historical materialism and science

[black magick hustla]

I've been reading the structure of scientific revolutions by kuhn, and as a science student, it struck me as fascinating.

I have a question though. Are there writers out there that have given to his theses a historical materialist spin? For example, lets take classical physics. Classical physics was largely deterministic in as much as in principle it was said that if you knew the momentum vector and the position of all particles at a given state in the Universe, you will know its future. I think this viewpoint can be fit largely with the general mode of production of the Western World at this given time (19th century) with the emergence of industrial capitalism and rational secularism - the latter which claimed a rationalistic understanding of the world and moral values. Production was given a more "scientific" twist with the application of thermodynamics. THis might have come with the ruling class rationalizing its rule from "natural law", like saying that it was the nature of Men to be given a right to do such thing and such thing, rather than claiming justification from some mystical divine grace. All of this was compatible with whole theoretical framework that the world is understandable as it is and can be understood as a set of perfectly rational natural laws, rather than delegating what could not be understood to God. Thus it was perfectly understandable that scientists thought they could grasp the universe in such a way that they could know everything about it.

The 20th century came with some interesting turns. I think the attitude of science towards certainity with relativity and quantum mechanics might come from the "general attitude" about the world from different sectors of society at that time. In the turn of the century, you had modernism and there was a general attitude of uncertainty in many intellectual sectors concerning morality, god, etc. (Belloc, a catholic writer, called this the modernist attack). All of these could probably be linked somehow to the state of capitalism at that time, that was ridden with a sort of generalized barbarism and seemed extremely unstable.

Obviously I am just throwing ideas here. But are there writers that have talked about this in similar terms?

[Invariance]

Sorry, this is a shorter response owing to me accidentally pressing backspace and losing most of what I wrote. Anyway, you don't have to look further than Marx who recognised the economic and social role science had:
'In the seventeenth century, the sporadic use of machinery was of the greatest importance, because it supplied the great mathematicians of that time with a practical basis and an incentive towards the creation of modern mechanics.'

'The knowledge, the judgement, and the will, which, though in ever so small a degree, are practised by the independent peasant or handicraftsman, in the same way as the savage makes the whole art of war consist in the exercise of his personal cunning these faculties are now required only for the workshop as a whole. Intelligence in production expands in one direction, because it vanishes in many others. What is lost by the detail labourers, is concentrated in the capital that employs them. It is a result of the division of labour in manufactures, that the labourer is brought face to face with the intellectual potencies of the material process of production, as the property of another, and as a ruling power. This separation begins in simple co-operation, where the capitalist represents to the single workman, the oneness and the will of the associated labour. It is developed in manufacture which cuts down the labourer into a detail labourer. It is completed in modern industry, which makes science a productive force distinct from labour and presses it into the service of capital.'
Well, I doubt few would deny that science is totally unaffected by social factors. Society determines what gets studies, what priory those studies take in relation to each other. This aspect is pretty uncontroversial.

What is controversial is that society affects the content of science itself. The examples of some scientists rejecting relativity in WW1 because Einstein was German, or in WW2 because he was Jewish, are supposed to be exceptions to the rule. And, I think they are; scientists typically very rarely make judgement on such clear ideological grounds. However, to what extent is science influenced by social and economic relations and in turn influence those social and economic relations? Kuhn blurred this line, to a degree. Science was a social practice in a historical context, with scientists dogmatically holding onto their theories. Normal science seemed more of an indoctrination that most would be happy to call a scientific method.

A school which had somewhat of a historical materialist spin is called the Strong Programme (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_programme) which originated in the University of Edinburgh in the 70s. It was supposed to be a 'science of science', a sociological view of science which was somewhat influenced by Kuhn (as many were), as against the positivist view of science which had its rationality as its special virtue. The norms of the scientific community were to be examined, how disputes arose, the publication of journals, the steps involved in getting published in journals, the hierarchy of those journals, the methods of resolution. The structure of the scientific community were to be examined to find the true authority behind it all.

Beliefs were to be explained by norms and non-epistemic interests, the notions of 'truth' and 'rationality' being unhelpful for the purpose; the scientific community thinks its beliefs and practices especially rational, but so do lots of other communities!

At the core of this was what is known as the 'Principle of Symmetry.' Wikipedia sums it up quite well:
The Principle of Symmetry holds that in explaining the origins of scientific beliefs, that is, assessing the success and failure of models, theories, or experiments, the historian / sociologist should deploy the same kind of explanation in the cases of success as in cases of failure. When investigating beliefs, researchers should be impartial to the (a posteriori attributed) truth or falsehood of those beliefs, and the explanations should be unbiased.

The strong programme adopts a position of relativism or neutralism regarding the arguments that social actors put forward for the acceptance/rejection of any technology. All arguments (social, cultural, political, economic, as well as technical) are to be treated equally.

The symmetry principle addresses the problem that the historian is tempted to explain the success of successful theories by referring to their "objective truth", or inherent "technical superiority", whereas s/he is more likely to put forward sociological explanations (citing political influence or economic reasons) only in the case of failures.

For example, having experienced the obvious success of the chain-driven bicycle for decades, it is tempting to attribute its success to its "advanced technology" compared to the "primitiveness" of the Penny Farthing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penny_farthing), but if we look closely and symmetrically at their history (as Pinch and Bijker do), we can see that at the beginning bicycles were valued according to quite different standards than nowadays. The early adopters (predominantly young, well-to-do gentlemen) valued the speed, the thrill, and the spectacularity of the Penny Farthing (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penny_farthing) - in contrast to the security and stability of the chain-driven Safety Bicycle (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_bicycle). Many other social factors (e.g., the contemporary state of urbanism and transport, women's clothing habits and feminism) have influenced and changed the relative valuations of bicycle models.

A weak reading of the Principle of Symmetry would point out that there often are many competing theories or technologies, which all have the potential to provide slightly different solutions to similar problems. In these cases the sociological factors are those, which tip the balance between them: that's why we should pay equal attention to them.

A strong, social constructivist reading would add that even the emergence of the questions or problems to be solved are governed by social determinations, so the Principle of Symmetry is applicable even to the apparently purely technical issues.
Of course, this presented a dichotomy...If the 'strong programmers' were to provide a scientific account of science, then their views too would have to be explained in terms of the norms and interests governing their scientific community. An example of the strong programme approach, is Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air-Pump (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leviathan_and_the_Air-Pump).

Sometimes, I think, people who do subscribe to some sort of sociological account of the role of science seem to see science as a result of the personal whims of the scientist, be it ideological or whatever. This seems far too deterministic and mechanical to me. But I think the Marxist approach is perfectly valid and probably had a large role on the sociology of science. At least looking at the Science and technology studies (http://www.stswiki.org/index.php?title=Main_Page)(STS), I would agree with the heading: (STS) examines the influence of society on science and technology, and the influence of science and technology on society. It seems very influenced by Marxism.

So there are writers that have the same approach you mention, I don't know any who has written the history of physics in terms of the justification of various ruling classes, however.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Vinnie:


A school which had somewhat of a historical materialist spin is called the Strong Programme which originated in the University of Edinburgh in the 70s. It was supposed to be a 'science of science', a sociological view of science which was somewhat influenced by Kuhn (as many were), as against the positivist view of science which had its rationality as its special virtue. The norms of the scientific community were to be examined, how disputes arose, the publication of journals, the steps involved in getting published in journals, the hierarchy of those journals, the methods of resolution. The structure of the scientific community were to be examined to find the true authority behind it all.

I agree with you about this, but, as I am sure you know, they did not see it quite this way. They were in fact working more in the Mertonian and Durkheimian tradition. In addition, many of these writers have wandered far too close to relativism, reductionism and naturalism.

The best book by far on Kuhn is:

Sharrock, W., and Read, R. (2002), Kuhn. Philosopher Of Scientific Revolution (Polity Press).

Rupert Read is also sympathetic to a Marxist view of history, interpreting it through Wittgenstein's eyes (which is a tactic I too have adopted). He has posted several relevant essays on Kuhn at his site:

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/publications.htm

Particularly:

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/howtounderstand.htm

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/KuhnWittgenstein.htm

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/Kuhnnatkinds.htm

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/kuhnfullernickles.pdf

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/sharrockandreadagainstfuller.pdf

See also his:

Read, R. (2002), 'Marx And Wittgenstein On Vampires And Parasites: A Critique Of Capital And Metaphysics', in Kitching and Pleasants (2002), pp.254-81.

Kitching, G., and Pleasants, N. (2002) (eds.), Marx And Wittgenstein. Knowledge, Morality And Politics (Routledge).

Online copy here:

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=608bpo9sneMC&pg=PA254&lpg=PA254&dq=Rupert+Read+Redner&source=bl&ots=nkygTAcEht&sig=KhqVeQwNDKEmIf8ICzdMKz10-hQ&hl=en&ei=rtMOSviuJJe7jAeKi7ivBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1

See also his 'Wittgenstein and Marx on Philosophical Language':

http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/read.html

However, by far and away the best attempt so far to appropriate Historical Materialism to Wittgenstein's work is that of Guy Robinson:

Robinson, G. (2003), Philosophy And Mystification. A Reflection On Nonsense And Clarity (Fordham University Press).

Guy has published some of these Essays at his site:

http://www.guyrobinson.net/

Particularly this:

http://www.guyrobinson.net/pdf/Materialism.pdf

Which essay, incidentally, has inspired much of my own work in this area.

[Invariance]

In addition, many of these writers have wandered far too close to relativism, reductionism and naturalism. Actually, I agree regarding the aspects of relativism and reductionism.

I just got around to reading that essay by Guy Robinson. Thank you for posting it, I'm impressed by the arguments and I substantially agree with what he has written. In particular:

The social constructivists rightly point out the shaping role that human-set standards, assumptions, programs and projects have on the development of the sciences. But they crucially fail to bring out that the setting of those standards and the making of those assumptions and the adopting of those programs and projects are not matters of whim or fashion but are the products of the practical interaction between historical humans and the material world from which they are trying to produce their needs. The social constructivists have correctly identified one of the points at which human history impinges on and intersects with the history of nature, but they have generally cancelled the value of their identification by treating those human inputs as though they came out of the air or out of human heads and were not the historical product of those practical struggles with the material world that need to be understood historically. It is at this point that we need to look carefully at the input from the material world so that we can make out that dialectical relation between the history of nature and the history of humanity.
This is what I was trying to say when I wrote: 'Sometimes, I think, people who do subscribe to some sort of sociological account of the role of science seem to see science as a result of the personal whims of the scientist, be it ideological or whatever.'

I think this too is a really poignant comment:
The first contribution of the Second Thesis to our project of constructing a world-view in which nature is seen as having a history is by its shooting down the concept of ‘objective reality’ which has been given so much ideological work to do in the ahistorical world-view we are trying to dismantle and replace with a historical perspective. ‘Objective reality’ is supposed to be externally fixed - by God or Nature or some other human artifact that is pictured as standing outside and confronting us and presenting us with this ‘reality’, its product, which we can only accept passively.
I think the whole talk about 'subjective' and 'objective' reality is thoroughly confused - or at least confuses me!

Lastly:
Mathematics is often held up as one of those ‘higher truths’ that are fixed and exempt from history and stand beyond humanity where they can only be contemplated and accepted. We need to undermine this view and to bring out the truth of Newton’s view that ‘The foundations of geometry lie in mechanical practice.’ We need to turn to Marx’s emphasis on practice and bring out the connection between mathematics and practice and see how the fundamental concepts arise out of practical activities. Geometry, for example, is often held up as a set of God-given truths that stand outside humanity. But if we look at the sources of its fundamental ideas such as ‘straight line’ or ‘right angle’ we can see them as arising out of the practices and problems of building in wood or stone. Fitting planks together without gaps or doors into frames requires the straight line and if blocks are similarly to fit without gaps it is easiest if they are square.

We have needed to stop and take a careful look at mathematics because the failure to see the practical origins of its concepts has led many to a mistaken view of mathematics a some kind of ‘higher truth’ that stands outside. We can accept it that mathematics has not got a history in the sense that its discoveries are subject to revision over time. We simply have to notice that it is constructed out of human artifacts that we have fixed by definitions that we see as not in need of revision and so stand outside of time.
Its interesting that Newton said such, because as I quoted above of Marx: 'In the seventeenth century, the sporadic use of machinery was of the greatest importance, because it supplied the great mathematicians of that time with a practical basis and an incentive towards the creation of modern mechanics.' I agree with the points regarding mathematical platonism. I also agree with Robinson's attack on 'naturalism' on the one hand and 'mechanical materialism' and 'ahistorical materialism' on the other. This was a good essay, I'm surprised I haven't heard of it before considering I agree with most of the points raised. I'm interested in whether you think the dialectical aspect (per Robinson's definition) can be 'rescued?' Or do you think such a dialectical approach to history ought just be called historical materialism? I'm referring to this comment:

The relation cannot be one-sided in either direction and it is only a materialism that is both historical and dialectical that can save us from those two complimentary confusions that arise from taking the relation between human and natural history as one-sided in either direction.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Apart from his reference to 'dialectics', Guy's ideas have had a huge influence on my own work.

I have just pushed them much further.

[Hit The North]

Apart from his reference to 'dialectics', Guy's ideas have had a huge influence on my own work.


So in that respect you stand in the same relation to Guy's ideas as you do to Marx's.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


So in that respect you stand in the same relation to Guy's ideas as you do to Marx's.

Well, you'd think so if you haven't read his work; but Guy's ideas and my own are a whisker apart.

Anyway, Marx abandoned the 'dialectic' as you lot understand it when he wrote Das Kapital.

As I am sure you know...

[Hit The North]

I have read his work.

What's wrong with the way he uses the concept of the dialectic? It has nothing to do with Hegel.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I have read his work.

What's wrong with the way he uses the concept of the dialectic? It has nothing to do with Hegel.

