Marcuse - Thinking Critically

[KropotkinKomrade]

Herbert Marcuse, a critical theorist from the Frankfurt School, was a German political theorist, sociologist, and philosopher. He followed a new western Marxism like others such as Wilheim Reich, Bertolt Brecht, Andre Breton, and Jean-Paul Sartre, that focused on creating whole well-rounded people. This form of Marxism was fairly different then others such as the Orthodox version by Engels, which seemed to imply that capitalism would bring about its own destruction without any effort by people, and Eastern Marxism headed by the Russians which was heavily authoritarian, for Lenin the State gets stronger, for Marx it withers away. The Frankfurt School of critical theory accepted Marx's analysis and theory of alienation, but disagreed with two main hypotheses.

They thought the working class would not bring about the revolution. Where was the proof that this idea was true, in Germany in 1933, 9 million voted for the Socialist Democratic Party and 6 million voted for the KPD Communist Party, then shortly after Hitler took power and there was little opposition from the working class. World War I also showed that, for the most part, rather than uniting as an international working class, working classes defined themselves first by their respective nationality.
The Frankfurt School also believed that instead of studying the economy for answers, culture should be investigated.
In his book One Dimensional Man, which was published in 1964 and is a phenomenal yet challenging read, Marcuse explores these ideas and studies American culture. In it he comes to a great deal of extremely important conclusions:

Modern Capitalist Society is on the wrong track
It diminishes human potential
Tension and oppositional forces are being integrated and neutralized
Human happiness has been defined in material terms...
... and because our modern way of life can "deliver the goods", people do not question whether our current organization and way of life is the best possible way
People must learn to think abstractly and critically so they can transcend what he refers to as the "Reality Principle"
People are programmed to think the way the system needs them to
"Under the rule of a repressive whole," he wrote, "liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination. Free election of masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear...that is, if they sustain alienation."
He discusses true and false needs
The private sector of life is being opened to the public and in the process they are being fused together
Long ago, high culture created a world seperate from reality where one could imagine a better existence and then work toward it
But now, for the most part, "The music of the soul is also the music of salesmanship. Exchange value, not truth value counts."
Ideas and feelings are often linked to commodities.
Essentially, modern culture and modern society create one dimensional people that cannot think critically or outside the box. This in itself is a horrifying truth, if it is in fact true, I believe it is. Perhaps I'm not in the know, but I had never heard of Marcuse until we studied him in an intellectual history class. I believe he has come to some of the most remarkably true assertations, and I cannot believe that he is not more popular than he is.

It seems as though there is not a great deal of interest in political and philosophical thought nowadays by the common person, especially that of an unconventional manner. I believe that this type of thinking is exactly what is necessary for humanity to achieve its true potential, which is still something I cannot fully imagine, as I am partially integrated into our modern culture and way of thinking, though what is important is that I know to oppose it.

[black magick hustla]

marcuse was a windbag who worked for the US in WWII. What was one a great man who participated in the spartacist rebellion became a fucking philosopher who rejected that the revolution will be carried on by the working class. he was just a flakey artist.

[KropotkinKomrade]

Some people cannot grasp Marcuse's concepts, and they attempt to destroy what they do not understand. Rather than slander a great thinker, these people should attempt to make sense of his ideas first, so they can critique them in an appropriate manner.

[Hit The North]

I'm moving this to Theory...

Btw, I dispute the contentions of your first paragraph. Engels didn't bequeath a deterministic Marxism. Lenin didn't believe that the further development of socialism meant strengthening the centralised state.

Without wanting to engage in the weird and prejudicial scientism of Marmot's position where philosophy and art are automatically suspect, I have to agree that Marcuse's denial of the role of the proletariat leads to a political dead-end. It's a typical move by an intellectual to elevate the historical significance of 'the intellectual' which seems symptomatic of so-called Western Marxism. However, that's not to deny the insights Marcuse brings to the development of post-second world war mass culture under capitalism. The idea that an "apparatus of pleasure" is utilised as one form of social control seems like a pretty accurate depiction of one side of consumer-driven, Western capitalism.

[KropotkinKomrade]

I appreciate your critiquing approach. I enjoy having a civilized debate which helps further my knowledge.

I was under the impression that (at least in practice) Marxism in Russia took on a heavily centralised state, and that Engels (at least in comparison to Marx) believed that the capitalist economy was eventually doomed on its own accord. I certainly could be wrong as my source for this info was not first hand, but from a professor at my school. He may have misinterpreted Engels himself. Could you please further explain the flaws in my thought? Thank You

[KropotkinKomrade]

What proof do we have that the working class is revolutionary? Did Marx argue that they are revolutionary or just that they are a necessary component in the revolution?In this day and age, it would seem to me that the main revolutionary force are students across the world and the youth in general. Whereas much of the working class is deeply involved in the modern capitalist system, the youth are still forming their perceptions and have the opportunity to escape the capitalist brainwash.

[Hit The North]

I was under the impression that (at least in practice) Marxism in Russia took on a heavily centralised state,

Of course this is true. However, there is little evidence that Lenin thought this was a desirable thing - only a necessary consequence of the backward material conditions the revolution found itself in. neither did Lenin consider that the society he sat at the head of was socialist.



and that Engels (at least in comparison to Marx) believed that the capitalist economy was eventually doomed on its own accord.I think this is a hard argument to sustain. In the writing of both Marx and Engels there is an equal concern with the objective nature of capitalism and the fact that it is unstable and will eventually lead to its own collapse and the subjective factor of the need to politically organise the class. Much of Engels last years were taken up with political questions and the shaping of German social democracy. I don't think Engels was any more deterministic than Marx on the question of the inevitable collapse of capitalism.


What proof do we have that the working class is revolutionary? Did Marx argue that they are revolutionary or just that they are a necessary component in the revolution?
He argued that the working class could be the only agent of a socialist revolution. This is because a socialist revolution, by definition, is one where the working class seize the means of production for itself. It's not a question of whether the working class is revolutionary (usually it is not), but that socialism can only be achieved when the working class make a successful revolution.


In this day and age, it would seem to me that the main revolutionary force are students across the world and the youth in general. The best elements of youth always think this way about themselves. But when you look around, most of youth culture is intensely conservative. On the other hand, a minority of students have occasionally found themselves at the vanguard of radical ideas. However we shouldn't confuse being radical with being a "revolutionary force". Revolutions take enormous power. What power do students have?


Whereas much of the working class is deeply involved in the modern capitalist system, the youth are still forming their perceptions and have the opportunity to escape the capitalist brainwash.Well, in fact, all of the working class, throughout its entire history, has been deeply involved in the capitalist system. It is labour which creates capital in the first place. This is what gives workers their power.

Meanwhile, ideas are not static and unchanging. When the fortunes of capitalism take a nose-dive, as they are now, all sorts of things, including ideas, change. Take the UK right now. Deep in an economic crisis, the ruling political elite faces a massive crisis of legitimacy. It wouldn't be too much of an exaggeration to say that politicians here are afraid to be seen in public at the moment, such is the public hostility toward them.

No one could have foreseen this sea-change in opinion a year ago.

Class consciousness changes.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrades should ignore Chapter Seven of One Dimensional Man; here is what I posted on this in another thread:


One Dimensional Thought

An equally crass attempt to come to grips with Wittgenstein's work (and with Ordinary Language Philosophy [OLP] in general) can be found in Chapter Seven of Marcuse's One Dimensional Man. [Marcuse (1968).]

Marcuse does not tell us that he lifted many of his criticisms from Ernest Gellner's notorious Words and Things [i.e., Gellner (1959)] (except that in note 2 page 141, he acknowledges that similar ideas appear in the latter work), but it is plain that he has.

[Gellner's diatribe will not be examined in this post; on this egregious book, see Uschanov (2002), with a lengthier version of this article, here (http://www.helsinki.fi/~tuschano/writings/strange/)).]

Marcuse begins with a hackneyed criticism of OLP and Wittgenstein:


"Austin's contemptuous treatment of the alternatives to the common usage of words, and his defamation of what we 'think up in our armchairs of an afternoon'; Wittgenstein's assurance that philosophy 'leaves everything as it is' -- such statements exhibit, to my mind, academic sado-masochism, self-humiliation, and self-denunciation of the intellectual whose labour does not issue in scientific, technical or like achievements. These affirmations of modesty and dependence seem to recapture Hume's mood of righteous contentment with the limitations of reason which, once recognized and accepted, protect man from useless mental adventures but leave him perfectly capable of orienting himself in the given environment. However, when Hume debunked substances, he fought a powerful ideology, while his successors today provide an intellectual justification for that which society has long since accomplished-namely, the defamation of alternative modes of thought which contradict the established universe of discourse."

Added in a footnote:


"The proposition that philosophy leaves everything as it is may be true in the context of Marx's Theses on Feuerbach (where it is at the same time denied), or as self-characterization of neo-positivism, but as a general proposition on philosophic thought it is incorrect." [Marcuse (1968), pp.141-42. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at my site. Spelling corrected to conform to UK English. I have used the on-line text here, and have corrected any typographical errors I managed to spot. The same is true of the other quotations from this book used below.]

I will not try to defend John Austin here (that will be done in a later Essay), but Marcuse clearly failed to note that Wittgenstein is here speaking of philosophy as he practices it, not as it is traditionally carried out. Moreover, in view of the fact that traditional Philosophy is little more than self-important hot air (on this, see Essay Twelve Part One (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm)), except negatively, it cannot change anything, anyway.

This is what Wittgenstein actually said:


"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is. It also leaves mathematics as it is, and no mathematical discovery can advance it." [Wittgenstein (1958), §124, page 49e.]

From this it is clear that the word "everything" refers to language. This is plain from the fact that he then goes on to mention mathematics ("It also leaves mathematics as it is"), which he would not have added if "everything" were unqualified.

