Can you get ought from is?

[Post-Something]

Can someone explain the "ought-is" problem to me by laying out Humes argument and perhaps giving possible criticisms of it too?

Thanks in advance :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

We have debated this many times.

Hume had accepted the old scholastic chestnut that you can have more in the conclusion than is present in the premisses, so if the premisses do not contain an 'ought', but only an 'is' (or its equivalent), no 'ought' can legitimately appear in the conclusion of a logical argument. He was trying to oppose the idea that ethical injunctions can be derived from facts about human nature, or about anything else 'natural', hence the opposite view was often (later) called the 'naturalistic fallacy' (i.e., the idea that 'values' can be derived from 'facts').

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalistic_fallacy

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Is-ought_problem

It is in fact very easy to get an 'ought' from an 'is'. Here is one example:

Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

From that fact that cars require oil, we can derived the hypothetical conclusion that anyone who wants their car to run well ought to lubricate the engine.

You can find many more here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/ought-problem-t63775/index.html

[gilhyle]

Humes point is that the relationship of 'ought' is not descriptive, therefore cannot be derived from a descriptive statement or any combination of descriptive statements, 'is' statements. Rosa's example would - in Humes argument - be an 'is' statement, a descriptive statement as he conceives it. Hypthetical 'oughts; are on this view descriptions of how certain things, machinery systems etc work. They are not really 'ought' statements as he means it at all. Whether there are actually any ought statements in the sense that Hume meant at all is debateable - are there any absolute moral laws irrespective of circumstances ? If there are, they are not derivable from any particular descriptive statements about any particular situations.

You can of course have an endless debate about this be redefining what 'is' and 'ought' means - but to describe the argument properly you have to go with Hume's understanding.

[Post-Something]

Thanks for both of your responses.

So, let me get this straight; Hume is saying that Ought basically implies a moral obligation, rather than a simple description of a sequence of events?

For example:


Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

Doesn't really work because it doesn't have any moral urgency to it?
What if we made it so that it was though?:

Premiss: Lying about the location of a bomb attack would lead to the death of millions, and yourself.

Conclusion: To be in line with the interests of yourself and others, you ought to tell the truth.

Or would that still be a descriptive statement? The thing is, I'm a utilitarian, I don't really think that much of morality, and to be honest, life doesn't mean very much in from the perspective of the universe. So, I guess since I don't hold any absolute moral values, I would be forced to agree with Hume?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Humes point is that the relationship of 'ought' is not descriptive, therefore cannot be derived from a descriptive statement or any combination of descriptive statements, 'is' statements. Rosa's example would - in Humes argument - be an 'is' statement, a descriptive statement as he conceives it. Hypthetical 'oughts; are on this view descriptions of how certain things, machinery systems etc work. They are not really 'ought' statements as he means it at all. Whether there are actually any ought statements in the sense that Hume meant at all is debateable - are there any absolute moral laws irrespective of circumstances ? If there are, they are not derivable from any particular descriptive statements about any particular situations.

But, it is a very brave (if not foolish) person who claims that something cannot be derived form something else, since the hsitroy of logic has repeatedly shown the opposite.

Anyway, you tried this traditionalist apparaoch in the thread I linked to above, and were comprehensively routed.


They are not really 'ought' statements as he means it at all.

Well, this depends on a very narrow view of the use of 'ought', one that Hume did not defend, and you have simply ignored.


You can of course have an endless debate about this be redefining what 'is' and 'ought' means - but to describe the argument properly you have to go with Hume's understanding.

But Hume, as usual, was hopelsssly unclear, and, as I pointed out, failed to consider a wide enough variety of examples of the use of 'ought'.

[Post-Something]

Wait, how did Hume define Ought?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Post-Something:


Doesn't really work because it doesn't have any moral urgency to it?

As I pointed out in the thread I linked to, it is relatively easy to repair this example, so that it revolves around 'ethical issues'. For instance:

Premiss: All human beings require love in order to flourish.

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your child to flourish, you ought to love her.

Anyway, here is a general (valid) argument schema:

Premiss: All and only Fs are Gs.

Conclusion: If you ought to F you ought to G.

You can replace these F's and G's with morally-neutral, or morally committed examples, and this derive any number of moral and non-moral 'oughts' from 'is-es'.

But, it is not too clear what you mean by 'moral urgency'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Post-Something:


Wait, how did Hume define Ought?

Well, he didn't; but you do not need to define everything to get an argument going (otherwise you will soon get bogged down over the definition of 'definition', to say nothing of the definiton of 'word').

[Post-Something]

Rosa, to me, that makes perfect sense. In fact, too much for it to really be philosophy. So, maybe I'm missing something:

What exactly is the debate?
What arguments would someone defending this problem bring up? How would they criticize your argument? Can you give an example of what Hume would call an "ought statement"?

I'm doing this as a topic for my exam, so I have to be able to write a decent essay on it.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

It is in fact very easy to get an 'ought' from an 'is'. Here is one example:

Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

From that fact that cars require oil, we can derived the hypothetical conclusion that anyone who wants their car to run well ought to lubricate the engine.l (http://www.revleft.com/vb/ought-problem-t63775/index.html)

Premise: All cars require lubricants to run well.
Premise: You want your car to run well. (ought)
Conclusion: You ought to lubricate your car.

"If you want your car to run well" already implies you ought to do something that "will" make your car run well. It's a derivation of an ought from an ought, rather than an is. You can't get an "ought" with an "is" unless it is combined with an "ought."

I don't think Hume is saying a conjunction of "is" and "ought" can't derive a new "ought." I think he is saying "is" does not derive an "ought" alone by way of naturalistic fallacy - that "is" therefore it "ought" to be.

In another way, he may be saying, "You ought to lubricate your car" is simply not derivable. You can't derive things from other things without relying on induction and causality, for instance, so speaking of a "conclusion" as stemming from another is to suggest there is a metaphysical basis for your conclusion. Something beyond the observation itself.

0. A v ~A
1. A
2. ~~A
3. A

All conclusions are simply statements of fact. To suggest you can "derive" something from another conclusion implies a "shared truth." Hume is talking about "new information" rather than "hidden information." Derivation is learning A --> A from A v ~A, for instance. Derivation always corresponds to "actuality," what is. To derive an "ought" from what "is" confuses the issue. "Ought is a moral claim, a motivation." If something "is," and you derive an "ought," you are always deriving "ought" from either a conjunction or itself.

The Conjunction of A & B, where B is an ought, can derive B. Logic implies what "is," but ethics is "what ought." Logical relations ultimately express correspondence to fact. They are self-justifying, which explains our adherence to "logical rules."

