Defending the Devil (and Property Rights).

[Invariance]

Paul Baran once said that defending capitalism – bourgeoisie property rights – is analogous to defending the devil – you’re going to get burned. Yet, I came across this* defence of property rights, so I leave it up to any self-professed Marxist/anarchist to prosecute the devil for the sophistry that it is.

Essentially, the argument goes like this:

Let’s assume we are in a ‘state of nature’ where a lake is shared by two neighbours. Neither owns the lake; it is a “common resource.” We will also assume, for the point of the exercise, that neither neighbour attempts to rob the other.

The neighbours can fish with either two intensities – high or low. Fishing with higher intensity, obviously, produces larger catches. The trade off is that it will deplete the fish population, let us say, after one neighbour fishes with high intensity. Assume that if both neighbours fish with low intensity, each will gain fish valued at 20 (a social benefit of 40). If both fish with high intensity, the lake will, obviously, be ruined, and the pay-off for each neighbour will be 4 for each neighbour (a social ‘benefit’ of 8). If one neighbour fishes with high intensity and the other doesn’t, the lake will be ruined in the future, but the one who fishes with high intensity will reap a short-term gain, let us say to a value of 30, whereas the one who fishes with low intensity will gain a value of 2 (a social benefit of 32). Understand?

Well, clearly the two neighbours would be better off if each fished with low intensity because only in that case would both receive a pay-off of 20 (and society would get a pay-off of 40). However, if one neighbour shows restraint, the other neighbour can get a pay-off of 30 by fishing with high intensity.

So, how will each neighbour behave when the lake is a common resource?

According to the writer, each will fish with high intensity – If neighbour 1 thinks that neighbour 2 will fish with low intensity, his best response is to fish with high intensity and receive a pay-off of 30, versus 20. If he thinks neighbour 2 will fish with high intensity, then he should also – 4 is greater than 2. Hence, both will fish with high intensity and the lake will be ruined, with a sum of the pay-offs of 8. Isn’t competition great?

Now, here comes the property defence. “Why was there such a poor result?” questions the bourgeoisie ideologue. Her answer: no one owned the lake. Because of lack of ownership, neither will show restraint. If owned by one neighbour, he will fish at low intensity (twice) that resulting in a pay-off of 40. Hell, he might even pay the other neighbour, from his higher surplus, to show restraint. Hence, the existence of property rights increases the pay-off to society, and hence are justifiable.

So...prosecution, present your case why this isn't so (the burden’s on you).

Vinnie

For anyone interested, the book is “Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, Andrew Schotter, 3rd edition, 2001.”

[TheCagedLion]

Paul Baran once said that defending capitalism – bourgeoisie property rights – is analogous to defending the devil – you’re going to get burned. Yet, I came across this* defence of property rights, so I leave it up to any self-professed Marxist/anarchist to prosecute the devil for the sophistry that it is.

Essentially, the argument goes like this:

Let’s assume we are in a ‘state of nature’ where a lake is shared by two neighbours. Neither owns the lake; it is a “common resource.” We will also assume, for the point of the exercise, that neither neighbour attempts to rob the other.

The neighbours can fish with either two intensities – high or low. Fishing with higher intensity, obviously, produces larger catches. The trade off is that it will deplete the fish population, let us say, after one neighbour fishes with high intensity. Assume that if both neighbours fish with low intensity, each will gain fish valued at 20 (a social benefit of 40). If both fish with high intensity, the lake will, obviously, be ruined, and the pay-off for each neighbour will be 4 for each neighbour (a social ‘benefit’ of 8). If one neighbour fishes with high intensity and the other doesn’t, the lake will be ruined in the future, but the one who fishes with high intensity will reap a short-term gain, let us say to a value of 30, whereas the one who fishes with low intensity will gain a value of 2 (a social benefit of 32). Understand?

Well, clearly the two neighbours would be better off if each fished with low intensity because only in that case would both receive a pay-off of 20 (and society would get a pay-off of 40). However, if one neighbour shows restraint, the other neighbour can get a pay-off of 30 by fishing with high intensity.

So, how will each neighbour behave when the lake is a common resource?

