Ethics - Deontological or Consequentialist?

[Oswy]

What is the better way to judge the moral value of an action - the intentions or the effects, a bit of both or something else?

[InTheMatterOfBoots]

How about prefigurative? ;)

[Black Dagger]

Moved to Philosophy.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

An action can be ethical or unethical. A person being ethical or unethical is not entirely determined by their actions.

Intentions are relevant when we have good reason to believe them. For instance, if a murderer misses his target, shoots through a wall, and kills a rapist, we won't believe that was his intention. If we assumed his action was ethical, because he was stopping a rape attempt, we still wouldn't considered him an ethical man.

I consider myself an ethical egoism, with modifications some egoists may deny. For instance, I think all acts of altruism are nonexistent. However, I also think that, even if we get no tangible benefit, we enjoy helping others because of an innate "capacity" that varies between individuals.

We're still egoists because it isn't like happiness in some African, right now, is filling me with joy unbeknown to me. However, there is a causal link of some sort that allows us to value helping others, seemingly for its own sake. I'd suggest it's an evolutionary capacity towards cooperation.

For instance, if you could steal a million dollars for yourself, and you knew it was going to a just charity, would you do it? Some people would if the consequences were avoidable. Assuming that, what logical reason is stopping someone? The contributions to society from the charity won't benefit you as much as the money. In this case, I'd suggest there is a "capacity" various individuals have. When someone can't stop committing crimes, because they don't care about others, they lack this capacity. When people idiotically sacrifice themselves for strangers, they have too much of this capacity.

Evolutionary characteristics vary in extremes. Someone who can't control their actions ends up in prison. Someone who is extremely altruistic will succeed because, given that such behavior benefits many, people will seek to reward them for their actions. However, there is a threshold, I would suggest, where most people aren't going to sacrifice their interests (perhaps with the million dollars).

The threshold, whether high or low, isn't some moral righteousness. There is probably some logical threshold, that, if we were to choose our genetics, we would pick. However, we don't choose our genetics. People sacrificing themselves have a capacity for self-sacrifice outside the norm. Repeat offenders sometimes have a capacity outside the norm, as well.

A lot of repeat offenders are the result of social conditions. This is not an attempt to stereotype all criminals as fundamentally flawed. However, there are criminals who offend based on psychological disorders. We consider them disorders because they fall outside the norm, based on conventions.

[Man from Another Place]

An action can be ethical or unethical. A person being ethical or unethical is not entirely determined by their actions.

Intentions are relevant when we have good reason to believe them. For instance, if a murderer misses his target, shoots through a wall, and kills a rapist, we won't believe that was his intention. If we assumed his action was ethical, because he was stopping a rape attempt, we still wouldn't considered him an ethical man.

I consider myself an ethical egoism, with modifications some egoists may deny. For instance, I think all acts of altruism are nonexistent. However, I also think that, even if we get no tangible benefit, we enjoy helping others because of an innate "capacity" that varies between individuals.

We're still egoists because it isn't like happiness in some African, right now, is filling me with joy unbeknown to me. However, there is a causal link of some sort that allows us to value helping others, seemingly for its own sake. I'd suggest it's an evolutionary capacity towards cooperation.

For instance, if you could steal a million dollars for yourself, and you knew it was going to a just charity, would you do it? Some people would if the consequences were avoidable. Assuming that, what logical reason is stopping someone? The contributions to society from the charity won't benefit you as much as the money. In this case, I'd suggest there is a "capacity" various individuals have. When someone can't stop committing crimes, because they don't care about others, they lack this capacity. When people idiotically sacrifice themselves for strangers, they have too much of this capacity.

Evolutionary characteristics vary in extremes. Someone who can't control their actions ends up in prison. Someone who is extremely altruistic will succeed because, given that such behavior benefits many, people will seek to reward them for their actions. However, there is a threshold, I would suggest, where most people aren't going to sacrifice their interests (perhaps with the million dollars).

The threshold, whether high or low, isn't some moral righteousness. There is probably some logical threshold, that, if we were to choose our genetics, we would pick. However, we don't choose our genetics. People sacrificing themselves have a capacity for self-sacrifice outside the norm. Repeat offenders sometimes have a capacity outside the norm, as well.