What "ought" and what "is" are separate due to human conceptualizations of our motivations, what "ought," being distinguished from logical relations due to lack of universality. Once you "ought" to do something, anything that "is" within the domain of the "ought" is a relation of ideas.

I don't think relations of ideas differ from matter of fact, but I'm not sure how relevant the issue is to the problem, here.

Ultimately, I would suggest a Wittgenstein approach to this, perhaps. You're breaking Hume's rules of the game. He arbitrarily distinguished between "is" and "ought." In reality:

Is (includes everything that is true)
Ought (is a subset of is)

Logically, you can derive a subset from a set.

What you "ought" to do corresponds to a matter of fact for the individual. The naturalistic fallacy is the application of what "is," for individuals, to what "ought" to be for everyone.

Is: X1,X2,...,Xn
Ought: X(z)1,X(z)2,...,X(z)n

I think Hume is denying that individual "ought" creates truths in the same way that scientific "ought" does.

That's how I understand it, anyway, as an objective ethics skepticism.

[JimFar]

Concerning ethical naturalism, one leading defender of it over the years has been Morton White who defends it from the standpoint of a pragmatism that derives from both John Dewey and W.V. Quine.

White has long argued that the Duhemian holism that Quine outlined in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" where Quine undermined the dualism between analytic and synthetic propositions can be extended so as to undermine the dualism between descriptive and prescriptive propositions too. For White this means recognizing that the type of holistic verification described by Quine can be extended to encompass feelings and emotions as part of the data against which we can test propositions about the world. Like William James, White is very insistent that it is the "whole man" who cognizes reality. And the networks of propositions which are subjected to holistic testing and verification can include normative or prescriptive propositions as well as factual or descriptive statements. Just as our scientific theories must face the tribunal of observation, so likewise our ethical views must face the joint tribunal of observation and moral feeling. Furthermore, White has been known to argue that if is the case that we can and do modify certain value judgments in light of new facts or descriptive statements that we come to accept, so likewise it is in theory possible that we might modify some of the descriptive propositions that we accept in light of certain value judgments or even in light of certain emotions or feelings that we might
have. Both procedures being equally legitimate.

It is interesting to note that G.E. Moore ranks high among the philosophers that White admires.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Premise: All cars require lubricants to run well.
Premise: You want your car to run well. (ought)
Conclusion: You ought to lubricate your car.

OK, but that's not my argument.


You can't derive things from other things without relying on induction and causality, for instance, so speaking of a "conclusion" as stemming from another is to suggest there is a metaphysical basis for your conclusion.

Induction and causality have nothing to do with it, and if Hume thought so (which I doubt) then he was seriously mistaken.


All conclusions are simply statements of fact.

Not so, they can be disjunctive or hypothetical, and they can be false (and thus correspond with nothing at all).


Hume is talking about "new information" rather than "hidden information

This is just the scholastic fallacy I was referring to earlier. But, it is easy to derive 'new information' from a set of premises. I gave an example in an earlier post, but there are countless others.


"Ought is a moral claim, a motivation." If something "is," and you derive an "ought," you are always deriving "ought" from either a conjunction or itself.

I also gave an example of the derivation of a 'moral ought' from an 'is', so Hume is wrong.


The Conjunction of A & B, where B is an ought, can derive B. Logic implies what "is," but ethics is "what ought." Logical relations ultimately express correspondence to fact. They are self-justifying, which explains our adherence to "logical rules."

I think you have a rather insecure grasp of logic. 'Logical relations', as you describe them, are those that exist between schematic letters, so they cannot express 'correspondence to fact', nor are they 'self-justifying' -- they are either valid or invalid, sound or unsound.


Once you "ought" to do something, anything that "is" within the domain of the "ought" is a relation of ideas.

This is just a priori psychology, and has nothing to do with logic.


Ultimately, I would suggest a Wittgenstein approach to this, perhaps. You're breaking Hume's rules of the game. He arbitrarily distinguished between "is" and "ought." In reality:

Is (includes everything that is true)
Ought (is a subset of is)

1) This is about as far removed from a 'Wittgensteinian approach' as one could wish for.

2) 'Ought' cannot be a sub-set of anything since it is a word, not a set.

3) 'is' propositions (if that is what you meant) cannot include everything that is true since a) 'is' propositions can be false (e.g., 'Tony Blair is a socialist') and b) 'is' propositions do not capture every truth (e.g., 'Tony Blair has resigned').

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Post-Something:


What exactly is the debate?

If you read the links I posted earlier, that should help clue you in.


What arguments would someone defending this problem bring up? How would they criticize your argument? Can you give an example of what Hume would call an "ought statement"?

They try all sorts of dodges, rather like those Gilhyle tried to pull (here and in that other thread), or they try to argue that these arguments are enthymemes -- that is they have a suppressed or hidden premise. However, all attempts to show this, so far as I know, have failed.


I'm doing this as a topic for my exam, so I have to be able to write a decent essay on it.

Good luck -- remember:

All those who do well in exams study hard.

Hence, if you want to do well in exams, you ought to study hard.

[Recall, in logic, premisses do not have to be true!]

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Fair enough with the falsity of propositions. Some propositions with "is" are false. However, we can presume "true" propositions for the sake of this discussion. You can derive a truth from a falsehood, accidentally, but it doesn't satisfy epistemology criteria in this context.

*****
I'm saying your example relies on the idea of an ought before the conclusion. You're deriving an ought from a conjunction of an "is" and an "ought."

I realize you can escape this criticism with "if," but ought is an motivational relation at least, an obligatory relation, at most. If this isn't your view of "ought," I'd need your definition to make further claims. The sentence "If X, ought Y" implies something about X. If you want your car to run well, "you ought to do things to make it run well." What you want, here, is what you "ought" to do.

If ought is an obligation, "wanting" your car to run well, then, is not enough to justify that you "ought" to do it. Your car could be regularly used for crime, which you morally object against, so you "ought" not maintain it.
*****
My issues with derivation is a lack of understanding of a priori and analytic/synthetic distinctions. I consider myself an empiricist and have difficulty reconciling this notion with certain ideas. Quine rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction. I'm not sure about that.

Analytic propositions are true by definition. Quine points out the issue of circularity with respect to such propositions. I don't agree with circularity, but I would suggest some pragmatism here.
Synthetic propositions are true independent of definition. They reference something about how the world "is." We induce the truth of such propositions.

There is a person over there. Synthetic.
That is a person. Analytic.