According to the writer, each will fish with high intensity – If neighbour 1 thinks that neighbour 2 will fish with low intensity, his best response is to fish with high intensity and receive a pay-off of 30, versus 20. If he thinks neighbour 2 will fish with high intensity, then he should also – 4 is greater than 2. Hence, both will fish with high intensity and the lake will be ruined, with a sum of the pay-offs of 8. Isn’t competition great?

Now, here comes the property defence. “Why was there such a poor result?” questions the bourgeoisie ideologue. Her answer: no one owned the lake. Because of lack of ownership, neither will show restraint. If owned by one neighbour, he will fish at low intensity (twice) that resulting in a pay-off of 40. Hell, he might even pay the other neighbour, from his higher surplus, to show restraint. Hence, the existence of property rights increases the pay-off to society, and hence are justifiable.

So...prosecution, present your case why this isn't so (the burden’s on you).

Vinnie

For anyone interested, the book is “Microeconomics: A Modern Approach, Andrew Schotter, 3rd edition, 2001.”


First off, this is an example straight out of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy_of_the_commons and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoners_dilemma

Second, in a socialist society the lake would be owned by both men, and logic would follow that they would discuss the usage of the lake with each other.

Third, as there would be no profit incentive, there would be no need to fish more than the lakes population of fish could sustain.

[mikelepore]

It's supposed problem is self-contradictory. It's usually put in terms like this: if there is common ownership of the means of production, people won't care about the future well-being of the lake, so they will overfish the lake during the operation of their businesses selling fish. But how could there exist businesses selling fish is there were common ownership of the means of production, including that lake?

[apathy maybe]

As pointed out, this is basically a version of the Prisoners dilemma. More accurately, it is an iterated prisoner's dilemma.

That is, the game is played repeatedly.

What does that mean? It means that neither player will rationally sell out the other, because in future games there will be no reason for the sold out player not to sell out the seller.

The following assumes the example given.

Game one: Player A over fishes, resulting in 30, and player B doesn't, resulting in 2.
Why wouldn't (in future games), B over fish as well? Player A has already proved more than willing to screw over player B.

Game two: Both A and B over fish, each gets 4.
B is better off (previously receiving only 2), A is much worse off (going from 30, to 4). Both are now 16 below the optimum (20).

---

Start over.

Game one: Player A and B both under fish, receiving 20 each.
Game two: Player A and B both under fish, receiving 20 each.

After two games, both A and B are better off (with 40) than if they followed the first scenario (where A had 34, and B, 6).

What if both over fish the first game? Both end up with only 8 after two games.

So, A and B, both being rational folks, what are they going to do? They aren't going to over fish that fucking lake are they...

[apathy maybe]

Double fucking post. Someone trash this one for me would you?

[Demogorgon]

Apathy Maybe hit it on the head when it comes to the game theory explanation. I think it is best to say to inject a little fat into this, that when game theory is actually tested by researchers, participants in the prisoners dilemma game actually tend to trust each other and co-operate rather than screw people over. Furthermore, it is worth adding that in real life interaction is not limited the way it is in game theory. Game theory after all tests peoples reactions in a controlled environment, only allowing people to interact at particular points. In real life you can have an ongoing to discussion, both neighbours will therefore co-ordinate their efforts and reach a point where both get 20 each.

Let's go further. We have established that the net social gain of common ownership will be 40, not 8 as the advocates of capitalism presume. What will be the outcome of private property? It will likely be 32, not 40. The owner will want maximum benefit for himself ad so will fish at high intensity and demand the other fish at low intensity. It may be the other neighbour does not accept this and the take it or leave it threat is not enough, so the owner pays the other to show restraint, say 5 units of fish. So that the end result is 25 for the owner and seven for the other, still a net gain of 32. The other possible agreement the owner could impose would be they both fish at low intensity and the other pay the owner 5 units for the privilege. So the owner again gets 25 and the other 15 for a net gain of 40, the same as under collective ownership and in theory a better outcome than the previous scenario as there is increased benefit for one player and no loss to the other. However this game is unstable as the non-owner is being screwed over from the start, getting ten units less for the same amount of work. Likely he will decide he is going to play as dirty and break the agreement to fish at low intensity meaning he brings in 30 units of which he pays 5 to the owner to supplement the 2 already yielded there. This time the owner gets 7 and the non owner 25, again a net gain of 32. Moreover as the owner has the upper hand in negotiations, he is hardly going to agree to such a deal, so will go back to the original, he gets 25, the other 7.