A lot of repeat offenders are the result of social conditions. This is not an attempt to stereotype all criminals as fundamentally flawed. However, there are criminals who offend based on psychological disorders. We consider them disorders because they fall outside the norm, based on conventions.

I would agree with this view to a large extent. Morality and its application to real-life situations is always relative. For instance; if a generally altruistic and 'morally righteous' individual is faced with a situation where they can either save a loved one or a group of strangers from certain death, the vast majority of people will act to save the loved one.

To me this demonstrates that there is no universal morality other than self-interest (driven by the process of natural selection) and everything else is simply artificially crafted by humans and influenced by certain specific social, cultural, economic and environmental conditions.

[black magick hustla]

The whole discourse of ethics is deeply flawed. Poor Kant would have had a heart attack if he had read Nietzche. The point is that matters of principles are outside logical discourse. You can't argue principles unless finding a common ground.

[gilhyle]

The best way, I suggest, for Marxists to model these issues is to see Morals as matters of fact, not value. By which I mean people display certain patterns of moral behaviour, that is the fact - the rationalisation of those moralities in ethical models is secularised religious superstition. None of these rationalisations is valid. But the morality is nevertheless a pattern of behaviour - a pattern of behaviour no more consistent than that of monkeys, who on occasion secretly murder each other, often steal and often engage in sexual infidelities while also generally complying with patterns of behaviour which involve not stealing, not murdering and complying with constraints on sexual behaviour.

The consistency and (spurious underlying rationalisations) are not the point. The point is what the pattern of moral convention is and what the pattern of endured breaches is (there always is one).

On occasion as Communists have created mass movements with their own culture, they have begun to display somewhat different moral patterns. Where States have been taken over, very different moral patterns have emerged.

Studying the facts is relevant, the rationalisations are only relevant as themselves facts, as themselves patterns of behaviour. Thus deontological and consequentialist rationalisations compete depending on various social factors - the relative popularity of each is itself a significant pattern. Which one is better is a mute point - no more relevant than whether sacrificing chickens to the Gods is more effective than sacrificing lambs. What is relevant is which one is considered more powerful.

And if that REALLY leaves you without a moral compass, well you never had one in the frst place.

[robbo203]

I consider ethical egoism to be deeply flawed, an example of such an approach being Ayn Rand´s. Her arguments are often poor and full of holes. James Rachel has dome a brilliant demolition job on the ethical egoist strategy of redefining motives.

Ultimately , morality is based on a benevolent regard for others - seeing others as having intrinsic value and not merely as a means to further one´s own end. This is not to deny that self interest is an important part of our motives but it is only a part.

It is simplistic and false to reduce human motivation to either pure self interest or pure altruism. The reality is that it is a mixture of both

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I consider ethical egoism to be deeply flawed, an example of such an approach being Ayn Rand´s. Her arguments are often poor and full of holes. James Rachel has dome a brilliant demolition job on the ethical egoist strategy of redefining motives.

Ultimately , morality is based on a benevolent regard for others - seeing others as having intrinsic value and not merely as a means to further one´s own end. This is not to deny that self interest is an important part of our motives but it is only a part.

It is simplistic and false to reduce human motivation to either pure self interest or pure altruism. The reality is that it is a mixture of both

Rachels advocates utilitarianism. He also suggests that there is "no reason" to consider your own interests above anyone else. This is a little far-fetched. I'll agree with his criticisms of ethical egoism, but that is a definitional criticism. Some ethical egoists account for his criticism. What qualifies as "self-interest" is debatable. If it is "what benefits you," then the egoists are free from his criticism.

There are various schools of ethical egoism, which aren't developed or named in a particularly way. Here are some points on egoism that can vary:

1. Pure Egoism versus Impure Egoism

Individuals are motivated by self-interest. Some egoists claim we get no direct benefit from helping others. It's only a consequential benefit. When we eat something, we feel good because of the consequences, but the action itself is pleasurable. When we help people, we only feel good because "we anticipate the consequences." In other words, helping others, the consequence itself of the action, is not pleasurable like the case of food. If helping others doesn't benefit us, we simply don't do it.

