Marx and Hegel [Archive]

Jimmie Higgins

17th May 2009, 01:35

I honestly don't know much about dialectics or bourgeois philosophers, but why is dialectics your number one axe to grind?

After reading some of your posts about Dialectics, it seemed to mostly deal with dialectics in thought and language, which I agree is idealist and I could care less about.

However I have always understood Marxist dialects in terms of nature. Your article claims that dialectics is imposing a philosophical concept onto the natural world rather than coming from empirical observations. However, I would say that dialectics as used by marxists do come out a a need to understand dynamic changes which are observable in nature.

1. Evolution: it seems to me that this is very dialectical because evolution is not a series of evenly timed small changes leading to some new species, it is the result of the struggle of the species survival against changing material conditions.

There is a recent theory of the Cambrian explosion that is very dialectical. For a long time scientists noticed that the fossil record shows little biological diversity in the ancient oceans for a very long time and in a short period, the oceans exploded in a large number of new species with wild new adaptations. A few years ago, student developed an theory that it was the development of photosensitive cells (the first eyes) that lead to this evolutionary explosion. Before eyes, there were carnivores, but they waited for things to float to them - after, they could look for prey and that meant the game had changed and everything needed to adapt if it was to survive: creatures developed propulsion through the water, camouflage and all sorts of other adaptations which then lead to further new adaptations: quantitative change brings qualitative change.

If I understand your arguments, you suggest that this dynamic view of change is not wrong, just that there are better ways to explain change than materialist dialectics. I would like to know more of what you think is a more useful way to look at changes because capitalism is very dynamic by nature and the better we can understand these dynamics at play, the stronger our positions can be.

Rosa Lichtenstein

17th May 2009, 02:20

Gravedigger:

but why is dialectics your number one axe to grind?

Because (1) the theory makes not one ounce of sense, and, (2) not unsurprisingly, it has helped make Dialectical Marxism the long-term failure we see today.

After reading some of your posts about Dialectics, it seemed to mostly deal with dialectics in thought and language, which I agree is idealist and I could care less about.

Well, if you read further, you will see that I also deal with more substantive issues.

Many of those are listed here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/RevLeft.htm

Your article claims that dialectics is imposing a philosophical concept onto the natural world rather than coming from empirical observations. However, I would say that dialectics as used by marxists do come out a a need to understand dynamic changes which are observable in nature.

Unfortunately, there is abundant evidence that dialecticians do in fact impose this 'theory' on nature (and society), and I have listed it here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2002.htm

Moreover, dialectics cannot help Marxists understand change in nature and/or society; this is because, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible. Proof here:

Quotes from the dialectical classics:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

Argument:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401001&postcount=77

1. Evolution: it seems to me that this is very dialectical because evolution is not a series of evenly timed small changes leading to some new species, it is the result of the struggle of the species survival against changing material conditions.

There is a recent theory of the Cambrian explosion that is very dialectical. For a long time scientists noticed that the fossil record shows little biological diversity in the ancient oceans for a very long time and in a short period, the oceans exploded in a large number of new species with wild new adaptations. A few years ago, student developed an theory that it was the development of photosensitive cells (the first eyes) that lead to this evolutionary explosion. Before eyes, there were carnivores, but they waited for things to float to them - after, they could look for prey and that meant the game had changed and everything needed to adapt if it was to survive: creatures developed propulsion through the water, camouflage and all sorts of other adaptations which then lead to further new adaptations: quantitative change brings qualitative change.

Yes, I know the traditional tale you have been told, I just do not buy it. I do not see how evolution can be 'dialectical' -- unless, of course, this mystical schema is imposed on it (a bit like Christians who believe that 'god' directed evolution, and then proceed to impose that idea on the facts).

If I understand your arguments, you suggest that this dynamic view of change is not wrong, just that there are better ways to explain change than materialist dialectics. I would like to know more of what you think is a more useful way to look at changes because capitalism is very dynamic by nature and the better we can understand these dynamics at play, the stronger our positions can be.

Well, taking the example of evolution, I think the best scientific explanation we have does not need this ancient, neo-Platonic 'theory' imposed on it.

Moreover, contrary to what you say, I do not in fact argue that dialectics is 'not wrong' (I prefer the word "false"), I go one further -- I argue that it is far too confused for anyone to be able to say whether or not it is true or false.

Indeed, if we needed a theory of change, then dialectics would not even make the bottom of the reserve list of likely candidates.

And, as far as social change is concerned, historical materialism (minus the Hegelian jargon) is all we need.

Of course, these are controversial things for a Marxist like me to say, but that is why I set my site up, where these allegations are defended in depth.

For example, the use of evolution, coupled with Engels's obscure and confused claims about 'quantity passing over into quality', in order to give a dialectical account of development in nature, is taken apart here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

trivas7

17th May 2009, 02:36

Because (1) the theory makes not one ounce of sense, and, (2) not unsurprisingly, it has helped make Dialectical Marxism the long-term failure we see today.

Re what is dialectics a theory? What is that theory specifically?

And why do you call yourself a Marxist if you think Marxism has been a long-term failure?

Rosa Lichtenstein

17th May 2009, 02:54

Trivas:

Re what is dialectics a theory? What is that theory specifically?

In fact, I originally posted this comment, but deleted it:

Dialectics is far too confused to be called a theory.

Trivas:

And why do you call yourself a Marxist if you think Marxism has been a long-term failure?

I see that you too have lost the ability to read; here is what I actually said:

not unsurprisingly, it has helped make Dialectical Marxism the long-term failure we see today.

trivas7

17th May 2009, 15:40

Dialectics is far too confused to be called a theory.

Ah, I see. So in fact you rail against a theory that doesn't exist for the sake of a non-dialectical Marxism. Good luck w/ that. :)

Rosa Lichtenstein

17th May 2009, 16:08

Trivas:

So in fact you rail against a theory that doesn't exist for the sake of a non-dialectical Marxism. Good luck w/ that.

Where did I say this theory didn't exist? What I said was this:

Dialectics is far too confused to be called a theory.

But it's supporters certainly think it's a theory, and that needs exposing.

Just as your incapacity to read and/or handle a complex argument needs exposing.

Lynx

17th May 2009, 16:57

Ridding Marxism of its baggage does appear to be a Herculean task.

trivas7

17th May 2009, 19:31

Ridding Marxism of its baggage does appear to be a Herculean task.
What is left of Marxism after its dialectics has been excised?

Just as your incapacity to read and/or handle a complex argument needs exposing.
Um, argument --- what argument? I have yet to see an argument by you.

Sarah Palin

17th May 2009, 19:56

“He turned Pong from a simple video game into the foundations of communism.”
~ Karl Marx on Georg Hegel

From uncyclopedia. Hilarious.

Rosa Lichtenstein

17th May 2009, 19:58

Trivas:

Um, argument --- what argument? I have yet to see an argument by you.

You'd have difficulty seeing yourself in a mirror, let alone anything else.

"Yet to see an argument" by me. What about this (which you could not quite follow at the time):

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1221394&postcount=464

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1221395&postcount=465

And we both know why (also from a few months back):

This reminds me of the Scopes trial in 1925 when William Jennings Bryan was put on the stand by Clarence Darrow, and was masked a series of unanswerable questions about the Bible.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scopes_Trial

Bryan simply refused to reply, and told Darrow that the Bible was good enough for him, and he was quite happy with its explanation of creation.

But there is also an embarrassing side to Bryan: the ‘great commoner’ was a Bible-banging fundamentalist. When officials in Dayton, Tennessee decided to roast John Scopes for teaching evolution in 1925, they called in the ageing Bryan to prosecute. The week-long trial became a national sensation and reached its climax when the defence attorney, Clarence Darrow, called Bryan to the stand and eviscerated his Biblical verities. ‘Do you believe Joshua made the sun stand still?’ Darrow asked sarcastically. ‘Do you believe a whale swallowed Jonah? Will you tell us the exact date of the great flood?’ Bryan tried to swat away the swarm of contradictions. ‘I do not think about things I don’t think about,’ he said. The New York Times called it an ‘absurdly pathetic performance’, reducing a famous American to the ‘butt of a crowd’s rude laughter’. This paunchy, sweaty figure went down as an icon of the cranky right. Today, most Americans encounter the Scopes trial and Bryan himself in a play called Inherit the Wind....’

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n04/moro01_.html

You are just as dogmatic and closed-minded. A simple faith is OK for you, even though I have ripped your core theory to shreads.

You are indeed the William Jennings Bryan of RevLeft.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1175356&postcount=121

And you still do not think about think you don't think about.

trivas7

17th May 2009, 20:59

You'd have difficulty seeing yourself in a mirror, let alone anything else.

You confuse slurs and ad hominems w/ reasoned argument. Amidst all your verbiage you have yet to communicate exactly what you are arguing.

And you still do not think about think you don't think about.
This is no way to argue; this is a pathetic plea for understanding.

Rosa Lichtenstein

17th May 2009, 22:39

Trivas:

You confuse slurs and ad hominems w/ reasoned argument.

Yet more confirmation that you can't cope with complex arguments, since you clearly have no idea what ad hominem is:

One of the most widely misused terms on the Net is "ad hominem". It is most often introduced into a discussion by certain delicate types, delicate of personality and mind, whenever their opponents resort to a bit of sarcasm. As soon as the suspicion of an insult appears, they summon the angels of ad hominem to smite down their foes, before ascending to argument heaven in a blaze of sanctimonious glory. They may not have much up top, but by God, they don't need it when they've got ad hominem on their side. It's the secret weapon that delivers them from any argument unscathed.

