The Philosophy of Self Ownership

[Conza88]

What are the marxists / socialists take on this? Who owns your bodies?

Generally interested in a civil discussion.

Or please point me in the right direction, if it has already - no doubt, taken place? :)

[Demogorgon]

Talking about ownership in relation to human beings is ridiculous. You are yourself and that is that. Ownership only applies when it comes to slavery, so self-ownership is rubbish.

[Kwisatz Haderach]

No one owns your body. It is possible to have a relationship between a person and an object other than the relationship of ownership. Therefore, it is a false dichotomy to imply that an object must be either (a) owned by someone, or (b) free for anyone to use.

You have exclusive rights to use your body, but you do not "own" your body. What is the difference, you ask? Well, for example, ownership of an object implies the right to sell that object. You may not sell* your body.

*Since selling implies giving up all your rights with regard to the object being sold, selling your body means selling yourself into slavery. Prostitution, which does not imply giving up all rights over your body, is in reality a form of renting, not selling.

[Trystan]

It's my body. "Own" sounds too . . . capitalist.

[MikeSC]

Self-ownership, as a concept, was only created as a feeble attempt to justify private property. You'll know the idea- "a person stumbles upon resources that are owned by nobody, labours on it and what he creates are his because it contains both natural material and his own labour-time, and then for some reason the land he worked on is also his".

It's completely arbitrary, and a completely wrong idea of how private property comes into being anyway. It's a silly way to try and make "ownership" sound like something inviolable and natural. But we know that early societies held their land, tools and resources in common, rather than the guesses of Enlightenment philosophers that ownership preceded society. Early man didn't have a concept of ownership, and the ownership we have today certainly isn't, as Locke thought, as a result of self-ownership and ownership of a person's own labour. It's through seizure of natural resources by the state in various forms, resources that no person has the moral right to, which it then distributed to individuals for no moral reason.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

I'm pretty sure that my body and I are the same thing!

[Nwoye]

Generally, socialists (and most non-libertarians) reject the notion that a human being can be "owned" by any entity, themselves or otherwise. Also, property is by nature a triadic relationship, with 1) the owner, 2) the object being owned, and 3) the party recognizing the ownership. In this case, 1 and 2 are the same. Now unless you argue some nonsensical distinction between mind and body, then it's not really a traditional argument for ownership at all, as the object being owned is actually owning itself. It's as if your couch owned itself.

The biggest problem with self-ownership is how it is used to justify private property. Neo-Lockeans argue that the proviso of Locke's original argument was unnecessary (leave enough as good for others), and therefore say that as long as you mix your labor with land, it's yours. They see this form of ownership a natural extension of ownership over the self, as one owns themselves, and therefore their labor, and therefore everything they mix their labor with.

The problem, is that one person or several persons exhibiting their self-ownership can deprive someone else of theirs. For example, if the entire world was owned (suppose legitimately owned, with people mixing their labor). If another person entered the world, they would have no property. They would have nowhere to live, and could only survive if they provided labor to a landowner, in exchange for a place to live (sharecropping). In this sense, could it really be said that that new person actually exclusively owns themselves? G.A Cohen describes self-ownership as such:
each person enjoys, over herself and her powers, full and exclusive rights of control and use, and therefore owes no service or product to anyone else that she has not contracted to supply.
In this instance, could it be said that that new person actually has the exclusive right of control and use over their own powers? or that they owe no service or product to anyone else? of course not. And if you find this example outlandish, then reduce it to an island, or a particular country. If one man owns an entire island, and another person comes upon such an island in a plane crash or what have you, they are in the same situation as that new person in a completely owned world. That person would not have their "right" of self-ownership at all. As Henry George explains:
ROBINSON CRUSOE, as we all know, took Friday as his slave. Suppose, however, that instead of taking Friday as his slave, Robinson Crusoe had welcomed him as a man and a brother; had read him a Declaration of Independence, an Emancipation Proclamation and a Fifteenth Amendment, and informed him that he was a free and independent citizen, entitled to vote and hold office; but had at the same time also informed him that that particular island was his (Robinson Crusoe's) private and exclusive property. What would have been the difference? Since Friday could not fly up into the air nor swim off through the sea, since if he lived at all he must live on the island, he would have been in one case as much a slave as in the other. Crusoe's ownership of the island would be equivalent of his ownership of Friday.

[New Tet]

What are the marxists / socialists take on this? Who owns your bodies?

I only have one body to give, and that I give, such as it is and in varying degrees, to the ones I love.


Generally interested in a civil discussion.

Oh, how disappointing! Just when I was warming up to talk about my body!


Or please point me in the right direction, if it has already - no doubt, taken place? :)

To the door would be my first impulse. But, never mind that! Let's play!

[krazy kaju]

No one owns your body.

So you don't have any mental faculties and you were not able to write that post, correct?


It is possible to have a relationship between a person and an object other than the relationship of ownership. Therefore, it is a false dichotomy to imply that an object must be either (a) owned by someone, or (b) free for anyone to use.

That is a non sequitur. You proved absolutely nothing. Only because you can have a relationship with something that does not involve ownership doesn't mean that everything is either owned or unowned.


You have exclusive rights to use your body, but you do not "own" your body. What is the difference, you ask? Well, for example, ownership of an object implies the right to sell that object. You may not sell* your body.

*Since selling implies giving up all your rights with regard to the object being sold, selling your body means selling yourself into slavery. Prostitution, which does not imply giving up all rights over your body, is in reality a form of renting, not selling.

Again, a non sequitur. Many libertarians agree that you cannot sell yourself into slavery, since self-ownership is not only axiomatic, but when you apply ethical theory to ownership, it becomes evident (to some, at least) that self-ownership is an inalienable right that cannot be contracted out. Only because you cannot sell yourself does not mean that you do not own yourself.

[BobKKKindle$]

The problem with "self-ownership", in addition to the general objection that it has no material basis, is that, if applied consistently, it leads to absurd conclusions. Let's say that a woman enters into a wage-labour contract and, with the money that she receives after having laboured for a set amount of time, decides to buy some sperm, because she wants to have a child. She then impregnates herself with this sperm, and, nine months later, gives birth. If we follow the "self-ownership" line of argument then the woman in question should be able to own her baby, because she has used her body, in combination with something she has acquired through legitimate market transactions, to produce a good, which, Locke would have us believe, should therefore be under her exclusive control. I have not yet encountered anyone who believes that this would be legitimate so the only way you can get out of this rather odd situation is if you acknowledge that there must be exceptions to the consequences that derive from "self-ownership" and the Lockean theory of private property. As soon as you do this, however, you have to deal with the question of why these exceptions should only be limited to the "production" of human beings, when there are also many other cases where not acknowledging the absolute sanctity of private property would result in desirable consequences, from a utilitarian point of view, e.g. being able to take the houses of the rich and distribute them to the homeless.

