Thesis, antithesis, synthesis [Archive]

Rosa Lichtenstein

24th April 2009, 00:54

Gil:

But your example is just that - an example. In the real world, the three people have some relationship or other. It is a particular movie and a particular circus. THere is a time, date, weather, financial considerations etc - all potential factors in the totalisation of the situation. Thus your example never exists and is persuasive only because the totality is merely the sum of the parts considered separately.

How can this be a 'totality' (unless you are using this word in a rather odd, and as yet unexplained, way)? Moreover, since everything in the entire universe is 'interconnected', this cannot be a sealed unit. In that case, those party to this decision must have been influenced by the movement of a few molecules on the other side of the universe.

As I have written in Essay Eleven Part Two:

It could also be argued that even if the entire nature of each part is determined by its relation to other parts and to the whole, that does not mean that all such influences are of equal significance. In that case, parts that are separated by billions of light years, say, -- or which are not relevantly related to one another -- would have vanishingly small effects on each other, which because of that could safely be ignored. Hence, objects on the outer fringes of the visible universe can for all intents and purposes be ignored -- or, to take another example, the changes to certain parts of an organism (such as to its hair or nails) will have no effect on the rest of that organism (which point might seem to defuse a few of the objections made here).

Now, this would be an effective response had it been made by anyone other than a DM-fan. This is because dialecticians hold that these 'influences' are not external and/or causal, but are "internal" and dialectical-logical. In that case, remoteness has no effect on this type of inter-relation, as it operates between part and part, whole and part or whole and whole.

To give an analogy: suppose that NN (who lives in New York) has a husband who unfortunately dies. This would have an immediate effect on the logical/legal status of NN whether her late partner was in New Jersey or in Tokyo at the time of his death. Distance would be irrelevant in this case. To be sure, the news of the bereavement might take longer to reach the widow if her partner had passed away in East Asia, but that has nothing to do with the logical/legal point being made. Plainly, separation-distance does not mean that widowhood is governed by some sort of inverse square law, so that if the said partner were twice as far away when he died, NN would now be only one quarter of the widow she would have been had he passed away in her arms.

Consider another example: suppose that the committee which controls the standards encapsulated in SI units were to alter the definition of a metre from 100 to 120 centimetres. If so, the length of a metre in distant galaxies, billions of light years away, would immediately change. There is no inverse square law at work here, either --, so the length of this (new) metre would not decrease with the square of the distance.

[The effects of Special Relativity do not enter into this, since it is assumed in this example that it is we who do the measuring, not distant aliens travelling at a greater relative velocity (to us), nor on our perception of their measuring devices. Sure, there might be a Lorentz-Fitzgerald Contraction involved here, but that will be detected by units that do not so alter -- for if they did, the said contraction would be undetectable. And, howsoever these remote distances are measured, any change made to our definitions will have an immediate effect on whatever we determine those remote distances to be. The bottom line here is that no one imagines that the length of a metre rod is a function of separation distance, whatever else affects it.]

Hence, the system-wide implications of the adoption of "internal relations" (which makes a crazy sort of sense in Hegel's mystical Whole), cannot be defused by pretending that they are really external relations in disguise, subject to inverse square laws, and the like.

It could be objected that dialecticians have built "relative interconnectedness" into their theory, which shows that the above comments are misguided.

Sure, they might say that this is what they have done, but until they can show how a logical link is capable of varying -- or decreasing with distance, say, -- their words will remain empty.

Once more, but with respect to a different example: consider the Prime Meridian that passes through Greenwich in South East London -- all other lines of longitude are unquestionably 'internally'-related to this Meridian (but I would wish to express this differently). But no one supposes that longitude 180 degrees West, say, is slightly less of a longitude than 179 degrees West, or that 5 degrees East is more of a longitude than 10 degrees East.

Furthermore, using an 'internal relation' that DM-fans themselves employ: suppose that capitalist C(1) goes on a trip across the globe, but all the while remains the owner of her company back in Paris, France, say. In that case, would she be any less of a capitalist with each mile she travels from her home country? Are the relations of production and ownership separation-sensitive? Would her employees be more, or less, workers as a result?

Of course, no one imagines that class or economic relations can be reduced to the links between their 'parts' taken severally (if we are ever told by DM-fans what these parts are!), but it is nevertheless the case that C(1) will rightly be classified as a capitalist by her legal connection with items that are interconnected by the relations of production and ownership. In that case, distance will not affect those relations, nor her, nor her employees. Taken severally or collectively, these are not governed by inverse square laws.

It could be objected that as a matter of fact inverse square laws do operate in nature, and that because of the force of gravity, for example, distant objects have a negligible effect on one another.

But, the "internal relations" in DM are not like the force of gravity -- which is manifestly an external cause --, so it cannot be used in such an "internalist" way.

Once more, it could be argued that "internal relations" are unlike the logical relations outlined above (concerning the goings on between married partners, varying metric lengths and peripatetic capitalists); so, the above comments are irrelevant.

To be sure, the nature of the interconnections postulated by dialecticians is eminently obscure (as we discovered in Part One of this Essay, and as we will see in Essay Three Part Three), but that is precisely the problem. Until we are told what these are, not even DM-fans will know if, or even how, their commitment to "internal relations" affects these assumed drop-off rates.

This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that there is no evidence at all that the 'internal relations' that DM-fans fantasise about do in fact exist (nor could there be).

More details here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2011_01.htm

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2011%2002.htm

Invariance

25th April 2009, 07:11

For example, in what I consider one of the best chapters in Capital:
Private property, as the antithesis to social, collective property, exists only where the means of labor and the external conditions of labor belong to private individuals. But according as these private individuals are laborers or not laborers, private property has a different character. The numberless shades, that it at first sight presents, correspond to the intermediate stages lying between these two extremes.

The private property of the laborer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or both; petty industry, again, is an essential condition for the development of social production and of the free individuality of the laborer himself. Of course, this petty mode of production exists also under slavery, serfdom, and other states of dependence. But it flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form, only where the laborer is the private owner of his own means of labor set in action by himself: the peasant of the land which he cultivates, the artisan of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso.

This mode of production pre-supposes parcelling of the soil and scattering of the other means of production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so also it excludes co-operation, division of labor within each separate process of production, the control over, and the productive application of the forces of Nature by society, and the free development of the social productive powers. It is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly says, “to decree universal mediocrity".

At a certain stage of development, it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society; but the old social organization fetters them and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the transformation of the individualized and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of the pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the few, the expropriation of the great mass of the people from the soil, from the means of subsistence, and from the means of labor, this fearful and painful expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to the history of capital.

It comprises a series of forcible methods, of which we have passed in review only those that have been epoch-making as methods of the primitive accumulation of capital. The expropriation of the immediate producers was accomplished with merciless Vandalism, and under the stimulus of passions the most infamous, the most sordid, the pettiest, the most meanly odious.

