What is the diference between Marxist and Pragmatic epistemology?

[heiss93]

Marxist and Pragmatic epistemology seem pretty similar in the criteria that "truth" must be judged by its interaction with the material world. In a sense what is useful is fact. Engels' answer to Kant's thing-in-itself is similar to how pragmatists would answer it. Marx's Thesis and Mao's On Practice are both very pragmatic. The only exception would be Lenin's Empirocriticism, which pushes for objective scientific truth. Sidney Hook tried to reconcile them, while the CPUSA published Pragmatism: philosophy of imperialism.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

In view of the fact that neither version works (pun intended), any differences (if there are any), or similarities (ditto) are irrelevant.

[Buffalo Souljah]

How do you mean that neither 'works'? Pragmatism seems to believe that 'what is practical' is true, and in so far as this is proposed, there seems to be no lack of 'use' for that formulation. I disagree fundamentally with their notiton of the 'spiritual' effects of beliefs on people, but I don't understand how you came to the conclusion that they don't 'work'.


Many philosophers would agree with James that we have a right to hypothesize and to adopt self-fulfilling beliefs without evidence; James, however, extends this idea to argue that, using this doctrine, adopting beliefs like God (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God), freewill (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freewill), possibility (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possibility), and morality (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morality) would cause evidence to come into existence, thus verifying beliefs that could not have been verified otherwise. James' rationale for this more controversial idea is in combining it with his pragmatic theory of truth (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth), the idea that a belief is verified if it causes better interaction with the world. For example, while one may have some doubts as to the existence of God (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God), the adoption of such a belief as a hypothesis, even without finding evidence to remove all doubt, would cause one to succeed better in the world, thus verifying the belief.I think this portion of James' and others' philosophies is pure rubbish, since, ultimately, immaterial 'affects', like a belief in God, have no practical bearing upon any decisions that are made by an individual: eg. an individual will only be affected to act 'differently' in a situation (and we have to scrutinize our use of 'difference' here) if he believes in a certain kind of God, ie. a judgmental, personal God who has an active role in the world. Otherwise, one still has to wreste with the notion of free will. I'm trying to work this out correctly in my head, and I'm starting to think James' putting pen to paper was a mistake...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

George Bush:


How do you mean that neither 'works'? Pragmatism seems to believe that 'what is practical' is true, and in so far as this is proposed, there seems to be no lack of 'use' for that formulation. I disagree fundamentally with their notion of the 'spiritual' effects of beliefs on people, but I don't understand how you came to the conclusion that they don't 'work'.

Well, much that works is not true, and much that is true does not work, so practice is not a safe guide to truth.

Incorrect theories often make successful (practical and theoretical) predictions -- as, for example, Ptolemy's system did for many centuries. In fact, the allegedly superior Copernican system was no more accurate than the older theory had been. Indeed, Ptolemy's system was refined progressively in line with observation for over a thousand years, and it became more accurate as a result. Despite that, it was no nearer to what we might now regard as the 'truth'.

And, correct theories can sometimes fail, and they can do so for many years. For instance, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which was not observed until 1838 with the work of Friedrich Bessel, three hundred years after Copernicus's book was published.

More importantly, according to Relativity theory, the Copernican system is no more 'true' than the Ptolemaic was.

On this, Robert Mills had this comment to make:


"Another way of stating the principle of equivalence, a way that better reflects its name, is to say that all reference frames, including accelerated reference frames, are equivalent, that the laws of Physics take the same form in any reference frame…. And it is also correct to say that the Copernican view (with the sun at the centre) and the Ptolemaic view (with the earth at the centre) are equally valid and equally consistent!" [Mills (1994), pp.182-83.]



And this is what Fred Hoyle had to say:


"Instead of adding further support to the heliocentric picture of the planetary motions the Einstein theory goes in the opposite direction, giving increased respectability to the geocentric picture. The relation of the two pictures is reduced to a mere coordinate transformation and it is the main tenet of the Einstein theory that any two ways of looking at the world which are related to each other by a coordinate transformation are entirely equivalent from a physical point of view....

"Today we cannot say that the Copernican theory is 'right' and the Ptolemaic theory 'wrong' in any meaningful physical sense...." [Hoyle (1973), pp.78-79.]


