Metaphysics

[RomuliousRevolution]

I've noticed that in some debates poster snap on each other for making "metaphysical" statements.

So here are my questions;
A) What is metaphysics?
B) Why are communists against it?


Romulious

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Marxists (following Hegel and Engels) in general view metaphysics in a different way from the vast majority of other theorists. The former describe it as a system of thought that ignores change, and which views objects as fixed and determined once and for all. [Yes, I know it makes little sense, but I am one of the few Marxists who do not follow Hegel here.]

This is a very narrow view, and would rule out the vast majority of metaphysical systems.

The word itself was introduced by an editor of Aristotle's works who named one of the latter's books 'After Physics', since it seemed to follow his book on Physics, and 'after physics' translated out as 'Metaphysics'.

It is not easy to say exactly what metaphysics is, since different theorists will define it differently, but perhaps the best characterisation of metaphysics is the study of the fundamental nature of reality. This includes the nature of existence, time and space, the nature and existence of 'god', the soul and the after-life. It also includes the nature and status of knowledge, matter, force, the past, present and future...

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/

I have summarised the main problems faced by any form of metaphysics in another thread. When I find that thread, I'll post a link.

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Ok, here it is (but it's not easy -- I'll explain why at the end):


This is in fact part of my Summary of Essay Twelve Part One (link at the end):


Consider a typical philosophical thesis:

M1: To be is to be perceived.

Contrast this with a typical empirical proposition (i.e., one about matters of fact):

M2: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital

The seemingly profound nature of theses like M1 is linked to rather more mundane features of the language in which they are expressed: that is, to the fact that the main verb they use is almost invariably in the indicative (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammatical_mood) mood.

[Sometimes, the latter is beefed-up with subjunctive and/or modal qualifying terms (such as 'must', 'necessary', etc. -- which, incidentally, helps create even more of a false impression.]

Now, this apparently superficial grammatical facade hides a deeper logical form -- several in fact. This is something which only becomes plain when such sentences are examined more closely.

As noted above, expressions like M1 look as if they reveal deep truths about reality since they resemble empirical propositions; in the event, however, they turn out to be nothing at all like them.

To see this, consider again an ordinary empirical proposition:

T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.

Compare this with these similar-looking indicative sentences:

T2: Time is a relation between events.

T3: Motion is inseparable from matter.

In order to understand T1, it is not necessary to know whether it is true or not.

However, the comprehension of T2 and T3 goes hand-in-hand with knowing either or both are true (or, conversely, knowing either or both are false). The truth or falsehood of T2 and T3 thus follows from the meaning of certain words (or from certain definitions -- i.e., from yet more words).

more words; no evidence is required.]

This now intimately links the truth status of T2 and T3 with meaning, but not with material confirmation/facts, and hence not with a confrontation with reality. Their truth-status is independent of and anterior to evidence.

In contrast, understanding T1 is independent of its confirmation or refutation -- indeed, it would be impossible to confirm or refute T1 if it had not already been understood.

Empirical propositions are typically like this; they have to be understood first before they can be confronted with the evidence that would establish their truth-status. In contrast, metaphysical propositions carry their truth/falsehood on their face, as it were.

So here, we have two sorts of indicative sentences, each with a radically different 'relation' to 'reality'.

Understanding the first sort (i.e., those like T1) is independent of their truth-status, whereas their actual truth or falsehood depends on the state of the world.

In the second case (i.e., those like T2 or T3), their truth or falsehood is not dependent on the state of the world, but follows solely from the meaning of the words they contain (or on those that feature in the argument from which they were 'derived'). To understand them is ipso facto to know they are true.

Indeed, metaphysical theses (like T2 and T3) are deliberately constructed to transcend the limitations of the material world (plainly because they relate to a 'hidden world' underlying 'appearances'), which condition is excused on the grounds that it allows the aspiring metaphysician to uncover the "underlying essences" in this 'hidden world', revealing nature's "secrets", the whole process based on thought alone. Theses like these are "necessarily true" (or "necessarily false"), and are said to express knowledge of fundamental aspects of reality (inaccessible to the senses), unlike empirical propositions whose truth depends on the vagaries of experience. Traditionally, this meant that empirical propositions like T1 were considered to be incapable of revealing genuine knowledge. In contrast "philosophical knowledge" (which supposedly reveals underlying and absolute certainties) has always been derived from T2 or T3-type sentences, which are necessary, a priori, non-contingent, generated by thought alone, and confirmed by thought alone.

