forces, drawn =
from resisting social segments and isolated from the rest of society, turn =
on the regime, and stop following the regime's orders. This is what =
happened to the Shah of Iran in 1979; it is also what happened in Russia =
in 1917 or in Romania in 1989.
=20
Revolutions fail when no one joins the initial segment, meaning the =
initial demonstrators are the ones who find themselves socially isolated. =
When the demonstrations do not spread to other cities, the demonstrations =
either peter out or the regime brings in the security and military forces =
-- who remain loyal to the regime and frequently personally hostile to the =
demonstrators -- and use force to suppress the rising to the extent =
necessary. This is what happened in Tiananmen Square in China: The =
students who rose up were not joined by others. Military forces who were =
not only loyal to the regime but hostile to the students were brought in, =
and the students were crushed.
=20
A Question of Support
This is also what happened in Iran this week. The global media, =
obsessively focused on the initial demonstrators -- who were supporters of =
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's opponents -- failed to notice that =
while large, the demonstrations primarily consisted of the same type of =
people demonstrating. Amid the breathless reporting on the demonstrations, =
reporters failed to notice that the uprising was not spreading to other =
classes and to other areas. In constantly interviewing English-speaking =
demonstrators, they failed to note just how many of the demonstrators =
spoke English and had smartphones. The media thus did not recognize these =
as the signs of a failing revolution.
=20
Later, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke Friday and called out the Islamic =
Revolutionary Guard Corps, they failed to understand that the troops -- =
definitely not drawn from what we might call the "Twittering classes," =
would remain loyal to the regime for ideological and social reasons. The =
troops had about as much sympathy for the demonstrators as a small-town =
boy from Alabama might have for a Harvard postdoc. Failing to understand =
the social tensions in Iran, the reporters deluded themselves into =
thinking they were witnessing a general uprising. But this was not St. =
Petersburg in 1917 or Bucharest in 1989 -- it was Tiananmen Square.
=20
In the global discussion last week outside Iran, there was a great deal of =
confusion about basic facts. For example, it is said that the urban-rural =
distinction in Iran is not critical any longer because according to the =
United Nations, 68 percent of Iranians are urbanized. This is an important =
point because it implies Iran is homogeneous and the demonstrators =
representative of the country. The problem is the Iranian definition of =
urban -- and this is quite common around the world -- includes very small =
communities (some with only a few thousand people) as "urban." But the =
social difference between someone living in a town with 10,000 people and =
someone living in Tehran is the difference between someone living in =
Bastrop, Texas and someone living in New York. We can assure you that that =
difference is not only vast, but that most of the good people of Bastrop =
and the fine people of New York would probably not see the world the same =
way. The failure to understand the dramatic diversity of Iranian society =
led observers to assume that students at Iran's elite university somehow =
spoke for the rest of the country.=20
Tehran proper has about 8 million inhabitants; its suburbs bring it to =
about 13 million people out of Iran's total population of 70.5 million. =
Tehran accounts for about 20 percent of Iran, but as we know, the cab =
driver and the construction worker are not socially linked to students at =
elite universities. There are six cities with populations between 1 =
million and 2.4 million people and 11 with populations of about 500,000. =
Including Tehran proper, 15.5 million people live in cities with more than =
1 million and 19.7 million in cities greater than 500,000. Iran has 80 =
cities with more than 100,000. But given that Waco, Texas, has more than =
100,000 people, inferences of social similarities between cities with =
100,000 and 5 million are tenuous. And with metro Oklahoma City having =
more than a million people, it becomes plain that urbanization has many =
faces.
Winning the Election With or Without Fraud=20
We continue to believe two things: that vote fraud occurred, and that =
Ahmadinejad likely would have won without it. Very little direct evidence =
has emerged to establish vote fraud, but several things seem suspect.=20
For example, the speed of the vote count has been taken as a sign of =
fraud, as it should have been impossible to count votes that fast. The =
polls originally were to have closed at 7 p.m. local time, but voting =
hours were extended until 10 p.m. because of the number of voters in line. =
By 11:45 p.m. about 20 percent of the vote had been counted. By 5:20 a.m. =
the next day, with almost all votes counted, the election commission =
declared Ahmadinejad the winner. The vote count thus took about seven =
hours. (Remember there were no senators, congressmen, city council members =
or school board members being counted -- just the presidential race.) =
Intriguingly, this is about the same time in took in 2005, though =
reformists that claimed fraud back then did not stress the counting time =
in their allegations.=20
The counting mechanism is simple: Iran has 47,000 voting stations, plus =
14,000 roaming stations that travel from tiny village to tiny village, =
staying there for a short time before moving on. That creates 61,000 =
ballot boxes designed to receive roughly the same number of votes. That =
would mean that each station would have been counting about 500 ballots, =
or about 70 votes per hour. With counting beginning at 10 p.m., concluding =
seven hours later does not necessarily indicate fraud or anything else. =
The Iranian presidential election system is designed for simplicity: one =
race to count in one time zone, and all counting beginning at the same =
time in all regions, we would expect the numbers to come in a somewhat =
linear fashion as rural and urban voting patterns would balance each other =
out -- explaining why voting percentages didn't change much during the =
night.