We can conceive of synthetic truths without language to express them. Analytic truths deal with "relations of ideas." The relationship between the category "bachelor" and "not married" is true in all possible worlds. Language expresses a relationship, or should,about interactions. When I learned about Kripke, I never thought I'd find myself agreeing with him. Set up the idea of "necessary a posteriori."

Analytic truths express relations of ideas that have correspondence. They are "synthetic" in origin. These truths are established by the absence of counterexamples, which is ultimately induced. We assume that if logic is sound and complete, it is true, but it's ultimately a circular pursuit.

1+1=2 expresses a synthetic relationship seems wrong.

1+1=2 is an analytic truth? A = ~A is an analytic truth? How do these truths correspond to experience? How can we "observe" them using sense data. It seems like we simply utilize circularity and induce the absence of counterexamples.We require coherence and universality of a logical rule. This doesn't prove it. It also doesn't seem to exist.

A priori involves acquiring new information from old information. How is this possible under empiricism? Things are the sum of their parts.

1. All men are mortal.
2. Socrates is a man.
C. Socrates is mortal.

Isn't "Socrates is mortal" more information than given? Not really. The "logical relations" are part of the premise.

My notion is that all analytic truths are observable "constant conjunctions." A priori conclusions synthetic matters of fact.

Maybe you can explain it to me somehow, how empiricism reconciles notions of analytic and synthetic? Would you also consider yourself a physicalist? How does empiricism view a priori?

If we can't observe these "analytic truths" and these "a priori" conclusions (not the conclusion itself, but the causal mechanisms which reach it), how do we consider them valid? Pragmatism is the easy answer, but I understood that logical positivism disliked pragmatism.

[gilhyle]

Hume, as usual, was hopelsssly unclear, and, as I pointed out, failed to consider a wide enough variety of examples of the use of 'ought'

Im not suggesting that Hume was correct; but it is important to understand him in his own terms, rather than in yours. IN his terms it is not necessary to consider all uses of 'ought'. When he talks about 'ought' statements both he and his audience know what he means. He lived at a time when belief in the existence of absolute moral right and wrong was widespread. You refer to utillitarianism, which broke with that view that morality necessarily involves reference to a relationship which is distinct from descriptive relations. Indeed Rosa's ground breaking perspective :rolleyes: is little more than a restatement of a form of utilitarianism in a linguistic philosophical form.

For Hume morals are a given, and we are wise just to conform to these moral sentiments.However, even in saying this he actually makes an instrumentalist argument - to be happy you should accept the conventional moral obligations (which can never be proven because of is/ought) because then you are conforming to your human nature.

Thus Hume initiates elements of a scientific study of morals - as a given phenomenon, rather than as a philosophy to be contested - but superimposes on that an argument which actually redefines the nature of moral obligation as exactly the kind of hypothetical which Rosa formulates -

Premiss: the true interests of each individual are achieved by conforming to their common humanity

Premiss : it is common to humanity to have a sentiment of moral approbation

Conclusion: Therefore each individual should adopt sentiments of moral approbation

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Im not suggesting that Hume was correct; but it is important to understand him in his own terms, rather than in yours. IN his terms it is not necessary to consider all uses of 'ought'. When he talks about 'ought' statements both he and his audience know what he means. He lived at a time when belief in the existence of absolute moral right and wrong was widespread. You refer to utilitarianism, which broke with that view that morality necessarily involves reference to a relationship which is distinct from descriptive relations. Indeed Rosa's ground breaking perspective is little more than a restatement of a form of utilitarianism in a linguistic philosophical form.

1) Hume claimed certain things that we now know are not so, based on logic that was out-of-date even in Aristotle's day. What is there then to 'understand'?

2) Where do I refer to 'utilitarianism'? I see you are back to the by-now-familiar 'I can't defeat Rosa, so I will make stuff up about her' mode. So, in your attempt to 'understand' Hume you have to lie about me, is that it?

3) Which part of what I have said is 'utilitarian'?

[Neutral observers, who have witnessed similar jousting matches between me and this serial dissembler, will no doubt also know that we can expect no attempt by Gil here to substantiate this latest baseless assertion about me, which we will soon be able to add to the long list of similar Gil-fibs accumulated over the last three years.]


For Hume morals are a given, and we are wise just to conform to these moral sentiments. However, even in saying this he actually makes an instrumentalist argument - to be happy you should accept the conventional moral obligations (which can never be proven because of is/ought) because then you are conforming to your human nature.

Thus Hume initiates elements of a scientific study of morals - as a given phenomenon, rather than as a philosophy to be contested - but superimposes on that an argument which actually redefines the nature of moral obligation as exactly the kind of hypothetical which Rosa formulates -

Thanks for the potted Hume you copied from your dusty, cob-web covered undergraduate crib-notes on Hume, but, as you have repeatedly had shown you, we needn't appeal to arguments with hypothetical conclusions:

Premiss: All and only Fs are Gs.

Conclusion: Anything that ought to be done to an F, ought to be done to a G.

Now, you can try to get around that one in your usual slippery, 'I must make up something else about Rosa' fashion that we have all come to know and loathe, but I have plenty more examples to throw in your logically-challenged direction.


Premiss: the true interests of each individual are achieved by conforming to their common humanity

Premiss : it is common to humanity to have a sentiment of moral approbation

Conclusion: Therefore each individual should adopt sentiments of moral approbation

This does not look at all Humean -- so much for your attempt to 'understand' him.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


You can derive a truth from a falsehood, accidentally, but it doesn't satisfy epistemology criteria in this context.

Where did you learn your logic? Off cigarette packets? The derivation of truths from falsehoods is in no way 'accidental', but entirely valid. Here is a simple syllogism, where the conclusion necessarily follows from the premisses:

P1: All whales are fish. [False]

P2: All fish have lungs. [False]

C: Ergo: All whales have lungs. [True]


You're deriving an ought from a conjunction of an "is" and an "ought."

There are no conjunctions in any of my arguments. [Do you know what a conjunction is?]


If this isn't your view of "ought," I'd need your definition to make further claims. The sentence "If X, ought Y" implies something about X. If you want your car to run well, "you ought to do things to make it run well." What you want, here, is what you "ought" to do.

I have no definition of 'ought', and do not need one, any more than you need a definition of 'word', or 'definition'.


My issues with derivation is a lack of understanding of a priori and analytic/synthetic distinctions. I consider myself an empiricist and have difficulty reconciling this notion with certain ideas. Quine rejects the analytic/synthetic distinction. I'm not sure about that.

