Lenin Refutes Newton

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

First, consider this question: Do objects move one another, themselves, or a bit of both?

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

Dialecticians have a revolutionary answer. But you might not like it.

Lenin depicted things this way:


"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin Philosophical Notebooks (1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphasis added.]

This is a rather odd passage since it seems to suggest that things can move themselves. If so, much of modern mechanics will need to be re-written. On this view, presumably, when someone throws a ball, the action of throwing does not in fact move the ball. On the contrary, the ball moves itself, and it knows exactly where it is going and how to get there, traversing its path independently of gravity. Intelligent projectiles like this, it seems, need no guidance systems -- they happily 'self-develop' from A to B like unerring homing pigeons. It is to be wondered, therefore, why the US military do not invest in such smart projectiles, and save themselves billions of dollars.

Thank goodness those at the Pentagon do not "understand" dialectics!



This probably explains the origin of the following 'joke':

Q: How many dialecticians does it take to change a light bulb?

A: None at all, the light bulb changes itself.

Well, as if to disappoint his fans, and provide no help at all for those who still think that dialectics has anything of worth to teach modern science, Lenin not only repeated this odd claim, he "demanded" that all DL-fans see things this way:


"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin Once More On The Trade Unions (1921), p.90. Bold emphasis added.]

Here, not only are objects said to be capable of moving themselves, but Lenin even says that DL "requires" us to view motion in no other way.

[DL = Dialectical Logic.]

Well, perhaps Lenin was merely referring to the development of certain systems, and not the movement of objects from place to place? If so, the impertinent 'counter-example' from earlier (i.e., the one about light bulbs) would neither be valid nor sensible.

But Lenin's words were pretty clear; he asserted that DL demands and/or requires that "objects" (not processes, nor yet systems, but objects) be taken in "development, in 'self-movement'", so he included both -- development and self-movement -- in this caveat. And, all this is quite apart from the fact that, as we have seen, Lenin counterposed this view of reality to that of mechanical materialists, who hold that objects move because of the action of external forces:


"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.

"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new." [Lenin (1961), p.358. Bold emphasis added.]

There would be no contrast here if objects did not move themselves in the DM-scheme-of-things, both developmentally and as they move from place to place. As we will see (in Essay Eight Part One (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_01.htm)), this is indeed how Lenin has since been interpreted by his epigones: holding to the view that things self-develop and [I]self-locomote.

Unfortunately, Lenin and his co-dialecticians failed to take any real note of the origin of these ancient ideas: Hermetic Philosophy (http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/magee.htm) is based on the belief that the universe is alive; indeed it is a cosmic egg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_egg)-- later transmogrified by Hegel into a Cosmic Ego.

Since eggs appear to develop all of their own, and because Hegel's immaterial and immanent cosmic Ego self-develops, it clearly seemed 'natural' for Lenin and his epigones to think this of nature, too.

Nevertheless, not even eggs develop of their own; in fact, it is hard to think of a single thing in the entire universe (of which we have any knowledge) that develops of its own, or which moves itself. Not even Capitalism does. Switch off the Sun and watch American Imperialism fold a whole lot quicker than Enron.

And yet, if Lenin were correct, no object in the universe could possibly interact with any other (since that would amount to external causation, and objects would not be self-motivated). Self-motivated beings must, it seems, be causally isolated from their surroundings, or they would not be self-motivated. This in turn must mean that, despite appearances to the contrary, nothing in reality interacts with anything else. That would, of course, make a mockery of the other DM-claim that everything in reality is interconnected.

So, based on the bird-brained doctrines of ancient mystics, and no evidence at all, we find Lenin once again propounding cosmic ideas that do not make sense even in DM-terms -- and ones that not even chickens observe. http://www.mysmiley.net/imgs/smile/animals/animal0031.gif

[Hit The North]

What a loony.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Really, you mustn't describe Lenin that way!

[Hit The North]

Well, as you pointed out in another thread, Lenin believed in the actual existence of Santa Claus and, presumably, thought that one day he would be transformed into Santa Claus (erroneously viewing himself as the opposite of Santa, little realising that Stalin was the real anti-Santa - we can laugh now, but then we've got the hindsight of history).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Well, as you pointed out in another thread, Lenin believed in the actual existence of Santa Claus and, presumably, thought that one day he would be transformed into Santa Claus (erroneously viewing himself as the opposite of Santa, little realising that Stalin was the real anti-Santa - we can laugh now, but then we've got the hindsight of history).

Well, that just shows that my judgement that you mystics can't cope with a complex philosophical arguments was correct, since my 'Santa' post was a reductio of Lenin's epistemology. This is because it is plain that he did not believe in Santa, but his 'theory' of knowledge implies he must have. Hence, in order to restore Lenin's reputation, we need to reject his 'theory' of knowledge.

But, you need to stay on topic or you will only have to warn yourself...

[Hit The North]

This is because it is plain that he did not believe in Santa, but his 'theory' of knowledge implies he must have.

Yes, exactly! Lenin thought he didn't believe in Santa but he did really - and he didn't even know it!

The witless idiot shouldn't even have been allowed within a hundred miles of the Bolshevik party, never mind the leadership of the first workers revolution. No wonder it went pear-shaped.

[Hit The North]

But, you need to stay on topic or you will only have to warn yourself...

