Collectivism and Paternalism

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Are communists, anarchists, or collectivist anarchists obliged to enact paternalist legislation in a future society? If we recognize that smoking harms our fellow man and respect his humanity, are we compelled to coerce him to compensate for his own failings? The more I consider this issue the more I think the answer is, yes, but I'm curious what justification there exists for rejecting paternalist legislation in society?

Seat belt laws, helmet laws, blood transfusion laws (you can't refuse one on religious grounds), banning smoking, mandatory exercise laws. The strong libertarian view rejects all of them. However, I am skeptical of this perspective.

Why does accepting an individual's humanity necessarily entail respecting their choices? And if it does, are their exceptions? We seem entirely confident in our paternalism towards children, but the mistakes of adults are often due to identical circumstances as the child. They lack information, understanding, or rationality. Perhaps in some cases they know best for themselves, but we could say the same of a child. The child gets infinitely great pleasure from eating unhealthy that is more valuable, to them, than their health. Why do we suddenly respect the choice of the adult when they reach a specific age, but we deny the child's rationality? There is no strong distinction between when paternalism is justified for children and suddenly never justified for adults.

Here is another point. We conveniently consider harm to others outside the jurisdiction of liberty. It is not an infringement of your freedom to restrict you from harming others. However, this distinction is precisely ludicrous. We are simply restricting freedom because it is collectively advantageous to impose such a restriction. There are a minority of people who would prefer the state of nature, I could conceive, and reject our society. They enjoy killing, stealing, and harming others so much that they would risk it happening onto themselves. To deny freedom is relatively entirely to the individual. We deny their freedom, rightly so, because it is collectively advantageous.

We protect individuals from harm for the good of the majority. What if we protect individuals, through paternalism for the good of majority? Having healthy members of society is certainly beneficial. Having members no longer suffer from an addiction they lack the capacity to overcome is also beneficial. I think we would all agree that even though a minority would suffer, the widespread elimination of smoking would be highly advantageous for society.

So what distinguishes legislation for collective advantage that is preventing harm to others. This is direct. However, the utilitarian consequences are still negative when we allow self-harm. We naturally dislike the suffering of others, and we naturally benefit from a society where everyone is functioning at maximum capacity.

This kind of logic seems to justify forcing individuals to do a multitude of things for the good of society. I don't know how to reconcile any limitations on this line of reasoning. However, the threat of individuals seeking me out to force good upon me is not exactly worrisome. The fact that they will sometimes be mistaken about my good is. However, I think a principle of universal good-coercion would be more beneficial than harmful.

Thoughts? I'm going to write a paper on individualism versus paternalism, basically, and I am experimenting with different arguments. I originally started with the strong libertarian approach, but I found it lacking in justification. Paternalism has justification already - it is doing something good. The main argument against it is that the majority of democratic citizens will not know what is best for the majority, but I think this fear is misguided. In our capitalist and pseudo-democracy now, we rarely see paternalist legislation that does not promote goods.

The same criticisms of the irrationality of individuals can be used against democracy as a whole. If we don't trust individuals to know what is good for themselves, paternalism, that is fine. However, we can trust the majority to know what is good, in most cases, for the majority of people. Most of us know what should be done regardless of whether we are capable of doing it. Paternalist legislation would allow society to force goods upon itself that it otherwise would not achieve. Think about locking yourself in your house, throwing away the key, and leaving yourself there. The house will automatically open when you have successfully completed all the household chores you need to accomplish. Ordinarily, you would be unable to restrict yourself in such ways. Someone would hear you and give you the key in respect for your individuality. Then you would fail at accomplish your given task. Or maybe you are simply to lazy to do the chores and you are certainly too lazy to restrict yourself to guarantee you do them. Paternalist legislation can assist you in accomplishing a good you would otherwise have been unable to achieve. Afterward, you are happier as a result.

[Diagoras]

There are a number of issues at hand with any notion of obliged paternalism that are not reconcilable with libertarian communism, in my opinion.

One issue with paternalism, it that is begs the question of who decides what is "for their own good", and secondarily, why should they have the authority to do so? The stated goal of your paternalism is to promote what is good for the majority, however, there is no universal principle upon which we can adequately discern that good for all persons. I do not consider the stopping of one person harming another to be simply an issue of acting in the good of the majority, but rather to stop trespasses upon individual consent and determinations of personal fulfillment, and to stop what amounts to a hierarchical wielding of power of one person over another. This is why strangulation and rape in a back alley is wrong, and consensual S&M bondage and rape fantasies that certainly contain some physical harm are fine (or, less risque, the difference between being assaulted and boxing for sport). As a result, something like smoking pot alone in your apartment while watching cartoons is not something I have a problem with, as it does not violate the ability of others to pursue their own personal fulfillment. It certainly does not maximize the ethical calculus of our collective health, or productivity, but that is precisely the point of contention. The goals of social policy should not just be oriented toward some enforced maximization of a uniform conception of the good, but rather oriented towards the maximization of opportunities and avenues for individuals to achieve their goals for personal fulfillment (which will include varying degrees of social interaction, intellectualism, fart jokes, chemical experimentation, and hard work, depending on the person), and the provision of community support and resources when a person desires help. This is why I think health care and drug addiction treatment should be freely available, yet the banning of alcohol/hallucinogens/etc, or having mandatory sit-ups is unacceptable.