In reality, ad hominem is unrelated to sarcasm or personal abuse. Argumentum ad hominem is the logical fallacy of attempting to undermine a speaker's argument by attacking the speaker instead of addressing the argument. The mere presence of a personal attack does not indicate ad hominem: the attack must be used for the purpose of undermining the argument, or otherwise the logical fallacy isn't there. It is not a logical fallacy to attack someone; the fallacy comes from assuming that a personal attack is also necessarily an attack on that person's arguments.

More on that here:

http://plover.net/~bonds/adhominem.html

Amidst all your verbiage you have yet to communicate exactly what you are arguing.

As I noted, and as this reply of yours shows, you'd have problems seeing yourself in a mirror.

This is no way to argue;

May I suggest you desist, then?

this is a pathetic plea for understanding.

You should not be so hard on yourself.

mikelepore

17th May 2009, 23:40

the fallacy comes from assuming that a personal attack is also necessarily an attack on that person's arguments

Why else would people do it in an anonymous online forum, except hoping that it makes the other person's argument appear to be false?

mikelepore

17th May 2009, 23:44

What is left of Marxism after its dialectics has been excised?

We would be left with the materialist conception of history, the economic theory, the principle of the class struggle and organization, and the goal of social ownership of the means of production.

trivas7

18th May 2009, 00:34

We would be left with the materialist conception of history, the economic theory, the principle of the class struggle and organization, and the goal of social ownership of the means of production.
I deny it. The materialist conception of history as Marx understood it is an historical understanding of matter in motion. The principle of the class struggle is a dialectical understanding of that history and the goal of social ownership of means of production is predicated on that class struggle.

Rosa Lichtenstein

18th May 2009, 01:29

Mike:

Why else would people do it in an anonymous online forum, except hoping that it makes the other person's argument appear to be false?

Mike, those weren't my words! And, as far as your question goes, I have no idea what the secret motives of on-line posters are, but whatever they are, they has nothing to do with the validity or otherwise of argumentum ad hominem.

Rosa Lichtenstein

18th May 2009, 01:31

Trivas:

The materialist conception of history as Marx understood it is an historical understanding of matter in motion. The principle of the class struggle is a dialectical understanding of that history and the goal of social ownership of means of production is predicated on that class struggle.

Not according to Marx:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158574&postcount=73

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158816&postcount=75

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1161443&postcount=114

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1163222&postcount=124

trivas7

18th May 2009, 23:42

Trivas:
Not according to Marx:

Nonsense. You, like all bourgeois critics of Marxism, attack its materialist dialectics, which constitute its methodological foundation.

Rosa Lichtenstein

19th May 2009, 01:54

Trivas:

You, like all bourgeois critics of Marxism, attack its materialist dialectics, which constitute its methodological foundation.

And you, like all mystics, can't defend your ideas.

trivas7

19th May 2009, 03:34

Trivas:
And you, like all mystics, can't defend your ideas.
You can't even tell me what you think I'm defending.

Rosa Lichtenstein

19th May 2009, 05:12

Trivas:

You can't even tell me what you think I'm defending

Then that makes two of us, since you can't either.

Kronos

19th May 2009, 16:56

Trivas, seems to me that people here like to quibble over the term "dialectics", and when they learn that Marx espoused historical materialism, they assume this is a generic form of dialectical materialism, but it isn't.

Hegelean dialectics is only feasible from the position of idealism, which Marx did not take. If you read Marx's Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right you can see his break with Hegel clearly.

The basic feature of their concept of dialectics which separates them is that Hegel believes mind, consciousness, and spirit to be acting on the material world affecting change, while Marx considers mind as a product of material relations. The individual, for Hegel, is an abstract entity while the state is the manifestation of the rational, universal idea of man manifesting as material substance. The individual, for Marx, is the universal starting point while the state is an abstraction rather than an expression of a rational evolution of a world spirit. Hegel implicitly denies man as the individual while Marx begins at the individual. What is concrete for one is abstract for the other. This is one of the many philosophical, "metaphysical" disagreements between them:

But in the state, which he demonstrates to be the self-conscious existence of the moral spirit, Hegel tacitly accepts this moral spirit's being the determining thing only implicitly, that is, in accordance with the universal Idea. He does not allow society to become the actually determining thing, because for that an actual subject is required, and he has only an abstract, imaginary subject.- MarxOne can use the term "dialectics" to describe the concepts of both Marx and Hegel, but they are significantly different as a modus operandi, so to speak. We have a materialist and an idealists modifying the meaning of the term "dialectical" for their own use. This is fine....but people need to understand how that use differs.

trivas7

19th May 2009, 17:47

One can use the term "dialectics" to describe the concepts of both Marx and Hegel, but they are significantly different as a modus operandi, so to speak. We have a materialist and an idealists modifying the meaning of the term "dialectical" for their own use. This is fine....but people need to understand how that use differs.
Fine; tell that to Rosa who eschews a materialist dialectics. Not all philosophy is idealist, ergo not all dialectics are a priori dogmatic.

Kronos

19th May 2009, 20:00

Well you know Rosa is a Wittgensteinian so she is going to have an aversion to all metaphysical terminology. I believe she thinks what "dialectics" is attempting to describe can be better described through not-so-ambiguous terms. It is the term "quality" that has a metaphysical feel to it, while quantity remains much clearer.

I think about the only thing she would agree is dialectical would be the manner of philosophical dialog (in Plato and Socrates) in discourse between philosophers- exchanging hypothesis in argument to arrive at a truth.

I certainly understand why she wouldn't call history dialectical. It is just something unnecessary. And as far as Marx is concerned, I agree with Rosa: he merely uses the term 'dialectical' coquettishly- it was the popular talk of his day. But he wasn't at all in agreement with Hegel regarding the metaphysical implications of the term.

Dialectics, I believe, should remain in the field of rhetoric, language, debate, and so forth. I don't see it as an applicable platform for describing material change. If you review the history of this term and how it has evolved in philosophy you can see the point at which it became a metaphysical term...the point at which philosophers began to interpret nature as a kind of "dialog" with itself....evolving and changing in ways analogous to two philosophers in debate.

I suppose one could make this analogy, but it is loaded with....what should we call it...anthropomorphism; attributing to nature a "mind" which is working out its contradictions, like a human being would.

Rosa Lichtenstein

19th May 2009, 20:23

Trivas:

Fine; tell that to Rosa who eschews a materialist dialectics. Not all philosophy is idealist, ergo not all dialectics are a priori dogmatic.

In fact, even Hegel disagrees with you:

"Every philosophy is essentially an idealism or at least has idealism for its principle…." [Hegel (1999) Science of Logic, pp.154-55.]

And it is quite easy to show that here at least, he was right:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm

Kronos

19th May 2009, 20:32

Nevertheless, I have tried as far as possible to keep this Essay free of academic complexities since it is aimed at revolutionaries, not scholars.

Gosh, thanks Rosa.

Can everybody say "t-h-a-n-k y-o-u R-o-s-a" like good boys and girls?

Listen Rosa, you have some body of work there and I wonder if you have made any effort to get it published and/or circulated through any universities. It would make itself at home in the political sciences and philosophy divisions, you know.

I think you need a wikipedia page for yourself, at least.

Rosa Lichtenstein

19th May 2009, 20:55

Kronos:

Listen Rosa, you have some body of work there and I wonder if you have made any effort to get it published and/or circulated through any universities. It would make itself at home in the political sciences and philosophy divisions, you know.

I had in fact planned to get it published when it is finished in ten years or so -- but, then again, it will be well over 2.5 million words long then, and no one would touch it with barge pole -- I'd never agree to it being editorally mangled.

I may publish it myself.

As for the Wikipedia idea, the mystics caused such a fuss when I was even so much as mentioned in a Wiki article last year, that they'd never tolerate a page devoted to little old me:

You can read the controversy here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Dialectical_materialism

Now, I am reduced to an unnamed link at the foot of the main article.

By the way, that quotation looks like I wrote it; where did you get it from?

Bud Struggle

19th May 2009, 21:21

As for the Wikipedia idea, the mystics caused such a fuss when I was even so much as mentioned in a Wiki article last year, that they'd never tolerate a page devoted to little old me:

Nope, do the Wiki. You are interesting. Your philosophy isn't everybody's cup of tea, but I think you represent a fresh look on Marxism and it should be discussed and argued on a broader forum than just RevLeft.

God knows we have enough Trotsky and Stalin discussions.

Rosa Lichtenstein

19th May 2009, 21:50

Thanks for that Tom, but it's up to others to try and do the Wiki article -- but one thing is for sure, he or she will get little other than abuse for their pains.

Bud Struggle

19th May 2009, 21:55

Thanks for that Tom, but it is up to others to try and do the Wiki -- but one thing is for sure; he or she will get little other than abuse for their pains.

If I may ask, from whom? The Communists or the people on the right?

Rosa Lichtenstein

19th May 2009, 21:58

Up to now, it has been from various assorted Marxists (and I have had 25 years of it!).

Much of their abuse (here and on other boards) over the last four years has been listed here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/RevLeft.htm

trivas7

20th May 2009, 00:39

Well you know Rosa is a Wittgensteinian so she is going to have an aversion to all metaphysical terminology.

Indeed; unfortunately for her Marx wasn't a Wittgensteinian.

I agree w/ Brendan M. Cooney (http://kapitalism101.wordpress.com/dialectical-materialism/) who posts: "The dialectical method lies at the core of Marxist theory. Much misused, much maligned, and currently out of favor even amongst some Marxists, I believe that without dialectics Marxist theory does not offer much of anything useful to the world(Indeed, the fizzling out of the Analytical Marxist project seems to prove what happens to Marxist theory without a dialectical method.)"

