Martin Blank
20th June 2009, 05:22
Note: This was drafted several days ago, so some of the information is dated. This appears in the current issue of Working People's Advocate, dated June 15. -- HJM
Election Result Provokes Popular Uprising in Iran
Statement of the Central Committee of the Workers Party in America
SINCE THE CLOSE of the polls last Friday in Iran’s latest presidential election, the country has been increasingly in the grips of a popular upheaval, the likes of which hasn’t been seen since the 1979 Revolution.
Across the capital, Tehran, and throughout numerous cities and towns, people have seized the opportunity created by a widespread belief of irregularities in the polling process to demand fundamental changes to the “Islamic Republic,” including greater democratic rights and an end to the brutal police-state tactics employed against dissenting Iranians.
At the same time, though, the democratic sentiment that has fueled the mass protests so far is being cynically exploited by the so-called “opposition,” headed by Mir Hossein Mousavi, who want to transform this struggle into a vehicle for them to take power. Mousavi, who was prime minister of Iran from 1981 to 1989, is a long-time supporter of the reactionary mullahs who control the “Islamic Republic,” and his differences with the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are cosmetic.
On the other side, there are increasing signs that the Great Power imperialists are looking to steer the protests in the direction of a “color revolution” that leads to a regime in their control. However, the official “opposition” around Mousavi appears to be ignoring the appeals of the U.S. and Britain, and no other elements have stepped forward to become their agents.
This puts the current protests in a unique and, in many ways, dangerous position. These protests have the potential to easily grow out of the control of the mullahs and their politicians, Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, and become a “new 1979” that threatens the very existence of the “Islamic Republic.” At the same time, the current character of the protests, and the limited demands being raised by the movement, has created a vacuum that, if left to continue as is, could lead to an equally reactionary outcome.
GOING INTO THE election on June 12, no one was quite sure who was going to be Iran’s next president. Some polls showed Ahmadinejad the likely winner, and others pointed in the direction of Mousavi. Indeed, even the ruling mullahs were confused about who was the winner, at one point telling the challenger he had won, and then withdrawing that announcement as more returns came in.
From the beginning of the election campaign, Mousavi and Ahmadinejad appealed to different classes and sections of Iranian society.
Ahmadinejad presented himself as a populist, seeking to win the votes of Iran’s working class and poor, both in the cities and in rural areas, with food distributions, as well as presenting himself as a fighter against “corruption” inside the “Islamic Republic.” But spiraling inflation and the effects of the worldwide economic crisis have sent Iran’s economy into a tailspin.
Mousavi, on the other hand, sought to run a “modern” campaign, including using the Internet to spread his message. Although a hand-picked candidate approved by the mullahs and their “Guardian Council,” Mousavi has appealed to “reform” sentiments among Iran’s discontented “middle class” and young people, capitalizing on the problems in the economy to attack Ahmadinejad’s “management” record.
The other two candidates in the election, Moshen Rezaei, former commander of the Revolutionary Guard, and Mehdi Karroubi, the former speaker of the Iranian parliament, also campaigned on platforms of “reform.” For the most part, though, these platforms sought to criticize Ahmadinejad only for his “provocative” international policy, including his overt anti-Semitism and denial of the Holocaust, and his goading of the George W. Bush regime.
In fact, all of the candidates, including Ahmadinejad, struck a more conciliatory tone toward the new occupant of the White House.
This consensus among the four candidates reflects an overall shift in the views and interests of the Iranian ruling class, and especially the views of the Islamist mullahs. (This also belies the belief among some self-described socialists and communists that there is any kind of “anti-imperialist” undertone to Ahmadinejad’s maneuvering with Washington.)
In the end, the key issue in the election was not the antics of the current president in relation to the rest of the world, but rather the extent to which the bribes and subsidies handed out by the current regime in Tehran will be cut. All of the candidates agreed on the need for massive cuts in social spending, but differed on how much and who would bear the burden.
This is likely why Ahmadinejad has been retained in power. All three of the candidates who opposed him in the election expressed an unwillingness to use the brutal police apparatus in the event of a social explosion, and sought accommodation of opposition elements. For the mullahs and the Islamist ruling class, such vacillation in the face of a mounting social crisis could quickly lead to ... a mass uprising.