Your characterization of the differences between toddlers and adults as minimal is simply nonsense. I have taught people at all manner of life stages, and there is certainly a difference between a 4 year old, a 14 year old, and a 24 year old. Of course people do stupid things across the span of their lives, but people certainly do learn and grow, particularly through the acquisition of experience and being allowed to make mistakes in their lives (again, that aren't actively harming others)... and we should be there to help them through the more difficult times, not treating all persons as children, but as fellow equals. It is this same process of individual growth through the practice of being given responsibility over one's choices that is necessary on a broad scale for a democracy to flourish.

The different approaches to individual liberty vs paternalism are effectively summarized in the family models that each seems to offer as microcosmic representations of society. Paternalism hails from the old Roman family model (the Pater- father), and seeks moral perfection in each of the family members, with the father (whoever the possesses the power) demanding conformity to this standard of personal moral aptitude. The other model allows represents not an attempt to reach some moral perfection amongst the members, but rather allows the members more individual responsibility and choice (even to potential detriment, though of course warning and providing info to such possibilities), and provides a supportive structure to fall back on when things go bad.


"Why does accepting an individual's humanity necessarily entail respecting their choices?"We don't have to agree with a person's choice in order to respect their right to make it. The ability to make choices is what allows for fulfillment, growth, maturity, and greater potential wisdom with which to make further decisions (not to mention self-actualization being a important component of human fulfillment in itself, however defined). As long as it not actively obstructing others in the ways outlined above, individual preferences for happiness are up to the individual. As already covered above as well, the assumption behind much of this paternalist rationale is that the paternalist possesses the correct knowledge of what the subject "should" be doing, or what should make them happy or fulfilled morally. This seems to me, at least, to be abhorrent to the values upon which I base my politics.

A final concern is the potential authoritarianism that can manifest if some, even a majority of persons in a group, are allowed to dictate the personal "good" to minorities whose erstwhile preferences are not trespassing the consent of others.

"Paternalist legislation can assist you in accomplishing a good you would otherwise have been unable to achieve. Afterward, you are happier as a result. "

This is the same rationale with which Evangelicals use to send their gay children to "Pray Out the Gay" camps, or some military families use to force their children to learn the "good" by going to military schools that quash individuality and diversity. The paternalist of course always thinks that they are doing it for the good of the recipient... that is the definition of paternalism.

I had a little bit more to address, but something has come up. If I missed something blatant, I will try to flesh it out in a bit.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

True, we can't discern the good for all persons. However, there are cases where we can discern the good for the majority. This would seem to be utility maximizing, following the logic of Mill and others. For instance, economic factors aside, banning smoking would be largely positive. A few people who smoking benefits would suffer. AKA, people who benefit from smoking for reasons only they have access to. However, the vast majority would benefit from such legislation. Seat belt legislation is a more benign example.

Avenues for pursuing your own good are great. However, there seem to be many cases where individuals are unable or unwilling to pursue it. That is where the paternalist justification comes into play.

The Evangelical rationale, I am saying, appears to be a good rationale. They are simply mistaken in what the good is. Of course, this is a worry for paternalism. We should never implement paternalism because we could be mistaken is a rather flimsy argument. That's like saying I should never do something I think will benefit me because I could be mistaken. If I think it is beneficial to a degree where I am confident in the results, I should act. If I am mistaken, well, that is part of life.

The mistakes of a democratic society influencing all individuals seems like a dangerous idea, but as I've argued earlier, it will be more beneficial overall than negative. Of course, you can say people will be mistaken about the good because of capitalist domination and other factors. However, that goes back to my earlier example. You could be mistaken about your own good for those same reasons. We have an obligation of sorts to act on the good when we are confident we aren't mistaken.

Here is another way of putting it:

Non-Paternalism:

1. People get pleasure from making choices.
2. The ability to make your own choices leads to pleasure, in some cases, that paternalist intervention would prevent.
4. Paternalism will make mistakes about the good that cause negative utility.
3. The utility gained from non-paternalism is greater than the utility gained from paternalism.

Paternalism:

1. There are significant gains to be made by paternalist legislation.
2. Paternalist legislation has an accurate conception of the good more often than not.
3. To maximize utility, paternalism advocates a democratic government.
4. Paternalism is more utility maximizing than non-paternalism.

Considering both arguments, it seems like non-paternalism needs more of a defense.

[Dimentio]

Hell no. Legislation will only create black markets.

It is better to develop harmless substitutes or to, if we really want to curb it, make those using drugs have to use a part of their labour/energy vouchers to pay for their own care, not burdening the rest of society with physical ailments they voluntarily has afflicted themselves with. But no legislation.

But if you want to, I think you could enact such rules in your local commune under an anarchist civilisation. We could have communes for people who do not want drugs, and communes for people who want them. Built on voluntary foundations, I must add.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Hell no. Legislation will only create black markets.

It is better to develop harmless substitutes or to, if we really want to curb it, make those using drugs have to use a part of their labour/energy vouchers to pay for their own care, not burdening the rest of society with physical ailments they voluntarily has afflicted themselves with. But no legislation.

