Is it true that the concept of force no longer applies?

[IcarusAngel]

Relativity.

The idea behind force not existing is that the idea of any object existing at any time is really a series of events; example, it is not the force of the sun that acts on the planets, but rather the nature of space-time: the planet is simply moving in the line that the neighborhood (all events near a given event) permits, as gravity is actually a curvature of "space-time."

"Along the way we show that conservation of four-momentum has an unexpected consequence -- the idea of force at a distance is inconsistent with the theory of relativity. This means that momentum and energy must be carried between interacting particles by another type of particle which we call an intermediary particle. These particles are virtual in the sense that they don't have their real-world mass when acting in this role. "

http://physics.nmt.edu/~raymond/classes/ph13xbook/node135.html

Even two neighboring events could be classifed by means of "intervals" - space-like or time-like. The interval between them is time-like when one body is present at both and space-like if one body could observe both events simultaneously. If a body can travel from one event to another, the interval will be the time between them as measured by a clock. If this is impossible, the interval between them will be the same as the distance between them as verified by an independent observer - but this holds only so long as the events are very near together. Everything in relativity goes from next to next, and there are no relations between distance events, such as distance in space time.

(Further explained by those numerous examples of a baby being placed in a capsule and supposed sent away from the earth, his "clock" will be different from the terristial beings on earth; if you a light is sent from person A on earth to person B on the sun, anything that happens to A before the light arrives at B and he sends it back, is neither definitely before nor after B receives it, etc. etc. Thus there is no way to tell if two events in space are really simultaneous or not.)

Thus, the "history" of any event should be seen more like that of a play or an act, as a series of events and movements, rather than as having forces acting upon them, and in general relativity, the notion of "force" doesn't apply at all.

"In modern particle physics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_physics), forces and the acceleration of particles are explained as the exchange of momentum-carrying gauge bosons (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gauge_boson). With the development of quantum field theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_field_theory) and general relativity (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_relativity), it was realized that "force" is a redundant concept arising from conservation of momentum (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservation_of_momentum) (4-momentum (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4-momentum) in relativity and momentum of virtual particles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_particle) in quantum electrodynamics (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_electrodynamics)). The conservation of momentum, from Noether's theorem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noether%27s_theorem), can be directly derived from the symmetry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symmetry_in_physics) of space (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space) and so is usually considered more fundamental than the concept of a force. Thus the currently known fundamental forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_forces) are considered more accurately to be "fundamental interactions (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_interactions)".[6] (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Force#cite_note-final_theory-5) "

Thus in a certain sense force is merely a convenient fiction used to explain a series of events, the atom or what have you is taking its most reasonable path, and physics is concerned with what happens, not the supposed reason (force) behind it.

V7vpw4AH8QQ

sources:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Force

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_interactions

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geodesic

These fundamental interactions are better explained by Feynman diagrams (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feynman_diagrams)

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

My understanding is that all forces with the exception of gravity are mediated by force-carrying gauge bosons (photons, gluons and W & Z bosons) which, because they travel at the speed of light, provide the illusion of "spooky action-at-a-distance".

Of course, the force of gravity complicates the issue rather a bit, since gravitons have yet to be observed if they exist (http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/gr-qc/pdf/0601/0601043v3.pdf) (PDF link).

Therefore those magnetic fields with all the lines coming out of the magnets that you see in diagrams aren't really "there" so to speak, but represent a useful abstraction of what's going on.

In other words, the map is not the same as the territory.

[IcarusAngel]

"Because an interaction results in fermions attracting and repelling each other, an older term for 'interaction' is 'force'."

It is difficult to think of force as an antiquated notion or merely a convenience or even not existing at all at least in terms of space-time (all things that have been said about force that i have read). I imagine the mathematics involved in explaining it is very complex. Of course, Newtonian principles are still vaid a great deal of the time and can serve as a "stepping stone" to understanding relativity and it's hard to see how the theories could have been developed through any other way (much like the theory of atoms still is explained in outdated characteristics in the textbooks).

Really, Newtonian principles have always been sufficient for my purposes, and yet most people do not even understand those very well, so it's easy to see why the abstractions for general relativity haven't been explained very well. Still, any clarity on the subject helps.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here is what nobel prize laureate Frank Wilczek (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Wilczek) had to say:


When I was a student, the subject that gave me the most trouble was classical mechanics. That always struck me as peculiar, because I had no trouble learning more advanced subjects, which were supposed to be harder. Now I think I've figured it out. It was a case of culture shock. Coming from mathematics, I was expecting an algorithm. Instead I encountered something quite different --- a sort of culture, in fact. Let me explain.

Newton's second law of motion, F = ma, is the soul of classical mechanics. Like other souls, it is insubstantial. The right-hand side is the product of two terms with profound meanings. Acceleration is a purely kinematical concept, defined in terms of space and time. Mass quite directly reflects basic measurable properties of bodies (weights, recoil velocities). The left-hand side, on the other hand, has no independent meaning. Yet clearly Newton's second law is full of meaning, by the highest standard: It proves itself useful in demanding situations. Splendid, unlikely looking bridges, like the Erasmus Bridge (known as the Swan of Rotterdam), do bear their loads; spacecraft do reach Saturn.

The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.

In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote:

"In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based."...

To anyone who reflects on it, it soon becomes clear that F = ma by itself does not provide an algorithm for constructing the mechanics of the world. The equation is more like a common language, in which different useful insights about the mechanics of the world can be expressed. To put it another way, there is a whole culture involved in the interpretation of the symbols. When we learn mechanics, we have to see lots of worked examples to grasp properly what force really means. It is not just a matter of building up skill by practice; rather, we are imbibing a tacit culture of working assumptions. Failure to appreciate this is what got me in trouble.

From his book: Fantastic Realities. 49 Mind Journeys And A Trip To Stockholm (World Scientific, 2006). [Most of this quote can be found here (http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/weblog/305.html).]

Scientist and philosopher of science, Max Jammer noted:


[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....

In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction.... [Jammer (1999) The Concept of Force , p.v.]

as Noxion and the Wiki article point out.



However, the [I]contrary opinion (that the concept of force is alive and well, and rightly so, in Physics) is argued very forcefully in this recent paper:

Wilson, J. (2007), 'Newtonian Forces', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58, 2, pp.173-205.

[Lynx]

If magnetic fields don't exist, why do iron filings align and clump themselves into 'lines'?

Are gravitational fields an abstraction?
I have read that certain areas of the Earth's surface display higher or lower 'gravitational force'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

No one is denying that fields explain why the phenomena you mention occur; it's the ontologiocal status and causal efficacy of such things that is up for grabs (in view of the fact that a 'field' is a mathematical construct, and as such can move/arrange nothing at all).

[Lynx]

Field = an area affected by a force.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Field = an area affected by a force

Well, that seems to separate forces from fields, since that latter appears to be a consequence of the former.

[Lynx]

Well, that seems to separate forces from fields, since that latter appears to be a consequence of the former.
Yes... fields do have some properties of their own, namely distance and permeability, which, if relevant, form part of an equation.

[IcarusAngel]

Well, thanks for posting those quotes, Rosa. That is basically what I was trying to say and thought some people here might like to hear the discussion. (Physics is not my field and when I first heard this I was also given somewhat of a "shock.")

The second quote actually makes sense to me, and I'll try and convey it whenever I bring up the issue.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

I thought it was a given that Newtonian and other classical mechanics are an "incomplete" picture of the universe, a "special case" so to speak. For example, Newtonian mechanics is just fine for plotting the courses of space probes and rockets because they cannot approach significant fractions of the speed of light, where Relativity comes into play. It's entirely possible to plan a space mission using Relativistic maths, but Newton's approach is easier and accurate enough for the job.

In a purely Newtonian universe, one can accelerate as much as one has reaction mass to do so. However, we do not live in a Newtonian universe, so as one approaches the speed of light additional factors, unpredicted by Newton, come into play. Hence the "incompleteness". It also turns out that there are objects with enormous masses (black holes, neutron stars etc) as well as objects travelling at enormous energies (cosmic rays) throughout the known universe, hence also the "special case" aspect.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Yes... fields do have some properties of their own, namely distance and permeability, which, if relevant, form part of an equation.

And yet, how can a mathematical object like a field make objects move (i.e., create a force)?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Noxion:


I thought it was a given that Newtonian and other classical mechanics are an "incomplete" picture of the universe, a "special case" so to speak. For example, Newtonian mechanics is just fine for plotting the courses of space probes and rockets because they cannot approach significant fractions of the speed of light, where Relativity comes into play. It's entirely possible to plan a space mission using Relativistic maths, but Newton's approach is easier and accurate enough for the job.

This is the standard view, but Newtonian mechanics cannot be a special case on Relativity Theory since many of the concepts employed by the former are totally different from those used in the latter -- for example, 'mass', 'time' and 'space' -- and of course, 'force'.

And, it is possible to use Newtonian theory to explain all the anomalies that Einstein's theory supposedly explains far batter, for example the perihelion of Mercury, and equally accurately.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

This is the standard view, but Newtonian mechanics cannot be a special case on Relativity Theory since many of the concepts employed by the former are totally different from those used in the latter -- for example, 'mass', 'time' and 'space' -- and of course, 'force'.

And, it is possible to use Newtonian theory to explain all the anomalies that Einstein's theory supposedly explains far batter, for example the perihelion of Mercury, and equally accurately.

But GR has stood up to decades of tests. Obviously these Newtonian explanations are insufficient.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Noxion:


But GR has stood up to decades of tests. Obviously these Newtonian explanations are insufficient.

No one 'important' has bothered to test Newton's theory, that's the only difference.

[Lynx]

And yet, how can a mathematical object like a field make objects move (i.e., create a force)?
Fields are real world objects that lend themselves to mathematical analysis - perhaps you are referring to the (imaginary) lines of force?

Fields don't make objects move, but they can affect the lines of force, by diverting and concentrating them. Flux density is an often used term. The magnitude of the force is represented by the number of lines of force per given area.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Fields are real world objects that lend themselves to mathematical analysis - perhaps you are referring to the (imaginary) lines of force?

In that case, what are fields made of? If they are made of nothing, how are they different from nothing? If they are made of something, what holds them together but other forces? In that case, you'd be explaining force by means of force, and thus going round in circles.


Fields don't make objects move, but they can affect the lines of force, by diverting and concentrating them. Flux density is an often used term. The magnitude of the force is represented by the number of lines of force per given area.

Once more, how can fields do this if they are made of nothing? And if they are made of something, then other forces (of cohesion, resistance, etc.) come into play, as noted above.

In that case, you'd have forces changing the motion of bodies.

But, forces are not made of anything; so how can they affect the motion of bodies?

This is in fact the classic problem posed by Leibniz, to which no one has been able to think of an effective answer. There isn't much on-line on this, but the following partly explains the background:

http://www.garybanham.net/LECTURES_files/METALECTURE16.pdf

And several related issues are explained by one of my old teachers:


"As significant as his critique of Descartes' mechanics was Leibniz's attack on Newton's account of force. In the Principles, Newton limited himself to describing interactions between bodies in terms of general mathematical laws. This limitation was both a strength and a weakness. Newton succeeded in making the complexities of nature amenable to mathematical description only by simplifying the phenomena: by treating material particles as if they were infinitely hard yet infinitely elastic, concentrated at points, capable of exchanging any amount of force all at once, connected by forces operating instantaneously at a distance, and so on. Leibniz complained that this made Newton's system an idealised abstraction, which could not possibly be true of the real world. In reality, nothing was absolutely hard or elastic, nothing happened instantaneously, and every causal interaction was mediated by a complex mechanism. In general terms, Newton would have agreed with Leibniz's comment. He too believed in underlying mechanisms, but he refused to speculate about them in the Principles (his famous, 'I do not invent hypotheses')....

"Much later, in his Specimen of Dynamics (1695), Leibniz tried to give an account of the mechanism which mediated exchanges of force between colliding bodies. In real collisions (unlike Newton's idealisations), there had to be a finite period during which one body slowed down and the other picked up speed. This implied that bodies had a certain size, and were not absolutely hard or elastic, since the only conceivable mechanism for transfer of force was that bodies were first squashed together, and then gradually sprang back from each other once all the kinetic energy had been taken up. However, as soon as it is accepted that transfer of force between every day objects must be mediated by a mechanism, there is no point at which you stop needing smaller and smaller sub-mechanisms. At no level can you suddenly say that force is transferred directly.

"Elasticity is itself a phenomenon requiring explanation in terms of pushings of particles. At the first instant of impact, the outermost particles of each colliding body push against their neighbours, and these in turn push against their neighbours, and so on right through each body. But then each of these pushings needs to be explained by the compression of sub-particles, and so on to infinity. The conclusion Leibniz drew was that, ultimately, forces were not really transferred at all. All action was, as he put it, spontaneous. The energy required for a body's motion on the occasion of an impact, had to be drawn from its own resources, since it could not actually take up any energy from bodies impinging on it....

"An even more significant aspect of the theory was its abandonment of the traditional notion that matter was essentially inert. Leibniz saw that if the only function of matter was as a passive carrier of forces, then it had no role to play in scientific explanation. Its only role would be the metaphysical one of satisfying the prejudice that forces must inhere in something more substantial than themselves. He maintained that matter was nothing other than the receptive capacity of things, or their 'passive power', as he called it. Matter just was the capacity to slow other things down, and to be accelerated rather than penetrated (capacities which ghosts and shadows lack) -- in other words, inertia or mass, and solidity. So, taking also into account 'active powers' such as kinetic energy, Leibniz reduced matter to a complex of forces. In this he was anticipating modern field theory, which treats material particles as concentrated fields of force –- an anticipation duly recognised by its founder, the Italian mathematician Ruggiero Giuseppe Boscovich (1711-87)." [Ross (1984) Leibniz, pp.40-44.]

[Lynx]

In that case, what are fields made of? If they are made of nothing, how are they different from nothing? If they are made of something, what holds them together but other forces? In that case, you'd be explaining force by means of force, and thus going round in circles.
Fields are comprised of 3 dimensional space. They are a consequence of a distance parameter in an equation. If I hold a magnet in my hand, the magnetic field extends into 3 dimensional space, and is affected by the medium present within that space.

I cannot answer to the rest of your post. By my understanding, lines of force are used to represent the magnitude and distribution of force over areas of space. By some (or most?) accounts, it is just a representation!

Read this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tesla_(unit))?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Fields are comprised of 3 dimensional space. They are a consequence of a distance parameter in an equation. If I hold a magnet in my hand, the magnetic field extends into 3 dimensional space, and is affected by the medium present within that space.

This seems to mean that fields are mathematical objects after all!


I cannot answer to the rest of your post. By my understanding, lines of force are used to represent the magnitude and distribution of force over areas of space. By some (or most?) accounts, it is just a representation!

Maybe so, but representing what exactly?

Thanks for the link, but that seems to confirm my suspicion: forces and fields are mathematical, not physical, entities.

[Lynx]

This seems to mean that fields are mathematical objects after all!
The math describes relationships, for example:
A particle passing through a magnetic field of 1 Tesla at 1 meter per second carrying a charge of 1 Coulomb experiences a force of 1 Newton, according to the Lorentz Force Law.

Maybe so, but representing what exactly?
Representing what can be observed or measured.

Thanks for the link, but that seems to confirm my suspicion: forces and fields are mathematical, not physical, entities.
Well, topographic lines don't physically exist, but they can represent the slope and elevation of geographic features. They provide numbers able to describe physical objects.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


The math describes relationships, for example:
A particle passing through a magnetic field of 1 Tesla at 1 meter per second carrying a charge of 1 Coulomb experiences a force of 1 Newton, according to the Lorentz Force Law.

Yes, I read this. The mathematics is not open to question; the problem is, how do these mathematical objects make things in the physical world happen?


Representing what can be observed or measured.

In that case, they are a rather poor representation.


Well, topographic lines don't physically exist, but they can represent the slope and elevation of geographic features. They provide numbers able to describe physical objects.

Once more, these mathematical objects can't make anything happen in the physical world.

In which case, we have no explanation why anything happens anywhere in the entire universe! All we have is an idealised description.

[Lynx]

Yes, I read this. The mathematics is not open to question; the problem is, how do these mathematical objects make things in the physical world happen?
The exact mechanism has not been revealed beyond the idea that "the property of magnetism, etc. is 'carried' by the lines of force."

In that case, they are a rather poor representation.
They are parsimonious. What's the alternative - epicycles or elaborate 'just so ' stories?

Once more, these mathematical objects can't make anything happen in the physical world.

In which case, we have no explanation why anything happens anywhere in the entire universe! All we have is an idealised description.
We have observation and measurements that are consistent with mathematical formulae. We have the means of calculating and predicting real world conditions. It's a start. Perhaps it's all we need.

[Lynx]

Question: Have 'force carrying guage bosons' invalidated the original formulas?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


The exact mechanism has not been revealed beyond the idea that "the property of magnetism, etc. is 'carried' by the lines of force."

In other words, we do not know why things happen in the physical universe; worse, we haven't a clue.


They are parsimonious. What's the alternative - epicycles or elaborate 'just so ' stories?

But they are not even good at this! 'Lines of force' are infinitely thin, made of nothing at all, and yet are supposed to be able to push things about the place when they have no solidity.


It's a start. Perhaps it's all we need.

It's not much of a start, since it is no better than saying that angels push things around.

[black magick hustla]

The interesting thing is that in advanced mechanics we barely use the idea of Force anymore. We used the lagrangian, which makes use of the concept of energy, not force. Force can be very confusing, especially when there are multiple force vectors abound.

Anyway, the issue of force being suspect or not does not bother me at all. Force is defined as the change of momentum - it is a mathematical definition, and beyond that the prose that one might attach to it might sound iffy, but force is just F=dp/dt. Whether force is caused by curved spacetime, force carrying bosoms, or whatever - it is not the how that makes force but it is the definition of F=dp/dt that makes it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Marmot:


We used the lagrangian, which makes use of the concept of energy, not force.

Indeed, but as no one seems to know what energy is, this is not much of an advance.

And even if we did, how it can make things happen is no less obscure.

[black magick hustla]

You cannot disprove "force" because it is a mathematical construct that cannot be seen in the world. You can disprove that the earth is the center of the universe, but the usage of the mathematical construct force rests on its usefulness in calculations and nothing else. If it becomes inefficient or tautological we can discard it but you cannot approach "force" in the same way you approach the existence of physical entities like atoms, because its existence is not really physical, rather, its existence is a definition. if I define BUBU is 2+2 and enough people start using it in such a way then BUBU is 2+2.

[black magick hustla]

Marmot:



Indeed, but as no one seems to know what energy is, this is not much of an advance.

And even if we did, how it can make things happen is no less obscure.

Well, it does not matter the obscurity inherent to it but the usefulness of it and I think that perhaps, energy is the most important of all concepts of Physics. I remember my father scolding me for not knowing the definition of energy and he defined it as the capability of a body to exert work. I think that is a useful definition.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Marmot:


Well, it does not matter the obscurity inherent to it but the usefulness of it and I think that perhaps, energy is the most important of all concepts of Physics. I remember my father scolding me for not knowing the definition of energy and he defined it as the capability of a body to exert work. I think that is a useful definition.

Thanks for that, but I was aware of this defintion of energy -- but that just deepens the mystery -- how can a 'capacity' make things happen?

[This of course just underlines my earlier comment: we have no more idea today why things happen than the ancient Greeks.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Marmot:


if I define BUBU is 2+2 and enough people start using it in such a way then BUBU is 2+2.

But then, the numerals and symbols you use to do this will have changed their meaning, and you will now have two different meanings of "2", and "+", just as we have several meanings of "bank". in which case, not much will have changed.

[black magick hustla]

Marmot:



Thanks for that, but I was aware of this defintion of energy -- but that just deepens the mystery -- how can a 'capacity' make things happen?

[This of course just underlines my earlier comment: we have no more idea now why things happen than the ancient Greeks.]
:shrugs: we ask why why why why and then the question does not makes sense, does it? We might as well reply "because of God". The universe just is.

[JimFar]

Marmot:



Thanks for that, but I was aware of this defintion of energy -- but that just deepens the mystery -- how can a 'capacity' make things happen?

[This of course just underlines my earlier comment: we have no more idea today why things happen than the ancient Greeks.]

So Rosa, what would an explanation of why things happen look like? How would such an explanation differ from the kinds that we normally rely upon in the natural sciences?

[Lynx]

In other words, we do not know why things happen in the physical universe; worse, we haven't a clue.
We have plenty of clues. We have measurable parameters, and equations that express their relationship. We appear to have accurate and consistent models.

But they are not even good at this! 'Lines of force' are infinitely thin, made of nothing at all, and yet are supposed to be able to push things about the place when they have no solidity.
Have you ever held two magnets and experienced the attractive and repelling force? When like poles are brought together, the force feels like a cushion. A slippery, yet invisible cushion. Can we not deduce that some process is occurring within that space?
Lines of force are the result of vector measurements joined together as if you were completing a connect-the-dots puzzle.

It's not much of a start, since it is no better than saying that angels push things around.
Build a large enough magnifying glass and perhaps science can finish what was started. As long as the angels respect the equations, engineers will be happy.

[Lynx]

:shrugs: we ask why why why why and then the question does not makes sense, does it? We might as well reply "because of God". The universe just is.
The universe is arbitrary?

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

The universe is arbitrary?

I don't see how marmot's point is incompatible with your previous post.

[Lynx]

I don't see how marmot's point is incompatible with your previous post.
Being unable to uncover a reason for something is sufficient grounds to declare it arbitrary?

[black magick hustla]

Being unable to uncover a reason for something is sufficient grounds to declare it arbitrary?

I am not concerned with the categories philosophers have abstracted from their everyday use and applied to the Universe as if the Universe were a creation of man and thus can be treated as a software program or your closet. Beyond the very specific treatment of chaos in mathematics, or of "disorder" in thermodynamics (which are very technical terms), the issue of order versus arbitrariness can only make sense in the context of our thoughts and creations. Your closet can be orderly, mathematics are considered orderly, etc. Your decisions can be arbitrary, etc. The Universe just is and any application of some nonsense category like "order" or "arbitraryness" is based on your own unique aesthetic and nothing else.

If you ask why why why why the question stops having any logical sense and starts treading waters that our own means of communication cannot treat. Its like asking what was before the big bang.

[Lynx]

I am not concerned with the categories philosophers have abstracted from their everyday use and applied to the Universe as if the Universe were a creation of man and thus can be treated as a software program or your closet. Beyond the very specific treatment of chaos in mathematics, or of "disorder" in thermodynamics (which are very technical terms), the issue of order versus arbitrariness can only make sense in the context of our thoughts and creations. Your closet can be orderly, mathematics are considered orderly, etc. Your decisions can be arbitrary, etc. The Universe just is and any application of some nonsense category like "order" or "arbitraryness" is based on your own unique aesthetic and nothing else.
Arbitrary means 'no reason'. To assert that the Universe is arbitrary is incompatible with science. The Universe is not an interchangeable concept, like positive (+) or negative (-). The Universe can be observed and categorized and explained. Its structure and processes are defined by the interaction of physical laws.

If you ask why why why why the question stops having any logical sense and starts treading waters that our own means of communication cannot treat. Its like asking what was before the big bang.
Reductio ad absurdum?
We may be able to answer what was before the big bang or whether there even was a big bang once a lot of other questions are answered. Including questions about fields, forces and particle physics. At no point does science give up its quest.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


We have plenty of clues. We have measurable parameters, and equations that express their relationship. We appear to have accurate and consistent models.

Sure, we certainly have plenty of clues about how things have and will happen (so that we can predict many years in advance how some of them will turn out), but we still have no idea what makes things happen -- save we use metaphor and analogy (which then can't be cashed out in physical terms).


Have you ever held two magnets and experienced the attractive and repelling force? When like poles are brought together, the force feels like a cushion. A slippery, yet invisible cushion. Can we not deduce that some process is occurring within that space?
Lines of force are the result of vector measurements joined together as if you were completing a connect-the-dots puzzle

This is precisely the point Prof Wilzcek was making: our notion of 'force' arises from the reaction of our muscles to the relative motion (or lack of it) of gross bodies with which we come into contact (such as magnets). In other words, 'force' is an anthropogenic notion (in the sense that it is dependent on our awareness of the reaction our muscles make in such circumstances). Compare this with our sensation of heat; no one supposes that a sensation of heat exists in the external world. Same with the sensations of force you mention.

If so, then without human input here, 'force' would have no content, which is why many physicists no longer use the term (that is, above school/grade level).

Lines of force are not really of much help either, since they just tell us how certain objects line up around magnets, etc. They do not tell us what makes them do this.

[That was the point Leibniz tried to make: if a force could make solid objects move, then it would have to possess the required impenetrability/solidity in order to do that. But forces do not have solidity/impenetrability -- otherwise they'd have an internal structure, and then problem would simply re-appear further down, at a micro-level. The micro-structure of forces would thus have to be solid/impenetrable, too, which would then require extra internal forces to maintain this cohesion. This would then pass the problem on to these internal cohesive forces, whose structure would then pose the very same problem: have they the required internal cohesion to transmit cohesive forces outwards? At no point would we arrive at something inherently solid/impenetrable/cohesive. This led Leibniz to conclude that there can be no interactions between bodies or between forces and bodies, since at no time could force or momentum be transmitted. All change was thus internally generated, put there by 'god' as part of the ‘complete concept’ of the simple bodies (monads) that comprised more complex bodies. Force was thus an inherent property of such simple bodies, now interpreted as having a propensity to act in a certain way, causing things to happen by their own internal impulse, as it were. This is what the quotation I appended earlier partially argued. The problem with this is that it requires something entirely mysterious (i.e., 'god') to explain the non-mysterious!]


Build a large enough magnifying glass and perhaps science can finish what was started. As long as the angels respect the equations, engineers will be happy.

I am sorry, but I could not see what a magnifying glass had to do with this.