THE EXPLOSION OF popular protest that began the day after the election has all indications that it will continue to grow and draw in wider sections of Iranian society if the Islamists in power cannot find a way to contain or suppress the daily demonstrations.
In just the last three days, the protests have went from handfuls and dozens gathering in Tehran and battling police to tens of thousands in cities and towns across the country marching, chanting and, most importantly, organizing.
If the protests follow the pattern that developed during the 1979 Revolution, and has been seen occasionally since then, the protests will continue to grow in size and scale until it will seem that the entire country is on the march — that is, unless the mullahs and Ahmadinejad are able to muster the forces to brutally suppress the protests and arrest the “opposition.”
Even the Iranian state is showing signs of confusion and indecision. Ahmadinejad has been forced to rely on the Islamist paramilitaries like the gasht ershad (morality police) to enforce his rule (and that of the mullahs!), due to increasing numbers of the regular police and militia declaring neutrality or open support for Mousavi and the protesters. This division has even begun to extend into the sitting government, with rumors of some state ministers expressing support for the growing “opposition.”
For their part, the “opposition” itself remains primarily a spontaneous formation, containing different political currents — from “moderate” Islamists to democrats to self-described socialists and communists — and having no clear political direction or platform.
“Moderate” Islamists, likely tied to the “opposition,” anonymously released a seven-point manifesto calling for stripping Ahmadinejad of the presidency and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of his position as “supreme leader,” replacing them with Mousavi and Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, respectively. (Montazeri is seen as a “reformer” and “moderate” Islamist.) They have also called for the release of all political prisoners and the dissolution of all paramilitary organizations like the gasht ershad.
These demands and others, raised by both participants and emigré organizations, are meant to address the most immediate concerns of Iranians. And while the removal of Ahmadinejad is seen as a step forward, their reliance on Mousavi represents, at best, a naive hope that he and his “opposition” will put an end to the worst aspects of the “Islamic Republic.”
As prime minister during most of the 1980s, Mousavi was responsible for horrific attacks on Iranian workers. He imposed deep cuts to social programs in order to pay for their war with Iraq, as well as oversaw the detention and execution (or exile) of thousands of Iranians who were members or supporters of self-described socialist and communist parties. All the while, he was negotiating with the U.S. and Israel to purchase military arms and equipment.
That he is now trying to cast himself as a “reformer,” and advocate for the poor and working people of Iran is a cynical attempt to capitalize on years of seething anger among Iran’s people. It is, in many ways, akin to how the mullahs came to power in Iran in 1979: hijacking a mass political movement that was politically confused and riding it into power.
The only way to keep the tragedy of 1979 from repeating itself today is for the democratic movement in Iran to begin to develop a stronger political perspective that goes beyond “moderate” Islamism and western-style “democracy.”
WHAT ARE THE next steps for Iran’s popular revolt? What can we expect to develop in the coming days?
It appears that the “opposition” is taking a page from the playbook used in the 1979 Revolution, resorting to mass “mourning” marches through the streets of Tehran and other cities. If these marches are attacked, they will provoke more and larger protests along the same lines.
This puts Ahmadinejad and the mullahs in a tough position. If they don’t suppress the protests, they have the potential to grow out of control. If they do attempt to suppress them, they will grow out of control. And for every person killed by the gasht ershad, police or militia, more people will take to the streets in “mourning.”
In the coming days, all eyes will turn to Ayatollah Khamenei. As Iran’s “supreme leader,” he has virtually unlimited power in the “Islamic Republic.” At the same time, he also has seen support for his continued leadership of the Guardian Council erode alongside that of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Many expect that Khamenei might, on behalf of the rest of the mullahs, attempt to broker a deal or even call a new election. However, given the negative view so many involved in the “opposition” and protests have of him, the “supreme leader” may cast his lot with Ahmadinejad’s regime and declare the outcome of the election legitimate.