Furthermore, Wittgenstein is not advocating "conformism", as Marcuse alleges. It is no more philosophy's goal to challenge the status quo than it is the role of basket weaving to do this. Alongside Marx, Wittgenstein would have argued that the point is in fact to change the world, not build empty/non-sensical theories about it. Change is the concern of political action, science and technology, not Philosophy. Moreover, one only has to read the many conversations that took place between Wittgenstein and those he gathered around him to see that he was not a political quietist. [On that, see here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Wittgenstein.htm).]

Now, in line with the traditional contempt shown toward the vernacular and the thought of ordinary workers, Marcuse argues:


"Throughout the work of the linguistic analysts, there is this familiarity with the chap on the street whose talk plays such a leading role in linguistic philosophy. The chumminess of speech is essential inasmuch as it excludes from the beginning the high-brow vocabulary of 'metaphysics;' it militates against intelligent non-conformity; it ridicules the egghead. The language of John Doe and Richard Roe is the language which the man on the street actually speaks; it is the language which expresses his behaviour; it is therefore the token of concreteness. However, it is also the token of a false concreteness. The language which provides most of the material for the analysis is a purged language, purged not only of its 'unorthodox' vocabulary, but also of the means for expressing any other contents than those furnished to the individuals by their society. The linguistic analyst finds this purged language an accomplished fact, and he takes the impoverished language as he finds it, insulating it from that which is not expressed in it although it enters the established universe of discourse as element and factor of meaning.

"Paying respect to the prevailing variety of meanings and usages, to the power and common sense of ordinary speech, while blocking (as extraneous material) analysis of what this speech says about the society that speaks it, linguistic philosophy suppresses once more what is continually suppressed in this universe of discourse and behaviour. The authority of philosophy gives its blessing to the forces which make this universe. Linguistic analysis abstracts from what ordinary language reveals in speaking as it does-the mutilation of man and nature." [Marcuse (1968), pp.142-43.]

It is quite plain that Marcuse prefers the obscure and impenetrable jargon of ruling-class hacks to that of ordinary workers, and it is not hard to see why. As was alleged above, Marcuse all but concedes here that it is impossible to derive the obscure theses of traditional Philosophy if theorists use only the vernacular. That is why he complains that the language used by Wittgenstein and others has been "purged" of the jargon traditionalists like Marcuse prefer, preventing them from attempting their verbal tricks.

It is also worth pointing out that, in line with many others, Marcuse has confused ordinary language with "common sense". As we saw here, these are not at all the same. [On this, see also Hallett (2008), pp.91-99.] In addition, he is wrong in what he says about "boffins" -- in fact, in all my years of studying OLP texts, I have yet to encounter anything that remotely suggests this reading. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Marcuse does not quote a single passage in support of this allegation.

What of this, though?


"Moreover, all too often it is not even the ordinary language which guides the analysis, but rather blown-up atoms of language, silly scraps of speech that sound like baby talk such as 'This looks to me now like a man eating poppies,' 'He saw a robin', 'I had a hat.' Wittgenstein devotes much acumen and spare to the analysis of 'My broom is in the corner.'" [Ibid., p.143.]

But, does Marcuse take Hegel or Engels to task for their use of "The rose is red", or Lenin for his employment of "John is a man"? Not a bit of it. In fact, Marcuse misses the point of using such simple language -- if we can't get this right, we stand no chance with more complex propositions. And, as we have seen (for example, here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_01.htm)), dialecticians cannot even get "John is a man" right! Which rather makes the point, one feels.

Except, Marcuse has an answer to this:


"To take another illustration: sentences such as 'my broom is in the corner' might also occur in Hegel's Logic, but there they would be revealed as inappropriate or even false examples. They would only be rejects, to be surpassed by a discourse which, in its concepts, style, and syntax, is of a different order -- a discourse for which it is by no means 'clear that every sentence in our language "is in order as it is,"' Rather the exact opposite is the case-namely, that every sentence is as little in order as the world is which this language communicates." [Ibid., p.144.]

But, if that were indeed so, then the ordinary words Marcuse himself uses are not "in order", either, and we cannot take what he says at face value. [But is there any other, deeper significance to them?] We have already seen (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2004.htm) that attempts to argue that ordinary language is in some way (or in any way) defective back-fire on those making such rash allegations. And now we witness the same here, for if Marcuse's words are not "in order", what can they possibly mean? As he notes on the same page:


"Thus the analysis does not terminate in the universe of ordinary discourse, it goes beyond it and opens a qualitatively different universe, the terms of which may even contradict the ordinary one." [Ibid., p.144.]

Except that here the tables are turned on Marcuse, for if we analyse his words we can see that if he is correct, then his words in fact say the opposite of what he intended: if they are in the "right order", we can understand him after all. And yet, as soon as we understand what he is telling us, we immediately see that his words too are not in the "right order" (for he tells us that none are!), and thus they make no sense. [Yet another ironic dialectical inversion here, one feels.]