Analytic propositions are true by definition. Quine points out the issue of circularity with respect to such propositions. I don't agree with circularity, but I would suggest some pragmatism here.
Synthetic propositions are true independent of definition. They reference something about how the world "is." We induce the truth of such propositions.

There is a person over there. Synthetic.
That is a person. Analytic.

We can conceive of synthetic truths without language to express them. Analytic truths deal with "relations of ideas." The relationship between the category "bachelor" and "not married" is true in all possible worlds. Language expresses a relationship, or should,about interactions. When I learned about Kripke, I never thought I'd find myself agreeing with him. Set up the idea of "necessary a posteriori."

Analytic truths express relations of ideas that have correspondence. They are "synthetic" in origin. These truths are established by the absence of counterexamples, which is ultimately induced. We assume that if logic is sound and complete, it is true, but it's ultimately a circular pursuit.

1+1=2 expresses a synthetic relationship seems wrong.

1+1=2 is an analytic truth? A = ~A is an analytic truth? How do these truths correspond to experience? How can we "observe" them using sense data. It seems like we simply utilize circularity and induce the absence of counterexamples.We require coherence and universality of a logical rule. This doesn't prove it. It also doesn't seem to exist.

A priori involves acquiring new information from old information. How is this possible under empiricism? Things are the sum of their parts.

I really have no idea what this has to do with the topic in hand. I'd like to say something like 'You ought to stick to the topic in hand', but that would be a cheap shot.

Were you high when you posted this?

By the way A = ~A is not a wff (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formula_(mathematical_logic)) if A is a propositional variable (unless you intended it to represent the biconditional sign).

On the other hand, if A is name variable, then the '~' is not an ordinary negation operator, but a functor operating on relational expressions (equivalent to 'other than' when used wth an '=' sign).

The rest of what you say seems to me to be no less off-topic.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I see how the reasoning goes. I fail to see how false premises justify (epistemological justification) the conclusion.

An argument (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument) is sound if and only if


The argument is valid (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Validity).
All of its premises are true (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth).

Can you put your argument in first order logic in a manner where it is true under any interpretation? Or true under your interpretation, given the meanings of terms? Will the switching of one language to a supposedly more precise one make a difference?

If "ought" is undefinable, it's a relation of ideas, is it not? You can't give a purposeful method of explain it, like Carnap might?

Your argument doesn't seem sound, to me. I think you derive the conclusion by a hidden premise, simply, that what you "want" to do is what you "ought" to do.

How do you derive the premises from the conclusion?

"If you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine."

What if you want the car to run, but you shouldn't spend the money? What if you want the car to run well, but it's broken? Maybe you need the premise "and adding oil to the engine will necessarily make it run well" but what you "want" is still distinct from what you "ought" to do. Even if it isn't, making them synonyms is equally problematic based on my understanding.

***

The A --> ~A was my intention. Technically, I was "high" when I posted it, but it's prescribed for medical purposes, taken regularly, and improves introspective clarity. My communication may suffer because I think faster, in these circumstances, which is not necessarily desirable in such cases. My apologies.

~A refers to "not A" in the logical texts I've been reading. Your point with respect to = is correct. My mistake in placing the equals there.

The analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori issue is my suspicion that our disagreement, or my inability to understand, is due to opposing views with respect to what constitutes legitimate "knowledge." This is an intuition, which may be entirely unfounded. However, intuitions either reveal a truth or mistake in ones reasoning, and I am often compelled to investigate my intuitions.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


I fail to see how false premises justify (epistemological justification) the conclusion.

Well, they don't. Logic is the study of inference, not justification.

And I do know the difference between a valid and a sound argument.

The point is that it is possible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is' whether the argument is sound or valid.


Can you put your argument in first order logic in a manner where it is true under any interpretation? Or true under your interpretation, given the meanings of terms? Will the switching of one language to a supposedly more precise one make a difference?

If the argument schema is valid, then it is valid under all interpretations, not just mine.

Do not confuse 'interpretation' in logic with 'opinion'. 'Interpretation' in logic just means the substitution of terms from ordinary language (or any other language) for the uninterpreted symbols.


If "ought" is undefinable, it's a relation of ideas, is it not?

Well, 'ought' is a word, so it can't be a 'relation of ideas'.

I think you should treat this Humean phrase (i.e., 'relation of ideas') with due care. We are far clearer about the use of the word 'ought' than we are of the obscure phrase 'relation of ideas', so the latter can hardly help us with the former. The alleged justification for this phrase depends on some highly dubious, a priori empiricist psychology from 250 years ago.


You can't give a purposeful method of explain it, like Carnap might?

I am sorry, I could not follow this sentence.


Your argument doesn't seem sound, to me. I think you derive the conclusion by a hidden premise, simply, that what you "want" to do is what you "ought" to do.

Which one? I gave several.


How do you derive the premises from the conclusion?

"If you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine."

The truth of the conclusion depends on the truth of the premiss.


What if you want the car to run, but you shouldn't spend the money?

That does not affect the conclusion, although it might affect how the person involved prioritises any other aims and intentions he/she might have. The bottom line is that if this person wants his/her car to run well, then based on the premiss, he/she now knows what he/she ought to do.


What if you want the car to run well, but it's broken?

That does not affect the conclusion. The conclusion does not state necessary and sufficient conditions for a car to run well, just one necessary condition.


Maybe you need the premise "and adding oil to the engine will necessarily make it run well" but what you "want" is still distinct from what you "ought" to do. Even if it isn't, making them synonyms is equally problematic based on my understanding

But, now you are making a different sort of challenge, that which concerns how we understand our wants and how we go about actualising them. That is not a philosophical, but a social or psychological question

However, as soon as we understand what it is to want something, hand in hand with that goes an understanding of what we ought to do to achieve that want, based on the truth of the premiss I gave.

Of course, if could be argued that we might have a certain want and not know how to go about satisfying it, but that is where, in this case, the premiss I gave comes in, for that tells us what we need to do in this instance to satisfy it.


The A --> ~A was my intention.

Well, this means that these 'A's must be propositional variables, and, I take it, you intend the arrow to be the implication sign.

If so, this would be a contradiction, not an analytic truth, as you had claimed. Even so, I still fail to see its relevance.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I think Hume is talking about justification, rather than inference. I meant A v ~A. I really don't understand how I mistook what I meant, twice. The truth is supposed to be A v ~A, A or not A (in case my notation is converting somehow).