[Lynx]

Sure, we certainly have plenty of clues about how things have and will happen (so that we can predict many years in advance how some of them will turn out), but we still have no idea what makes things happen -- save we use metaphor and analogy (which then can't be cashed out in physical terms).
Consider them learning or perceptual aids. That is the extent of their usefulness and purpose.

This is precisely the point Prof Wilzcek was making: our notion of 'force' arises from the reaction of our muscles to the relative motion (or lack of it) of gross bodies with which we come into contact (such as magnets). In other words, 'force' is an anthropogenic notion (in the sense that it is dependent on our awareness of the reaction our muscles make in such circumstances). Compare this with our sensation of heat; no one supposes that a sensation of heat exists in the external world. Same with the sensations of force you mention.

If so, then without human input here, 'force' would have no content, which is why many physicists no longer use the term (that is, above school/grade level).
Force can be measured using instruments. Heat is indicative of infrared light, which can also be measured. These methods are independent of and more accurate than human based input.
We can observe a car being lifted with an electromagnet. When the current is cut, the car returns to Earth. Clearly something is acting upon the mass of the car. There is an exchange between potential and kinetic energy. And yet, the events just described do not occur with an object comprised of wood.
How does our concept of force play into the mystery being observed here?
We can measure and predict, yet can't fully explain...

Lines of force are not really of much help either, since they just tell us how certain objects line up around magnets, etc. They do not tell us what makes them do this.
Noxion wrote about 'force carrying guage bosons'. Might that help? Perhaps there is a computer generated animation that can help us visualize it.

[That was the point Leibniz tried to make: if a force could make solid objects move, then it would have to possess the required impenetrability/solidity in order to do that. But forces do not have solidity/impenetrability -- otherwise they'd have an internal structure, and then problem would simply re-appear further down, at a micro-level. The micro-structure of forces would thus have to be solid/impenetrable, too, which would then require extra internal forces to maintain this cohesion. This would then pass the problem on to these internal cohesive forces, whose structure would then pose the very same problem: have they the required internal cohesion to transmit cohesive forces outwards? At no point would we arrive at something inherently solid/impenetrable/cohesive. This led Leibniz to conclude that there can be no interactions between bodies or between forces and bodies, since at no time could force or momentum be transmitted. All change was thus internally generated, put there by 'god' as part of the ‘complete concept’ of the simple bodies (monads) that comprised more complex bodies. Force was thus an inherent property of such simple bodies, now interpreted as having a propensity to act in a certain way, causing things to happen by their own internal impulse, as it were. This is what the quotation I appended earlier partially argued. The problem with this is that it requires something entirely mysterious (i.e., 'god') to explain the non-mysterious!]
It's been my impression that matter is mostly empty space at the subatomic scale. Collisions between particles are rare. In the absence of interaction, particles such as neutrinos can pass right through the Earth. One criteria for whether an interaction takes place is proximity.
That's it - that's all I can remember.

I am sorry, but I could not see what a magnifying glass had to do with this.
I assume the answer to this mystery is to be found in the realm of the very small. I suppose it could also be hidden dimensionally.

Will you be having a tesseract with your String Tea?

[Lynx]

We imagine forces: the electromagnet pulling the car to itself, Earth continuously tugging at it from below...

[Black Sheep]

that cannot be, Luke used it

[Lynx]

After reading this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gauge_boson) and that (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fundamental_interaction), I require a visual representation to better understand what I read. The Standard Model is too complex to visualize using just words.

The modern quantum mechanical view of the fundamental forces other than gravity is that particles of matter (fermions) do not directly interact with each other, but rather carry a charge, and exchange virtual particles (gauge bosons), which are the interaction carriers or force mediators. For example, photons mediate the interaction of electric charges, and gluons mediate the interaction of color charges.

[black magick hustla]

Arbitrary means 'no reason'. To assert that the Universe is arbitrary is incompatible with science. The Universe is not an interchangeable concept, like positive (+) or negative (-). The Universe can be observed and categorized and explained. Its structure and processes are defined by the interaction of physical laws.

Obviously the universe has no reason for anything. Only men and their affairs have reasons.. The Universe can be described as what it is, but ithere are no reasons to why this things happen - they only happen. Whether we can extrapolate a paradigm from nature is very different of whether the Universe is "rational". Besides, such a paradigm cannot be assured it describes "accurarately" nature, but it can only be known how experimentally and observationally sensible is the paradigm. Ptolemy's epicicles were very good at explaining the movement of planets for example. How can we know the schrodinger equation is not a giant epicycle that is good at explaining the position and momentums of subatomic particles?



We may be able to answer what was before the big bang or whether there even was a big bang once a lot of other questions are answered. Including questions about fields, forces and particle physics. At no point does science give up its quest.

We cannot know what was before the big bang if what scientists say is correct - i.e. the big bang is also the beginning of space time. Words do not exist to describe something before space and time. If it is true that the big bang was the beginning of space and time then that will be the limit of science because that is essentially the limit of the words we are able to use to describe the world. Can you even imagine a world without space and time?


This is precisely the point Prof Wilzcek was making: our notion of 'force' arises from the reaction of our muscles to the relative motion (or lack of it) of gross bodies with which we come into contact (such as magnets). In other words, 'force' is an anthropogenic notion (in the sense that it is dependent on our awareness of the reaction our muscles make in such circumstances). Compare this with our sensation of heat; no one supposes that a sensation of heat exists in the external world. Same with the sensations of force you mention.

If so, then without human input here, 'force' would have no content, which is why many physicists no longer use the term (that is, above school/grade level).

Lines of force are not really of much help either, since they just tell us how certain objects line up around magnets, etc. They do not tell us what makes them do this.

[That was the point Leibniz tried to make: if a force could make solid objects move, then it would have to possess the required impenetrability/solidity in order to do that. But forces do not have solidity/impenetrability -- otherwise they'd have an internal structure, and then problem would simply re-appear further down, at a micro-level. The micro-structure of forces would thus have to be solid/impenetrable, too, which would then require extra internal forces to maintain this cohesion. This would then pass the problem on to these internal cohesive forces, whose structure would then pose the very same problem: have they the required internal cohesion to transmit cohesive forces outwards? At no point would we arrive at something inherently solid/impenetrable/cohesive. This led Leibniz to conclude that there can be no interactions between bodies or between forces and bodies, since at no time could force or momentum be transmitted. All change was thus internally generated, put there by 'god' as part of the ‘complete concept’ of the simple bodies (monads) that comprised more complex bodies. Force was thus an inherent property of such simple bodies, now interpreted as having a propensity to act in a certain way, causing things to happen by their own internal impulse, as it were. This is what the quotation I appended earlier partially argued. The problem with this is that it requires something entirely mysterious (i.e., 'god') to explain the non-mysterious!]

Well force does have a place in the lagriangian, which is used to describe mechanics more advancely. Force is encoded in the equation of motion you get by solving the lagrangian.

I understand why you think Force entirely makes use of human attributes. But I think the project you are proposing, of a "science" devoid of human qualities is impossible. You are the one that inspired me to read Wittgenstein. How can words describe a science without refering to concepts we are familar with? The fact that you need to picture something palpable to describe magnetic lines of force has more to do with our own limits than anything else. I don't think science can do that. I think what can science hope at most is describe the universe as it is in the sense that it can come with unified axioms that can lead to future predictions. Otherwise we might as well start looking for an ultimate "truth:, as the socrates and the christians think.

[black magick hustla]

Arbitrary means 'no reason'. To assert that the Universe is arbitrary is incompatible with science. The Universe is not an interchangeable concept, like positive (+) or negative (-). The Universe can be observed and categorized and explained. Its structure and processes are defined by the interaction of physical laws.

Obviously the universe has no reason for anything. Only men and their affairs have reasons.. The Universe can be described as what it is, but ithere are no reasons to why this things happen - they only happen. Whether we can extrapolate a paradigm from nature is very different of whether the Universe is "rational". Besides, such a paradigm cannot be assured it describes "accurarately" nature, but it can only be known how experimentally and observationally sensible is the paradigm. Ptolemy's epicicles were very good at explaining the movement of planets for example. How can we know the schrodinger equation is not a giant epicycle that is good at explaining the position and momentums of subatomic particles?



We may be able to answer what was before the big bang or whether there even was a big bang once a lot of other questions are answered. Including questions about fields, forces and particle physics. At no point does science give up its quest.

We cannot know what was before the big bang if what scientists say is correct - i.e. the big bang is also the beginning of space time. Words do not exist to describe something before space and time. If it is true that the big bang was the beginning of space and time then that will be the limit of science because that is essentially the limit of the words we are able to use to describe the world. Can you even imagine a world without space and time?


This is precisely the point Prof Wilzcek was making: our notion of 'force' arises from the reaction of our muscles to the relative motion (or lack of it) of gross bodies with which we come into contact (such as magnets). In other words, 'force' is an anthropogenic notion (in the sense that it is dependent on our awareness of the reaction our muscles make in such circumstances). Compare this with our sensation of heat; no one supposes that a sensation of heat exists in the external world. Same with the sensations of force you mention.

If so, then without human input here, 'force' would have no content, which is why many physicists no longer use the term (that is, above school/grade level).

Lines of force are not really of much help either, since they just tell us how certain objects line up around magnets, etc. They do not tell us what makes them do this.

[That was the point Leibniz tried to make: if a force could make solid objects move, then it would have to possess the required impenetrability/solidity in order to do that. But forces do not have solidity/impenetrability -- otherwise they'd have an internal structure, and then problem would simply re-appear further down, at a micro-level. The micro-structure of forces would thus have to be solid/impenetrable, too, which would then require extra internal forces to maintain this cohesion. This would then pass the problem on to these internal cohesive forces, whose structure would then pose the very same problem: have they the required internal cohesion to transmit cohesive forces outwards? At no point would we arrive at something inherently solid/impenetrable/cohesive. This led Leibniz to conclude that there can be no interactions between bodies or between forces and bodies, since at no time could force or momentum be transmitted. All change was thus internally generated, put there by 'god' as part of the ‘complete concept’ of the simple bodies (monads) that comprised more complex bodies. Force was thus an inherent property of such simple bodies, now interpreted as having a propensity to act in a certain way, causing things to happen by their own internal impulse, as it were. This is what the quotation I appended earlier partially argued. The problem with this is that it requires something entirely mysterious (i.e., 'god') to explain the non-mysterious!]

Well force does have a place in the lagriangian, which is used to describe mechanics more advancely. Force is encoded in the equation of motion you get by solving the lagrangian.

I understand why you think Force entirely makes use of human attributes. But I think the project you are proposing, of a "science" devoid of human qualities is impossible. You are the one that inspired me to read Wittgenstein. How can words describe a science without refering to concepts we are familar with? The fact that you need to picture something palpable to describe magnetic lines of force has more to do with our own limits than anything else. I don't think science can do that. I think what can science hope at most is describe the universe as it is in the sense that it can come with unified axioms that can lead to future predictions. Otherwise we might as well start looking for an ultimate "truth:, as the socrates and the christians think.

[Lynx]

Obviously the universe has no reason for anything. Only men and their affairs have reasons.. The Universe can be described as what it is, but ithere are no reasons to why this things happen - they only happen. Whether we can extrapolate a paradigm from nature is very different of whether the Universe is "rational".
Discovering how the universe works and how it came to be is the goal of science. Reasons for "how" things work are mechanistic, functional.

Besides, such a paradigm cannot be assured it describes "accurarately" nature, but it can only be known how experimentally and observationally sensible is the paradigm. Ptolemy's epicicles were very good at explaining the movement of planets for example. How can we know the schrodinger equation is not a giant epicycle that is good at explaining the position and momentums of subatomic particles?
We cannot be certain, even when there are no known inconsistencies. We've seen that theories can be refined or replaced. Science is not static, theories are not carved onto stone tablets.

We cannot know what was before the big bang if what scientists say is correct - i.e. the big bang is also the beginning of space time. Words do not exist to describe something before space and time. If it is true that the big bang was the beginning of space and time then that will be the limit of science because that is essentially the limit of the words we are able to use to describe the world. Can you even imagine a world without space and time?
A zero dimensional universe would be a tough nut to crack.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

Discovering how the universe works and how it came to be is the goal of science. Reasons for "how" things work are mechanistic, functional.

What's the difference, at the end of the day? Why do stars like our Sun shine? Because of a process we know as nuclear fusion. But why nuclear fusion? Well, what's the alternative?

The universe is under no obligation to "make sense" to us naked apes. We're clever enough to know how a lot of it keeps on ticking, but to subscribe any further function, purpose or agency beyond what we can actually measure strikes me as fruitless.

Yet despite that, and what interests me about science more than anything else, our universe can be understood, to a degree at least. Magnetic field lines may be an abstract representation of what's "really" there, but maglev trains still work. Quantum mechanics baffles the shit out of a vast majority of people (it certainly baffles the shit out of me!), yet billions of transistors function billions of times every second.

Frankly, philosophical neatness can go hang as far as I'm concerned. The only reliable way of finding out anything about the universe involves actually going out there (or out to the lab) and poking, prodding, fiddling with, taking apart, heating up or otherwise experimenting on the bits of the universe one wishes to find out more about. You can also discover a surprising amount simply through careful observation with the right tools. That is at once amazing and empowering.

Speaking of which, you know that old saw, "knowledge is power"? Science has given the human species power undreamed of by any before. We applied our knowledge of expanding steam, and at a stroke animal labour was pushed to the margins and the way was paved for the eventual freedom of humanity from soul-destroying drudgery. When we poked around inside the atom, it gave us more power to sustain life, or to obliterate it utterly if we so choose. Knowledge of evolution and genetics has already reaped bumper harvests and provided advances such that modern medicine would be poorer without them. Our current knowledge may already be leading us to create genuinely new life (abiogenesis) as well as new intelligence (neuroscience & Artificial intelligence), and so much more besides.

My only regret is that we have far, far too much scientific knowledge than can reasonably be expected to be stored in a single human brain. Another problem that scientists could work on. I think they should jump to it!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Consider them learning or perceptual aids. That is the extent of their usefulness and purpose.

But then so is the 'theory' that angels push things about the place.


Force can be measured using instruments. Heat is indicative of infrared light, which can also be measured. These methods are independent of and more accurate than human based input.

What is measured in fact (as the earlier passages I quoted argued) are relative accelerations, not forces. These accelerations are then transformed into forces by means of devices such as Newton's Second Law.


We can observe a car being lifted with an electromagnet. When the current is cut, the car returns to Earth. Clearly something is acting upon the mass of the car. There is an exchange between potential and kinetic energy. And yet, the events just described do not occur with an object comprised of wood.
How does our concept of force play into the mystery being observed here?
We can measure and predict, yet can't fully explain..

All we see are events that happen one after the other. No forces are observed, nor can they be. So, all we have are relative accelerations.

Moreover, as I argued in my last post, forces cannot actually account for such relative accelerations. So, the postulation of forces is to no avail -- except perhaps to maintain the morale of those who cling on to this animistic idea.

And it depends on what you mean by 'explain'. If you mean that our mathematical theories can predict events, fine. But, if you mean that we understand the means by which these things happen, then we don't have an explanation, just a gesture at one (and one no more convincing than attributing such events to the intervention of angels).


Noxion wrote about 'force carrying gauge bosons'. Might that help? Perhaps there is a computer generated animation that can help us visualize it.

Not really, since these bosons do not actually 'carry' anything, they just transfer momentum.


It's been my impression that matter is mostly empty space at the subatomic scale. Collisions between particles are rare. In the absence of interaction, particles such as neutrinos can pass right through the Earth. One criteria for whether an interaction takes place is proximity.
That's it - that's all I can remember.

Maybe so, but as Leibniz argued, we still have no clue how interaction can occur (and, if he is right, good reason to suppose they cannot), howsoever rare or frequent these are.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Marmot:


Well force does have a place in the lagriangian, which is used to describe mechanics more advancely. Force is encoded in the equation of motion you get by solving the lagrangian.

I do not deny that forces appear in the mathematics; the question is, do they enjoy a physical existence? If it legitimate to argue from the mathematics to the real world, then we should try to discover divs, grads and curls in reality, too. But, where would you even begin to look? And by what means?


I understand why you think Force entirely makes use of human attributes. But I think the project you are proposing, of a "science" devoid of human qualities is impossible. You are the one that inspired me to read Wittgenstein. How can words describe a science without referring to concepts we are familiar with? The fact that you need to picture something palpable to describe magnetic lines of force has more to do with our own limits than anything else. I don't think science can do that. I think what can science hope at most is describe the universe as it is in the sense that it can come with unified axioms that can lead to future predictions. Otherwise we might as well start looking for an ultimate "truth:, as the socrates and the christians think.

In fact, I am taking no position here. If scientists need forces to 'explain' things, that is up to them. But, on the other hand, it is up to those who think like me to point out the limitations of using such concepts.

And I agree with you that it is impossible to filter out of science the use of words derived from human interaction; but that just underlines the fact that scientists have to use ordinary language (extended into metaphor and analogy), in order to make their ideas relate to reality in a comprehensible way.

It is when they fail to recognise this, and misconstrue these metaphors as literal descriptions of nature, that confusion arises.

And that is perhaps how Wittgenstein would have put this.

[Lynx]

What's the difference, at the end of the day? Why do stars like our Sun shine? Because of a process we know as nuclear fusion. But why nuclear fusion? Well, what's the alternative?
How does nuclear fusion work? We should answer these type of questions before asking about alternatives. Philosophical 'why's' should perhaps never be asked, at least not by science.

Yet despite that, and what interests me about science more than anything else, our universe can be understood, to a degree at least. Magnetic field lines may be an abstract representation of what's "really" there, but maglev trains still work. Quantum mechanics baffles the shit out of a vast majority of people (it certainly baffles the shit out of me!), yet billions of transistors function billions of times every second.

Frankly, philosophical neatness can go hang as far as I'm concerned. The only reliable way of finding out anything about the universe involves actually going out there (or out to the lab) and poking, prodding, fiddling with, taking apart, heating up or otherwise experimenting on the bits of the universe one wishes to find out more about. You can also discover a surprising amount simply through careful observation with the right tools. That is at once amazing and empowering.

Speaking of which, you know that old saw, "knowledge is power"? Science has given the human species power undreamed of by any before. We applied our knowledge of expanding steam, and at a stroke animal labour was pushed to the margins and the way was paved for the eventual freedom of humanity from soul-destroying drudgery. When we poked around inside the atom, it gave us more power to sustain life, or to obliterate it utterly if we so choose. Knowledge of evolution and genetics has already reaped bumper harvests and provided advances such that modern medicine would be poorer without them. Our current knowledge may already be leading us to create genuinely new life (abiogenesis) as well as new intelligence (neuroscience & Artificial intelligence), and so much more besides.

My only regret is that we have far, far too much scientific knowledge than can reasonably be expected to be stored in a single human brain. Another problem that scientists could work on. I think they should jump to it!
Exactly. We don't necessarily require perfect knowledge (or perfect comprehension) to be able to apply what we've learned. As I'm fond of saying, life's a kludge. Eventually it will get more elegant, but only after trial and error, and by finding out what works concretely.

[Lynx]

But then so is the 'theory' that angels push things about the place.
This is not a useful explanation. It doesn't represent the measurements that can be made, or their relationships.

What is measured in fact (as the earlier passages I quoted argued) are relative accelerations, not forces. These accelerations are then transformed into forces by means of devices such as Newton's Second Law.
Then it is an inference?

All we see are events that happen one after the other. No forces are observed, nor can they be. So, all we have are relative accelerations.
Would the same analysis hold true for a mechanical transfer of energy, such as a hammer driving a nail?

And it depends on what you mean by 'explain'. If you mean that our mathematical theories can predict events, fine. But, if you mean that we understand the means by which these things happen, then we don't have an explanation, just a gesture at one (and one no more convincing than attributing such events to the intervention of angels).
We have models. Models are supposed to be approximations of reality. We take these and work with them at the macro world level.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


This is not a useful explanation. It doesn't represent the measurements that can be made, or their relationships.

Maybe so, but I was replying to this:


Consider them learning or perceptual aids. That is the extent of their usefulness and purpose.

Here you say: "That is the extent of their usefulness and purpose"; now you want more out of them:


This is not a useful explanation. It doesn't represent the measurements that can be made, or their relationships.

So, that wasn't "the extent of their usefulness and purpose", after all.

Make your mind up.

Anyway, as I noted earlier in reply to Marmot, the mathematics is not in any doubt; what is up for grabs is the ontological status of forces:


I do not deny that forces appear in the mathematics; the question is, do they enjoy a physical existence? If it legitimate to argue from the mathematics to the real world, then we should try to discover divs, grads and curls in reality, too. But, where would you even begin to look? And by what means?

Lynx:


Then it is an inference?

Forces can't be inferences (that would make them linguistic); propositions expressing their existence can be the result of an inference. But, as I noted, such an inference would no more account for change than would an appeal to the angels, or to epicycles in the case of planetary motion (remember, an appeal to epicycles can be made as accurate as one could wish; all one has to do is keep adding them until the mathematics tells you to stop). So, such an inference (to the existence of forces) would produce something the nature of which is obscure, and whose efficacy is impossible to spell out, but whose existence we can show cannot account for change.


Would the same analysis hold true for a mechanical transfer of energy, such as a hammer driving a nail?

The nature of energy is alas even more obscure than the nature of forces


We have models. Models are supposed to be approximations of reality. We take these and work with them at the macro world level

Call them what you like, if such 'models' contain a reference to forces, all the problems I have been outlining kick in. And if that is so they cannot be 'approximations' to anything remotely physical.

In which case, you could replace 'force' with 'angel' once more, with no loss of accuracy.

[Lynx]

Maybe so, but I was replying to this:

Here you say: "That is the extent of their usefulness and purpose"; now you want more out of them:

So, that wasn't "the extent of their usefulness and purpose", after all.

Make your mind up.
I thought we had already covered the fact that they are representations. So you can't go changing their content and expect they will remain useful for their intended audience. Which, I might add, consists of amateurs like myself and paradigm-dwelling scientists.

Forces can't be inferences (that would make them linguistic); propositions expressing their existence can be the result of an inference. But, as I noted, such an inference would no more account for change than would an appeal to the angels, or to epicycles in the case of planetary motion (remember, an appeal to epicycles can be made as accurate as one could wish; all one has to do is keep adding them until the mathematics tells you to stop). So, such an inference (to the existence of forces) would produce something the nature of which is obscure, and whose efficacy is impossible to spell out, but whose existence we can show cannot account for change.
And yet 'force' plays a useful role as a parameter, or as a unit of measurement. A useful concept for engineering, if not for science.
Considering all of the above, what is its ontological status?

The nature of energy is alas even more obscure than the nature of forces
Yes, but in this case wouldn't the mechanism for transmission of force be straightforward? Solid pushing solid...

Call them what you like, if such 'models' contain a reference to forces, all the problems I have been outlining kick in. And if that is so they cannot be 'approximations' to anything remotely physical.
What would you call them?

In which case, you could replace 'force' with 'angel' once more, with no loss of accuracy.
Angel = Mass x Acceleration ?
Maybe so, but it is fanciful to believe a bridge is held together by angels. Literally or figuratively.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


I thought we had already covered the fact that they are representations. So you can't go changing their content and expect they will remain useful for their intended audience. Which, I might add, consists of amateurs like myself and paradigm-dwelling scientists.

But, the question is, what do they represent? No one has a clue. Nor does anyone know how forces would work (physically), even if they knew.


And yet 'force' plays a useful role as a parameter, or as a unit of measurement. A useful concept for engineering, if not for science.
Considering all of the above, what is its ontological status?

As I noted earlier, force only works as a unit of measurement because of translational equations like Newton's Second Law. And force does indeed serve as a useful heuristic (explanatory) device in engineering and certain areas of physics, but it is plain that forces have no physical correlate in the material world.

Moreover, it is no use asking me what the ontological status of force is, since neither I nor anyone else seems to know.


Yes, but in this case wouldn't the mechanism for transmission of force be straightforward? Solid pushing solid...

Well, this is the idea that Leibniz criticised, which I outlined earlier:


That was the point Leibniz tried to make: if a force could make solid objects move, then it would have to possess the required impenetrability/solidity in order to do that. But forces do not have solidity/impenetrability -- otherwise they'd have an internal structure, and then problem would simply re-appear further down, at a micro-level. The micro-structure of forces would thus have to be solid/impenetrable, too, which would then require extra internal forces to maintain this cohesion. This would then pass the problem on to these internal cohesive forces, whose structure would then pose the very same problem: have they the required internal cohesion to transmit cohesive forces outwards? At no point would we arrive at something inherently solid/impenetrable/cohesive. This led Leibniz to conclude that there can be no interactions between bodies or between forces and bodies, since at no time could force or momentum be transmitted. All change was thus internally generated, put there by 'god' as part of the ‘complete concept’ of the simple bodies (monads) that comprised more complex bodies. Force was thus an inherent property of such simple bodies, now interpreted as having a propensity to act in a certain way, causing things to happen by their own internal impulse, as it were. This is what the quotation I appended earlier partially argued. The problem with this is that it requires something entirely mysterious (i.e., 'god') to explain the non-mysterious!

Lynx:


What would you call them?

Well, us Wittgensteinians call them (or the theories in which they are embedded) 'forms of representation'.


Angel = Mass x Acceleration ?

That wasn't the point I was making. The point was that when it comes to explaining how forces can make anything change, that explanation will be no more effective than using the word 'angel'.


Maybe so, but it is fanciful to believe a bridge is held together by angels. Literally or figuratively.

But, once more, when it comes to explaining how forces hold bridges together, 'angel' works just as well, or just as bad, as 'force', depending on your viewpoint.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

How does nuclear fusion work?

Well, we seem to know quite a bit about it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion). Basically, gravity (or in the case of artificial fusion, electromagnetic fields and lasers/particle beams) squishes hydrogen atoms and their isotopes to the point where residual nuclear forces overcome electrostatic repulsions and the nuclei fuse together, releasing energy and reaction products in the process.

