Empiricism, rationalism and idealism

[GracchusBabeuf]

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[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I'm not confident in my answers. Here is my attempt:

1. Rationalism states reason determines truth deductively. Idealism states that truth comes from the mind. I'd say it's possible, but I can't think of anyone who holds this view.

All truths would come from the mind, and the mind is reason and metaphysical. This might be some sort of monist belief in reason as a non-physical qualia that determines the truth of everything matter-of-fact contingent on the existence of a soul. I'm patronizing this theoretical view. It may have decent adherents. Rosa tends to know her enemies better than I do. She might have a better answer if she comes across this thread.

2. Technically, I'd say no. Neutral monism is an attempt to reconcile the empiricist and idealist dilemmas. It's probably not right to say they are both empiricist and idealist, though. That philosophy is meant to diffuse the dilemma.

3. I'm not familiar with the terminology there. Do you have an article or an example of philosophers associated with each idea?

4. Not sure the best way to answer that question.

5. Marx is more of an empiricist, according to him. He tends to operate on the view things can be objectively the case, and this leads him to his systematic thinking about inevitability, et cetera.

6. Marx seems to like skepticism as it leads to a critique of the capitalist system, but he ultimately wants people to do something rather than simply be skeptical. Dogmatism is only dogmatism is it isn't empiricist. Dogmatism about reality isn't actually dogmatism, as I see Marx's view. To be fair, this is the view many scientists and educated people hold. I'm not sure it can be dismissed outright, but I don't adhere to it.

[mikelepore]

In mainstream philosophy (college Philosophy 101), George Berkeley is usually called an idealist type of empiricist. While holding that sense impressions are most important, he believed that there's no evidence that a physical world exists. I guess, in modern terms, he would be said to have a "brain in a vat" kind of hypothesis.

[Invariance]

Yes, numerous empiricists were idealists, George Berkeley being the most well known example. Most empiricists (it depends upon what school we are talking about) make no claim about their being an 'objective reality' which humans can read - their very empiricism marks out how inadequate experience is - which is why some have turned to a wholly idealistic views to explain anything - e.g. God or 'human nature'. However, some, like Hume, also influenced people like Adam Smith, who influenced Marx on the matter of historical materialism...Regarding scepticism, Marx's motto was 'doubt everything.' I don't think Marx said that things can be 'viewed objectively' (I'm not sure even what this means), nor am I aware of him having a 'systematic thinking about inevitability' - few of Marx's theories argue that something is inevitable, most of them point out numerous dynamics, for example, how capitalists can increase profits by either extending the working day, reducing wages, increasing absolute or relative surplus capital, the dynamic of workers struggling against this, the role of machinery, cooperation, division of labour etc - some can be varied whilst others remain constant, all can vary, some can vary and cancel out another's effect etc. Edit: okay, Mikelepore already raised Berkeley. Another point on empiricism - depends on what definition you use, most use it in the sense that knowledge comes from experimentation and observation. The point that philosopher's like Hume made, was that for all the good that observation did it still couldn't explain why something happened --- the problem of induction.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Socialist -- all forms of traditional philosophy (rationalist, empiricist, phenomenalist, etc.) are different forms of idealism.

I have outlined the reasons for saying this here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1408653&postcount=46

But in extensive detail here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm