What exactly happened in Afghanistan during the 80's?

[Poppytry]

Apart from Rambo 3 and Charlie Wilson's War lol I know very little about the conflict. Could someone outline the situation in Afghanistan prior to the war and the Soviet reason for invading. Also about the consequences.

Would you be right in suggesting that the US are doing exactly what the Soviets did today? :glare:

[Jia]

Would you be right in suggesting that the US are doing exactly what the Soviets did today? :glare:

There are certainly making the same mistakes all over again. Killing the Militants leads to some of the population (Who could be related, imagine the huge connections in the Afghan community who stay together) turning against the invading force and going off to join their brother in the Mountains. Its a unwinable war, unless you want to destroy a entire mountain range. Even then, the population will see the mountain range gone and think to themselves. "I really liked that mountain range, damn Americans".

[Poppytry]

There are certainly making the same mistakes all over again. Killing the Militants leads to some of the population (Who could be related, imagine the huge connections in the Afghan community who stay together) turning against the invading force and going off to join their brother in the Mountains. Its a unwinable war, unless you want to destroy a entire mountain range. Even then, the population will see the mountain range gone and think to themselves. "I really liked that mountain range, damn Americans".

For every one civilian or militant Afghan they kill there will be another 5 who seek revenge and join the resistance. When people say dont you know anything about socialism just look at its history, how violent and oppresive it is. Well I would say to them look at western imperialism history.. why dont they ever learn from their own lessons. People are not going to easily give up there homeland .. no matter how advanced your guns are. Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine etc.

[mykittyhasaboner]

Apart from Rambo 3 and Charlie Wilson's War lol

Exactly.


I know very little about the conflict. Could someone outline the situation in Afghanistan prior to the war and the Soviet reason for invading. Also about the consequences. Basically the whole thing started when the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan with the support of popular demonstrations, as well as loyal military troops overthrew the government of Afghanistan, and established a socialist government, with the same name (The Republic of Afghanistan).

Obviously hostile to this new government, Muslim extremists (funded by the US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia) began attacking the new government. In need of assistance the RPA called on military aid from the Soviet Union, which basically escalated into an invasion of the country.


Would you be right in suggesting that the US are doing exactly what the Soviets did today? :glare:Definitely not, the USSR was justified in intervening because it was to assist a socialist government that requested aid, but ultimately failed.

The US on the other hand has no real justification for their invasion in Afghanistan, we could talk for days about all the reasons for this invasion though.

http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/index-nab.html

[chebol]

Basically the whole thing started when the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan with the support of popular demonstrations, as well as loyal military troops overthrew the government of Afghanistan, and established a socialist government, with the same name (The Republic of Afghanistan).

Obviously hostile to this new government, Muslim extremists (funded by the US, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia) began attacking the new government. In need of assistance the RPA called on military aid from the Soviet Union, which basically escalated into an invasion of the country.

That's a gross oversimplification...

Firstly, it is important to note that there were two factions in the PDPA - Khalq ("Masses") and Parcham ("Flag") - who had split several years earlier and had only just reunited (and were still very much at loggerheads).

Parcham - the more "centrist" faction - had taken part in the previous government that had replaced the monarchy, before it was driven out by more right-wing elements. Parcham's membership base was largely in the educated urban layers of Afghani society.

Khalq refused to take part in Daoud's government, and conducted a large part of its work underground in the 70s, in the cities, the countryside and in the military. Nevertheless, both groups' memberships were largely urban (Parcham moreso).

The Saur ("April") Revolution came largely as a surprise to both groups - it was cooked up by their military allies and members, and resembled a coup as much as an actual revolution. Nevertheless, there was popular support for them, and their reforms. The problems became apparent for a few reasons.

1. The factionalism within the PDPA. The Parcham faction - which had closer ties to Moscow (neither faction ever had formal ties) forced a slower pace of reforms than Khalq would have liked. Also, because the two factions spent a good part of their time manouevering to defeat the other, less effort was spent on the practical work of reform. While Parcham was willing to tolerate Taraki, however, they would not tolerate Amin, because they correctly realised that he was the main organisational force within Khalq, and therefore a threat to the position of Parcham's leader Babrak Karmal within the PDPA heirarchy.