Robert

20th May 2009, 02:16

Okay, I have given an hour skimming -- sorry if that's disrespectful, but I do have other obligations -- Rosa's essays, and I have a question related to this:

Or, if you belong to another "sect", you can expect to be called a "Revisionist!", "bourgeois stooge", or worse.
Those familiar with revolutionary papers will already know about their unsinkable optimism (anger is always "growing", movements are always "gaining strength", victory is always "around the corner"), how almost all of them claim to be the only one that is "leading the class", and how Capitalism is once again entering its "final crisis" -- that latter apparently having more lives than a lorry load of cats.
But, all that this will confirm is how unreasonable (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/RevLeft.htm) dialecticians are, and how they are prepared to bend every rule, lie and invent in order to protect their precious dialectic.
So, Dialectical Marxists cling to this 'theory' because without it not only would their entire world-view fall apart, their source of consolation would disappear. Hence, they are super-glued to dialectics for the same sorts of reasons (http://www.awitness.org/news/november_2001/opiate_religion_marx.html) that religious folk cling to their faith. [More on this here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm#ReligiousAlienation).]
That, of course, explains the mind-numbing, mantra-like repetitiveness of DM, the pathological fear of the "R" word ("Revisionism"), the sacred books, the appeal to 'orthodoxy', the heroic pictures of the dialectical saints carried on parades (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Che, Kim Jong-il, etc., etc.), and the inexplicable adherence to the Stone Age Logic found in a thinly-disguised work of mystical theology that celebrates the goings-on of an invisible 'Being (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slbeing.htm)' (i.e., Hegel's 'Logic').
If this wasn't quite so serious, you'd laugh.

It was I who italicized the part above beginning "the appeal to ...."

In the first place, Rosa deserves to be canonized (a little ironic mystical humor there) for denouncing those hideous portraits and the deification of Mao Tse Tung.

But my question is this, and I'm sure she's addressed this somewhere, an excerpt of which I'd like to read: what does the embrace of a faulty theory like DM -- I'm happier than you know to stipulate it's faultiness -- have to do with hero worship? Or "movement fragmentation," for that matter. Is the one really the cause of the other? Do the workers in North Korea have the faintest idea what DM is? How can you do more than just note their coincidence and suspect causation? The cappies think the hero business is due to something else.

Either way, it may help you other commies to listen to her if you won't listen to us, for it is the totalitarianism lying behind those portraits that is preventing you from getting any traction with average people. You won't even get a conversation going with them until you address, admit, and fix that problem.

Rosa Lichtenstein

20th May 2009, 03:43

RtheG:

But my question is this, and I'm sure she's addressed this somewhere, an excerpt of which I'd like to read: what does the embrace of a faulty theory like DM -- I'm happier than you know to stipulate it's faultiness -- have to do with hero worship? Or "movement fragmentation," for that matter. Is the one really the cause of the other? Do the workers in North Korea have the faintest idea what DM is? How can you do more than just note their coincidence and suspect causation? The cappies think the hero business is due to something else.

The topics you mention are explained in detail here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm

Here is the skinny: if you have a theory that is supposed to reveal the ultimate secrets of the universe, and which puts you and your party at the centre of the movement of human history, making you and your ilk key players in the next and most significant development of the human race, but which theory is in fact based on the interpretation of a set of obscure texts of dubious meaning, then, just like the Bible, those texts are going to need an 'orthodox' interpretation, by an magus of some sort. Enter the dialectical guru, who explains all, expels all, and if given a chance, kills all. So, as with religious affectation, this theory encourages the promotion of the Leader, surrounded by his/her (mostly his) dialectical saints.

However, the fragmentation of Dialectical Marxism is not caused by this theory, but by other, clearly identifiable sociological factors (which I can outline too, if requested); all this 'theory' does is make the situation worse. If this theory is impenetrably obscure (so much so that not one single dialectician can explain it in comprehensible terms), and is based on one of the most obscure books ever written (i.e., Hegel's 'Logic'), then it can serve just like the Bible, and be used to condemn all those who disagree with the Leader's line, who thus, we are always told, do not 'understand' dialectics (an easy claim to make since no one understands it).

Do the workers in North Korea have the faintest idea what DM is?

I doubt it, but communists do not in general fragment (or nowhere near as much as us Trotskyists do), and the reason for that is quite plain: all their 'renegades' are either imprisoned, shot or declared insane.

Remember, dialectics is meant only for the party foot soldiers (not workers), since this theory superglues them to the idea that they are situated at the centre of the meaning universe, right on the tide of history, in a way that is analogous to religious belief. And that is why they all become irrational and abusive when their precious dialectic is attacked.

Either way, it may help you other commies to listen to her if you won't listen to us, for it is the totalitarianism lying behind those portraits that is preventing you from getting any traction with average people. You won't even get a conversation going with them until you address, admit, and fix that problem.

Well, this 'problem' has social causes, so it cannot be fixed by challenging ideas. Hence I have no illusions that my work will change anything (except perhaps at the margin, with a handful of comrades). To imagine otherwise would be to lapse into idealism.

And here is why (this post was my contribution to a thread whose OP asked why dialectics is a 'world-view'):

There are two interconnected reasons, I think.

1) The founders of this quasi-religion weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in the classics and in philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

So, these non-worker founders of our movement, who had been educated to believe there was this hidden world that governed everything, looked for principles in that invisible world that told them that change was inevitable, and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of a ruling-class mystic called Hegel.

2) That allowed the founders of this quasi-religion to think of themselves as special, as prophets of the new order, which workers, alas, could not quite grasp because of their defective education and reliance on ordinary language and 'common sense'.

Fortunately, history had predisposed these prophets to ascertain the truth about reality for them, which meant they were their 'naturally-ordained' leaders. That in turn meant these 'leaders' were also teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who could thus legitimately substitute themselves for the unwashed majority -- in 'their own interests', you understand, since the masses were too caught up in 'commodity fetishism' to see the truth for themselves.

And that is why DM is a world-view.

It is also why dialecticians cling on to this theory like grim death (and become very emotional (and abusive!) when it is attacked by yours truly), since it provides them with a source of consolation that, despite outward appearances to the contrary, and because this hidden world tells them that dialectical Marxism will one day be a success, everything is in fact peachy, and nothing in the core theory needs changing -- in spite of the fact that that core theory says everything changes! Hence, it is ossified into a dogma, and imposed on reality. A rather nice unity of opposites for you to ponder.

So, this 'theory' insulates the militant mind from the facts.

In that case:

Dialectics is the sigh of the depressed dialectician, the heart of a heartless world. It is the opiate of the party. The abolition of dialectics as the illusory happiness of the party hack is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.

Unfortunately, these sad characters will need (materialist) workers to rescue them from themselves -- I stand no chance.

Rosa Lichtenstein

20th May 2009, 03:56

Trivas:

Indeed; unfortunately for her Marx wasn't a Wittgensteinian.

Perhaps not, but what has that got to do with anything?

Anyway, Marx anticipated many of Wittgenstein's ideas. Here is just one:

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]

More details here, at Rupert Read's site:

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j339/publications.htm

See also his:

Read, R. (2002), 'Marx And Wittgenstein On Vampires And Parasites: A Critique Of Capital And Metaphysics', in Kitching and Pleasants (2002), pp.254-81.

Kitching, G., and Pleasants, N. (2002) (eds.), Marx And Wittgenstein. Knowledge, Morality And Politics (Routledge).

Online copy here:

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=608bpo9sneMC&pg=PA254&lpg=PA254&dq=Rupert+Read+Redner&source=bl&ots=nkygTAcEht&sig=KhqVeQwNDKEmIf8ICzdMKz10-hQ&hl=en&ei=rtMOSviuJJe7jAeKi7ivBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1

See especially his 'Wittgenstein and Marx on Philosophical Language':

http://www.humboldt.edu/~essays/read.html

However, by far and away the best attempt so far to appropriate Historical Materialism to Wittgenstein's work is that of Guy Robinson:

Robinson, G. (2003), Philosophy And Mystification. A Reflection On Nonsense And Clarity (Fordham University Press).

Guy has published some of these Essays at his site:

http://www.guyrobinson.net/

Particularly this:

http://www.guyrobinson.net/pdf/Materialism.pdf

Which essay, incidentally, has inspired much of my own work in this area.

Trivas:

I agree w/ Brendan M. Cooney who posts: "The dialectical method lies at the core of Marxist theory. Much misused, much maligned, and currently out of favor even amongst some Marxists, I believe that without dialectics Marxist theory does not offer much of anything useful to the world(Indeed, the fizzling out of the Analytical Marxist project seems to prove what happens to Marxist theory without a dialectical method.)"

Well, just like you and other dialectical mystics, when I engaged comrade Cooney in debate, he could not even explain what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, nor respond effectively to my demonstration that Marx abandoned 'materialist dialectics' when he came to write Das Kapital.

And as for Analytic Marxism, it wasn't analytic enough, nor was it recognisably Marxist (except perhaps for Gerry Cohen's work).

Robert

20th May 2009, 04:46

Enter the dialectical guru, who explains all, expels all, and if given a chance, kills all. So, as with religious affectation, this theory encourages the promotion of the Leader, surrounded by his/her (mostly his) dialectical saints.

Thanks. I'll read the link tomorrow. I confess I'm intrigued, but now I wonder how we can know that this "promotion of a mystical leader" wouldn't develop in civilizations, as it always has, even if DM did make sense. I'll bet the answer to that is "mysticism by definition can never 'make sense.' " (Is I be learning yet?)

And then you also have instances of hero worship on a large scale not predicated on mysticism. Himmler was a wannabe mystic, but was Hitler? Is Castro?

Kronos

20th May 2009, 13:11

Robert, the contention of most traditional marxists is that mystical beliefs tend to pacify the working class rather than stimulate them toward revolutionary activity. This is what Marx meant with "the opiate of the masses".