But if you want to, I think you could enact such rules in your local commune under an anarchist civilisation. We could have communes for people who do not want drugs, and communes for people who want them. Built on voluntary foundations, I must add.

Theoretically, you could stop the black markets. The justification isn't to prevent people from doing what they want. It's to prevent them from doing what they shouldn't be doing. Many people who choose to be drugs are harming themselves.

[apathy maybe]

Wow. You know, anarchism is built upon individual freedom and developing the potential of individuals. Communist anarchists believe that this can best be achieved through the communal ownership of the "means of production", and equality, where as individualists say that freedom can only come from being able to own ones own property, without being dependent on anyone else (thus, rejecting capitalism, because it requires workers to be dependent on bosses).

All anarchists though should reject any attempt to enforce laws and rules that prohibit acts that do not harm others (not exactly, but sufficient for this explanation I hope). This includes rules on wearing seat belts, helmets, smoking and similar.

If I don't wear a helmet while riding my bicycle, and I get hit by a car, it impacts me, not anyone else. (Similarly, if I do not wear a seat belt in a car, and have an accident.)

As soon as you start creating these sorts of laws, and the means to enforce them, you stop edging out of "anarchist" "territory" into statism. Fuck that.


Many people who choose to be drugs are harming themselves.
And that is their fucking choice. You have no right to tell them what to do, and enforce that, and still say "I anarchist".
If I want to cut myself, commit suicide, or merely partake of a few drugs, it is my choice, my body, not yours. Self-ownership, I own my body, I do what I want with it.

[Dimentio]

Theoretically, you could stop the black markets. The justification isn't to prevent people from doing what they want. It's to prevent them from doing what they shouldn't be doing. Many people who choose to be drugs are harming themselves.

With what? The police?

Most people are doing things which are harming themselves. As an unrepentent nerd, I am addicted to jolt cola and other harmful sugar-based liquids. That could shorten my life and destroy my teeth. Forbid it please mommy state! :D

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

There is a difference between rationally engaging in a harmful activity for the benefits (driving, drinking cola, et cetera) and engaging in something entirely irrational (not wearing a seat belt, heroin addiction).

The idea that harming yourself only hurts you is false. If you shoot heroin all day and except the communism to provide your basic needs, that isn't the communist society I envision. If a society is structured in such a way that people still actively engage in illogical instances of self-harm, the society should make changes.

Basically, communism would support the person using heroin all day (who is addicted and in denial). That is my understanding. It respects the idea that certain conditions should be provided for and we have an obligation to care for members of the community.

So we have an obligation to give food, shelter, and other benefits to heroin addicts (to maximize their happiness), but we can't get them off heroin if it involves coercion?

Freedom is only valuable with respect to the results it achieves. If someone's liberty is leading them to harm, we should restrict it. If you would rather be miserable and free than happy you have a priority problem.

There is also a big distinction between individualist and collectivist anarchism. Even Bakunin denies paternalism, but I think he may be mistaken. We still maintain voting rights and expressive capabilities.

If a child wants to see the tigers up close, a locked door prevents him. Paternalist laws are a locked door. It is suspect to claim the child/adult distinction somehow has significance. When a person isn't being rational, it's a problem.

Seat belt laws are beneficial. They prevent harm to individuals and the fines create profit that funds useful programs such as health care, in my country. The removal of laws with respect to seat belts would give people choice. Choice is useless unless the alternatives are practical. If I only like chocolate ice cream, there is no value in giving my a choice between flavors. If I like chocolate ice cream and peanut butter ice cream, but I am allergic to peanut butter, the choice has no value. If I like peanut butter more than a risk of death, I am not being reasonable.

The restriction of self-harm in certain cases does not necessarily justify restriction in other circumstances (we can set a stringent criteria). The restriction of such harms seems to be beneficial, too, in some cases.

If I don't care about people harming themselves, I don't see why I should care about the interests at all. I could say "because I want them to care about mine," but I would want people to prevent me from harming myself if it is evident that I am engaging in harm (a matter of physical evidence of harm rather than value conjecture). If I don't care about people, too, I could simply subjugate a small group based on criteria I don't hold (racism, sexism) and benefit myself in such a way.

Communism is founded on a respect for individuals right to pursue happiness. We stop murderers from pursuing their happiness and limit their freedom because it is harmful to others. Why not self harm? We care about those individuals and their happiness, supposedly, yet we do nothing. Everyone recognizes that Mill's notion that "the individual is best at pursuing their interests" is simply not always the case.

A fear of being wrong, Mill argues, is not justification for inaction with respect to self-benefit. Yet he claims it is for self-harm. Suicide is an exception for Mill, as well as others, so clearly there is a problem with regard to values clashing.

I share the worry about values of religion and such infringing on my rights with their false views. But physical harm is quantifiable and measurable. Someone who is clearly suffering from the result of an activity shouldn't be left to suffer because of a commitment to non-coercion.

When we stop suicide, the relativist can claim we are imposing our values on the individual. The state they are in is different from ours, but it is not wrong or immoral. I'd be inclined to agree. However, we also have an obligation to pursue our interests sometimes at the expense of others.