If that happens, it sets up a situation where even the smallest incident could lead to a decisive showdown between the protest movement and the “Islamic Republic.” From the moment that Khamenei turns against the protesters, anything they do will be considered an attack on the rule of the mullahs. If the Guardian Council sends out its gasht ershad against a mass “mourning” protest and people are killed, it could lead to a full-scale popular revolution.
For Mousavi and the “opposition,” this is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, given the current relationship of forces, it would almost guarantee Mousavi’s ascension to the presidency of the “Islamic Republic,” as well as the removal of many of the conservative Islamist “principlists” in the government and on the Guardian Council. On the other hand, Mousavi would not be able to control or even guide such a revolutionary movement, and if he did anything that the movement opposed (like impose the cuts in social programs he advocated before the election), he could very quickly become a victim of his own “success.”
That would open up a vacuum of leadership in the democratic movement — a vacuum that could potentially be filled by elements that are only now in their infancy, including possibly organizations funded by the U.S. government and seeking to turn Mousavi’s “green” movement into a “green revolution” along the lines of the “color revolutions” sponsored by Washington in the Ukraine, Georgia and Lebanon.
There are elements within Mousavi’s camp that would serve well as agents for the Great Power imperialist states, and would be able to receive a steady flow of funds and support through certain Iranian emigré organizations in Europe and North America. They, even more than those elements in the “opposition” that are loyal to the “Islamic Republic,” represent the greatest danger to the popular upheaval.
IT IS CLEAR that we are witnessing the revival of the democratic upheaval that drove the 1979 Iranian Revolution forward and toppled the U.S.-backed Shah from his throne.
Unfortunately, this revival is also including the worst elements of that past revolution, most notably the disproportionate presence of the “middle class” and lack of a political perspective independent of the ruling class.
When the Shah was overthrown in February 1979, it was due primarily to the initiative and organizing of the Iranian working class. Since the previous September, workers had been staging mass strikes and protests against the Shah, demanding an end to martial law and the freeing of all political prisoners. The workers themselves organized shoras (councils) to coordinate strike activity, raised more and more political demands and, with the help of sections of the military, armed themselves.
But a lack of a unifying political perspective and organization, along with the central role of the shoras being eclipsed by Islamist and other organizations drawn from the “middle class,” allowed the Shi’a clergy, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, to hijack the overall direction of the democratic movement and turn it into what became the “Islamic Revolution.”
The victory of the Islamists forced the workers’ organizations underground and into exile, where they remain today. Many of the leaders of the shoras, trade unions and mass leftwing political parties were arrested, tortured and executed by the mullahs’ regime.
Nevertheless, when momentary windows of opportunity have opened, Iran’s working class has stood up for their rights and livelihoods, reminding anyone who is paying attention of what they accomplished 30 years ago.
In the current upheaval, however, the working class is beginning from a position of relative subordination to the “middle class” elements. But in order for this uprising to advance, the working class must stand up and take a leading role.
Yes, more and more workers are joining the protests, but that is not enough. The limited character of the movement’s demands and the “middle class” composition of the protests makes it impossible to resolve the multitude of outstanding democratic tasks facing the people of Iran. As was shown in 1979, only the working class and its own organizations have the power to sweep away social reaction and begin to address the objective needs of all people in Iran.
The turning point for this movement will be when working people turn out in mass numbers under their own banners and signs, and begin to challenge the “Islamic Republic” on the basis of their own platform of slogans and demands, not that of Mousavi’s Islamists.
Then the democratic movement will have the power to do more than tinker with the composition of the Guardian Council or the mechanics of the “Islamic Republic.” It will have the means to complete the work begun by the shoras 30 years ago. Then, all that will be lacking is the perspective and political direction to defeat all the currents of Islamism, as well as any organization looking to take control of the movement and turn it in the direction of a pro-Washington “color revolution.”
In our view, that perspective and direction can only come from a communist party, emerging from within the working-class and poor neighborhoods of Iran’s cities and towns, organized and led by Iranian workers themselves.
Thirty years ago, the oil and steel workers were the backbone of the revolutionary-democratic overthrow of the Shah. Today, they can again play that pivotal role; however, in order to do more than repeat the outcome of 1979, the workers of Iran must have a principled and unified hezb-e kargaran-e komunisti (communist workers’ party) they can call their own.