"We now know that the difference between a heliocentric theory and a geocentric theory is one of relative motion only, and that such a difference has no physical significance. But such an understanding had to await Einstein's theory of gravitation in order to be fully clarified." [Hoyle (1975), p.416.]

Similarly, Max Born commented:


"Thus from Einstein's point of view Ptolemy and Copernicus are equally right. What point of view is chosen is a matter of expediency. For the mechanics of the planetary system the view of Copernicus is certainly the more convenient. But it is meaningless to call the gravitational fields that occur when a different system of reference is chosen 'fictitious' in contrast with the 'real' fields produced by near masses: it is just as meaningless as the question of the 'real' length of a rod...in the special theory of relativity. A gravitational field is neither 'real' nor 'fictitious' in itself. It has no meaning at all independent of the choice of coordinates, just as in the case of the length of a rod." [Born (1965), p.345. I owe this reference to Rosser (1967).]

Of course, it could always be claimed that Copernican theory is simpler than the Ptolemaic system, but until we receive a clear sign that nature works according to our notion of simplicity (or cares a fig about it), that argument won't wash.

Similarly, Darwin's theory of descent through modification made predictions that were at variance with patently obvious facts: the persistence of inherited variations. The latter were inconsistent with Darwin's own "blending" theory of transmission. Given Darwin's account, new and advantageous variations should be blended out of a breeding population, not preserved or enhanced. It was not until the advent of genetically-based theories of inheritance forty or so years later that Darwin's theory became viable.

Moreover, this new synthetic theory did not achieve success by preserving anything from the old blending theory (and, because of that fact, this defunct theory cannot be seen as an approximation to the 'truth', toward which later developments more closely inched this theory). Indeed, because of the difficulties his ideas faced, Darwin found he had to incorporate Lamarckian concepts into later editions of his classic book in order to rescue his theory. Hence, in the period between, say, 1865 and 1900 there were good reasons to reject Darwinism (as many serious biologists did). This means that the development of the most successful theory of the 19th century (and one of the most successful ever) actually contradicts the pragmatic accounts of truth, by making incorrect predictions.

Furthermore, some theories can make both successful and unsuccessful predictions. Consider the 'contradictions' between Newtonian Physics and observation -- those that prompted both the discovery of Neptune and the 'non-discovery' of the planet Vulcan:


"The arguments which terminate in an hypothesis's positing the existence of some trans-Uranic object, the planet Neptune, and the structurally identical arguments which forced Leverrier to urge the existence of an intra-Mercurial planet, the planet 'Vulcan', to explain the precessional aberrations of our 'innermost' solar system neighbour are formally one and the same. They run: (1) Newtonian mechanics is true; (2) Newtonian mechanics requires planet P to move in exactly this manner, x, y, z, …; (3) but P does not move à la x, y, z; (4) so either (a) there exists some as-yet-unobserved object, o, or (b) Newtonian mechanics is false. (5) 4b) contradicts 1) so 4a) is true -- there exists some as-yet-undetected body which will put everything right again between observation and theory. The variable 'o' took the value 'Neptune' in the former case; it took the value 'Vulcan' in the latter case. And these insertions constituted the zenith and the nadir of classical celestial mechanics, for Neptune does exist, whereas Vulcan does not." [Hanson (1970), p.257.]

[More details in Hanson (1962). There are many other examples like this in the history of science.]

It could be objected to this that these examples clearly ignore wider and/or longer-term issues. In the first case, the Ptolemaic system was finally abandoned because it proved inferior to its rivals in the long run. The same applies to Darwin's theory, which when combined with Mendelian genetics, is closer to the truth, something that is also true of Newtonian Physics, which has been superseded by the Theory of Relativity.