And then we encounter this hackney, traditionalists' lament; Marcuse (quoting Wittgenstein):


"The almost masochistic reduction of speech to the humble and common is made into a program: 'if the words "language", "experience", "world", have a use, it must be as humble a one as that of the words "table", "lamp", door."' We must 'stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties...' -- as if this were the only alternative, and as if the 'extreme subtleties' were not the suitable term for Wittgenstein's language games rather than for Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Thinking (or at least its expression) is not only pressed into the straitjacket of common usage, but also enjoined not to ask and seek solutions beyond those that are already there. 'The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known.'

"The self-styled poverty of philosophy, committed with all its concepts to the given state of affairs, distrusts the possibility of a new experience. Subjection to the rule of the established fact is total -- only linguistic facts, to be sure, but the society speaks in its language, and we are told to obey. The prohibitions are severe and authoritarian: 'Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language.' 'And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place.'

"One might ask what remains of philosophy? What remains of thinking, intelligence, without anything hypothetical, without any explanation? However, what is at stake is not the definition or the dignity of philosophy. It is rather the chance of preserving and protecting the fight, the need to think and speak in terms other than those of common usage -- terms which are meaningful, rational, and valid precisely because they are other terms. What is involved is the spread of a new ideology which undertakes to describe what is happening (and meant) by eliminating the concepts capable of understanding what is happening (and meant)." [Ibid., pp.144-45.]

Marcuse has worked himself up into a right old lather here, all the while missing the point. Once more: Wittgenstein is here speaking of his new approach to philosophy, which, if correct, means that the traditional forms-of-thought beloved of characters like Marcuse are simply "houses of cards (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm)". Wittgenstein is certainly not arguing against "anything hypothetical", or against "explanation" in other areas of theory (for example, in science). Once more, in his haste to malign Wittgenstein, Marcuse has taken a few swings at a straw man.

And, far from this being true:


"It is rather the chance of preserving and protecting the fight, the need to think and speak in terms other than those of common usage -- terms which are meaningful, rational, and valid precisely because they are other terms. What is involved is the spread of a new ideology which undertakes to describe what is happening (and meant) by eliminating the concepts capable of understanding what is happening (and meant)." [Ibid.]

the opposite is in fact the case. The obscure terminology found in traditional thought, and particularly the impenetrable jargon Hegel inflicted on humanity, actually prevents us understanding the world. As I pointed out in Essay Twelve Part One (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm), the influence of traditional Philosophy must be destroyed in order to facilitate the advance of scientific knowledge in general, and Marxism in particular. [Here, I am very loosely paraphrasing Kant!]

Marcuse's failure to get the point is further underlined by this blindingly irrelevant comment:


"To begin with, an irreducible difference exists between the universe of everyday thinking and language on the one side, and that of philosophic thinking and language on the other. In normal circumstances, ordinary language is indeed behavioural -- a practical instrument. When somebody actually says 'My broom is in the corner,' he probably intends that somebody else who had actually asked about the broom is going to take it or leave it there, is going to be satisfied, or angry. In any case, the sentence has fulfilled its function by causing a behavioural reaction: 'the effect devours the cause; the end absorbs the means.'" [Ibid., pp.145-46.]

Marcuse clearly did not know, perhaps because of his characteristically sloppy research, that when Wittgenstein used the sentence "My broom is in the corner" [Wittgenstein (1958), §60, p.29e.] he was in fact criticising a view he had adopted in the Tractatus -- about (1) the nature of logically simple names, (2) the idea that a fact is a complex, and (3) that analysis can reveal hidden logical form, etc. [Wittgenstein (1972), 2-3.263, pp.7-25, and 5.5423, p.111; on the background to this, see White (1974, 2006). On the Investigations §37-61 (the relevant sections), see Baker and Hacker (2005b), pp.112-42, Hallett (1977), pp.112-39, Hallett (2008), pp.33-41]. Wittgenstein is here advancing a profound criticism of his earlier way of seeing things, and whether or not one agrees with Wittgenstein (before or after his change of mind -- or even at all!), the issues he raises are not of the everyday "behavioural" sort that Marcuse seems to think; they concern the logical nature of propositions and how they can represent the world (that is, if they can).

[These issues are considered in more detail in Essay Twelve Part One (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm), and in subsequent Parts of that Essay (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Rest_of_Summary_of_Twelve.htm).]


"In contrast, if, in a philosophic text or discourse, the ward 'substance,' 'idea,' 'man,' 'alienation' becomes the subject of a proposition, no such transformation of meaning into a behavioural reaction takes place or is intended to take place. The word remains, as it were, unfulfilled -- except in thought, where it may give rise to other thoughts. And through a long series of mediations within a historical continuum, the proposition may help to form and guide a practice. But the proposition remains unfulfilled even then -- only the hubris of absolute idealism asserts the thesis of a final identity between thought and its object. The words with which philosophy is concerned can therefore never have a use 'as humble ... as that of the words "table", "lamp", "door"'.