It's fascinating how things that operate on very large scales are intimately connect to things that happen on the very small scales


We should answer these type of questions before asking about alternatives.There doesn't seem to be any alternative to what we know. At least no alternative with evidence backing it up.


Philosophical 'why's' should perhaps never be asked, at least not by science.If a question can't be (at least in theory) answered or informed by science, then it doesn't strike me as a worthwhile question to ask.


Exactly. We don't necessarily require perfect knowledge (or perfect comprehension) to be able to apply what we've learned. As I'm fond of saying, life's a kludge. Eventually it will get more elegant, but only after trial and error, and by finding out what works concretely.It seems that pragmatism is something that escapes most philosophers.

[black magick hustla]

Marmot:



I do not deny that forces appear in the mathematics; the question is, do they enjoy a physical existence? If it legitimate to argue from the mathematics to the real world, then we should try to discover divs, grads and curls in reality, too. But, where would you even begin to look? And by what means?

Force exists as a definition. Force is dp/dt. I would agree with you if someone said "the magnet pushed the other magnet", but the issue here is that there is a change of momentum and thus a force vector. The physicality of it does not concerns me, but the statement that Force is mass times acceleration is a correct statement and there is nothing wrong with using it like that.

[black magick hustla]

Well, we seem to know quite a bit about it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion). If a question can't be (at least in theory) answered or informed by science, then it doesn't strike me as a worthwhile question to ask.


But scientists are a community of men with their own prejudices and aspirations. I might agree with you to the extent that questions that aren't truth functions and cannot be compared to a picture of reality might be nonsense, (because they cant never be proved true or false), but scientists sometimes are culprits of doing this to (String theory).

[black magick hustla]

While I think traditional philosophy and continental philosophy is worthless, I think reading a bit up on logic and philosophy of language and science does help the scientist. Because this "philosophies" are concerned more with the clarificiation of thoughts and the limits of them than any sort of "truth finding".

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

But scientists are a community of men with their own prejudices and aspirations.

Yes, but each scientist has their own particular set of prejudices and aspirations. While there is some overlap, there's a lot of cancelling out as well. Besides, what is "true" in science is decided by observation and experiment, not the authority of any one scientist. Scientists don't accept the Theory of Relativity because Einstein was a swell guy - they accept it because its predictions are confirmed by experiment and observation.


I might agree with you to the extent that questions that aren't truth functions and cannot be compared to a picture of reality might be nonsense, (because they cant never be proved true or false), but scientists sometimes are culprits of doing this to (String theory).I wasn't aware that String "Theory" was anything other than a hypothesis. Confirming or falsifying it will require energies that we cannot currently achieve... at the moment. It certainly seems an elegant solution, but that doesn't really mean anything at the end of the day.

My prediction, for what it's worth: The fuss over String Theory will die down long before we have the capability to falsify it. When we do, it'll either return from the dead so to speak, or will languish eternally as an elegant mathematical construction.

Go on Universe, prove me wrong, I dare you.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Marmot:


Force exists as a definition. Force is dp/dt. I would agree with you if someone said "the magnet pushed the other magnet", but the issue here is that there is a change of momentum and thus a force vector.

So do divs, grads and curls.


The physicality of it does not concerns me, but the statement that Force is mass times acceleration is a correct statement and there is nothing wrong with using it like that

Maybe it doesn't concern you, but it does concern physicists who want to explain why things happen.

And sure, force is related to mass and acceleration by the Second Law, but that does not mean that force has a correlate in the material world, anymore than there are matrices in nature.

[Lynx]

But, the question is, what do they represent? No one has a clue. Nor does anyone know how forces would work (physically), even if they knew.
They represent repeated observation and measurement.
They may represent unproven hypotheses.
For the casual reader, they represent the limit of current scientific knowledge.
Of course, there are questions that are not addressed, and mysteries that are left unresolved.

As I noted earlier, force only works as a unit of measurement because of translational equations like Newton's Second Law. And force does indeed serve as a useful heuristic (explanatory) device in engineering and certain areas of physics, but it is plain that forces have no physical correlate in the material world.

Moreover, it is no use asking me what the ontological status of force is, since neither I nor anyone else seems to know.
It's ontological status is thus unknown.

Well, this is the idea that Leibniz criticised, which I outlined earlier:
That suggests it is of no use for scientific purposes. It is irreducible.

Well, us Wittgensteinians call them (or the theories in which they are embedded) 'forms of representation'.
Very well, by my count there are 3 'forms of representation' involving forces: Field Theory, The Standard Model and String Theory.

That wasn't the point I was making. The point was that when it comes to explaining how forces can make anything change, that explanation will be no more effective than using the word 'angel'.
You are wryly emphasizing the current lack of a scientific explanation, a situation that may change in the future.

But, once more, when it comes to explaining how forces hold bridges together, 'angel' works just as well, or just as bad, as 'force', depending on your viewpoint.
My viewpoint is that an explanation should be as factually based as possible, or be a plausible alternative, or provide some hope that it can be tested.

[Lynx]

Well, we seem to know quite a bit about it (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_fusion). Basically, gravity (or in the case of artificial fusion, electromagnetic fields and lasers/particle beams) squishes hydrogen atoms and their isotopes to the point where residual nuclear forces overcome electrostatic repulsions and the nuclei fuse together, releasing energy and reaction products in the process.
It's also true that our knowledge is incomplete, hence more work is required at both the theoretical and applied levels.

It's fascinating how things that operate on very large scales are intimately connect to things that happen on the very small scales
Yes, there does appear to be an interconnectedness between physical laws.

There doesn't seem to be any alternative to what we know. At least no alternative with evidence backing it up.
This may be so, yet we are already capable of creating optimized versions of matter, exemplified by materials engineering and perhaps in the future, with nanotechnology.

It seems that pragmatism is something that escapes most philosophers.Indeed.
Does pragmatism escape most workers?

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

This may be so, yet we are already capable of creating optimized versions of matter, exemplified by materials engineering and perhaps in the future, with nanotechnology.

Nanotechnology is still made up of ordinary atoms - one distinctly ordinary element, Carbon, is proving useful in this regard.


Indeed.
Does pragmatism escape most workers?

Considering the fact they have bills to pay, I don't think so. But most workers don't seems to see science as a pragmatic discipline because of the appalling state of most educational systems.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


They represent repeated observation and measurement.
They may represent unproven hypotheses.
For the casual reader, they represent the limit of current scientific knowledge.
Of course, there are questions that are not addressed, and mysteries that are left unresolved.

Again, depends on what you mean by 'represent'. If you mean 'maps reality' then forces will not appear on that map, any more than the hopes and fears of human beings appear on a map of the town where you live.

If you mean by 'represent', 'expresses the mathematics of the processes in question', then fine. But, a graph represents in this way, but no one supposes the axes, the grid lines, the curve, etc., actually exist in reality.


They may represent unproven hypotheses.

Again, depends on what you mean by 'hypothesis'. If you mean a 'provisional theory about how things happen', then we are back to where we were before, since forces cannot make things happen. On the other hand, if you mean a 'provisional theory about how the mathematics pans out' then fine.


It's ontological status is thus unknown.

Indeed, but the situation is even worse, since we know that whatever they are, forces cannot make things happen. So their 'ontological status' is on a par with the angels.


Very well, by my count there are 3 'forms of representation' involving forces: Field Theory, The Standard Model and String Theory

Fair enough.


You are wryly emphasizing the current lack of a scientific explanation, a situation that may change in the future.

In fact, I have repeatedly been arguing that no matter what is done with them, forces cannot offer a physical explanation of how things happen, and this is because they are replete with animistic connotations (having originated in our experience of muscular strain).


My viewpoint is that an explanation should be as factually based as possible, or be a plausible alternative, or provide some hope that it can be tested.

Indeed, but our use of theory determines what counts as a fact. So, a Christian who is a scientist will see 'the divine order' as a fact; an atheist won't, etc. So, Christians tend to be OK with forces (since they are quite happy to animate nature as an arena where 'god' does things with the 'forces' at 'his' command).

Which is, of course, just one more reason for us atheists to accept 'forces' as nothing but useful fictions.

[Lynx]

Again, depends on what you mean by 'represent'. If you mean 'maps reality' then forces will not appear on that map, any more than the hopes and fears of human beings appear on a map of the town where you live.
Is there such a thing as a reality map?
How would you classify a topographical map?

If you mean by 'represent', 'expresses the mathematics of the processes in question', then fine. But, a graph represents in this way, but no one supposes the axes, the grid lines, the curve, etc., actually exist in reality.
Lines of force are the result of a large number of vector measurements (ie. dots with a little arrow to indicate direction of force and a number indicating its magnitude)) being connected to form lines. The lines are not real (nor the dots), but the measurements are real and the correlative method used to connect the dots is supposedly valid. Thus, I place this under mathematical representation.

I do not know enough about the Standard Model to know where to place it. Barring the existence of visual evidence showing 'force carrying guage bosons' doing their thing, it is likely a mathematical representation as well.

Again, depends on what you mean by 'hypothesis'. If you mean a 'provisional theory about how things happen', then we are back to where we were before, since forces cannot make things happen. On the other hand, if you mean a 'provisional theory about how the mathematics pans out' then fine.
I mean an actual hypothesis that hasn't yet been confirmed. String Theory may be an example.

Indeed, but the situation is even worse, since we know that whatever they are, forces cannot make things happen. So their 'ontological status' is on a par with the angels.
[...]
In fact, I have repeatedly been arguing that no matter what is done with them, forces cannot offer a physical explanation of how things happen, and this is because they are replete with animistic connotations (having originated in our experience of muscular strain).
How can you be certain that a scientific explanation will not be developed in the future?
The use of the concept of force and our daily experience with it can be used to make things happen. This suggests we're on the right track towards discovering the actual mechanisms.

Indeed, but our use of theory determines what counts as a fact. So, a Christian who is a scientist will see 'the divine order' as a fact; an atheist won't, etc. So, Christians tend to be OK with forces (since they are quite happy to animate nature as an arena where 'god' does things with the 'forces' at 'his' command).
Be that as it may, a Christian would not assert that a bridge is held together by angels. Meanwhile, theories are supposed to be built on collections of facts, not the other way around!

Which is, of course, just one more reason for us atheists to accept 'forces' as nothing but useful fictions.
I'm not a Christian physicist, so I tend to accept 'forces' as merely useful.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Is there such a thing as a reality map?
How would you classify a topographical map?

Well, I used the phrase "maps reality" and put it in 'scare quotes' since it is not a phrase I myself prefer; I was merely trying to understand you.

A topographical map, if mathematical, but not geological or geographical, is a special sort of rule, not a map as we would ordinarily understand the term.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map_(mathematics)


Lines of force are the result of a large number of vector measurements (ie. dots with a little arrow to indicate direction of force and a number indicating its magnitude)) being connected to form lines. The lines are not real (nor the dots), but the measurements are real and the correlative method used to connect the dots is supposedly valid. Thus, I place this under mathematical representation.

Yes, I do know; I do have a mathematics degree.

Once more, the 'measurements' you keep referring to are the result of using Newton's Second Law (or some other), and derive from relative motion. Forces are merely the shadow of such operations cast onto the world by over imaginative physicists (mercifully, less so these days).

So, this sort of 'representation' is not like a geographical map, but more like a graph, where the mode of representation (axes, grid lines, labels, curves) are not actually to be found in reality (except they certainly appear on the page!), but only on the graph.


Barring the existence of visual evidence showing 'force carrying gauge bosons' doing their thing, it is likely a mathematical representation as well.

As I noted earlier, force carrying bosons are only a facon de parler (a way of speaking) since they certainly do not carry forces, they just transfer momentum (and how they do that is a mystery, too!).


How can you be certain that a scientific explanation will not be developed in the future?
The use of the concept of force and our daily experience with it can be used to make things happen. This suggests we're on the right track towards discovering the actual mechanisms.

Because this is not a scientific question, but a conceptual issue.


The use of the concept of force and our daily experience with it can be used to make things happen. This suggests we're on the right track towards discovering the actual mechanisms.

We've already been through this; our everyday notion of force is fine as it is. It is when it is transferred into a theoretical context that the conceptual problems (Leibniz detailed) kick in.

The forces we use to move things about are connected with our notions of solidity and resistance (indeed, Aristotle's theories here represent a nice summary of our ordinary ways of thinking about force), but these make no sense in physical theory (at the level at which fundamental physics applies), as Leibniz pointed out.

Hence, such everyday notions can be no help at all in 'discovering the actual mechanisms'; indeed, they become metaphorical when applied at a fundamental level.


Be that as it may, a Christian would not assert that a bridge is held together by angels. Meanwhile, theories are supposed to be built on collections of facts, not the other way around!

Well, it depends on the Christian. Thomist philosophers, for example, would argue that the fundamental cause of all things is 'god', hence, for them, even a bridge is held together by 'his will'. So, take your pick; 'god's will' and/or the angels are as physically real as forces.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomism


so I tend to accept 'forces' as merely useful.

Fine, a 'useful fiction', then.

But, in that case, we still have no idea at all why anything happens (at a fundamental level).

[Lynx]

Well, I used the phrase "maps reality" and put it in 'scare quotes' since it is not a phrase I myself prefer; I was merely trying to understand you.

A topographical map, if mathematical, but not geological or geographical, is a special sort of rule, not a map as we would ordinarily understand the term.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map_(mathematics)
I'm not sure I understand the above sentence. Maps that represent functions vis a vis those that represent measurements?

A topographical map describes contours and relief. The map contains distance and elevation data. The elevation data is joined into lines of equal elevation. Such a map allows for the visualization and calculation of slopes.
I would consider a topographical map to be an accurate representation of reality. That's not to say that it is 'complete'.

Another example would be the schematic for an electronic circuit. Merely a representation, yet highly accurate, containing most of the information required by technicians and engineers.

Yes, I do know; I do have a mathematics degree.

Once more, the 'measurements' you keep referring to are the result of using Newton's Second Law (or some other), and derive from relative motion. Forces are merely the shadow of such operations cast onto the world by over imaginative physicists (mercifully, less so these days).
You appear to be referring to the calculation of gravitational force. I should have been more specific and use the term 'magnetic force'.


Magnetic Field (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magnetic_field)
Mapping out the strength and direction of the magnetic field is simple in principle. First, measure the strength and direction of the magnetic field at a large number of locations. Then mark each location with an arrow (called a vector) pointing in the direction of the local magnetic field with a length proportional to the strength of the magnetic field. An alternative method of visualizing the magnetic field which greatly simplifies the diagram while containing the same information is to 'connect' the arrows to form "magnetic field lines".[/size]
The strength of a magnetic field is measured in teslas (or webers per square meter). Which can then be expressed by the Lorentz Force equation:


A charged particle moving in a B-field will feel a sideways force that is proportional to the strength of the magnetic field, the component of the velocity that is perpendicular to the magnetic field and the charge of the particle. This force is known as the Lorentz force, and is given by F=q(v x B) where F is the force (in newtons), q is the electric charge of the particle (in coulombs), v is the instantaneous velocity of the particle (in meters per second), and B is the magnetic field (in teslas).

The force is always perpendicular to both the velocity of the particle and the magnetic field that created it. Neither a stationary particle nor one moving in the direction of the magnetic field lines will experience a force. For that reason, charged particles move in a circle (or more generally, in a helix) around magnetic field lines; this is called cyclotron motion. Because the magnetic force is always perpendicular to the motion, the magnetic fields can do no work on an isolated charge. It can and does, however, change the particle's direction, even to the extent that a force applied in one direction can cause the particle to drift in a perpendicular direction. (See figure.) The magnetic force can do work to a magnetic dipole, or to a charged particle whose motion is constrained by other forces.
And these are just the basics!

So, this sort of 'representation' is not like a geographical map, but more like a graph, where the mode of representation (axes, grid lines, labels, curves) are not actually to be found in reality (except they certainly appear on the page!), but only on the graph.
The way in which the information is displayed is changed. Something may be gained or something may be lost in doing this, but that something is not the information!

As I noted earlier, force carrying bosons are only a facon de parler (a way of speaking) since they certainly do not carry forces, they just transfer momentum (and how they do that is a mystery, too!).
There must be more to that model than just a manner of speaking?

Because this is not a scientific question, but a conceptual issue.
How else to resolve a conceptual issue but with a scientific explanation?

We've already been through this; our everyday notion of force is fine as it is. It is when it is transferred into a theoretical context that the conceptual problems (Leibniz detailed) kick in.

The forces we use to move things about are connected with our notions of solidity and resistance (indeed, Aristotle's theories here represent a nice summary of our ordinary ways of thinking about force), but these make no sense in physical theory (at the level at which fundamental physics applies), as Leibniz pointed out.

Hence, such everyday notions can be no help at all in 'discovering the actual mechanisms'; indeed, they become metaphorical when applied at a fundamental level.
Granted, they can be of no help in resolving the mystery. They did get us started in the right direction though? Or must we take a forceful detour, taking us outside the box, so to speak?

Well, it depends on the Christian. Thomist philosophers, for example, would argue that the fundamental cause of all things is 'god', hence, for them, even a bridge is held together by 'his will'. So, take your pick; 'god's will' and/or the angels are as physically real as forces.
Given that 'God's will' is insufficient to build a bridge, I find it outrageous that they would attribute it as instrumental in holding it together. Once you have 'God's rules' or 'Angel's rules' for building a bridge, you no longer need God or Angela.

Fine, a 'useful fiction', then.

But, in that case, we still have no idea at all why anything happens (at a fundamental level).
What about the Standard Model? Say it ain't 'just so'... :crying:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


I'm not sure I understand the above sentence. Maps that represent functions vis a vis those that represent measurements?

And I do not understand that question.

Look, you must have studied the mathematics of functions; well maps are a group of rules to which functions belong.

The other maps I alluded to are the ones you use when you want to find your way about the place (hence my reference to geography, etc.). In fact, this shows you have got the point:


A topographical map describes contours and relief. The map contains distance and elevation data. The elevation data is joined into lines of equal elevation. Such a map allows for the visualization and calculation of slopes.
I would consider a topographical map to be an accurate representation of reality. That's not to say that it is 'complete'.

Another example would be the schematic for an electronic circuit. Merely a representation, yet highly accurate, containing most of the information required by technicians and engineers.

Mathematical maps are not the same as these.


You appear to be referring to the calculation of gravitational force. I should have been more specific and use the term 'magnetic force'.

No, my use of 'etc.' (and 'or some other') indicated I was making a general point about all such attempts to measure force; what is in fact measured (even with respect to 'magnetic force') is relative acceleration.

This quotation:


Mapping out the strength and direction of the magnetic field is simple in principle. First, measure the strength and direction of the magnetic field at a large number of locations. Then mark each location with an arrow (called a vector) pointing in the direction of the local magnetic field with a length proportional to the strength of the magnetic field. An alternative method of visualizing the magnetic field which greatly simplifies the diagram while containing the same information is to 'connect' the arrows to form "magnetic field lines"

does not affect my assessment of what we actually measure.


The way in which the information is displayed is changed. Something may be gained or something may be lost in doing this, but that something is not the information!

You will need to say what 'information' you think we have about forces and their alleged physical reality.


There must be more to that model than just a manner of speaking?

Well, all you have to do is look at what physicists themselves say: they translate 'force carrying bosons' (etc.) as 'particles' that transfer momentum. Force is thus edited out.

In that case, the use of 'force' here is indeed a facon de parler.


How else to resolve a conceptual issue but with a scientific explanation?

A conceptual issue revolves around how we are to interpret the words we use, and that is not a scientific question. Scientists are no more experts with language than the rest of us are.


They did get us started in the right direction though? Or must we take a forceful detour, taking us outside the box, so to speak?

Depends what you mean by 'right direction'. If you mean that they have developed theories that help us control nature, make predictions and balance the books (as it were), then I agree. If on the other hand, you mean that they have waved goodbye to animistic views of nature (including dropping the use of 'force'), then that is only partially true (for example, many still interpret the metaphors they use literally).


Given that 'God's will' is insufficient to build a bridge, I find it outrageous that they would attribute it as instrumental in holding it together. Once you have 'God's rules' or 'Angel's rules' for building a bridge, you no longer need God or Angela.

According to Thomist philosophers, since 'god' is the cause of everything, including everything that human beings do, and everything that happens in the entire universe, then 'he' does indeed hold bridges together, as they see it.

And who is Angela?


What about the Standard Model? Say it ain't 'just so'...

No, we still have no idea, not even the faintest clue, why anything happens.

Since the Standard Model is so heavily mathematical, it is even further removed from giving us a fundamental explanation why anything takes place than, say, Aristotle's theories were.

For example, we have no idea why anything should move along a geodesic (they just do), and we have no idea how momentum is transmitted (it just is). [Referring to the second law of thermodynamics here (or any other law) would be to no avail, since we have no idea how a mathematical law can make things happen, as opposed to merely describing what does in fact happen.]

Sure, we know a shed load of mathematics, and can predict with hair-raising accuracy -- but what makes things happen: zippo.

[Lynx]

And I do not understand that question.

Look, you must have studied the mathematics of functions; well maps are a group of rules to which functions belong.

The other maps I alluded to are the ones you use when you want to find your way about the place (hence my reference to geography, etc.). In fact, this shows you have got the point:

Mathematical maps are not the same as these.
You're saying that a map or a diagram of a magnetic field is the equivalent of plotting a function?

No, my use of 'etc.' (and 'or some other') indicated I was making a general point about all such attempts to measure force; what is in fact measured (even with respect to 'magnetic force') is relative acceleration.

This quotation:

does not affect my assessment of what we actually measure.
But the force equations are not plotted onto magnetic or gravitational field maps. If they were, we would see trajectory paths of hypothetical masses as they traversed the field. Such a map (of a transformation equation?) could then be confirmed by carrying out the experiment in real life. The result would generate a geographical type map.

You will need to say what 'information' you think we have about forces and their alleged physical reality.
Sorry, information = measurement data. We plot measurement data onto various types of maps, thereby affecting its display. The data is not lost; what is gained or lost is our interpretation of the reality of what we're looking at. The wiki article on gravitational wells (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity_well) provides an example of this trade off.

Well, all you have to do is look at what physicists themselves say: they translate 'force carrying bosons' (etc.) as 'particles' that transfer momentum. Force is thus edited out.

In that case, the use of 'force' here is indeed a facon de parler.
I mean, have they explained this model in detail? Are there diagrams, maps, animations of what is described?

A conceptual issue revolves around how we are to interpret the words we use, and that is not a scientific question. Scientists are no more experts with language than the rest of us are.
Well, I meant in the sense of resolving terms like 'atom' whose conceptualization has evolved from Rutherford to Bohr to Standard Model as science has progressed.

Depends what you mean by 'right direction'. If you mean that they have developed theories that help us control nature, make predictions and balance the books (as it were), then I agree. If on the other hand, you mean that they have waved goodbye to animistic views of nature (including dropping the use of 'force'), then that is only partially true (for example, many still interpret the metaphors they use literally).
The latter part. Science appears to follow a paradigm, that assumes what we have learned is somehow related to what remains to be discovered. Lines of existing inquiry are extended, far more often than new inquiries are started 'outside the box'. Science assumes that uncovering the fundamental building blocks of the universe will lead to a greater (if not complete) understanding.

According to Thomist philosophers, since 'god' is the cause of everything, including everything that human beings do, and everything that happens in the entire universe, then 'he' does indeed hold bridges together, as they see it.
And so His blessings are recognized while His crimes go unpunished...
My goodness, what does this belief entail, other than deferential lip service?

And who is Angela?Angela, Angel, angels are God's messengers.

No, we still have no idea, not even the faintest clue, why anything happens.

Since the Standard Model is so heavily mathematical, it is even further removed from giving us a fundamental explanation why anything takes place than, say, Aristotle's theories were.
Are you suggesting an explanation with lesser mathematical 'backing' would be less removed?

For example, we have no idea why anything should move along a geodesic (they just do), and we have no idea how momentum is transmitted (it just is). [Referring to the second law of thermodynamics here (or any other law) would be to no avail, since we have no idea how a mathematical law can make things happen, as opposed to merely describing what does in fact happen.]

Sure, we know a shed load of mathematics, and can predict with hair-raising accuracy -- but what makes things happen: zippo.
Perhaps realistic explanations are too complex for our understanding. They could be hiding in plain sight, beyond pattern recognition.
It may also be dubious to hope for 'the mother of all explanations' or the 'theory of everything'. Inherent in such hopes is a belief in apex hierarchy.

[Lynx]

What science can describe :) may have no bearing on what science can explain :(

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


You're saying that a map or a diagram of a magnetic field is the equivalent of plotting a function?

No, I was simply responding to a question of yours:


Is there such a thing as a reality map?
How would you classify a topographical map?

And underlining that maps in mathematics are different from ordinary maps -- that's all.


But the force equations are not plotted onto magnetic or gravitational field maps. If they were, we would see trajectory paths of hypothetical masses as they traversed the field. Such a map (of a transformation equation?) could then be confirmed by carrying out the experiment in real life. The result would generate a geographical type map.

No, but they are solutions to such equations.


I mean, have they explained this model in detail?

Again, depends on what you mean by 'explained'. If you mean "Have they been able to solve equations, predict movement, satisfy theoretical constraints (such as symmetry)?" then apparently: Yes. On the other hand, if you mean "Do they understand what makes anything happen", then: No.


Are there diagrams, maps, animations of what is described?

You'll need to ask a physicist.


Well, I meant in the sense of resolving terms like 'atom' whose conceptualization has evolved from Rutherford to Bohr to Standard Model as science has progressed.

Ah, I see. Your original question was:


How else to resolve a conceptual issue but with a scientific explanation?

Here, the science was resolved by conceptual change, not the other way round. Modern concepts of the atom were introduced to explain the phenomena, they weren't discovered (in the sense of 'observed first').