Self-earned private property, that is based, so to say, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent laboring-individual with the conditions of his labor, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labor of others, i.e., on wage-labor. As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed the old society from top to bottom, as soon as the laborers are turned into proletarians, their means of labor into capital, as soon as the capitalist mode of production stands on its own feet, then the further socialization of labor and further transformation of the land and other means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the laborer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many laborers.

This expropriation is accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralization of capital. One capitalist always kills many. Hand in hand with this centralization, or this expropriation of many capitalists by few, develop, on an ever-extending scale, the co-operative form of the labor-process, the conscious technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the transformation of the instruments of labor into instruments of labor only usable in common, the economizing of all means of production by their use as means of production of combined, socialized labor, the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world-market, and with this, the international character of the capitalistic regime. Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the process of capitalist production itself.

The monopoly of capital becomes a fetter upon the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished along with, and under it. Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. Thus integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.

The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labor of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of Nature, its own negation. It is the negation of negation. This does not re-establish private property for the producer, but gives him individual property based on the acquisition of the capitalist era: i.e., on co-operation and the possession in common of the land and of the means of production.

The transformation of scattered private property, arising from individual labor, into capitalist private property is, naturally, a process, incomparably more protracted, violent, and difficult, than the transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically resting on socialized production, into socialized property. In the former case, we had the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers; in the latter, we have the expropriation of a few usurpers by the mass of the people.http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch32.htm

Clearly the language had some influence on him, clearly it had some effect on his understanding of the world and the way it operates.

Rosa Lichtenstein

25th April 2009, 11:14

But, as I have shown, Marx derived this bowdlerised Kantian/Fichtean schema (it's certainly not Hegelian) from Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus. So, this aspect of Das Kapital, at least, cannot represent the alleged 'rational core' of Hegel's system:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=707195&postcount=7

Of course, this is quite apart from the fact that we also know, because Marx told us, that he was merely 'coquetting' with obscure Hegelian phrases like 'the negation of the negation' in Das Kapital. If so, we cannot take his use of obscure jargon like this at all seriously.

And, this is not the least bit surprsing, since, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401001&postcount=77

Finally, even if Marx were serious here, and dialectics could explain change, the above passages would suggest that Marx believed that Capitalism was one huge argument, and its development was powered by thought!

Hence, it is best either to regard these passages as non-serious, or ignore them as we disregard the mystical aspects of Newton's work.

gilhyle

27th April 2009, 00:47

VInnie you are quite right historically - Marx began the use of hegelian terminology by using it quite extensively in Volume One. Duhring picked up on this and charged Marxh with Hegelian schematism - Marx asked Engels to respond on his behalf; Engels responded to the effect that the use of the terminology did not mean that Marx was schematic in his approach, explaining that an hegelian terminology could be used without being schematic......and the matter went from there.

Rosa Lichtenstein

27th April 2009, 00:50

Gil:

Marx began the use of hegelian terminology by using it quite extensively in Volume One. Duhring picked up on this and charged Marxh with Hegelian schematism - Marx asked Engels to respond on his behalf; Engels responded to the effect that the use of the terminology did not mean that Marx was schematic in his approach, explaining that an hegelian terminology could be used without being schematic......and the matter went from there.

Alas for you, as we have shown here many times, Marx (not little old me) told us he was merely 'coquetting' with this obscure jargon in Das Kapital.

But, if you need telling another thousand times before this sinks in, I am just the gal to do it...:)

gilhyle

27th April 2009, 23:31

And you need telling a thousand times that you misunderstand the verb 'to coquette'

Rosa Lichtenstein

27th April 2009, 23:42

Gil:

And you need telling a thousand times that you misunderstand the verb 'to coquette'

Well, you certainly can't help me out; the last time you tried, you failed miserably.

Still, 999 more of your failures to go...

Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor

27th April 2009, 23:55

Gil:

Well, you certainly can't help me out; the last time you tried, you failed miserably.

Still, 999 more of your failures to go...

Harsh, although I looked up the word. It means "to flirt." You can flirt with an idea. You consider its truth for a brief period, generally, and move on with your other pursuits. It often implies nothing significant arose from the consideration, but it doesn't necessarily imply that.

More importantly, language is used for expressive purposes. It's clear what she meant. Languages changes. There is only a problem when it leads to confusion, which I admit is often. However, it doesn't in this case if you "know" what the word references.

Rosa Lichtenstein

28th April 2009, 00:27

Dooga:

It means "to flirt." You can flirt with an idea. You consider its truth for a brief period, generally, and move on with your other pursuits. It often implies nothing significant arose from the consideration, but it doesn't necessarily imply that.

The full definition is:

A woman who makes teasing sexual or romantic overtures; a flirt.

The point is that Gil wants us to read this in a complicated fashion so that it does not mean what the word actually says -- that is, that Marx was not using Hegelian jargon seriously. [These days we'd use 'scare quotes' perhaps.]

More importantly, language is used for expressive purposes. It's clear what she meant. Languages changes. There is only a problem when it leads to confusion, which I admit is often. However, it doesn't in this case if you "know" what the word references.

I beg to differ. It is rarely clear what Gil means; in fact, if he/she put bag over his/her head, donned boxing gloves and randomly bashed away at his/her keyboard, she'd make more sense.

Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor

28th April 2009, 06:58

My fault, Rosa. I was siding with you, there. I should have clarified that. It was "clear" what you meant. However, I was admitting, for Gil, that the word might be considered as implying that the person didn't commit to the idea. They only flirted with it. Maybe that's also the sense you meant it. Either way, it's analytically a valid use was my main point. The other point was that, perhaps, another word could have been more "precise." However, we can't fault people for lack of precision, necessarily.

Basically, I was suggesting maybe you are using a less popular usage of the word that could "potentially" lead to confusing in someone who, recognizing the context, assumes something about Marx's belief in what he "flirted with."

gilhyle

29th April 2009, 00:23

And my point has always been this - the word coquette is not self explanatory in this case - one needs to read it in context to understand Marx's use of it; therefore one must read it merely as an addendum to the reading of all the usages of hegelian terminology by Marx in Capital. The word to coquette opens up (and delimits) a range of options which only the careful examination of the actual usage of the hegelian concepts in Volume One will resolve. That, however, is something Rosa will not do.

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th April 2009, 01:33

Gil:

the word coquette is not self explanatory in this case - one needs to read it in context to understand Marx's use of it; therefore one must read it merely as an addendum to the reading of all the usages of hegelian terminology by Marx in Capital. The word to coquette opens up (and delimits) a range of options which only the careful examination of the actual usage of the hegelian concepts in Volume One will resolve. That, however, is something Rosa will not do.