[Nwoye]

So you don't have any mental faculties and you were not able to write that post, correct?
self-ownership has nothing to do with cognitive ability - it's an attempt by right libertarians to justify natural rights.


Again, a non sequitur. Many libertarians agree that you cannot sell yourself into slavery, since self-ownership is not only axiomatic, but when you apply ethical theory to ownership, it becomes evident (to some, at least) that self-ownership is an inalienable right that cannot be contracted out. Only because you cannot sell yourself does not mean that you do not own yourself.so you're arguing that you can't sell your ownership over yourself to someone else?

[krazy kaju]

self-ownership has nothing to do with cognitive ability - it's an attempt by right libertarians to justify natural rights.

Not at all. The defacto existence of self-ownership has little to do with natural rights.


so you're arguing that you can't sell your ownership over yourself to someone else?

Did I say that I believe that? No.

I have not studied the issue enough to have an opinion on it. I feel rather the same about abortion, though I lean towards being pro-choice. Generally speaking, I think that one can sell oneself, but since self-ownership is simply a fact of existence, the canceling of such a "slave contract" would be easy.

[Fluery]

Let's say that a woman enters into a wage-labour contract and, with the money that she receives after having laboured for a set amount of time, decides to buy some sperm, because she wants to have a child. She then impregnates herself with this sperm, and, nine months later, gives birth. If we follow the "self-ownership" line of argument then the woman in question should be able to own her baby, because she has used her body, in combination with something she has acquired through legitimate market transactions, to produce a good, which, Locke would have us believe, should therefore be under her exclusive control.
No, if you follow the self-ownership argument, the baby owns itself.

[Kwisatz Haderach]

So you don't have any mental faculties and you were not able to write that post, correct?
Huh? Explain that statement.


That is a non sequitur. You proved absolutely nothing. Only because you can have a relationship with something that does not involve ownership doesn't mean that everything is either owned or unowned.
Either I'm reading this wrong, or your logic is faulty. I said A is a sufficient condition for B, where:

A: You can have a relationship with something that does not involve ownership.
B: A good is not necessarily either owned or free for all to use.

And then you said A is not a necessary condition for not-B. Or in other words, not-B does not imply A. Ok, so? To prove me wrong, you would have had to say that not-B does not imply not-A - in other words, that if everything is either owned or free for all to use, that still leaves room for a relationship with something that does not involve ownership. And such a statement is obviously false.


Again, a non sequitur. Many libertarians agree that you cannot sell yourself into slavery, since self-ownership is not only axiomatic, but when you apply ethical theory to ownership, it becomes evident (to some, at least) that self-ownership is an inalienable right that cannot be contracted out. Only because you cannot sell yourself does not mean that you do not own yourself.
It's about time you start defining "ownership" here. In my dictionary, the right to alienate your property is an inherent part of "owning" that property. If this "self-ownership" of yours does not include the right to alienate your self, then I'm not sure what kind of "ownership" you're talking about, and what it implies.

Also, you'd better explain how "you" are somehow separate from your "self." If you own yourself, that means that "you" the owner is not the same as "yourself" the object being owned. How does that work, exactly?

[IcarusAngel]

I once had a Libertarian tell me that self-ownership is "proven" because when we talk about our bodies, we often use possessive terms: my body, my arm, my heart.

By this logic, which obviously doesn't prove anything, labor is the true source of ownership of resources, not capital or anything else. For example, when you work on something in a factory you often say it is "my product" and your are ideas are "my input." So you should thus own what you create, not the capitalist.

All of this ignores the ambiguity of language, but it shows what absurd lengths Libertarians will go to to "prove" their claims. Their "intellectuals" give similar arguments.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

I once had a Libertarian tell me that self-ownership is "proven" because when we talk about our bodies, we often use possessive terms: my body, my arm, my heart.

By that silly logic, I "own" my mother.

[Qwerty Dvorak]

Ownership is a misleading concept in any case. Generally "ownership" simply means a bundle of rights which cumulatively give the beneficiary of the rights such control and enjoyment of the object that we consider him or her to own that object in normal terminology. Obviously people have certain rights and entitlements in their own body, the question is thus whether these rights can collectively be considered tantamount to ownership, which I think they are. After that, the question of whether a person can give away ownership of his or her body depends on what rights of his or her own a person may legitimately alienate to others, and whether the presence of these rights is essential for "ownership" to exist in any meaningful sense.

But as you might guess from the above, talking about self-ownership only unnecessarily complicates matters. It's much better to talk about a person's rights and personal autonomy, and the extent to which that may be abrogated by consent.

[Bright Banana Beard]

I once had a Libertarian tell me that self-ownership is "proven" because when we talk about our bodies, we often use possessive terms: my body, my arm, my heart.

What strange is that in language Spanish, we do not refer our body as "my", but as "the." The tooth, the arm, the heart. This is how it done in Spanish and it is incorrect to use "my." When you describe the pain, in literal English, it is "The tooth is hurting me." It is incorrect to use possessive terms when refers to our body parts.

[trivas7]

The problem with "self-ownership", in addition to the generalobjection that it has no material basis [...]
What else do you mean by "material basis" other than simple "basis in fact"? You particularly revel in Marxist phraseology as if it were endowed w/ mantic powers of explanation.

[EqualityandFreedom]

The self does not exist therefore it cannot be owned, nor is there a self to be the owner of said self.