That's the argument defeated through game theory, but let's take it a step beyond that and go into territory game theory cannot handle, that is games with more than two players. Let's presume a great big lake with dozens of fishermen using it. With that many people, it is perfectly feasible that without co-ordination someone is going to overfish ruining it for everyone else, so some kind of organisation of the fishing is needed. There are two ways of doing this. The capitalist method and the common ownership method. Under the capitalist method, one individual, or a group of two or more (for simplicity we will presume one) owns the lake and gets to dictate the terms by which the others may fish. It is now a big lake so individually the others do not have much leverage so their options are very much "take it or leave it". The owner will set terms that benefit him more than everybody else, firstly rendering an unfair result and more importantly as his only goal is to maximise his own benefit, the system he devises will have the goal of rendering him the most fish, not of gaining the greatest collective yield.

If we have common ownership however, the decision is made through a voting process. Depending on how may fishermen (or women) there are, they can either vote amongst themselves or, if this would take too long, elect a number of them to do the organising. Under this system, no individual can ignore the interests of the others as the outcome has to be one that the others will accept. Inevitably this is going to be the outcome rendering the greatest collective yield with the proceeds shared equitably. This is the only outcome that will give maximum benefit to each individual without screwing over other individuals. Once again the collective yield is greater than it is when there is just one owner.

[apathy maybe]

Demogorgon is of course correct when he notes that this isn't even a good scenario for game theory. The two individuals are more than able to communicate outside the result of their actions.

They can discuss stuff before any action takes place, hash over the result, and even introduce a third party arbitration system.

Ultimately, game theory is not a good mechanism for deciding the ultimate result in scenarios such as this.

[JimmyJazz]

They would make a mutual agreement to fish at a low intensity. That was easy!

Inevitable objections from the apologists for inequality about "zomg who will enforce this agreement" break against the fact that humans are smart, and will figure out a way to enforce collective-use property rights just as easily as they have figured out a way to enforce bourgeois property rights.

However, I'm not an anarchist, and would be interested to hear how someone who opposes the existence of a state or anything which resembles a state would expect such mutual agreements to be perfectly enforced (if they are not perfectly and universally enforced, then of course you have sown the seeds of a new capitalism, which will soon overtake all of society). The fact is that, while there is ample evidence for the assertion that most states around the world currently are just tools of class rule, I have seen no convincing argument for the assertion that there is something intrinsic to the nature of a state that makes it a tool of class rule. In fact, if it exists to enforce mutual agreements regarding collective use, then by definition it is not an instrument of class rule.

Also, I'd add that the use of any "tragedy of the commons"-type example in support bourgeois property rights is ironically hilarious/sad, given that capitalists in search of a short-term profit are currently wreaking almost certainly irreversible long-term damage to our global ecosystem.

[Decolonize The Left]

Previous posters have well deconstructed this argument, though it can be dismissed without the previous counter-arguments on the basis that it posits a state of nature and hence falls into the pits of idealism.

- August

[apathy maybe]

Inevitable objections from the apologists for inequality about "zomg who will enforce this agreement" break against the fact that humans are smart, and will figure out a way to enforce collective-use property rights just as easily as they have figured out a way to enforce bourgeois property rights.
Or you know, they don't even need to enforce anything 'cause it is in their own best interest not to over fish.


However, I'm not an anarchist, and would be interested to hear how someone who opposes the existence of a state or anything which resembles a state would expect such mutual agreements to be perfectly enforced (if they are not perfectly and universally enforced, then of course you have sown the seeds of a new capitalism, which will soon overtake all of society).
Say what?

OK, you made to fatal assumptions (fatal to your argument I mean). First you say that such agreements have to be perfectly universally enforced without explaining why, else it leads to capitalism. Capitalism is a heck of a lot more than mere ownership of property (otherwise feudal lords would be called capitalists). Moreover, capitalism requires a state to function effectively (or, some would argue, at all). If you have a state to enforce these arguments, you are more likely to be "sowing the seeds of a new capitalism".

Then you say that this "new capitalism" "will soon overtake all of society", again without any evidence. Why would people living in equality and freedom let capitalism come back?