Metaphysical propositions thus masquerade as especially profound super-empirical truths which cannot fail to be true (or cannot fail to be false, as the case may be). They do this by aping the indicative mood --, but they go way beyond ordinary indicative sentences. What they say does not just happen to be this way or that, as is the case with ordinary empirical truths -- these propositions cannot be otherwise. The world must conform to whatever they say; this is the opposite of ordinary turths, which have to conforn to the way the world actually is to be true. Indeed, this accounts for the frequent use of modal terms (like "must", "necessary" and "inconceivable") in metaphysical propositions.

Conversely, if anyone were to question the truth of T1, the following response: "Tony Blair must own a copy of Das Kapital" would be highly inappropriate -- unless, perhaps, T1 itself were the conclusion of an inference, such as: "Tony Blair told me he owned a copy, so he must own one", or it was based on a direct observation statement. But even then, the truth or falsehood of T1 would depend on an interface with material reality at some point.

In the latter case, reality would be dictating to us whether what we said was true or false. We would not be dictating to nature what it must contain, or what it must be like, as metaphysicians have always done.

Hence, with respect to T2 and T3, things are radically different; the second option above applies, for their truth/falsehood can be determined independently and in advance of the way the world happens to be. In this case, it seems that the essential nature of reality can be ascertained from words alone. Such Super-Truths (or Super-Falsehoods) are derived solely from the alleged meaning of the words contained in sentences like T2 and T3 (or from the 'concepts' they supposedly express). In that case, once understood, metaphysical propositions like T2 and T3 guarantee their own truth or their own falsehood. which means evidence is unnecessary. They are thus true a priori (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_priori_and_a_posteriori_(philosophy)).

So, to understand a metaphysical thesis is to know it is true or (to know it is false, as the case may be). That is why, to their inventors metaphysical propositions appear to be so certain and self-evident. Questioning them seems to run against the grain of our understanding, not of our experience. Indeed, they appear to be self-evident precisely because they need no evidence to confirm their truth-status; indeed, they provide their own evidence, and testify on their own behalf. Their veracity follows from the alleged meaning of the words they contain. They, not the world, guarantee their own truth (or falsehood).

Unfortunately, this divorces such theses from material reality, since they are true or false independently of any apparent or conceivable state of the world.

In that case, any thesis that can be judged true or false on conceptual grounds alone cannot feature in a materialist account of reality, only an Idealist one.

This might seem to be a somewhat dogmatic statement to make, but as we shall see, the opposite view is the one that is dogmatic, since it is based on a ruling-class view of reality (and on one whose validity is not sensitive to any sort of empirical test), but which collapses into incoherence when examined closely.

The paradoxical nature of metaphysical theses illustrates the ineluctable slide into non-sense that all theories undergo whenever their proponents try to undermine either the vernacular or the logical and pragmatic principles on which it is based -- those which, for example, ordinary speakers regularly use to state contingent truths or falsehoods about the world without such rigmarole.

However, intractable logical problems soon begin to emerge (with regard to such putatively indicative, but nonetheless metaphysical, sentences) if an attempt is made to restrict or eliminate one or other of the paired semantic possibilities associated with ordinary empirical propositions: i.e., truth and falsehood.

This occurs, for example, when an apparently empirical proposition is declared to be only true or only false (or, more pointedly, 'necessarily' the one or the other) -- as a "law of cognition", perhaps -- or, more likely, when a 'necessary' truth or falsehood is mis-identified as a particularly profound sort of empirical thesis.

As we will soon see, this tactic results in the automatic loss of both semantic options, and with that goes any sense that the original proposition might have had, rendering it incomprehensible.

This is because empirical propositions leave it open as to whether they are true or false; that is why their truth-status cannot simply be read-off from their content, why evidence is required in order to determine this status, and why it is possible to understand them before their truth or falsehood is known. If that were not so, it would be impossible to ascertain their truth or falsehood. [How could you proceed if you do not undersatnd what to look for?]

When this is not the case -- i.e., when either option (truth or falsehood) is closed-off, and when propositions are said to be "necessarily true" or "necessarily false" -- evidence clearly becomes irrelevant. Thus, whereas the truth or falsehood of an empirical proposition cannot be ascertained on linguistic, conceptual or semantic grounds alone, if the truth or falsehood of a proposition is capable of being established solely on the basis of such structural factors (i.e, on meaning alone), that proposition cannot be empirical.