[BobKKKindle$]

What else do you mean by "material basis" other than simple "basis in fact"? You particularly revel in Marxist phraseology as if it were endowed w/ mantic powers of explanation.I thought it was entirely clear - "material basis" is by no means a Marxist term. The expression "basis of rights" is a common term when discussing human rights. But, to demonstrate my point, let's begin with some questions. Where does the concept of "self-ownership" actually come from? Why is it anything more than an ideological device that libertarians have made up to support their idealist arguments in favour of capitalism? If someone argued that capitalism should be supported because it is the most efficient economic system and guarantees everyone a high standard of living then that would be an acceptable defense because it relates to the material conditions in which people live and identifies the material benefits that would arise from adopting a particular course of action (i.e. living under a capitalist economy), but defending capitalism from a rights-based perspective, based on the notion of self-ownership, is problematic, particularly if capitalism generates problems that would justify the system being overthrown if a utilitarian outlook were adopted, unless you have a prior theory of rights to explain what rights are, where they come from, and why, in the case of self-ownership, this moral concept yields the inviolable right to private property, even at the expense of other people having access to food and shelter.


No, if you follow the self-ownership argument, the baby owns itself. Why? A woman has used a commodity she owns - sperm - and her body to produce something, so why should she not have ownership over that something? More to the point, if you acknowledge that women should not own their children, then not only does that make the theory of "self-ownership" internally incoherent, it also suggests that even you regard human beings as intrinsically valuable, and as deserving of dignity, in which case why do you not also believe that all human beings should be entitled to education, healthcare, shelter - things which would require the "violation" of property rights?

[Nwoye]

I see my lengthy post went unaddressed.

[Kronos]

Who owns your bodies?Whoever has the power to control the fate of it. This power is concealed behind a facade of "ethics", which pretend that such control is not determined by sheer power, but "rational" truths which are the same for everyone...those in power and those who are subject to that power. It is with this mistake that institutions fail to understand the foundation of "rights". Rights are not deserved...they are granted...and to grant something one must have enough power revoke as well.

At this moment I am at war with the law for the right to determine the fate of my body. I am a registered sex offender- I will briefly explain how this happened:

Last year I was homeless, living in my truck. After work one evening I parked in a shopping center parking lot to use an unsecured network to get online and look at some porn....so I could flog my dolphin. It just so happened that I had parked beside a van, which had tinted windows, in which sat three fourteen year old girls. These girls (who I did not see in the van) saw me flogging the dolphin. I was charged with three counts of felonious indecent exposure and three counts of indecent liberties with a minor. SIX felonies. I spent five months in jail waiting to go to court. I was scared into accepting a plea bargain by the DA- they use a tactic called "overcharging", which means they exaggerate the charges on purpose...then offer to drop some if you accept a plea bargain, rather than try to fight it at trial....which would cost the DA time and money. If you do not accept the plea bargain, and choose to fight it, you risk being found guilty and given a maximum sentence. The max I could have gotten was nine years....so I accepted the plea bargain- five years supervised probation with a suspended sentence of 16-20 months in prison. All the while, the "indecent liberties with a minor" were blatant lies...because I NEVER TOUCHED anyone. Of course, in addition to the risk of trying to fight it...I also had a court appointed attorney...and they don't give a shit about anything and aren't worth a fuck.

So here is where I am at today: I MUST maintain a residence or I go to prison. I cannot pay rent if I cannot find a job. Nobody will hire me because I am a registered sex offender, so I have terrible trouble finding work. Landlords don't want to rent to me either. If I end up without a residence, and go to prison, chances are I will have conflict with other inmates...since prison staff love to gossip about new inmates...and are sure to tell them I am a sex offender.

To make a long story short...the system, through its incompetence, has completely fucked me. The corrupt court fries me, then puts me back into society with a burden I cannot possibly bear- nearly impossible demands- the state expects me to maintain a job in a free market society where employers have a right to refuse me employment because I AM A TERRIBLE SEX OFFENDER WHO'S JOHNSON WAS SEEN IN PUBLIC. I have been stigmatized and will remain so for ten years. More or less my life is ruined at this moment, and because of that I am at war with the very system that has sacrificed me. They call it "law and order", I call it pure incompetence.

In order to have the power to control my fate I have to fight against a state that has the power to lock me in a cage. In my case, because the consequences I must conform to are not justified...precisely because the system did not exercise an honest judicial process in my prosecution, the right to my body can only be based on brute power and cunning- nothing "rational", nothing "reasonable", nothing "democratic". To regain control over myself I would have to defect completely from the authority of the state....I would have to "go on the run".

I have become a martyr, a victim of a system which, tested in practice, exhibits absolutely no conscience toward me. I have experienced what has enabled me to see through the facade of "justice" and the democratic institution. It does not exist, and it takes misfortune such as my own to understand this.

This misfortune is ironically fortunate..in a philosophical sense. It has put me above and beyond the average, complacent understanding of "ethics". I get to see the truth from a rare angle....one which most are oblivious to. It is the kind of truth one does not know exists until they "cross over"....and then it becomes clear.

The system will never pay its debt to me for its incompetence. Because this debt will forever exist, the state, as an authority over me, has forfeited its right to have that power. "Law" is completely meaningless to me. I am a vigilante who no longer answers to the law, but to myself.

I no longer waste time with moral philosophy, because there is none.

[Bud Struggle]

I no longer waste time with moral philosophy, because there is none.

I wish you well Kronos. You've been fucked over in classic style.

[Kronos]

My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (its will to power), and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the process goes on--

from The Will to Power, s.636, Walter Kaufmann transl.
[Anything which] is a living and not a dying body... will have to be an incarnate will to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize, become predominant - not from any morality or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will to power... 'Exploitation'... belongs to the essence of what lives, as a basic organic function; it is a consequence of the will to power, which is after all the will to life.

from Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil, s.259, Walter Kaufmann transl. "All truth is simple. Is that not doubly a lie", asked Nietzsche. An appropriate question here. Those who discuss "morals" haven't even yet come into contact with a real question. How then could they possibly find an answer. There are no answers to non-questions- such discussion proceeds like a pantomime, a charade.

The only contempt an immoralist (as myself) can have, and a stretch at that, is the contempt for the liar who lies not for his own advantage, but out of stupidity, out of mindlessness, out of some moral habit...like those Christians who recite commandments; not only are these mores ridiculous...but they aren't even wrong...they can't be...because there isn't even a question here!

Such is the case of society. First, there are no morals...so one cannot be immoral. But when a power pretends it takes power in the name of morals....this, this must be held in contempt.

If you do not yet understand what I mean, perhaps I can explain it this way: I respect honest destroyers, honest tragedy, honest cruelty.

Where there is only the will to power, is can be expressed in one of two ways- honestly and deceitfully.

The "state" is the deceitful expression of this immorality.