2. The factionalism within not only the PDPA, but also within Khalq. While Taraki was head of the PDPA (and of Khalq), most of the work had been done - and continued to be done - by his 2nd in command Hafizullah Amin. Amin genuinely wanted Aghanistan to be a non-aligned, independent, republic, and worked on getting financial aid from not only the USSR, but the US and elsewhere (which has led - in classic Stalinist style - to him being accused of being a US agent). Taraki - who was already getting quite old, and still drank to excess - became suspicious of Amin (no doubt with help from factionalising comrades in the PDPA), and "promoted" him to the ineffective position of Prime Minister. In an encounter the details of which are still unclear, Amin was summoned to a meeting (the Soviet ambassador was also present) in Taraki's office, where several people were shot, including Amin's closest ally, and Taraki, after which Amin took the presidency.

3. The unwillingness of tribal and religious forces to reform. This was worst in the Pushtun areas (most of the rest of Afghanistan can't be honestly described as "tribal", per se). In fact, the issue of Pushtunistan (which is divided between Afghanistan and Pakistan) was then, and continues to be, a major problem. The reforms Daoud made of bringing what was a religious legal profession into the state apparatus deepened the bureaucratic-tribal-familial power structures in the state, making later reforms very, very difficult, as the forces facing change held powerful stakes within the state which the PDPA was attempting to change from the top down.

The bureaucratic, and often apolitical, manner in which the PDPA tried to carry out the reforms was also a problem - especially in the land reform, where Kabul-based bureaucrats would often shame landowners while handing over leases to peasants, leading to repression once the officials had left. In one case, a peasant decapitated on the spot an official who shamed the landowner who had until that moment been exploiting him. Nevertheless, the peasant also refused to hand back the lease, which he kept on his person all the time he was involved in fighting the war against the USSR.

4. The reaction of the USA, Pakistan and other forces to the revolution. The USA essentially wrote Afghanistan off as part of the Soviet camp, and the islamic military dictatorship of Pakistan wrote them off as well. Aghanistan became gradually cut off from other forces than the Soviets (made worse when the US ambassador - a friend of Hafizullah Amin - was kidnapped and killed in Kabul, thereby all but destroying links with the US).

The US began training and funding religious extremists almost immediately after the Saur revolution, and fostered extreme antipathy towards the "communist" regime in Kabul. While Amin tried to defuse the religion issue after Taraki's death, the instability caused by a succession of partial, badly carried out, and sometimes unpopular reforms threatened to bring down the government. There were even a couple of mutinies by the military (notably in Herat, where the role of the contemporaneous Iranian revolution needs to be considered).

Amin requested Societ assistance 14 times, but refused what was offered - no doubt because it would have required Afghanistan becoming a soviet satelite, rather than a non-aligned socialist republic. The "invitation" which the Soviets eventually responded to, however, was not official (despite their claims. They pulled the same trick in Czechoslovakia in 1968) but came from members of the Parcham faction.

The Soviets invaded, killed Amin, deposed most Khalq members (until their desire for power overrode their principles) and put Babrak Karmal, head of the Parcham faction, in power.

And that was just the first 18 months of the revolution!!!

The war in Afghanistan consisted of the Soviets and the Kabuli government against largey US-funded mujaheddin ("holy warriors"). There were also some maoists fighting against the Soviets, but the islamists killed most of them off in short order.

[manic expression]

chebol, that's some good info, but I'd like to add a few things:

The Soviet Union didn't take so long to intervene because they didn't like the terms offered, they were hesitant because they wanted to know what they were getting into; when Amin overthrew Taraki, that was a tipping point. The fact that Amin was soliciting help from the US should raise the eyebrows of everyone on this forum. It's not like he had to, Afghanistan is on the Soviet border.

The infighting in the PDPA was unfortunate, but the Soviet forces had to work with what they had. I don't think there was an easy solution to that problem.