If we let every suicidal person commit suicide immediately, we would lose significant opportunity to cure them as well as develop cures.

Anyway, just kind of ranting. Writing an essay on this in a bit, maybe I will post it.

[Dimentio]

The question remains: Who Should Enforce This?


There is a difference between rationally engaging in a harmful activity for the benefits (driving, drinking cola, et cetera) and engaging in something entirely irrational (not wearing a seat belt, heroin addiction).

The idea that harming yourself only hurts you is false. If you shoot heroin all day and except the communism to provide your basic needs, that isn't the communist society I envision. If a society is structured in such a way that people still actively engage in illogical instances of self-harm, the society should make changes.

Basically, communism would support the person using heroin all day (who is addicted and in denial). That is my understanding. It respects the idea that certain conditions should be provided for and we have an obligation to care for members of the community.

So we have an obligation to give food, shelter, and other benefits to heroin addicts (to maximize their happiness), but we can't get them off heroin if it involves coercion?

Freedom is only valuable with respect to the results it achieves. If someone's liberty is leading them to harm, we should restrict it. If you would rather be miserable and free than happy you have a priority problem.

There is also a big distinction between individualist and collectivist anarchism. Even Bakunin denies paternalism, but I think he may be mistaken. We still maintain voting rights and expressive capabilities.

If a child wants to see the tigers up close, a locked door prevents him. Paternalist laws are a locked door. It is suspect to claim the child/adult distinction somehow has significance. When a person isn't being rational, it's a problem.

Seat belt laws are beneficial. They prevent harm to individuals and the fines create profit that funds useful programs such as health care, in my country. The removal of laws with respect to seat belts would give people choice. Choice is useless unless the alternatives are practical. If I only like chocolate ice cream, there is no value in giving my a choice between flavors. If I like chocolate ice cream and peanut butter ice cream, but I am allergic to peanut butter, the choice has no value. If I like peanut butter more than a risk of death, I am not being reasonable.

The restriction of self-harm in certain cases does not necessarily justify restriction in other circumstances (we can set a stringent criteria). The restriction of such harms seems to be beneficial, too, in some cases.

If I don't care about people harming themselves, I don't see why I should care about the interests at all. I could say "because I want them to care about mine," but I would want people to prevent me from harming myself if it is evident that I am engaging in harm (a matter of physical evidence of harm rather than value conjecture). If I don't care about people, too, I could simply subjugate a small group based on criteria I don't hold (racism, sexism) and benefit myself in such a way.

Communism is founded on a respect for individuals right to pursue happiness. We stop murderers from pursuing their happiness and limit their freedom because it is harmful to others. Why not self harm? We care about those individuals and their happiness, supposedly, yet we do nothing. Everyone recognizes that Mill's notion that "the individual is best at pursuing their interests" is simply not always the case.

A fear of being wrong, Mill argues, is not justification for inaction with respect to self-benefit. Yet he claims it is for self-harm. Suicide is an exception for Mill, as well as others, so clearly there is a problem with regard to values clashing.

I share the worry about values of religion and such infringing on my rights with their false views. But physical harm is quantifiable and measurable. Someone who is clearly suffering from the result of an activity shouldn't be left to suffer because of a commitment to non-coercion.

When we stop suicide, the relativist can claim we are imposing our values on the individual. The state they are in is different from ours, but it is not wrong or immoral. I'd be inclined to agree. However, we also have an obligation to pursue our interests sometimes at the expense of others.

If we let every suicidal person commit suicide immediately, we would lose significant opportunity to cure them as well as develop cures.

Anyway, just kind of ranting. Writing an essay on this in a bit, maybe I will post it.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

The idea is collective democracy will implement it. It isn't always far, but it benefits the majority. For instance, an anarchist society could benefit greatly from public health care. Let's assume we continue some sort of currency. I'm not sure what kind of monetary anarchist ideals I hold in this respect. I am going through a long period of refining, justifying, and altering my views on things.

So we have a functioning democracy where individuals express their interests through an electoral system. In issues where individual decisions are not possible, where to build the new hospital, we result to collective decision making. Nobody really objects to this.

The objection is individual decisions are possible with regard to self-harm and that they somehow matter. But let's consider the funding of a public health care system. Individuals capable of paying and receiving benefits from the system can pay into it. A rational society, you could argue, is morally and practically motivated. They willingly contribute to funding the health care system. There is some good rationale for this view.

There isn't good rationale for the the idea that "everyone" will see that contributing to the health care system. There is a small percentage of people who can contribute to the health care system, should contribute, and don't. We've democratically agreed they should, and we hold them to this obligation.

The individual is well compensated for his forced contribution. If the contribution was a matter of personal taste (forcing him to buy a copy of Atlas Shrugged) he would be rightfully angry. We are depriving him of resources so we can justify giving him charity later.

If he didn't contribute to the health care system, we would have an obligation to treat him because he clearly wasn't being rationale about it. Yes, it is a collective definition of rationality, but we make collective decisions when "we have to." Why not make them "when we should" as well.

I'm working on this essay, although I haven't got to the portion dealing specifically with this, but I am very sympathetic to the libertarian worries. I just don't think a society that says we should sit back and let people harm themselves because "coercion is always bad" is necessarily on the right track.