Well, we need not speculate, for Marx very helpfully explained this to us. Indeed, he quoted a reviewer thus:

"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

Once more, you will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics you have had forced down your throat, for in it there is not one ounce of Hegel -- no quantity turning into quality, no contradictions, no negation of the negation, no unities of opposites, no totality...

So, Marx's method has had Hegel totally extirpated. For Marx, putting Hegel on 'his feet' is to crush his head.

So, the 'rational core' of the dialectic has not one atom of Hegel in it, which is why Marx merely 'coquetted' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

That is hardly a ringing endorsement of this mystical theory...

Cumannach

29th April 2009, 11:08

I don't see how that quote implies Marx didn't use dialectics.

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th April 2009, 11:23

Cummanach:

I don't see how that quote implies Marx didn't use dialectics.

Read what I said:

Once more, you will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics you have had forced down your throat, for in it there is not one ounce of Hegel -- no quantity turning into quality, no contradictions, no negation of the negation, no unities of opposites, no totality...

So, Marx's method has had Hegel totally extirpated. For Marx, putting Hegel on 'his feet' is to crush his head.

So, the 'rational core' of the dialectic has not one atom of Hegel in it, which is why Marx merely 'coquetted' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

That is hardly a ringing endorsement of this mystical theory...

Cumannach

29th April 2009, 11:59

The reviewer says;

“The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; ...”

And what Marx says is true;

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?
Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner connexion. "

Marx then says he employed some of Hegel's peculiar expressions in the chapter of Capital on value, and then affirms that the basic dialectical method of Hegel is, still, despite Hegel's mysticism, valid - and the basis of his materialist dialectics-

"[I] in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner."

How is this a by any interpretation a rejection of dialectics?

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th April 2009, 13:00

Cummanach:

And what Marx says is true;

Indeed, and the summary Marx (not me) endorses as 'his method' contains not one atom of Hegel.

And the passages you highlighted come from Historical Materialism (a scientific theory), not dialectical materialism (a Hermetic cess pool).

Marx then says he employed some of Hegel's peculiar expressions in the chapter of Capital on value, and then affirms that the basic dialectical method of Hegel is, still, despite Hegel's mysticism, valid - and the basis of his materialist dialectics-

Already covered: Marx tells us he merely 'coquetted' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon. In other words, he was not using these terms seriously.

How is this a by any interpretation a rejection of dialectics?

Easy, Marx's version of dialectics (which more closely resembles that of Aristotle and Kant) has had every trace of Hegel removed, except for the limited use of a few Hegelian buzz-words, which Marx merely used non-seriously.

And a good job too; as we have already had established: if 'dialectics' (as you lot understand it) were true, change would be impossible.

Hit The North

29th April 2009, 13:16

R:
Easy, Marx's version of dialectics (which more closely resembles that of Aristotle and Kant) had every trace of Hegel removed, except for the limited use of a few Hegelian buzz-words, with which Marx merely used non-seriously.Except Marx writes:
The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.This would indicate that Marx thinks he has appropriated its "general form". He does not write that his dialectic is Kantian or derived from Aristotle. Of course, it is possible that Marx was unaware of his reversion to these earlier forms of dialectic. But it is beholden on you to take this debate further by outlining what you consider to be the dialectical method of Kant or Aristotle and demonstrate how Marx is employing it in Das Kapital.

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th April 2009, 13:53

BTB (quoting Marx):

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.

We have already been over this!

This mystification, as Marx says, does not indeed prevent Hegel from doing what Marx says, but other things do.

Since no one has presented the dialectic in a 'comprehensible and conscious' manner, nor can they (certainly you mystics have yet to do this), no one can be first, just as no one can be the first to square the circle.

And this explains why Marx dropped Hegel (and indicated quite clearly that he had done so in that summary he endorsed, which you just ignore), and why he used Hegelian jargon non-seriously.

This would indicate that Marx thinks he has appropriated its "general form". He does not write that his dialectic is Kantian or derived from Aristotle. Of course, it is possible that Marx was unaware of his reversion to these earlier forms of dialectic. But it is beholden on you to take this debate further by outlining what you consider to be the dialectical method of Kant or Aristotle and demonstrate how Marx is employing it in Das Kapital.

Before I do that, we need to see one of you (just one will do -- but I and several others have been asking this for over three years, with no coherent response, or none at all, coming from you mystics) explain 'the dialectic'.

And, worse of all, you, BTB, reject Hegel even more than you now claim Marx actually adopted his ideas!

I contend that Marx dropped the 'unity and interpenetration of opposites', the 'negation of the negation', the transformation of 'quantity into quality', and you object to this (in the above manner). And yet, you also reject these obscure notions!

So, your 'version' of the dialectic bears little relation to that which Marx allegedly adopted in Das Kapital!

So, you least of all, have room to point fingers.

Indeed, before I even so much as attempt to answer your questions, we need to see you respond to this sort of challenge:

BTB:

No, I'm merely arguing that it is not the formulae proffered to capture general patterns of change which is the component which sustains our optimism, but the general spirit of the dialectical view.

What 'general spirit' of 'the dialectical view' are you talking about? Without change through 'internal contradiction' (but see below), based on the 'unity and interpenetration of polar opposites', guided by the 'negation of the negation' and the transformation of 'quantity into quality' (all of which terms appear in Das Kapital, which jargon I claim Marx's was using non-seriously, to which allegation you took great exception), there is no 'dialectic' as the 'great dialecticians' (including Tony Cliff) understood this 'theory'.

Now, it's all the same to me if you have resiled from your earlier unwise acceptance of this mystical creed under my relentless attack, but at least have the decency to admit that your 'spirit of the dialectic' is little more than a ghostly apparition hovering over what is left of its dead and decaying corpse.

Meanwhile, no I don't reject the concept of contradiction driving social change which we find all over Das Kapital; I merely restrict its usage to the social.

In that case, you must reject the 'unity and interpenetration of polar opposites' (and thus the thesis that the proletariat is the dialectical 'opposite' of the capitalist class), the 'negation of the negation' (a term that also appears in Das Kapital) and the alleged transformation of 'quantity into quality' (ditto).

Unless, like me, you think that Marx was using these obscure terms non-seriously.

If so, on what basis do you think he was using 'contradiction' in a non-'coquettish' manner?

It strikes me that you are uncomfortably like those theologians who look at the miracles of the Bible (and the rest of the rubbish that book contains), and then at modern science, shrug their shoulders and just appeal to the 'spirit' of the 'good book', cherry-picking which bits they find acceptable, not realising that in adopting such an intellectually bankrupt compromise, the game is up.

As I said, try running your 'revisionist' ghost of a theory past your fellow coven-hounds in the Dialectical Materialist Group. You will soon be subject to the same sort of abuse and emotive response that has been directed at yours truly.

It most certainly is.

Indeed, but it is not 'dialectics' as Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, Tony Cliff, Chris Harman, Alex Callinicos..., understand it.

