Marx and the "Species-Being"

[Random Precision]

Hey all,

A while back I was reading the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and Marx seemed to mention this thing called the "species-being" an awful lot in relation to alienation. I was never sure what he meant by that term. Wikipedia has, as is usually the case with Marxist theory, been less than helpful.

Could anyone here explain what exactly Marx meant by that term, or failing that link me to a more helpful explanation? Thanks in advance.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

This is a term Marx derived from Feuerbach (who borrowed it from the German Romantics, I believe).

It is reasonably well explained at Wiki:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marx's_theory_of_human_nature

Here, the writer goes into more detail, but his style has been badly affected by French 'Philosophy':

http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:jzVwAras5hgJ:www.marxandphilosophy. org.uk/skempton2008.doc+Gattungswesen&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk

Allen Wood is perhaps clearer:

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=07_JWI5A2v8C&pg=PA17&lpg=PA17&dq=Gattungswesen&source=bl&ots=RQg2amhw6u&sig=K6_vdZhlQ9GWTkXEErClIorq3wg&hl=en&ei=ETP7Se7VA9LRjAeN0tWSAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8#PPA17,M1

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I have to say, though, that Wood (above) gets it wrong when he argues that:


the truth would seem to be the just the oppposite, that it is the human ability to form universal concepts which makes it possible for people to know themselves as members of a species.

In fact Marx is right to say the opposite of this, that is, it is our social nature that allows us to form universal concepts.

This is an Aristotlelian notion, more fully developed in Wittgenstein's work (although he might not have seen it this way) --, it is only because we are part of a speech community (or, as Wittgenstein put it, only because we share the same 'form of life'), and thus are social beings, that we have language (as a means of communication), and thus are able to use words to express generality.

The opposite view (i.e., the one Wood holds) is the one normally held by ruling-class theorists and assorted idealists: that is, that it is only because we are able to think first that we are able to form social bonds, and thus come to see ourselves as human. This idealist view sees language primarily as a representational device (whereby we represent the world to ourselves first, and only then can we communicate), and not primarily a vehicle for communciation (which is Marx's view). On the latter view, we can only represent the world to ourselves second because we were first socialised into language, and thus were taught to communicate first by parents, siblings, teachers, carers and peers.

Interestingly, Chomsky's view of language puts him in the first category: language is primarily a vehicle for thought/representation, and not communication, which makes him an idealist. So, no wonder he called his theory 'Cartesian Linguistics'.

I have developed these ideas in more datail here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page_13_03.htm

and here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm

[gilhyle]

The concept of species being in the EPN is very close to Feuerbach's idea, which is, in turn the result of his critique of the concept of 'God'. For Feuerbach the concept of God is a list of qualities ascribed to a mythical entity. These qualities are actually "dispersed among men and realize themselves in the course of world history" [Thesis 12, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future]

[gilhyle]

Superficial no. but limited yes. The first problem is that they are references, and it is better to write here what is meant to be read here. The other problem with your references is that the wikipedia article opens up with approving references to Geras' historically ignorant and methodologically flawed book.

As I have pointed out to you before, Rosa (vocative), Marx operates with an external relational theory of identity - like Feuerbach. It does not rely on an inherent essence.

If you understand that, you can then understand how the materialist conception of history dissolves the Feuerbachian conception of species being, itself a critical concept derived from Feuerbach's critique of Hegel - and ceases to use the term from the GI onwards. For what the materialist conception of history illuminates is that Feuerbach's idea of a cumulative total of qualities is a false total - that act of addition cannot be made.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Looks like someone has deleted my last post.

Gil:


The other problem with your references is that the wikipedia article opens up with approving references to Geras' historically ignorant and methodologically flawed book.

So?


As I have pointed out to you before, Rosa (vocative), Marx operates with an external relational theory of identity - like Feuerbach. It does not rely on an inherent essence.

If you understand that, you can then understand how the materialist conception of history dissolves the Feuerbachian conception of species being, itself a critical concept derived from Feuerbach's critique of Hegel - and ceases to use the term from the GI onwards. For what the materialist conception of history illuminates is that Feuerbach's idea of a cumulative concetion of qualities is a false total - that act of addition cannot be made.

This seems to make little sense. Which Martian dialect has it been written in?