My criteria for determining paternalist legislation would fail for almost everything except seat belt laws, heroin usage, and suicide, and even then I allow a procedure for rationale complaint that could grant an exception (although seat belts would likely still fail, and heroin usage and suicide would fail in most cases).

I just can't stand the idea of our "ideal" society just letting people sit back and kill themselves. Especially people addicted to drugs who want to quit. Drug courts, i believe they are called, literally monitor and force people to quit. They are extremely effective according to the stats.

Anyway, I know this is a dangerous topic and authority (collective or otherwise) can be dangerous, but the advantage with physical harm is that it's scientifically evident.

The only argument a person can make is that "they enjoy harm" which a doctor could validate, or that "the restriction is too inconvenient." What constitutes a legitimate inconvenience is a social issue the majority determines. Traffic is an inconvenience and public transit would alleviate this issue if cars were banned, but the majority doesn't see it that way.

I do have a worry with the inconvenience argument. People are very fearful when certain conditions arise, and they are willing to be inconvenienced more than they usually would. 9/11 is a perfect example.

However, the people are the ones to decide (as much as I hate their flighty traits) what is a legitimate inconvenience. I think airport security can be toned down (though I think the majority agrees, just not the elite) but if the majority thought otherwise, I can't create a separate airport because I don't have the funds. They don't have an obligation to create another airport based on my interests. If a significant portion of society shared this view, they might have that obligation.

If a significant portion of society holds the view X with respect to matters of security, unfortunately, we can't let them distinguish themselves. We have a responsibility to care for irrationals because we want to be cared for should we become irrational. I guess that is it.

Basically, is the threat of restricting action X wrongly worse than the benefit of not restricting x wrongly. We consider not helping individuals who harm themselves a moral wrong because we don't want to be ignored if we harm ourselves.

For instance, if we ban physical harm where the majority of people think we should and they are being rational (anarchism is a primarily rational society) we do so because we think:

The risk of me being harmed by the legislation is lower than the risk of refraining from paternalism. AKA, if I am right that airport security is excessive, are such legislation worse than removing paternalism altogether. When the majority restrict harms, would they be right enough to sufficiently justify the process of restricting.

I think yes, but many people think no. I'll deal with airport security and seatbelts rather than have individuals never consider coercion. We help a lot of people by coercing them off drugs (though I would not advocate banning drugs because we harm people a lot more). We help a lot of people by enforcing seat belt legislation.

When the gains of restrictions justify the restrictions themselves, we say the restrictions are just. Democratic criteria would be particularly good at recognizing physical harm, I think. Maybe not, though.

[Jimmie Higgins]

No I don't think these kinds of regulations of people's private lives could or should be taken up by a worker's government. The only regulations should be on things that could harm other people directly.

1. I think workplaces could enforce things like you can't be drunk, abusive, or high (though shifts working manual labor may want to exclude weed from that last rule).

2. The treatment of drug addicts or other people who have anti-social behaviors in capitalist society a societal problem has everything to do with the capitalist society we live in.
A. The politicians and media demonize/criminalize drug addicts in order to blame individuals for the failures of the system. Homeless aren't considered victims of capitalism, the're called "crack-heads" or "winos" regardless to any drug or alcohol use/dependency.
B. Anti-social behavior is more systematic in capitalism because workers and the poor have little to no control over their own lives. In a worker society where people have a say at what happens at work or in the running of their neighborhood, there would be incentives to participate in these things because they effect you life.

(Digression: Ever notice how professionals and the petty bourgoise spend so much time in neighborhood meetings or business associations or community clean up programs and so on - that's because they believe (and often do) have a degree of control over the conditions of their daily lives. When I get screwed by the Gas company, I fight a little, but give up usually because it's just one more fuck-over just like my job, my landloard, credit cards and so on - working people are usually resigned to the fact that they can't fight the banks or hospitals or so on. Rich people tend to go balistic if they get misbilled because they've been conditioned to believe that the world is set up to meet their needs.)

3. Paternalistic laws come from the point of view that people don't know how to run their own lives. Again, this suggests that people who fail do so not because capitalism is flawed but because they are somehow lacking in skills or common sense and so on. In a worker's revlution this idea will be turned on its head. You can't say "All power to the workers except for the kids over there smoking weed, the folks over there who smoke cigs, and Sally because she sleeps around"!

[Dimentio]

And if one community of stoners decide to break free and form their own autonomous community apart from the "collective democracy"?

To my mind, an essential part of anarchism is federalism, namely that not everyone need to follow the same social code, and that communities should be founded upon voluntary basis.


The idea is collective democracy will implement it. It isn't always far, but it benefits the majority. For instance, an anarchist society could benefit greatly from public health care. Let's assume we continue some sort of currency. I'm not sure what kind of monetary anarchist ideals I hold in this respect. I am going through a long period of refining, justifying, and altering my views on things.

So we have a functioning democracy where individuals express their interests through an electoral system. In issues where individual decisions are not possible, where to build the new hospital, we result to collective decision making. Nobody really objects to this.