Science appears to follow a paradigm, that assumes what we have learned is somehow related to what remains to be discovered. Lines of existing inquiry are extended, far more often than new inquiries are started 'outside the box'. Science assumes that uncovering the fundamental building blocks of the universe will lead to a greater (if not complete) understanding.

But there are limits to what can be done, and we can see these here, since scientists have to use figurative language to explain themselves.

Anyway, as Kuhn has shown, science does not develop in a linear fashion. Every so often, it undergoes a revolution, where the concepts/models used are dropped and new ones introduced.


Science assumes that uncovering the fundamental building blocks of the universe will lead to a greater (if not complete) understanding.

But, as Leibniz has shown, we will never be able to explain interaction, and thus we will never be able to explain why anything happens (unless we postulate the existence of little minds in nature all controlled by 'god').


My goodness, what does this belief entail, other than deferential lip service?

No, it's a serious attempt to explain what it means to say that nature is rational. [And, if you ever have to debate with a sophisticated Thomist, you will soon see how formidable they are. I know, I was taught logic by one!]


Are you suggesting an explanation with lesser mathematical 'backing' would be less removed?

Aristotle explained motion by an appeal to a mover (such as a human being, or 'god', but he did not use that word, I think).

Now since you and I can move things, that is an immediate explanation of movement.

Contrast that with a mathematical theory: it cannot push things about the place, so it is a worse explanation of movement in the second sense, but not in the first.

These are the two senses, from earlier:


If you mean "Have they been able to solve equations, predict movement, satisfy theoretical constraints (such as symmetry)?" then apparently: Yes. On the other hand, if you mean "Do they understand what makes anything happen", then: No.


It may also be dubious to hope for 'the mother of all explanations' or the 'theory of everything'. Inherent in such hopes is a belief in apex hierarchy.

Well, since it will be a mathematical explanation, it will never be a able to tell us why things happen.


What science can describe may have no bearing on what science can explain

Again, it depends on what you mean by 'explain'.

[Lynx]

Again, depends on what you mean by 'explained'. If you mean "Have they been able to solve equations, predict movement, satisfy theoretical constraints (such as symmetry)?" then apparently: Yes. On the other hand, if you mean "Do they understand what makes anything happen", then: No.
Well, I'd say that physicists' level of understanding of 'what makes anything happen' is the gold standard, as far as humans are concerned.

Here, the science was resolved by conceptual change, not the other way round. Modern concepts of the atom were introduced to explain the phenomena, they weren't discovered (in the sense of 'observed first').
The earlier models had inconsistencies or were incomplete, requiring an update. Without science, these and future 'updates' would not occur.

Anyway, as Kuhn has shown, science does not develop in a linear fashion. Every so often, it undergoes a revolution, where the concepts/models used are dropped and new ones introduced.
And our view of the Universe changes.

But, as Leibniz has shown, we will never be able to explain interaction, and thus we will never be able to explain why anything happens (unless we postulate the existence of little minds in nature all controlled by 'god').
If something is intractable, then you claim it is intractable. Embellishments are to be avoided.

No, it's a serious attempt to explain what it means to say that nature is rational. [And, if you ever have to debate with a sophisticated Thomist, you will soon see how formidable they are. I know, I was taught logic by one!]
Who says that nature is rational?

Aristotle explained motion by an appeal to a mover (such as a human being, or 'god', but he did not use that word, I think).

Now since you and I can move things, that is an immediate explanation of movement.

Contrast that with a mathematical theory: it cannot push things about the place, so it is a worse explanation of movement in the second sense, but not in the first.

Again, it depends on what you mean by 'explain'.
To explain in the sense of conveying a complete understanding of how everything works. In this sense, the glass is not full.
Assuming that human beings are physically and intellectually incapable of comprehending the full complexity of the universe, then it wouldn't matter if the glass were full.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Well, I'd say that physicists' level of understanding of 'what makes anything happen' is the gold standard, as far as humans are concerned.

Maybe so, maybe not; but the bottom line is that not even they know why things happen.


The earlier models had inconsistencies or were incomplete, requiring an update. Without science, these and future 'updates' would not occur.

And Dalton's work was shot through with the same, which is why his ideas were not universally accepted until a hundred years later, with the work of Einstein and Jean Perrin.

And, modern atomic theory is not without its own problems.


If something is intractable, then you claim it is intractable. Embellishments are to be avoided.

I did not mention "intractable", so why you brought this up is somewhat unclear.

In fact, I was talking about "interaction"; not at all the same thing.


Who says that nature is rational?

This has in fact been the overwhelmingly dominant view since ancient Greek times until today.

Speaking for myself I deny this view, in the sense that it makes no sense to attribute to the universe a capacity that only rightly belongs to intelligent creatures. So, it makes no sense to say, or to deny, that the universe is rational

But, Thomist philosophers would simply reply that if we are to makes sense of nature, then we have to appeal to its origin in a creative act of 'god'.


To explain in the sense of conveying a complete understanding of how everything works. In this sense, the glass is not full.
Assuming that human beings are physically and intellectually incapable of comprehending the full complexity of the universe, then it wouldn't matter if the glass were full.

What we can or cannot know does not affect Leibniz's proof that interaction is impossible (any more than what we know or do not know affects the proof that it is impossible to trisect an angle with only a ruler, compass and pencil).

[Lynx]

Maybe so, maybe not; but the bottom line is that not even they know why things happen.
Well, physics is an incomplete science. I wouldn't doubt that there are physicists who believe they know why things happen.

And Dalton's work was shot through with the same, which is why his ideas were not universally accepted until a hundred years later, with the work of Einstein and Jean Perrin.
How can we determine which theories are 'ahead of their time' and select in favour of them?

And, modern atomic theory is not without its own problems.
Good. This is necessary if science is to continue.

I did not mention "intractable", so why you brought this up is somewhat unclear.

In fact, I was talking about "interaction"; not at all the same thing.
You wrote "as Leibniz has shown, we will never be able to explain interaction". This suggests an intractable problem. On the other hand, if interaction is impossible, then there are no intractability issues. Once something is proven impossible, it vanishes.

This has in fact been the overwhelmingly dominant view since ancient Greek times until today.

Speaking for myself I deny this view, in the sense that it makes no sense to attribute to the universe a capacity that only rightly belongs to intelligent creatures. So, it makes no sense to say, or to deny, that the universe is rational

But, Thomist philosophers would simply reply that if we are to makes sense of nature, then we have to appeal to its origin in a creative act of 'god'.
We could simply appeal to the notion of 'first cause' and leave it at that. Or claim we have finally uncovered all of the 'fundamental laws' of nature - and leave it at that.

What we can or cannot know does not affect Leibniz's proof that interaction is impossible (any more than what we know or do not know affects the proof that it is impossible to trisect an angle with only a ruler, compass and pencil).Once we know that a particular concept or approach is impossible, we look elsewhere.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Well, physics is an incomplete science. I wouldn't doubt that there are physicists who believe they know why things happen.

In fact, this has nothing to do with the 'incompleteness' of physics. It is in fact about the concepts/language we use to represent the world, and it is here that Leibniz shows their/its incoherence.


How can we determine which theories are 'ahead of their time' and select in favour of them?

Theories are in fact 'selected' as a result of poorly understood social forces.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociology_of_scientific_knowledge


This suggests an intractable problem. On the other hand, if interaction is impossible, then there are no intractability issues. Once something is proven impossible, it vanishes.

Indeed, except, this means we will never be able to explain why anything happens.


We could simply appeal to the notion of 'first cause' and leave it at that. Or claim we have finally uncovered all of the 'fundamental laws' of nature - and leave it at that.

Thomists go further, and argue that 'god' is the first cause in a more over-arching sense: 'he' is the cause of everything coming into existence, and of their continuing existence --, just as 'he' is the cause of every other cause.


Once we know that a particular concept or approach is impossible, we look elsewhere.

But, as language users, we do not have the wherewithal to answer such questions -- except we descend into metaphor and analogy.

[Lynx]

In fact, this has nothing to do with the 'incompleteness' of physics. It is in fact about the concepts/language we use to represent the world, and it is here that Leibniz shows their/its incoherence.
Conceptualization is but one obstacle to greater understanding. The fact that science is a work-in-progress means we are still learning. Lack of proper instrumentation is another roadblock.

Theories are in fact 'selected' as a result of poorly understood social forces.
This will not do. The default approach should be equal consideration of all ideas - unless there's a full-proof method to discard the dross without hindering the 'gems in the rough'.

Thank-goodness for proper note-taking, documentation and long-term archiving.

Indeed, except, this means we will never be able to explain why anything happens.
If this were literally true Marxism and your essays would have to join a rather large bonfire...

Thomists go further, and argue that 'god' is the first cause in a more over-arching sense: 'he' is the cause of everything coming into existence, and of their continuing existence --, just as 'he' is the cause of every other cause.
On what basis do they justify this 'further' argument?

But, as language users, we do not have the wherewithal to answer such questions -- except we descend into metaphor and analogy.
I wouldn't fault the limitations of language for unproductive endeavours. Coming up with explanations for things that are already well described mathematically is strictly a human need. I believe science can manage without this.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


This will not do. The default approach should be equal consideration of all ideas - unless there's a full-proof method to discard the dross without hindering the 'gems in the rough'.

Thank-goodness for proper note-taking, documentation and long-term archiving.

Whether or not you think this 'will not do', it is still a fact. Scientists are no more nor no less subject to bias and the influence of social factors in their work as anyone else.


If this were literally true Marxism and your essays would have to join a rather large bonfire...

I was of course referring to scientific explanations. When we use ordinary language, we can easily explain why things happen (in historical materialism). If these methods are transferred into the sciences proper, they become metaphorical.


On what basis do they justify this 'further' argument?

On the basis 1) that to argue otherwise invites an infinite regress:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalam_cosmological_argument

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/menus/existence.html

and 2) that it renders causation itself unintelligible.

There is a flavour of 2) in Leibniz's argument: since we cannot account for interaction save we postulate 'god' bringing this about (either through pre-established harmony (Leibniz), or through direct divine causation (Thomas Aquinas), or through 'his' self-development (Hegel)), 'god' is therefore necessary for anything at all to happen. In other words, the material world is insufficient to itself and requires 'divine' intervention (all the time) for it to work.


I believe science can manage without this.

Well, scientists have to use some language or other, hence they too cannot escape from this impasse.

[Lynx]

Whether or not you think this 'will not do', it is still a fact. Scientists are no more nor no less subject to bias and the influence of social factors in their work as anyone else.
It is a fact that 'will not do', unless you insist nothing can be done about it. Solutions please!

On the basis 1) that to argue otherwise invites an infinite regress:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalam_cosmological_argument

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/menus/existence.html

and 2) that it renders causation itself unintelligible.

There is a flavour of 2) in Leibniz's argument: since we cannot account for interaction save we postulate 'god' bringing this about (either through pre-established harmony (Leibniz), or through direct divine causation (Thomas Aquinas), or through 'his' self-development (Hegel)), 'god' is therefore necessary for anything at all to happen. In other words, the material world is insufficient to itself and requires 'divine' intervention (all the time) for it to work.
This is an argument for the notion of 'first cause'. Where is the argument for 'God as first cause'?
Besides that, what is wrong with the idea of infinite regress?
The idea was implicit in the Steady State theory, then got eclipsed by Big Bang enthusiasts positing the creation of time.
Also convenient is the idea that we should just happen to be able to uncover the 'fundamental' building blocks of nature and then conclude that nothing lies beyond the detection limits of our instruments.

Well, scientists have to use some language or other, hence they too cannot escape from this impasse.
They can use conjecture and then return to the work of devising fact-gathering machines.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


It is a fact that 'will not do', unless you insist nothing can be done about it. Solutions please!

There are none, and it is possible to show that there can be none.


This is an argument for the notion of 'first cause'. Where is the argument for 'God as first cause'?

Look, I am not trying to make this argument look rational, but it does not matter what you call the 'first cause', the argument is simply aimed at showing there must be one.


Besides that, what is wrong with the idea of infinite regress?

Well, you will have to read the articles posted at the links I gave -- Thomists would argue that it does not matter whether there is an infinite regress or not, the whole series (finite or infinite) requires a cause and that is 'god'.


The idea was implicit in the Steady State theory, then got eclipsed by Big Bang enthusiasts positing the creation of time.

The argument is in fact independent of whatever theory is fashionable in science right now, or ever.


They can use conjecture and then return to the work of devising fact-gathering machines.

This makes no difference; those machines will need programming in some language or other, and will need to be read and interpreted by language users at some point.

[Lynx]

There are none, and it is possible to show that there can be none.
If you've resigned yourself to the status quo what is there to be gained by showing there are no solutions?

Look, I am not trying to make this argument look rational, but it does not matter what you call the 'first cause', the argument is simply aimed at showing there must be one.
The 'first cause' is unknown, and carries no description, therefore calling it God is unacceptable.

Well, you will have to read the articles posted at the links I gave -- Thomists would argue that it does not matter whether there is an infinite regress or not, the whole series (finite or infinite) requires a cause and that is 'god'.

The argument is in fact independent of whatever theory is fashionable in science right now, or ever.
How independent can it be? When you ask what created God, the usual response is to deny that anything created God - He has always existed. Much like the steady state universe.

This makes no difference; those machines will need programming in some language or other, and will need to be read and interpreted by language users at some point.
As we have seen, a proper description involves numbers and mathematics, which can then be expressed in words or diagrams for easier digestion.
Language has not stopped us from making progress in engineering, which is a major benefit of applied science.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


If you've resigned yourself to the status quo what is there to be gained by showing there are no solutions?

I didn't show this, Leibniz did. Moreover, most theorists ignore his proof, and I have yet to meet a scientist who is even aware of it.


The 'first cause' is unknown, and carries no description, therefore calling it God is unacceptable.

They call it 'God' since the Bible tells them to do so. The existence of the first cause is established, so they claim, by argument. Its/'His' name and purpose for man comes from revelation.


How independent can it be? When you ask what created God, the usual response is to deny that anything created God - He has always existed. Much like the steady state universe.

God, by definition, is uncreated. You either accept that definition or you don't. If you do, then 'He' needs no creator.

If you don't then you can't explain causation.

And it is independent of any and all science since it is anterior to the material world, and to all evidence. So, nothing any scientist can say can affect it.

And it is nothing like the Steady State Universe, since that requires an ontological cause (i.e., a cause for its continuing to exist). 'God' needs no such cause.


As we have seen, a proper description involves numbers and mathematics, which can then be expressed in words or diagrams for easier digestion.
Language has not stopped us from making progress in engineering, which is a major benefit of applied science.

Without language, none of this would have happened.

[Lynx]

I didn't show this, Leibniz did. Moreover, most theorists ignore his proof, and I have yet to meet a scientist who is even aware of it.
I thought we were discussing the unwarranted 'selection' of theories for support or repression by the scientific establishment, and possible ways to change this.

They call it 'God' since the Bible tells them to do so. The existence of the first cause is established, so they claim, by argument. Its/'His' name and purpose for man comes from revelation.
Ok, but only if God = Universe, without the Bible embellishments.

God, by definition, is uncreated. You either accept that definition or you don't. If you do, then 'He' needs no creator.

If you don't then you can't explain causation.
When there is no 'beginning', an infinite regression is assumed prior to/beyond known causes.

And it is independent of any and all science since it is anterior to the material world, and to all evidence. So, nothing any scientist can say can affect it.

And it is nothing like the Steady State Universe, since that requires an ontological cause (i.e., a cause for its continuing to exist). 'God' needs no such cause.
I have not heard of any cause required for the Universe's continued existence other than it's current observable state. There are limits to what we can observe, hence a limit to the history that can be ascribed. We have yet to uncover the origin or fate of the known universe, nor can we assume we ever will.
I accept the term 'God of the Gaps' as an alternative to 'the unknown'.

Without language, none of this would have happened.
Agreed.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


I thought we were discussing the unwarranted 'selection' of theories for support or repression by the scientific establishment, and possible ways to change this.

Were we? Sorry for my mistake. However, the social influences on science are not as overt as you seem to think.


Ok, but only if God = Universe, without the Bible embellishments.

Well, the Thomist 'God' can't be the universe since the latter requires a creator (according to them), but not the former.


When there is no 'beginning', an infinite regression is assumed prior to/beyond known causes.

We have already been over this; here is what I said last time:


On the basis 1) that to argue otherwise invites an infinite regress:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kalam_c...gical_argument

http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billc...existence.html

and 2) that it renders causation itself unintelligible.

There is a flavour of 2) in Leibniz's argument: since we cannot account for interaction save we postulate 'god' bringing this about (either through pre-established harmony (Leibniz), or through direct divine causation (Thomas Aquinas), or through 'his' self-development (Hegel)), 'god' is therefore necessary for anything at all to happen. In other words, the material world is insufficient to itself and requires 'divine' intervention (all the time) for it to work.

It does not matter whether the origin of the universe stretches off to infinity (or just looks like that), it requires a cause now for it to continue to exist, and for anything to happen.


I have not heard of any cause required for the Universe's continued existence other than it's current observable state. There are limits to what we can observe, hence a limit to the history that can be ascribed. We have yet to uncover the origin or fate of the known universe, nor can we assume we ever will.
I accept the term 'God of the Gaps' as an alternative to 'the unknown'.

Well, this is were the argument gets rather technical, but it is based on the idea that everything that exists in the material world requires a cause for it to come into existence, and at each stage of its existence it is dependent on the stages that went before, and on other external sustaining causes. So, nothing material contains within itself the cause of its own existence, or its own continued existence. Now this is true of the whole universe at any point in time. So, even if the universe is eternal (or only looks eternal), it requires now a cause for its continued existence. But that can't be the universe, since it does not contain the cause of its own existence. So there must be something else which is the cause of its existence, but which 'something else' does contain the cause of its own existence.

This they call 'god'.

[Lynx]

Were we? Sorry for my mistake. However, the social influences on science are not as overt as you seem to think.
Depends on what adjectives were used, when examining the history of science. Suffice it to say the current situation is not optimal.

We have already been over this; here is what I said last time:

It does not matter whether the origin of the universe stretches off to infinity (or just looks like that), it requires a cause now for it to continue to exist, and for anything to happen.
This is not in dispute, only that this 'cause' has not been uncovered. To that end physics has gone towards the sub-atomic. Where to next?

Well, this is were the argument gets rather technical, but it is based on the idea that everything that exists in the material world requires a cause for it to come into existence, and at each stage of its existence it is dependent on the stages that went before, and on other external sustaining causes. So, nothing material contains within itself the cause of its own existence, or its own continued existence. Now this is true of the whole universe at any point in time. So, even if the universe is eternal (or only looks eternal), it requires now a cause for its continued existence. But that can't be the universe, since it does not contain the cause of its own existence. So there must be something else which is the cause of its existence, but which 'something else' does contain the cause of its own existence.

This they call 'god'.
Well, I would say the universe contains the results of its own peculiar form of existence (is that a tautology?)
The 'something else' is unknown. The term 'god' carries too many connotations for it to be an appropriate label.

[Lynx]

Tortoise Shrugged (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


This is not in dispute, only that this 'cause' has not been uncovered. To that end physics has gone towards the sub-atomic. Where to next?

As I have pointed out many times, science cannot discover this cause, and for reasons Leibniz set out.


The 'something else' is unknown. The term 'god' carries too many connotations for it to be an appropriate label.

Maybe so, maybe not; but as I noted earlier, Christians did not get this word from the Cosmological Argument, but from the Bible.

[Lynx]

As I have pointed out many times, science cannot discover this cause, and for reasons Leibniz set out.
An infinite regress is reason enough for science to be unable to discover the 'cause' of anything. What Leibniz 'set out' with regard to the concept of force can be assumed to apply elsewhere.
This will not stop science, nor should it. What may stop is the building of ever larger particle accelerators.

Maybe so, maybe not; but as I noted earlier, Christians did not get this word from the Cosmological Argument, but from the Bible.
Fair to say they got it from the Bible and are now trying to perpetuate it through the Cosmological Argument. Not over my dead body.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


An infinite regress is reason enough for science to be unable to discover the 'cause' of anything. What Leibniz 'set out' with regard to the concept of force can be assumed to apply elsewhere.

But, Leibniz's argument does not rely on an infinite regress.


Not over my dead body.

It would be if this were the twelfth century!

[Lynx]

But, Leibniz's argument does not rely on an infinite regress.
It doesn't have to, infinite regress appears as a result.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


It doesn't have to, infinite regress appears as a result.

I don't think it does.

[Lynx]

I don't think it does.
From page 1 of this thread:

"As significant as his critique of Descartes' mechanics was Leibniz's attack on Newton's account of force. In the Principles, Newton limited himself to describing interactions between bodies in terms of general mathematical laws. This limitation was both a strength and a weakness. Newton succeeded in making the complexities of nature amenable to mathematical description only by simplifying the phenomena: by treating material particles as if they were infinitely hard yet infinitely elastic, concentrated at points, capable of exchanging any amount of force all at once, connected by forces operating instantaneously at a distance, and so on. Leibniz complained that this made Newton's system an idealised abstraction, which could not possibly be true of the real world. In reality, nothing was absolutely hard or elastic, nothing happened instantaneously, and every causal interaction was mediated by a complex mechanism. In general terms, Newton would have agreed with Leibniz's comment. He too believed in underlying mechanisms, but he refused to speculate about them in the Principles (his famous, 'I do not invent hypotheses')....

"Much later, in his Specimen of Dynamics (1695), Leibniz tried to give an account of the mechanism which mediated exchanges of force between colliding bodies. In real collisions (unlike Newton's idealisations), there had to be a finite period during which one body slowed down and the other picked up speed. This implied that bodies had a certain size, and were not absolutely hard or elastic, since the only conceivable mechanism for transfer of force was that bodies were first squashed together, and then gradually sprang back from each other once all the kinetic energy had been taken up. However, as soon as it is accepted that transfer of force between every day objects must be mediated by a mechanism, there is no point at which you stop needing smaller and smaller sub-mechanisms. At no level can you suddenly say that force is transferred directly.

"Elasticity is itself a phenomenon requiring explanation in terms of pushings of particles. At the first instant of impact, the outermost particles of each colliding body push against their neighbours, and these in turn push against their neighbours, and so on right through each body. But then each of these pushings needs to be explained by the compression of sub-particles, and so on to infinity. The conclusion Leibniz drew was that, ultimately, forces were not really transferred at all. All action was, as he put it, spontaneous. The energy required for a body's motion on the occasion of an impact, had to be drawn from its own resources, since it could not actually take up any energy from bodies impinging on it....

"An even more significant aspect of the theory was its abandonment of the traditional notion that matter was essentially inert. Leibniz saw that if the only function of matter was as a passive carrier of forces, then it had no role to play in scientific explanation. Its only role would be the metaphysical one of satisfying the prejudice that forces must inhere in something more substantial than themselves. He maintained that matter was nothing other than the receptive capacity of things, or their 'passive power', as he called it. Matter just was the capacity to slow other things down, and to be accelerated rather than penetrated (capacities which ghosts and shadows lack) -- in other words, inertia or mass, and solidity. So, taking also into account 'active powers' such as kinetic energy, Leibniz reduced matter to a complex of forces. In this he was anticipating modern field theory, which treats material particles as concentrated fields of force –- an anticipation duly recognised by its founder, the Italian mathematician Ruggiero Giuseppe Boscovich (1711-87)." [Ross (1984) Leibniz, pp.40-44.]
And now we have the Standard Model where fermions do not interact directly but through guage bosons which "leap across" thereby transferring the momentum of one fermion mass to another. This sounds like a "mediating mechanism" to me.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx, the above is one attempt to summarise Leibniz's argument. That does not imply it is the actual argument that Leibniz used.

In fact, Leibniz's argument revolves around any attempt to explain interaction in materialist terms, which at no point actually explains interaction.

The allleged 'infinite regress' is therefore one way of showing what would result if one tried to explain causation in materialist terms, but it is not Leibniz's way.


And now we have the Standard Model where fermions do not interact directly but through guage bosons which "leap across" thereby transferring the momentum of one fermion mass to another. This sounds like a "mediating mechanism" to me.

But, as I pointed out before, how momentum is transferred by such bosons is left entirely mysterious. So, we still do not have an explanation of interaction, only a description.

[These 'particles' (but, many physicists do not regard them as particles), and their behaviour, are the result of the reification of some pretty abstruse mathematics. And mathematical structures cannot make anything happen -- they can only be used to describe what happens.]

[And, of course, Leibniz's theory does not work, either -- but we can leave that to another time.]

[Lynx]

Lynx, the above is one attempt to summarise Leibniz's argument. That does not imply it is the actual argument that Leibniz used.

In fact, Leibniz's argument revolves around any attempt to explain interaction in materialist terms, which at no point actually explains interaction.

The allleged 'infinite regress' is therefore one way of showing what would result if one tried to explain causation in materialist terms, but it is not Leibniz's way.
Yes, the bolded parts refer to the results I wish to emphasize and the blue parts refer to his conclusion. All this should be clear to the reader, and that his conclusion anticipated modern field theory.

But, as I pointed out before, how momentum is transferred by such bosons is left entirely mysterious. So, we still do not have an explanation of interaction, only a description.
Then this description will have to suffice (or have to suffice for explanations offered at a higher level).

[These 'particles' (but, many physicists do not regard them as particles), and their behaviour, are the result of the reification of some pretty abstruse mathematics. And mathematical structures cannot make anything happen -- they can only be used to describe what happens.]
In that case, to reiterate, it's just a 'form of representation' for many physicists - not to be taken literally.

[And, of course, Leibniz's theory does not work, either -- but we can leave that to another time.]
You mean it can't serve as an explanation?
Not wishing to beat a dead horse yet again, but why are explanations even an issue? Descriptions (and math) are sufficient for us to accomplish great things.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Yes, the bolded parts refer to the results I wish to emphasize and the blue parts refer to his conclusion. All this should be clear to the reader, and that his conclusion anticipated modern field theory.