On the other hand, great political leaders, if they are wise, understand that in some cases mystical, religious beliefs can also work to bond people and to increase morale. But as far as the process of revolution, that is, the coming-about of revolution, mass religious belief almost always thwarts it. Once a communist or fascist state is achieved, leaders are generally pretty liberal regarding religious belief and practice. Mussolini protected the right to practice religion, Castro as well, and believe it or not....Hitler considered himself a "positive Christian", which is a radically different interpretation of the principles of Christianity (Jesus as the Aryan opponent to the Jews).

It was Plato who first spoke of this idea as a "noble lie", meaning that while philosopher kings might be atheist because of their greater intelligence, the masses will never be capable of understanding that God does not exist....and should therefore be allowed the privilege to be "lied to".

So the point is: religion at the right time, or not at all. Religion after power is secured helps to bond people (look at Nazi Germany...how enthusiastic the people were)....but in regards to the communist view that the international proletariat is divided by his conflicting religious beliefs....this couldn't be more true.

Kronos

20th May 2009, 13:55

Indeed; unfortunately for her Marx wasn't a Wittgensteinian.

Trivas, I'll explain a development in a dialectical form which you might like.

I see the history of "philosophy" as a dialectical process in the Hegelian sense which began with the Greeks and which has ended with post-modernism, structuralism.

Suppose for a moment that thousands of years of bastardized language would necessarily be resolved in a final stage of positivism- the elimination of metaphysics and metalanguage. The dialectical process here is exemplified as the act of resolving conflicts between the material environment and confusing ideas which increasingly complicate the material relations of society.

Wittgenstein and Marx, as I see it, are the veritable "end" of traditional philosophy. Since the Enlightenment period, philosophy has become re-appropriated by the analytical methods of the fields of semantic and propositional logic. Here, philosophical introspection turns upon itself and examines the structures of language as activity rather than, as Rosa so perfectly put it, representation, which was the opus of traditional "idealist" and "rationalist" philosophers.

Wittgenstein is a kind of foot-note to Marx in this sense....and Marx espoused many ideas which Wittgenstein would later elaborate on.

So in the good Hegelian fashion we might view "philosophy" today as a kind of synthesis of the thesis of "knowledge" and the antithesis of "a priori metaphysics". The synthesis might best be described as the equivocation of certain objective, foundational and universal "truths" arrived at through the logical method (logical form being the only acceptable "a priori" concept) and the contingent, empirical conditions of the material world which we acquire knowledge of through this method. Enter "science", the bedfellow of positivism....the last real "philosophy" devoid of representational metaphysics.

It was Marx who so brilliantly made the connection between the nonsense of philosophy and the conflicting material and economic circumstances which generated such false ideologies. Yes, philosophy was certainly real.....real precisely because the rampant misuse of ordinary language had spread across the globe like a plague.

Go back in time and subtract the despotistic orgins of ruling class idealisms and you will return to a present time where language is an entirely different organism.....and where, perhaps, capitalism was never realized because the catalyst was absent- representational metaphysics.

Rosa Lichtenstein

20th May 2009, 15:08

RtheG:

Thanks. I'll read the link tomorrow. I confess I'm intrigued, but now I wonder how we can know that this "promotion of a mystical leader" wouldn't develop in civilizations, as it always has, even if DM did make sense. I'll bet the answer to that is "mysticism by definition can never 'make sense.' " (Is I be learning yet?)

And then you also have instances of hero worship on a large scale not predicated on mysticism. Himmler was a wannabe mystic, but was Hitler? Is Castro?

Well, in the case of Dialectical Marxism, I have given you some of the ideological and sociological reasons for hero worship, but there are other political causes, especially in relation to different ideologies (like Fascism).

In Dialectical Marxism (in the mid-to-late 1920s in the USSR, but later in China and E Europe), the political motivation for the promotion of a Leader cult was connected with the need to super-exploit workers; so a sort of quasi state religion was promoted to that end. But, in the case of Stalin, Mao and others, their personalities were largely irrelevant; the politcal economic needs of the new state capitalist class in the former USSR, China and elsewhere were parmount.

And you are right, mysticism in general makes not one ounce of sense, but, as far as I'm concerned, I prefer to concentrate on Dialectical Mysticism.

Rosa Lichtenstein

20th May 2009, 15:12

Kronos, thank you for that interesting account (in the second of your two posts), but I distance myself from it.

I prefer to see metaphysics as simply ruling-class ideology, and the history of thought, not as a battle of ideas, but an ideological consequence/off-shoot of the wider class war.

However, your first post I largely agree with.

trivas7

20th May 2009, 15:25

In one of his last major works, On the Significance of Militant Materialism (1922) Lenin sharply criticized those who

retreated in quest of fashionable reactionary philosophical doctrines, captivated by the tinsel of the so-called last word in European science, and unable to discern beneath this tinsel some variety of servility to the bourgeoisie, to bourgeois prejudice and bourgeois reaction.

In the same article Lenin writes:

For our attitude towards this phenomena to be a politically conscious one, it must be realized that no natural science and no materialism can hold its own in the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the restoration of the bourgeois world outlook unless it stands on solid philosophical ground. In order to hold his own in this struggle and carry it to a victorious finish, the natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious adherent of the materialism represented by Marx, i.e., he must be a dialectical materialist.

Those who call themselves Marxists do well to heed Lenin's words.

[email protected]

20th May 2009, 15:32

Hegel and Marx sought to liberate the homosexuals. They dreamed of a world where the poor man could be penetrated by a man of the high society.

HenrikOlafson

20th May 2009, 15:37

Hegel and Marx sought to liberate the homosexuals. They dreamed of a world where the poor man could be penetrated by a man of the high society.

Why do you like to speak so much about homsexuals.
Do you have homofobia?

Kronos

20th May 2009, 15:46

I googled this guy and apparently he is a Dieterean. Here is a picture of his exemplar and their main thesis:

http://www.delawareonline.com/blogs/secondhelpings/uploaded_images/dieter-786777.jpg

"Do you want to touch my monkey?"

Rosa Lichtenstein

20th May 2009, 18:47

Trivas:

retreated in quest of fashionable reactionary philosophical doctrines, captivated by the tinsel of the so-called last word in European science, and unable to discern beneath this tinsel some variety of servility to the bourgeoisie, to bourgeois prejudice and bourgeois reaction.

Fine words from a man who pinched his own ideas off a quintessentaily bourgeois philosopher, Hegel.

For our attitude towards this phenomena to be a politically conscious one, it must be realized that no natural science and no materialism can hold its own in the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the restoration of the bourgeois world outlook unless it stands on solid philosophical ground. In order to hold his own in this struggle and carry it to a victorious finish, the natural scientist must be a modern materialist, a conscious adherent of the materialism represented by Marx, i.e., he must be a dialectical materialist.

Not the attitude of Marx though was it?

But, the irony in Lenin's position is quite clear: in order to defeat bourgeois thought we have to copy it, and we have to copy large sections from the very worst of mystical bourgeois philosophers to have been inflicted on humanity.

One might as well argue that to defeat confusion we have to become even more confused ourselves.

Those who call themselves Marxists do well to heed Lenin's words.

In fact, those who call themselves Marxists would do well to heed Marx here, and ignore Lenin.

Rosa Lichtenstein

20th May 2009, 18:52

JewDavid:

Hegel and Marx sought to liberate the homosexuals. They dreamed of a world where the poor man could be penetrated by a man of the high society.

1) Exactly where did these two argue this?

2) Who cares anyway?

trivas7

20th May 2009, 19:52

In fact, those who call themselves Marxists would do well to heed Marx here, and ignore Lenin.
Here your break w/ Marxism is clearly exposed. In your zeal to liquidate Lenin you refuse to defend materialism against idealism, thus surrendering to bourgeois ideology.

Robert

20th May 2009, 21:45

I have given you some of the ideological and sociological reasons for hero worship, but there are other political causes, especially in relation to different ideologies (like Fascism).

Okay. I should have seen that one coming. Every thing you say makes me want to ask at least one other question, but I'll read some more before I do. Rosa, I think you're Great. Kind of like ...ahem ... :D

Trivas, if you don't mind my asking, what exactly is at risk if Rosa's view prevails in this debate? It seems like 99% of the current commie "in crowd" denounces Stalin and Mao, and I hope the worship of same, on one ground or another anyway. So Lenin and Hegel end up discredited as well. Is that going to derail or retard the revolution?

Rosa Lichtenstein

20th May 2009, 23:12

Trivas:

Here your break w/ Marxism is clearly exposed. In your zeal to liquidate Lenin you refuse to defend materialism against idealism, thus surrendering to bourgeois ideology.

Once more, it's bit rich of you accusing me of 'surrendering to bourgeois ideology', when you advocate a philosophy that derives from the work of that quintessential bourgeois mystic, Hegel.

And where do I even so much as remotely suggest this?

In your zeal to liquidate Lenin

I am a Leninist; all I am doing is exposing his poor judgement when it came to philosophy -- taking his cue from Hegel.

And, far from this being the case:

you refuse to defend materialism against idealism

the only way to defend Marxist materialism is to expose the idealism in dialectics.

Even so, I note that you are long on accusation, short on proof. Where do I defend 'idealism', and where do I 'liquidate' Lenin?

Rosa Lichtenstein

20th May 2009, 23:16

RtheG:

Trivas, if you don't mind my asking, what exactly is at risk if Rosa's view prevails in this debate? It seems like 99% of the current commie "in crowd" denounces Stalin and Mao, and I hope the worship of same, on one ground or another anyway. So Lenin and Hegel end up discredited as well. Is that going to derail or retard the revolution?

Good luck getting a response out of Trivas, whose posts here reveal that he is prone to spin an odd idea around in his head until its centripetal acceleration overcomes the forces of good sense, and out it pops.