[Fluery]

Why? A woman has used a commodity she owns - sperm - and her body to produce something, so why should she not have ownership over that something?
Because that something is a human, and also entitled to self-ownership rights, negating her right to own the products of her labor (note that I am for abortion, because women should have the right to remove anything from their bodies whenever they want)


it also suggests that even you regard human beings as intrinsically valuable, and as deserving of dignity, in which case why do you not also believe that all human beings should be entitled to education, healthcare, shelter - things which would require the "violation" of property rights?
Well first off value is subjective, so while I may value my life, I might not value the lives of others as much.

Just because I might value other humans does not mean that I say theft, which violates others rights, is ok.
Humans aren't entitled to anything - except to be free from initiation of aggression.

I'm sorry if I'm not clearly articulating myself, I'm still thinking about everything.

[nerditarian]

By that silly logic, I "own" my mother.

Although you wouldn't intend this, to clarify no one on here used such arguments and the whole detour onto this topic has really not addressed any of the arguments of Kaju or Conza or that I may make in a few.

[nerditarian]

Generally, socialists (and most non-libertarians) reject the notion that a human being can be "owned" by any entity, themselves or otherwise. Also, property is by nature a triadic relationship, with 1) the owner, 2) the object being owned, and 3) the party recognizing the ownership. In this case, 1 and 2 are the same. Now unless you argue some nonsensical distinction between mind and body, then it's not really a traditional argument for ownership at all, as the object being owned is actually owning itself. It's as if your couch owned itself.

The biggest problem with self-ownership is how it is used to justify private property. Neo-Lockeans argue that the proviso of Locke's original argument was unnecessary (leave enough as good for others), and therefore say that as long as you mix your labor with land, it's yours. They see this form of ownership a natural extension of ownership over the self, as one owns themselves, and therefore their labor, and therefore everything they mix their labor with.

The problem, is that one person or several persons exhibiting their self-ownership can deprive someone else of theirs. For example, if the entire world was owned (suppose legitimately owned, with people mixing their labor). If another person entered the world, they would have no property. They would have nowhere to live, and could only survive if they provided labor to a landowner, in exchange for a place to live (sharecropping). In this sense, could it really be said that that new person actually exclusively owns themselves? G.A Cohen describes self-ownership as such:
each person enjoys, over herself and her powers, full and exclusive rights of control and use, and therefore owes no service or product to anyone else that she has not contracted to supply.
In this instance, could it be said that that new person actually has the exclusive right of control and use over their own powers? or that they owe no service or product to anyone else? of course not. And if you find this example outlandish, then reduce it to an island, or a particular country. If one man owns an entire island, and another person comes upon such an island in a plane crash or what have you, they are in the same situation as that new person in a completely owned world. That person would not have their "right" of self-ownership at all. As Henry George explains:
ROBINSON CRUSOE, as we all know, took Friday as his slave. Suppose, however, that instead of taking Friday as his slave, Robinson Crusoe had welcomed him as a man and a brother; had read him a Declaration of Independence, an Emancipation Proclamation and a Fifteenth Amendment, and informed him that he was a free and independent citizen, entitled to vote and hold office; but had at the same time also informed him that that particular island was his (Robinson Crusoe's) private and exclusive property. What would have been the difference? Since Friday could not fly up into the air nor swim off through the sea, since if he lived at all he must live on the island, he would have been in one case as much a slave as in the other. Crusoe's ownership of the island would be equivalent of his ownership of Friday.


I don't think the definition you provided by G.A Cohen was bad. However, I take issue with your Friday example where you try and draw the comparison between wage labor for the wealth-less and slavery. Friday has the ability to deal with Crusoe as a man, an individual, a sovereign. After such an agreement of labor is stroke he could perhaps bargain the terms of his survival as an equal as opposed to a slave.

[Nwoye]

Friday has the ability to deal with Crusoe as a man, an individual, a sovereign. After such an agreement of labor is stroke he could perhaps bargain the terms of his survival as an equal as opposed to a slave.
But he's not an equal, in this position. He is a man without property, in any form. And his ability to obtain property, rests solely on Crusoe's will. Now if he doesn't want to drown, or starve to death, he must submit to Crusoe's demands. It's true that Crusoe could be a nice dude and give him food and a place to live, but he is in no way obliged to.

According to Cohen's definition, which I think suffices, does Friday enjoy "over herself and her powers, full and exclusive rights of control and use" does she owe "no service or product to anyone else that she has not contracted to supply."? My argument is no - if that's true, then the concept of self-ownership is no way axiomatic, as it is unable to be universalized in this instance.

[BobKKKindle$]

Because that something is a human, and also entitled to self-ownership rights, negating her right to own the products of her labor (note that I am for abortion, because women should have the right to remove anything from their bodies whenever they want)So, we've established that the right to own things that you produce is not absolute - it can be negated under certain circumstances, such as when the rights of other human beings are at stake. If you acknowledge this, then why do you believe that ownership rights should extend to withholding access to food (in addition to other goods that might be seen as necessary for wellbeing, such as shelter and education) and pressuring people to enter into relationships of dependence, given that acting in this way is also detrimental to the lives of others, and is arguably incompatible with human dignity?

I think you'll find that everyone here supports abortion rights. Unlike you, we recognize that winning the battle for reproductive freedom isn't limited to making abortion legal, in the sense of women being able to purchase an abortion without encountering penalties, imposed by the state - we think that if abortion is not free and widely available then the impact of abortion being legal will be limited, particularly for working-class women, who cannot afford to travel long distances and pay for abortions at private clinics. This position is not limited to abortion, it is part of a more general analysis on the nature and preconditions of freedom - you and others who are part of the liberal tradition see freedom as the legal right to do something, whereas we have a broader understanding of freedom that recognizes the importance not only of internal factors (such as fear, and misinformation that can lead to people acting in irrational ways because they are not aware of what is really in their best interests) but also of economic circumstances, in limiting the degree of autonomy that is available to any particular individual, and especially to workers, who are, by definition, forced to sell their labour power in exchange for a wage because they have no other way to survive.


Well first off value is subjective, so while I may value my life, I might not value the lives of others as much.If value is subjective, then what gives me or anyone else an obligation to respect your property rights? Why is it that you and other libertarians see the state taxing private citizens as "immoral", i.e. a case of rights being violated, instead of just something that is not conducive to positive outcomes, measured by a utilitarian calculus, involving criteria such as economic efficiency, and so on?


