Hegemonicretribution
12th April 2009, 16:27
I know this may be better in learning or something, but as I am constrained by time (hence lack of posting of late) I thought I would stick it here as it is more likely to be viewed by Sartre nerds here:cool:
Anyway I am writing an essay on Sartrean freedom, and I am currently establishing its ontology. Now its seems that a transcendental deduction is used to get from the existence of nothingnesses, to the role of man in creating these nothingnesses, to the freedom of man. I haven't got time to go through all of Being and Nothingness in detail, so I was wondering if anyone could point me to where Sartre makes this deduction?
My lecturer glossed over this point, and it seems to me that the external factors which determine nothingnesses (along with individual perception), could also determine the individual's perceptions also.
For example;
If I accept that nothingnesses are real, and that they come to be through man (being in-Itself is not sufficient), why must man be free? I experience that Joe is not in my room, this is a combination of a (subjective) genuine expectation to find him here, and an (objective) fact about the world which is that he is not here. The nothingness requires both of these, and that is why I accept that it is through man that nothingnesses come to be. When Sartre asks 'what must man be so that nothingnesses may come into being?' and answers 'they must be free' why is it that they must be free? Expectations, questions, perceptions....all the things which are necessary for nothingnesses and come into being through man could also exist with a determined man could they not?
I don't know, maybe I have missed something, maybe Sartre has. I can answer the other problems with his account, but this one seems to be troublesome. Thanks in advance for any help.
Anyway I am writing an essay on Sartrean freedom, and I am currently establishing its ontology. Now its seems that a transcendental deduction is used to get from the existence of nothingnesses, to the role of man in creating these nothingnesses, to the freedom of man. I haven't got time to go through all of Being and Nothingness in detail, so I was wondering if anyone could point me to where Sartre makes this deduction?
My lecturer glossed over this point, and it seems to me that the external factors which determine nothingnesses (along with individual perception), could also determine the individual's perceptions also.
For example;
If I accept that nothingnesses are real, and that they come to be through man (being in-Itself is not sufficient), why must man be free? I experience that Joe is not in my room, this is a combination of a (subjective) genuine expectation to find him here, and an (objective) fact about the world which is that he is not here. The nothingness requires both of these, and that is why I accept that it is through man that nothingnesses come to be. When Sartre asks 'what must man be so that nothingnesses may come into being?' and answers 'they must be free' why is it that they must be free? Expectations, questions, perceptions....all the things which are necessary for nothingnesses and come into being through man could also exist with a determined man could they not?
I don't know, maybe I have missed something, maybe Sartre has. I can answer the other problems with his account, but this one seems to be troublesome. Thanks in advance for any help.