Kant and Hobbes on Punishment

[Vincent]

Immanuel Kant's theory of punishment is retributivist. That is to say, he is concerned with the question of which punishments are appropriate for which crimes, assuming that a crime generates an obligation to hand out 'just deserts'. kant does assume this, saying that '...judicial punishment.. must always be imposed on the criminal simply because he has committed a crime.' For example, if I steal bread I must be punished simply because i stole, and not for any other reason (such as: to deter me or others from stealing in the future). To determine what degree of punishment is just, Kant adopts a kind of 'principile of equality', saying that '...any underserved evil which you do to someone else among the people is an evil done to yourself.' Such a principles is much like 'an eye for an eye'; if I were to kill someone, my just punishment would be death - for example.

Hobbes takes a consequentialist approach to punishment, something Kant rejects. in offering the Seventh Law of Nature, Hobbes says that 'In revenge..., men should should not at the greatness of past evil but at the greatness of the future good.' Basically, the role of punishment is to secure the 'future good'. This view contrasts with kant because it promotes something which Kant clearly rejects - consequentialism. If I have stolen bread, kant would say that I deserve punishment simply because I stole bread. Hobbes, on the other hand, would say that punishment is required as long as it secures the future good, and this implies that punishment would be required so that I am deterd from stealing food again.

A common objection to Hobbes' view is that punishment may not deter me, or others, from stealing bread. Furthermore, it is possible that punishing an innocent person could deter people from certain acts. Kant's view is somewhat immune to these objections, because he says it is simply a case of duty, and has nothing to with deterrance or consequence.

However, Kant still has to answer questions about why people deserve punishmet in the first place... and, how do we establsh equivalence between a crime and a deserved punishment? And, why shouldn't we look to the future consequences of our punishing?

What are your thoughts on these two accounts of punishment? Which one apeals to you?

Something I'm interested in is the role of 'just deserts' in distributive justice. Few people object to the role of desert in retributive justice, but what about its role in distributive justice? Should people simply 'get what they deserve' in punishment and in the distribution of goods?

Cheers!

[rouchambeau]

Neither appeal to me. Punishment (intentional infliction of harm) is unjustified. Consequentialist reasoning leads to punishing the innocent, and that's bad. Retributivists are not justified because they have not shown what it is about a crime that makes the criminal deserving of punishment.

[Vincent]

Neither appeal to me. Punishment (intentional infliction of harm) is unjustified. Consequentialist reasoning leads to punishing the innocent, and that's bad. Retributivists are not justified because they have not shown what it is about a crime that makes the criminal deserving of punishment.

Exactly, and retributivists would usually appeal to some principles or 'high truth' - usually for no good reason - to justify what is deserved. Could the same be said for distributive justice; in the distribution of goods, are people to get what they deserve, and how would you justify what people deserve?

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Punishment is necessary to prevent a crime. At the very least, we need to implement circumstances that prevent the crime from occurring again. If a murderer had a brain chip that prevented him from committing murder, he is still being punished through the inability to maintain his natural behaviors.

When we punish people, we take into consideration their intentions and actions, with the latter being most relevant. Establishing a fear of punishment is arguably necessary to discourage crimes.

For instance, I think people vary due to genetics and their environment. Amongst a group of financial stable individuals, I think some of them would steal money from the homeless if given the opportunity to avoid consequences.

[Vincent]

Punishment is necessary to prevent a crime. At the very least, we need to implement circumstances that prevent the crime from occurring again. If a murderer had a brain chip that prevented him from committing murder, he is still being punished through the inability to maintain his natural behaviors.

So you might say that, by committing a crime, the criminal kind of 'forfeits' his or her right to act fully according to their will? As a punishment, it would certainly deter others from committing crime - I think - but I wonder if we'd ultimately prefer people to simply never want to commit crimes, rather than just not being able to..?

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

So you might say that, by committing a crime, the criminal kind of 'forfeits' his or her right to act fully according to their will? As a punishment, it would certainly deter others from committing crime - I think - but I wonder if we'd ultimately prefer people to simply never want to commit crimes, rather than just not being able to..?

Some people have a genetic predisposition to harming others. Current scientific methods prevent us from making them "never want" to commit a crime. Ideally, I agree with you.