=20
It has been pointed out that some of the candidates didn't even carry =
their own provinces or districts. We remember that Al Gore didn't carry =
Tennessee in 2000. We also remember Ralph Nader, who also didn't carry his =
home precinct in part because people didn't want to spend their vote on =
someone unlikely to win -- an effect probably felt by the two smaller =
candidates in the Iranian election.=20
=20
That Mousavi didn't carry his own province is more interesting. Flynt =
Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett writing in Politico make some =
interesting points on this. As an ethnic Azeri, it was assumed that =
Mousavi would carry his Azeri-named and -dominated home province. But they =
also point out that Ahmadinejad also speaks Azeri, and made multiple =
campaign appearances in the district. They also point out that Khamenei is =
Azeri. In sum, winning that district was by no means certain for Mousavi, =
so losing it does not automatically signal fraud. It raised suspicions, =
but by no means was a smoking gun.=20
=20
We do not doubt that fraud occurred during Iranian election. For example, =
99.4 percent of potential voters voted in Mazandaran province, a mostly =
secular area home to the shah's family. Ahmadinejad carried the province =
by a 2.2 to 1 ratio. That is one heck of a turnout and level of support =
for a province that lost everything when the mullahs took over 30 years =
ago. But even if you take all of the suspect cases and added them =
together, it would not have changed the outcome. The fact is that =
Ahmadinejad's vote in 2009 was extremely close to his victory percentage =
in 2005. And while the Western media portrayed Ahmadinejad's performance =
in the presidential debates ahead of the election as dismal, embarrassing =
and indicative of an imminent electoral defeat, many Iranians who viewed =
those debates -- including some of the most hardcore Mousavi supporters -- =
acknowledge that Ahmadinejad outperformed his opponents by a landslide.
=20
Mousavi persuasively detailed his fraud claims Sunday, and they have yet =
to be rebutted. But if his claims of the extent of fraud were true, the =
protests should have spread rapidly by social segment and geography to the =
millions of people who even the central government asserts voted for him. =
Certainly, Mousavi supporters believed they would win the election based =
in part on highly flawed polls, and when they didn't, they assumed they =
were robbed and took to the streets.=20
But critically, the protesters were not joined by any of the millions =
whose votes the protesters alleged were stolen. In a complete hijacking of =
the election by some 13 million votes by an extremely unpopular candidate, =
we would have expected to see the core of Mousavi's supporters joined by =
others who had been disenfranchised. On last Monday, Tuesday and =
Wednesday, when the demonstrations were at their height, the millions of =
Mousavi voters should have made their appearance. They didn't. We might =
assume that the security apparatus intimidated some, but surely more than =
just the Tehran professional and student classes posses civic courage. =
While appearing large, the demonstrations actually comprised a small =
fraction of society.=20
=20
Tensions Among the Political Elite
All of this not to say there are not tremendous tensions within the =
Iranian political elite. That no revolution broke out does not mean there =
isn't a crisis in the political elite, particularly among the clerics. But =
that crisis does not cut the way Western common sense would have it. Many =
of Iran's religious leaders see Ahmadinejad as hostile to their interests, =
as threatening their financial prerogatives, and as taking international =
risks they don't want to take. Ahmadinejad's political popularity in fact =
rests on his populist hostility to what he sees as the corruption of the =
clerics and their families and his strong stand on Iranian national =
security issues.=20
=20
The clerics are divided among themselves, but many wanted to see =
Ahmadinejad lose to protect their own interests. Khamenei, the supreme =
leader, faced a difficult choice last Friday. He could demand a major =
recount or even new elections, or he could validate what happened. =
Khamenei speaks for a sizable chunk of the ruling elite, but also has had =
to rule by consensus among both clerical and non-clerical forces. Many =
powerful clerics like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani wanted Khamenei to =
reverse the election, and we suspect Khamenei wished he could have found a =
way to do it. But as the defender of the regime, he was afraid to. Mousavi =
supporters' demonstrations would have been nothing compared to the =
firestorm among Ahmadinejad supporters -- both voters and the security =
forces -- had their candidate been denied. Khamenei wasn't going to flirt =
with disaster, so he endorsed the outcome.
=20
The Western media misunderstood this because they didn't understand that =
Ahmadinejad does not speak for the clerics but against them, that many of =
the clerics were working for his defeat, and that Ahmadinejad has enormous =
pull in the country's security apparatus. The reason Western media missed =
this is because they bought into the concept of the stolen election, =
therefore failing to see Ahmadinejad's support and the widespread =
dissatisfaction with the old clerical elite. The Western media simply =
didn't understand that the most traditional and pious segments of Iranian =
society support Ahmadinejad because he opposes the old ruling elite. =
Instead, they assumed this was like Prague or Budapest in 1989, with a =
broad-based uprising in favor of liberalism against an unpopular =
regime.=20
=20
Tehran in 2009, however, was a struggle between two main factions, both of =
which supported the Islamic republic as it was. There were the clerics, =
who have dominated the regime since 1979 and had grown wealthy in the =
process. And there was Ahmadinejad, who felt the ruling clerical elite had =
betrayed the revolution with their personal excesses. And there also was =
the small faction the BBC and CNN kept focusing on -- the demonstrators in =
the streets who want to dramatically liberalize the Islamic republic. This =
faction never stood a chance of taking power, whether by election or =
revolution. The two main factions used the third smaller faction in =
various ways, however. Ahmadinejad used it to make his case that the =
clerics who supported them, like Rafsanjani, would risk the revolution and =
play into the hands of the Americans and British to protect their own =
wealth. Meanwhile, Rafsanjani argued behind the scenes that the unrest was =
the tip of the iceberg, and that Ahmadinejad had to be replaced. Khamenei, =
an astute politician, examined the data and supported Ahmadinejad.
=20
Now, as we saw after Tiananmen Square, we will see a reshuffling among the =
elite. Those who backed Mousavi will be on the defensive. By contrast, =
those who supported Ahmadinejad are in a powerful position. There is a =
massive crisis in the elite, but this crisis has nothing to do with =
liberalization: It has to do with power and prerogatives among the elite. =
Having been forced by the election and Khamenei to live with Ahmadinejad, =
some will make deals while some will fight -- but Ahmadinejad is =
well-positioned to win this battle.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with =
attribution to www.stratfor.com.