Election Result Provokes Popular Uprising in Iran
Statement of the Central Committee of the Workers Party in America
SINCE THE CLOSE of the polls last Friday in Iran’s latest presidential election, the country has been increasingly in the grips of a popular upheaval, the likes of which hasn’t been seen since the 1979 Revolution.
Across the capital, Tehran, and throughout numerous cities and towns, people have seized the opportunity created by a widespread belief of irregularities in the polling process to demand fundamental changes to the “Islamic Republic,” including greater democratic rights and an end to the brutal police-state tactics employed against dissenting Iranians.
At the same time, though, the democratic sentiment that has fueled the mass protests so far is being cynically exploited by the so-called “opposition,” headed by Mir Hossein Mousavi, who want to transform this struggle into a vehicle for them to take power. Mousavi, who was prime minister of Iran from 1981 to 1989, is a long-time supporter of the reactionary mullahs who control the “Islamic Republic,” and his differences with the current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are cosmetic.
On the other side, there are increasing signs that the Great Power imperialists are looking to steer the protests in the direction of a “color revolution” that leads to a regime in their control. However, the official “opposition” around Mousavi appears to be ignoring the appeals of the U.S. and Britain, and no other elements have stepped forward to become their agents.
This puts the current protests in a unique and, in many ways, dangerous position. These protests have the potential to easily grow out of the control of the mullahs and their politicians, Ahmadinejad and Mousavi, and become a “new 1979” that threatens the very existence of the “Islamic Republic.” At the same time, the current character of the protests, and the limited demands being raised by the movement, has created a vacuum that, if left to continue as is, could lead to an equally reactionary outcome.
GOING INTO THE election on June 12, no one was quite sure who was going to be Iran’s next president. Some polls showed Ahmadinejad the likely winner, and others pointed in the direction of Mousavi. Indeed, even the ruling mullahs were confused about who was the winner, at one point telling the challenger he had won, and then withdrawing that announcement as more returns came in.
From the beginning of the election campaign, Mousavi and Ahmadinejad appealed to different classes and sections of Iranian society.
Ahmadinejad presented himself as a populist, seeking to win the votes of Iran’s working class and poor, both in the cities and in rural areas, with food distributions, as well as presenting himself as a fighter against “corruption” inside the “Islamic Republic.” But spiraling inflation and the effects of the worldwide economic crisis have sent Iran’s economy into a tailspin.
Mousavi, on the other hand, sought to run a “modern” campaign, including using the Internet to spread his message. Although a hand-picked candidate approved by the mullahs and their “Guardian Council,” Mousavi has appealed to “reform” sentiments among Iran’s discontented “middle class” and young people, capitalizing on the problems in the economy to attack Ahmadinejad’s “management” record.
The other two candidates in the election, Moshen Rezaei, former commander of the Revolutionary Guard, and Mehdi Karroubi, the former speaker of the Iranian parliament, also campaigned on platforms of “reform.” For the most part, though, these platforms sought to criticize Ahmadinejad only for his “provocative” international policy, including his overt anti-Semitism and denial of the Holocaust, and his goading of the George W. Bush regime.
In fact, all of the candidates, including Ahmadinejad, struck a more conciliatory tone toward the new occupant of the White House.
This consensus among the four candidates reflects an overall shift in the views and interests of the Iranian ruling class, and especially the views of the Islamist mullahs. (This also belies the belief among some self-described socialists and communists that there is any kind of “anti-imperialist” undertone to Ahmadinejad’s maneuvering with Washington.)
In the end, the key issue in the election was not the antics of the current president in relation to the rest of the world, but rather the extent to which the bribes and subsidies handed out by the current regime in Tehran will be cut. All of the candidates agreed on the need for massive cuts in social spending, but differed on how much and who would bear the burden.
This is likely why Ahmadinejad has been retained in power. All three of the candidates who opposed him in the election expressed an unwillingness to use the brutal police apparatus in the event of a social explosion, and sought accommodation of opposition elements. For the mullahs and the Islamist ruling class, such vacillation in the face of a mounting social crisis could quickly lead to ... a mass uprising.