I'm not sure committing a crime necessarily forfeits will. If society consisted entirely of people who are willing to risk their life to be able to murder others, murder wouldn't be considered unethical. Some people like things so disproportionately, such as drugs, they are willing to take significant risks to get them.

If science theoretically allowed people to change their nature, I think we'd have an interesting time deciding how to construct people. Of course, murder would be disallowed because the firing of "happy chemicals" is prevented entirely if someone is dead. Maximizing the happiness of genetic organisms requires some type of cooperation.

The question is, really. In ideal situations, would a person maximize their good by dictatorial means? Or would an egalitarian society better facilitate their needs? Given that the world could "revolve around you" would this necessarily be preferable to cooperative pursuits?

Here I would say yes, but I hope the answer is no. If it is yes, we might never see communism. Propaganda and conditioning can make us enjoy capitalism, really enjoy it. That is disheartening, but it might be true. I guess if I become a brainwashed slug I won't have to worry anymore.

[rouchambeau]

Punishment is necessary to prevent a crime.

Not true. We can prevent crimes by other means. For example, giving everyone what they need would eliminate crimes that are caused by poverty.


If a murderer had a brain chip that prevented him from committing murder, he is still being punished through the inability to maintain his natural behaviors.
We can imagine that doctors can implant such chips into people to control their seizures. In that case, people would be prevented from maintaining their natural behaviors, but we would never say that the doctor is punishing the person.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Not true. We can prevent crimes by other means. For example, giving everyone what they need would eliminate crimes that are caused by poverty.


We can imagine that doctors can implant such chips into people to control their seizures. In that case, people would be prevented from maintaining their natural behaviors, but we would never say that the doctor is punishing the person.

I meant to say some crimes, most likely. Eliminating the causes of crime will certainly prevent the crime from happening, by definition. I am simply saying we don't necessarily have the means to eliminate those causes in some circumstances, or are unwilling to, so we implement punishment.

We would never say the doctor is punishing the person. Why not? What if murdering was part of his identity. After changing his nature, both the procedure and therapeutic efforts should produce a desirable result for the patient. If they aren't happy with the change, or were happier before, why isn't it punishment? They're being forced into unpleasant circumstances for deviating from a social norm. A Clockwork Orange illustrates this phenomenon.

If we harm someone, "for their own good," it might be considered something other than punishment. We might distinguish punishments and justified harms with respect to the individuals happiness post-facto. However, we have to consider the harm of our procedures.

If I help someone stop using heroin by locking them in a cellar, the physical results are terrible. The cure, let's say, is in the best interests of the individual so I am not punishing them.

If vaccinations are mandatory, the disease may be relatively under control. If everyone but you received the vaccination, or most people did, your risk would be significantly lower. Because community sacrifices must be egalitarian, you aren't being punished. It's an obligation you have in exchange for the benefits you receive as a member of the community.

If the community directly harms you, to protect themselves, it's a punishment. If you were shot for trying to blow up a school, for instance. However, the line between a risk, above, and harm, below.

Benefits to the community can arguably justify risks on individuals if there are mutually competing interests. I want to pollute to gain a profit and you don't want me to do so. Therefore, we decide the risk of your health is minimal enough to justify minor pollutants.

Slightly off topic:

However, actively harming an individual "for the good of the community" is punishment. Killing someone who tries to kill you is punishment, as I see it. Consider the case of neutering dogs, which is troubling due to its potential human implications.

1. The dog population is too high.
2. Although there will be no significant disadvantages to neutering long-term, the procedure involves discomfort that is not insignificant.
3. The medical benefits of neutering are exaggerated and almost null. Neutering affects different breeds more than others, and the effects are sometimes negative instead of positive.
4. The primary motivation for neutering dogs is to keep the pet population down because, in practicality, we lack the resources to care for those animals.
5. In practicality, the resources used to neuter dogs, if pooled together, could create a sustainable economic plan to care for an increased pet population as opposed to neutering the animals. Of course, we are too lazy, in practicality.
6. If we consider the animals perspective, had they rational capacities, they might engage in voluntary neutering, to avoid inconvenience for the owners, in exchange for the benefits of living with us.
7. I might exchange my labor for 8 cents if I was poor. That doesn't mean it's ethical.

China has a one child policy. Are these policies ethical if they prevent the existence of children in poverty? How bad does a quality of life have to be, let's say, to justify sterilization to prevent such a life from existing.

