Liberty Situations

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Firstly, here are some situations dealing with when we might justify infringing on liberty:

1. A child wants to stay out late in a dangerous neighborhood. Can you legitimately force them to come inside?
2. An adult wants to do the same thing. Can you legitimately force them to come inside?
3. An adult has surgery. After the surgery, the painkillers malfunction. The patient tries to remove their bandages, and this could cause considerable harm to them long-term. The patient has signed nothing. Do you restrain them until a dosage of morphine can be administered?
4. An adult has surgery, in the same case, but he signed something allowing you to do nothing in that situation. Do you obey his wishes?

What is the criteria for an action being "in the interests of the person" and when, if ever, can we justify rejecting the liberty of a person?

Secondly, does liberty have value "in spirit?" If so, how can we explain this? By, "in spirit," I mean the following. There exist laws enforcing seat belt use. I would use my seat belt anyway. Does the mere "requirement" diminish my liberty in some form? It seems like it does, but I have not satisfactory way to communicate this. If liberty has value, "in spirit," how much value does it have?

Liberty confuses me to to know end, both positive and negative. I don't know if they are different - they seem different - and I don't know what negative liberty, exactly, is supposed to be.

[dog_jones]

What is the criteria for an action being "in the interests of the person" and when, if ever, can we justify rejecting the liberty of a person?


An action is in the interests of a person if it eases the suffering of that person.

I think when a person lacks the mental capacity to do what is good it is sound to deny a person their right to do as they please. As always, the trouble lies in figuring out what is good.



Secondly, does liberty have value "in spirit?" If so, how can we explain this? By, "in spirit," I mean the following. There exist laws enforcing seat belt use. I would use my seat belt anyway. Does the mere "requirement" diminish my liberty in some form? It seems like it does, but I have not satisfactory way to communicate this. If liberty has value, "in spirit," how much value does it have?


In my view, liberty has no value "in spirit". The only right that a person needs is the right to do what is good. This does not mean that a person should be denied the right to make wrong decisions, but ultimately that doesn't matter. In the example you provide, I expect everyone can agree that wearing your seatbelt is the correct decision. It doesn't matter whether or not a person was denied their right to make the wrong decision (drive without a seatbelt) because they still have the right to do what is morally sound (wear their seatbelt).

It seems the ultimate question being posed here is "Is it okay to deny someone their right to do something that is against the interests of human beings?" My conclusion is that it is acceptable, because you are not infringing on their right to do what is in the interests of humans, and progress can continue unhindered.

[Nils T.]

Negative liberty is when nothing stops you from doing what you want, and positive liberty is when something gives you the power to do what you want.

I absolutely disagree with dog_jones. We can't just hope that the morals used to define what can be legitimately banned and restricted will be progressive or balanced. First, because it is nigh impossible : it supposes that we maintain the current overall state of our philosophical stances (notably those concerning rights and laws), and dog_jones just proved that we can't just eliminate even the most obviously oppressive parts, concerning our lack of rights to put ourselves at risk (for example by not wearing a seatbelt, or by doing drugs in either a recreative or self-destructive manner). Secondly, because the very idea of rights is designed to replace freedom, not to apply it, and accepting it has numerous consequences, ideologically speaking. It encourage sacrifices and the idea of negative liberty, among others old reactionnary concepts; and it put aside the problem of why and how the rights are defined and applied. It also tend to legitimate any authority that ensures the stability of the society so that "progress can continue unhindered". And it allows debate with john rawls supporters...

I propose to reverse this logic. First, refuse every constraint. Secondly, organise the collectivity as a constantly empowering process.
1-2. Enquire if the person knows the dangers and is there in spite of them. If she is, then offer another way of getting what she wants or something better yet. You can't legitimately force her. If she is coerced to be there (for example, she suffer from withdrawal symptoms or is there to work) then you can try to help her to free herself, but only if she is willing to.
3. Since removing the bandages won't ease the pain, the patient is acting out of panic, not out of will (be it right or wrong). You can stop him if you care.
4. If you fear a trial enough, this can be a reason not to stop him. But that's coercion too, so you probably shouldn't consider it.

