Mind uploading and teleportation

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

While the topic title might seem more suited to S&E or even Chit-Chat, I wanted to the explore the philosophical implications rather than the technical feasibility or the literary aspect, so I posted here.

I have a couple of questions and thoughts that I have been mulling over, but I have not studied philosophy in any great detail, so I thought the regulars in the Philosophy forum might already be familiar with the issues I seek to address.

Firstly, mind uploading (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading). Is an uploaded person a continuation of the previous consciousness, or one that is entirely new yet shares the same memories and personality?

Secondly, if one were to step into a teleportation machine that created and destroyed an exact duplicate of oneself (in different places), would that be suicide, or have you really moved?

I feel that both of these questions are closely related, because ultimately I think they boil down to what defines a person, an individual. Is it this particular arrangement of atoms and molecules? It can't be, since they change all the time. What about thoughts, memories and personality? Those things are also fluid.

I would tentatively suggest that individuality is an ongoing emergent process subject to change - if the process is interrupted or sufficiently degraded, then death is the result. But processes can be resumed as well as halted.

So assuming there is no metaphysical component to the human individual, and that human consciousness, cogitation et cetera are purely classical phenomenon (physically speaking) with no quantum weirdness going on, should it not be possible to continue the feeling of being an individual? Would mind uploading or teleportation have no more bearing on one's perception of the universe than falling unconscious and waking up again?

I'm aware of the possibility that the feeling of being a thinking individual may be entirely illusory - what effect if any does this have on the problem?

I apologise in advance for rambling or for being unclear, but recently this particular set of problems have been bothering me - when I contemplated stepping into a teleporter a few days ago, I felt a stab of existential terror. I hope that doesn't mean I'm getting old. :bored:

[Lynx]

If you duplicate someone's memories and activate them in another organism, you have created another instance of the source identity. The identities will then begin to diverge.
If you destroy the original, the identity is continued by proxy.

[Klepto]

There's probably a discussion on the teleportation issue on a trekkie website somewhere, I'm aware it's been discussed in those circles (I am not a trekkie). IMO the target self would be a copy of the original, the original would cease to be.

Assuming you don't have to destroy the original to convert it into data (possibly impossible) then one could test this by creating the target self without destroying the original. If the soul then inhabits both bodies then there's nothing to worry about, but I find that highly improbable. The fictional technology of Stargate would seem to be a less murderous way forward.

Mind uploading is as you pointed out a related issue. A simple mind upload would create a new copy of your self, but would do nothing to extend the life of the old one. The only way to achieve immortality that I can see is to have nanobots work on your existing brain to repair and/or enhance it without destroying it. Even then, once the work is complete would you really be the same person?

The fictional works of Ken McLeod (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_MacLeod) deal with this issue in some depth, as does the sci-fi of Iain M. Banks (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iain_M_Banks). They both also deal with leftist politics, I recommend them.

Really this boils down to the age old questions: do we have a soul? If so where does it reside? Is it immortal? What is the nature of the soul? My own best guesses for answers to these questions would probably be better posted in the religion forum as they are mystical (but not I hope unscientific) in nature.

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

If you duplicate someone's memories and activate them in another organism, you have created another instance of the source identity. The identities will then begin to diverge.

This makes sense, and matches up to what I know about human consciousness/individuality*.

*Perhaps Rosa could help us come up with a suitable term for the subject in question.


If you destroy the original, the identity is continued by proxy.Does "the identity" include the subjective viewpoint through which we all look at the universe?

That is to say, if I were to go through such a teleporter, would my subjective experiences resemble death or a temporary loss of consciousness?


There's probably a discussion on the teleportation issue on a trekkie website somewhere, I'm aware it's been discussed in those circles (I am not a trekkie). IMO the target self would be a copy of the original, the original would cease to be.

Assuming you don't have to destroy the original to convert it into data (possibly impossible) then one could test this by creating the target self without destroying the original. If the soul then inhabits both bodies then there's nothing to worry about, but I find that highly improbable.

The problem is that there is no evidence for a "soul", so your test is impossible.


The fictional technology of Stargate would seem to be a less murderous way forward.Latest canon seems to be that Stargates are based on the warping of spacetime, a method which has it's own problems only tangentially related to philosophy so I will speak no more of it.