Just because I might value other humans does not mean that I say theft, which violates others rights, is ok. Where do rights, particularly the right to own private property, come from, in your view? What gives the state an obligation to protect private property when doing so leads to other people being deprived of food?

It would probably be valuable to step back from the particular debate about private property, and rights, and consider a simpler question: what values do we think that political and economic systems should enshrine? In my view, the foremost value that we should be working towards when we think about the desirability of capitalism and the possibility of organizing society on a non-capitalist basis is freedom, because it seems self-evident that freedom is an integral part of our identity as human beings ("man is born free", as Rousseau proclaims, only to assert "everywhere he is in chains" - an accurate description of the failure of capitalism to meet our desire for freedom) such that we need to be free in order to live fulfilling lives that will best allow us to develop our potential and engage in satisfactory relationships with other individuals. Given the prominence of freedom in libertarian discourse, it would seem that libertarians also see freedom as important. The question, then, is how we should go about defining freedom, as simply saying that you happen to be in favour of freedom does not tell us much about the kind of system you support, and your attitude towards the status quo. Which brings us to this:


Humans aren't entitled to anything - except to be free from initiation of aggression. It is clear from this statement that your understanding of freedom is very similar to that of Hobbes. In fact, it might be worth quoting Hobbes, because he conveys his understanding of freedom rather effectively:

"Liberty or Freedome, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean externall Impediments of motion) [...] For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposition of some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further" pp. 145, Leviathan, Penguin Edition

In other words, people can be seen as at liberty insofar as they are not faced with an immediate physical obstacle, especially in the form of the state imposing its will. The problem with this conception is that it treats individuals in the abstract without considering the actual conditions in which people live and the situations they have to deal with as individuals who inhabit a particular position with a class society. Hobbes argues at one point in the course of Leviathan that if an individual is captured in a war and is given the choice of becoming a slave (the slave part is not particularly important for the purposes of this argument, but it reflects the conditions of Hobbes's era, as well as what Hobbes wrote in Leviathan - replace it with "enter into an employment relation" if you like) or being put to death then that individual can still be seen as having made a free and legitimate choice if they decide that they want to become a slave, solely on the basis that they were not faced with an immediate physical impediment, and despite the fact that the alternative - dying, probably in a rather nasty way - is not what most people would regard as a meaningful alternative, given the need to be alive in order to sample life's pleasures. The example described above is relevant because Hobbes inadvertently does a good job of revealing the problems associated with a negative conception of liberty. This is particularly true when we think about the nature of wage-labour, which is a defining component of capitalism. A negative-liberty theorist such as Nozich would have us believe that when somebody decides to sell their labour power to a capitalist then they are entering into a free contract and should be seen as having made a voluntary decision. Hobbes would agree with this.

However, the reality of life under capitalism is rather different - people who own nothing but their labour power are coerced into becoming workers, because if they did not then they would not have any other way to gain an income (particularly if welfare were eliminated, as you wish were the case) and as a result would not be able to purchase food, and all the other things people need to avoid dying, or causing other people to die. Not only are people forced to sell their labour power, they do so on terms that are favorable to the capitalist - because the capitalist can always hire another worker, if it turns out that an individual worker is not happy with the wage and conditions that are offered, and could probably survive for some time without having to hire any workers at all, whereas every worker under capitalism needs to sell their labour power continuously to survive. Understood properly, then, wage-labour is not a voluntary transaction at all, but something into which people are coerced by their economic circumstances, indicating that, in general, the negative conception of liberty is inadequate, and it needs to be recognized by all who admire freedom that not being dependent on others, either in emotional or economic terms, is necessary for someone to be free. It is for this reason that Rousseau (the first philosopher to examine the shortcomings of negative liberty) called for a body politic in which "no citizen should be so opulent that he can buy another, and none so poor that he is constrained to sell himself", and it is in this tradition of liberty that Marxists stand.

[nerditarian]

But he's not an equal, in this position. He is a man without property, in any form. And his ability to obtain property, rests solely on Crusoe's will. Now if he doesn't want to drown, or starve to death, he must submit to Crusoe's demands. It's true that Crusoe could be a nice dude and give him food and a place to live, but he is in no way obliged to.

According to Cohen's definition, which I think suffices, does Friday enjoy "over herself and her powers, full and exclusive rights of control and use" does she owe "no service or product to anyone else that she has not contracted to supply."? My argument is no - if that's true, then the concept of self-ownership is no way axiomatic, as it is unable to be universalized in this instance.

I don't want to argue about whether Friday would be able to reason with Crusoe on a higher level as a tenant than as a slave. And I don't want to argue about whether such monopoly situations would arise on an entirely free market. That's not the main argument. For the sake of debate let's agree to disagree least till a later date and agree to your framing of the argument.

I think she still does have self-ownership and it is able to be universalized here. Just because as a tenant in order to be provided a suitable living condition she must obey whatever rules this landlord, in this case the only one Crusoe, places on her. People who have their rights of self-ownership recognized still get horrible diseases. People who have their rights of self-ownership recognized still fall down stairs. People who have their rights of self-ownership recognized still die painful deaths. And in fact that is the worst case-or one of the worst case scenarios for Friday, right? I'm not saying that bad sh*t doesn't happen with libertarianism only that it is the most moral basis for human affairs. Likewise, I'm sure you hold no Utopian view of leftism either.

Like I said before I don't believe that monopolies such as this are possible sans government intervention or licensing, although I know you do believe that about the free market

[Plagueround]

The way right-libertarians bumble around on this forum retreading the same tired textbook arguments definitely demonstrates a form of "self-ownage"...but not in the way they're thinking.

[Nwoye]

I don't want to argue about whether Friday would be able to reason with Crusoe on a higher level as a tenant than as a slave. And I don't want to argue about whether such monopoly situations would arise on an entirely free market. That's not the main argument. For the sake of debate let's agree to disagree least till a later date and agree to your framing of the argument.
fair enough.


I think she still does have self-ownership and it is able to be universalized here. Just because as a tenant in order to be provided a suitable living condition she must obey whatever rules this landlord, in this case the only one Crusoe, places on her. People who have their rights of self-ownership recognized still get horrible diseases. People who have their rights of self-ownership recognized still fall down stairs. People who have their rights of self-ownership recognized still die painful deaths. And in fact that is the worst case-or one of the worst case scenarios for Friday, right? I'm not saying that bad sh*t doesn't happen with libertarianism only that it is the most moral basis for human affairs. Likewise, I'm sure you hold no Utopian view of leftism either. I genuinely don't understand your argument here. The point of my example was not to show that bad stuff happens in Libertarianism, but rather that in order to universalize self-ownership, there must be some recognition of positive liberty, or positive freedom. I cannot act (claim exclusive rights over my body), without owing something to someone else, unless I have property to do it on. In other words:

"How can I be said to own myself if I may do nothing without the permission of others?"