[mel]

Firstly, here are some situations dealing with when we might justify infringing on liberty:

1. A child wants to stay out late in a dangerous neighborhood. Can you legitimately force them to come inside?
2. An adult wants to do the same thing. Can you legitimately force them to come inside?
3. An adult has surgery. After the surgery, the painkillers malfunction. The patient tries to remove their bandages, and this could cause considerable harm to them long-term. The patient has signed nothing. Do you restrain them until a dosage of morphine can be administered?
4. An adult has surgery, in the same case, but he signed something allowing you to do nothing in that situation. Do you obey his wishes?

What is the criteria for an action being "in the interests of the person" and when, if ever, can we justify rejecting the liberty of a person?

The best criteria I have for all of these situations is: Is the person capable of giving informed consent to continue their dangerous actions?

1. No, they are too young to give informed consent to stay outside in a dangerous neighborhood.

2. Maybe, if the adult is of sound mind, and aware of the risks, they cannot be forced to come inside.

3. No, the painkillers malfunctioning have made the person incapable of giving informed consent to rip off their bandages because their state of mind has been altered.

4. Maybe, was the paper signed while they were of sound mind and aware of the risks? What were the circumstances surrounding the signing of this document? I'm afraid this one needs more information. What behavior specifically would the document prohibit, restraining the person if they are incapable of making decisions after surgery? I don't see why any sane person would sign something that says "don't help me if I go insane and try to hurt myself"...because of this, I think that the scenario might be too unrealistic to come to a philosophical decision about.


Secondly, does liberty have value "in spirit?" If so, how can we explain this? By, "in spirit," I mean the following. There exist laws enforcing seat belt use. I would use my seat belt anyway. Does the mere "requirement" diminish my liberty in some form? It seems like it does, but I have not satisfactory way to communicate this. If liberty has value, "in spirit," how much value does it have?

I don't really see what you're driving at here, but let me address your example. The reason you feel that the "requirement" diminishes your liberty is because as soon as the requirement to do what you were going to do anyway is in place, there are legislated negative consequences attached to the alternative. You were once at liberty to engage in either action, knowing the risks of each option. Now you are only at liberty to wear your seatbelt, the likelihood of the alternative choice has suddenly had an arbitrary increase in the level of risk associated with it. Before, there were only negative consequences if you got into a car accident, which is relatively low probability. Now there are negative consequences if you get into a car accident OR are confronted by a police officer. Your liberty has been infringed upon because there is an arbitrary increase in risk associated with the alternative action.


Liberty confuses me to to know end, both positive and negative. I don't know if they are different - they seem different - and I don't know what negative liberty, exactly, is supposed to be.

It's complex, but to put it simply, Negative liberty is freedom from restrictions on x, Positive liberty is freedom to x. Where x is some action you wish to engage in.

[21st Century Kropotkinist]

Firstly, here are some situations dealing with when we might justify infringing on liberty:

1. A child wants to stay out late in a dangerous neighborhood. Can you legitimately force them to come inside?

This addresses an important issue: are children the property of their parents? The obvious answer to the anti-authoritarian is "No." So, many of us seek a society in which children are viewed as equal and not subordinated, vis-a-vis parents or in any kind of hierarchical family arrangement.

With this said, the real world has nothing to do with that. The child we would let run the streets at 4am, say, has no safety-net; there aren't a bunch of children to show solidarity with this child if a problem arises. Hence, in most cultures, there is a taboo concerning letting children have autonomy. So, if I decide to be a rogue parent and let my kid leave in the middle of the night and someone abducts him because he was the only lone child roaming the streets at night, I think my actions had adverse effects.

In this case, we, I argue, should pick a lesser coercion. It's certainly coercion treating our children like they're property. But the possible alternative involves much more coercion, i.e., the child being abducted. This could go in many different directions, but usually one who kidnaps children does not have good intent. And I would argue the latter kind of coercion is far worse than prohibiting a child to leave the house at 4am.