In fact, it is about as accurate to describe your ghostly theory as 'dialectics' as it is to call Tony Blair a 'socialist'.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1426383&postcount=9

Cumannach

29th April 2009, 16:51

Indeed, and the summary Marx (not me) endorses as 'his method' contains not one atom of Hegel.

It's a reviewer summing up (or attempting to as he sees it) Marx's finished materialist analysis. In this summary, the reviewer points out a number of characteristics of the analysis, which anyone with a slight knowledge of dialectics, can be forgiven for concluding were come by via dialectics, as the author, Marx actually states himself anyway. For example;

"The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena..."

"Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one."

"...not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution..."

And Marx points out that the dialectical method is a method which neccesarily results in an analysis of such a character.

Rosa Lichtenstein

29th April 2009, 23:06

Cummanach:

It's a reviewer summing up (or attempting to as he sees it) Marx's finished materialist analysis. In this summary, the reviewer points out a number of characteristics of the analysis, which anyone with a slight knowledge of dialectics, can be forgiven for concluding were come by via dialectics, as the author, Marx actually states himself anyway. For example;

Which Marx (not I) endorsed as 'his method', and in which there is no trace of Hegel; no 'contradiction', no 'unity and interpentration of opposites', no 'negation of the negation', no 'quantity passing over into quality', no 'totality', no 'universal change'...

And, once more, the passages you quote are manifestly non-Hegelian; indeed, they are Historical Materialist ideas (a theory invented by the Scottish School of Historical Materialists, and Kant, not Hegel -- he just mystified it).

And Marx points out that the dialectical method is a method which neccesarily results in an analysis of such a character.

Indeed, it does so result, but, according to this endorsement by Marx, it achieves this without an atom of Hegel.

No wonder then that Marx only 'coquetted' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital -- and as I said earlier: good job too, since we now know that if dialectics (as you lot understand it) were true, change would be impossible.

Hit The North

29th April 2009, 23:57

R:
Historical Materialist ideas (a theory invented by the Scottish School of Historical Materialists, and Kant,

You keep making this claim without a shred of evidence produced. I'd be happy to see the texts whereby either Kant or the Scottish School "invent" historical materialism in any organised sense.

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th April 2009, 00:17

BTB:

You keep making this claim without a shred of evidence produced. I'd be happy to see the texts whereby either Kant or the Scottish School "invent" historical materialism in any organised sense.

I have done this, but you must have missed it (see below)

Anyway, it is rather odd that, anti-Hegelian that you are, you should be defending that mystery-meister Hegel in this regard. Or, do you think someone else invented this theory?

[Recall, I am not denying Marx systematised this theory, only that he invented it.]

Here is my earlier post:

It is not I who called them this, but others, mainly Marx and Engels.

Ronald Meek, "The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology" [1954; collected in his Economics and Ideology and Other Essays, 1967. Such luminaries as Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith. This influence was actually acknowledged. In The German Ideology, right after announcing their theme that "men be in a position to live in order to be able to `make history'", they say "The French and the English, even if they have conceived the relation of this fact with so-called history only in an extremely one-sided fashion, particularly as long as they remained in the toils of political ideology, have nevertheless made the first attempts to give the writing of history a materialistic basis by being the first to write histories of civil society, of commerce and industry."]

http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/notebooks/historical-materialism.html

I have to say that the above link is hostile to Marx and Engels, but there is little available on the internet on this.

Meek actually calls them the "Scottish Historical School" (p.35), but he attributes this to Roy Pascal (Communist Party member, friend of Wittgenstein and translator of the German Ideology), who used it in his article "Property and Society: The Scottish Historical School of the Eighteenth Century" Modern Quarterly March 1938.

The full passage is:

Since we are dealing with the Germans, who are devoid of premises, we must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to “make history.” But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life. Even when the sensuous world is reduced to a minimum, to a stick as with Saint Bruno [Bauer], it presupposes the action of producing the stick. Therefore in any interpretation of history one has first of all to observe this fundamental fact in all its significance and all its implications and to accord it its due importance. It is well known that the Germans have never done this, and they have never, therefore, had an earthly basis for history and consequently never an historian. The French and the English, even if they have conceived the relation of this fact with so-called history only in an extremely one-sided fashion, particularly as long as they remained in the toils of political ideology, have nevertheless made the first attempts to give the writing of history a materialistic basis by being the first to write histories of civil society, of commerce and industry

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htm

In the Poverty of Philosophy, Marx wrote:

Let us do him this justice: Lemontey wittily exposed the unpleasant consequences of the division of labor as it is constituted today, and M. Proudhon found nothing to add to it. But now that, through the fault of M. Proudhon, we have been drawn into this question of priority, let us say again, in passing, that long before M. Lemontey, and 17 years before Adam Smith, who was a pupil of A. Ferguson, the last-named gave a clear exposition of the subject in a chapter which deals specifically with the division of labor.

p.181 of MECW volume 6.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/ch02b.htm

Marx refers to Ferguson repeatedly in his 'Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' (MECW volume 300, pp.264-306), as he does to others of the same 'school' (Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart) throughout this work:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1861/economic/ch32.htm

He does so too in Volume One of Das Kapital -- MECW volume 35, p.133, 359, 366, 367. [He also refers to others of that 'school', Robertson, p.529, Stewart and Smith (the references to these two are too numerous to list).]

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/cw/volume35/index.htm

Indeed, throughout his entire works, the references to Smith and Stewart are too numerous to list.

But, call them what you like, Marx learnt from them.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1195129&postcount=57

Kant's influence can be found here (these references were given me by Phil Gasper, if you know who he is):

Wood, A, (1998), 'Kant's Historical Materialism' in Kneller and Axinn, Chapter Five.

--------, (1999), Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press).

Kneller, J., and Axinn, S, (1998), Autonomy And Community: Readings In Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy (State University of New York Press).

Hit The North

30th April 2009, 00:33

I'm not defending Hegel. Why do you think that because someone is disagreeing with you, they must be defending Hegel. It is this kind of binary thinking which a dose of dialectics could free you from.:lol:

[Recall, I am not denying Marx systematised this theory, only that he invented it.]

If they didn't systematise it, it could hardly be described as a theory then - let alone "their" theory.

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th April 2009, 00:43

BTB:

I'm not defending Hegel. Why do you think that because someone is disagreeing with you, they must be defending Hegel. It is this kind of binary thinking which a dose of dialectics could free you from.

So, from where do you think Marx got this theory?

If they didn't systematise it, it could hardly be described as a theory then - let alone "their" theory.

Depends what you mean by 'theory'. It was certainly systematised by Adam Smith, and by Adam Ferguson -- but not to the same extent as Marx. Kant certainly systematised it (but, again, not to the same extent as Marx).