"Thus, exactness and clarity in philosophy cannot be attained within the universe of ordinary discourse. The philosophic concepts aim at a dimension of fact and meaning which elucidates the atomized phrases or words of ordinary discourse 'from without' by showing this 'without' as essential to the understanding of ordinary discourse. Or, if the universe of ordinary discourse itself becomes the object of philosophic analysis, the language of philosophy becomes a 'meta-language.' Even where it moves in the humble terms of ordinary discourse, it remains antagonistic. It dissolves the established experiential context of meaning into that of its reality; it abstracts from the immediate concreteness in order to attain true concreteness." [Ibid., p.146.]

Once more, as we have seen, it is in fact the use of the obscure jargon found in traditional Philosophy that undermines clarity of thought. In which case, it is no surprise to discover that, far from constituting a "guide" to practice, dialectics has been refuted by it. [On this, see Essay Ten Part One (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20010_01.htm).] And as far as 'abstraction' is concerned, Marcuse just helps himself to this word without any attempt to explain this obscure process, or show how it is even possible to 'abstract' anything at all [On this, see Essay Three Parts One (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_01.htm) and Two (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_02.htm.).]


"Ordinary language in its 'humble use' may indeed be of vital concern to critical philosophic thought, but in the medium of this thought words lose their plain humility and reveal that 'hidden' something which is of no interest to Wittgenstein. Consider the analysis of the 'here' and 'now' in Hegel's Phenomenology, or...Lenin's suggestion on how to analyze adequately 'this glass of water' on the table. Such an analysis uncovers the history in every-day speech as a hidden dimension of meaning -- the rule of society over its language. And this discovery shatters the natural and reified form in which the given universe of discourse first appeals. The words reveal themselves as genuine terms not only in a grammatical and formal-logical but also material sense; namely, as the limits which define the meaning and its development -- the terms which society imposes on discourse, and on behaviour. This historical dimension of meaning can no longer be elucidated by examples such as 'my broom is in the corner' or 'there is cheese on the table.' To be sure, such statements can reveal many ambiguities, puzzles, oddities, but they are an in the same re language games and academic boredom." [Ibid., pp.147-48.]

As we will see in Essay Twelve, Hegel's crass analysis of the spatial and temporal indexicals ("here" and "now") is not a flattering advertisement for the 'superiority' of 'dialectical logic'; we have already seen what a mess Lenin dropped himself into with his 'analysis' of glass tumblers (here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20010_01.htm)). In which case, the alleged banalities of ordinary language are much to be preferred to the irredeemable confusion that flows from Hegel's Hermetic (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/glenn_magee.htm) House of Horrors. Indeed, science has about as much to learn from this backwater of Neo-Platonic mysticism as it has from dowsing or crystal gazing.

Moreover, it is revealing that Marcuse shows an unhealthy interest in what is "hidden", since we have already seen that it is a cornerstone of ruling-class ideology that there is indeed a "hidden" world behind "appearances", which is accessible to thought alone. Here, Marcuse reveals that he too, while pretending to be a radial, is a philosophical conservative. [On that, see the opening comments of Essay Two (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2002.htm).]

It would be tedious indeed to detail the many other confusions and errors this chapter of One Dimensional Man alone contains, so I will end with just two more examples (one taken from the next chapter, and one from earlier in the book):


"The 'whole' that here comes to view must be cleared from all misunderstanding in terms of an independent entity, of a 'Gestalt,' and the like. The concept somehow expresses the difference and tension between potentiality and actuality -- identity in this difference. It appears in the relation between the qualities (white, hard; but also beautiful, free, just) and the corresponding concepts (whiteness, hardness, beauty, freedom, justice). The abstract character of the latter seems to designate the more concrete qualities as part-realizations, aspects, manifestations of a more universal and more 'excellent' quality, which is experienced in the concrete.

"And by virtue of this relation, the concrete quality seems to represent a negation as well as realization of the universal. Snow is white but not 'whiteness;' a girl may be beautiful, even a beauty, but not 'beauty;' a country may be free (in comparison with others) because its people have certain liberties, but it is not the very embodiment of freedom. Moreover, the concepts are meaningful only in experienced contrast with their opposites: white with not white, beautiful with not beautiful. Negative statements can sometimes be translated into positive ones: 'black' or 'grey' for 'not white,' 'ugly' for 'not beautiful.'

"These formulations do not alter the relation between the abstract concept and its concrete realizations: the universal concept denotes that which the particular entity is, and is not. The translation can eliminate the hidden negation by reformulating the meaning in a non-contradictory proposition, but the untranslated statement suggests a real want. There is more in the abstract noun (beauty, freedom) than in the qualities ('beautiful,' 'free') attributed to the particular person, thing or condition. The substantive universal intends qualities which surpass all particular experience, but persist in the mind, not as a figment of imagination nor as more logical possibilities but as the 'stuff' of which our world consists. No snow is pure white, nor is any cruel beast or man an the cruelty man knows -- knows as an almost inexhaustible force in history and imagination." [Ibid., pp.168-69.]

This is a faint echo of Hegel's reference to Spinoza's Greedy Principle [SGP] (so-called in Essay Eleven Part Two (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2011%2002.htm)) -- i.e., "All determination is also a negation". But this is an unreliable principle (even if sense can be made of it), not least because it confuses what we do with words with the devices and/or means by which we do it. Of course, that is about as brainless as confusing, say, a holiday with the aeroplane we board in order to begin it, or a map with a trek in the hills! [The other serious weaknesses of the SGP are outlined in Essay Eight Part Three (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_03.htm).]