Anyway, so how are these agreements enforced? They don't need to be "perfectly" enforced (as already mentioned). Moreover, most anarchist theory (and of course, I leave "anarcho"-capitalism outside anarchism) rejects the notion of contracts. Therefore, there would be nothing to enforce.

Some interesting articles that might have some slight relevance to the topic:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchist_law
http://www.wendymcelroy.com/print.php?news.1813


The fact is that, while there is ample evidence for the assertion that most states around the world currently are just tools of class rule, I have seen no convincing argument for the assertion that there is something intrinsic to the nature of a state that makes it a tool of class rule. In fact, if it exists to enforce mutual agreements regarding collective use, then by definition it is not an instrument of class rule.
The whole thing about a state is that it is a hierarchical organisation by definition.
States, have a tendency to perpetuate themselves, they don't just go away. The people who work in the state machinery have an interest in keeping the state powerful.

And, if you aren't very careful, the bureaucrats become the ruling class. (Sort of like in the former Soviet Union, and in North Korea.)

I would also like to note, if you only look at the state from an economic perspective, you are going to miss a lot of things. If you examine it from a power perspective, you pick up aspects that might otherwise go unnoticed.

Also, I'd add that the use of any "tragedy of the commons"-type example in support bourgeois property rights is ironically hilarious/sad, given that capitalists in search of a short-term profit are currently wreaking almost certainly irreversible long-term damage to our global ecosystem.
Indeed.

[Post-Something]

Previous posters have well deconstructed this argument, though it can be dismissed without the previous counter-arguments on the basis that it posits a state of nature and hence falls into the pits of idealism.

- August

Huh?

State of Nature is just stateless. How is it idealistic to imagine that? Or were Rousseau, Hobbes, Hume and Locke all idealists as well?

[apathy maybe]

Huh?

State of Nature is just stateless. How is it idealistic to imagine that? Or were Rousseau, Hobbes, Hume and Locke all idealists as well?

The state of nature assumption is that there is no society. There is a big difference between "state of nature" and "statelessness" (though, the first is part of the second).

To say that something requires a state of nature, is to say, first we must get a virgin, untouched land, and then introduce some people who don't have property. They will work it out.

This is impossible. We already have property, there is no virgin untouched land (which is why the liberal/right-libertarian idea of "mixing your labour with land" fails).

Robert Nozick posited a way that a state could emerge without infringing anyone's rights. The only trouble? There was no way to get from here to there there. We can't turn back history and undo all the injustice in the world. Nozick did say that perhaps Rawls' idea of distribution could be used initially.

So, to say that something requires a "state of nature" is to say that it is idealistic. There is no such thing as a "state of nature".

A future perfect society might resemble a "state of nature" in that there is no state. But there are few other similarities, and many differences. A state of nature is not organised, even individualist anarchists desire organisation.

(Oh, and you know that Rousseau, Hobbes, Hume and Locke all provided different ideas for what they considered the "state of nature" to have been? Heh, great quote, I love Hume:

David Hume's view is that the use of a "state of nature" hypothesis in political philosophy is a rhetorical ploy, or at best a thought-experiment, and should not be taken seriously as a statement about what human beings have historically been or done.)

[Demogorgon]

Apathy Maybe is absolutely spot on when it comes to the state of nature. Such arguments tend to boil down to: "so we'll take this fictional state of nature as defined by myself to be the starting point of our argument and apply to it a fictional process of development as defined by myself and lo and behold we get exactly the answer I was looking for!"

[Post-Something]

Thanks for that apathy maybe.

Although, surely the state of nature hypothesis is, as you stated, simply a thought experiment to help us understand the scenario a bit better? The dilemma itself does not rest squarely on the idea of a state of nature. Even wikipedia has an example without bringing up the notion:


illustrate the problem of two states engaged in an arms race (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_race). Both will reason that they have two options, either to increase military expenditure (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_expenditure) or to make an agreement to reduce weapons. Either state will benefit from military expansion regardless of what the other state does; therefore, they both incline towards military expansion. The paradox (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox) is that both states are acting rationally (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationality), but producing an apparently irrational result. This could be considered a corollary (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corollary) to deterrence theory (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deterrence_theory).