Of course, we are too lazy to deal with the issue itself, and we can't watch our dog 24/7. It could impregnate another dog without our knowledge, and that owner could act irresponsibly. Therefore, so long as we aren't going to address the real problems, it seems practically ethical to stop future children from being born into poverty.

Yet does this make having children unethical because other children are already existing in poverty? Dog owners get criticized for buying from breeders, sometimes, even if the breeder is perfectly caring towards their animals.

I live with my Dad, and we have a dog which he owns. I wouldn't have neutered the dog because it's irreversible (the pain of the procedure), and I wasn't convinced of the arguments for it. I let him neuter the dog based on his own decision, which may have been hypocritical of me. He's been fine and happy as ever since the procedure (which I was not around at the time of). The dog is also from a breeder. I let him decide what kind of dog to get, and where, as I won't live here forever.

What constitutes an unhappy life. I've been depressed. Depressed individuals often sincerely believe they would rather be dead. Is that true? The majority of these individuals continue living. If these unwanted dogs lived a life as terrible as we suggest, shouldn't they kill themselves immediately? I don't agree with this view.

It might be legitimate to draw a line with cases of having the "inability to sustain existence and an unwillingness of others to care for it." By that view, we could neuter people if we're unwilling to care for the children they have.

Given a female dog, a commitment to not neutering might be reasonable if one could guarantee the adoption into healthy families, yet we can't even guarantee that of humans - but we see adoption as legitimate, interestingly enough. So clearly there is an acceptable "test" to give where, if that test fails, we aren't morally responsible. Then these dogs would live happy lives at the expense of other dogs who "would've lived" and been cared for had they not been born?

That view certainly points in the direction of having children being unethical and allowing us to neuter people to force them to adopt Africans they otherwise would've left to die. But does this sound right? Maybe my Western biases towards freedom are kicking in here.

Then again, this issue has been bugging me. Theoretically, it could be unethical to have a non-white child in an incredibly racist society.

[Vincent]

Benefits to the community can arguably justify risks on individuals if there are mutually competing interests. I want to pollute to gain a profit and you don't want me to do so. Therefore, we decide the risk of your health is minimal enough to justify minor pollutants.

Though a cost-benefit analysis can be very difficult when either the cost or the benefit are intangible - it would require a level of subjective value judgment to determine a measure of somethings 'cost' or 'benefit'. Sometimes it would seem clear - the 'cost' (or harm) of imprisoning a serial murderer, when compared with the 'benefit' (the safety of, or whatever) to the community seems justifiable on a cost-benefit analysis. But I think, sometimes, there would be cases where the analysis would be subjective to the values and judgments of any person measuring costs and benefits.

So, a quasi-paternalistic method of determining crime and punishment might be problematic in so far as it is based upon subjective value judgments. Mill wouldn't accept it, but if you look into Dworkin's philosophy of law, he offers a defense of paternalism that you might like. I don't think paternalism is necessarily a bad thing in issues of crime and punishment, when it is supported by a rational and objective justification.



China has a one child policy. Are these policies ethical if they prevent the existence of children in poverty? How bad does a quality of life have to be, let's say, to justify sterilization to prevent such a life from existing.

Then again, this issue has been bugging me. Theoretically, it could be unethical to have a non-white child in an incredibly racist society.

The big problem here to get your head around is the idea of 'wrongful life'. There have been cases where people have sued their parents or doctors for bringing them into existence. Most of the cases are unsuccessful because there is no way of determining that non-existence is better than existing ... 1) no one could know that non-existance is better, because no one existing has 'not-existed' and can report on it. 2) it is hard to see how the lowest-quality of life, nearing non-existence, could be worse than not existing. It like havin a continuum of life-quality, non-existence at one end, and full-existence at the other, and saying that a very low quality of life actually falls lower than non-existence.

So, from that point of view, its hard to say how bringing a child into existence could be unethical. However, if we hold as an ethical principle that potential parents have a duty or obligation to bring children into the world with the best possible chances, then it might seem unethical to have a child in a soceity where it will most likely not flourish and hae a good life. But, that's only th event of birth. Parents can redeem themselves by, say, moving to a better society. But, in cases such as children who will most likely be born with some illness or disablilty, suffer for a short time and die a painful death, the parents ethical duties have been broken, without the potential for redemption. So, there I would say what the parents had done was unethical, if they knew what would happen if they continued with the pregnency.