All this is undeniable, but the above response is unfortunately double-edged: if it is only in the long run that we may determine whether or not a theory as successful, then that theory might never be so judged. This is because future contingencies could always arise to refute that theory -- no matter how well it might once have seemed to 'work'. In fact, if history is anything to go by, this has been the fate of the vast majority of previous theories. Even though most, if not all, at one time 'worked', or were well-supported, the overwhelming majority were later abandoned. As Stanford notes:


"...[I]n the historical progression from Aristotelian to Cartesian to Newtonian to contemporary mechanical theories, the evidence available at the time each earlier theory was accepted offered equally strong support to each of the (then-unimagined) later alternatives. The same pattern would seem to obtain in the historical progression from elemental to early corpuscularian chemistry to Stahl's phlogiston theory to Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry to Daltonian atomic and contemporary physical chemistry; from various versions of preformationism to epigenetic theories of embryology; from the caloric theory of heat to later and ultimately contemporary thermodynamic theories; from effluvial theories of electricity and magnetism to theories of the electromagnetic ether and contemporary electromagnetism; from humoral imbalance to miasmatic to contagion and ultimately germ theories of disease; from 18th Century corpuscular theories of light to 19th Century wave theories to contemporary quantum mechanical conception; from Hippocrates's pangenesis to Darwin's blending theory of inheritance (and his own 'gemmule' version of pangenesis) to Wiesmann's germ-plasm theory and Mendelian and contemporary molecular genetics; from Cuvier's theory of functionally integrated and necessarily static biological species or Lamarck's autogenesis to Darwinian evolutionary theory; and so on in a seemingly endless array of theories, the evidence for which ultimately turned out to support one or more unimagined competitors just as well. Thus, the history of scientific enquiry offers a straightforward inductive rationale for thinking that there are alternatives to our best theories equally well-confirmed by the evidence, even when we are unable to conceive of them at the time." [Stanford (2001), p.9.]

[See also Stanford (2000, 2003, 2006a, 2006b), and Lyons (2002, 2003).]

So, if anything, [I]practice shows that practice is unreliable!

Furthermore, if it is only in the long run that superior theories win out, or can be seen to be superior, then for most of the time inferior theories could make (and have made) successful predictions. In that case, we would have no way of telling the good from the bogus for most of the time.

Once more, the reason for saying this is that pragmatic theories are eternal hostages to fortune. Because of that, those who appeal to practice as a test of truth should feign no surprise when future contingencies fail to match repeatedly dashed expectations.

These comments were taken from two of my essays, where more details about the above references can be found.

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_02.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm

[Calmwinds]

Rosa, then what would you add as additional criteria, other than merely just practice?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

It's up to scientists to decide, not me.

All I can do is help clear up the mess, if they make any.

[Buffalo Souljah]

Rosa, then what would you add as additional criteria, other than merely just practice?

Well, as far as we know as applied to the empirical sciences (which are such by their nature), induction is the only means by which we can and have arrived successfully at any ground of reasoning. To appeal to anything else is either mysticism or some form of Platonist thinking.

Now, on to Rosa's rather savory post:

Though I have no theoretical grievances, I do have some technical questions about what you said, and hope you can lead me to understand what exactly was meant by what was said.

You quoted the--I'm presuming--physicist Max Born, who says that
What point of view is chosen is a matter of expediency I have no qualms with this. However, he says later in the same paper that
A gravitational field is neither 'real' nor fictitious' in itself. It has no meaning at all independent of the choice of coordinates, just as is the case of the length of a rod.What does this mean? What is a good way to represent 'what a gravitational field means', using some sort of concrete example? It seems to me--just thinking abstractly-- that when referring to any gravitational field A1 (or any gravitational field at all), one must take into account-- when referring to that field-- all bodies acting as forces on it? Surely, the particulars depend on the precise coordinates of the points in reference to which we are speaking, but does not talk of each field have to take into account all forces acting on that field at any given moment? Perhaps I am not understanding the implication of what is being said correctly, but it seems to me this would make a big difference.

I personally agree with you on your judgment of the pragmatists, and would argue that their notions of truth and "the real" are ultimately thinly veiled attempts to return to theism. This is not an ad hominem attack, mind you: reading James feels to me not unlike going to Sunday School!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

George Bush:


What does this mean? What is a good way to represent 'what a gravitational field means', using some sort of concrete example? It seems to me--just thinking abstractly-- that when referring to any gravitational field A1 (or any gravitational field at all), one must take into account-- when referring to that field-- all bodies acting as forces on it? Surely, the particulars depend on the precise coordinates of the points in reference to which we are speaking, but does not talk of each field have to take into account all forces acting on that field at any given moment? Perhaps I am not understanding the implication of what is being said correctly, but it seems to me this would make a big difference.