So you cannot really deconstruct the argument itself by asserting that it's based on the state of nature.

[Nwoye]

this is just another version of the tragedy of the commons argument and a pretty crappy justification for private property. also it acknowledges that in a "state of nature", land is owned in common, meaning the original appropriation to private owners must be formulated on complete consent on all of those involved for it to be justified - something i highly doubt occurred. also, even if we accept that private property is in this case more efficient than a communitarian approach to property (which isn't an assumption one should make) it still does not justify the appropriation. for example, i couldn't just forcibly take your television on the basis that i would use it more efficiently, regardless of whether or not that's true.

on another argument for property, what do you guys think of Robert Nozick's argument for private property in land? if you're not familiar with it it's essentially that it's justifiable to appropriate land to yourself so long as no one else is made worse off then they were before the appropriation. imo it's the best argument for private property i've heard, though definitely not good enough to make me a capitalist.

[JimmyJazz]

Or you know, they don't even need to enforce anything 'cause it is in their own best interest not to over fish.

In the words of Ernest Hemingway, "Isn't it pretty to think so?"

How can you possibly predict that humans will never engage in opportunistic plunder of the commons if they are allowed to? It only takes one wrench to break a machine, and only one asshole to ruin a communist economy without something or someone to enforce the rules.

I feel like it's just semantic games to say "yes of course it needs to be enforced in a systematic way, but not by a state." That's what a state is: an institutional enforcer of commonly agreed upon rules. It can also be an instrument of class rule of course, but under a socialist economic system it wouldn't be (by definition). You can say that "a state is by definition something above the people", but that is both a false dichotomy and useless semantics. There is no above the people/of the people; there are just degrees of democracy and decentralization. And as far as defining the "state" as something above and separate from and unaccountable to the people, I can just as easily start to define workers' militias (or whatever organ you posit as an alternative systematic enforcer of socialism) in the same way.

And if you think that enforcement should be spontaneous rather than institutionalized, I think that is incredibly idealist and wishful thinking (see below).


If you have a state to enforce these arguments, you are more likely to be "sowing the seeds of a new capitalism".

If you are stating this on the basis of history, we'll just have to agree to disagree about what would have been the outcome of a successful world revolution following the Leninist model. I think a democratic socialism would have eventually resulted. But if you are making it on the basis of something else (something more theoretical), I'd be interested to hear what it is.

(1)
First you say that such agreements have to be perfectly universally enforced without explaining why, else it leads to capitalism.

(2)
Then you say that this "new capitalism" "will soon overtake all of society", again without any evidence. Why would people living in equality and freedom let capitalism come back?

In response to the second one, why wouldn't they? Why did they, when small-scale commodity production originally became large-scale commodity production and transformed all of society into a capitalist system?

I think (1) the idea that capitalism doesn't inherently dominate (because of its need for an ever-expanding market) is flat out incorrect and ahistorical, and (2) the idea that people will ever spontaneously enforce this not happening is both incredibly idealist and completely ahistorical (the only argument I can conceive for it would be that people will have some sort of all-pervasive communist "consciousness" in the future which they did not have in the past when they allowed capitalism to take over the first time).


States, have a tendency to perpetuate themselves, they don't just go away.

I'm not sure if you believe that Lenin et al. were lying when they said that they aimed to create a classless, stateless society; I tend to believe that they simply failed (although they did the best that they could with just one country on board, which is to say, very little).

Maybe your argument is more nuanced than that they were simply lying, in which case, keep reading...


The people who work in the state machinery have an interest in keeping the state powerful.

Second and third generation bureaucrats might. The early Bolsheviks very clearly did not; they genuinely sought a dissolution of the state. This is not evident just in isolated statements that appear as concessions to left-wing communists and anarchists, but rather something that absolutely permeates everything they said and did, both domestically and in their early foreign relations (think of Trotsky's statement upon being appointed commisar of foreign affairs: "What diplomatic work are we apt to have now? I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the people of the world, and then shut up shop").

That a world revolution can never be achieved in a single generation is a different and viable (if not necessarily fatal) argument against the Leninist model, however. And if you were to make this argument, I'd have to admit that I'd be in danger of you turning my charges of "idealism" back against me, because it's very hard to argue that the genuine revolutionaries can ever keep the opportunists in check within a party or (especially) a government over the course of several generations. But of course, showing that the fight against bureaucratization and ossification and the creep of opportunists is very difficult, is not much of an achievement unless you can show why some other path to revolution is less hard.