Of course, such a view is rather convoluted. We seem to vary in our capacity to enjoy helping others. Some people help others, and this is often at the expense of themselves, it seems. Of course, it really isn't because they get intrinsic pleasure from helping others. I'd say most people do, but it varies in degree.

2. Survival versus Utility

Should you do something that puts your survival at risk for pleasure? Once an action begins to harm you, to a large enough degree, the benefits of the action no longer outweigh the harm.

The evolutionary argument might suggest pleasure allows us to accomplish tasks. It facilitates how we live and whether we survive. However, evolution has no agenda. How do we decide what is more important? Surviving, or pleasure?

Do we value survival with respect to how it allows us to experience pleasure? Suicide would support this argument, I suggest.
Or, should we value survival more than pleasure. It's better to live unhappy than not live at all. Miserable even. Suicidal individuals sometimes continue living in pain. Patients in horrible pain, in a medical situation, could certainly aid their own death, but they often continue to live until death takes them naturally.

***

I'd consider myself an Impure/Utility Egoist. My experiences with depression bias my opinion. Evolution favors species that propagate. However, evolution has millions of species that die out. We have survival instincts that support this notion, but we could be poorly adapted for long-term survival. I'm not sure that's the case.

However, a species with a capacity for pseudo-altruism would be advantageous so long as the strong don't save the weak and useless, perhaps. Furthermore, a species that looks after its interests, over everything else, will value survival as long as it's well-suited to experience pleasure (not severely depressed). The species will also naturally want children, perhaps, for the joy they bring and the benefits they create (managing society when people age).

I'd consider Rand a Pure/Survival Egoist. Aka, an opportunist, valuer of resource hording, et cetera. We have no reason to care about others, and we want to survive. We need to be able to horde resources, gain advantages, et cetera, to secure our survival. Any system that impedes on our ability to pursue our natural advantages harms our nature. Lot's of problems with this view.

I think a Pure/Survival Egoist should still advocate leftism, but I'd say if pure egoism is right, communism would need a sophisticated legal system. I'm inclined to believe that regardless, though.

[robbo203]

Rachels advocates utilitarianism. He also suggests that there is "no reason" to consider your own interests above anyone else. This is a little far-fetched. I'll agree with his criticisms of ethical egoism, but that is a definitional criticism. Some ethical egoists account for his criticism. What qualifies as "self-interest" is debatable. If it is "what benefits you," then the egoists are free from his criticism.
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Not quite sure what you are driving at here. I was talking about Rachel´s point about how ethical egoists attempt to refine everying in terms of benefitting oneself which he dubbed the egoistic strategy of "redefining motives"

At any rate, to me, ethical egoism is more or less a contradiction in terms since ethics cannot be egoistically grounded. This flouts the first principle of any ethical system - universability. In any case it is to confuse prudential matters (self interest) with ethical matters - whereas a true ethics is always other-directed and concerns the value we attach to others. However, this is definitely not to suggest an abandonment of self interest but that in pursuing our self interests we are prudentially motivated

A more realistic of human motives is one in which are are subject to both prudential and ethical motives. I am a pluralist in that respect

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Not quite sure what you are driving at here. I was talking about Rachel´s point about how ethical egoists attempt to refine everying in terms of benefitting oneself which he dubbed the egoistic strategy of "redefining motives"

At any rate, to me, ethical egoism is more or less a contradiction in terms since ethics cannot be egoistically grounded. This flouts the first principle of any ethical system - universability. In any case it is to confuse prudential matters (self interest) with ethical matters - whereas a true ethics is always other-directed and concerns the value we attach to others. However, this is definitely not to suggest an abandonment of self interest but that in pursuing our self interests we are prudentially motivated

A more realistic of human motives is one in which are are subject to both prudential and ethical motives. I am a pluralist in that respect

Ethical systems do not have to be universal. They simply have to be enforced by those wielding power. I'll agree with Rachel's concerning the "redefining motives" notion. However, I still consider ethical egoism definable in a manner that avoids this criticism.