To deny that their work constituted a theory would be tantamount to rejecting, say, Kepler and Galileo's work as a theory just because Newton's theory was superior and more systematic.

By the way, we are still waiting for a response to this:

BTB:

No, I'm merely arguing that it is not the formulae proffered to capture general patterns of change which is the component which sustains our optimism, but the general spirit of the dialectical view.

What 'general spirit' of 'the dialectical view' are you talking about? Without change through 'internal contradiction' (but see below), based on the 'unity and interpenetration of polar opposites', guided by the 'negation of the negation' and the transformation of 'quantity into quality' (all of which terms appear in Das Kapital, which jargon I claim Marx's was using non-seriously, to which allegation you took great exception), there is no 'dialectic' as the 'great dialecticians' (including Tony Cliff) understood this 'theory'.

Now, it's all the same to me if you have resiled from your earlier unwise acceptance of this mystical creed under my relentless attack, but at least have the decency to admit that your 'spirit of the dialectic' is little more than a ghostly apparition hovering over what is left of its dead and decaying corpse.

Meanwhile, no I don't reject the concept of contradiction driving social change which we find all over Das Kapital; I merely restrict its usage to the social.

In that case, you must reject the 'unity and interpenetration of polar opposites' (and thus the thesis that the proletariat is the dialectical 'opposite' of the capitalist class), the 'negation of the negation' (a term that also appears in Das Kapital) and the alleged transformation of 'quantity into quality' (ditto).

Unless, like me, you think that Marx was using these obscure terms non-seriously.

If so, on what basis do you think he was using 'contradiction' in a non-'coquettish' manner?

It strikes me that you are uncomfortably like those theologians who look at the miracles of the Bible (and the rest of the rubbish that book contains), and then at modern science, shrug their shoulders and just appeal to the 'spirit' of the 'good book', cherry-picking which bits they find acceptable, not realising that in adopting such an intellectually bankrupt compromise, the game is up.

As I said, try running your 'revisionist' ghost of a theory past your fellow coven-hounds in the Dialectical Materialist Group. You will soon be subject to the same sort of abuse and emotive response that has been directed at yours truly.

It most certainly is.

Indeed, but it is not 'dialectics' as Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, Tony Cliff, Chris Harman, Alex Callinicos..., understand it.

In fact, it is about as accurate to describe your ghostly theory as 'dialectics' as it is to call Tony Blair a 'socialist'.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1426383&postcount=9

gilhyle

30th April 2009, 00:46

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th April 2009, 00:51

The Midnight-Creeper:

The bizare part of this is that here is a gloss on the use of dialectical ideas in Captial, a gloss which clearly aims to explain a usage which DOES involve using those terms - and which aims to explain it by not using the terms explained as is a good procedure - but because the terms the usage of which is to be explained are not used in the gloss then Rosa concludes that the gloss is divorced from what it seeks to explain.

Well, we need not speculate, since Marx cleared this up for us, since he quoted a reviewer thus:

"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:*

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

You will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics you have had forced down your throat, for in it there is not one ounce of Hegel -- no quantity turning into quality, no contradictions, no negation of the negation, no unities of opposites, no totality...

So, Marx's method has had Hegel totally extirpated. And of the few terms Marx uses of Hegel's in Das Kapital, he tells us this:

"and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him."

So, the 'rational core' of the dialectic has not one atom of Hegel in it, and Marx merely 'coquetted' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

So, only another 999 more goes before this sinks into your class-compromised skull.

Its a quite bizarre argument, which only has any appearance of substance by being supported by a refusal to go on and read the actual texts within Capital - Rosa refuses to do this (and instead tries to shift the burden of disproving her bizarre reading on to her opponents ) because she can only produce the vaguest simulacrum of a reading of Marxs poltiical economy without using Marx's complex dialectical methodology.

A similar vagueness arises in the anachronistic application of the term 'historical materialism' to the Scottish Enlightenment and Kantian ideas which are - definitiely - part of the origins of Marx's materialist conception of history, but are not part of that.

This very manouver also indicates the assimilation of Marxism to bourgoies thinking (Englihtenment and analytical views ) which Rosa's perspective represents.

I refer the honourable mystic to my comments above.

gilhyle

30th April 2009, 01:01

Reduced now to cutting and pasting your own prior comments in the paranoid desire to have the last word.....the comedy continues.

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th April 2009, 01:04

Midnight Creeper:

Reduced now to cutting and pasting your own prior comments in the paranoid desire to have the last word.....

If it takes another 999 goes before you wise up, sure.

the comedy continues.

Indeed, you are always good for a laugh...

gilhyle

30th April 2009, 01:06

ditto

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th April 2009, 01:13

Midnight Creeper:

ditto

No, stop it. That's hilarious!

Hit The North

30th April 2009, 01:44

R:

Indeed, before I even so much as attempt to answer your questions, we need to see you respond to this sort of challenge:

Done. Now perhaps you can give some attention to outlining the Kantian and Aristotlian dialectic(s)?

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th April 2009, 01:45

BTB:

Now perhaps you can give some attention to outlining the Kantian and Aristotlian dialectic(s)?

Ok, here is my attempt (which is just as pathetic as your attempt to answer my post):

Kant...

More in ten years time.

Hit The North

30th April 2009, 01:53

See, I knew you weren't up to it.

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th April 2009, 01:54

BTB:

See, I knew you weren't up to it.

On the contrary, I was just as pathetic as you.

Cumannach

30th April 2009, 11:39

Which Marx (not I) endorsed as 'his method', and in which there is no trace of Hegel; no 'contradiction', no 'unity and interpentration of opposites', no 'negation of the negation', no 'quantity passing over into quality', no 'totality', no 'universal change'...
Marx didn't endorse it as his method, this is what he said;

"That the method employed in “Das Kapital” has been little understood, is shown by the various conceptions, contradictory one to another, that have been formed of it...German reviews, of course, shriek out at “Hegelian sophistics.” The European Messenger of St. Petersburg ...finds... my method of presentation, unfortunately, German-dialectical. ...the writer goes on: “The one thing which is of moment to Marx, ...”

Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?...The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner."

So he didn't endorse the description of his analysis as actually showing his method he says;

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?"

And you think Marx goes on to contradict himself, a few lines later when he says that his dialectics are Hegel's, but cutting out the idealism and mystification? Is this the only evidence you have for your claim that Marx secretly abandoned dialectics?

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th April 2009, 14:56

Cummanach:

Marx didn't endorse it as his method, this is what he said;

Oh yes he does:

"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on...

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?"

I am not sure why you think otherwise.

But, you add this, from a later paragraph (perhaps as some sort of support):

The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner."

I have already dealt with this in one of my replies to BTB:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1429436&postcount=24

Cummanach

And you think Marx goes on to contradict himself, a few lines later when he says that his dialectics are Hegel's, but cutting out the idealism and mystification? Is this the only evidence you have for your claim that Marx secretly abandoned dialectics?