But, ignoring the fact that Marcuse confuses concepts with words, it is not even true that:


"the concepts are meaningful only in experienced contrast with their opposites: white with not white, beautiful with not beautiful. Negative statements can sometimes be translated into positive ones: 'black' or 'grey' for 'not white,' 'ugly' for 'not beautiful.'" [Ibid.]

Colour concepts are meaningful, among other things, because of the colour octahedron not because we have met in experience "not-white" (or whatever). If someone has no understanding of colour words, they can swim in "not-white" all day long for all the good it will do them.

But, the above errors are connected with much deeper logical issues; this brings us to the final passage from One Dimensional Man I propose to discuss here:


"In the classical logic, the judgment which constituted the original core of dialectical thought was formalised in the propositional form, 'S is p.' But this form conceals rather than reveals the basic dialectical proposition, which states the negative character of the empirical reality. Judged in the light of their essence and idea, men and things exist as other than they are; consequently thought contradicts that which is (given), opposes its truth to that of the given reality. The truth envisaged by thought is the Idea. As such it is, in terms of the given reality, 'mere' Idea, 'mere' essence -- potentiality.

"But the essential potentiality is not like the many possibilities which are contained in the given universe of discourse and action; the essential potentiality is of a very different order. Its realisation involves subversion of the established order, for thinking in accordance with truth is the commitment to exist in accordance with truth. (In Plato, the extreme concepts which illustrate this subversion are: death as the beginning of the philosopher's life, and the violent liberation from the Cave.) Thus, the subversive character of truth inflicts upon thought an imperative quality. Logic centres on judgments which are, as demonstrative propositions, imperatives, -- the predicative 'is' implies an 'ought'.

"This contradictory, two-dimensional style of thought is the inner form not only of dialectical logic but of all philosophy which comes to grips with reality. The propositions which define reality affirm as true something that is not (immediately) the case; thus they contradict that which is the case, and they deny its truth. The affirmative judgment contains a negation which disappears in the propositional form (S is p). For example, 'virtue is knowledge'; 'justice is that state in which everyone performs the function for which his nature is best suited'; 'the perfectly real is the perfectly knowable'...; 'man is free'; 'the State is the reality of Reason.'

"If these propositions are to be true, then the copula 'is' states an 'ought,' a desideratum. It judges conditions in which virtue is not knowledge, in which men do not perform the function for which their nature best suits them, in which they are not free, etc. Or, the categorical S-p form states that (S) is not (S); (S) is defined as other-than-itself. Verification of the proposition involves a process in fact as well as in thought: (S) must become that which it is. The categorical statement thus turns into a categorical imperative; it does not state a fact but the necessity to bring about a fact. For example, it could be read as follows: man is not (in fact) free, endowed with inalienable rights, etc., but he ought to be, because be is free in the eyes of God, by nature, etc." [Ibid., pp.110-11.]

We have already seen (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_01.htm)that dialecticians have bought into a defective theory of predication, so it is no surprise to see Marcuse follow suite. His claim that the traditional logic of subject (S) and predicate (P) "conceals rather than reveals the basic dialectical proposition, which states the negative character of the empirical reality" may or may not be true --, but if it is, then it is all to the good since "reality" has neither a "negative" nor a positive "character". In fact, it is only because Marcuse has considered a very narrow range of examples that his assertions here might seem (to some) to be reliable. As was noted in Essay Three Part One (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_01.htm):


For example, how would the following be classified?

H1: Every sailor loves a girl who reminds him of anyone other than his mother.

H2: Anyone who knows Marx's work will also know that he is second to none in his analysis of all the economic forces operating in Capitalism, and most of those constitutive of other Modes of Production.

H3: Any prime factor of an even number between two and one hundred is less than a composite number not equal to but greater than fifty.

H4: Some who admire most of those who do not despise themselves often avoid sitting opposite any who criticise those who claim membership of the minority break-away faction of the Socrates Appreciation Society.

H5: Today, Blair met some of those who think his policy in Iraq is a betrayal of his few remaining socialist principles.

Are these universal, particular, negative, or positive? Are they judgements or propositions? But these sort of propositions (and worse!) appear in mathematics and the sciences all the time (to say nothing of everyday speech). Indeed, the serious limitations of the restrictive old logic, with its incapacity to handle complex sentences in mathematics, inspired Frege to recast the entire discipline in its modern form. [On this, see Essay Four (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2004.htm).]

Some might argue that these are not the sort of "judgements" traditional' logic concerned itself with; but that is precisely the point. It is only because Marcuse, along with other dialecticians, relied on a bowdlerised form of Aristotle's logic, that his argument can seem to gain even a slender toe-hold.