In my example, Friday is deprived of his "right" to self-ownership, because he cannot act or even exist without the permission of Robinson Crusoe.

Now, the possible resolution of this problem, could be the addition of the original Lockean proviso, that you have to leave land for others when claiming property (so they may have ownership over themselves). However, that would violate the theory of self-ownership, as whenever someone lays claim to property, they automatically owe someone else a service or product - land for that other person to live on.

Because of these problems, and the silliness of something owning itself, self-ownership fails as a theory.


Like I said before I don't believe that monopolies such as this are possible sans government intervention or licensing, although I know you do believe that about the free marketWell why would this scenario not be possible - or rather, why would it not be legitimate according to self-ownership theory. If that original person labored on all of the land when he got there (alone), then it's his, right? That's totally legitimate (according to Neo-Lockeans).

[krazy kaju]

Huh? Explain that statement.

Self ownership is more or less an axiomatic fact, or perhaps a corollary fact to the axiom of human action. The fact that you - and you alone - are able to control your thoughts and your action is proof of your self ownership. Others may influence your thoughts and action, which undoubtedly happens every second, minute, hour, and day. However, you alone are able to control what you do.

Of course, it is possible to lose your self ownership. For example, if you become brain dead, then you obviously lose all of the mental faculties which distinguish you as being wholly self owned.


Either I'm reading this wrong, or your logic is faulty. I said A is a sufficient condition for B, where:

A: You can have a relationship with something that does not involve ownership.
B: A good is not necessarily either owned or free for all to use.

And then you said A is not a necessary condition for not-B. Or in other words, not-B does not imply A. Ok, so? To prove me wrong, you would have had to say that not-B does not imply not-A - in other words, that if everything is either owned or free for all to use, that still leaves room for a relationship with something that does not involve ownership. And such a statement is obviously false.

Here is exactly what you said: It is possible to have a relationship between a person and an object other than the relationship of ownership. Therefore, it is a false dichotomy to imply that an object must be either (a) owned by someone, or (b) free for anyone to use.

The first part of the sentence I fully agree with. It is entirely possible to have a relationship with a person or object other than ownership.

Your conclusion, however, is not built upon your premise. Only because "it is possible to have a relationship between a person and an object other than the relationship of ownership" does not mean that "it is a false dichotomy to imply that an object must be either (a) owned by someone, or (b) free for anyone to use." In logical terms, you're stating:


A
Therefore, C.



To take your argument into the real world, let's consider the relationship we're engaging right now. I do not own you, you do not own me, I don't necessarily own the computer I'm typing on, you don't necessarily own the computer you're typing on, and we both don't own the Internet or this website. Yet, we're engaged in a communicative relationship; we're engaged in a debate. Only because we have some kind of relationship that does not involve ownership does not mean that everything doesn't have to be owned or unowned.

In other words, you're stating that there is a middle ground between owned and unowned, or A and not-A; or at least that is what you said in the statement I quoted. That statement is obviously wrong, since one object cannot be A while being not-A at the same time.


It's about time you start defining "ownership" here. In my dictionary, the right to alienate your property is an inherent part of "owning" that property. If this "self-ownership" of yours does not include the right to alienate your self, then I'm not sure what kind of "ownership" you're talking about, and what it implies.

Also, you'd better explain how "you" are somehow separate from your "self." If you own yourself, that means that "you" the owner is not the same as "yourself" the object being owned. How does that work, exactly?

There is a distinct difference between psychological self-ownership and the concept of inalienable rights. Only because your own yourself does not mean that you are physically or intellectually capable to alienate something from yourself.

Roderick Long explains better than I ever could in libertariannation[dot]org/a/f22l1.html:

One distinctive feature of Virtue Ethics is that, to borrow a distinction from Douglas Den Uyl, it represents a supply-side rather than a demand-side approach to ethics. According to a demand-side ethics, the way that A should treat B is determined primarily by facts about B, the patient of moral activity; but for a supply-side approach like Virtue Ethics, the way that A should treat B is determined primarily by facts about A, the agent of moral activity.
Let's apply this distinction to the special case of justice, that virtue which determines the proper sphere for the use of violence among human beings. My having a right consists, at least primarily, in other people having an obligation to act toward me in certain ways; those others act justly insofar as they respect my rights. The rights-bearer is thus defined as the patient of just activity. A demand-side conception of justice, then, would focus on the rights-bearer; its primary concern would be to determine the features of human beings in virtue of which they possess rights.
It seems to me — though not all Virtue Ethicists agree — that a Virtue Ethics approach should reverse this direction of scrutiny. In questions of justice, the focus should be, not on the person qua moral patient, the bearer of rights, but on the person qua moral agent, the respecter of rights. In other words, from the supply-side perspective of Virtue Ethics, the moral agent's main question in matters of justice should be, not "What it is about other people that requires me to respect their rights?" but rather "What is it about me that requires me to respect the rights of others?"
Virtue Ethicists, particularly those in the Aristotelean tradition, see the aim of the moral life as one that best expresses what it means to be truly human, as opposed to erring on the side of either the subhuman or the superhuman; for example, Aristotle counsels us to live the life of a human being, not the life of a beast or a god. The cowardly, the stingy, the sensualistically self-indulgent, pay too much respect to their animal
side, their vulnerable embodiedness, and neglect the divine spark within them; the rash, the spendthrift, the ascetically self-restrained, pay too little respect to their animal side in their quest to divinize themselves. Only the courageous, the generous, the temperate find the distinctively human path, the Golden Mean between less-than-we-can-be and more-than-we-can-be.
Justice for Humans
How does this apply to justice? Well, just as courage, generosity, and temperance are the virtues that define the appropriately human attitudes toward danger, giving, and bodily pleasures respectively, so the virtue of justice defines the appropriately human attitude toward violence. A maximally human life will give central place to the distinctively human faculty of reason; and one's life more fully expresses this faculty to the extent that one deals with others through reason and persuasion, rather than through violence and force. To choose cooperation over violence is to choose a human mode of existence over a bestial one.
Hence the virtuous person will refrain from initiating coercion against others. But what will the virtuous person's response be to the initiation of coercion on the part of others? In this case, cooperation is not an option, and so the moral agent is not faced with a choice between cooperation and violence. Still, it might be thought that the most human response would be one that forswore self-defense in favor of continuing attempts at persuasion, even in the face of implacable aggression. But this, in my judgment, would make the opposite error from the one the initiator of violence makes; to submit passively to aggression is to try to live a superhuman life, and to value our vulnerable embodiedness too little. Forswear the initiation of violence, but employ violence when necessary to repel the initiatory violence of others; this TIT-FOR-TAT approach seems to me to best strike the Golden Mean balance between the subhuman aggression of the criminal and the superhuman aspirations of the pacifist. Our obligation to abstain from the initiation of coercion translates into a right, on the part of others, not to be aggressed against. On the other hand, since we have no obligation to refrain from self-defense, no right is generated on the part of others to aggress against us. In short, libertarianism. (For more on the issue of self-defense, see my "Punishment vs. Restitution: A Formulation," in Formulations, Vol. I, No. 2 (Winter 1993-94).)
Sticky Rights
So what has any of this got to do with slavery contracts? Well, if a person's rights consist primarily, not in moral facts about the rights-bearer, but in moral facts about other people, then the rights-bearer cannot simply dispose of his or her rights. You cannot, by a simple act of will, release me from my obligation not to coerce you, since that obligation depends on my calling as a human being, something that is not in your control. Hence, on the supply-side conception of justice, no one can divest him or herself of the right not to be coerced. In short, the right to liberty is inalienable.
In forbidding A to sell him or herself into slavery (or, more broadly, any kind of indentured servitude) to B, then, we do not in any way infringe upon A's liberty; for what A is offering to do is to transfer to B the right of decision over A's life and actions; but in fact this right cannot be transferred, as it is not under A's control. Thus A's offer to sell this right is fraudulent; A is trying to sell something that is not hers to sell.
How are Contracts Possible?
One objection that is sometimes raised against the defenders of inalienability is this: If slavery contracts are impermissible, how can any room be made for ordinary contractual obligation? After all, suppose I have contracted with you to perform some service — say, to paint your dog. If I break our contract and refuse to paint your dog, can you — or the law, acting on your behalf — legitimately force me to paint your dog? It seems not. For in ordinary circumstances, forcing me to paint your dog would be a morally unacceptable act of aggression. How can the fact that I agreed to paint your dog make any difference? After all, on the view I've been defending, no mere act of will on my part can free you from your obligation not to aggress against me. But if I cannot legitimately be forced to fulfill my side of the contract, it seems that contracts in general are unenforceable, and so legally void. This seems to present an unpromising prospect for a political philosophy like libertarianism, committed as it is to the free-market economy — which relies so crucially on the principle of contract.
Here I adopt the solution offered by libertarian legal theorist Randy Barnett. Suppose I offer to paint your dog for 200 drakhmas. You give me the 200 drakhmas, whereupon I pocket the money and skip town. On my view, you cannot legitimately force me to paint your dog; that would be involuntary servitude. But you can force me to give back the money; for you only transferred it to me on condition that I paint your dog; since the condition has not been met, the transfer has not gone through, and so I am holding on to your property without your consent. (I also think I can be required to pay you damages, as restitution for the value I have destroyed by depriving you of the use of your money during the intermediate period; for more on restitution, see my article cited above.) Thus, contracts can legitimately be "enforced" in the sense that a person who has received some consideration in exchange for an unperformed service can be required to pay back the consideration. Even "slavery contracts" could be enforced in that sense; for example, if, in exchange for 2000 drakhmas, I agree to do whatever you want, for the rest of my life, then if I ever back out of the contract (which I am free to do at any time), I have to pay you 2000 drakhmas (plus damages) — but I may not legitimately be forced to fulfill the contract. (If I do not presently have the money to pay, then I simply have a debt, like any other.)




Kinsella explains the possibility of slavery in a blog post:

In other words, to say a contract is "impossible" simply refers to whether one of the specified performances or conditions is really possible; and the reason we ask this is to determine the full context, so it can be determined whether or not the apparent intent to transfer title is genuine, or just some kind of non-serious wordplay between the parties who never really meant it. There are a million type of purported "slavery" contracts--or agreements, if you prefer--that you could posit, and I suppose each would have to be analyzed on its own terms to see if it makes sense or is enforceable. From my point of view, an agreement to *do something* cannot be specifically enforced, precisely because one has no power to sell one's body. But it is not because there is some "metaphysical impossibility" involved in "alienating one's will". As I have repeatedly stated, in my view a real, effective slavery relationship requires *only* that the master have the *right* to use force against a recalcitrant slave--*despite* the slave's will. And that simply cannot be done by contract, for reasons i've given before.
But it has nothing to do with impossibility. It has to do with the nature of ownership: ownership means the right to control, and one's right to control one's body is *precisely why* a slavery contract is not enforceable: at the time the master tries to use force against the slave, the slave can refuse to give consent, *because* the slave has the right to control his body. Slavery can only be a consequence of the slave's somehow having lost this right to control. This can be done only if the slave has committed aggression against the master, thereby entitling the master to punish etc. the slave. But "signing a piece of paper" does not commit aggression.
In other words you can make a contract to sell your body, but then you can refuse to enforce said contract and opt instead to recompensate the person who purchased you as a "slave." So in the true sense of the term "slavery," you cannot truly sell yourself into slavery, since you still retain the right to break the "slave" contract. A slave, by definition, does not have this power.

[nerditarian]

Well why would this scenario not be possible - or rather, why would it not be legitimate according to self-ownership theory. If that original person labored on all of the land when he got there (alone), then it's his, right? That's totally legitimate (according to Neo-Lockeans).

So one man mixed his labor with the entire island and every piece of land on it? That's not Rothbardian land theory as I understand it. I can't simply take a coconut from a tree and claim I own it. I have to improve it and mix my labor with it in some way. For example, if I were to convert part of the island into a coconut farm it could be said I acquired ownership of that farm. But what is the likelihood that one man could develop an island the size of the one described in Defoe's book, especially given the technology he had and the time period between his ship wreck and his meeting Friday. Now if he wished to exclude Friday from his fenced-in shin dig near the cave he'd be free to do so. But Crusoe didn't own most of the island and couldn't because it was impossible for one man to civilize all that. And I think if he spent ten years civilizing another part of the island while offering no improvements to his part of the island he'd sacrifice proper ownership, as I see it, over his initial holdings.