No, Marx is quite clear: the method he says 'pictures' his method, contains not one atom of Hegel -- so Marx (not I) tells us that a picture of his method, 'the dialectic method', contains no Hegel at all.

Now, if this reviewer were leaving something significant out, Marx would hardly tell us it was a picture of 'the dialectic method', unless of course, the Hegelian part was so insignificant, its ommission was of no matter.

So, if someone drew a picture of your face, but left your eyes, nose and mouth out, we'd hardly call that a pictue of you. But, if they left out a few specs of dandruff, no one would complain.

The Hegelian stuff is the dandruff.

The other alleged endorsement of Hegel is not much better:

The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner."

You will note that Marx put this in the past tense; we can also see from this that his current regard for Hegel is so 'high' that the best he can do is 'coquette' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon, here and there!

Hardly a ringing endorsement of that allegedly 'mighty thinker'.

Finally, calling Hegel a 'mighty thinker' is no endorsement either, whether in the past or the present tense. I think Plato is a 'mighty thinker', but I disagree with 99.99% of what he says.

gilhyle

30th April 2009, 16:48

Now, if this reviewer were leaving something significant out, Marx would hardly tell us it was a picture of 'the dialectic method', unless of course, the Hegelian part was so insignificant, its ommission was of no matter.

Which would of course mean - fi your tangental reading were correct - that marx was suggesting - and doing so as a mere aside - that 'the dialectical method' involved not a bit of Hegel....note that he would be claiming not that his method contained not a bit of Hegel, but that the dialectical method contained not a bit of Hegel....THE DIALECTICAL METHOD !!!!

THis woould be quite a claim, namely that Hegel was not a dialectician. See where tangental overreading gets you. Instead of placing too much weight on one mere phrase and a misunderstanding of the significance of paraphrase, you should just go and read the parts of Kapital where Marx actually uses dialectics.

Rosa Lichtenstein

30th April 2009, 19:20

Gil, getting quite het-up, so much so that he/she is making more than his/her usual number of typos:

Which would of course mean - fi your tangental reading were correct - that marx was suggesting - and doing so as a mere aside - that 'the dialectical method' involved not a bit of Hegel....note that he would be claiming not that his method contained not a bit of Hegel, but that the dialectical method contained not a bit of Hegel....THE DIALECTICAL METHOD !!!!

Aaaannddd...

THis woould be quite a claim, namely that Hegel was not a dialectician. See where tangental overreading gets you. Instead of placing too much weight on one mere phrase and a misunderstanding of the significance of paraphrase, you should just go and read the parts of Kapital where Marx actually uses dialectics.

Blame Marx for confusing you, not me.

In fact, since he was quite clear, I think we can restrict the circle of blame to just you.

And of course Hegel wasn't a dialectician (in Marx's sense) -- he was a confused mystic.

gilhyle

30th April 2009, 22:32

Hegel wasn't a dialectician (in Marx's sense)

WHich brings us to a very simple question at the heart of all this.....what sense would that be ?

Rosa Lichtenstein

1st May 2009, 00:04

Ah, Gil to your more nornal hauning hour, I see:

WHich brings us to a very simple question at the heart of all this.....what sense would that be ?

No need to speculate, for Marx told us:

"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

Once more, you will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics you have naively swallowed, for in it there is not one ounce of Hegel -- no 'quantity turning into quality', no 'contradictions', no 'negation of the negation', no 'unities of opposites', no 'totality'...

So, Marx's method has had Hegel totally extirpated. For Marx, putting Hegel on 'his feet' is to crush his head.

So, only another 998 reminders before this penetrates into that Heretic House of Horrors you keep between your ears.

Cumannach

1st May 2009, 09:04

Rosa I guess we just don' agree on that selective interpretation of one sentence of Marx. But in any case, your claim that Marx secretly abandoned dialectics isn't based solely around one sentence in an afterword, so what is the other evidence? It must be pretty strong and explain why Marx repeatedly stated he method was dialectics and why he used dialectics in Capital.

Rosa Lichtenstein

1st May 2009, 12:37

Cummanach:

Rosa I guess we just don' agree on that selective interpretation of one sentence of Marx. But in any case, your claim that Marx secretly abandoned dialectics isn't based solely around one sentence in an afterword, so what is the other evidence? It must be pretty strong and explain why Marx repeatedly stated he method was dialectics and why he used dialectics in Capital.

Well, since I take Marx's last published comments as a guide to what he actually thought, and since he endorsed a 'picture' of the 'dialectic' that bears no relation to the tradition that has descended to us from Engels and Plekhanov, and which thus contains no trace of Hegel, and since Marx (not me) tells us that he was using Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital non-seriously (i.e., he was 'coquetting' with it), I rather think that it is you (and the vast majority of Marx's supposed followers -- small wonder he said he was no Marxist) who mis-interpret his method.

[Note that I do not deny that Marx called his method 'dialectics', but it more closely resembles that of Aristotle and Kant, and bears no relation to that which is supposedly contained in Hegel's work. So, when I say Marx abandoned the 'dialectics', I am referring to the tradition you have swallowed, not that which can be found in Marx.]

Cumannach

2nd May 2009, 00:11

Well, since I take Marx's last published comments as a guide to what he actually thought, and since he endorsed a 'picture' of the 'dialectic' that bears no relation to the tradition ...
Well let's look at the lines that follow the line upon which it appears your whole claim hangs -that Marx abruptly abandoned dialectics mid paragraph; These lines surely are in fact the last coming at the very end of the piece;

"My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. ...With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought....The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner..."

So Hegel first presented dialectic comprehensively, and Marx turned it on it's head by cutting out the idealism and rooting it in materialism. Presumably then Marx uses Hegel's dialectics, but without the idealism, and ensuant mystification. Why else would he say ;

"The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner..." ?

Then Marx makes a comparison;

"In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary."

Surelyan endorsement of dialectics?Then, near the very end, how does he choose to start off his sentence?

"...The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire."

Here we have a clear endorsement of dialectics. If Marx's new version of Hegelian dialectics is what he's talking about, and everything above suggests it is, when the next capitalist crisis comes around 'dialectics' will drum itself into their heads- But then obviously dialectics is the way to understand the crisis.

[Note that I do not deny that Marx called his method 'dialectics', but it more closely resembles that of Aristotle and Kant, and bears no relation to that which is supposedly contained in Hegel's work. So, when I say Marx abandoned the 'dialectics', I am referring to the tradition you have swallowed, not that which can be found in Marx.]
Well Rosa, there's at least (in fact a thousand times more) evidence in the 1873 afterword to suggest that Marx believed it did bear quite a relation to Hegel's work (as well as evidence that this was true). So, you really cannot use this document to back up your claim. Have you got anything else?