1) Glad to hear it.

2) I have been in correspondence with him, and his use does in fact owe itself to Hegel (as it does with Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, Cliff, Harman, Callinicos...).

[DeLeonist]

Hi Rosa
A bit off topic, but I was wondering what you thought of Bertell Ollman and his "Dance of the Dialectic".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DeLeonist:


A bit off topic, but I was wondering what you thought of Bertell Ollman and his "Dance of the Dialectic".

An absolutely awful book, full of a priori dogmatics, just like traditional, ruling-class thought.

I have criticised his rather weak attempt to tell us what 'abstraction' is, here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_02.htm#Ollmans-Traditionalism

You will need to copy and paste this link into your address bar (but delete the anonymiser part of the link), since the anonymiser RevLeft uses ignores '#' sub-links.

Or, click on this, and use the 'Quick Links' to skip to Section (5) (iiic):

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2003_02.htm

[DeLeonist]

Thanks for that Rosa.
Have you considering getting any of your stuff published in refereed journals?

I'd like to see how academic marxists respond to you work, but don't imagine they would put the effort in unless it was in an academic publication.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DeLeonist:


Have you considering getting any of your stuff published in refereed journals?

No; they'd require far too many editorical cuts. Anyway, since my Essays are almost 100% negative, they'd stand no chance of being accepted.


I'd like to see how academic marxists respond to you work, but don't imagine they would put the effort in unless it was in an academic publication.

To be perfectly honest, I am not the least bit interested in what academic Marxists think about my work, and here is why:


Of course, these observations are somewhat less true of academic Marxism, a hardy perennial that largely took-off in the 1960s, and is still going strong -- but, alas, to nowhere in particular.

In fact, the political effectiveness of this current has been conspicuous by its total absence -- which is an odd sort of thing to have to say of those comrades in Universities and Colleges around the world who spare no effort in reminding us that truth is tested in practice (or "praxis", to use the buzz-word). "Practice" here seems to mean (for these comrades) attending seminars, endlessly discussing things on internet mailing lists, and writing obscure articles and books that not a single worker will ever see --, except perhaps in the print room just before they are shipped.

It is quite ironic that, just as the richest of Christian Churches in the world can 'justify' the brazenly luxurious life-style of Cardinals and Bishops while claiming to represent a man who lived in absolute poverty and who condemned wealth, so these academic comrades can claim to be furthering the "world-view of the proletariat" with theories and jargon that few without a PhD can hope to comprehend.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2001.htm

And:


(2) High Church Dialecticians [HCDs]: These Marxists are in general openly contemptuous of the 'sophomoric ideas' found in most of the DM-classics (even though many of them seem to have a fondness for Engels's first 'Law').

More often than not, HCDs reject the idea that the dialectic operates in nature, sometimes inconsistently using Engels's first 'Law' to justify this 'leap' (which tactic allows them to claim that human history and development are unique), just as they are equally dismissive of these simple LCD souls for their adherence to every last word in the classics.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism; LCD = Low Church Dialectician, described earlier in this Essay.]

[Anyone who knows about High Church Anglicanism will know exactly of what I speak.]

HCDs are mercifully above such crudities; they prefer the mother lode -- direct from Hegel, Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks and/or the writings of assorted latter day Hermeticists like Raya Dunayevskaya, CLR James, Tony Smith, Tom Sekine, Robert Albritton, Chris Arthur, Bertell Ollman, or Slavoj Zizek --, sometimes cut with a few kilos of hardcore jargon drawn straight from that intellectual cocaine-den otherwise known as French 'Philosophy', or, perhaps, from that hot-bed of studied confusion: the Frankfurt School.

Or, even worse, lifted from that intellectual waste of space, the work of Heidegger.

HCDs are generally, but not exclusively, academic. Tortured prose is their forte, and pointless existence is their punishment.

http://filipmoroz.files.wordpress.com/2008/12/sisyphus.jpg

Figure One: The Sisyphus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sisyphus) College Recruitment Poster --
Aimed At HCDs Seeking A More Useful Existence

At least LCDs try to pretend that their ideas are relevant to the class struggle.

High Church dialectics, in contrast, is just good for the CV.

[And clearly, the latter sort of dialectics is not an "abomination" for that section of the bourgeoisie that administers Colleges and Universities.]

Both factions are, however, well-stocked with conservative-minded comrades, happy in their own small way to copy the a priori thought-forms of two-and-a-half millennia of boss-class theory, seldom pausing to give any thought to the implications of such easily won knowledge. If knowledge of the world is a priori, and based solely on armchair speculation, reality must indeed be Ideal.

From here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm

So, my essays are aimed at younger comrades in order to help prevent the spread of this Hermetic virus.