What would be the first order logic equivalent of your argument? Maybe that will help me understand.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


I think Hume is talking about justification, rather than inference. I meant A v ~A. I really don't understand how I mistook what I meant, twice. The truth is supposed to be A v ~A, A or not A (in case my notation is converting somehow).

1) I'd like to see the proof that Hume knew the difference between inference and 'justification'.

2) I gave examples where the premiss was true.

3) I still do not see the relevance of 'A v ~A'.


What would be the first order logic equivalent of your argument? Maybe that will help me understand.

Well, I am not basing my argument solely on first order logic; but this is a safe inference:

P1) Vx (Fx <-> Gx).

C) VxVy [(Fx & Ox) -> (Gy & Oy)]

Translated:

P1) All and only Fs are Gs.

[I would normally use the Greek letters (phi and psy) here to allow for F and G to include active verbs and state verbs (such as 'telling the truth' and 'stolen').]

C) Ergo, if there is anything that is F which ought to be done, then anything else which is G also ought to be done.

[I have used the biconditional here to make the argument immune to well known counter-examples; if it is weakened to a simple conditional then this argument form has to be strengthened in other ways.]

The thing is, modern logic is so powerful, almost anything can be derived from anything else if one is careful/determined enough.

Hume unfortunately lived in an era when even the 2000 year old Aristotelian logic had degenerated rather badly into the bowdlerised form one sees in, for example Kant and Hegel, and 100 years before Frege revolutionised the subject.

So, anyone who relies on Hume's logic is rather like someone who prefers Ptolemy to Newton!

[gilhyle]

2) Where do I refer to 'utilitarianism'? I see you are back to the by-now-familiar 'I can't defeat Rosa, so I will make stuff up about her' mode. So, in your attempt to 'understand' Hume you have to lie about me, is that it?

3) Which part of what I have said is 'utilitarian'?

[Neutral observers, who have witnessed similar jousting matches between me and this serial dissembler, will no doubt also know that we can expect no attempt by Gil here to substantiate this latest baseless assertion about me, which we will soon be able to add to the long list of similar Gil-fibs accumulated over the last three years.]


Your narcisiism knows few limits Rosa; I wasnt talking about you as claiming to be a utilitarian - it is post-something who raised the question of utilitarianism. If you read my post properly you would see that it it is based on acknowledging that you would not see yourself as a utilitarian, but it make it the point that, nevertheless you contentment to see hypothecal instrumental claims as similar in type to the kind of universal claims of moral approbation which concerned Hume is a reflection of the influence of ideas initially promoted by utilitarianism.


This does not look at all Humean -- so much for your attempt to 'understand' him.

It does not look Humean to you because you can only assess similarity by reference to similarity of terms - this syllogism embodies the substance of Humes argument in differen tterms - I understand that that kind of thing confuses you; but that is your problem.

Youre tilting at windmills again trying to prove Hume false - Hume's suggestion is patently beside the point; but your rejection of him is as beside the point as his proposition. IT is absurd to enter the lists to argue with long dead philosophers with little contemporary relevance. The point is to understand their ideas as historical phenomena and while you are busy pointlessly rejecting him you miss that point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil before he/she was rumbled:


You refer to utilitarianism

After:


Your narcissism knows few limits Rosa; I wasn't talking about you as claiming to be a utilitarian -

So, who is this 'you' then? The cat's mother?

Ah, but Gil has an excuse:


it is post-something who raised the question of utilitarianism.

Well, let's look at the entire passage, which was in reply to this comment of mine, not Post Something's:


Hume, as usual, was hopelessly unclear, and, as I pointed out, failed to consider a wide enough variety of examples of the use of 'ought'

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1427005&postcount=5

Gil:


Im not suggesting that Hume was correct; but it is important to understand him in his own terms, rather than in yours. IN his terms it is not necessary to consider all uses of 'ought'. When he talks about 'ought' statements both he and his audience know what he means. He lived at a time when belief in the existence of absolute moral right and wrong was widespread. You refer to utilitarianism, which broke with that view that morality necessarily involves reference to a relationship which is distinct from descriptive relations. Indeed Rosa's ground breaking perspective is little more than a restatement of a form of utilitarianism in a linguistic philosophical form.

The first highlighted 'yours' refers to the quoted passage of mine above, and there is no indication between then and the next highlighted passage that the referent of this 'you/yours' has changed. Indeed, the last sentence confirms this, since you (gil) attribute utilitarianism to me.

So, may I suggest you take the advice I have given you many times: abandon this mystical theory of yours since it is screwing around with your capacity to reason. Indeed, things have gotten so bad, you can't tell who you are referring to from minute to minute.

[Max Eastman's diagnosis confirmed yet again, I fear.]


It does not look Humean to you because you can only assess similarity by reference to similarity of terms - this syllogism embodies the substance of Hume's argument in different terms -- I understand that that kind of thing confuses you; but that is your problem.

In fact, it doesn't look Humean since you have 'sanitised' his confused thoughts, and added some modern jargon of your own.

I note, however, that you did not quote Hume (not even once) -- the reason being that you are probably relying on those undergraduate crib notes of yours again, which were most likely culled from secondary sources.


You're tilting at windmills again trying to prove Hume false

Ah, yet another fib.

Where have I tried to show he is false? In fact, Hume is far too confused to make it that far -- but, to his credit, he is nowhere near as doolally as Hegel.

So, the 'windmill tilter' is in fact your good self.


Hume's suggestion is patently beside the point.

Eh?


but your rejection of him is as beside the point as his proposition. IT is absurd to enter the lists to argue with long dead philosophers with little contemporary relevance. The point is to understand their ideas as historical phenomena and while you are busy pointlessly rejecting him you miss that point

So you say, but we have already established you are even more confused than Hume ever was. At least he knew who he was referring to!

[Post-Something]

Ok, I haven't actually followed the rest of the discussion because it tailed off into something more complex than I'm probably capable of understanding, but I just want to ask Rosa a quick question:

In this example:



Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

Isn't there a hidden premiss? Or at least two oughts in the conclusion? Shouldn't it be further broken down into:


Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Premiss: You want your car to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, you ought to put oil in the engine.

?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Post-Something:


Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Premiss: You want your car to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, you ought to put oil in the engine.

That is a different argument. Mine is called a 'conditionalisation'. The conclusion:


If you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.

follows directly from the given premiss. Recall, the 'If...then' connective is there since we are not assuming that the said individual wants their car to run well, only that if ever they do, they will have to do such and such.

Here's a parallel argument that might illustrate the point:

P1: Anyone who wants to visit Mars will have to travel through outer space.