However, let us assume that Marcuse's analysis is impeccable -- even then what Marcuse alleges is still incorrect:


"In the classical logic, the judgment which constituted the original core of dialectical thought was formalised in the propositional form, 'S is p.' But this form conceals rather than reveals the basic dialectical proposition, which states the negative character of the empirical reality. Judged in the light of their essence and idea, men and things exist as other than they are; consequently thought contradicts that which is (given), opposes its truth to that of the given reality. The truth envisaged by thought is the Idea. As such it is, in terms of the given reality, 'mere' Idea, 'mere' essence -- potentiality.

"...Or, the categorical S-p form states that (S) is not (S); (S) is defined as other-than-itself. Verification of the proposition involves a process in fact as well as in thought: (S) must become that which it is. The categorical statement thus turns into a categorical imperative; it does not state a fact but the necessity to bring about a fact. For example, it could be read as follows: man is not (in fact) free, endowed with inalienable rights, etc., but he ought to be, because be is free in the eyes of God, by nature, etc." [Ibid.]

But, this depends on "men and things" having an essence, which Marcuse simply takes for granted. Of course, to mystics like Hegel and Aristotle, it seemed clear that "men and things" did indeed have an "essence", but that was just another example of "ruling-class" ideology dominating their thought. But, even if this allegation is itself incorrect, what is Marcuse going to say about propositions like these?

M1: Man is mortal.

M2: Things are material.

Do these "oppose" the "truth of reality"? Are we to assume that "men" are "really" immortal, and that they "oughtn't" be like this? Or that ordinary objects are in "reality" non-material, and that there is an "imperative" here which means that we should struggle to make them material? If not, then Marcuse analysis cannot be relied on to reveal truth consistently, which fact should not surprise us in view of the preceding paragraphs -- that is, in view of the defective logic by means of which Marcuse arrived at most of his conclusions.

It is time to leave this sad victim of ruling-class confusion, and turn to others who have similarly drifted off into deep water....

References, other links and explanations of the technical terms used can be found here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page_13_03.htm).

[black magick hustla]

Some people cannot grasp Marcuse's concepts, and they attempt to destroy what they do not understand. Rather than slander a great thinker, these people should attempt to make sense of his ideas first, so they can critique them in an appropriate manner.

:shrugs: I have grappled with those ideas before when I had a strong affinity with situationism. Someone who considers himself a "Hegelian", a term even the most dogmatic dialectical materialists reject, and writes an essay about "art being the great negation", relegating "revolutionary" role to the artists, or whatever other nonsense is outside sensical discourse and thus there is no much that can be grappled with. The only person of similar ideas I like and do read is Vaneigem, only because he never considered himself a philosopher and was explicit that what he wrote was not an argument. Marcuse has a corpse in his mouth.

[black magick hustla]

I'm moving this to Theory...



Without wanting to engage in the weird and prejudicial scientism of Marmot's position where philosophy and art are automatically suspect,.

this is unfair. I am probably more critical of science than 90 percent of this forum. Honestly, do you think there is much substance in a man that call himself a Hegelian and uses nonsense concepts like "Great Negation"? The man might be writing poetry, which is pefectly fine, but he is not making any sort of argument whatsoever.

[Post-Something]

Er..

On the working class, I don't think what Marmot originally said is 100% accurate..
I think Marcuse was basically saying that the working class had become so caught up in the capitalist system, that it needed help from others, such as the lumpen proletariat or students, to work as some sort of catalyst for liberation.

On art, Marcuse basically thought that art was a destructive force, and therfore valuable in times of revolution and leading up to it. Marcuse modifies Freud's analysis by making a distinction between necessary and surplus repression. Necessary repression is necessary because it helps the individual to survive. However, surplus repression is not demanded by reality, but by other people. Progress is an elimination of surplus and a lessening of necessary repression. However, Marcuse feels that surplus repression is being increased by the privileged sectors of society to ensure their dominance.

Marcuse is interested in the question: Why do the most powerful and outrageous claims get so quickly integrated into our society? Given surplus repression, and the theory of the unconscious we can sketch Marcuse's answer. He thinks that the outrage people express at social transgression is overstated because it is a product of their inner conflict, between repression and our defenses against it. We recoil from it because we are drawn to the breach of the rules. Now, if it was necessary repression which was being challenged, we would have a duty (to preserve civilization) to constrain such outbursts. However, there is surplus repression. And, in order to conquer the surplus repression we must tap our infantile desire for release from all repression. Thus art serves a revolutionary role, it promises what can never be in order to obtain what should be.


Paraphrased to some degree from here: http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/~celiasmi/courses/old_courses/WashU/Phil110/class7.html (http://watarts.uwaterloo.ca/%7Eceliasmi/courses/old_courses/WashU/Phil110/class7.html)

I think Marcuse places too much on art, but on the working class, I'm with him to a certain extent. And I quite like the western Marxist breed of Marx and Freud to be honest..

[bolshevik butcher]

The major theme running through Marcuse's work from a Marxist point of view, his failure to recognise the revolutionary potential of the working class in the imperialist countries is clear. I think this i is important because it seems to have effected the 'new left' quite profoundly, it immerses itself in a desperate attempt to seek other forces to carry out the revolution; students, women, ethnic minoroties, lgbt people, the peasantry in the oppressed countries etc all emerged as supposed replacements at various times according to the weird and wonderful range of tendencies.