The objection is individual decisions are possible with regard to self-harm and that they somehow matter. But let's consider the funding of a public health care system. Individuals capable of paying and receiving benefits from the system can pay into it. A rational society, you could argue, is morally and practically motivated. They willingly contribute to funding the health care system. There is some good rationale for this view.

There isn't good rationale for the the idea that "everyone" will see that contributing to the health care system. There is a small percentage of people who can contribute to the health care system, should contribute, and don't. We've democratically agreed they should, and we hold them to this obligation.

The individual is well compensated for his forced contribution. If the contribution was a matter of personal taste (forcing him to buy a copy of Atlas Shrugged) he would be rightfully angry. We are depriving him of resources so we can justify giving him charity later.

If he didn't contribute to the health care system, we would have an obligation to treat him because he clearly wasn't being rationale about it. Yes, it is a collective definition of rationality, but we make collective decisions when "we have to." Why not make them "when we should" as well.

I'm working on this essay, although I haven't got to the portion dealing specifically with this, but I am very sympathetic to the libertarian worries. I just don't think a society that says we should sit back and let people harm themselves because "coercion is always bad" is necessarily on the right track.

My criteria for determining paternalist legislation would fail for almost everything except seat belt laws, heroin usage, and suicide, and even then I allow a procedure for rationale complaint that could grant an exception (although seat belts would likely still fail, and heroin usage and suicide would fail in most cases).

I just can't stand the idea of our "ideal" society just letting people sit back and kill themselves. Especially people addicted to drugs who want to quit. Drug courts, i believe they are called, literally monitor and force people to quit. They are extremely effective according to the stats.

Anyway, I know this is a dangerous topic and authority (collective or otherwise) can be dangerous, but the advantage with physical harm is that it's scientifically evident.

The only argument a person can make is that "they enjoy harm" which a doctor could validate, or that "the restriction is too inconvenient." What constitutes a legitimate inconvenience is a social issue the majority determines. Traffic is an inconvenience and public transit would alleviate this issue if cars were banned, but the majority doesn't see it that way.

I do have a worry with the inconvenience argument. People are very fearful when certain conditions arise, and they are willing to be inconvenienced more than they usually would. 9/11 is a perfect example.

However, the people are the ones to decide (as much as I hate their flighty traits) what is a legitimate inconvenience. I think airport security can be toned down (though I think the majority agrees, just not the elite) but if the majority thought otherwise, I can't create a separate airport because I don't have the funds. They don't have an obligation to create another airport based on my interests. If a significant portion of society shared this view, they might have that obligation.

If a significant portion of society holds the view X with respect to matters of security, unfortunately, we can't let them distinguish themselves. We have a responsibility to care for irrationals because we want to be cared for should we become irrational. I guess that is it.

Basically, is the threat of restricting action X wrongly worse than the benefit of not restricting x wrongly. We consider not helping individuals who harm themselves a moral wrong because we don't want to be ignored if we harm ourselves.

For instance, if we ban physical harm where the majority of people think we should and they are being rational (anarchism is a primarily rational society) we do so because we think:

The risk of me being harmed by the legislation is lower than the risk of refraining from paternalism. AKA, if I am right that airport security is excessive, are such legislation worse than removing paternalism altogether. When the majority restrict harms, would they be right enough to sufficiently justify the process of restricting.

I think yes, but many people think no. I'll deal with airport security and seatbelts rather than have individuals never consider coercion. We help a lot of people by coercing them off drugs (though I would not advocate banning drugs because we harm people a lot more). We help a lot of people by enforcing seat belt legislation.

When the gains of restrictions justify the restrictions themselves, we say the restrictions are just. Democratic criteria would be particularly good at recognizing physical harm, I think. Maybe not, though.

[Jimmie Higgins]

So we have a functioning democracy where individuals express their interests through an electoral system. In issues where individual decisions are not possible, where to build the new hospital, we result to collective decision making. Nobody really objects to this.


If we have the resources, who gives a shit if the Marquee De Sade want's to drip hot wax on himself and land in the hospital or if Joe wants to smoke 3 packs of cigs a day?

If people voted to build a hospital, the most important things would not be are people going to take advantage, the real concern for worker councils would be: do we have the building materials, do we have people with the skills to staff the hospital. The rest doesn't really matter.

When schools are built, does anyone go on talk radio and worry that students won't remember the main themes of "Wuthering Heights"? Do doctors operate on people and then tell them, "hey we put a lot of labor and resources into repairing your spine; you will have to remain in bed for the rest of your life because we don't want you slipping on the sidwalk and wasting all our work!"?

In capitalism we have to compete over resources and jobs. If worker's ran things I think our goals would be to make things as cheep and easy as possible. If I work at a TV manufacturing plant I wouldn't worry that my work is wasted if the future viewer sits around all day watching "Police Academy" movies. If I worked at a hospital I would want to provide the best care and not care if someone goes snowboarding right after leaving my care.

What people do in their own lives doesn't matter as long as it doesn't directly hurt others or effect production.

[Diagoras]

"All power to the workers except for the kids over there smoking weed, the folks over there who smoke cigs, and Sally because she sleeps around"!

:lol: It is the new banner for the revolution!:laugh:

[apathy maybe]

There isn't good rationale for the the idea that "everyone" will see that contributing to the health care system. There is a small percentage of people who can contribute to the health care system, should contribute, and don't. We've democratically agreed they should, and we hold them to this obligation.