If, however, such propositions are still regarded (by those who propose them) as truths (or Supertruths) about the world, about its "essence", then they are plainly metaphysical.

Otherwise the truth or falsehood of such propositions would be world-sensitive, not solely meaning-, or concept-dependent. And that explains why the comprehension of metaphysical propositions appear to go hand in hand with knowing their 'truth' (or their 'falsehood') -- they are based on features of thought/language, not on the material world. This means that they cannot be related to the material world or on anything in it -- and hence they can't be used to help change reality.

Of course, it could always be claimed that such 'essentialist' thoughts 'reflect' the world.

But, if thought 'reflects' the world, it would be possible to understand a proposition that allegedly expressed such a reflected thesis in advance of knowing whether it was true or false, otherwise confirmation in practice, or by comparing it with the world, would become an empty gesture.

And yet, on the other hand if its truth could be ascertained from that proposition/'thought' itself (i.e., if it were "self-evident"), then plainly the world drops out of the picture, which just means that that 'thought'/proposition cannot be a reflection of the world, whatever else it is.

Another odd feature of metaphysical theses is also worth underlining: since the truth-values of defective sentences like these are plainly not determined by the world, they have to be given a truth-value by fiat. They have to be declared "necessarily true" or "necessarily false", and this is plainly because their truth/falsehood cannot be derived from the world, and hence with which they cannot now be compared.

Or, more grandiloquently, their opposites have to be pronounced "unthinkable" by a sage-like figure: a Philosopher of some sort.

Metaphysical decrees like this are as common as dirt in traditional thought.

Isolated theses like these have necessary truth or falsehood granted them as a gift. Instead of being compared with material reality to ascertain their truth-status, they are derived solely from, or compared with other related theses (or to be more honest, they are merely compared with yet more jargon) as part of a terminologically-driven gesture at 'verification'. Their bona fides are thus thoroughly Ideal, and 100% bogus.

The normal cannons which determine when something is true or false (i.e., a comparison with reality) have to be set aside, and a spurious 'evidential' ceremony substituted for it -- or, if it is carried out in advance, it is performed in the head as a sort of 'thought experiment', or as part of a very hasty and superficial consideration of the 'concepts' involved.

As far as traditional Philosophy (Metaphysics) is concerned, we know this is precisely what happened as the subject developed; philosophers simply invented more and more jargon, juggled with obscure terminlogy, and thus derived 'truths' from thought/words alone.

But, none of these truths can be given a sense, no matter what is done with them; in that case, they are all non-sensical.

This, of course, illustrates why Marx said:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels, (1970) The German Ideology, p.118.]

Now, there is a reason why traditional theorists attempted to derive 'truths' from thought alone. I have already summarised this reason; here it is again:


This traditional way of seeing reality taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

And this is why all of traditional philosophy is dogmatic, and thus non-sensical.

Now the reason why this traditional approach to 'philosophical truth' has dominated 'western' (and 'eastern') thought for 2500 years was outlined by Marx, too:


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an 'eternal law.'" [Marx and Engels (1970), pp.64-65.]

And we can see this form of thought still dominating the thinking of comrades here, at RevLeft -- all of whom think it perfectly ordinary/acceptable to try to derive profound theses about 'The self', or 'consciousness' from a few (jargonised/distorted) words, or from a few minutes superficial thought. [In contrast, scientific research takes years of intense effort, and copious amounts of evidence, to perfect.]

There is in fact a sociological reason for this univeral and ubiquitous intellectual habit (of trying to derive truths from thought alone), and why it afflicts the vast majority of human beings: it is based on ideas Feuerbach rehearsed 160-odd years ago --, but I have said enough already.

These ideas are worked out in extensive detail, and defended in depth here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm

Traditional Philosophy has been dominated by metaphysics and metaphysical ways of thinking for over 2500 years, but it contains fatal weaknesses that have escaped the notice of some of the greatest minds in human history. Hence, an outline of these errors cannot be other than difficult. However, I have tried to make the above as easy as possible to follow. If you are still not sure, let me know. [My ability to respond to you is rather limited at the moment, since I am away from home right now, and am using a friend's computer!);