The Frankfurt school were a group of largely depressed exmarxists who ventured into intellectualism, particularly after the rise of Hitler in Germany which was obviously a traumatic expirience for anyone involved in the German left. As a result they retreated to universities and justified their position with a perspective that abbandoned the revolution and replaced it with a theory where in the working class was supposedly too atomised for revolution. It has to be said this is a historical irony given that shortly after gaining aclaim the world was shaken by the revolutionary wave of the late 60s and 70s.

I think that Marcuse's ideas are profoundly at odds and contrary to the ideas not just of marxism but of revolutionary socialism as a whole. If the role of revolutionary socialists is to organise the at this stage minoroty of the working class and others who have reached the conclusion of the need for a revolutionary transformation of society and orientate them to carry this out then Marcuse is a non-starter.

[Post-Something]

What do you mean "recognize the revolutionary potential"?

Name one succesful revolution in an imperialist country? No, of course you won't.
Because there aren't any, and you're not interested in actually making any change, you just want to see the same old worn out strategy fail time and time again.

The Frankfurt school did what the vast majority of Marxists do actually, they saw their ideas fail in the real world, but came up with the best theories as to why that happened. But contrary to what you've said, their ideas did make a difference. The 60's was a time of upheaval mainly from the students. Look at Prague 68 or May 68 in France.

[Decolonize The Left]

Marcuse and the Frankfurt school, like Leninism and Stalinism, Maoism, etc... are all developments and critiques/reinventions of Marxism.

As revolutionaries living in the imperialist stages of capitalism, we need to synthesize these theories. No one theory is entirely correct, and no one thinker is entirely incorrect. They all provide adequate analysis in certain respects.

Regarding Marcuse, I think it's important to understand that the artists and philosophers too are working class individuals. They are workers in the ever-widening service sector in that they provide intellectual and culturally creative services: books, lectures, papers, stories, music, etc... If we suffer the blindness of viewing the working class as solely industrial/agricultural laborers, we not only ignore the developments of capitalism (which have greatly diminished these sectors) but also the realities of a Marxist perspective - namely, that the working class assumes many roles, many faces, in many places yet is always defined by a relationship to the means of production.

It is our responsibility to approach Marcuse and others with as open a mind as possible, and reject what seems inadequate and irrational, while accepting what appears apt and logical. I believe that Marcuse focused on an aspect of contemporary society which was not addressed in Marx, for whatever reason, and while it is certainly not the foremost aspect of the revolutionary struggle, it is an aspect worthy of consideration.

- August

[bolshevik butcher]

The Frankfurt school did what the vast majority of Marxists do actually, they saw their ideas fail in the real world, but came up with the best theories as to why that happened. But contrary to what you've said, their ideas did make a difference. The 60's was a time of upheaval mainly from the students. Look at Prague 68 or May 68 in France.

If you think May 1968 was only a student movement you have a very strange outlook on what was nothing but an aborted revolution. I've never denied the role the revolutionary role that students can play, or I would be wasting my time in a lot of the political activity I take part in! However, the students don't hold the same weight of economic power and don't have the ability to change society in the same way that the working class does. I think that you need to re-access your analysis of May 1968 in France if you genuinely believe it was only a student movement; it was the biggest general strike in history. You also fail to consider subsequent strike movements that placed Britain and Italy in pre-revolutionary situations in the 1970's.

You mention Prague in 1968 but how about Hungary in 1956? Surely if there was one event in the history of eastern bloc Stalinism which demonstrated the possibility of a political revolution it was those in Hungary rather than those in Czechoslovakia; whilst the former saw an open clash between a deformed worker's state and a working class organised under the banner of workers democracy and socialism the latter represented ultimately the clash of the bueraucracy in Czechoslovakia and that in Moscow.

[Red_Storm]

marcuse was a windbag who worked for the US in WWII. What was one a great man who participated in the spartacist rebellion became a fucking philosopher who rejected that the revolution will be carried on by the working class. he was just a flakey artist.
Marcuse never workerd for the USA during ww2. They had to go to the usa , together with Theodor Adorno to avoid the nazi threat. The institute of social reasearch ( the frankfurt school) had to change location, and the USA where the ideal place. Marcuse despiced American society together with its mentality. During WW2 the american proletariat didnt have any kind of massive movement, so in a way, Marcuse had to do a structural segragation of marxsist theory with political practice. When he went back to Germany in 1949, he realised ( together with his colegues from the institute) that the communist party of germany was litherally eradicaded. He had to adopt to the german envierment which still had relics from the nazi period, plus the anglo american opressive machine was doing its action of supression to any kind of leftist movement. He had to adopt to the conditions, so thats why he started the ,, social critique,,, as a new philosophy wave. HE NEVER WORKED FOR THE AMERICANS, ESSPECIALLY NOT IN THE WAY U BELIVE HE DID. :)