The individual is well compensated for his forced contribution. If the contribution was a matter of personal taste (forcing him to buy a copy of Atlas Shrugged) he would be rightfully angry. We are depriving him of resources so we can justify giving him charity later.

Yeah, and when you have "forced contribution", then you stop being anarchistic. To decided what is forced, what paternalistic laws are decided, and to actually enforce these laws, you need a state.

And we all know how well those have turned out over history don't we...

Free association, as I keep saying, works both ways. There is nothing that requires a community to provide health care to a heroin addict, if they decided that.

But, why wouldn't they? They have an abundance of resources (aren't we talking post-scarcity here?), and well, what of it? Let's do a little to help others.
---


I'm not going to go through your entire posts line by line, because frankly, there isn't any point. You are arguing from a non-anarchist (dare I say statist) perspective, I'm arguing from an anarchist one. Irrational actions are part of being free, and you want to reduce freedom.

Fuck that shit. I want freedom, if I wanted a nanny state, well fuck, I live in one right now, and it doesn't make me happy.

[Diagoras]

"Freedom is only valuable with respect to the results it achieves. "This line is the fundamental point of contention for this entire discussion, DAB. The rest is periphery or a consequence of the assumptions acting behind this. I, at least, do not accept this value judgment. You are operating on a very simplistic/classical utilitarian paradigm (correct me if I am mistaken), that devalues individual preference against a perceived positive outcome end-slate. This is dubious. I certainly agree that many things people do are stupid. It is risky to get tattoos for example. There are chances of infection, tearing of skin, and mistakes in application that can all lead to less-than-positive utility, according to a classical utilitarian framework. I have two, and plan on getting at least one more at some point. The reason that this classical perspective has generally given way to more contemporary adaptations of utilitarianism, such as preference utilitarianism (a la Singer), is largely because of its inability to take into account individual preferences and value judgments. There is nothing inherently "rational" or "irrational" about getting tattoos, because there is no objective standard of utility that is capable of taking individual aesthetic and value judgments into account. You use this example to talk about differences in decisions:


"There is a difference between rationally engaging in a harmful activity for the benefits (driving, drinking cola, et cetera) and engaging in something entirely irrational (not wearing a seat belt, heroin addiction)."I would reject this distinction. There is no way you can objectively determine that approving of the cost-benefit ratio of Dr. Pepper is inherently more "rational" than other chemicals, because you can not possibly prove one value/preference judgment of another person is more or less rational than your own. Value/preference judgments are the standards by which you apply tests of rationality of action, and these actions can only be measured against assumed judgments... but the judgments are very much assumed, and subjective, and thus the claim of one choice being inherently more rational than another really does not hold water. This reality is one of the reasons that Positivism (and many aspects of classical utilitarianism) tanked in the early 20th century, and why Objectivism is a joke (one of many reasons ;)).

This is partially why most anarchists do not support paternalism. Seat belt laws would not be justifiable, in my opinion, in an anarchist society. You can certainly educate people about their virtues, and parents can certainly play an excellent role in showing why not wearing a seat belt is potentially deadly. Punishment for not optimizing physical safety in personal decision making, however, is not justifiable.

Another reason most anarchists would not accept the quote at the top of this post is a valuing, a priori, of self-determination down to the smallest unit, as long as that determination does not infringe on the same right of others. You make no distinction between self-harm, and harm against others. Most other anarchists do. Harm against others recreates power hierarchies and exploitation, and is opposed on those grounds via anarchism, not because potential health detriments are inherently something to be opposed in order to maximize an imagined objective standard of utility.

This:



Non-Paternalism:

1. People get pleasure from making choices.
2. The ability to make your own choices leads to pleasure, in some cases, that paternalist intervention would prevent.
4. Paternalism will make mistakes about the good that cause negative utility.
3. The utility gained from non-paternalism is greater than the utility gained from paternalism.

Paternalism:

1. There are significant gains to be made by paternalist legislation.
2. Paternalist legislation has an accurate conception of the good more often than not.
3. To maximize utility, paternalism advocates a democratic government.
4. Paternalism is more utility maximizing than non-paternalism.is not necessarily the formulation by which the two choices would be accepted. There are a number of points that are questionable in the formula, but that is not really the issue. A rejection of your initial requirement of individual freedom requiring maximal/greatest possible utility to be justifiable is what has occurred, in favor of an assumption of self-ownership/determination, and an a priori valuing of individual preference as a right, superceding even collective judgments of proper utility.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

How you define a state varies depending on the individual. A state is a central authority, for some people. If authority is decentralized and equality, it's not necessarily a state by this definition.

Consider the following. You're allowed to limit others to protect yourself from harm. For instance:

1. Speeding Laws
2. Drunk Driving Laws
3. Licenses to Perform Professions

Those are all reasonable. We can't check our doctor for his credentials if forging credentials is acceptable. We also can't speed because certain speeds are too dangerous to individuals. Same goes for drunk driving.

But consider this:

Person A doesn't want cars on the road at all. They regularly like to walk near road X, because that is their right to movement. The risk wasn't a natural risk. You placed cars on the road based on your values.