Rachel's says that there is no reason to prefer your own interests over those of others. He is simply mistaken. If you can press a button once, and it grants physical pleasure, what do you do? Rachels implies that you should consider interests of others equally to your own.

If you give it to yourself, you assume your pleasure is worth "more," or you know you'll enjoy it while, the other person, may not. If it's a person you know receives x2 the amount of pleasure you do, from it, will you give the pleasure to them? We don't give all our resources to the poor because they'll get more pleasure out of them. We might give some.

Egoism says we place are own needs and desires over others. False.
Sometimes we place the needs and desires of others over our own. True.
When we place the interests of others above our own, why do we do it?

Rachels suggests society simple has us discriminate against the pleasure of others. This is false. We do consider the interests of others. We have a natural appreciation of others. When you help someone, you feel good about it. That feeling is "distinctly different" from other feelings you experience, would you not agree? Let's call this "altruistic pleasure." It's confusing because it's not specifically altruistic, you still have it.

If you like physical pleasure x1 over x2 altruistic pleasure, you'll give yourself the physical pleasure. How much people enjoy different pleasures varies between people. Some people clearly enjoy altruistic pleasure to the extent that they constantly put themselves at risk.

Egoism says that when you have sex, you feel something "different" than when you watch, hear about, etc, someone else having sex. Rachels seems to imply this is not true. He has little reason to suggest this. He's working from a logical framework rather than an emotional one. Emotions, such as the difference in the feeling of self-pleasure and pleasuring others, must be incorporated into an ethical analysis because motions are the "heart" of ethical issues.

Egoists traditionally say egoism means, when you help someone, the "feeling" you get is explainable. We can explain it with respect to ideas about it benefiting us in the future. This "fits." There is nothing wrong with the explanation. The problem is, though, the counterexamples and the elaborate methodologies that refute them. Egoism tries to refute the solider jumping on a grenade, for instance, and the sacrifices mothers make.

The simplest explanation, between the extremes of Rachels view and egoism, is that self-pleasure and pleasuring others are distinct. Both views claim they are not.

When I consider myself egoist, I change the definition. If I said I was utilitarian, that would be false. If I had no capacity, or little capacity, for the enjoyment of assisting others, it would not be in my interests. I would not be motivated to do so. Ethical systems that don't align themselves with motivations, or alter motivations, are useless. Having a guideline to tell someone their unethical is useless if it does nothing to motivate them. That's why ethics must align themselves with how humans actually interact and our motivated. If humans were all ruthless amoral, people, we would not see the altruism (again, not in the traditional sense of the word) that exists in our societies.

Perhaps some research on pleasure might illuminate that I am mistaken. The brain function in "watching" may be identical to that in "participating," but I suspect this false.

Ethical egoism, as I see it, simply means "who you are" determines "what you should do." Ethics in society are "what we, as a group, don't want other people to do." It's just domination. If those who ethical norms we viciously attack, such as murders, were the norm, our society would be distinctly different. There are some arguments to suggest that all people, given no society, will agree to similar "ethical codes," but that's a generalization. To assume all people share nature so consistent to create universal ethics, amongst "all" people, is shortsighted. There are criminals who think they are ethical. There is a difference between people "unable" to do what they want, not murder, and those who "want" to murder.

Ethical egoism says that when you help someone, that's because of your nature. Because your nature makes that benefit "you." Perhaps it is a poor distinction. However, what "benefits you" is typically the motivation people hold. Sometimes, they are inclined to something that is not beneficial. Some people are charitable when they know they shouldn't be. Society simply encourages them because we exploit their goodness.

Ethical egoism says the following is false. When someone feels pleasure, there brain gives them pleasure. If you are happy for them, that pleasure has a causal chain that reaches "you." Can you conceive of a person's pleasure simply, in their head, benefiting you? If that were the case, much of our mood is the result of brain states influencing us from across the world. Clearly, such a view has no evidence to support it. Rachels implies such a conception when he accuses the egoist of illogically separating his interests from those of others.