2. An adult wants to do the same thing. Can you legitimately force them to come inside?

It depends on the adult and the situation, I suppose. If my grandmother wants to go walk around a notoriously dangerous neighborhood at 4am, then I would feel pretty good about my decision to coerce her from the potential worse coercion. Or, say, someone with mental illness who is completely unpredictable wants to do the same thing. Since they could put themselves in a compromising situation, and if one had the ability to prevent them from leaving the house, then one could be preventing (a) them from coercing this person from harming innocent people ( a worse coercion, I would argue), or (b) being coerced themselves by others.

Or say someone is really wasted and you prevent them from leaving because you know they'll drive or could hurt someone because of whatever drug they used. I would say this kind of coercion is certainly justified. If we can avoid the person from leaving the house, driving, and running into a traveling group of 6 on the road, then the coercion of sorts justifies the person staying inside.


3. An adult has surgery. After the surgery, the painkillers malfunction. The patient tries to remove their bandages, and this could cause considerable harm to them long-term. The patient has signed nothing. Do you restrain them until a dosage of morphine can be administered?

I think that this is justified in cases in which the patient would show complete incoherence. I mean, it's the same way people in families with someone who has alzheimers take care of their family, and respond not to requests, but assumptions for as to what is best for the individual with alzheimers. In an absolutist stance, this is coercive. Hell, so is keeping the KKK out of your backyard, but that is what most of us would do.

If a person knows what is going on and is completely aware of the circumstances, ultimately, they are a sovereign over their own body. However, if the person is heavily drugged or has a brain injury or other debilitating cognitive problem, then I would argue that the person that prevents them from removing the bandage is doing them a favor.



4. An adult has surgery, in the same case, but he signed something allowing you to do nothing in that situation. Do you obey his wishes?

I would make a judgment call and try to save someone's life. If I felt like the person's life was in jeopardy, I would do everything in my power to save them. This means at times I may even have to coerce said individual in order to keep them healthy. If a woman was hit by a car and stuck and she utters "Leave me. Leave me” I would think most people would ignore her request. Most people would, at the very least, call 911. And many people would do what they could to get the car off of the suffering woman.


What is the criteria for an action being "in the interests of the person" and when, if ever, can we justify rejecting the liberty of a person?

I don’t think we’re liberating the mentioned hypothetical child that gets abducted if we let them leave the house at 4am; the same goes for the completely hammered person that we could prevent from leaving, getting in her car, and killing someone. I think you’re asking the important question of when an authoritarian hierarchy is justified. Well, I think there are rare occasions. This is an example that Chomsky often uses: if you’re walking down the street with your 3 year old child (or any 3 year old), you would grab the child so as to prevent them from running into oncoming traffic. Another (albeit silly) hypothetical situation would be that one person has the ability to save one million people from being executed, say. However, that person refuses to save the one million people from being executed. I think the justification is valid to coerce that one person into saving the one million people. In both cases, if we allowed an absolutist stance on liberty, then the child would be dead, as well as the hypothetical one million people. I know these are kind of cliché examples, but I think they both illustrate examples where libertarians must justify a lesser-evil coercion. I think it’s an axiom or self-evident that the libertarian has to do this at times, but some may disagree.


Secondly, does liberty have value "in spirit?" If so, how can we explain this? By, "in spirit," I mean the following. There exist laws enforcing seat belt use. I would use my seat belt anyway. Does the mere "requirement" diminish my liberty in some form? It seems like it does, but I have not satisfactory way to communicate this. If liberty has value, "in spirit," how much value does it have?

I think the seatbelt thing is tricky. So, most people want all cars to be manufactured with seatbelts; I think the corporations should be forced to do this or they should cease to be (well, I think they should be democratically dismantled anyway, but that is a different topic). Also, if someone else has my child in their car, I do think they should be coerced into making sure my child wears their seatbelt. But as far as power structures enforcing safety, well, this is a slippery slope. So, individual x that does not wear his seatbelt and dies does not affect me, per se. Same goes with hard drugs. Of course this is unjust coercion for the State to prohibit citizen’s personal drug use that does not affect others. Second-hand smoke is tricky, because it certainly has adverse affects for other people around the smoker. So, personal decisions that do not affect others should not be impinged upon. That said, I would choose the lesser-evil coercion if someone wanted to smoke a cigarette in my house or if my kid didn’t want to wear their seatbelt. And I wouldn’t feel contradictory about this as an anti-authoritarian.