Mind uploading is as you pointed out a related issue. A simple mind upload would create a new copy of your self, but would do nothing to extend the life of the old one.I think that depends on how accurate the simulation/emulation is. If it's sufficiently accurate as to be indistinguishable in functional terms from the original, I think the "copy" could lay a good claim to representing a continuation of the "original" individual, much as you or I could claim to be a continuation of our younger selves.


The only way to achieve immortality that I can see is to have nanobots work on your existing brain to repair and/or enhance it without destroying it. Even then, once the work is complete would you really be the same person?The thing is, as I alluded to in my original post, is that over the course of a lifetime one isn't the same person, neither physically nor psychologically.

Which is why I was going on about processes - a human being isn't a static, Platonic, "thing" that doesn't change, but a dynamic process that is subject to external and internal variables and changes.


The fictional works of Ken McLeod (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ken_MacLeod) deal with this issue in some depth, as does the sci-fi of Iain M. Banks (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iain_M_Banks). They both also deal with leftist politics, I recommend them.I've read some of Banks' work, good stuff. I've yet to read anything by McLeod, although maybe that will change.


Really this boils down to the age old questions: do we have a soul? If so where does it reside? Is it immortal? What is the nature of the soul?I think any enquiries in that direction are very much a dead end.


My own best guesses for answers to these questions would probably be better posted in the religion forum as they are mystical (but not I hope unscientific) in nature.Well, in terms of science any answers you give will be completely unsupported hypotheses at best, and at worst, in the right place. ;)

[Vincent]

Firstly, mind uploading (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading). Is an uploaded person a continuation of the previous consciousness, or one that is entirely new yet shares the same memories and personality?

Well, call the original A. At the point of uploading we get two new individuals (A has split into two), B and B'. Now, at the point of uploading, or splitting, B and B' have no conscious access to each others memories, and Locke would say that they are now two distinct individuals. But, they both satisfy the requirement of psychological continuity with A. So, has A survived? Or is A now B (or B')? Well, A has survived as two distinct individuals, but those individuals are not the same identity.


Secondly, if one were to step into a teleportation machine that created and destroyed an exact duplicate of oneself (in different places), would that be suicide, or have you really moved?

No, I don't think you would be comitting suicide. The duplicate would not be you, it would be a duplicate of you. I think my above comments apply here.

Some recommended reading?

William Gibson 'The Winter Market', from his Burning Chrome, 1988

Greg Egan 'Dust', from The Years Best Science Fiction, 10th edition, ed Gardener Dozois, 1993.

Anything by Derek Parifit on personal identity

Descartes, Meditation on First Philosophy, especially Med 2 and 6.

[Lynx]

Does "the identity" include the subjective viewpoint through which we all look at the universe?

That is to say, if I were to go through such a teleporter, would my subjective experiences resemble death or a temporary loss of consciousness?
If the process can be experienced and committed to memory, it may be perceived as a temporary loss of consciousness. But that only applies to surviving organisms. That which is destroyed experiences death.

Of course, the perception of one's identity would be affected by knowledge of what happened (ie. I'm a transporter copy). In the absence of that knowledge, the copies subjective viewpoint should not change.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

The transporter is suicide. You need physical continuity of "at least" the brain to continue through different places. If the transporter worked another way, it might be a different situation. For instance, if I light a match, there is fire. Could we gain significant understanding and mechanisms to make the unlit match relight and become usable again?

Typically, our reverse processes for complicated scenarios aren't that sensitive to circumstance. If X part of your brain disconnects, like a battery disconnecting and short-circuiting a system, you die. If a machine can somehow avoid this, or reverse the short-circuit, you "might" be the same person. I don't know if causation can work that way, for sure. Secondly, I'm still not sure if you're the same person. The person who came out of the machine would be indistinguishable from you, which is the problem that arises from testing these hypothesize with thought experiments. Lack of reason to doubt, combined with being indistinguishably, might be sufficient.

I've went back and forth on this issue. I thought structural integrity was necessarily important to identity, before, and I gave up the few because of an objection. I keep coming back to it, though.

If you cloned yourself in a blind clone atmosphere, where you both would emerge unsure who was the clone, I think you would rightfully conceptualize yourself as the same. However, the scientist who recorded the data and imprinted you with chips, for instance, would you who you are.

Memory seems insufficient because you can get amnesia and still be the same person. Pain is a more relevant concern than self-realization, basically. Ultimately, I don't have a real answer to this topic. I think we are biased towards conceptualizing ourselves as special. However, we also don't want harm.