The Saur Revolution was a surprise, but it was largely a reaction to Daoud-led suppression of communists around Afghanistan IIRC. There was a real fear that Daoud was making moves against the PDPA, and so the revolution came from that concern.

I'm not sure the Soviets cared so much about a genuinely socialist country being officially "non-aligned". Cuba participated in the non-aligned movement with Tito and the USSR stayed behind them anyway.

Just some thoughts, thanks for taking the time to type that, though, it does clarify the background a lot.

[chebol]

Manic, you miss my point:

Amin asked for assistance, then rejected it, because the conditions were precisely what he feared - Soviet control of Afghanistan. The fact that Amin - the key architect of Khalq's success - sought US aid (amongst other countries - a majority it still came from the USSR before the assassination of the US ambassador), shows that he feared both the links between the USSR and Parcham, and the effect Soviet control would have on Afghanistan. He was genuinely in favour of Afhanistan being non-aligned: something which the US didn't believe possible, and the Soviets didn't want to happen.

To paraphrase: seeking US aid was unfortunate, but Amin had to work with what he had. I don't think there was an easy solution to that problem.

Non-alignment was - to Soviet eyes - a massive problem, and one which they tried constantly to "rectify". There were - in fact - three tendencies in the non-aligned movement, one of which was Moscow aligned.

Further, Moscow tried twice to overthrow Castro (61 and 68), and exerted massive control through Cuba's economic dependence. The Kremlin and CPSU loathed Tito, and regarded him as a threat, not as an ally, except in circumstances where he was guaranteed to side with them. And try talking up Moscow's tolerance for independent socialist states to the victims of the Prague Spring in '68 or Hungary in '56.

Also, yes, the repression of PDPA leaders was the catalyst - the protests against the repression took Daoud by surprise becasue of their size. He placed Taraki, Amin and many others under house arrest but didn't know quite how senior Amin was, and Amin was able to sneak messages out to organise the "revolution" in the military.

[manic expression]

First, I wasn't saying Tito was Moscow's ally, I was simply pointing out the fact that Cuba remained non-aligned and retained the support of the USSR.

On the Soviet attempt to overthrow Castro, I've never heard of this. Soviet advisers to Cuba helped repulse the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, and soon after they were sending the most powerful weapon in human history to Cuba. Soviet support to Cuba was very important, and it did not end when Cuba did warm to Tito.

What would be so wrong about an Afghanistan with close relations to the Soviet Union? That's what I'm not buying; the USSR genuinely aided revolutionary struggles around the world, what's wrong with letting them back one right across their border? If Amin was "working with what he had" by going to the imperialists, I would hate to have seen him work with what he wanted.

The "victims of the Prague Spring...or Hungary" didn't want a socialist state. Those movements were trying to turn back the progress made by the Soviet-driven liberations of those countries. In both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, those events were characterized by opening to western imperialist influece. The most significant difference between the Prague Spring and Lech Walesa is that the first was crushed while the second was allowed to reestablish capitalism.

[chebol]

What would be so wrong about an Afghanistan with close relations to the Soviet Union?

Amin wanted close relations with the USSR. He didn't want stifling Soviet control over Afghanistan, nor the support this would grant to reactionary and tribal forces if Soviet influence was apparent too fast. Which is what happened, disastrously for everyone concerned.

On Cuba: you need to look into the Anibal Escalante affairs - the creation of a secret, Moscow-funded faction in, first, the ORI, and second, within the PCC, in an attempt to take control of the revolution. Moscow was uncomfortable with the Castro brothers and Che and their internationalist activity, which kept rocking the boat in Latin America and Africa especially.

On Hungary, I'm aware there were fascist and nazi collaborators involved in the uprising, but the majority of those involved were not calling for capitalist restoration.

On Prague, sorry, but you've swallowed the wrong story, hookline and sinker (and you'll notice I didn't mention Poland and Lech Walesa - for good reason.)

None of which uprisings would have been necessary if not for the undemocratic bureaucratic practices emanating from Moscow.

[mykittyhasaboner]

That's a gross oversimplification...

You fail to realize that I was only summarizing the situation concisely, don't be picky.