Well, this has been known for some time, which means that field theory is just as much a product of mystical Christianity as dialectics is.


You mean it can't serve as an explanation?
Not wishing to beat a dead horse yet again, but why are explanations even an issue? Descriptions (and math) are sufficient for us to accomplish great things.

No, because it requires nature to be full of tiny intelligences called 'monads' and for them to be the product of mind (i.e., 'god').

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monadology

But, how disembodied minds can make things move is no less mysterious than how matter can make them move.

So, Leibniz's 'explanation' is itself only a re-description, and one couched in mystical terms.

So, it mirrors the mysticism of 'field theory', too (indeed, as noted above, it was its precursor).

[Of course, field theory is only mystical if it is interpreted as a literal description of nature, and not as a form of representation.]

[Lynx]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monadology
Sorry I asked :blink:

But, how disembodied minds can make things move is no less mysterious than how matter can make them move.

So, Leibniz's 'explanation' is itself only a re-description, and one couched in mystical terms.
Explanations can be replaced without necessarily improving our understanding.

So, it mirrors the mysticism of 'field theory', too (indeed, as noted above, it was its precursor).

[Of course, field theory is only mystical if it is interpreted as a literal description of nature, and not as a form of representation.]
Well, field theory is a mathematical description of nature and a form of representation. Thus, according to you, it is not mystical. By my count, it serves its purpose and is useful.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

As I said, it is mystical if it is imposed on the world (as a literal picture of nature), since that implies that nature is mathematical, and hence the product of mind.

[Lynx]

Being able to describe nature (mathematically or otherwise) demonstrates that nature is non-random. Nothing else is implied.
Imposing a mathematical description as being literal would not make nature any less mechanistic than it is.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Being able to describe nature (mathematically or otherwise) demonstrates that nature is non-random.

Well, not only do we not know this, we do not even know what it means (in the sense that we do not know what sort of world this might even picture)


Nothing else is implied.
Imposing a mathematical description as being literal would not make nature any less mechanistic than it is.

Mechanistsic views of nature were abandoned nearly 100 years ago.

Now, at a fundamental level, nature is all metaphor...

[Except, of course, the 'mechanical view' of nature was metaphorical too!]

[Lynx]

Well, not only do we not know this, we do not even know what it means (in the sense that we do not know what sort of world this might even picture)
Picture what? A random universe?

Mechanistsic views of nature were abandoned nearly 100 years ago.

Now, at a fundamental level, nature is all metaphor...

[Except, of course, the 'mechanical view' of nature was metaphorical too!]
What are you talking about? Mechanistic ~ dominated by mechanisms. Nature is comprised of nothing but mechanisms.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Picture what? A random universe?

Indeed.


What are you talking about? Mechanistic ~ dominated by mechanisms. Nature is comprised of nothing but mechanisms.

It's a metaphor derived from the word 'machine', and came into vogue in the 17th century. It is no longer the dominant metpahor.

Check these out:

Dijksterhuis, E. The Mechanization of the World Picture: Pythagoras to Newton (Princeton University Press, 1986).

Shanker, S. 'The Decline and Fall of the Mechanist Metaphor', in Born, R. Artificial Intelligence. The Case Against (Croom Helm, 1987) .pp.72-131.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanism_(philosophy)

http://science.jrank.org/pages/7851/Mechanical-Philosophy.html

http://history.wisc.edu/sommerville/351/351-192.htm

[Lynx]

Indeed.
A hypothetical observer in a random universe would be unable to detect any form, pattern or relationship. Conditions could be recorded, but not mathematically described. You'd have numbers without information. It'd be like trying to decipher an encrypted message without a key.

It's a metaphor derived from the word 'machine', and came into vogue in the 17th century. It is no longer the dominant metpahor.

Check these out:

Dijksterhuis, E. The Mechanization of the World Picture: Pythagoras to Newton (Princeton University Press, 1986).

Shanker, S. 'The Decline and Fall of the Mechanist Metaphor', in Born, R. Artificial Intelligence. The Case Against (Croom Helm, 1987) .pp.72-131.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mechanism_(philosophy)

http://science.jrank.org/pages/7851/Mechanical-Philosophy.html

http://history.wisc.edu/sommerville/351/351-192.htm
Too bad this word has been tarnished by philosophers. I see a universe dominated by mechanisms - what dominant metaphor is preferred by today's scientists and/or philosophers?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Too bad this word has been tarnished by philosophers. I see a universe dominated by mechanisms - what dominant metaphor is preferred by today's scientists and/or philosophers?

1) This metaphor was in fact introduced by philosopher/scientists (before the two professions were distinguished) like Descartes and Boyle; so it came into the world already 'tarnished' and has not been polished-up since. The world is in fact, nothing like a machine.

2) The next popular metaphor (introduced in the late 18th century by Hegel and other Natürphilosophers (such as Schelling), but it had been around since ancient times) was that of the world as an organism -- aspects of it in fact underpin Darwin's theory, and that of subsequent evolutionists.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturphilosophie

The most recent metaphor (or family of metaphors) is that of the universe as a huge great cipher, the crystallisation of mathematical structures. Much of modern physics and cognitive science (including Chomsky's Linguistics) would be dead and buried without this metaphor.

[This one is also ancient, having been invented, as far as we know, by the mystical Pythagoreans.]

Of course, this is one of the reasons why science will never be able to explain why anything happens -- it cannot avoid using these ancient metaphors, and others.


A hypothetical observer in a random universe would be unable to detect any form, pattern or relationship. Conditions could be recorded, but not mathematically described. You'd have numbers without information. It'd be like trying to decipher an encrypted message without a key.

In a random universe there'd be no observers and nothing regular to observe -- thus no science.

This is a point that Kant tried to make.

[Lynx]

1) This metaphor was in fact introduced by philosopher/scientists (before the two professions were distinguished) like Descartes and Boyle; so it came into the world already 'tarnished' and has not been polished-up since. The world is in fact, nothing like a machine.
From Wiktionary:
mechanism (plural mechanisms)

1. Within a machine or machinery; any mechanical means for the conversion or control of motion, or the transmission or control of power
2. Any combination of cams, gears, links, belts, chains and logical mechanical elements
3. A group of objects or parts that interact together. (as in Political machine)
4. A mental, physical or chemical process.
5. (philosophy) A theory that all natural phenomena can be explained by physical causes.

Definition 3 and 4 would be what I'm aiming for. I'm not looking for a metaphor, I'm looking to define (or classify) what science has uncovered about nature, the universe, the world. In a word: mechanisms

2) The next popular metaphor (introduced in the late 18th century by Hegel and other Natürphilosophers (such as Schelling), but it had been around since ancient times) was that of the world as an organism -- aspects of it in fact underpin Darwin's theory, and that of subsequent evolutionists.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturphilosophie
The biosphere could be defined as a homeostatic process. Self-regulating mechanisms are found within individual living organisms. Extrapolate.

The most recent metaphor (or family of metaphors) is that of the universe as a huge great cipher, the crystallisation of mathematical structures. Much of modern physics and cognitive science (including Chomsky's Linguistics) would be dead and buried without this metaphor.

[This one is also ancient, having been invented, as far as we know, by the mystical Pythagoreans.]
I don't get this metaphor. Mathematical descriptiveness is merely a property of non-random systems.

Of course, this is one of the reasons why science will never be able to explain why anything happens -- it cannot avoid using these ancient metaphors, and others.
Scientists should avoid using them. Metaphors are not a substitute for explanations.

In a random universe there'd be no observers and nothing regular to observe -- thus no science.

This is a point that Kant tried to make.
There'd be no science regardless of the presence of observers.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Definition 3 and 4 would be what I'm aiming for. I'm not looking for a metaphor, I'm looking to define (or classify) what science has uncovered about nature, the universe, the world. In a word: mechanisms

But, all we actually get are more and more detailed descriptions; these alleged 'mechanisms' in fact do no real work.


The biosphere could be defined as a homeostatic process. Self-regulating mechanisms are found within individual living organisms. Extrapolate.

Extending this into the biosphere is already metaphorical.


I don't get this metaphor. Mathematical descriptiveness is merely a property of non-random systems.

But a mathematical description is totally misleading if applied to the real world.


Scientists should avoid using them. Metaphors are not a substitute for explanations.

It is in fact impossible for them not to. What are you going to do, stop them using words such a 'particle', 'field' and 'wave', all of which are metaphorical when applied to the real world?


There'd be no science regardless of the presence of observers.

I agree.

[Lynx]

But, all we actually get are more and more detailed descriptions; these alleged 'mechanisms' in fact do no real work.
Mechanisms perform a function. The action and interaction of mechanisms over time constitute a process.

Extending this into the biosphere is already metaphorical.
Yes, until evidence confirms or disproves this.
Using 'organism' to describe the universe would be fanciful.

But a mathematical description is totally misleading if applied to the real world.
How so? Motion capture and face recognition technology rely upon such descriptions.

It is in fact impossible for them not to. What are you going to do, stop them using words such a 'particle', 'field' and 'wave', all of which are metaphorical when applied to the real world?
I would stop them from applying them to the real world, or from using them as literal descriptions of their models. It is acceptable to use such words as definitions of various elements within a system, model, or theory - but only as a learning aid, or when distinctions do need to be made.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Mechanisms perform a function. The action and interaction of mechanisms over time constitute a process.

Well, simply repeating this will not change the fact that these 'mechanisms' are just sequences of events, and are thus descriptions not explanations.


Yes, until evidence confirms or disproves this.
Using 'organism' to describe the universe would be fanciful.

Confirmed or not, this will still be a metaphor and no more literally true than this is:


But, soft! what light through yonder window breaks?
It is the east, and Juliet is the sun.

No matter how much this is 'confirmed', Juliet is not the sun.


How so? Motion capture and face recognition technology rely upon such descriptions.

I've already been through this -- in our discussion of the nature of the field and of lines of force, etc.

And I'm not sure how this helps:


Motion capture and face recognition technology rely upon such descriptions.


I would stop them from applying them to the real world, or from using them as literal descriptions of their models. It is acceptable to use such words as definitions of various elements within a system, model, or theory - but only as a learning aid, or when distinctions do need to be made.

Are you serious? Do you really think they are going to listen to you?

And what are you going to replace them with?

[Lynx]

Well, simply repeating this will not change the fact that these 'mechanisms' are just sequences of events, and are thus descriptions not explanations.
I'm using them as definitions.

Confirmed or not, this will still be a metaphor and no more literally true than this is:

No matter how much this is 'confirmed', Juliet is not the sun.
Juliet is a fictional character. Are you a fictional character?
If there is sufficient evidence that the biosphere functions much like a living organism, then there may come a point when it is defined or classified as an organism. At that point, it will no longer be a metaphor.

I've already been through this -- in our discussion of the nature of the field and of lines of force, etc.
How does this relate to our earlier discussion? Facial recognition is a mathematical representation but there is no mystery surrounding its design. It's algorithms can be explained!

Are you serious? Do you really think they are going to listen to you?
We listen to them. We evaluate. We criticize. Their 'listening to us' is not a requirement, anymore than it is for you to go ahead and write your essays.

And what are you going to replace them with?
There is no replacement per se, although the judicious use of insight enabling drugs might be worth a try.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


I'm using them as definitions.

Well, definitions are just yet more words, and even if scientists were to use these definitions, all that they could deliver would be (increasingly detailed) descriptions, not explanations.


Juliet is a fictional character. Are you a fictional character?

That does not affect the point; to see this, consider a real live individual. if I were to say that George W Bush is an imperialist pig, few here would disagree. But, for all that, Dubbya is not a pig.

Anyway, are you suggesting that in the play Romeo and Juliet, Juliet could literally be the sun? Have you ever seen her portrayed that way?


If there is sufficient evidence that the biosphere functions much like a living organism, then there may come a point when it is defined or classified as an organism. At that point, it will no longer be a metaphor.

The operative word here is "like", and that gives the metaphor away.

Of course, we can re-classify whatever we want, but if we do as you suggest, then the meaning of the word 'organism' will have changed, and all you will have achieved here is a novel piece of terminological reform. The world will continue on its way as before, unaltered.


How does this relate to our earlier discussion?

In relation to this comment of mine:


But a mathematical description is totally misleading if applied to the real world.

You asked the following:


How so?

And I pointed out that we have already been over this. If I could be bothered, I'd find the actual post.


Facial recognition is a mathematical representation but there is no mystery surrounding its design. It's algorithms can be explained!

Who said there was a 'mystery'? But how this relates to what I said, is a mystery.


We listen to them. We evaluate. We criticize. Their 'listening to us' is not a requirement, anymore than it is for you to go ahead and write your essays.

Brave words, but what you say will have no effect on how scientists use metaphor. And the reason for that is that their use cannot be avoided.


There is no replacement per se, although the judicious use of insight enabling drugs might be worth a try.

A joke, surely!

[Lynx]

Well, definitions are just yet more words, and even if scientists were to use these definitions, all that they could deliver would be (increasingly detailed) descriptions, not explanations.
Definitions have limited descriptive and explanatory power. They are mainly used to classify or to summarize.

That does not affect the point; to see this, consider a real live individual. if I were to say that George W Bush is an imperialist pig, few here would disagree. But, for all that, Dubbya is not a pig.
He is, by definition, an imperialist. The word 'pig' is being used as an adjective.
Furthermore, the term 'imperialist pig' has no porcine equivalent. Thus, there is no comparison to be made, and no similitude to be drawn.

Anyway, are you suggesting that in the play Romeo and Juliet, Juliet could literally be the sun? Have you ever seen her portrayed that way?
I don't recall seeing such a portrayal. Nevertheless, if Romeo is a sunflower then Juliet is the sun. Their relationship would be the metaphor.

The operative word here is "like", and that gives the metaphor away.

Of course, we can re-classify whatever we want, but if we do as you suggest, then the meaning of the word 'organism' will have changed, and all you will have achieved here is a novel piece of terminological reform.
If we use a strict definition of the word 'organism' then its meaning would be as little changed as possible. If we use sloppy criteria, then we risk 'organism' turning into an umbrella term.
We can avoid the "like" operative by inventing new terminology. Doing so transforms likeness into distinctiveness.

The world will continue on its way as before, unaltered.
I certainly hope so!
And yet - can a change in definition spark a revolution in thought?

In relation to this comment of mine:
But a mathematical description is totally misleading if applied to the real world.
I proposed the example of facial recognition systems. How can facial recognition be misleading if applied to the real world?

Brave words, but what you say will have no effect on how scientists use metaphor. And the reason for that is that their use cannot be avoided.
Their improper use can be avoided.

A joke, surely!
No joke. The idea that scientists would refrain from indulging in mind altering drugs is too naive to be true. Humans of all stripes have been doing so for ages. Granted, the results of these little 'adventures' may be mixed. They are also unlikely to be mentioned to colleagues, or to the public.

[Klaatu]

Back to the original topic,

As Dada has stated, Force = change of momentum with respect to time (F = dÞ/dt) (or F = ma) where dÞ/dt can be considered to be the equivalent of centripetal acceleration of the electron spin. Alignment of this spin from unpaired electrons in (ferro or para) magnetic substances may explain how magnetic "force" originates from the electron. We can consider magnetic newtonian "force" as the macro-scale summation of the influence of trillions of individual electrons, each contributing to the total.

But what of other "forces?" Certainly they always originate at the atomic (or subatomic) level.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

Back to the original topic,

As Dada has stated, Force = change of momentum with respect to time (F = dÞ/dt) (or F = ma) where dÞ/dt can be considered to be the equivalent of centripetal acceleration of the electron spin. Alignment of this spin from unpaired electrons in (ferro or para) magnetic substances may explain how magnetic "force" originates from the electron. We can consider magnetic newtonian "force" as the macro-scale summation of the influence of trillions of individual electrons, each contributing to the total.

But what of other "forces?" Certainly they always originate at the atomic (or subatomic) level.

That made absolutely no sense. The last sentence is not even wrong; I think it would be more accurate to say that different forces act at different overlapping scales.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Definitions have limited descriptive and explanatory power. They are mainly used to classify or to summarize.

Well, I am not sure that this is true of every sort of definition (recursive, ostensive, stipulative, demonstrative, categorical, contextual, persuasive...), but you are the one who introduced this idea, even though you now admit they are not much use in explaining things.


He is, by definition, an imperialist. The word 'pig' is being used as an adjective.
Furthermore, the term 'imperialist pig' has no porcine equivalent. Thus, there is no comparison to be made, and no similitude to be drawn.

He can't be an imperialist 'by definition' otherwise he would have been born an imperialist, and could never have shaken this off. But, many members of the ruling elite change, and become anti-imperialists. The fact that this is an adjective is no reply; most metaphors are adjectives!

And if you do not like the example, think of George W being described as a 'hawk' (which he is); but does he have feathers?


I don't recall seeing such a portrayal. Nevertheless, if Romeo is a sunflower then Juliet is the sun. Their relationship would be the metaphor.

Well, that's the point; but try and interpret this literally. It can't be done.


If we use a strict definition of the word 'organism' then its meaning would be as little changed as possible. If we use sloppy criteria, then we risk 'organism' turning into an umbrella term.

What 'strict definition'?


We can avoid the "like" operative by inventing new terminology. Doing so transforms likeness into distinctiveness.

Invent away, but if the terminology you invent does not do what the word 'like' now does, then your comparison would fail, and with that would go your argument.


How can facial recognition be misleading if applied to the real world?

Where did I say it would or could?


Their improper use can be avoided.

I agree, but then, out would go any attempt at giving an explanation.


No joke. The idea that scientists would refrain from indulging in mind altering drugs is too naive to be true. Humans of all stripes have been doing so for ages. Granted, the results of these little 'adventures' may be mixed. They are also unlikely to be mentioned to colleagues, or to the public.

The reason I assumed you were joking is that we could never trust the deliverances of anyone under the influence.

[Lynx]

Well, I am not sure that this is true of every sort of definition (recursive, ostensive, stipulative, demonstrative, categorical, contextual, persuasive...), but you are the one who introduced this idea, even though you now admit they are not much use in explaining things.
If an explanation cannot be found, look for something else. Currently, I'm looking for definitions.

He can't be an imperialist 'by definition' otherwise he would have been born an imperialist, and could never have shaken this off. But, many members of the ruling elite change, and become anti-imperialists.
I find it very odd that you would equate 'by definition' as implying a permanent state to GW's role in society.

The fact that this is an adjective is no reply; most metaphors are adjectives!
Well, the word 'pig' in imperialist pig is not a metaphor.

And if you do not like the example, think of George W being described as a 'hawk' (which he is); but does he have feathers?
If he had the demeanor or in some way was comparable to a hawk (bird), then this would be an example of using the word hawk as a metaphor. But it is obvious we are referring to his aggressive political stance. By this definition, GW is, in fact, a hawk. The relationship between hawk (political) and hawk (bird) is connotative.

Well, that's the point; but try and interpret this literally. It can't be done.
You can anything with fiction - from suspension of belief to removal of the 'third wall'. A play is an enactment. It may be taken as literal or allegorical, or whatever the viewer's imagination makes of it.

What 'strict definition'?
Strict implies a set of criteria that will exclude most applicants.

organism (plural organisms)

1. (biology) A discrete and complete living thing, such as animal, plant, fungus or microorganism.
2. (by extension) Any complex thing with properties normally associated with living things.[/b]

The biosphere would not qualify under def #1 but might under def #2. The universe does not qualify.

Invent away, but if the terminology you invent does not do what the word 'like' now does, then your comparison would fail, and with that would go your argument.
Inventing terminology is often about placating critics. The term 'planetary organism' might satisfy some, while upsetting others. Much of the wrangling is best left to taxonomists.

Where did I say it would or could?
You wrote "a mathematical description is totally misleading if applied to the real world." Facial recognition is based on mathematical descriptions of the real world.

I agree, but then, out would go any attempt at giving an explanation.
Such attempts have not been successful, so no loss there.

The reason I assumed you were joking is that we could never trust the deliverances of anyone under the influence.
We can trust the results of repeated observation, testing and measurement. Scientific method or not, it is unwise to make character judgments. Would you think less of Marx's work if it were shown he was on a bender while developing them?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


If an explanation cannot be found, look for something else. Currently, I'm looking for definitions.

Well, a definition is no good on its own, otherwise we could re-define, say, 'dark matter' as a virtual particle, and think we had solved the problem.

Anyway, what definitions had you in mind?


Well, the word 'pig' in imperialist pig is not a metaphor.

It's not referring to a literal pig, so what else could it be but a metaphor?


I find it very odd that you would equate 'by definition' as implying a permanent state to GW's role in society.

In fact, since you did not say, I thought you were using what we call a 'real definition', that is, a definition that supposedly gives the essence of whatever it is aimed at defining.

So, you will need to say what sort of definition you had in mind if sense is to be made of this:


He is, by definition, an imperialist.

Types of definition (http://cla.calpoly.edu/~mforte/typesdef.pdf)

L:


If he had the demeanour or in some way was comparable to a hawk (bird), then this would be an example of using the word hawk as a metaphor. But it is obvious we are referring to his aggressive political stance. By this definition, GW is, in fact, a hawk. The relationship between hawk (political) and hawk (bird) is connotative.

The political use of the word 'hawk' in fact is derived from the character of the bird with that name; it alludes to the aggressive nature of hawks, the exact opposite of doves. That is why it is a metaphor.

And, of course, a metaphor shares some of the connotations of the original word, otherwise no one would use it as such. So, metaphorical use is connotative. What else could it be?

In response to your comment about Romeo and Juliet:


I don't recall seeing such a portrayal. Nevertheless, if Romeo is a sunflower then Juliet is the sun. Their relationship would be the metaphor.

I replied:


Well, that's the point; but try and interpret this literally. It can't be done.

To which you responded:


You can anything with fiction - from suspension of belief to removal of the 'third wall'. A play is an enactment. It may be taken as literal or allegorical, or whatever the viewer's imagination makes of it.

Are you now trying to say that it would be possible to interpret Juliet literally as the sun? In you were, we'd then have problems with the meaning of the word 'sun' --, which word, if what you say were possible, would itself become non-literal.

Of course, in fiction one can do whatever one likes, but then, that is because fiction is not literally true. That's why we call it 'fiction'.


Strict implies a set of criteria that will exclude most applicants.

organism (plural organisms)

1. (biology) A discrete and complete living thing, such as animal, plant, fungus or microorganism.
2. (by extension) Any complex thing with properties normally associated with living things.[/b]

The biosphere would not qualify under def #1 but might under def #2. The universe does not qualify.

Now, the problem with dictionary definitions is that they record usage, not necessarily meanings. In this case, the extension of the term 'organism' to entities other than organic beings reflects a metaphorical extension of the term. 'Social organism' is just such a metaphor -- it is probably what we call a 'dead metaphor' by now.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_metaphor

Nothing wrong with that, but it does mean that the two uses of the word are different, and hence that they mean something different. Which is why the dictionary you consulted numbered them differently:

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/organism


Inventing terminology is often about placating critics. The term 'planetary organism' might satisfy some, while upsetting others. Much of the wrangling is best left to taxonomists.

Well, I am not sure this is the case (do you have an evidence that it is?) -- but even if it were, that would still not invalidate the point being made: any new term introduced to replace "like" would have to function in the same way the word 'like' does now, or it would not be delineating the use of a metaphor.

Of course, that is why you chose the word "like" in the first place -- it is intimately connected with the use of metaphor. Metaphors draw our attention to certain similarities inexpressible (or difficult to express) in other ways.


You wrote "a mathematical description is totally misleading if applied to the real world." Facial recognition is based on mathematical descriptions of the real world.

Well, as you say, facial recognition software (if that is what you mean) is the result of the use of mathematics, but it is not an example of the projection of mathematics onto reality (as if functions, differential equations and matrices were physical objects/processes in the material world).



Such attempts have not been successful, so no loss there.

I'm not sure this was your opinion at the beginning of this discussion.


We can trust the results of repeated observation, testing and measurement. Scientific method or not, it is unwise to make character judgments. Would you think less of Marx's work if it were shown he was on a bender while developing them?

That is because of the reasons and evidence he gave, not the drugs he did or did not take. Compare that with the whacko writings of those genuinely on drugs -- nothing there to learn (except, perhaps, not to take drugs when doing science).

And, of course, the scientists you suppose who do these trials had better not be on drugs, or we could not trust the readings they took.

Naturally, if we find there are compounds which improve our ability to observe and concentrate, etc. no problem. But that would still not by-pass the need for argument and evidence -- nor would it get around Leibniz's arguments.

To do that, we'd need better counter-arguments. Not much chance of that.

[Klaatu]

NoXion

But why would my hypothesis "make no sense?" Can you explain?

I was using: dÞ/dt = change of momentum = mass X acceleration = force

Can we say that there is an interface of quantum atomic motion/forces to newtonian motion/forces
at some point? There has to be.

Perhaps I should have posed that as a question outright. I am certain your physics background
knowledge is more abundant than mine. Thanks.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

NoXion

But why would my hypothesis "make no sense?" Can you explain?

For a start, electrons are quantum mechanical objects and thus their "spin" is of a different nature to the spinning experienced in the macroworld.


I was using: dÞ/dt = change of momentum = mass X acceleration = forceWhich is based on what?


Can we say that there is an interface of quantum atomic motion/forces to newtonian motion/forces
at some point? There has to be.Most individual atoms are large enough to count as being macroscale - we've photographed them. Residual uncertainty means they're a little fuzzy, but they're definately there. Brownian motion is the result of pollen or smoke particles being knocked about by water molecules, if I remember correctly.


Perhaps I should have posed that as a question outright. I am certain your physics background
knowledge is more abundant than mine. Thanks.I'd be more inclined to believe that you know what you're talking about if you didn't mention a cultural movement in a scientific topic.