I would also like to note, if you only look at the state from an economic perspective, you are going to miss a lot of things. If you examine it from a power perspective, you pick up aspects that might otherwise go unnoticed.

I don't think anyone does this, really. I'm sure you've read Lenin's State and Revolution, and are aware that it is what Michael Lowy calls "a remarkable piece of semi-anarchism." I certainly don't ignore the importance of having democracy in all institutions, including those of the Left (whether we are talking about oppositional organizations like labor unions, revolutionary organizations like parties, or established organizations like state socialist governments).

[Schrödinger's Cat]

Socialists don't oppose ownership, nullifying the tragedy of commons dilemma.

[IcarusAngel]

Richard Dawkins has a segment in this in one of his documentaries. They constructed a computer program to play the Prisoner's dilemma game by assuming that there would be numerous kinds of players. So, there was a programs to the effect of: nice (who would always be cooperative), grudgers (who would hold a grudge against those who cheated him), tit-for-tat, selfish capitalists, and so on.

They found that the best strategy with all of these multiple players was tit-for-tat, an inherently cooperative program. That single program alone disproves the idea that it is wrong to be cooperative: clearly, sometimes being cooperative is to have the BEST strategy.

"The success of the strategy, which is largely cooperative, took many by surprise. In successive competitions various teams produced complex strategies which attempted to "cheat" in a variety of cunning ways, but Tit for Tat eventually prevailed in every competition."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tit_for_tat

Furthermore, even if we ignored the facts and admitted ownership of property is the best way to work for the commons, I'm not convinced capitalism is the way to go.

In capitalism, if someone tried to look out for the future of the commons and adjusted his market practice accordingly, he could be undercut in the market place. This happens all the time in the real world and why corporations are always moving towards the "bottom line" so to speak. So, I fail to see how capitalist ownership is the most sufficient solution, although Nozick's is a bet better than the rest.

Also, capitalism creates the problem of the Tragedy of the Anti-commons.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tragedy_of_the_anticommons

That is to say, capitalist property rights like patents, copyrights, etc., end up being counterproductive because they prevent people from freely inventing and creating, and give monopolies to certain individuals. This is also a good argument against capitalism. We see how this happens with market failures or with technologies that probably should have come through like electric cars or at least cars that get far better gas milage than the ones on the roads today.

[apathy maybe]

They found that the best strategy with all of these multiple players was tit-for-tat, an inherently cooperative program. That single program alone disproves the idea that it is wrong to be cooperative: clearly, sometimes being cooperative is to have the BEST strategy.
Yes, I remember reading that as well.

Kropotkin wrote about cooperation and evolution as well (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_Aid:_A_Factor_of_Evolution).

[Kronos]

Let’s assume we are in a ‘state of nature’ where a lake is shared by two neighbours. Neither owns the lake; it is a “common resource.”

That's a bad example to make an argument with. In such a scenario, nobody is working to produce something which will be used by people. The lake is already there, and both users have not invested any effort in making it exist.

Short and sweet: capitalism presents a problem because one class of people is prospering from the work of another. This doesn't make capitalism "unethical", because there is no such thing. What it does is create a necessary chasm between the interests of the competing classes. The classes are at war with each other...and no "law" pacifies, distracts, avoids or prevents this conflict. I do not want another human being getting out of my labor what I do not. It is that simple. I don't care anything about a constitution or democratic vote or any of that shit in a capitalism. All of it irrelevant. The only solution for me would be to become a capitalist myself....and I ain't gonna do it, so I wage war.

I defend the human beings desire to own property and I defend the principle that people are not equal. What I do not defend is the possibility of one person profiting off the labor of another. I believe the state should have absolute authority while the citizens should have the right to own property. The state comprises an internal economic market system where the working classes make wages according to their skill level, and the value of the job as determined by the state through an economic forecast and democratic vote, and are allowed to buy property with their money.

Goodbye capitalists and goodbye hippies.

They call me a hybrid fascist who employs many different principles from many different political ideologies. I think that is too generous. I call me common sense with a huge pair of minerals.