Rosa Lichtenstein

2nd May 2009, 02:02

Cummanach (we have actually been through this many times at RevLeft, so this is getting rather tedious):

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. ...With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought....The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner..."

Indeed, the 'direct opposite' of Hegel is no Hegel at all.

And, Marx's comments about the ideal being "nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought" is correct, and these 'forms of thought' are empty, and that is why Marx endorsed a 'picture' of the 'dialectic' that contained not one atom of Hegel. The material world these particular forms 'reflect' consists of the material relations of petty-bourgeois mystics like Hegel, who, as Marx noted in the German Ideology, have to distort ordinary language to make their 'theories' appear to work:

The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.

Bold added.

This is why I said what I did about Zeno in that other thread.

As for this:

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner..."

I have already covered it above. Here it is again:

BTB (quoting Marx):

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.

We have already been over this!

This mystification, as Marx says, does not indeed prevent Hegel from doing what Marx says, but other things do.

Since no one has presented the dialectic in a 'comprehensible and conscious' manner, nor can they (certainly you mystics have yet to do this), no one can be first, just as no one can be the first to square the circle.

And this explains why Marx dropped Hegel (and indicated quite clearly that he had done so in that summary he endorsed, which you just ignore), and why he used Hegelian jargon non-seriously.

And I have been over this several times, too:

In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.

The highlighted part of passage suggests the 'dialectic' is a person! So we can't take this literally. And nor should we, since this is plainly where Marx is 'coquetting' with these obscure terms.

This can also be seen from the hyperbole Marx introduces

In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things,

Since the professors Marx refers to in fact totally ignore 'the dialectic' (few have read Das Kapital even to this day), they can hardly be scandalised by it; and no wonder -- it has no rational form, except that from which every trace of Hegel has been removed, as Marx indicated when he endorsed the 'picture' of the dialectic summarised by that reviewer (who was a professor, and he wasn't 'abominated' by it).

What about this?

...The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire.

How many more time do you need reminding that Marx is here 'coquetting' with Hegelian buzz-words (such as 'dialectical contradiction' -- an obscure term that no one has been able to explain in 200 years)?

Historical Materialism (not dialectical materialism) is adequate enough to show that bourgeois society is unstable, and ripe for revolution. We do not need Hegel to tell us this -- nor can he. As I have already shown: if Hegel's theory (or that contained in 'materialist dialectics') were true, change would be impossible.

Here we have a clear endorsement of dialectics. If Marx's new version of Hegelian dialectics is what he's talking about, and everything above suggests it is, when the next capitalist crisis comes around 'dialectics' will drum itself into their heads- But then obviously dialectics is the way to understand the crisis.

Not so; we already know from his earlier words that Marx was merely 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital, just as we know that Marx's version of 'dialectics' contains has no trace of Hegel.

Well Rosa, there's at least (in fact a thousand times more) evidence in the 1873 afterword to suggest that Marx believed it did bear quite a relation to Hegel's work (as well as evidence that this was true). So, you really cannot use this document to back up your claim. Have you got anything else?

As we have seen, this is not so; there is no evidence at all that Marx retained a single Hegelian idea -- upside down, or the right way up --, whereas we have Marx's own endorsement of a 'picture' of the 'dialectic' from which every trace of Hegel has been removed.

Hit The North

2nd May 2009, 11:13

R:
Indeed, the 'direct opposite' of Hegel is no Hegel at all.Does that mean the 'direct opposite' of a kettle is 'no kettle'? Because according to you in this post:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/search.php?searchid=1167687

it would be incorrect to argue this. So extrapolating from this logic it would be incorrect to say that the opposite of Hegel is the absence of Hegel. You would need to locate the 'anti-Hegel' to demonstrate his opposite.

Rosa Lichtenstein

2nd May 2009, 11:34

BTB:

Does that mean the 'direct opposite' of a kettle is 'no kettle'?

Does that mean the 'direct opposite' of a kettle is 'no kettle'? Because according to you in this post:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/search.php?searchid=1167687

it would be incorrect to argue this. So extrapolating from this logic it would be incorrect to say that the opposite of Hegel is the absence of Hegel. You would need to locate the 'anti-Hegel' to demonstrate his opposite.

The above link is dead.

Hit The North

2nd May 2009, 11:43

It works for me. Nevertheless, here's a link to the actual thread:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/do-all-things-t68956/index.html
(http://www.revleft.com/vb/../do-all-things-t68956/index.html?t=68956)

Rosa Lichtenstein

2nd May 2009, 17:58

Thanks, that works.

BTB:

R:

Indeed, the 'direct opposite' of Hegel is no Hegel at all.

Does that mean the 'direct opposite' of a kettle is 'no kettle'? Because according to you in this post:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/search.php?searchid=1167687

it would be incorrect to argue this. So extrapolating from this logic it would be incorrect to say that the opposite of Hegel is the absence of Hegel. You would need to locate the 'anti-Hegel' to demonstrate his opposite.

And I thought I was supposed to be the pedant!?

Just for you, then, the opposite of "A method that contains some Hegel" is "A method that contains no Hegel".

So, no need to refer to kettles after all...

gilhyle

2nd May 2009, 20:38

'necessity' = dialectic

'laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence' = materialist character of the dialectic of history

'a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period' = totality

'the social movement as a process of natural history' = totality

'the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution' = totality

'the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions' = contradiction

'The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one' - science consists in disclosing the dialectic of the object of enquiry

'the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves' = thesis/antithesis/sythesis ie. linked stages of an evolution

' the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over' = negation of the negation

BTW, Rosa since there is not a word of the distinctive terminology of either Kant or Aristotle in this mysteriouse reviewers text there is, by your bizarre method of argumentation not a jot of Kant or Aristotle in Marx either ! such is the amazing power of this reviewer that he/she determines for us what Marx thought.

By the same logic, since this review is full of this reviewers terminology, that makes Marx a follower of this mysterious reviewer.

Rosa Lichtenstein

2nd May 2009, 21:34

Gil:

'necessity' = dialectic

'laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence' = materialist character of the dialectic of history

'a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period' = totality

'the social movement as a process of natural history' = totality

'the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution' = totality

'the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions' = contradiction

'The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one' - science consists in disclosing the dialectic of the object of enquiry

'the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves' = thesis/antithesis/sythesis ie. linked stages of an evolution

' the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over' = negation of the negation

These are your interpolations, and since Marx did not make them, we can take them with a pinch of non-dialectical salt.

BTW, Rosa since there is not a word of the distinctive terminology of either Kant or Aristotle in this mysteriouse reviewers text there is, by your bizarre method of argumentation not a jot of Kant or Aristotle in Marx either ! such is the amazing power of this reviewer that he/she determines for us what Marx thought.