[Lynx]

Well, a definition is no good on its own, otherwise we could re-define, say, 'dark matter' as a virtual particle, and think we had solved the problem.

Anyway, what definitions had you in mind?
I ask what science has discovered and the first definition that comes to mind is 'mechanism'.

It's not referring to a literal pig, so what else could it be but a metaphor?
It's not making a comparison. It could be a term of endearment or an invective.

In fact, since you did not say, I thought you were using what we call a 'real definition', that is, a definition that supposedly gives the essence of whatever it is aimed at defining.

So, you will need to say what sort of definition you had in mind if sense is to be made of this:
I'm sorry but this does not help. If I write "he is the definition of", or "he is the embodiment of imperialist thought, disguised in human form", would that qualify as a 'real definition'?

The political use of the word 'hawk' in fact is derived from the character of the bird with that name; it alludes to the aggressive nature of hawks, the exact opposite of doves. That is why it is a metaphor.
That is why it began as a metaphor. It has since become a definition.

And, of course, a metaphor shares some of the connotations of the original word, otherwise no one would use it as such. So, metaphorical use is connotative. What else could it be?
Metaphorical use has to be comparative. "George Bush is a hawk" is a literal description. Connotative, yes; metaphorical, no.

In response to your comment about Romeo and Juliet:

I replied:

To which you responded:

Are you now trying to say that it would be possible to interpret Juliet literally as the sun? In you were, we'd then have problems with the meaning of the word 'sun' --, which word, if what you say were possible, would itself become non-literal.
If Juliet = Sun, then both are literal, with a storyline.
If Juliet <> Sun, then we have two characters. If you make Juliet be more like the sun, Juliet becomes non-literal. If you make the sun be more like Juliet, then the sun becomes non-literal.
Juliet can also be the personification of the sun.

Of course, in fiction one can do whatever one likes, but then, that is because fiction is not literally true. That's why we call it 'fiction'.
A non-fictional play would still be an enactment. I suppose in that case, it could be true, yet not 'real'.

Now, the problem with dictionary definitions is that they record usage, not necessarily meanings. In this case, the extension of the term 'organism' to entities other than organic beings reflects a metaphorical extension of the term. 'Social organism' is just such a metaphor -- it is probably what we call a 'dead metaphor' by now.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_metaphor

Nothing wrong with that, but it does mean that the two uses of the word are different, and hence that they mean something different. Which is why the dictionary you consulted numbered them differently:

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/organism
Perhaps the Gaia Hypothesis and its sponsored metaphors will die out too, or retain their current usage. If the biosphere is redefined we should expect an explanation, or a notation in a dictionary indicating the field of reference.

Well, I am not sure this is the case (do you have an evidence that it is?)
The existence of politics and pettiness should be proof enough.

-- but even if it were, that would still not invalidate the point being made: any new term introduced to replace "like" would have to function in the same way the word 'like' does now, or it would not be delineating the use of a metaphor.

Of course, that is why you chose the word "like" in the first place -- it is intimately connected with the use of metaphor. Metaphors draw our attention to certain similarities inexpressible (or difficult to express) in other ways.
I'm unsure what point you're trying to make. When something ceases to be a metaphor, it will either be added to an existing definition, or given its own name. Definitions with similar names usually imply similarity or relatedness. I believe this is as it should be, it makes it easier to study related topics.

Well, as you say, facial recognition software (if that is what you mean) is the result of the use of mathematics, but it is not an example of the projection of mathematics onto reality (as if functions, differential equations and matrices were physical objects/processes in the material world).
These 'projections' are merely mathematical descriptions of observed phenomena. I don't see the difference, except for what some scientists may assert out of hubris.

I'm not sure this was your opinion at the beginning of this discussion.
Definitions, descriptions and representations are good enough 'explanations' for me. My opinion on this has not changed. The explanatory standard you seem to want appears to be impractical beyond the macro-world and impossible at the sub-atomic.

That is because of the reasons and evidence he gave, not the drugs he did or did not take. Compare that with the whacko writings of those genuinely on drugs -- nothing there to learn (except, perhaps, not to take drugs when doing science).
It's the validity of ideas that count, not how they were inspired.

And, of course, the scientists you suppose who do these trials had better not be on drugs, or we could not trust the readings they took.
Agreed. The same goes for those scientists 'on the take'.

Naturally, if we find there are compounds which improve our ability to observe and concentrate, etc. no problem. But that would still not by-pass the need for argument and evidence -- nor would it get around Leibniz's arguments.

To do that, we'd need better counter-arguments. Not much chance of that.
Well, I don't know how you would counter the saying "It's not turtles - it's mechanisms. Nested mechanisms all the way down..."

[Klaatu]

"For a start, electrons are quantum mechanical objects and thus their "spin" is of a different nature
to the spinning experienced in the macroworld."
True, quantum effects are not the same thing as "classical" effects, such as angular momentum. But electrons are also discrete particles. They have mass, and although small, still exibit these effects. Thus there has to be a centripetal acceleration, especially in the huge P and SP-type orbital. This is the source of magnetic moment. "Macro-scale" properties do not simply cease to exist at the atomic level. Of course, this is not yet fully understood.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electron#Virtual_particles

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gyromagnetic_ratio#Gyromagnetic_ratio_for_an_isola ted_electron


"Most individual atoms are large enough to count as being macroscale"
Relative to what?


"we've photographed them"
Or have we only photographed their "shadows?"

Brownian motion is of the macroscale. It has nothing to do with electron orbitals.



I was using: dÞ/dt = change of momentum = mass X acceleration = force
Which is based on what?

I guess that is the topic of the discussion on this thread.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


I ask what science has discovered and the first definition that comes to mind is 'mechanism'.

Well, as we know, this is a metaphor not a definition, and it was invented, not discovered.


It's not making a comparison. It could be a term of endearment or an invective

Indeed, but the other uses you give also depend on a metaphorical extension to this term.


I'm sorry but this does not help. If I write "he is the definition of", or "he is the embodiment of imperialist thought, disguised in human form", would that qualify as a 'real definition'?

Not unless George W was given, or possessed this essence from birth (or from conception) as part of his physical constitution, which is why I made that earlier point:


He can't be an imperialist 'by definition' otherwise he would have been born an imperialist, and could never have shaken this off. But, many members of the ruling elite change, and become anti-imperialists. The fact that this is an adjective is no reply; most metaphors are adjectives!

If this were a 'real definition', Bush could not have chosen to be an imperialist, nor could he ever cease to be one, any more than water chose to be, or can cease being, H2O.


That is why it began as a metaphor. It has since become a definition.

Maybe so, maybe not; but definitions use metaphors too.


"George Bush is a hawk" is a literal description. Connotative, yes; metaphorical, no.

If it were literal, Bush would have feathers and could fly.


If Juliet = Sun, then both are literal, with a storyline.
If Juliet <> Sun, then we have two characters. If you make Juliet be more like the sun, Juliet becomes non-literal. If you make the sun be more like Juliet, then the sun becomes non-literal.
Juliet can also be the personification of the sun.

I'm sorry, but none of this seems to make sense. You have either reached beyond the limit of the descriptive power of the language you are trying to use, or you have not yet clarified in your own mind what you want to say.


A non-fictional play would still be an enactment. I suppose in that case, it could be true, yet not 'real'.

Again, I am not sure I followed this.


The existence of politics and pettiness should be proof enough.

Once more, I don't see this as a 'proof', but the point is not worth arguing over.


These 'projections' are merely mathematical descriptions of observed phenomena. I don't see the difference, except for what some scientists may assert out of hubris.

In some cases mathematical terms can be used to describe the world (when we speak of five oranges, or half a cake, for example), but more complex mathematical terms are not descriptions. If they were, we'd have to assume that things like matrices, self-adjunct operators and Hermite Polynomials exist in the material world.

They are much more like rules.


Definitions, descriptions and representations are good enough 'explanations' for me. My opinion on this has not changed. The explanatory standard you seem to want appears to be impractical beyond the macro-world and impossible at the sub-atomic.

Except that theorists since Thales days have been searching for just such explanations. Here is one summary of this search:


"Empirical, contingent truths have always struck philosophers as being, in some sense, ultimately unintelligible. It is not that none can be known with certainty…; nor is it that some cannot be explained…. Rather is it that all explanation of empirical truths rests ultimately on brute contingency -- that is how the world is! Where science comes to rest in explaining empirical facts varies from epoch to epoch, but it is in the nature of empirical explanation that it will hit the bedrock of contingency somewhere, e.g., in atomic theory in the nineteenth century or in quantum mechanics today. One feature that explains philosophers' fascination with truths of Reason is that they seem, in a deep sense, to be fully intelligible. To understand a necessary proposition is to see why things must be so, it is to gain an insight into the nature of things and to apprehend not only how things are, but also why they cannot be otherwise. It is striking how pervasive visual metaphors are in philosophical discussions of these issues. We see the universal in the particular (by Aristotelian intuitive induction); by the Light of Reason we see the essential relations of Simple Natures; mathematical truths are apprehended by Intellectual Intuition, or by a priori insight. Yet instead of examining the use of these arresting pictures or metaphors to determine their aptness as pictures, we build upon them mythological structures.

"We think of necessary propositions as being true or false, as objective and independent of our minds or will. We conceive of them as being about various entities, about numbers even about extraordinary numbers that the mind seems barely able to grasp…, or about universals, such as colours, shapes, tones; or about logical entities, such as the truth-functions or (in Frege's case) the truth-values. We naturally think of necessary propositions as describing the features of these entities, their essential characteristics. So we take mathematical propositions to describe mathematical objects…. Hence investigation into the domain of necessary propositions is conceived as a process of discovery. Empirical scientists make discoveries about the empirical domain, uncovering contingent truths; metaphysicians, logicians and mathematicians appear to make discoveries of necessary truths about a supra-empirical domain (a 'third realm'). Mathematics seems to be the 'natural history of mathematical objects' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.137], 'the physics of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1976), p.138; however these authors record this erroneously as p.139, RL] or the 'mineralogy of numbers' [Wittgenstein (1978), p.229]. The mathematician, e.g., Pascal, admires the beauty of a theorem as though it were a kind of crystal. Numbers seem to him to have wonderful properties; it is as if he were confronting a beautiful natural phenomenon [Wittgenstein (1998), p.47; again, these authors have recorded this erroneously as p.41, RL]. Logic seems to investigate the laws governing logical objects…. Metaphysics looks as if it is a description of the essential structure of the world. Hence we think that a reality corresponds to our (true) necessary propositions. Our logic is correct because it corresponds to the laws of logic….

"In our eagerness to ensure the objectivity of truths of reason, their sempiternality and mind-independence, we slowly but surely transform them into truths that are no less 'brutish' than empirical, contingent truths. Why must red exclude being green? To be told that this is the essential nature of red and green merely reiterates the brutish necessity. A proof in arithmetic or geometry seems to provide an explanation, but ultimately the structure of proofs rests on axioms. Their truth is held to be self-evident, something we apprehend by means of our faculty of intuition; we must simply see that they are necessarily true…. We may analyse such ultimate truths into their constituent 'indefinables'. Yet if 'the discussion of indefinables…is the endeavour to see clearly, and to make others see clearly, the entities concerned, in order that the mind may have that kind of acquaintance with them which it has with redness or the taste of a pineapple' [Russell (1937), p.xv; again these authors record this erroneously as p.v, RL], then the mere intellectual vision does not penetrate the logical or metaphysical that to the why or wherefore…. For if we construe necessary propositions as truths about logical, mathematical or metaphysical entities which describe their essential properties, then, of course, the final products of our analyses will be as impenetrable to reason as the final products of physical theorising, such as Planck's constant." [Baker and Hacker (1988), pp.273-75. Referencing conventions in the original have been altered to conform to those adopted here.]

Baker, G. and Hacker, P. (1988), Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar And Necessity, Volume Two (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).

The other references can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm

And this search will continue (with or without you) just as long as class society lasts. I have tried to explain some of the reasons why this is so in several other threads:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1349779&postcount=2

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653


It's the validity of ideas that count, not how they were inspired.

Well, that was the point was trying to make.


Well, I don't know how you would counter the saying "It's not turtles - it's mechanisms. Nested mechanisms all the way down..."

I'd say something like: the word 'mechanism' is just as non-literal as 'turtles'.

[Lynx]

Well, as we know, this is a metaphor not a definition, and it was invented, not discovered.
If I'm using it as a metaphor, what am I comparing it to?

Indeed, but the other uses you give also depend on a metaphorical extension to this term.
The uses I gave could be interpreted as connotative, sarcastic or rhetorical.

Not unless George W was given, or possessed this essence from birth (or from conception) as part of his physical constitution, which is why I made that earlier point:

If this were a 'real definition', Bush could not have chosen to be an imperialist, nor could he ever cease to be one, any more than water chose to be, or can cease being, H2O.
Well, he's a human being. If we recognize that fact, then nothing anyone can say can transform him into a caricature or a 'real definition'.

Maybe so, maybe not; but definitions use metaphors too.
Not in this case. In any case, we have allegories, analogies, facsimiles, etc to do comparative work with.

If it were literal, Bush would have feathers and could fly.
We're not asserting that he is a bird of prey.

I'm sorry, but none of this seems to make sense. You have either reached beyond the limit of the descriptive power of the language you are trying to use, or you have not yet clarified in your own mind what you want to say.
Fiction and fictional characters give us a freedom we don't enjoy in the real world. In such circumstances, interpreting Juliet literally should be easier.

Again, I am not sure I followed this.
Consider keepsakes. What makes a particular object 'special' while other objects, even identical ones, are not?

Once more, I don't see this as a 'proof', but the point is not worth arguing over.
We can observe the politicization of words by the ruling class, or wrangling over technical terms by members of the scientific and taxonomic communities.
I find quite unusual the points you do feel are worth arguing over!!

In some cases mathematical terms can be used to describe the world (when we speak of five oranges, or half a cake, for example), but more complex mathematical terms are not descriptions. If they were, we'd have to assume that things like matrices, self-adjunct operators and Hermite Polynomials exist in the material world.
Why assume they exist? We can choose to make a distinction between a complex mathematical description that yields solutions and a literal description (that probably yields nothing).

They are much more like rules.
Yes. Some are called laws.

Except that theorists since Thales days have been searching for just such explanations. Here is one summary of this search:




Baker, G. and Hacker, P. (1988), Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar And Necessity, Volume Two (Blackwell, 2nd ed.).
Ah, a glimpse of the 'crystallization of math' metaphor is included...
My first concern would be how much time is saved or wasted by these searches.

The other references can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm

And this search will continue (with or without you) just as long as class society lasts. I have tried to explain some of the reasons why this is so in several other threads:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1349779&postcount=2

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653
I'll have to read these at another time.
I have no objections to contingency.

I'd say something like: the word 'mechanism' is just as non-literal as 'turtles'.
Maybe so, yet for some reason I find it more convincing.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


If I'm using it as a metaphor, what am I comparing it to?

A machine.


The uses I gave could be interpreted as connotative, sarcastic or rhetorical.

Again, maybe so, but these varied uses would still depend on the metaphor.


Well, he's a human being. If we recognize that fact, then nothing anyone can say can transform him into a caricature or a 'real definition'.

I agree, but that just means that he can't be an 'imperialist pig' by definition, as you asserted.


Not in this case.

I beg to differ.


In any case, we have allegories, analogies, facsimiles, etc to do comparative work with.

Many of these rely on metaphor too.


We're not asserting that he is a bird of prey.

But you said 'hawk' was literal, and if it is, then Bush must have feathers and can fly.

Unless, that is, you are using 'literal' non-literally!


Fiction and fictional characters give us a freedom we don't enjoy in the real world. In such circumstances, interpreting Juliet literally should be easier.

Yes, I have already agreed this; but the point is that if Juliet is a human being (even a fictional human being) then she cannot be the sun, too -- not unless you change the meaning of 'human being' to mean something like 'massive shiny object at the centre of the solar system', and then you might have problems explaining how Romeo could kiss her. Even so, the comaprison with the sun would be lame, since you'd only be comparing Juliet with herself.


Consider keepsakes. What makes a particular object 'special' while other objects, even identical ones, are not?

Thanks, but I am sure I do not know how this is at all relevant.


Why assume they exist? We can choose to make a distinction between a complex mathematical description that yields solutions and a literal description (that probably yields nothing).

Of course, I agree; but the point I was making was far stronger. Mathematical objects (like the ones I mentioned) cannot exist in the physical world.


Some are called laws.

Indeed, but I prefer not to use that word since it has only encouraged theorists to confuse mathematical rules with physical laws.


Maybe so, yet for some reason I find it more convincing.

However, a believer in the 'turtle' metaphor will simply ask you why the machine metaphor is any better.

[Lynx]

A machine.
A mechanism can be part of a machine - or a system. That makes it integral. Where's the metaphor?

Again, maybe so, but these varied uses would still depend on the metaphor.
These 'varied uses' are interpretations.

I agree, but that just means that he can't be an 'imperialist pig' by definition, as you asserted.
He is an imperialist (by definition, not by metaphor). Is ~ present tense only.

Many of these rely on metaphor too.
Yes, and all metaphors rely upon comparison.

But you said 'hawk' was literal, and if it is, then Bush must have feathers and can fly.
All he must have is an aggressive political stance.

Unless, that is, you are using 'literal' non-literally!
Literal, as in 'the same'.

Yes, I have already agreed this; but the point is that if Juliet is a human being (even a fictional human being) then she cannot be the sun, too -- not unless you change the meaning of 'human being' to mean something like 'massive shiny object at the centre of the solar system', and then you might have problems explaining how Romeo could kiss her. Even so, the comaprison with the sun would be lame, since you'd only be comparing Juliet with herself.
Juliet as human is fairly conventional.
Juliet is given attributes of the sun, or the sun is given attributes of Juliet. If there is a singular character, you accept the character as described. Comparisons may begin with the story itself, or not at all.
Juliet-as-the-sun generally refers to a conventional representation of a sun shining in the sky. Romeo felt her radiating warmth...
The-sun-as-Juliet refers to a non-conventional representation. An example of this might be an avatar in human form. Juliet was an energetic lady, yet could not be roused from dusk till dawn...

Thanks, but I am sure I do not know how this is at all relevant.
You don't have keepsakes?

Indeed, but I prefer not to use that word since it has only encouraged theorists to confuse mathematical rules with physical laws.
Is Ohm's Law a mathematical rule?

However, a believer in the 'turtle' metaphor will simply ask you why the machine metaphor is any better.
Turtles are both machine and mechanism.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


A mechanism can be part of a machine - or a system. That makes it integral. Where's the metaphor?

The universe is not a machine. Look, we went over this several pages ago.


He is an imperialist (by definition, not by metaphor). Is ~ present tense only.

And you said this several pages back, too; so what kind of definition is this? Who invented it? Is it one of these types of defintions?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition

And the metaphor appears in the use of the word 'pig'.


All he must have is an aggressive political stance.

Hence the use of the metaphorical word 'hawk'.


Literal, as in 'the same'.

'Literal' does not mean 'the same'.


Juliet as human is fairly conventional.
Juliet is given attributes of the sun, or the sun is given attributes of Juliet. If there is a singular character, you accept the character as described. Comparisons may begin with the story itself, or not at all.
Juliet-as-the-sun generally refers to a conventional representation of a sun shining in the sky. Romeo felt her radiating warmth...
The-sun-as-Juliet refers to a non-conventional representation. An example of this might be an avatar in human form. Juliet was an energetic lady, yet could not be roused from dusk till dawn...

And more besides; but the point was that Juliet could not literally be the sun, anymore than George W Bush could literally be a hawk.


You don't have keepsakes?

Whether I do or do not, what is the point of mentioning keepsakes? They do not seem to bear any relevance to this discussion.


Is Ohm's Law a mathematical rule?

Indeed, and this is precisely the confusion I alluded to.


Turtles are both machine and mechanism.

Turtles can't be machines or they'd have to have been designed. So, unless you are a theist, turtles are not machines.

They don't even look like machines!

[Lynx]

The universe is not a machine. Look, we went over this several pages ago.
I prefer system to machine. The universe is a system, or system is a metaphor for the universe. System could also be a generalization.

And you said this several pages back, too; so what kind of definition is this? Who invented it? Is it one of these types of defintions?
It (imperialist) appears to be a nominal definition.

And the metaphor appears in the use of the word 'pig'.
The use of the word pig in the term 'imperialist pig' is a matter for interpretation. It could mean 'slovenly', but that would be better expressed by the sentence "he is an imperialist and a pig."

Hence the use of the metaphorical word 'hawk'.
Hence the use of a word with metaphorical origins in a declarative sentence.

'Literal' does not mean 'the same'.
Literal: real, as stated, not figuratively, not metaphorically.
"Bush is a hawk (political)" is a literal description.
"Bush is a hawk (bird)" is a metaphorical description.
We're free to interpret words, but not at the expense of reality.

And more besides; but the point was that Juliet could not literally be the sun, anymore than George W Bush could literally be a hawk.
If your imagination does not allow you to accept a fictional portrayal as being literal, then I suppose not.

Whether I do or do not, what is the point of mentioning keepsakes? They do not seem to bear any relevance to this discussion.
They might have been an example of something that was true, yet not real.

Indeed, and this is precisely the confusion I alluded to.
Well, I am confused by the term 'mathematical object'. Laws, rules and descriptions are not objects.

Turtles can't be machines or they'd have to have been designed. So, unless you are a theist, turtles are not machines.
They're biological machines.

They don't even look like machines!
Looks can be deceiving. They are part of a larger mechanism (or system), as are we.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


I prefer system to machine. The universe is a system, or system is a metaphor for the universe. System could also be a generalization.

"System" is a metaphor too. Anyway, if you prefer this word, then you will need to ditch "mechanism".


It (imperialist) appears to be a nominal definition.

But, who gave him this 'definition'?


The use of the word pig in the term 'imperialist pig' is a matter for interpretation. It could mean 'slovenly', but that would be better expressed by the sentence "he is an imperialist and a pig."

Indeed, but whatever interpretation is given it, that will depend on its being a metaphor.


Hence the use of a word with metaphorical origins in a declarative sentence.

Absolutely, but even there, they are not being used literally.


Literal: real, as stated, not figuratively, not metaphorically.
"Bush is a hawk (political)" is a literal description.
"Bush is a hawk (bird)" is a metaphorical description.
We're free to interpret words, but not at the expense of reality.

In your political version, the word "hawk" then must be a dead metaphor.


We're free to interpret words, but not at the expense of reality.

I agree, but then there is no rigid boundary between the two. "Reality" is itself a nominalization.


They might have been an example of something that was true, yet not real.

I think you mean that sentences about them might be true even though the objects concerned aren't real, as in "Sherlock Holmes is a detective". However, the word "true" is not being used here as it would be in relation to "New York is in the USA".


Well, I am confused by the term 'mathematical object'. Laws, rules and descriptions are not objects.

I am using the term as in "object of study".


They're biological machines.

Then you must believe in 'god', I presume.


They are part of a larger mechanism (or system), as are we.

And we are back to metaphor again....

[Lynx]

"System" is a metaphor too. Anyway, if you prefer this word, then you will need to ditch "mechanism".
I could replace mechanism with 'process'.

But, who gave him this 'definition'?
Leftists?

Indeed, but whatever interpretation is given it, that will depend on its being a metaphor.
It will depend on its usage in a sentence.

In your political version, the word "hawk" then must be a dead metaphor.
It has its own meaning and is used to convey that meaning, so why would I consider it a metaphor at all?

I agree, but then there is no rigid boundary between the two. "Reality" is itself a nominalization.
Literal and metaphorical follow rigid boundaries as far as I'm concerned. The exception to this can be found in fiction.

I think you mean that sentences about them might be true even though the objects concerned aren't real, as in "Sherlock Holmes is a detective". However, the word "true" is not being used here as it would be in relation to "New York is in the USA".
Romeo and Juliet - A True Story

I am using the term as in "object of study".
An artifact can be an object of study :confused:

Then you must believe in 'god', I presume.
I believe in the evolutionary process.

And we are back to metaphor again....
Yes, but a better metaphor than turtles.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


I could replace mechanism with 'process'.

Indeed, you could; but 'process' is no less metaphorical.


Leftists?

Well, they might call him this, but I can't think how they 'defined' him this way -- did they all attend a meeting and have a show of hands?


It will depend on its usage in a sentence.

Sure, but that usage will be guided by this metaphor.


It has its own meaning and is used to convey that meaning, so why would I consider it a metaphor at all?

That's why we call it a dead metaphor.


Literal and metaphorical follow rigid boundaries as far as I'm concerned.

'Boundary' is, of course, metaphorical itself.


Romeo and Juliet - A True Story

I am sorry, I'm not sure what you are driving at.


An artefact can be an object of study

Indeed; mathematicians create these forms and then study them.


I believe in the evolutionary process.

Unfortunately, there is a shed load of teleology in evolutionary theory -- even though Darwinians try to deny this. Check out the last two or three chapters of David Stove's book.

This is brought out very well by Jerry Fodor's review of Daniel Dennett's egregious book 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea':


Suppose, however, that adaptationism is true; is it able to ground a notion of natural teleology? ... Is it then reasonable to speak of [a certain property] P as a property that [organism] O was "designed" to have? Or as a "solution" to an "engineering problem" that O's ecology posed?...

The subtext is the thing to keep your eye on here. It is, no doubt, an interesting question in its own right whether adaptationism licences teleological notions like SELECTION FOR. But what makes that question interesting in the present metaphysical context is that SELECTION FOR is presumably intensional (sic).... If so, then maybe a naturalistic teleology is indeed a first step toward a naturalistic theory of mind.

But, promising though it may seem, I'm afraid this line is hopeless, and for familiar reasons. Design (as opposed to mere order) requires a designer. Not theologically or metaphysically..., but just conceptually. You can't explain intentionality by appealing to the notion of design because the notion of design presupposes intentionality....