His responses to me are particluarly good examples of this endearing character defect.

You also need to note that I am a Leninist, although I do not hero worship the man.

Bud Struggle

20th May 2009, 23:43

Okay. I should have seen that one coming. Every thing you say makes me want to ask at least one other question, but I'll read some more before I do. Rosa, I think you're Great. Kind of like ...ahem ... :D Indeed she is for posting her ideas here with us poor OIers! I haven't posted on the subject much, but have been reading with interest what I can understand.

Thank you Rosa.

trivas7

21st May 2009, 00:22

Trivas, if you don't mind my asking, what exactly is at risk if Rosa's view prevails in this debate? It seems like 99% of the current commie "in crowd" denounces Stalin and Mao, and I hope the worship of same, on one ground or another anyway. So Lenin and Hegel end up discredited as well. Is that going to derail or retard the revolution?
IMO without dialectics Marxist theory does not offer much of anything useful to the world; regarding this you and Rosa completely agree.

Marxism isn't principally re political revolution; it is bigger than that. It aspires to adequately explain the actions of groups of people, institutions and markets. It aspires to understand the laws of capitalism and the history of the economic systems before it. It wants to create visions of alternatives to capitalism that are more humane and rational. It can't do any of that w/ the schoolbook logic that Rosa espouses.

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st May 2009, 03:01

Trivas:

Marxism isn't principally re political revolution; it is bigger than that. It aspires to adequately explain the actions of groups of people, institutions and markets. It aspires to understand the laws of capitalism and the history of the economic systems before it. It wants to create visions of alternatives to capitalism that are more humane and rational. It can't do any of that w/ the schoolbook logic that Rosa espouses.

1) It is in fact possible to explain social change and development using modern logic (coupled with ordinary language and historical materialism) -- you only say what you do about the logic since you are almost totally ignorant of it.

2) And, once more, it's a bit rich of you criticising modern logic when dialectics not only cannot explain change, if it were true, change would be impossible:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401001&postcount=77

Bud Struggle

21st May 2009, 13:33

Can we just slow down for a second to see if I'm getting this right?

Trivas' position is that DM is important because it legitimatizes the Marxist synthesis as a direct descendent of human philosophical thinking. It validates Marx and Lenin's approach to Communism. It posits that what Lenin did in the creation of the Soviet Union was the philosophic outcome of logical and rational thought. It puts Communism as the end of the dialectic.

I guess Rosa's saying that as a materialist the dialectic means nothing--actually less than nothing because it is idealism. It's sets up a philosophy where none is really needed and that philosophy can pervert the spontaneous nature of Communism as a human built creation based on logic in the real world.

A good example of where DM went wrong is the SU--where a Communism should have based itself on the real world--depended more and more on its own internal logic got further and further away from reality till it finally collapsed.

That close?:confused:

trivas7

21st May 2009, 14:36

TomK --
Re DM go here (http://kapitalism101.wordpress.com/dialectical-materialism/). I understand DM as a methodology, Rosa speaks for herself.

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st May 2009, 15:49

Tom:

I guess Rosa's saying that as a materialist the dialectic means nothing--actually less than nothing because it is idealism. It's sets up a philosophy where none is really needed and that philosophy can pervert the spontaneous nature of Communism as a human built creation based on logic in the real world.

A good example of where DM went wrong is the SU--where a Communism should have based itself on the real world--depended more and more on its own internal logic got further and further away from reality till it finally collapsed.

Well, the revolution in the soviet union went into reverse because (1) the German revolution failed, and (2) much of the proletariat in the USSR was wiped out by war and famine -- you can't build a workers' state without an economy that is capable of creating a massive surplus (hence the significance of the German fiasco), nor can to you if there are very few workers left to run it.

However, dialectics came into its own in such circumstances, making a bad situation worse, for it provided the decaying Bolshevik party with an ideological justification for substitutionism (http://www.marxists.org/archive/cliff/works/1960/xx/trotsub.htm) (i.e., for 'allowing' the now bureaucratised Bolshevik State to substitute itself for the working class, for reasons outlined earlier (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1448812&postcount=39)), and for Stalin and his henchmen (and later Mao and others) to justify anything they liked, and then the opposite 24 hours later (since dialectics glories in contradiction, and was used because of that).

So, dialectics is the ideology of petty-bourgeois substitutionist elements within Marxism.

But the reason I reject dialectics is not so much because of the above (the above is a reason why I hate this theory -- that is, for the ordure it has heaped on Marxism over the years), but because this 'theory' makes not one ounce of sense. I turned against dialectics long before I knew the history of Marxism.

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st May 2009, 15:53

Trivas:

Re DM go here. I understand DM as a methodology, Rosa speaks for herself.

But, it is a 'methodolgy' that does not work -- and you can't cope with my criticisms of it, hence you simply ignore them.

trivas7

21st May 2009, 16:49

Trivas:
But, it is a 'methodolgy' that does not work -- and you can't cope with my criticisms of it, hence you simply ignore them.
Your criticisms of DM are mainly inscrutable to me (although not totally without merit) and seem to be based on misunderstanding and unacknowledged assumptions -- your Wittgensteinian take on philosophy, e.g. Nothing in your voluminous outpourings leads me to think you understand Marx or Lenin -- yet you call yourself a Marxist and a Leninist. So, yes -- I can't cope. :lol:

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st May 2009, 17:39

Trivas:

Your criticisms of DM are mainly inscrutable to me (although not totally without merit) and seem to be based on misunderstanding and unacknowledged assumptions

And yet 1) you seem incapable of saying where I go wrong, or where I 'misunderstand' this 'theory', and 2) revealing my 'unacknowledged' assumptions.

Except perhaps this:

your Wittgensteinian take on philosophy

But, the vast majority of my criticisms of DM are not based on his work, and would remain the same even if he had never lived.

Nothing in your voluminous outpourings leads me to think you understand Marx or Lenin -- yet you call yourself a Marxist and a Leninist. So, yes -- I can't cope.

Even of this were so, you seem incapable of putting me straight, which suggests your comprehension is somewhat defective too.

trivas7

21st May 2009, 17:49

Even of this were so, you seem incapable of putting me straight, which suggests your comprehension is somewhat defective too.
My defects have nothing to do w/ it; no amount of "putting straight" can make one into a dialectical thinker.

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st May 2009, 18:36

Trivas:

My defects have nothing to do w/ it; no amount of "putting straight" can make one into a dialectical thinker.

Typical response of a mystic -- I presume it takes an 'act of god' then?

Certainly Hegel thought so. No wonder you argue like him then.

trivas7

21st May 2009, 19:45

Certainly Hegel thought so. No wonder you argue like him then.
Wow -- thanks for the compliment. :)

Kronos

21st May 2009, 20:21

Trivas, how much have you read of Hegel? I don't mean to pry, but I would say confidently that anyone who dug deep into Hegel's "logic" would soon understand why a positivist is so critical of him. Thinkers with a history in analytical philosophy tend not to accept much of Hegel's work- the text is very esoteric and cryptic which lends to the confusion when trying to understand his work. But alternatively, because of its obscurity it is a philosophy that can be adopted by many people....without them ever really knowing what the hell it means.

In order for you to understand how and why Dialectical Materialism is at stake here you have to get before Lenin, Engles, Mao, Trotsky and whoever else endorses the philosophy.

You could better understand where Rosa is coming from if you could look at Hegel's work from the perspective of analytical, positivistic philosophy. For instance, how clear and meaningful can terms like "Being", "Essence", and "Absolute Idea" be in propositional logic? How could anyone ever get to certainty regarding what those terms really mean? Aren't they especially unordinary terms.....and do we use such terms when communicating meaningfully? Or, are they philosophical concepts which have relevance only in the domain of metaphysical speculation- that is, is real, practical life seemingly suspended when we think with terms like that? I do think so.

Here. What if I said "the essence of the spirit as it manifests in the universal subject must resolve the objectification of the Other, as being-for-itself, so that it is no longer alienated." Do you think you know what I mean here? Hell no. I don't even know what I mean, nor did Hegel when he said crap like that.

What remains elusive in diatribes like that is the fact that while such propositions can be proven to be valid and logically sound, they are meaningless concepts outside of the logical, semantic relations they take place in. That is to say none of these concepts can stand alone as certain, meaningful terms. This is a good example of what Wittgenstein meant when he said philosophy is a "house of cards". There is indeed a structure there, but the slightest probing would cause the whole thing to collapse.

Anyway, if you aren't very familiar with Hegel's stuff, take a look at this link. If you think you understand any of it.....explain to me what you think you understand....and I'll demonstrate how that is impossible.

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/mean.htm

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st May 2009, 23:28

Trivas:

Wow -- thanks for the compliment.

Only an idiot would see that as a compliment -- looks like you fit the bill.

Rosa Lichtenstein

21st May 2009, 23:30

Kronos, nice try, but what makes you think a) Trivas will reply to what you have posted (in view of the fact that he ignored your last excellent post), and b) will grasp anything other than the punctuation marks?

You could better understand where Rosa is coming from if you could look at Hegel's work from the perspective of analytical, positivistic philosophy.

There is nothing positivist about my work.

trivas7

22nd May 2009, 14:40

There is nothing positivist about my work.
Confused by Rosa yet, Kronos?

Rosa Lichtenstein

22nd May 2009, 16:30

Trivas:

Confused by Rosa yet, Kronos?

Not one tenth as much as you have been.

--------------------

Kronos, see what I mean? Not even a pathetically weak attempt to respond to you by this joker.

Kronos

23rd May 2009, 13:33

Confused by Rosa yet, Kronos?