THE EXPLOSION OF popular protest that began the day after the election has all indications that it will continue to grow and draw in wider sections of Iranian society if the Islamists in power cannot find a way to contain or suppress the daily demonstrations.
In just the last three days, the protests have went from handfuls and dozens gathering in Tehran and battling police to tens of thousands in cities and towns across the country marching, chanting and, most importantly, organizing.
If the protests follow the pattern that developed during the 1979 Revolution, and has been seen occasionally since then, the protests will continue to grow in size and scale until it will seem that the entire country is on the march — that is, unless the mullahs and Ahmadinejad are able to muster the forces to brutally suppress the protests and arrest the “opposition.”
Even the Iranian state is showing signs of confusion and indecision. Ahmadinejad has been forced to rely on the Islamist paramilitaries like the gasht ershad (morality police) to enforce his rule (and that of the mullahs!), due to increasing numbers of the regular police and militia declaring neutrality or open support for Mousavi and the protesters. This division has even begun to extend into the sitting government, with rumors of some state ministers expressing support for the growing “opposition.”
For their part, the “opposition” itself remains primarily a spontaneous formation, containing different political currents — from “moderate” Islamists to democrats to self-described socialists and communists — and having no clear political direction or platform.
“Moderate” Islamists, likely tied to the “opposition,” anonymously released a seven-point manifesto calling for stripping Ahmadinejad of the presidency and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei of his position as “supreme leader,” replacing them with Mousavi and Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, respectively. (Montazeri is seen as a “reformer” and “moderate” Islamist.) They have also called for the release of all political prisoners and the dissolution of all paramilitary organizations like the gasht ershad.
These demands and others, raised by both participants and emigré organizations, are meant to address the most immediate concerns of Iranians. And while the removal of Ahmadinejad is seen as a step forward, their reliance on Mousavi represents, at best, a naive hope that he and his “opposition” will put an end to the worst aspects of the “Islamic Republic.”
As prime minister during most of the 1980s, Mousavi was responsible for horrific attacks on Iranian workers. He imposed deep cuts to social programs in order to pay for their war with Iraq, as well as oversaw the detention and execution (or exile) of thousands of Iranians who were members or supporters of self-described socialist and communist parties. All the while, he was negotiating with the U.S. and Israel to purchase military arms and equipment.
That he is now trying to cast himself as a “reformer,” and advocate for the poor and working people of Iran is a cynical attempt to capitalize on years of seething anger among Iran’s people. It is, in many ways, akin to how the mullahs came to power in Iran in 1979: hijacking a mass political movement that was politically confused and riding it into power.
The only way to keep the tragedy of 1979 from repeating itself today is for the democratic movement in Iran to begin to develop a stronger political perspective that goes beyond “moderate” Islamism and western-style “democracy.”
WHAT ARE THE next steps for Iran’s popular revolt? What can we expect to develop in the coming days?
It appears that the “opposition” is taking a page from the playbook used in the 1979 Revolution, resorting to mass “mourning” marches through the streets of Tehran and other cities. If these marches are attacked, they will provoke more and larger protests along the same lines.
This puts Ahmadinejad and the mullahs in a tough position. If they don’t suppress the protests, they have the potential to grow out of control. If they do attempt to suppress them, they will grow out of control. And for every person killed by the gasht ershad, police or militia, more people will take to the streets in “mourning.”
In the coming days, all eyes will turn to Ayatollah Khamenei. As Iran’s “supreme leader,” he has virtually unlimited power in the “Islamic Republic.” At the same time, he also has seen support for his continued leadership of the Guardian Council erode alongside that of Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Many expect that Khamenei might, on behalf of the rest of the mullahs, attempt to broker a deal or even call a new election. However, given the negative view so many involved in the “opposition” and protests have of him, the “supreme leader” may cast his lot with Ahmadinejad’s regime and declare the outcome of the election legitimate.
If that happens, it sets up a situation where even the smallest incident could lead to a decisive showdown between the protest movement and the “Islamic Republic.” From the moment that Khamenei turns against the protesters, anything they do will be considered an attack on the rule of the mullahs. If the Guardian Council sends out its gasht ershad against a mass “mourning” protest and people are killed, it could lead to a full-scale popular revolution.