...Patently, not every effect that a process has is ipso facto an effect that it designs; short of theology, at least some effects of every process are merely adventitious. This must hold of the process of natural selection inter alia. So, in evolutionary theory as elsewhere, if you wish to deploy the idiom of posed problems and designed solutions [as Dennett does -- RL], you must say something about what designing requires over and above mere causing. Lacking this distinction, everything a process causes is (vacuously) one of its designed effects, and every one of its effects is (vacuously) the solution to the problem of causing one of those.

To be sure, if solutions aren't distinguished from mere effects, it does come out -- as Dennett would want it to -- that the giraffe's long neck solved the problem of reaching to the top of things, and did so under precisely the ecological conditions that giraffes evolved in. But equally...the Rockies solve the problem of how to make mountains just like the Rockies out of just the materials that the Rockies are made of and under just the conditions of upthrust and erosion in which they formed; and the Pacific Ocean solves the problem of how to make a hole of just that size and just that shape that is filled with just that much salt water; and the tree in my garden solves the problem of how to cast a shadow just that long at just this time of the day. This, however, is no metaphysical breakthrough. It's just a rather pointless way of talking; neither [the Rockies] nor the Pacific get any kudos for being solutions in this attenuated sense. That's because problems like this are like headaches; they don't float free of people having them. The Pacific [and the Rockies] didn't really solve anything because nobody had the problems that [these] would have been the solutions to....

Serious talk about problems and solutions requires a serious account of the difference between designing and merely causing. Notice, moreover, that if your goal is a reductive theory of intentionality, then your account of this difference cannot itself invoke intentional idiom in any essential way. This really does make things hard for Dennett. In the usual case, we distinguish designing from mere causing by reference to the effects that the designer did or didn't intend. For example: The flowers that Sam gave Mary made her wheeze and did not please her. They were, nonetheless, a failed solution to the please-Mary problem, not a successful solution to the wheeze-Mary problem. That's because Sam intended that receiving the flowers should please her and did not intend that they should excite her asthma. Suppose, by contrast, that Mary merely came across the flowers, and they both pleased her and made her wheeze. Then the flowers didn't solve, or fail to solve, anything; they just had whatever effects they did.... It certainly looks [from this that] the concept of design presupposes, and hence cannot be invoked to explain, the accessibility of intentional idiom.

If you found a watch on a desert island, you'd have a couple of options. You could argue that since it was clearly designed, there has to have been a designer; or you could argue that since there certainly was no designer, the watch can't have been designed. What is not, however, available is the course that Dennett appears to be embarked upon: there was no designer, but the watch was designed all the same. That just makes no sense. [Fodor (1998b), pp.176-78. Capitals and italics in the original.]

Fodor, J. (1998a), In Critical Condition. Polemical Essays On Cognitive Science And The Philosophy Of Mind (MIT Press).

--------, (1998b), 'Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin', in Fodor (1998a), pp.171-87.

And more or less the same sort of things can be said about 'mechanism' and 'machine'.


Yes, but a better metaphor than turtles.

Not really, since it implies that the universe had a maker (or was the result of some intention or other), as we have just seen.

[Lynx]

Indeed, you could; but 'process' is no less metaphorical.
If I'm using 'process' as a metaphor, what am I comparing it to?
It's metaphorical for you because you associate (mechanism) exclusively to machines, removing it from alternative use.

Well, they might call him this, but I can't think how they 'defined' him this way -- did they all attend a meeting and have a show of hands?
Many sub-cultures develop their own terminology.

Sure, but that usage will be guided by this metaphor.
I'm guided by the propensity of leftists to engage in overblown, outdated rhetoric. This 'pig' is no more substantive than the "running dogs" of capitalism.

That's why we call it a dead metaphor.
Well! Talk about beating a dead horse...
I don't necessarily forget the original meaning, but if it isn't being used in that way, its not up for consideration.

'Boundary' is, of course, metaphorical itself.
That which is mutually exclusive has non-overlapping 'boundaries'. A representation of this is possible.

I am sorry, I'm not sure what you are driving at.
A true story is an accurate depiction of a series of events, yet any story is no less 'true' (or true to form) when fictional.

Indeed; mathematicians create these forms and then study them.
They create them for a purpose. To analyze, to describe, to represent...
The field of pure mathematics is an exploration, is it not?

Unfortunately, there is a shed load of teleology in evolutionary theory -- even though Darwinians try to deny this. Check out the last two or three chapters of David Stove's book.

This is brought out very well by Jerry Fodor's review of Daniel Dennett's egregious book 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea':
I prefer 'refinement through attrition'. Natural designs are not purpose driven. They are not 'solutions' but outcomes. They are as contingent upon what happened as upon what did not happen. (The same can be said for human technological development)
Design also refers to the properties of an organism. There is an inference to functionality, but only in the context that such functionality is a result. Describing it as a culmination of events is inappropriate.

And more or less the same sort of things can be said about 'mechanism' and 'machine'.
By your rather strict interpretation of what constitutes a mechanism or a machine, such words should not be used outside of the automotive industry.

Not really, since it implies that the universe had a maker (or was the result of some intention or other), as we have just seen.
It does not, for the reason stated above. Apart from 'process' and 'mechanism', is there another substitute word I could use?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I'm just about to move house; I'll respond when I have been re-connected to the internet.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


If I'm using 'process' as a metaphor, what am I comparing it to?
It's metaphorical for you because you associate (mechanism) exclusively to machines, removing it from alternative use.

1. A machine.

2. The word was originally introduced to describe machines, and so the metaphor was aimed at making that comparison.


1662, from Mod.L. mechanismus, from Gk. mekhane (see machine).

http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=mechanism


Many sub-cultures develop their own terminology.

Indeed they do, but how does that answer my point?


I don't necessarily forget the original meaning, but if it isn't being used in that way, its not up for consideration.

That's the whole point of calling it a dead metaphor:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_metaphor


That which is mutually exclusive has non-overlapping 'boundaries'. A representation of this is possible.

Maybe so, maybe not, but that still does not affect the point that this word is metaphorical too.


A true story is an accurate depiction of a series of events, yet any story is no less 'true' (or true to form) when fictional.

Even if such a story describes things that never happened (as in 'The Lord of the Rings')?


They create them for a purpose. To analyze, to describe, to represent...
The field of pure mathematics is an exploration, is it not?

It's only ever invention not exploration (nor yet discovery) -- unless, that is, you are a Platonist and think there is a mathematical world 'out there' somewhere, in a hidden sort of realm, anterior to this one, where mathematical theses, theorems, solutions, objects..., already exist waiting for us to 'discover'.


Natural designs are not purpose driven. They are not 'solutions' but outcomes. They are as contingent upon what happened as upon what did not happen. (The same can be said for human technological development)
Design also refers to the properties of an organism. There is an inference to functionality, but only in the context that such functionality is a result. Describing it as a culmination of events is inappropriate.

I agree, but as Fodor points out, this rips the guts out of Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism.

And, theorists have yet to find a definition of 'function' that eliminates all reference (overt and covert) to teleology. [David Stove's book is excellent on this point.]

Why that is so, see below.


By your rather strict interpretation of what constitutes a mechanism or a machine, such words should not be used outside of the automotive industry.

Well, you have yet to tell us what your use of this metaphor cashes out as. Until you do, we would be wise to stick to my allegedly 'strict' characterisation' (i.e., the literal meaning) of this term.


It does not, for the reason stated above. Apart from 'process' and 'mechanism', is there another substitute word I could use?

Ah, but it does and for the reasons I have reiterated in this reply.

Language is primarily a means of communication. When we use it to try to represent things, we are forced to use metaphor, and if we then try to interpret these literally, untoward teleological connotations unfortunately begin to cloud our thought.

Hence there are no other terms you could use.

There is a way out of this and that is to abandon the view that science is always a literal description of nature, but often merely a form of representation, by means of which we do our best to understand nature, balance its books (to use another metaphor), and control it.

Failure to do that will, alas, take you down a route that implies nature is controlled, or has been created by some mind or other -- aka 'god'.

And that is because you are forced then to use terms that we have invented, to apply to our own activity in the world, as if the depict things nature does by itself. In that way, nature is now transformed into something that possesses a cosmic will of some sort, or is controlled by one -- because, of course, the terms we use of ourselves and our activity in the world obviously do that already or we'd not have invented them. Transposing them into a human-neutral arena naturally carries over the teleological connotations human beings put into such words. Failure to note this means that these metaphors trap us in a religious/quasi-religious view of the world, whereby the humanity we put into our language seems to stare back at us from the universe as the face of 'god'.

There is a good but slightly different analysis of this by a Marxist philosopher (one of the few worth reading!), who has influenced my thought in this area:

http://www.guyrobinson.net/pdf/PhilosophyAndMystification_Introduction.pdf

This is even better (but the link appears to be dead right now):

http://www.guyrobinson.net/pdf/Materialism.pdf

I'll try to post a copy of it at my site if the link stays dead.

[By the way, this is just a generalisation of Feuerbach's analysis of the origin of religious belief:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ludwig-feuerbach/]

Alas, there is no other way out of this bind.

[Lynx]

1. A machine.

2. The word was originally introduced to describe machines, and so the metaphor was aimed at making that comparison.
A series of events can be categorized as a process.
A non-random, repeatable process can be categorized as a mechanism.

Indeed they do, but how does that answer my point?
What was your point? Leftist sub-culture creates its own terminology, and promotes its insular way of perceiving the world. 'Imperialist pig' appears to be used exclusively by leftists.

That's the whole point of calling it a dead metaphor:
So what happens to metaphors when they die? Do they become literal?

Maybe so, maybe not, but that still does not affect the point that this word is metaphorical too.
A Venn diagram containing the set of {things that are literal} and the set of {things that are metaphorical} would have non-overlapping boundaries.

Even if such a story describes things that never happened (as in 'The Lord of the Rings')?
Yes, fiction allows for this. In practice, history also allows this to happen.

It's only ever invention not exploration (nor yet discovery) -- unless, that is, you are a Platonist and think there is a mathematical world 'out there' somewhere, in a hidden sort of realm, anterior to this one, where mathematical theses, theorems, solutions, objects..., already exist waiting for us to 'discover'.
No, but I believe math is useful for examining what we uncover. Where would we be without it?
When I mentioned the field of 'pure' mathematics, I was referring to the exploration of math itself, by mathematicians and other geniuses.

I agree, but as Fodor points out, this rips the guts out of Darwinism and Neo-Darwinism.

And, theorists have yet to find a definition of 'function' that eliminates all reference (overt and covert) to teleology. [David Stove's book is excellent on this point.]
Evolutionary 'function' refers to properties of living organisms that are a result of interactions between organisms or between organisms and their environment.

Well, you have yet to tell us what your use of this metaphor cashes out as. Until you do, we would be wise to stick to my allegedly 'strict' characterisation' (i.e., the literal meaning) of this term.
Does systems analysis use words like process and mechanism? My use of these words would fall within that realm.

Ah, but it does and for the reasons I have reiterated in this reply.

Language is primarily a means of communication. When we use it to try to represent things, we are forced to use metaphor, and if we then try to interpret these literally, untoward teleological connotations unfortunately begin to cloud our thought.

Hence there are no other terms you could use.

There is a way out of this and that is to abandon the view that science is always a literal description of nature, but often merely a form of representation, by means of which we do our best to understand nature, balance its books (to use another metaphor), and control it.
If the stories we tell ourselves have no inconsistencies, then we can pretend they are true. Emphasis on pretend.


Failure to do that will, alas, take you down a route that implies nature is controlled, or has been created by some mind or other -- aka 'god'.

And that is because you are forced then to use terms that we have invented, to apply to our own activity in the world, as if the depict things nature does by itself. In that way, nature is now transformed into something that possesses a cosmic will of some sort, or is controlled by one -- because, of course, the terms we use of ourselves and our activity in the world obviously do that already or we'd not have invented them. Transposing them into a human-neutral arena naturally carries over the teleological connotations human beings put into such words. Failure to note this means that these metaphors trap us in a religious/quasi-religious view of the world, whereby the humanity we put into our language seems to stare back at us from the universe as the face of 'god'.

There is a good but slightly different analysis of this by a Marxist philosopher (one of the few worth reading!), who has influenced my thought in this area:

http://www.guyrobinson.net/pdf/PhilosophyAndMystification_Introduction.pdf

This is even better (but the link appears to be dead right now):

http://www.guyrobinson.net/pdf/Materialism.pdf

I'll try to post a copy of it at my site if the link stays dead.

[By the way, this is just a generalisation of Feuerbach's analysis of the origin of religious belief:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ludwig-feuerbach/]

Alas, there is no other way out of this bind.
I can see where the misuse of language can lead to mistaken assumptions or incorrect conceptualizations (as evidenced by popular depictions of evolution). But I don't see how it leads to a belief in God or the supernatural.
It doesn't seem to make any difference (to me) if I were to accept our understanding of the universe as being literal. There is no room for God in the Standard Model or String Theory. These descriptions are too complex and inelegant to carry any supernatural connotation.

[Lynx]

p.s. First two links were/are not working.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


A series of events can be categorized as a process.

Give me an example that does not overtly or covertly use/refer to a cause or causation.


A non-random, repeatable process can be categorized as a mechanism.

Indeed it can, but then that would be yet another use of metaphor.


So what happens to metaphors when they die? Do they become literal?

They can do, but then there is always a danger that someone will try to re-interpret the old live metaphor literally. [Often this occurs in humour, but this is not always the case.]


A Venn diagram containing the set of {things that are literal} and the set of {things that are metaphorical} would have non-overlapping boundaries.

Maybe so, but that does not affect the fact that 'boundary' is metaphorical.


No, but I believe math is useful for examining what we uncover. Where would we be without it?

Then you are a closet Platonist.


Evolutionary 'function' refers to properties of living organisms that are a result of interactions between organisms or between organisms and their environment.

It's considerably more involved than this, and even though philosophers and other theorists have been working on this since at least Kant's input in this area, no one has yet come up with a definition of 'function' that is non-teleological.


Does systems analysis use words like process and mechanism? My use of these words would fall within that realm.

I have no idea, but if they do, that use will either be technical (and thus tightly constrained) or metaphorical, too.


If the stories we tell ourselves have no inconsistencies, then we can pretend they are true. Emphasis on pretend.

Sure, but pretending something is true no more makes it true than pretending you are a millionaire affects your bank balance.


I can see where the misuse of language can lead to mistaken assumptions or incorrect conceptualizations (as evidenced by popular depictions of evolution). But I don't see how it leads to a belief in God or the supernatural.

Well, that is a rather involved subject, about which I have written in threads on metaphysics and determinism in the Philosophy section.


It doesn't seem to make any difference (to me) if I were to accept our understanding of the universe as being literal. There is no room for God in the Standard Model or String Theory. These descriptions are too complex and inelegant to carry any supernatural connotation.

It's more involved than that, but I do not want to say any more about it in this thread. See my previous point.


p.s. First two links were/are not working.

I did say they weren't. Guy's site appears to be down at the moment. If it stays down, I'll re-publish his essays at my site (if I can get him to agree!).

[Lynx]

Give me an example that does not overtly or covertly use/refer to a cause or causation.
Winning a lottery?
Evolution is an ongoing process. Any indeterminate process might satisfy the criteria of being independent from any one cause or series of causes.
I don't see however, how we can eliminate causation completely. The 'arrow of time' makes causation seem sensible.

Indeed it can, but then that would be yet another use of metaphor.
A proper categorization requires something other than a metaphor.

Maybe so, but that does not affect the fact that 'boundary' is metaphorical.
Venn diagrams use terms like boundary or region. They're not intended to be metaphors.

It's considerably more involved than this, and even though philosophers and other theorists have been working on this since at least Kant's input in this area, no one has yet come up with a definition of 'function' that is non-teleological.
Why is it necessary to use the word 'function' at all? Its usage in the above passage was aimed at describing organisms. Using it to describe evolution is to apply it out of context.

I have no idea, but if they do, that use will either be technical (and thus tightly constrained) or metaphorical, too.
Technical terms would be preferable. Or at a minimum, be taxonomic in scope.

Sure, but pretending something is true no more makes it true than pretending you are a millionaire affects your bank balance.
There is an obvious inconsistency in that example. Deluding oneself is a bit different than pretending. What I am describing is pragmatic, and everyone does it. Unfortunately too many go too far, and we end up with dogma.

Well, that is a rather involved subject, about which I have written in threads on metaphysics and determinism in the Philosophy section.

It's more involved than that, but I do not want to say any more about it in this thread. See my previous point.
I assume that belief in God is a rationalization, with no empirical basis. Am I mistaken?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Winning a lottery?

In what way is this a process?

[Careful, this is a trap: as soon as you try to supply the details, you will find you have introduce causal concepts, as I predicted.]


Evolution is an ongoing process. Any indeterminate process might satisfy the criteria of being independent from any one cause or series of causes.
I don't see however, how we can eliminate causation completely. The 'arrow of time' makes causation seem sensible.

Of course you can't eliminate causation; and that means that you cannot also eliminate metaphor.


A proper categorization requires something other than a metaphor.

And we are still waiting for just such a 'proper characterisation'.


Venn diagrams use terms like boundary or region. They're not intended to be metaphors.

Then they aren't boundaries or regions. Unless you mean to use these words in a new, and as yet unspecified sense.


Why is it necessary to use the word 'function' at all? Its usage in the above passage was aimed at describing organisms. Using it to describe evolution is to apply it out of context.

Ask Darwinians this question, not me.


Technical terms would be preferable. Or at a minimum, be taxonomic in scope.

Fine, but we are still waiting for a definition of these 'technical terms' here, and ones that do not themselves use metaphors.


There is an obvious inconsistency in that example. Deluding oneself is a bit different than pretending. What I am describing is pragmatic, and everyone does it. Unfortunately too many go too far, and we end up with dogma.

Well, you seem to be using 'delude' to (partly) mean 'false'; in that case, even in your example, those involved would be deluding themselves if they thought the story was true.

And it is worth recalling that in the example you gave all you required was that the story was consistent. But, it is possible for falsehoods to be consistent. For example, these two propositions are consistent with each other (i.e., they could both be true together): 'Paris is in Germany' and 'The Moon is 300,000 miles away from the earth'.


I assume that belief in God is a rationalization, with no empirical basis. Am I mistaken?

But, according to you, it is possible to hold that a story (like any in the Bible) is true. Why can't Christians do this?

Anyway, there is plenty of evidence that 'god' exists. Unfortunately for Christians, atheists refuse to accept it as conclusive.

[Lynx]

In what way is this a process?

[Careful, this is a trap: as soon as you try to supply the details, you will find you have introduce causal concepts, as I predicted.]
I can describe the steps (events) necessary to win a lottery. This should be sufficient to identify it as a process. I included an example featuring a probabilistic event in hopes of addressing your 'causality clause'.

Of course you can't eliminate causation; and that means that you cannot also eliminate metaphor.
How does it follow that causation requires metaphor?

And we are still waiting for just such a 'proper characterisation'.
As far as I know, mechanism is a proper term for a non-random repeatable process. Algorithm is another term, but one that is normally used in computer science.

Then they aren't boundaries or regions. Unless you mean to use these words in a new, and as yet unspecified sense.
I'm describing Venn diagrams, the use of these words in that context should be straightforward. In more technical terms, the union of these two sets results in a null intersection.
Other terms: mutually exclusive, XOR, dichotomy.

Ask Darwinians this question, not me.
To my knowledge Darwinians do not use the word function. They might say: "The function of attribute X is a result of long term interaction between species X and species Y". This is an attempt to describe situations in the here and now. The careful reader would be wise not to draw inferences, and to filter out inferences made by an overly-enthused author.
When explaining the process of evolution itself, 'inadvertent' should be included as part of the discourse.

Fine, but we are still waiting for a definition of these 'technical terms' here, and ones that do not themselves use metaphors.
A technical term refers to some detail of a larger system or process. It may be a unique or qualified term. Taxonomic-like terms are as follows:
Universe or Cosmos. A subset of this is the Observable Universe. From there, it is broken down into Galaxies, Nebulae and other large structures. We have stars, black holes, and quasars. Stars are classified according to size, temperature and density. Stars may be binary, and have lesser bodies such as planets or asteroids. Stars and their planetary systems undergo a life cycle. The universe is also divided into the macroscopic, microscopic and subatomic realms.
The more detailed our knowledge or theories, the more technical the terms.

Well, you seem to be using 'delude' to (partly) mean 'false'; in that case, even in your example, those involved would be deluding themselves if they thought the story was true.
Yes, the operative difference being they never have to face the consequences of their delusions.

And it is worth recalling that in the example you gave all you required was that the story was consistent. But, it is possible for falsehoods to be consistent. For example, these two propositions are consistent with each other (i.e., they could both be true together): 'Paris is in Germany' and 'The Moon is 300,000 miles away from the earth'.
How are these two propositions consistent?
Their factual basis makes them easy to confirm or disprove.
Inconsistent can refer to a range of possibilities, from minor details to major flaws.

But, according to you, it is possible to hold that a story (like any in the Bible) is true. Why can't Christians do this?
They do. It's called faith.

Anyway, there is plenty of evidence that 'god' exists. Unfortunately for Christians, atheists refuse to accept it as conclusive.
By all means, show me this evidence. I'm not a dogmatic atheist.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


I can describe the steps (events) necessary to win a lottery. This should be sufficient to identify it as a process. I included an example featuring a probabilistic event in hopes of addressing your 'causality clause'.

I'd like to see you explain how probabilistic events can be causes.

Anyway, the 'steps' you have to take involve things like buying a ticket, filling it in, checking it, claiming your prize -- and many other physical activities, like opening doors, walking, holding a pen, or pressing a computer key..., -- all of which implicate causation.


How does it follow that causation requires metaphor?

I dealt with this in threads on determinism, for example, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/freedom-state-mind-t56836/index.html?t=56836

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2


As far as I know, mechanism is a proper term for a non-random repeatable process. Algorithm is another term, but one that is normally used in computer science.

I don't think that is what 'mechanism' means. I went through this earlier:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1515345&postcount=130


I'm describing Venn diagrams, the use of these words in that context should be straightforward. In more technical terms, the union of these two sets results in a null intersection.
Other terms: mutually exclusive, XOR, dichotomy.

Well, mathematicians slide between a technical meaning of 'boundary' (defined in set-theoretical terms, for example) and a metaphorical use of this word. Many of the alleged paradoxes of set-theory arise from this and similar slides.

I suspect you are doing the same.


To my knowledge Darwinians do not use the word function. They might say: "The function of attribute X is a result of long term interaction between species X and species Y". This is an attempt to describe situations in the here and now. The careful reader would be wise not to draw inferences, and to filter out inferences made by an overly-enthused author.
When explaining the process of evolution itself, 'inadvertent' should be included as part of the discourse.

Oh yes they do, and all the time. Check out David Stove's book for dozens of quotations. [I'll try and post it at my new site, it I can get away with it!]

And these:

http://www.darwins-theory-of-evolution.com/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T3M-4T3VR0K-1&_user=10&_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId=980793527&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=3d24aa896801946cf2f0c59f7740c3af

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8501924

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Ecohydrology-Darwinian-Expression-Vegetation-Function/dp/0521772451

http://www.physorg.com/news133783972.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adaptation

http://www.interdisciplines.org/adaptation/papers/10

There are plenty more on the internet. And, as Stove points out, evolutionists readily slide into using this word teleologically.


A technical term refers to some detail of a larger system or process. It may be a unique or qualified term. Taxonomic-like terms are as follows:
Universe or Cosmos. A subset of this is the Observable Universe. From there, it is broken down into Galaxies, Nebulae and other large structures. We have stars, black holes, and quasars. Stars are classified according to size, temperature and density. Stars may be binary, and have lesser bodies such as planets or asteroids. Stars and their planetary systems undergo a life cycle. The universe is also divided into the macroscopic, microscopic and subatomic realms.
The more detailed our knowledge or theories, the more technical the terms.

I have highlighted the terms in here that are probably metaphorical or in some other way non-literal:

http://www.serve.com/hecht/words/fos.htm


How are these two propositions consistent?

Well, 'consistent' means 'can be true together', which both can.


They do. It's called faith.

Sure, but that does not mean it is true.


By all means, show me this evidence. I'm not a dogmatic atheist.

Check out any fundamentalist web site, for example:

http://www.everystudent.com/features/isthere.html

http://www.proofgodexists.org/

[Lynx]

I'd like to see you explain how probabilistic events can be causes.
In the case of a lottery, if a probabilistic event does not occur, the prize is not won.

Anyway, the 'steps' you have to take involve things like buying a ticket, filling it in, checking it, claiming your prize -- and many other physical activities, like opening doors, walking, holding a pen, or pressing a computer key..., -- all of which implicate causation.
Indeed, quite literally.

I dealt with this in threads on determinism, for example, here:
http://www.revleft.com/vb/freedom-state-mind-t56836/index.html?t=56836

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2
These do not appear to hold an answer, as to the relevance of causation to metaphor. A deterministic process is a non-random process.

I don't think that is what 'mechanism' means. I went through this earlier:
http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1515345&postcount=130
Well, I can't use algorithm, the design - purpose - problem solving connotations are too strong. One has to make do with words that are available and are most appropriate...
When a new term is needed, there is a decided preference to taking existing words and qualifying them, instead of creating unique ones.

Well, mathematicians slide between a technical meaning of 'boundary' (defined in set-theoretical terms, for example) and a metaphorical use of this word. Many of the alleged paradoxes of set-theory arise from this and similar slides.

I suspect you are doing the same.
I'm simply asserting there is nothing that is both literal and metaphorical.

Oh yes they do, and all the time. Check out David Stove's book for dozens of quotations. [I'll try and post it at my new site, it I can get away with it!]

And these:

There are plenty more on the internet. And, as Stove points out, evolutionists readily slide into using this word teleologically.
Then forgive them. Unless you're suggesting they're closet creationists.