No, not yet. Though as I get to know how she thinks over the years I think her position is most comparable to positivism. There is some reasonable Wittgensteinesque criticism against positivism, however, based on the claims that positivism cannot reduce all process down to physiological events, because to do so would be to misuse terms like "mind" and "consciousness" (as an epiphenomena), for instance. So surprisingly, post-analytical Wittgenstein is even more radical than positivism.

All that considered though, if Rosa HAD to be classified and put into a straight-jacket philosophical position....I'd say it is positivism. There is no discipline I know of that is more suitable to her method and style.

But no, what I've read of her work so far is not confusing...but maybe a little over my head, as I don't have the education she has.

Kronos

23rd May 2009, 14:15

What I find confusing is that the logical methods used to invalidate and reduce to nonsense the pseudo-empirical terms used by philosophers are themselves "unordinary" concepts...in the sense that, like the essentialism demonstrated in metaphysical propositions, they are "a priori" to experience. In other words, it can be said that analytical methods used to deconstruct nonsensical "philosophical" terms relies on super-empirical forms of analysis.

We have to ask if logic itself is prior to experience or contingent to our physiological faculties- do we conceive of the quantity of "two" because our sensory perception functions in a way that divides quantities.....or are those quantities already divided. Is a mental image a result of a kind of autopoiesis, a re-created duplicate of the external world, or does quantity exist despite the conditions of our sensory perception. What is "sense data".

Psychologism claims that the nature of logic is based on internal psychological, and therefore physiological, states....so that a logical quantifier, for example, is a linguistic "copy" of a posterior experience. In identity logic (A=A- Aristotle- Law of Identity), an "A" represents a sensible object in experience...so the world is in a sense transforming into its own logical expressions.

Psychologism is asserting that "logic" is not an "a prior" science, while anti-psychologism is asserting that logic is independent of experience...that it does not depend on the content of ideas.

From an anti-psychologistic stance, the Law of Identity is not valid because it corresponds with the world, but because it represents fixed values outside and beyond posterior experience. I am baffled by the fact that that condition of identity logic (A=A) is absolutely necessary for any possible world....but also that we can never be certain that our faculties of "reason" are not creating those conditions.

In a strange kind of way, Wittgenstein is upholding a paradoxical position in his analysis of language, calling it "misused", and determining that by employing axioms of logic. The method he uses to desconstruct philosophical language incorporates techniques in logic which are not founded in ordinary language...but specialized metaphysical constructs that provide a kind of mathematical approach to language. From where does Wittgenstein get the principles of logic that he uses as a tool to decipher sense from nonsense?

I will confront Rosa on this matter at once...but first I must attend to a brunch that is being sponsored by MIT Tech's department of advanced logic.

Rosa Lichtenstein

23rd May 2009, 14:40

Kronos:

All that considered though, if Rosa HAD to be classified and put into a straight-jacket philosophical position....I'd say it is positivism.

What possible reason do you have for advancing this wildly inaccurate allegation? My ideas have absolutely nothing on common with positivism.

------------------

Psychologism claims that the nature of logic is based on internal psychological, and therefore physiological, states....so that a logical quantifier, for example, is a linguistic "copy" of a posterior experience. In identity logic (A=A- Aristotle- Law of Identity), an "A" represents a sensible object in experience...so the world is in a sense transforming into its own logical expressions.

In fact, the 'law of identity' is not to be found in Aristotle.

In a strange kind of way, Wittgenstein is upholding a paradoxical position in his analysis of language, calling it "misused", and determining that by employing axioms of logic.

Where on earth did you get this idea? It has nothing to do with Wittgenstein. I defy you to find a single passage in the early, middle or later Wittgenstein that even remotely resembles this.

I will confront Rosa on this matter at once...but first I must attend to a brunch that is being sponsored by MIT Tech's department of advanced logic.

You will need to learn far more Wittgenstein first!

Kronos

24th May 2009, 13:59

What possible reason do you have for advancing this wildly inaccurate allegation?

Seems to me that what you consider to be "ordinary" language isn't ordinary at all, since that is a measure of consensus- if fifty people used language X and fifty one people used language Y, then language Y would be the ordinary language because it is used by a majority. You would have to be more concise when you describe a language as "ordinary", I think.

But I assume you are generalizing unordinary language as a language that employs philosophical terms. Then you would have to separate the philosophical terms from the non-philosophical terms....which would take you five life times.

So since the first idea of ordinary language as a language majority is impossible to determine, and the second idea of ordinary language being non-philosophical language is also impossible to distinguish, what's left is the general idea that you must uphold a theory of meaning in language that deduces all meaning to what can be verified. How that can be done I don't know.

Naturally I would suspect your criterion for meaningful language would be closer to the criterion of the logical positivists. This is not an "allegation"....I am simply explaining to you how your reasoning appears to me.

In fact, the 'law of identity' is not to be found in Aristotle.

Yeah, thanks. I just looked that up. But wouldn't his principle of contradiction entail that the law of identity "goes without saying"? One has to determine that A=A before one can determine what A can and cannot be. That there is A is necessary, first.

Where on earth did you get this idea? It has nothing to do with Wittgenstein. I defy you to find a single passage in the early, middle or later Wittgenstein that even remotely resembles this.

The more I read Wittgenstein, and about Wittgenstein, the more I see what appear to be contradicting position shifts. I especially noticed his issue with Moore and skepticism ("this is one hand, etc.") which I couldn't believe Wittgenstein would seriously challenge.

You will need to learn far more Wittgenstein first!

There is no rhinoceros in this room, Rosa.

Rosa Lichtenstein

24th May 2009, 15:03

Kronos:

Seems to me that what you consider to be "ordinary" language isn't ordinary at all, since that is a measure of consensus- if fifty people used language X and fifty one people used language Y, then language Y would be the ordinary language because it is used by a majority. You would have to be more concise when you describe a language as "ordinary", I think.

Is the above in ordinary language? If not, then it must have a specialised meaning which is as yet unclear. In that case, I cannot respond to it.

On the other hand, if it is in ordinary language, then your argument self-destructs; in which case I needn't respond to it.

Either way, what you posted was a waste of space.

But I assume you are generalizing unordinary language as a language that employs philosophical terms. Then you would have to separate the philosophical terms from the non-philosophical terms....which would take you five life times.

It's actually far easier than you think.

So since the first idea of ordinary language as a language majority is impossible to determine, and the second idea of ordinary language being non-philosophical language is also impossible to distinguish, what's left is the general idea that you must uphold a theory of meaning in language that deduces all meaning to what can be verified. How that can be done I don't know.

Verification forms no part of any theory of meaning I'd accept, and that is because I reject all theories of meaning.

[By the way, same response above applies to these latest comments of yours about ordinary language, in the above quote.]

Naturally I would suspect your criterion for meaningful language would be closer to the criterion of the logical positivists. This is not an "allegation"....I am simply explaining to you how your reasoning appears to me.

I do not have a criterion of meaning, nor do I want one.

And I thought you said you would stop calling me a 'positivist'.

But wouldn't his principle of contradiction entail that the law of identity "goes without saying"? One has to determine that A=A before one can determine what A can and cannot be. That there is A is necessary, first.

The identity relation "x = y" (if we ignore for the present the equivocation between equality and identity) takes singular terms as arguments. The 'law of non-contradiction' (in its simplest form "p^¬p") takes propositions as instances.

Hence, the 'law of identity' supposedly expresses a relation between an object and itself (or between its names, depending on which version you accept). The 'law of non-contradiction' (again, in its simplest form) expresses the truth functional link between a propsosition and its negation; it is not about objects, since objects are not propositions. Moreover, the 'law' of identity cannot be about propositions, since, once more, they are not objects.

Hence, these two 'laws' have absolutely no connection with one another. [You have been reading too much Hegel -- who makes the same mistake. [I]Indeed, this is from were dialecticians have derived their whacky ideas about logic.]

There is no rhinoceros in this room, Rosa.

Maybe so, maybe not, But there are plenty of unfounded allegations to make up for it.

Kronos

24th May 2009, 22:41

Is the above in ordinary language?

If I had fifty large apples and fifty one small apples, the most commonly encountered apple would be the small apples since there are more of them. The same rule applies for the language. When you designate some language as ordinary and some as unordinary....how else do you define the term "ordinary" other than as it pertains to a consensus?

If there are three people on the planet and two of them say "I feel a supergalactic omnipresent oneness" to express joy, and the other one says "I feel good", the former would be the ordinary language while the latter would be strange and obscure.

The fact is nobody can point at grammar and say "that is ordinary" or "that is unordinary". Can one look at a garden and say "that one there is an ordinary flower while that one over there is not"?

There is a difference between meaningful statements and ordinary language....just as there is a difference between nonsensical statements and unordinary language. One doesn't guarantee the other in either case.

Either way, what you posted was a waste of space.

Euclidean space can only be occupied by objects with mass. A pixel has no mass.

Wait! Shit. I suppose the electricity that powers the screen upon which the pixel is printed consists of particles which do occupy space. Sorry then.

It's actually far easier than you think.

Hardly. The "love of wisdom" was the Greek's mess. But philosophical language has existed as long as man could talk. There are all kinds of statements which express philosophical meanings- evaluations, preferences, opinions, and emotive statements, especially.

If I say "this chocolate tastes good", what does "good" mean here? Would that meaning be public in the sense that my "good" is another person's "good"? You see what I mean. There is absolutely no platform on which to determine what such a term means other than one which performs an extensive analysis of language. That is the business of philosophy, no?

I believe that all language falls under one of two basic categories- intersubjective statements about "what is the case" and private statements about cases that have quality, and this is a matter of intentionality. Such intentionality in statements can strike people as meaningless or nonsensical because they involve evaluations about things. People take for granted that terms like "beautiful" and "horrible" and "good" and "anxious" and "fearful" are adjective descriptions which have no objective basis in language. Philosophy is useless where it deals with objective things in the world, since that is the business of science. But metaphor, adjective and such....that requires something more.