For Mousavi and the “opposition,” this is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, given the current relationship of forces, it would almost guarantee Mousavi’s ascension to the presidency of the “Islamic Republic,” as well as the removal of many of the conservative Islamist “principlists” in the government and on the Guardian Council. On the other hand, Mousavi would not be able to control or even guide such a revolutionary movement, and if he did anything that the movement opposed (like impose the cuts in social programs he advocated before the election), he could very quickly become a victim of his own “success.”
That would open up a vacuum of leadership in the democratic movement — a vacuum that could potentially be filled by elements that are only now in their infancy, including possibly organizations funded by the U.S. government and seeking to turn Mousavi’s “green” movement into a “green revolution” along the lines of the “color revolutions” sponsored by Washington in the Ukraine, Georgia and Lebanon.
There are elements within Mousavi’s camp that would serve well as agents for the Great Power imperialist states, and would be able to receive a steady flow of funds and support through certain Iranian emigré organizations in Europe and North America. They, even more than those elements in the “opposition” that are loyal to the “Islamic Republic,” represent the greatest danger to the popular upheaval.
IT IS CLEAR that we are witnessing the revival of the democratic upheaval that drove the 1979 Iranian Revolution forward and toppled the U.S.-backed Shah from his throne.
Unfortunately, this revival is also including the worst elements of that past revolution, most notably the disproportionate presence of the “middle class” and lack of a political perspective independent of the ruling class.
When the Shah was overthrown in February 1979, it was due primarily to the initiative and organizing of the Iranian working class. Since the previous September, workers had been staging mass strikes and protests against the Shah, demanding an end to martial law and the freeing of all political prisoners. The workers themselves organized shoras (councils) to coordinate strike activity, raised more and more political demands and, with the help of sections of the military, armed themselves.
But a lack of a unifying political perspective and organization, along with the central role of the shoras being eclipsed by Islamist and other organizations drawn from the “middle class,” allowed the Shi’a clergy, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, to hijack the overall direction of the democratic movement and turn it into what became the “Islamic Revolution.”
The victory of the Islamists forced the workers’ organizations underground and into exile, where they remain today. Many of the leaders of the shoras, trade unions and mass leftwing political parties were arrested, tortured and executed by the mullahs’ regime.
Nevertheless, when momentary windows of opportunity have opened, Iran’s working class has stood up for their rights and livelihoods, reminding anyone who is paying attention of what they accomplished 30 years ago.
In the current upheaval, however, the working class is beginning from a position of relative subordination to the “middle class” elements. But in order for this uprising to advance, the working class must stand up and take a leading role.
Yes, more and more workers are joining the protests, but that is not enough. The limited character of the movement’s demands and the “middle class” composition of the protests makes it impossible to resolve the multitude of outstanding democratic tasks facing the people of Iran. As was shown in 1979, only the working class and its own organizations have the power to sweep away social reaction and begin to address the objective needs of all people in Iran.
The turning point for this movement will be when working people turn out in mass numbers under their own banners and signs, and begin to challenge the “Islamic Republic” on the basis of their own platform of slogans and demands, not that of Mousavi’s Islamists.
Then the democratic movement will have the power to do more than tinker with the composition of the Guardian Council or the mechanics of the “Islamic Republic.” It will have the means to complete the work begun by the shoras 30 years ago. Then, all that will be lacking is the perspective and political direction to defeat all the currents of Islamism, as well as any organization looking to take control of the movement and turn it in the direction of a pro-Washington “color revolution.”
In our view, that perspective and direction can only come from a communist party, emerging from within the working-class and poor neighborhoods of Iran’s cities and towns, organized and led by Iranian workers themselves.
Thirty years ago, the oil and steel workers were the backbone of the revolutionary-democratic overthrow of the Shah. Today, they can again play that pivotal role; however, in order to do more than repeat the outcome of 1979, the workers of Iran must have a principled and unified hezb-e kargaran-e komunisti (communist workers’ party) they can call their own.