Fine; I'll admit Marx's dialectic was nothing like Kant or Arostotle's if you'll admit there is no trace of Hegel in it either.

By the same logic, since this review is full of this reviewers terminology, that makes Marx a follower of this mysterious reviewer.

Not really, since, on Marx's own written authority, we know that this reviewer was 'picturing' Marx's method.

Hit The North

3rd May 2009, 01:23

R:
Just for you, then, the opposite of "A method that contains some Hegel" is "A method that contains no Hegel".That is no more a pair of opposites than a bowl of fruit not containing bananas is the opposite of a bowl of fruit which does.

It is clear from contextualising Marx's claim that his method is the "direct opposite" of Hegels, within the statements which follow, that the opposition Marx refers to is between the idealism of Hegel's dialectic and the materialism of Marx's own.

Fine; I'll admit Marx's dialectic was nothing like Kant or Arostotle's if you'll admit there is no trace of Hegel in it either.
And here you reveal the opportunism of your debating style.

gilhyle

3rd May 2009, 01:28

I'll admit Marx's dialectic was nothing like Kant or Arostotle's if you'll admit there is no trace of Hegel in it either.

Marx's dialectic is not Hegels dialectic, thats for sure.....' trace of Hegel' - I have no clue what that means.

Rosa Lichtenstein

3rd May 2009, 02:51

BTB:

That is no more a pair of opposites than a bowl of fruit not containing bananas is the opposite of a bowl of fruit which does.

You clearly know nothing of Aristotle's Square of Opposition, do you?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square/

It is clear from contextualising Marx's claim that his method is the "direct opposite" of Hegels, within the statements which follow, that the opposition Marx refers to is between the idealism of Hegel's dialectic and the materialism of Marx's own.

Indeed, and we also know, because Marx endorsed a 'picture' of his method that contained not one atom of Hegel, that his version of the 'dialectic' has had Hegel completely extirpated. There's your 'opposite'.

Fine; I'll admit Marx's dialectic was nothing like Kant or Aristotle's if you'll admit there is no trace of Hegel in it either.

And here you reveal the opportunism of your debating style.

It's in fact known as 'calling a bluff'.

Rosa Lichtenstein

3rd May 2009, 02:52

Gil:

Marx's dialectic is not Hegels dialectic, thats for sure.....' trace of Hegel' - I have no clue what that means.

Well, I have always known you were clueless.

gilhyle

4th May 2009, 01:22

To think that Rosa the child carried such knowledge around, incredible

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th May 2009, 05:14

Gil:

To think that Rosa the child carried such knowledge around, incredible

Indeed, I was frighteningly mature well beyond my years.

Hit The North

4th May 2009, 16:50

BTB:
You clearly know nothing of Aristotle's Square of Opposition, do you?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square/

Clearly.

Indeed, and we also know, because Marx endorsed a 'picture' of his method that contained not one atom of Hegel, that his version of the 'dialectic' has had Hegel completely extirpated. There's your 'opposite'.
Not his dialectic method; he refers to the dialectic method. Besides there is no textual evidence here that Hegel is completely extirpated. The textual evidence is that Hegel's idealism is extirpated. The "general form of working" is intact. Marx deals explicitly with the opposition between his method and Hegel's here:

Original by Marx
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.
It's in fact known as 'calling a bluff'. If you spent more time positively outlining your case that Marx's dialectic method was derived from Aristotle and Kant, instead of playing blind-man's bluff, we'd all benefit.

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th May 2009, 17:15

BTB:

Clearly.

But still you pontificate about 'opposites'.

Not his dialectic method; he refers to the dialectic method. Besides there is no textual evidence here that Hegel is completely extirpated. The textual evidence is that Hegel's idealism is extirpated. The "general form of working" is intact. Marx deals explicitly with the opposition between his method and Hegel's here:

In fact, he refers to 'his method' and the 'the dialectic method'. Does this mean that you think that 'the dialectic method' was hot 'his method'?

Besides there is no textual evidence here that Hegel is completely extirpated.

Unfortunately for you, Marx added a summary of 'the dialectic method', which has had every trace of Hegel removed (I'd quote it, but you classify this passage as 'spam'), and Marx himself (not me), told us he was merely 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

But, if you disagree, perhaps you can tell us which Hegelian terms you accept.

BTB (quoting Marx):

My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.

Yes, we have already been through this: you can't get more opposite than a method that contains no Hegel at all.

If you spent more time positively outlining your case that Marx's dialectic method was derived from Aristotle and Kant, instead of playing blind-man's bluff, we'd all benefit.

You'd only benefit if we found a cure for the Hermetic virus that now infects your brain.

Hit The North

4th May 2009, 17:50

In fact, he refers to 'his method' and the 'the dialectic method'. Does this mean that you think that 'the dialectic method' was hot 'his method'? No, but it doesn't imply identity. The dialectic method could be my method, but not exclusively. It could be the method I share with others.

Yes, we have already been through this

Quite. It's your own fault if you can't read Marx properly and continue to need all this spelling out to you.

You'd only benefit if we found a cure for the Hermetic virus that now infects your brain.

Still playing blind-man's bluff, I see.

gilhyle

4th May 2009, 19:51

you can't get more opposite than a method that contains no Hegel at all.

If one is an analytical thinker, that is so. If one is a dialectical thinker that is not so. You, Rosa (vocative), are an analytical thinker....no trace of dialectics survives in your philosophy. Hence your problem understanding this text by a dialectical thinker like Marx, for whom to be the opposite of another thinker is to subsume that other thinker in his negation.

Rosa Lichtenstein

4th May 2009, 22:47

Gil

If one is an analytical thinker, that is so. If one is a dialectical thinker that is not so. You, Rosa (vocative), are an analytical thinker....no trace of dialectics survives in your philosophy. Hence your problem understanding this text by a dialectical thinker like Marx, for whom to be the opposite of another thinker is to subsume that other thinker in his negation

1) Yet more special pleading from you mystics.

2) I am a dialectical thinker: in Aristotle and Kant's (and Marx's) sense of the word.

no trace of dialectics survives in your philosophy

So, you do know what this means, contrary to your earlier disingenuous claim:

Me:

I'll admit Marx's dialectic was nothing like Kant or Arostotle's if you'll admit there is no trace of Hegel in it either.

Gil:

Marx's dialectic is not Hegels dialectic, thats for sure.....' trace of Hegel' - I have no clue what that means.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1432967&postcount=58

Hence your problem understanding this text by a dialectical thinker like Marx, for whom to be the opposite of another thinker is to subsume that other thinker in his negation.

Except that, as we now know, for Marx, the 'opposite' of Hegel's method is one that contains no Hegel at all, which is why he added that summary of 'the dialectic' (written by a reviewer) which contained no trace of Hegel.

I can now use the phrase, 'no tace of Hegel', since it is clear that you do understand it.