The 'law of non-contradiction' (again, in its simplest form) expresses the truth functional link between a propsosition and its negation; it is not about objects, since objects are not propositions. Moreover, the 'law' of identity cannot be about propositions, since, once more, they are not objects.

This is one of the things that confuses me. I can't imagine that propositions are not objects. There is no difference in the image of a rock and a logic symbol. If a proposition is not an object it would be impossible to conceive of it at all. If I see a picture of "x = y" and a picture of a kangaroo, I would immediately know what each picture was of without having to consider what either picture meant. The gross, immediate experience of the meaning of the pictures is the same- both are objects of my perception. If there are "rules" which logic conforms to, and which objects do not conform to, then in the instance of "a = a", I cannot correspond that to "this apple equals itself, or is itself".

Anyway I cannot understand how logic doesn't have to "stand for" objects in the world. Is it some kind of magical, platonic idea that has a reality beyond the material world?

I thought you knew some logic!

I understand and utilize the process but do not know the language. This is what I get for dropping out of highschool and pounding nails for a living.

Throw me a bone. If I knew how the fuck to properly state my thoughts with the correct terminology....I'd be the next Wittgenstein....you bet your ass, buster.

In other news, we've hijacked this thread you know. Maybe we should start a "Logic with Rosa" thread or something.

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th May 2009, 00:10

Kronos:

If I had fifty large apples and fifty one small apples, the most commonly encountered apple would be the small apples since there are more of them. The same rule applies for the language. When you designate some language as ordinary and some as unordinary....how else do you define the term "ordinary" other than as it pertains to a consensus?

In fact, I do not have a definition of ordinary language, nor do I want one. Like Wittgenstein, I take it as a given -- why, see below.

Once more, I take it that your comments above are in ordinary language -- which is why I was able to reply to you. If so, then we can communicate.

On the other hand, if they aren't, then I must ask you to explain the meaning of all the terms you use.

But, in order to do that, you will have to use ordinary language, or the same merry-go-round will just start all over again.

And as soon as you do that, you will have answered your own question.

There is no way out of this bind if you want to make yourself understood -- which is why Wittgenstein took ordinary language as a given.

If there are three people on the planet and two of them say "I feel a supergalactic omnipresent oneness" to express joy, and the other one says "I feel good", the former would be the ordinary language while the latter would be strange and obscure.

Well, to understand this, it must be in ordinary language, or in some technical language I already understand, or some language that can be translated into my own.

And yet, I do not understand "I feel a supergalactic omnipresent oneness", so I cannot comment.

The fact is nobody can point at grammar and say "that is ordinary" or "that is unordinary". Can one look at a garden and say "that one there is an ordinary flower while that one over there is not"?

This is not a good comparison. In order to say something comprehensible about flowers, it will have to be in ordinary language already (or in some technical language already understood, or some language that can be translated into that of the listener). Now, no one is going to point to language and say 'that is ordinary language', for to do so, that clause will have to be in ordinary language already (or in some technical language already understood, or some language that can be translated into that of the listener), which presupposes a grasp of the very thing being identified, thus rendering nugatory that very identification.

Of course, if the person being shown an example of ordinary language does not know ordinary language already, this little play will be of no use to them.

There is a difference between meaningful statements and ordinary language....just as there is a difference between nonsensical statements and unordinary language. One doesn't guarantee the other in either case.

Indeed, but so what?

Euclidean space can only be occupied by objects with mass. A pixel has no mass.

You are assuming physical space is Euclidean -- or Riemannian, it matters not. Physical space is not a mathematical object/construct.

Or if it is, we need to see the proof.

But philosophical language has existed as long as man could talk. There are all kinds of statements which express philosophical meanings- evaluations, preferences, opinions, and emotive statements, especially.

It was in fact invented by the ancient Greeks (in the 'West') -- all ruling-class hacks.

If I say "this chocolate tastes good", what does "good" mean here? Would that meaning be public in the sense that my "good" is another person's "good"? You see what I mean. There is absolutely no platform on which to determine what such a term means other than one which performs an extensive analysis of language. That is the business of philosophy, no?

The word means what it says. If someone said this too you, you would understand it straightaway. It's only when you allow your language to 'go on holiday' (as Wittgenstein put it) that you become puzzled with the use of perfectly ordinary words.

And if someone were to explain its meaning to someone else who did not understand it, that would have to be in ordinary language, too, otherwise they'd not follow the explanation.

[And that includes you, as well. And this can be asserted with some confidence because the words I have just used are in ordinary language already, which is why you can understand them. If they weren't, you could not follow me, nor even understand this caveat...]

I believe that all language falls under one of two basic categories- intersubjective statements about "what is the case" and private statements about cases that have quality, and this is a matter of intentionality. Such intentionality in statements can strike people as meaningless or nonsensical because they involve evaluations about things. People take for granted that terms like "beautiful" and "horrible" and "good" and "anxious" and "fearful" are adjective descriptions which have no objective basis in language. Philosophy is useless where it deals with objective things in the world, since that is the business of science. But metaphor, adjective and such....that requires something more.

I think you are going astray here, because your language has just gone on tour...

This is one of the things that confuses me. I can't imagine that propositions are not objects. There is no difference in the image of a rock and a logic symbol. If a proposition is not an object it would be impossible to conceive of it at all. If I see a picture of "x = y" and a picture of a kangaroo, I would immediately know what each picture was of without having to consider what either picture meant. The gross, immediate experience of the meaning of the pictures is the same- both are objects of my perception. If there are "rules" which logic conforms to, and which objects do not conform to, then in the instance of "a = a", I cannot correspond that to "this apple equals itself, or is itself".

A proposition is what is proposed by an indicative sentence. You are confusing a proposition here with a propositional sign (a sentence, written or spoken), a common failing (indeed, it afflicts most American Analytic Philosophers, for example, but not just them!) the Tractatus should have disabused you of.

Wittgenstein's best discussion of this is in his Philosophical Remarks (I was fortunate to have as my PhD supervisor the translator of this amazing book) -- the passage where he asks the reader what a collection of objects, or even a single object, says. May I refer you to that?

Now, if you leaf through logic texts, you will see there very clearly the rules we have for the use of "=", and they do not include propositions flanking it on either side.

[On the rules we do have, see Bostock (1997), pp.323-33, Lemmon (1993), pp.159-67, and Quine (1974), pp.221-26.]

References here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_03.htm

Anyway I cannot understand how logic doesn't have to "stand for" objects in the world. Is it some kind of magical, platonic idea that has a reality beyond the material world?

I am sorry, I did not understand the above comment.

I understand and utilize the process but do not know the language. This is what I get for dropping out of highschool and pounding nails for a living.

Apologies, but you said you were off to an advanced logic class, so I assumed you were up on this.

trivas7

25th May 2009, 23:51

In fact, I do not have a definition of ordinary language, nor do I want one. Like Wittgenstein, I take it as a given -- why, see below.

What is historical materialism -- in ordinary language?

Rosa Lichtenstein

26th May 2009, 11:07

Trivas:

What is historical materialism -- in ordinary language?

I might consider answering this question if you answer the many I have asked you which you just ignore.

Lynx

26th May 2009, 12:38

Will ordinary language from Wikipedia suffice? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_Materialism)

Rosa Lichtenstein

26th May 2009, 13:17

That seems OK, provided the Hegelian guff is ditched.

Kronos

26th May 2009, 15:41

What is historical materialism -- in ordinary language?

Don't submit to her chimera, trivas!

There is no such thing as ordinary language. Tell me, at what point in the history of language were terms invented which were not ordinarily used? And how often would they have to be used to be considered ordinary- every five minutes.....once an hour....twice a week? And at which point does a new word, being a compound of may other words and meanings, become unnecessary?

If someone says "we want to collect five bushels of wheat without using more than three people before sundown" and I say "what we need is a new word. I think I've got it. "Objective". Here is how it works- our objective is to collect five bushels of wheat without using more than three people before sundown." Then the guys says "cool, we have a new word. In the future I'll use it when it is appropriate. Whenever I want to declare that we will make an effort to use means for achieving an end....I'll just simply say "our objective is."

Now isn't such a new term in such circumstances unordinary? Certainly. Is it unnecessary? Not necessarily. The question is, did the term work, was it pragmatic, did it prove to be successful in communication. If that is the criteria (and it is), then how would we distinguish between language that Rosa's calls unordinary or ordinary if the standard used to determine the validity is only agreement and communication? Finally, how does one convey that they actually understand the meaning of a statement, question, command or proposition? Is meaning private, or public as Wittgestein suggests? If it is public, then we must suppose that all meaning manifests in behavior. But it doesn't. What about deceit, lying, feigned ignorance? One intentionally behaves in a deceiving manner.....what happens to public language in such a case?

Language is intersubjective. Meaning, in the public sense, is a triangulation consisting of three parts- two speakers and an object. Meaning does not stand out and independently of language and behavior. So there can be no "ordinary" language because novel circumstances generate new terms all the time. At the same time, meaning cannot be solely a public affair, therefore, what is unordinary for one person might be ordinary for another. If I claim to understand the meaning of a term that another person calls unordinary, am I understanding nonsense?

(I'm telling you this issue is not as cut and dried as Rosa wants to pretend....and I guarantee she is aware of the problems....she just wants to ignore them)

Now there are metaphysical terms, which, by their very definition, cannot represent real entities, hence "meta" or "lying behind" the physical. To this extent I agree with Rosa in that metaphysical terms are meaningless. But I do not agree that there is some kind of essential, ordinary collection of terms in language.

Anyway, historical materialism explained in the most ordinary language possible would look something like this:

"Things happen and then things happen later."