There are in fact several ways to represent a force field; lines of force is one, a tangent field is another. They can even be represented by a scalar field. There are other ways too. [If you want me to explain these, I will.]

It is also worth recalling that in Relativity Theory, gravity is not a force. It's also worth remembering that the general notion of a force is controversial in modern Physics. I'll add a few quotes to that effect in a minute or so.

Finally, if I quote someone, it does not imply I agree with everything they say!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, this is what Nobel Laureate, Professor Wilczek had to say:


"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.

"In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote

"'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'" [Wilczek, F., Fantastic Realities. 49 Mind Journeys And A Trip To Stockholm (World Scientific, 2006), pp.37-38.]

And this is what physicist, Max Jammer had to say:


"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....

"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer, M., Concepts Of Force (Dover Publications, 2nd ed., 1999)., p.v.]

The contrary view is argued forcefully (but I think unsuccessfully) in the following:

Wilson, J. (2007), 'Newtonian Forces', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58, 2, pp.173-205.

[Buffalo Souljah]

Well, what about Newton's laws of motion!!? I thought the brunt of Newtonian physics was OK until we advanced to speed nearing that of light??? You have to understand, my whole world view rests on the assumption there are forces in the world!!! How can this be?!


From Wikipedia:


The Standard Model (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_Model) predicts that exchange particles called gauge bosons (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gauge_boson) are the fundamental means by which forces are emitted and absorbed. Only four main interactions are known: in order of decreasing strength, they are: strong (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_force), electromagnetic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_force), weak (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weak_force), and gravitational (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_force)Is this then a problem with the Standard Model then? Rosa, tell me who is right here!


Newton's description of gravity is sufficiently accurate for many practical purposes and is therefore widely used. Deviations from it are small when the dimensionless quantities φ/c2 and (v/c)2 are both much less than one, where φ is the gravitational potential (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_potential), v is the velocity of the objects being studied, and c is the speed of light (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_of_light).[29] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_force#cite_note-28) For example, Newtonian gravity provides an accurate description of the Earth/Sun system, since
http://upload.wikimedia.org/math/a/f/e/afe04d235105565c1aef295664c4437a.png where rorbit is the radius of the Earth's orbit around the Sun.
In situations where either dimensionless parameter is large, then general relativity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity) must be used to describe the system. General relativity reduces to Newtonian gravity in the limit of small potential and low velocities, so Newton's law of gravitation is often said to be the low-gravity limit of general relativity.
Is this similar to what these individuals are referring to?



The predicted angular deflection of light rays by gravity that is calculated by using Newton's Theory is only one-half of the deflection that is actually observed by astronomers. Calculations using General Relativity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity#Bending_of_light) are in much closer agreement with the astronomical observations.This is very interesting!

Says Newton in a letter to a friend:


"That one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one another, is to me so great an absurdity that, I believe, no man who has in philosophic matters a competent faculty of thinking could ever fall into it."and in another letter:


"I have not yet been able to discover the cause of these properties of gravity from phenomena and I feign no hypotheses (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypotheses_non_fingo)... It is enough that gravity does really exist and acts according to the laws I have explained, and that it abundantly serves to account for all the motions of celestial bodies."In relation to Einstein's solution to the problem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity):

Wikipedia again:

He [Newton] lamented that "philosophers have hitherto attempted the search of nature in vain" for the source of the gravitational force, as he was convinced "by many reasons" that there were "causes hitherto unknown" that were fundamental to all the "phenomena of nature". These fundamental phenomena are still under investigation and, though hypotheses abound, the definitive answer has yet to be found.
General relativity also predicts the existence of gravitational waves (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_wave), which have since been measured indirectly; a direct measurement is the aim of projects such as LIGO (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LIGO). In addition, general relativity is the basis of current cosmological (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_cosmology) models of a consistently expanding universe.Well, my mind is thoroughly blown. I have some interesting reading over the next few months and weeks...

[Buffalo Souljah]

Well, what about Newton's laws of motion!!? I thought the brunt of Newtonian physics was OK until we advanced to speed nearing that of light??? You have to understand, my whole world view rests on the assumption there are forces in the world!!! How can this be?!