What is sufficient enough to removal from a human such that they could no longer care about their existence, if they were rational? If we couldn't feel physical pain, we can still appreciate life mentally. If we feel pain, we need a certain level of brain function, too. We want brain function section X plus enough pleasure > pain to make our life worthwhile.

If we copy ourselves with memory, it's not enough, I say. If we copy ourselves physically, we need physical continuity. If we replace X amount of parts of the brain with similar parts, it seems legitimate, though. As long as the functionality is not disturbed, things seem alright by me.

The question is. Is there a part of the brain that necessarily facilitates destruction if changed? If yes, can we theoretically reverse this process somehow with scientific means or no? Science would probably say yes. I'm not getting into a machine unless I understand how it works and why that's significant, if I could potentially be ending my life.

Of course, the suicidal individuals might sneak into the machines, which unknowing to us actually work. They might get all the fun before the rest of us and develop an economic monopoly with their crafty traveling ways.

[Lynx]

Amnesia would affect a person's identity and their relationships. Whom amongst us has experienced amnesia?

With regard to the point of view of a person undergoing teleportation, there was an episode of TNG that explored this. They also use the term transporter psychosis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Realm_of_Fear).

[Stranger Than Paradise]

Firstly, mind uploading (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading). Is an uploaded person a continuation of the previous consciousness, or one that is entirely new yet shares the same memories and personality?

I don't quite understand what is meant by the term consciousness. What is the difference between the two options?



Secondly, if one were to step into a teleportation machine that created and destroyed an exact duplicate of oneself (in different places), would that be suicide, or have you really moved?

It would be literal suicide becaue you would die and a new you would arrive. I think the implications of duplicating onself would mean you definitely would not return in exact state as the original you. I mean it seems to me that that would be impossible if this were to be possible.

[WhitemageofDOOM]

I shall reverse the question.
If i download your memory and personalities do i die and become replaced with you? Or am i still me just with your information.

As a continuity theorist i argue No to the first. I am a process not a state, and the data moving through that process is just that data. Therefore anything which ends the process ends my existence but a later instance with my identity data could be created at a later date. But it would not be me, but an identical copy of me.



I'm aware of the possibility that the feeling of being a thinking individual may be entirely illusory - what effect if any does this have on the problem?


For an identity theorist i have no idea.
For a continuity theorist there just pieces of the process.

[mel]

That is to say, if I were to go through such a teleporter, would my subjective experiences resemble death or a temporary loss of consciousness?

If you're trying to get at what I think you're trying to get at here, the original source would experience "death" while the "copy" would experience the sensation of a temporary loss of consciousness, despite that they are just then coming into existence for the first time, as a function of the memory of having entered the teloporter then came into existence at the "other end".

[Decolonize The Left]

Firstly, mind uploading (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading). Is an uploaded person a continuation of the previous consciousness, or one that is entirely new yet shares the same memories and personality?

If you are person N, and I upload your 'brain data' into body X, the situation would result as follows:
1) Trauma. All previous muscle memory is gone. All previous perceptions of the body are not synonymous with the current body. All previous understandings of one's spacial reality are changed.
2) Re-invention. Given that identity is a fiction, a story we write about ourselves, you would need to write this transition into your identity. Theoretically you could synthesize the transition, but I imagine it would be very difficult.

So would that body X with person N be you. It all depends on how well you make it happen.


Secondly, if one were to step into a teleportation machine that created and destroyed an exact duplicate of oneself (in different places), would that be suicide, or have you really moved?

Suicide. I agree with Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor on this one.


I feel that both of these questions are closely related, because ultimately I think they boil down to what defines a person, an individual. Is it this particular arrangement of atoms and molecules? It can't be, since they change all the time. What about thoughts, memories and personality? Those things are also fluid.

A person is a locus of sense-making ability.


So assuming there is no metaphysical component to the human individual, and that human consciousness, cogitation et cetera are purely classical phenomenon (physically speaking) with no quantum weirdness going on, should it not be possible to continue the feeling of being an individual? Would mind uploading or teleportation have no more bearing on one's perception of the universe than falling unconscious and waking up again?

Yes, one would still have the feeling of being an individual. That is not in question - what is in question is whether or not that individual is actually you. Or, rather, whether or not you feel as though that individual is you.


I'm aware of the possibility that the feeling of being a thinking individual may be entirely illusory - what effect if any does this have on the problem?

It negates the problem. The problem you have posed here is one of identity. If identity is an illusion, a fiction, then there is no problem to speak of.

“‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything.” -- Nietzsche

- August