I have highlighted the terms in here that are probably metaphorical or in some other way non-literal:
http://www.serve.com/hecht/words/fos.htm
The terms you have highlighted are non-specific. Generalities are not metaphors.

Well, 'consistent' means 'can be true together', which both can.
I'm sorry but I don't see how these two propositions become (or can be) true when they are together.

Sure, but that does not mean it is true.
Having faith brings about a feeling of confidence that is independent of truth. In a similar fashion, suspension of disbelief allows you to enjoy a work of fiction.

Check out any fundamentalist web site, for example:
http://www.everystudent.com/features/isthere.html

http://www.proofgodexists.org/
These are rationalizations. I assume these are related to the 'involvement' of the various philosophies, 2500 years and counting.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


In the case of a lottery, if a probabilistic event does not occur, the prize is not won.

That is a decision the adjudicators make. But where in here is probability a cause?


Indeed, quite literally.

But these causes, now you agree they are indeed causes, confirm my earlier prediction:


[Careful, this is a trap: as soon as you try to supply the details, you will find you have introduce causal concepts, as I predicted.]

Lynx:


These do not appear to hold an answer, as to the relevance of causation to metaphor. A deterministic process is a non-random process.

The word 'determine' here is metaphorical, unless you think that nature literally is Mind.


Well, I can't use algorithm, the design - purpose - problem solving connotations are too strong. One has to make do with words that are available and are most appropriate...
When a new term is needed, there is a decided preference to taking existing words and qualifying them, instead of creating unique ones

As I said earlier, this is the predicament all theorists find themselves in: no matter what they do, in order to make sense of the world, they have to use figurative language, which, when it is interpreted literally (as it often then is) simply re-introduces teleology into nature.

That is why you are having such problems with 'mechanism'.


Unless you're suggesting they're closet creationists.

Not at all; I explained why this happens in an earlier post, repeated briefly above.


I'm sorry but I don't see how these two propositions become (or can be) true when they are together.

You misunderstand the term 'together' here. What this means that it is possible for both of them to be true at the same time.


Having faith brings about a feeling of confidence that is independent of truth. In a similar fashion, suspension of disbelief allows you to enjoy a work of fiction.

Maybe so, but that does not mean that one or both are true.


These are rationalizations. I assume these are related to the 'involvement' of the various philosophies, 2500 years and counting.

Well, they'd say the same of us atheists.

[Lynx]

That is a decision the adjudicators make. But where in here is probability a cause?
A chance event results in a lottery win. Any other cause would be evidence of a lottery draw being rigged.

But these causes, now you agree they are indeed causes, confirm my earlier prediction:
It should be clear that failing to buy a ticket reduces your chances of winning to zero. What part of this relationship do you dispute?

The word 'determine' here is metaphorical, unless you think that nature literally is Mind.
A non-deterministic process is random. See Stochastic_process (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stochastic_process). I'm aware that some people dress this up in philosophical terms ie. determinism.

As I said earlier, this is the predicament all theorists find themselves in: no matter what they do, in order to make sense of the world, they have to use figurative language, which, when it is interpreted literally (as it often then is) simply re-introduces teleology into nature.

That is why you are having such problems with 'mechanism'.
I'm not having any problems with it, other than to find a better alternative. Technical terms are preferable, as long as your audience is capable of the same level of comprehension.

Not at all; I explained why this happens in an earlier post, repeated briefly above.
Then forgive them. It's not easy to write a book about a complex topic, make it accessible to the general public and have it remain entertaining.
Are you suggesting that popular Darwinian authors have an unspoken political agenda?

You misunderstand the term 'together' here. What this means that it is possible for both of them to be true at the same time.
The more things that appear to be true at the same time would help with the criteria of 'consistent', yes. But consistent also implies a continuation of that state of affairs over time. It is often the case that when more detailed or complementary observations become possible, what once seemed consistent is no longer.

Maybe so, but that does not mean that one or both are true.
No, of course not. But that's how a lot of people maintain or set aside their perception of 'the truth'. Only a guileless empiricist is incapable of such flights of fancy.

Well, they'd say the same of us atheists.
They could say the same of certain overly strident strong atheists.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


A chance event results in a lottery win. Any other cause would be evidence of a lottery draw being rigged.

Yes, I am aware of this everyday fact; what isn't clear is how a chance event can be a cause, as opposed to the alleged cause and its supposed effect(s) being two coincidental events.


It should be clear that failing to buy a ticket reduces your chances of winning to zero. What part of this relationship do you dispute?

Well, this is just to use "chance" as a synonym for "probability". What is still unclear is how probabilities can causes.


A non-deterministic process is random. See Stochastic_process. I'm aware that some people dress this up in philosophical terms ie. determinism.

Well, I am a mathematician, so I know about such processes.

What I do not understand is the use of this new metaphor: non-deterministic.


I'm not having any problems with it, other than to find a better alternative. Technical terms are preferable, as long as your audience is capable of the same level of comprehension.

Forgive me, but you are having problems, since you cannot tell me what you mean without using metaphors that cannot be cashed-out; that is, they cannot be given a literal meaning.


Are you suggesting that popular Darwinian authors have an unspoken political agenda?

I wasn't suggesting that here, no.


But consistent also implies a continuation of that state of affairs over time. It is often the case that when more detailed or complementary observations become possible, what once seemed consistent is no longer.

Yes, but that is a different use of typographically the same word (like "bank" (institution of boss-class theft) and "bank" (side of a river). It's not how I was using it.

I am using it in its logical sense.

[Lynx]

Yes, I am aware of this everyday fact; what isn't clear is how a chance event can be a cause, as opposed to the alleged cause and its supposed effect(s) being two coincidental events.
A lottery is designed to produce coincidental events. It uses a non-linear system for number selection and formal rules to guide its operation.
You seem to be arguing that if an outcome is unpredictable it cannot be causal. ?

Well, I am a mathematician, so I know about such processes.

What I do not understand is the use of this new metaphor: non-deterministic.
Would you prefer I use stochastic? Or random? Or non-random?
'Deterministic' is an oft-used term, so I make reference to it. Perhaps I shouldn't, considering the 'ism' attached to it. (So far, there's no 'randomism' or 'stochasticism'.)

Forgive me, but you are having problems, since you cannot tell me what you mean without using metaphors that cannot be cashed-out; that is, they cannot be given a literal meaning.
Literal meanings can be given:
A series of events is a process. (eg. evolution)
An identifiable, repeatable process is a mechanism (eg. mitosis)
In circuit analysis:
Reactance is a property. Resonance is a state.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


A lottery is designed to produce coincidental events. It uses a non-linear system for number selection and formal rules to guide its operation.

In that case, this cannot be an example of a cause at work.

And, I am not arguing this:


You seem to be arguing that if an outcome is unpredictable it cannot be causal?


Would you prefer I use stochastic? Or random? Or non-random?
'Deterministic' is an oft-used term, so I make reference to it. Perhaps I shouldn't, considering the 'ism' attached to it. (So far, there's no 'randomism' or 'stochasticism'.)

Yes, I know it is commonly used, but that is part of the problem I have pointed out several times; when we try to give a causal account of nature, we are forced to use inappropriate metaphors. This is just another example of the same predicament.

And, because 'random' is used as an antonym of 'determined', it too can gain no grip, and is thus no help at all.

[It is worth pointing out that I am not criticising the ordinary use of these words, just their theoretical employment.]


Literal meanings can be given:
A series of events is a process. (eg. evolution)
An identifiable, repeatable process is a mechanism (eg. mitosis)
In circuit analysis:
Reactance is a property. Resonance is a state.

Well, we are just going round in circles, since these seem to be stipulative 'definitions', and as such they leave the original words unaffected.

And, they are not particularly good stipulations either. A series of events (such as a wave crashing on a shore in Australia, the death of a mouse in Holland, a car crash in New York, and a broken vase in Paris, France, all on the same day, and roughly the same time, say GMT) can in no way be considered a process.

[Adding the word 'evolution' here is no help, too, since the following series of events cannot be a process either: an amphibian emerging from a river; an ape descending from the trees, an insect shedding its wings, a fish jumping out of the sea -- even if they all follow one another in strict chronological order.]

You need something to connect them, and that is where the metaphors come in.

More-or-less the same can be said for your other off-the-cuff 'definitions'.

[Lynx]

In that case, this cannot be an example of a cause at work.
Why? Are lotteries exempt from causality?

And, I am not arguing this:
Then what are you arguing?

Yes, I know it is commonly used, but that is part of the problem I have pointed out several times; when we try to give a causal account of nature, we are forced to use inappropriate metaphors. This is just another example of the same predicament.

And, because 'random' is used as an antonym of 'determined', it too can gain no grip, and is thus no help at all.

[It is worth pointing out that I am not criticising the ordinary use of these words, just their theoretical employment.]
It is the mathematical definition of 'random' that is of concern here. Theoretically, a deterministic process cannot produce random output. For example, if we compress a message the non-redundant information remains. If we encrypt it, no further information is destroyed. No matter how we rearrange the original message, all the information necessary to reconstruct it remains. The best one can do is obfuscation. But no amount of obfuscation or 'cryptographically secure' can qualify as being random.
In the case of numbered balls bouncing around in a rotating drum, the necessary information is destroyed, both inherently and by lack of opportunity to measure the required information in real time. Non-linear systems however, do not qualify as random processes.
In practical terms, compression/encryption algorithms and lottery selection systems possess attributes that are as good as if they really were random.

Well, we are just going round in circles, since these seem to be stipulative 'definitions', and as such they leave the original words unaffected.

And, they are not particularly good stipulations either. A series of events (such as a wave crashing on a shore in Australia, the death of a mouse in Holland, a car crash in New York, and a broken vase in Paris, France, all on the same day, and roughly the same time, say GMT) can in no way be considered a process.
Without exception, they are part of unrelated (or seemingly unrelated) processes. They should not be viewed as isolated events.

[Adding the word 'evolution' here is no help, too, since the following series of events cannot be a process either: an amphibian emerging from a river; an ape descending from the trees, an insect shedding its wings, a fish jumping out of the sea -- even if they all follow one another in strict chronological order.]
Again, these are invariably part of various processes. Your attempt to portray them as isolated events, in relation to each other, serves what purpose?

An identifiable process, such as digestion, can be defined as a mechanism but not as an algorithm. We're not free to use any word we want.

You need something to connect them, and that is where the metaphors come in.
If you cannot establish a relationship or a correlation between events, then they should not be connected. That is the default starting position.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Why? Are lotteries exempt from causality?

I didn't say that, only that if you rely on probability, then the best you can do is appeal to coincidence, not causality.


Then what are you arguing?

That the concept of force is a throwback to an animistic, or anthropomorphic view of nature. So, I could not see why you introduced predictability here.


It is the mathematical definition of 'random' that is of concern here. Theoretically, a deterministic process cannot produce random output. For example, if we compress a message the non-redundant information remains. If we encrypt it, no further information is destroyed. No matter how we rearrange the original message, all the information necessary to reconstruct it remains. The best one can do is obfuscation. But no amount of obfuscation or 'cryptographically secure' can qualify as being random.
In the case of numbered balls bouncing around in a rotating drum, the necessary information is destroyed, both inherently and by lack of opportunity to measure the required information in real time. Non-linear systems however, do not qualify as random processes.
In practical terms, compression/encryption algorithms and lottery selection systems possess attributes that are as good as if they really were random.

Well, you are using many words here metaphorically, as I predicted.


Without exception, they are part of unrelated (or seemingly unrelated) processes. They should not be viewed as isolated events.

But then, as I pointed out, your 'definition' of "process" is no good, since it implies that the list I gave is a process, when it isn't.


If you cannot establish a relationship or a correlation between events, then they should not be connected. That is the default starting position.

Maybe so, but then that is a problem that your 'definition' of "process" faces.

[Lynx]

I didn't say that, only that if you rely on probability, then the best you can do is appeal to coincidence, not causality.
As long as the odds of 'coincidence' can be calculated, I can appeal to both.

That the concept of force is a throwback to an animistic, or anthropomorphic view of nature. So, I could not see why you introduced predictability here.
It's a question of what qualifies as a 'causal' event. Are only predictable events to be considered causal? If a one-day weather forecast is accurate while a 7-day forecast is not, are we implying the dynamics of weather operate on both a causal and non-causal manner?

Well, you are using many words here metaphorically, as I predicted.
I don't believe I am. Any questions?

But then, as I pointed out, your 'definition' of "process" is no good, since it implies that the list I gave is a process, when it isn't.
The contents of the list you gave constitute a process. A series of events is a process, whether or not (you believe) those events are unrelated, arbitrary or random.

Maybe so, but then that is a problem that your 'definition' of "process" faces.
Definitions don't face problems that can't be expanded upon, qualified or fixed.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


As long as the odds of 'coincidence' can be calculated, I can appeal to both.

Well, no, since a coincidence is not a cause.


It's a question of what qualifies as a 'causal' event. Are only predictable events to be considered causal? If a one-day weather forecast is accurate while a 7-day forecast is not, are we implying the dynamics of weather operate on both a causal and non-causal manner?

I have neither linked causal explanations to predictability, nor attempted to deny this alleged link, since it depends.


I don't believe I am. Any questions?

No questions, just a few examples will do.

You use these metaphorically: "information", "deterministic" and "random".


The contents of the list you gave constitute a process. A series of events is a process, whether or not (you believe) those events are unrelated, arbitrary or random.

How are unrelated events a 'process'? I think you are trying to redefine 'process' again on the hoof. On this definition, everything that happens in the universe, no matter how far apart in space and/or time, would be part of the same process.


Definitions don't face problems that can't be expanded upon, qualified or fixed.

And how can you be so sure?

[Lynx]

Well, no, since a coincidence is not a cause.
In this example, 'coincidence' is determined by the number of unique tickets sold. The odds of winning can be calculated for each participant and for the draw as a whole. Seems to me all the elements necessary for causation are present. The chances of winning are distributed evenly and that is by design.

No questions, just a few examples will do.

You use these metaphorically: "information", "deterministic" and "random".
'Information' is mainly based on this article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_entropy

'Deterministic' and 'random' are taken from this article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pseudorandom

A message containing random characters would have maximum (infinite?) entropy and could not be compressed. Such a message would contain no information and could not be 'decrypted' ie. mathematically analyzed.

How are unrelated events a 'process'? I think you are trying to redefine 'process' again on the hoof. On this definition, everything that happens in the universe, no matter how far apart in space and/or time, would be part of the same process.
This is a consequence of the universe not being static.

And how can you be so sure?
I have a dictionary.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


In this example, 'coincidence' is determined by the number of unique tickets sold. The odds of winning can be calculated for each participant and for the draw as a whole. Seems to me all the elements necessary for causation are present. The chances of winning are distributed evenly and that is by design.

Well, for one thing, you are using 'determined' here in a non-literal sense (unless you think that some mind or other controls this allegedly random process). For another, no matter what the 'determining' causes, if this is genuinely random, then there can be no causal input in the result.

If, on the other hand, there is such a causal input, then, what I said earlier is correct: you cannot give an account of such processes without causal talk entering in at some point, which you denied.


'Information' is mainly based on this article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_entropy

Yes, I have studied the mathematics as part of my degree. This in no way affects what I said; your use of this word is metaphorical.

Same comment over 'deterministic'.


A message containing random characters would have maximum (infinite?) entropy and could not be compressed. Such a message would contain no information and could not be 'decrypted' ie. mathematically analyzed.

Well, here, as is quite common, you are confusing a mathematical system with the way nature actually works -- hence your repeated descent into metaphor. Which is what I predicted; when we try to understand nature, our explanations cannot avoid the use of metaphor.


This is a consequence of the universe not being static.

I fail to see how this answers what I posted, which was this:


How are unrelated events a 'process'? I think you are trying to redefine 'process' again on the hoof. On this definition, everything that happens in the universe, no matter how far apart in space and/or time, would be part of the same process.

You:


I have a dictionary.

In other words, you are making an inference from a few words to truths about reality; that makes you a linguistic idealist.

[Lynx]

Well, for one thing, you are using 'determined' here in a non-literal sense (unless you think that some mind or other controls this allegedly random process). For another, no matter what the 'determining' causes, if this is genuinely random, then there can be no causal input in the result.
We have a probability distribution which appears to be random. All combinations which can be selected have an equal chance of being selected.

If, on the other hand, there is such a causal input, then, what I said earlier is correct: you cannot give an account of such processes without causal talk entering in at some point, which you denied.
The selection process itself appears to be deterministic, thus it should contain causal elements. There is no escape from causality, except for random or unknown processes from which no pattern or correlation can be drawn.

Yes, I have studied the mathematics as part of my degree. This in no way affects what I said; your use of this word is metaphorical.
A metaphor for what? 'Information' can be representative of many things, be it a weather report, a text file, a computer program, or poetry. In the context of that article, I don't see 'information' being used in an unusual or comparative way.

Same comment over 'deterministic'.
Here is another source article, where 'deterministic', 'random' and 'entropy' are used in a straightforward manner:
https://www.grc.com/passwords.htm

Well, here, as is quite common, you are confusing a mathematical system with the way nature actually works -- hence your repeated descent into metaphor. Which is what I predicted; when we try to understand nature, our explanations cannot avoid the use of metaphor.
If Shannon entropy is an illegitimate conceptual tool, please feel free to critique it or show where it is inconsistent with the way nature 'actually works'.

I fail to see how this answers what I posted, which was this:
All events that occur in the universe are part of the same process. Since we are composed of matter and energy - the same stuff the universe is composed of, our origins are one and the same.
Our future will also be one and the same, one possibility being the 'heat death' of the universe. (If you are looking for a 'minimal process situation', this is as minimal as it gets).

In other words, you are making an inference from a few words to truths about reality; that makes you a linguistic idealist.
Words and their definitions are tools. Our perception of reality is no more or no less than what these (and other tools) can build.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


We have a probability distribution which appears to be random. All combinations which can be selected have an equal chance of being selected.

Indeed, but if you want to avoid all mention of uncaused coincidences, plainly you are going to have to introduce the language of causation, as I predicted.


The selection process itself appears to be deterministic, thus it should contain causal elements. There is no escape from causality, except for random or unknown processes from which no pattern or correlation can be drawn.

Then the results are mere coincidences, unrelated to the preceding events.


A metaphor for what? 'Information' can be representative of many things, be it a weather report, a text file, a computer program, or poetry. In the context of that article, I don't see 'information' being used in an unusual or comparative way.

Well, information is typically that which is communicated between language users, more often than not expressed, or expressible in indicative sentences. Since this is not, and cannot be true of the processes you mention, this word must be being used metaphorically.


Here is another source article, where 'deterministic', 'random' and 'entropy' are used in a straightforward manner:
https://www.grc.com/passwords.htm

As I have already noted, I have no problem with this word being used in a special, technical sense in mathematics, but when it is used to interpret the world, which is not a mathematical system, you are forced to use it non-literally -- since events in the world are not governed by a cosmic will or mind of some sort.


If Shannon entropy is an illegitimate conceptual tool, please feel free to critique it or show where it is inconsistent with the way nature 'actually works'.

Where did I say it did not work. The difficulties arise in trying to explain why and how it works, and as soon as you do that, my earlier comments begin to apply:


Well, here, as is quite common, you are confusing a mathematical system with the way nature actually works -- hence your repeated descent into metaphor. Which is what I predicted; when we try to understand nature, our explanations cannot avoid the use of metaphor.

You:


All events that occur in the universe are part of the same process. Since we are composed of matter and energy - the same stuff the universe is composed of, our origins are one and the same.

Then your definition does not distinguish what is and what is not part of a process, and so is useless.


Words and their definitions are tools. Our perception of reality is no more or no less than what these (and other tools) can build.

And, I hope you are not using this as an excuse to ignore the language we have invented, as well as the different roles that the various tools we have occupy; for example, that some of our words are used metaphorically.

If you ignore that, then no wonder idealist implications follow from what you say.

[Lynx]

Indeed, but if you want to avoid all mention of uncaused coincidences, plainly you are going to have to introduce the language of causation, as I predicted.

~

Then the results are mere coincidences, unrelated to the preceding events.
Well, which is it? Causal or non-causal?
The lottery works as designed, so I'm in favor of calling it causal.

Well, information is typically that which is communicated between language users, more often than not expressed, or expressible in indicative sentences. Since this is not, and cannot be true of the processes you mention, this word must be being used metaphorically.
'Information' has various definitions, none of them are metaphorical.

information (countable and uncountable; plural informations)

1. (uncountable) A collection of related data.
2. (uncountable) Knowledge about a topic.
3. (uncountable) Data that have been processed into a format that is understandable by its intended audience.
4. (uncountable) A service provided by telephone which provides listed telephone numbers of a subscriber: see 411.
5. answer to a question, minimal part of information is bit, which is answer yes or no.
6. (countable, US, law) A sworn statement by an authorized official filed in court briefly describing the nature of each charge against a suspect, tantamount to an indictment but without the involvement of a grand jury.

Whatever it is you are referring to, 'metaphor' is not the proper word to use.

As I have already noted, I have no problem with this word being used in a special, technical sense in mathematics, but when it is used to interpret the world, which is not a mathematical system, you are forced to use it non-literally -- since events in the world are not governed by a cosmic will or mind of some sort.
Interpreting the world as a collection of numbers expressed by mathematical relationships is a practical and useful endeavor. Doing this doesn't lead me to believe in a 'cosmic will' or anything of that sort.

Where did I say it did not work. The difficulties arise in trying to explain why and how it works, and as soon as you do that, my earlier comments begin to apply:
Why? On one end of the scale (random data) you have maximum entropy and zero information. On the other end (data: "22222222222...") you have zero entropy and redundant information. Therein lies a mathematical definition of the word random; the relationship between information, redundancy and compressibility; and additional insights useful for cryptography.

Then your definition does not distinguish what is and what is not part of a process, and so is useless.
Everything in the universe is part of a process by definition and through any real application of the phrase "a series of events". Even the insides of a rock are subject to long term processes that will eventually alter it.
Process is a basic, generic term. It describes a state of nature.

And, I hope you are not using this as an excuse to ignore the language we have invented, as well as the different roles that the various tools we have occupy; for example, that some of our words are used metaphorically.
Simplified versions of complex subjects may resort to metaphor, as well as any version that doesn't rely entirely on precise technical jargon. We do not have the tools to obtain perfect knowledge, so a 'complete' understanding of the universe will remain mythical.

If you ignore that, then no wonder idealist implications follow from what you say.
What is idealist?
We will not transcend language, or thought. We will never witness the end of science, or the elimination of the unknown.
We do have comprehensive, coherent knowledge of the physical world. This allows us to harness energy and to build, repair and maintain stuff.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Lynx:


Well, which is it? Causal or non-causal?

Well, if you recall I said this a few posts ago:


[Careful, this is a trap: as soon as you try to supply the details, you will find you have introduce causal concepts, as I predicted.]

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1520816&postcount=139

And all this arose because you had said earlier:


A series of events can be categorized as a process.

In response to this comment of mine:


Give me an example that does not overtly or covertly use/refer to a cause or causation

You then said this:


Winning a lottery?

To which I replied:


In what way is this a process?

[Careful, this is a trap: as soon as you try to supply the details, you will find you have introduce causal concepts, as I predicted.]

So, as you can now see, you fell into that trap; and here it is:


The lottery works as designed, so I'm in favor of calling it causal.

As I predicted. Causation is integral to our notion of a process, and once causation is introduced, in come all those unhelpful metaphors.


Whatever it is you are referring to, 'metaphor' is not the proper word to use.

Well, recall what I said:


Well, information is typically that which is communicated between language users, more often than not expressed, or expressible in indicative sentences. Since this is not, and cannot be true of the processes you mention, this word must be being used metaphorically.

I do not see any of the six different definitions of this word contradicting the above comment of mine.


Interpreting the world as a collection of numbers expressed by mathematical relationships is a practical and useful endeavor. Doing this doesn't lead me to believe in a 'cosmic will' or anything of that sort.

We have already been over this, several weeks ago. I can only refer you back to that discussion, and to my comments about 'determinism' in posts to which I also linked earlier.

All you have done here is deny some of my conclusions; what we need to see are your reasons why I am mistaken, if I am.


Why? On one end of the scale (random data) you have maximum entropy and zero information. On the other end (data: "22222222222...") you have zero entropy and redundant information. Therein lies a mathematical definition of the word random; the relationship between information, redundancy and compressibility; and additional insights useful for cryptography.

Once again, you are running together what can properly be said of a mathematical system, with what we can say about processes in nature (which we might interpret by the use of mathematics) without the use of metaphor.


Everything in the universe is part of a process by definition and through any real application of the phrase "a series of events". Even the insides of a rock are subject to long term processes that will eventually alter it.
Process is a basic, generic term. It describes a state of nature.

Then, as I said, your definition does not distinguish what is and what is not part of a process, and so is useless.

Anyway as we have seen, and as you seem to have admitted (in relation to that lottery example of yours), our descriptions of processes require the use of causal language, and this is where those awkward metaphors creep back in.


We do not have the tools to obtain perfect knowledge, so a 'complete' understanding of the universe will remain mythical.

I do not know how you can possibly know this.

If you do, you must have access to 'perfect' knowledge about what we might or might not know one day. If so, then at least here we have perfect knowledge. And if that is so, then what you say is wrong at least here. And if it is wrong at least here, then you cannot possibly know it.

This does not imply that we will one day have 'perfect' knowledge (but I prefer the word 'complete' here), only that you cannot possibly know this.


What is idealist?
We will not transcend language, or thought. We will never witness the end of science, or the elimination of the unknown.
We do have comprehensive, coherent knowledge of the physical world. This allows us to harness energy and to build, repair and maintain stuff.

It is idealist in the sense that what you say follows from thought/language alone.

I have outlined the argument there:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/self-t105849/index.html?p=1408653#post1408653

But more thoroughly here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htm