From Wikipedia:


The Standard Model (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Standard_Model) predicts that exchange particles called gauge bosons (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gauge_boson) are the fundamental means by which forces are emitted and absorbed. Only four main interactions are known: in order of decreasing strength, they are: strong (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_force), electromagnetic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electromagnetic_force), weak (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weak_force), and gravitational (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_force)Is this then a problem with the Standard Model then? Rosa, tell me who is right here!


Newton's description of gravity is sufficiently accurate for many practical purposes and is therefore widely used. Deviations from it are small when the dimensionless quantities φ/c2 and (v/c)2 are both much less than one, where φ is the gravitational potential (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_potential), v is the velocity of the objects being studied, and c is the speed of light (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_of_light).[29] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_force#cite_note-28) For example, Newtonian gravity provides an accurate description of the Earth/Sun system, since
http://upload.wikimedia.org/math/a/f/e/afe04d235105565c1aef295664c4437a.png where rorbit is the radius of the Earth's orbit around the Sun.
In situations where either dimensionless parameter is large, then general relativity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity) must be used to describe the system. General relativity reduces to Newtonian gravity in the limit of small potential and low velocities, so Newton's law of gravitation is often said to be the low-gravity limit of general relativity.
Is this similar to what these individuals are referring to?



The predicted angular deflection of light rays by gravity that is calculated by using Newton's Theory is only one-half of the deflection that is actually observed by astronomers. Calculations using General Relativity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity#Bending_of_light) are in much closer agreement with the astronomical observations.This is very interesting!

Says Newton in a letter to a friend:


"That one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one another, is to me so great an absurdity that, I believe, no man who has in philosophic matters a competent faculty of thinking could ever fall into it."and in another letter:


"I have not yet been able to discover the cause of these properties of gravity from phenomena and I feign no hypotheses (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypotheses_non_fingo)... It is enough that gravity does really exist and acts according to the laws I have explained, and that it abundantly serves to account for all the motions of celestial bodies."Wikipedia again:

He [Newton] lamented that "philosophers have hitherto attempted the search of nature in vain" for the source of the gravitational force, as he was convinced "by many reasons" that there were "causes hitherto unknown" that were fundamental to all the "phenomena of nature". These fundamental phenomena are still under investigation and, though hypotheses abound, the definitive answer has yet to be found.In relation to Einstein's solution to the problem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity):
General relativity... predicts the existence of gravitational waves (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravitational_wave), which have since been measured indirectly; a direct measurement is the aim of projects such as LIGO (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LIGO). In addition, general relativity is the basis of current cosmological (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_cosmology) models of a consistently expanding universe.Well, my mind is thoroughly blown. I have some interesting reading over the next few months and weeks...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GB:


Well, what about Newton's laws of motion!!? I thought the brunt of Newtonian physics was OK until we advanced to speed nearing that of light??? You have to understand, my whole world view rests on the assumption there are forces in the world!!! How can this be?!

Well, that's what we are told, but what has that got to do with Newtonian forces?

Now, you may want to believe in forces, but check this thread out:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/true-concept-force-t109485/index.html


Is this then a problem with the Standard Model then? Rosa, tell me who is right here!

As the quotaions I added earlier explain, this is a reductive theory: forces have been replaced by particles, which exchange momentum. So there are no forces, just particles in relative motion, as Engels noted, 130 years ago (one of the few scientific ideas he actually got right!):


"All motion is bound up with some change of place…. The whole of nature accessible to us forms a system, an interconnected totality of bodies…. [These] react one on another, and it is precisely this mutual reaction that constitutes motion…. When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion.... [Engels (1954) Dialectics of Nature, pp.70-71. Bold emphasis added.]

The ontological status of forces has always been a problem (in short wtf are they?); I try to spell these out in the above thread, and here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm


Is this similar to what these individuals are referring to?

Well, in Newton's system, particles in a gravitational field move as if they are on wires (forces); in Relativity, they do so on tram lines (geodesics) -- but we still do not know what makes things move. Calling it a force just labels the problem. Why should a body move if acted on by a non material force? And if forces are material, then there would have to be contact forces at work between such interacting bodies. But that just pushes the problem back one more stage...