Can we perform any action that places the safety of other individuals at risk, even if they don't agree to that risk? If not, this entails primitivism. You can't do anything that potentially endangers someone unless the risk is acceptable to every individual in society. This is ridiculous, of course.

Then you suggest that there is a threshold of reasonable risk that all people believe. Well, there isn't. The propensity to take risks varies between individuals, and to avoid harming anyone's negative liberty entails the most fearful man. This man is not irrational by any real categorization. He is only deemed irrational based on majority opinion. He doesn't like cars. They are dangerous. Electricity can cause a fire. He doesn't like that prospect. He'd rather not have electricity and avoid that risk.

Of course, you might say you can prove a logical inconsistency in such an individual. For hating risks, he smokes. So clearly his opinion makes no sense. Well, as it turns out this isn't true. He considers smoking an acceptable risk, but electricity is unacceptable. I'll take a risk on dieing painlessly, if the risk is low, but I won't take a risk on torture (or not a high one). Claiming that in situation A, the individual takes a risk, does in no way prove he is logically inconsistent in case B. You have no access to his inclinations, his tastes, as Mill would say.

So what does this mean. Logically, we can't do things that harm others. Negative freedom doesn't allow that. So certainly we can't take a risk on harming others. After all, there is no objective criteria to solve the dispute of what a legitimate risk is. I've seen no anarchist advocate such a position. We "can" take risks on the safety of others, and the risks are based on the norms of the majority. We aren't going to significantly suppress our interests just because Joe Smith is scared of electricity.

So we can take risks on individuals, but we can't prevent them from harming themselves. So far, social libertarianism is still alright. Everything seems perfectly consistent.

I've got a magic 8 ball. In five months, you will become addicted to heroin. Not only will you become addicted, but you will think it's in your best interests to be a heroin addict. If you tell me to intervene in five months, I will go against your liberty and help you. You have reason to believe your going to be mistaken about your interests because, well, you'll be under the influence of an addictive substance. Do you want me to intervene? I certainly would.

The ridiculous response is that "if you did X, you must be acting in your own best interests." Consider that you don't trust me. A machine gives candy every time you press a button. I own the machine, which you don't know. On the 100th time the button is pressed, it performs an electric shock. I am a sadistic person, normally, but my family likes you, and I want to ensure your safety. I explain the situation, as you are about to press for the 100th time. You have the information, but you don't believe me. Your inclination and desire is perfectly rational. I've lied to you before. Would you want me to intervene against your liberty?

We rarely get certainties in life. If I was 99% sure the heroin was harming you, would you still want me to intervene? Probably. In the candy case, you would almost want me to intervene with below 50% certainty. After all, candy probably isn't "THAT" important to you.

If you don't know what is going to happen in the future, do you want people enforcing their notion of "good" on you? Not really. What if they are using reliable, scientific methodology to establish a harm? The degree of risk society is willing to take is determinable only by society itself.

Consider the following. You don't know who you will be in society. Rawl's original position. You do know that 99% of people, let's say, will be harmed by heroin use. This isn't a value judgment. This is science, here. Most people who use heroin in society, given the average nature of people, are harmed by using it.

If 99% of people are harmed by using heroin, would you want to be stopped if "you" were using heroin? If "you" want to be stopped, but you won't once you begin using heroin, how do you guarantee that you will be stopped? Paternalist law.

What if 70% of people using heroin will be harmed, and the other 29% can demonstrate by appealing to rationality, medical expertise, or otherwise, that they are different. You could enact a law then grant exceptions. However, what if 1% can't demonstrate that they benefit from heroin. You end up harming them by accident. You could be that 1%.

You could also be the 1% that fears electricity. You weigh the odds of being within the standard threshold, and the benefits of the risks it takes, against the odds of being outside it, and the harms associated with that.

We clearly take risks, and we clearly would want to be protected in certain cases. Therefore, when the issues can be scientifically evaluated, we will probably want to implement some sort of paternalism. It's your fundamental right to pursue your interests even at risk of the expense of others. We don't want to stop driving. We shouldn't want to stop helping others from self-harm.

As for the hospital example with unlimited resources. Why should we help them? Well, we don't care. Even though we have the resources, it's easier to let them die. If we intrinsically dislike suffering, that presents a conflict. Why aren't we preventing them from the harm in the first place?

Agreeing to paternalist legislation for yourself (stop me if I try to do heroin) is legitimate, is it not? Paternalist legislation, then, is just pre-facto what you would have advocated had you been rational.

Liberty and paternalism are not all or nothing. Allowing freedom doesn't mean allowing everything under the sun, such as direct harm to others. Allowing paternalism doesn't mean forcing church, exercise, and everything under the sun at people.

We value our liberty more than we dislike the possibility of being a bit fat, perhaps. We don't value our liberty more than we dislike the possibility of being dead, tortured, drugged up to hell, or otherwise harmed.

[Nietzsche's Ghost]

If you are an anarchist you cannot enact any type of legislation on anybody. This might have been said already(forgive me if it has), but the only thing you can do is educate people so they can make an informed descision. If you do that succesfully there will be few who will do things that are harmful to themselves(or others).