C: Therefore, if you want to visit Mars in 2035, you will have to travel through outer space.

Now, you might not want to go to Mars, but if ever you do, then you will have to do such and such, and we can infer that from the given premiss alone.

[Post-Something]

Ahhh! Now I understand!


Thanks for clearing that up :)

[gilhyle]

Rosa, for the record you misread even the text you quote from me, by ignoring the fact that in that passage references to yourself are put in the third person as references to 'Rosa'. Your reading of my text cant explain this.....but this discussion has become, as so often with you a pointless degeneration into pedantry which occurs again and again because you are not here to discuss but to win, a goal you pursue with a sophistic method.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Midnight Creeper:


Rosa, for the record you misread even the text you quote from me, by ignoring the fact that in that passage references to yourself are put in the third person as references to 'Rosa'. Your reading of my text cant explain this.....but this discussion has become, as so often with you a pointless degeneration into pedantry which occurs again and again because you are not here to discuss but to win, a goal you pursue with a sophistic method.

Hardly. You quote me (not Post Something) and then start using the offending pronoun. Here it is again:



Hume, as usual, was hopelessly unclear, and, as I pointed out, failed to consider a wide enough variety of examples of the use of 'ought'

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1427005&postcount=5

Gil:


Im not suggesting that Hume was correct; but it is important to understand him in his own terms, rather than in yours. IN his terms it is not necessary to consider all uses of 'ought'. When he talks about 'ought' statements both he and his audience know what he means. He lived at a time when belief in the existence of absolute moral right and wrong was widespread. You refer to utilitarianism, which broke with that view that morality necessarily involves reference to a relationship which is distinct from descriptive relations. Indeed Rosa's ground breaking perspective is little more than a restatement of a form of utilitarianism in a linguistic philosophical form.

The first highlighted 'yours' refers to the quoted passage of mine above, and there is no indication between then and the next highlighted passage that the referent of this 'you/yours' has changed. Indeed, the last sentence confirms this, since you (gil) attribute utilitarianism to me.

And you constantly oscillate between referring to me as 'Rosa' and 'you'. You do that above, and here:


Your narcisiism knows few limits Rosa; I wasnt talking about you as claiming to be a utilitarian - it is post-something who raised the question of utilitarianism. If you read my post properly you would see that it it is based on acknowledging that you would not see yourself as a utilitarian, but it make it the point that, nevertheless you contentment to see hypothecal instrumental claims as similar in type to the kind of universal claims of moral approbation which concerned Hume is a reflection of the influence of ideas initially promoted by utilitarianism.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1428985&postcount=22

[mikelepore]

Isn't there a hidden premiss? Or at least two oughts in the conclusion? Shouldn't it be further broken down into:

Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Premiss: You want your car to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, you ought to put oil in the engine.

?

It's implied that a human desire should be fulfilled, which may or may not be true. You could just as well say you want your car to run well, but you should let the engine burn up, because satisfying what you want is not desirable. If it were a vehicle driven by the Gestapo, we might say: it will run well if you add lubricant, but you shouldn't add any lubricant, because it would be better for everyone that your vehicle breaks down and you get stranded out in the woods. Whether it's a goal to satisfy someone desires isn't descriptive and there is no logical operator for it. Even a most extreme case about not wanting the whole world to be annihilated can't be demonstrated with logic. Hume had it right.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Mike:


It's implied that a human desire should be fulfilled, which may or may not be true. You could just as well say you want your car to run well, but you should let the engine burn up, because satisfying what you want is not desirable. If it were a vehicle driven by the Gestapo, we might say: it will run well if you add lubricant, but you shouldn't add any lubricant, because it would be better for everyone that your vehicle breaks down and you get stranded out in the woods. Whether it's a goal to satisfy someone desires isn't descriptive and there is no logical operator for it. Even a most extreme case about not wanting the whole world to be annihilated can't be demonstrated with logic. Hume had it right.

Maybe so, but that does not affect the fact that is is possible to derive an 'ought' form an 'is', as I have shown.

So, Hume was confused (mainly by the poor logic he had been taught).

[gilhyle]

that does not affect the fact that is is possible to derive an 'ought' form an 'is', as I have shown

No you have shown that it is possible to derive a statement which uses the word ought from a statement which uses the word is....thats not the same thing.

[And in misreading me above you not only confuse the use of 'you' as a substitute for the indefinitie pronoun 'one' - a common practice among people who dont want to sound like the British Royal family, but you also conflate the use of 'Rosa' as a third person reference and the use of 'Rosa' as a form of address. Your readings are abysmally imprecise.]

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil, you are up a little early; are you sure that sunshine won't make you crumble?


No you have shown that it is possible to derive a statement which uses the word ought from a statement which uses the word is....thats not the same thing.

I can take lessons from you in pedantry.

Nevertheless, even this shows that a proposition containing an 'ought' can be derived from one containing an 'is', and no 'ought'.


[And in misreading me above you not only confuse the use of 'you' as a substitute for the indefinitie pronoun 'one' - a common practice among people who dont want to sound like the British Royal family, but you also conflate the use of 'Rosa' as a third person reference and the use of 'Rosa' as a form of address.]

Not so; you quoted me and referred to the one who posted it (me) as as 'you', and you use 'you' and 'Rosa' indiscriminately. No amount of back-tracking and/or casuistry is going to get you out of this minor hole.


Your readings are abysmally imprecise

Not quite as imprecise as your writing, but I am doing my best to catch you up.

[gilhyle]

a proposition containing an 'ought' can be derived from one containing an 'is', and no 'ought'.


Whichi is true, trivial and quite irrelevant to the understanding Hume, who would have been neither surprised nor upset by such a conclusion.

[THere is no backtracking - differntiate the vocative from the nominative and it would all make perfect sense to you ('one) except that 'you' (Rosa (vocative) dont reach the standards of reading you ('one') can can normally expect so Rosa (nominative) just accuses others of taking about her when they arent.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Whichi is true, trivial and quite irrelevant to the understanding Hume, who would have been neither surprised nor upset by such a conclusion.

Trite, trivial, true..., who cares? It shows Hume was in error, and worse: thoroughly confused.

Ah, more casuistry:


[THere is no backtracking - differntiate the vocative from the nominative and it would all make perfect sense to you ('one) except that 'you' (Rosa (vocative) dont reach the standards of reading you ('one') can can normally expect so Rosa (nominative) just accuses others of taking about her when they arent.

Nice try, except you quoted me (and thought you were quoting Post Something), and thus got your proper nouns and pronouns all mixed up.