Your example is meant to apply, I think, to monopoly capitalism something I think you guys but not us Rothbardians believe in. We believe that monopolies are caused, antithetically, by States' grants of privilege to specific companies not markets qua markets. Hence, no one would be able to say "if you want to live on this continent you have to work for me on my terms" or something like that because his business model would be inefficient and he would quickly die or he would operate better. IANAAE but that's what I believe.

That is why I think your example isn't good. If capitalists were Martians would Marxism be valid?


fair enough.

I genuinely don't understand your argument here. The point of my example was not to show that bad stuff happens in Libertarianism, but rather that in order to universalize self-ownership, there must be some recognition of positive liberty, or positive freedom. I cannot act (claim exclusive rights over my body), without owing something to someone else, unless I have property to do it on. In other words:

"How can I be said to own myself if I may do nothing without the permission of others?"

Ironically, that is the same question us libertarians ask about the State: "How can I be said to own myself if I may do nothing without the permission of others[the State]?"

However, Friday still has self-ownership rights even if he has no property, no food, no clothes and no sense of survival. Just as one can still have car-ownership rights if their car is burnt out and unable to do anything, they can still have self-ownership if their self has no chance of survival or no chance of a decent livelihood.


Because of these problems, and the silliness of something owning itself, self-ownership fails as a theory.

A. I think I adequately addressed those problems, although I'm prepared to continue if you still have disagreements.
B. I fail to see why something owning itself is "silly" qua itself in the sense that libertarians use the word ownership. Let's lose the word "ownership". I've heard that gives you leftist the heebies for some reason ;) . I fail to see why it is "silly" to believe that individuals should have the final decision in their actions. Why where at it why is any idea silly and another valid? What meter are you losing to make this decision? If LTV is wrong, is it silly?

[MikeSC]

I have to improve it and mix my labor with it in some way. For example, if I were to convert part of the island into a coconut farm it could be said I acquired ownership of that farm.

And stop. Haven't you lot thought up some other justification for private property yet?

It's completely arbitrary- and it accounts for 0% of property ownership anyway. The Enlightenment idea that people worked the land, created property, and then created society is one that we know to be false. Land cultivation preceded private property- the earliest societies held land in common. It only became private property after seizure and distribution, and only property as we know it today after a large number of seizures and redistributions.

If your excuse for private property was honest, you would be a communist. It's a silly excuse anyway, completely arbitrary (you would have to deny to other people with equal right to it before you begin cultivating it, and who has the right to decide such rules?)

[IcarusAngel]

There has never been an "unappropriated" piece of property in history. The first forms of property were devised in groups, probably taken from others and certainly borrowed at the expense of the other forms of life on earth, even then, but especially now.

The reason states were created was to attempt to determine who can own the property, and property has been hierarchical ever since.

The only other way to get property according to "misean logic" other than acquiring unappropriated property (which can't exist any more) is by buying it from someone who acquired this "unappropriated" property. But no one has such property.

Thus, ironically, Misians give an argument as to why it would be impossible for anyone to own any "property" of land, and ideas (which are always based on other ideas).

[Misanthrope]

I do not own myself, I am myself.

[trivas7]

I do not own myself, I am myself.
Agreed.

[Nwoye]

So one man mixed his labor with the entire island and every piece of land on it? That's not Rothbardian land theory as I understand it. I can't simply take a coconut from a tree and claim I own it. I have to improve it and mix my labor with it in some way. For example, if I were to convert part of the island into a coconut farm it could be said I acquired ownership of that farm. But what is the likelihood that one man could develop an island the size of the one described in Defoe's book, especially given the technology he had and the time period between his ship wreck and his meeting Friday. Now if he wished to exclude Friday from his fenced-in shin dig near the cave he'd be free to do so. But Crusoe didn't own most of the island and couldn't because it was impossible for one man to civilize all that. And I think if he spent ten years civilizing another part of the island while offering no improvements to his part of the island he'd sacrifice proper ownership, as I see it, over his initial holdings.
by your definition, how can you justify absentee ownership? i mean how can you own real estate or a share in a company if you committed no labor whatsoever towards the cause?


Your example is meant to apply, I think, to monopoly capitalism something I think you guys but not us Rothbardians believe in. We believe that monopolies are caused, antithetically, by States' grants of privilege to specific companies not markets qua markets. Hence, no one would be able to say "if you want to live on this continent you have to work for me on my terms" or something like that because his business model would be inefficient and he would quickly die or he would operate better. IANAAE but that's what I believe.
monopolies could certainly arise in a "free market" with private defense services. i mean why couldn't a larger service claim rights over an extensive piece of land, if they could defend it of course.


Ironically, that is the same question us libertarians ask about the State: "How can I be said to own myself if I may do nothing without the permission of others[the State]?"
well you're the one arguing for self-ownership so this doesn't really apply to me.


However, Friday still has self-ownership rights even if he has no property, no food, no clothes and no sense of survival. Just as one can still have car-ownership rights if their car is burnt out and unable to do anything, they can still have self-ownership if their self has no chance of survival or no chance of a decent livelihood.
how can he? he quite literally cannot exist without the permission of others.


If LTV is wrong, is it silly?
sure. and i'm not going to argue the LTV with you here. start another thread.

[Dimentio]

What are the marxists / socialists take on this? Who owns your bodies?

Generally interested in a civil discussion.

Or please point me in the right direction, if it has already - no doubt, taken place? :)

No one could own a body, since ownership is something which is created by society.

[YKTMX]

As people have noted, the concept of self-ownership is ultimately incoherent and self-referential. Also, if anyone has ever read Cohen's brilliant book, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, they'll have some idea of why the notion, if it persists in the Marxist tradition, poses problems for any possible socialist society. Ultimately, if we want to build a society on which all claims of property have been transcended, then we have to include claims of property over ourselves (and others).

[RGacky3]

No one could own a body, since ownership is something which is created by society.

excactly.

Asking "do you own your body" is like asking "is "your brain a dictator over your body". Its stupid and applying concepts where they don't belong. Ownership is a societal concept, and has nothing to do with identity philosophy.