And if they move on geodesics, why do they do this?

I try to say much more about this in that thread above.

[Buffalo Souljah]

Rosa:

Here is a link to an essay I wrote (http://www.scribd.com/doc/29437129/Untitled) on the subject of William James' epistemology (and how it fails the test of even the simplest critical examination).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks, I'll check it out.:)

[Buffalo Souljah]

Of course, it could always be claimed that Copernican theory is simpler than the Ptolemaic system, but until we receive a clear sign that nature works according to our notion of simplicity (or cares a fig about it), that argument won't wash.


Isn't this a rather Hegelian notion for a rabid anti-Hegelian to take on? A belief in some transcendent "nature" that dictates its own and our existence?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^It's just a harmless piece of rhetoric. Don't take it literally.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Marxist and Pragmatic epistemology seem pretty similar in the criteria that "truth" must be judged by its interaction with the material world. In a sense what is useful is fact. Engels' answer to Kant's thing-in-itself is similar to how pragmatists would answer it. Marx's Thesis and Mao's On Practice are both very pragmatic. The only exception would be Lenin's Empirocriticism, which pushes for objective scientific truth. Sidney Hook tried to reconcile them, while the CPUSA published Pragmatism: philosophy of imperialism.

Marxism attempts to analyze the material world based on dialectical "laws." His methodologies are questionable, but he had a scientific end in mind.

Pragmatism is a philosophical school. While it's been misrepresented to be the philosophy of "common sense," it has it's own philosophical ideology. For instance, many pragmatists solve questions based on how the terms are defined (much like ordinary language philosophy).

Pragmatism generally adopts a coherentist view of truth, where Marx's epistemological view is arguably foundationalist (something pragmatism generally opposes). There are variations on the epistemology in pragmatism.

Much of the criticism surrounding pragmatism is based on a misunderstanding of the school. Misinterpretations are primarily the result of quotations from William James which, if read in a greater context, reveal what his views actually were.

Among pragmatists, there are at least five major thinkers that had a different conception of what pragmatism means. This makes it very difficult to have "general" conversations about it. It needs to be talked about with respect to specific definitions that people take to be what pragmatism means. This requirement for linguistic precision is one of the underlying themes in pragmatism, in fact.

**

A summation a particular pragmatist viewpoint might be something I am interested in:

Truth is something that is a subset of "good." In other words, truth is always "good." Otherwise, it is simply not true. Truth is a psychological and social concept.

Russell and others point out some problems with certain pragmatist conceptions. Obviously, the bringing up of morality or even "interests" is controversial. Furthermore, believing your mother died peacefully, even though it was not true, may be the "pragmatic" solution. I think it actually was true, in many respects. But my beliefs are pretty much an incoherent mess that I'm still trying to sort out.

On the other hand, pragmatists can return with a criticism:

A scientist who arose at the conclusion with a certainty level similar to, say, evolution, might advocate killing small children. It's an exaggeration, but we have seen science come to the defense of Nazism, extreme eugenics, racism, and a variety of other issues. And despite what scientists will tell you, many of the false beliefs science has had were consistent with the information available at the time. It wasn't an issue of scientific method.

Pragmatist says screw science in such a case. Science doesn't concern itself with ethics but rather things it deems factual truths.

Scientists will claim some of the following responses:

1. Things are true regardless of whether they are convenient for humanities ethical concerns.
2. Science should be followed even when conclusions advocate things that appear ridiculous.

I disagree with 2, and I think most scientists would as well. I also disagree with one, but it's probably the weaker conclusion.

Pragmatism, in many ways, is like a child that isn't getting its way. It wants the candy it can't have so it kicks, screams, and smashes things. Whether it likes it or not, things aren't changing.

Pragmatism can be seen as an outlet for individuals to lash out against a world that doesn't cohere to their mindset. Of course, many other pragmatists have views where they believe truth literally "is" based on utilities of a sort.

So while I flirt with pragmatism in a self-contradictory manner, other pragmatists believe analytically they are correct and care little for my concerns.

Pragmatism is confusing. I read a decent amount on pragmatism and I still can't tell you with any certainty what it is.