Now, for the last three years I have been trying to warn you of the deleterious effects of the Hermetic virus you unwisely allowed into your brain, but to no avail. And we can all see the results for ourselves, for it seems that even you do not know who you are referring to these days.

You'll soon need help opening and closing doors...

[mikelepore]

Rosa, what you did is derive an ought from another ought, or, as I would prefer to express it, you showed that one human desire is equivalent to another desire. To desire a car that keeps running is the same as to desire a car that is oiled. The connection from one thing to the other thing is physically descriptive, but what are being connected there are two emotional states.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Mike:


Rosa, what you did is derive an ought from another ought, or, as I would prefer to express it, you showed that one human desire is equivalent to another desire. To desire a car that keeps running is the same as to desire a car that is oiled. The connection from one thing to the other thing is physically descriptive, but what are being connected there are two emotional states.

Not so; here are my examples (there are plenty more):


Premiss: All cars require lubricants to run well

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your car to run well, you ought to put oil in the engine.


Premiss: All human beings require love in order to flourish.

Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your child to flourish, you ought to love her.

Anyway, here is a general (valid) argument schema:

Premiss: All and only Fs are Gs.

Conclusion: If you ought to F you ought to G.

You can replace these F's and G's with morally-neutral, or morally committed examples, and this derive any number of moral and non-moral 'oughts' from 'is-es'.


Premiss: All and only Fs are Gs.

Conclusion: Anything that ought to be done to an F, ought to be done to a G.


P1) Vx (Fx <-> Gx).

C) VxVy [(Fx & Ox) -> (Gy & Oy)]

Translated:

P1) All and only Fs are Gs.

[I would normally use the Greek letters (phi and psy) here to allow for F and G to include active verbs and state verbs (such as 'telling the truth' and 'stolen').]

C) Ergo, if there is anything that is F which ought to be done, then anything else which is G also ought to be done.

[I have used the biconditional here to make the argument immune to well known counter-examples; if it is weakened to a simple conditional then this argument form has to be strengthened in other ways.]

No 'ought' anywhere in sight in any of then premises, especially these:


Premiss: All and only Fs are Gs.

Conclusion: Anything that ought to be done to an F, ought to be done to a G.


P1) Vx (Fx <-> Gx).

C) VxVy [(Fx & Ox) -> (Gy & Oy)]

Translated:

P1) All and only Fs are Gs.

[I would normally use the Greek letters (phi and psy) here to allow for F and G to include active verbs and state verbs (such as 'telling the truth' and 'stolen').]

C) Ergo, if there is anything that is F which ought to be done, then anything else which is G also ought to be done.

But you say:


or, as I would prefer to express it, you showed that one human desire is equivalent to another desire. To desire a car that keeps running is the same as to desire a car that is oiled. The connection from one thing to the other thing is physically descriptive, but what are being connected there are two emotional states.

I note you have to change the problem to make this objection work, and yet you have not shown that a 'desire' is in any way an 'ought'.

Finally, except perhaps for the first, my arguments have nothing to do with 'desire'; they are valid whether or not there are no human beings, and thus no 'desires'.

And even in the first case, 'desire' is not automatic, but even if there were, the premiss has no 'desire' element in it, just the conclusion.

So, in that case, I have derived a 'desire' from an 'is'. QED.

[gilhyle]

I think your elaboration has illustrated well the irrlevance of the example....all it does is work through the logic of equivalence. if F is , G is. If F is not, G is not, if F is desirable G is desirable, if F ought to be, G ought to be, if F is impossible, G is impossible etc. This actually says nothing at all about the logic of obligation except that it trasfers between equivalent objects. So ?

That is why you are wrong to say


It shows Hume was in error, and worse: thoroughly confused.

It shows no such thing. Hume existed in a world where many people believed themselves to be subject to certain moral obligations (as a matter of fact) and he denied that. Your logical analysis is quite irrelevant to that...it is merely about when words can be used.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


I think your elaboration has illustrated well the irrlevance of the example....all it does is work through the logic of equivalence. if F is , G is. If F is not, G is not, if F is desirable G is desirable, if F ought to be, G ought to be, if F is impossible, G is impossible etc. This actually says nothing at all about the logic of obligation except that it trasfers between equivalent objects. So ?

This thread is not about the alleged 'logic of obligation' but about deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' (or, for you pedants, 'ought' propositions from those not containing an 'ought', or any of its cognates, or synonyms).

The many examples I have given (not all of which depend on 'equivalence') show that this can be done, no matter how much you moan and stamp your little feet.


That is why you are wrong to say


It shows Hume was in error, and worse: thoroughly confused.

It shows no such thing. Hume existed in a world where many people believed themselves to be subject to certain moral obligations (as a matter of fact) and he denied that. Your logical analysis is quite irrelevant to that...it is merely about when words can be used.

What has this got to do with whether one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is (or, for you pedants, 'ought' propositions from those not containing an 'ought', or any of its cognates, or synonyms)?

[gilhyle]

The error is the simple one of thinking that any proposition containing the word 'ought' is what Hume was referring to when he patently was not.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


The error is the simple one of thinking that any proposition containing the word 'ought' is what Hume was referring to when he patently was not.

If he wasn't using propositions, then he was not asserting/denying/proposing anything. In that case, there would be no case to answer.

[mikelepore]

Rosa,

Premiss: All human beings require love in order to flourish.
Conclusion: Therefore, if you want your child to flourish, you ought to love her.

You're simply hiding an additional premiss in your nested if-then "conclusion",
figuring that this will change the fact that it's equivalent to saying:
(1) You ought to produce the result that she flourishes,
(2) she will flourish only if you love here,
(3) therefore you ought to love her.
So you're actually deriving an ought from another ought, which no one ever denied was doable.

Having done that, you have made your task as simple as a direct substitution of symbols:
result Flourish implies condition Love, specify result Flourish, therefore set condition Love.
It's the same form as:
Banana implies yellow, given banana, therefore yellow.

You're just choosing to phrase a mere symbol substitution as an ought, which is artificial, because you could also do the same with the banana.
If it the object ought to be a banana, then it ought to be something yellow.

That not what it means to derive an ought. That's not what the problem is about.

The problem is about going beyond the direct substitution of symbols.

If you could take purely descriptive information, like the fact that a human being is a heap of chemical compounds, and then derive the imperative that you ought to give her love, then you would really have something.