[gilhyle]

As a principle it seems to me that consequentialism is coherent, while retributivism is pure fantasy. You may utter the statement that the occurence of a crime generates an obligation to hand out a punishment, but its factually false. As a matter of fact the occurence of crime just doesnt generate any such thing.

The arguments you make against consequentialism dont seem to me very forceful against the principle. Of course you can punish the innocent on occasion - and societies do because on occasion it does make sense. But if the practice is generalised, then the deterrent effect fails unless state violence becomes so widespread as to spread terror throughout the population. Also, it may well be the case that there are other ways to deter crime, rather than punishment - but that does not actually undermine the consequentialist logic of punishment in principle. It just suggests that there is a consequentialist logic for other actions which can outweigh the consequentialist logic of punishment. Furthermmore, it may well be true that certain punishments are ineffective, but in consequentialist terms that only means the punishment should be changed

[Nwoye]

As a principle it seems to me that consequentialism is coherent, while retributivism is pure fantasy. You may utter the statement that the occurence of a crime generates an obligation to hand out a punishment, but its factually false. As a matter of fact the occurence of crime just doesnt generate any such thing.

The arguments you make against consequentialism dont seem to me very forceful against the principle. Of course you can punish the innocent on occasion - and societies do because on occasion it does make sense. But if the practice is generalised, then the deterrent effect fails unless state violence becomes so widespread as to spread terror throughout the population. Also, it may well be the case that there are other ways to deter crime, rather than punishment - but that does not actually undermine the consequentialist logic of punishment in principle. It just suggests that there is a consequentialist logic for other actions which can outweigh the consequentialist logic of punishment. Furthermmore, it may well be true that certain punishments are ineffective, but in consequentialist terms that only means the punishment should be changed

to be honest, consequentialism as a normative philosophy just doesn't even make sense. by its very nature it is a retroactive way of judging ethics, so it's not much help if we're trying to determine how we should act. and that's just the beginning of the problem with consequentialism.

that being said, i don't really accept kant's justification here. i mean he doesn't really give a reason why we should use punishment, he just appeals to an abstract sense of duty, that somehow we have a moral duty to punish unethical acts. however, i don't see the justification for that in his theory.

[WhitemageofDOOM]

Hobbes takes a consequentialist approach to punishment, something Kant rejects. in offering the Seventh Law of Nature, Hobbes says that 'In revenge..., men should should not at the greatness of past evil but at the greatness of the future good.' Basically, the role of punishment is to secure the 'future good'.

Yes, this one.


A common objection to Hobbes' view is that punishment may not deter me, or others, from stealing bread.

Then why punish stealing bread?
We should not punish people for being desperate, we should strike at those who peddle desperation.

I find the notion of giving people what they "deserve" to be morally repugnant. It leads to desiring the suffering of others, it leads to causing the suffering of others without reason, it opposes equality, and how do you even determine what people "deserve" in the first place?


to be honest, consequentialism as a normative philosophy just doesn't even make sense. by its very nature it is a retroactive way of judging ethics, so it's not much help if we're trying to determine how we should act.

Reasonable expectations of consequence.

[Nwoye]

Reasonable expectations of consequence.
1. what determines reasonable?

2. it still doesn't really help. it's impossible to have knowledge of the consequences of an act before you do it.

3. it's in many cases impossible to prove causality or whether the perceived consequences of the act are actually the consequences of another act. we don't know if those perceived consequences would have happened regardless of whether someone acted. for example, we have no way of knowing whether or not dropping an atomic bomb on hiroshima actually ended the war, or whether or not it would have happened anyway.

4. (the most common argument) you can't aggregate happiness or utility. how do we measure the happiness lost of those who died in hiroshima versus those who would have died after an invasion (assuming that consequence is accurate)? you can't.

5. there is no way to measure short term results versus long term, and whether negative results in the short term overrides positive results in the long term, or vice versa.

6. with your justification above, you could justify pretty much anything.

[gilhyle]

consequentialism as a normative philosophy just doesn't even make sense

Yes but I thought the discussion was on the theory of punishment, not normative philosophy.

There is one criticism of consequentialism which I agree is substantial - and its made by Engels - which is as Sedrox says


it's impossible to have knowledge of the consequences of an act before you do it

True, but does that stop us acting in other contexts in a goal directed fashion ? No. We act and accept a proportion of failures.