I wouldn't dare use terms like "change" or "cause" or "process" or "development" because they are compound terms, right? Hell, Heraclitus and Democritus couldn't agree on what the term "change" meant for the life of them. Just an example of how even what we suspect of being ordinary terms are really not at all.

Fuckin A, even "is" is a difficult word to define. Just ask Heidegger.

Kronos

26th May 2009, 15:49

Dammit! Rosa is here. She was supposed to be going somewhere for a week....which would give me ample opportunity to to seize power over this thread.

Now I'm really gonna get it.

I will not run because I am no coward. I will stand and fight the Kraken, comrades, and should I fall....carry my name into posterity.

trivas7

26th May 2009, 15:54

Trivas:
I might consider answering this question if you answer the many I have asked you which you just ignore.
Per your understanding all philosophy is illegitimate -- which makes Marxism qua philosophy illegitimate.

Suffice it to say that your questions presuppose misunderstandings of the use and scope of materialist dialectics.

Kronos

26th May 2009, 16:04

Bingo. When Marx made the infamous statement "philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point is to change it" he was not abandoning philosophy...he was re-appropriating it. You remember Marx's insistence that materialism not be reduced to "vulgar materialism", as he charged Feuerbach with doing (if I remember correctly). Marx certainly did use philosophical terms like "subjectivity", "consciousness", "alienation" and "abstract", for instance. He understood that materialism had to be cooperative with psychological theory....and in doing so he becomes a philosopher.

Rosa Lichtenstein

26th May 2009, 16:51

Kronos:

There is no such thing as ordinary language. Tell me, at what point in the history of language were terms invented which were not ordinarily used? And how often would they have to be used to be considered ordinary- every five minutes.....once an hour....twice a week? And at which point does a new word, being a compound of may other words and meanings, become unnecessary?

If you mean by 'thing' here that there is no identifiable object called 'ordinary language'. I agree. If by 'no such thing as ordinary language' you mean that ordinary human beings, going about their daily affairs, communicating with one another, do not use a vernacular form of speech, then, manifestly, you are wrong, for they do -- indeed, as you are doing here.

The questions you ask about the ordinary use of words (frequency, etc.) are best put to linguists, for they are scientific questions of no concern to philosophy.

If someone says "we want to collect five bushels of wheat without using more than three people before sundown" and I say "what we need is a new word. I think I've got it. "Objective". Here is how it works- our objective is to collect five bushels of wheat without using more than three people before sundown." Then the guys says "cool, we have a new word. In the future I'll use it when it is appropriate. Whenever I want to declare that we will make an effort to use means for achieving an end....I'll just simply say "our objective is."

This edifying homily depends, of course, on there being ordinary words with which this scenario might not only be played out, but also be described. So, as Wittgenstein noted, even you have to take ordinary language as a given, otherwise we would not be able to comprehend your point, and neither would you.

Now isn't such a new term in such circumstances unordinary? Certainly. Is it unnecessary? Not necessarily. The question is, did the term work, was it pragmatic, did it prove to be successful in communication. If that is the criteria (and it is), then how would we distinguish between language that Rosa's calls unordinary or ordinary if the standard used to determine the validity is only agreement and communication?

Not if it can be explicated in ordinary terms. And I do not think I have used the word “unordinary”.

Finally, how does one convey that they actually understand the meaning of a statement, question, command or proposition? Is meaning private, or public as Wittgenstein suggests? If it is public, then we must suppose that all meaning manifests in behavior. But it doesn't. What about deceit, lying, feigned ignorance? One intentionally behaves in a deceiving manner.....what happens to public language in such a case?

The question of understanding, of course, is quite complex, so it cannot be answered in general terms. You need to be more specific.

And I think you are having problems here because you are running together several different senses of the noun 'meaning' and the verb 'to mean'.

[And where does Wittgenstein pass a comment on the public or private nature of meaning?]

Language is intersubjective. Meaning, in the public sense, is a triangulation consisting of three parts- two speakers and an object. Meaning does not stand out and independently of language and behavior. So there can be no "ordinary" language because novel circumstances generate new terms all the time. At the same time, meaning cannot be solely a public affair, therefore, what is unordinary for one person might be ordinary for another. If I claim to understand the meaning of a term that another person calls unordinary, am I understanding nonsense?

I am not sure from where you plucked this example of a priori linguistics.

What you need to do is concentrate on the many and varied uses we have of 'meaning' and its cognates. This will prevent you wandering off into confusion (a well-trodden path over the last 2400 years, and one you seem determined to explore).

So there can be no "ordinary" language because novel circumstances generate new terms all the time. At the same time, meaning cannot be solely a public affair, therefore, what is unordinary for one person might be ordinary for another. If I claim to understand the meaning of a term that another person calls unordinary, am I understanding nonsense?

What do you mean by 'generate' here? Do these terms spring out of thin air, or are they invented by human beings? If the latter, then this will occur on the back of a language already understood -- and if that is so, we are back to where we were a few posts/paragraphs ago.

And sure, new words might not be understood by others, but that does not threaten ordinary language. Moreover, if the person who has invented a new word can't explain it, then not even he/she understands it. End of story.

If I claim to understand the meaning of a term that another person calls unordinary, am I understanding nonsense?

Again, this is far too unspecific; we will need an example.

(I'm telling you this issue is not as cut and dried as Rosa wants to pretend....and I guarantee she is aware of the problems....she just wants to ignore them)

How the hell do you know I want to ignore them!?!

More like: you want to ignore, and have ignored, the points I made earlier!

And who said this was 'cut-and-dried'!

If you knew any Wittgenstein, you would also know that the whole point of his later work was to emphasise that such things are not 'cut-and-dried'; the fight against confusion is open-ended.

But I do not agree that there is some kind of essential, ordinary collection of terms in language.

And where, prey, have I asserted that there are!

Anyway, historical materialism explained in the most ordinary language possible would look something like this:

"Things happen and then things happen later."

Not so, but we can leave that to another time.

I wouldn't dare use terms like "change" or "cause" or "process" or "development" because they are compound terms, right? Hell, Heraclitus and Democritus couldn't agree on what the term "change" meant for the life of them. Just an example of how even what we suspect of being ordinary terms are really not at all.

What is so problematic about complex terms?

[That is a central point of Wittgenstein’s method: to attain a perspicuous view of such words/phrases.]

Fuckin A, even "is" is a difficult word to define. Just ask Heidegger.

1) Why do we need a definition?

2) Why is Heidegger considered a fountain of wisdom here? Indeed, we should no more want to ask him about 'is' than we'd want to ask George W Bush about Quantum Mechanics

Correction: on second thoughts, we'd probably get more sense from Duddya...

Rosa Lichtenstein

26th May 2009, 16:55

Kronos:

Now I'm really gonna get it.

Stop posting falsehoods about my beliefs then.

I will not run because I am no coward. I will stand and fight the Kraken, comrades, and should I fall....carry my name into posterity.

Impressive...

Kronos

28th May 2009, 19:41

If by 'no such thing as ordinary language' you mean that ordinary human beings, going about their daily affairs, communicating with one another, do not use a vernacular form of speech, then, manifestly, you are wrong, for they do -- indeed, as you are doing here.Nice try, Rosanator, but you are conflating common speech, native language, with meaning in language, as if meaning is as easily identifiable as idiom, tonality, and other speech characteristics in vernacular. There may certainly be "ordinary" anatomical characteristics of language, but never is there a line where on one side there is ordinary language and on the other, unordinary language, within any native language. So yes, there is ordinary vernacular as in "common to such and such language", but there cannot be ordinary language as in "such and such terms mean nothing because they are not common, or such and such uncommon terms mean something but must necessarily be reducible to ordinary, common terms."

How could you possibly stop two people in a conversation and say "wait! That term wasn't ordinary, therefore it is nonsense"?

There are many words that are literally obfuscating in communication, and yet they are meaningful in context. Look for the list of figure-of-speech schemes and tropes that evidence there are many kinds of unordinary ways for conveying sense and meaning:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Figure_of_speech

Kronos

28th May 2009, 19:59

Getting carried away in a link clicking spree, I arrived at what I suspected to be the easiest most obvious subject....but found that the perplexity had only just begun.

Linguistics is a *****, people. Just look at the article for "word":

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Word

This is too much for me. I'm tempted to take a vow of silence for the rest of my life.

( don't you wish )

Rosa Lichtenstein

28th May 2009, 21:28

Kronos:

Nice try, Rosanator, but you are conflating common speech, native language, with meaning in language, as if meaning is as easily identifiable as idiom, tonality, and other speech characteristics in vernacular. There may certainly be "ordinary" anatomical characteristics of language, but never is there a line where on one side there is ordinary language and on the other, unordinary language, within any native language. So yes, there is ordinary vernacular as in "common to such and such language", but there cannot be ordinary language as in "such and such terms mean nothing because they are not common, or such and such uncommon terms mean something but must necessarily be reducible to ordinary, common terms."

Where have I conflated these things? I note you haven't quoted a single passage in support of this latest fantasy.

The rest of the above paragraph is, alas, far too obscure to pass comment upon.

How could you possibly stop two people in a conversation and say "wait! That term wasn't ordinary, therefore it is nonsense"?

There are many words that are literally obfuscating in communication, and yet they are meaningful in context. Look for the list of figure-of-speech schemes and tropes that evidence there are many kinds of unordinary ways for conveying sense and meaning:

1) Why would I want to stop someone saying this? Do you think that I am a sort of linguistic policewoman? People can say what they like, the question is: What sense does it make?

2) Sure, communication can fail, but it typically does not.

3) What makes you think I am not aware of figurative speech, for goodness sake? In many cases it facilitates communication.

Linguistics is a *****, people. Just look at the article for "word":

If "word" is unclear, then "linguistics" stands no chance.