________________________________________

We OUGHT to celebrate May 5 - Karl Marx's 191st birthday

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Mike:


You're simply hiding an additional premiss in your nested if-then "conclusion",figuring that this will change the fact that it's equivalent to saying:

(1) You ought to produce the result that she flourishes,
(2) she will flourish only if you love here,
(3) therefore you ought to love her.
So you're actually deriving an ought from another ought, which no one ever denied was doable.

Not so; yours is a different argument. Mine leaves it open whether anyone ought to do what you say. All mine does it derive a hypothetical conclusion (which asserts nothing, that is why it is called a hypothetical) based on the assumed truth of the premiss. Period. No hidden premisses.


Having done that, you have made your task as simple as a direct substitution of symbols:
result Flourish implies condition Love, specify result Flourish, therefore set condition Love.
It's the same form as:
Banana implies yellow, given banana, therefore yellow.

You're just choosing to phrase a mere symbol substitution as an ought, which is artificial, because you could also do the same with the banana.
If it the object ought to be a banana, then it ought to be something yellow.

That not what it means to derive an ought. That's not what the problem is about.

The problem is about going beyond the direct substitution of symbols.


I am sorry, I could not follow this, nor see how it related to the argument I gave, which contained no symbols.


If you could take purely descriptive information, like the fact that a human being is a heap of chemical compounds, and then derive the imperative that you ought to give her love, then you would really have something.

Easy:

P1: Every heap of chemicals flourishes if you give it some love.

C: Therefore, if you want your heap of chemicals to flourish, you ought to give it some love.

Recall: the premisses of an argument do not have to be true for that argument to be valid, only that if the pemniss were true, the conclusion could not fail to true, too.

[gilhyle]

If he wasn't using propositions, then he was not asserting/denying/proposing anything. In that case, there would be no case to answer.

Thats a weird comment - I never suggested he wasnt using propositions.

[Post-Something]

It's a shame that all this debate went to waste, considering it didn't actually come up in my exam :(

Thanks for the mental stimulation though :)

[gilhyle]

if you want the question to come up in your exam you ought not prepare for it

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


Thats a weird comment - I never suggested he wasnt using propositions.

In that case, my earlier derivations show he was in error, as I claimed.

[gilhyle]

You seem to willfully misunderstand....quite pointless.

Patently Hume was not claiming that no statement including the term ought can be derived from a statement including is....rather he was claiming that it is not possible to derive universal and necessary rules of behaviour from any description of particular situations. Your deduction just does not engage with that claim.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


You seem to willfully misunderstand....quite pointless.

Despite the split infinitive, you have no room to talk, you have been doing this to my posts for three years -- and during that time you have compounded this by regularly lying about me and my ideas.


Patently Hume was not claiming that no statement including the term ought can be derived from a statement including is....rather he was claiming that it is not possible to derive universal and necessary rules of behaviour from any description of particular situations. Your deduction just does not engage with that claim.

Ah, yet another movement of the goal posts.

But I'd like to see where Hume said this:


to derive universal and necessary rules of behaviour from any description of particular situations.

[gilhyle]

That is the point I made at the very beginning - you need to read Hume in context : Hume lived at a time where universal moral laws (primarily, but not exclusively in religious form) were widely believed. Hume was counterposing to those views his own view that moral views had no specific objective basis in any particular state of the world ( a view Kant then turned on its head). For that reason it is not possible to reason to an end/objective. You cant seriously deny that that is Hume's view, if you pay any attention to history - in which case the points you make about logic are quite beside the point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


That is the point I made at the very beginning - you need to read Hume in context : Hume lived at a time where universal moral laws (primarily, but not exclusively in religious form) were widely believed. Hume was counterposing to those views his own view that moral views had no specific objective basis in any particular state of the world ( a view Kant then turned on its head). For that reason it is not possible to reason to an end/objective. You cant seriously deny that that is Hume's view, if you pay any attention to history - in which case the points you make about logic are quite beside the point.

The relevant context being: he was a ruling-class hack (ignorant even of Aristotelian logic), so naturally, you defend him.

And, despite being asked, we have yet to see you produce a single quotation from him in support of your undergraduate attempt to summarise his ideas.

[gilhyle]

go read about him Im not saying anything in the slightest bit contentious in terms of Hume interpretation - what is bizarre is your implied suggestion that Hume would be interested in showing that statements including the word ought could not be derived from statements including the word is. What would be the point of such a claim ? What would follow from it ? You have undoubtedley have disproven such a silly claim....but why would anyone make it ?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


go read about him Im not saying anything in the slightest bit contentious in terms of Hume interpretation - what is bizarre is your implied suggestion that Hume would be interested in showing that statements including the word ought could not be derived from statements including the word is. What would be the point of such a claim ? What would follow from it ? You have undoubtedley have disproven such a silly claim....but why would anyone make it ?

So, in other words, you can't back-up your superficial claims about Hume, as I surmised.

And the point of showing that one can derive 'ought' propositions from those that have 'is' (or one of its cognates) as the main verb, but do not contain an 'ought' (or one of its cognates) is, at the very least, and among other things, to unmask comrades like you who make claims about logic that you can't substantiate.

[gilhyle]

No, Rosa, you still avoid the point. The question was not why you would claim that statements including the word ought can be derived from statements including the word is. The question was why on earth Hume would have claimed the opposite - the opposite being not only patently incorrrect but also a claim without any significant or potentially useful implications. Patently, Hume was talking about the absence of any logical relationship between descriptive statements and universal moral obligations. Every writer on Hume would agree (with any refinements of course). Just read one. There is no need for me to rehearse it here. Seeking that is just a diversionary tactic on your part.

What is flawed in your argument is not that you claim that statements including 'ought' can be derived from statements including 'is'. What is flawed in your argument is you thinking that this has any force against Hume's point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


No, Rosa, you still avoid the point.

I must admit, in trying to emulate you in the skilled art of 'ignoring the point', I always seem to come off second best.

What's your secret?


The question was not why you would claim that statements including the word ought can be derived from statements including the word is. The question was why on earth Hume would have claimed the opposite - the opposite being not only patently incorrrect but also a claim without any significant or potentially useful implications. Patently, Hume was talking about the absence of any logical relationship between descriptive statements and universal moral obligations. Every writer on Hume would agree (with any refinements of course). Just read one. There is no need for me to rehearse it here. Seeking that is just a diversionary tactic on your part.

What is flawed in your argument is not that you claim that statements including 'ought' can be derived from statements including 'is'. What is flawed in your argument is you thinking that this has any force against Hume's point.

And the wait goes on for at least one quotation in support of this first year undergraduate attempt to summarise Hume.