I'm just agreeing with you. As you point out (endlessly it seems), Lenin was no philosopher. I mean he thought that objects moved by themselves, so I wouldn't even buy a used car from that guy never mind a philosophy book. It probably wouldn't have an engine in it! The car, not the book. By the way, we used to have a branch member who thought as Lenin did - I guess he was a Leninist. We'd say, "Hey, Brian, where's the subs tin?" And he'd reply, steady as you like, "It must have moved off by itself." Later, we discovered that he wasn't a Leninist at all. He was a kleptomaniac.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB, substituting sarcasm for argument:


I'm just agreeing with you. As you point out (endlessly it seems), Lenin was no philosopher. I mean he thought that objects moved by themselves, so I wouldn't even buy a used car from that guy never mind a philosophy book. It probably wouldn't have an engine in it! The car, not the book. By the way, we used to have a branch member who thought as Lenin did - I guess he was a Leninist. We'd say, "Hey, Brian, where's the subs tin?" And he'd reply, steady as you like, "It must have moved off by itself." Later, we discovered that he wasn't a Leninist at all. He was a kleptomaniac....

Yes, exactly! Lenin thought he didn't believe in Santa but he did really - and he didn't even know it!

The witless idiot shouldn't even have been allowed within a hundred miles of the Bolshevik party, never mind the leadership of the first workers revolution. No wonder it went pear-shaped.

Try that one at your next branch meeting, or even in the Coven.

Of course, when I last ran with this theme, you tried to defend Lenin...

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=791432&postcount=148

[Cumannach]

First, consider this question: Do objects move one another, themselves, or a bit of both?

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

Dialecticians have a revolutionary answer. But you might not like it.

Lenin depicted things this way:



This is a rather odd passage since it seems to suggest that things can move themselves. If so, much of modern mechanics will need to be re-written. On this view, presumably, when someone throws a ball, the action of throwing does not in fact move the ball. On the contrary, the ball moves itself, and it knows exactly where it is going and how to get there, traversing its path independently of gravity. Intelligent projectiles like this, it seems, need no guidance systems -- they happily 'self-develop' from A to B like unerring homing pigeons. It is to be wondered, therefore, why the US military do not invest in such smart projectiles, and save themselves billions of dollars.

Thank goodness those at the Pentagon do not "understand" dialectics!





Here, not only are objects said to be capable of moving themselves, but Lenin even says that DL "requires" us to view motion in no other way.

[DL = Dialectical Logic.]

Well, perhaps Lenin was merely referring to the development of certain systems, and not the movement of objects from place to place? If so, the impertinent 'counter-example' from earlier (i.e., the one about light bulbs) would neither be valid nor sensible.

But Lenin's words were pretty clear; he asserted that DL demands and/or requires that "objects" (not processes, nor yet systems, but objects) be taken in "development, in 'self-movement'", so he included both -- development and self-movement -- in this caveat. And, all this is quite apart from the fact that, as we have seen, Lenin counterposed this view of reality to that of mechanical materialists, who hold that objects move because of the action of external forces:



There would be no contrast here if objects did not move themselves in the DM-scheme-of-things, both developmentally and as they move from place to place. As we will see (in Essay Eight Part One (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_01.htm)), this is indeed how Lenin has since been interpreted by his epigones: holding to the view that things self-develop and [I]self-locomote.

Unfortunately, Lenin and his co-dialecticians failed to take any real note of the origin of these ancient ideas: Hermetic Philosophy (http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/magee.htm) is based on the belief that the universe is alive; indeed it is a cosmic egg (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_egg)-- later transmogrified by Hegel into a Cosmic Ego.

Since eggs appear to develop all of their own, and because Hegel's immaterial and immanent cosmic Ego self-develops, it clearly seemed 'natural' for Lenin and his epigones to think this of nature, too.

Nevertheless, not even eggs develop of their own; in fact, it is hard to think of a single thing in the entire universe (of which we have any knowledge) that develops of its own, or which moves itself. Not even Capitalism does. Switch off the Sun and watch American Imperialism fold a whole lot quicker than Enron.

And yet, if Lenin were correct, no object in the universe could possibly interact with any other (since that would amount to external causation, and objects would not be self-motivated). Self-motivated beings must, it seems, be causally isolated from their surroundings, or they would not be self-motivated. This in turn must mean that, despite appearances to the contrary, nothing in reality interacts with anything else. That would, of course, make a mockery of the other DM-claim that everything in reality is interconnected.

So, based on the bird-brained doctrines of ancient mystics, and no evidence at all, we find Lenin once again propounding cosmic ideas that do not make sense even in DM-terms -- and ones that not even chickens observe. http://www.mysmiley.net/imgs/smile/animals/animal0031.gif

If you want to talk like that about it, all matter in the Universe does create it's own movement by exerting a gravitational pull on every other bit of matter. Take the other piece of matter on which that force is exerted as the inertial frame and there you have it, every object locomotes itself, by gravitationally moving itself towards other objects. So Lenin was right.

If matter cannot create any self-generated impulse to move (like gravitation or electro-magnetism), and can only move by the force of something external, then reductio ad absurdum all the way back to Idealism, where no movement in the Universe could exist without a divine supernatural impulse. Again, Lenin is right.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cummanach:


If you want to talk like that about it, all matter in the Universe does create it's own movement by exerting a gravitational pull on every other bit of matter. Take the other piece of matter on which that force is exerted as the inertial frame and there you have it, every object locomotes itself, by gravitationally moving itself towards other objects. So Lenin was right.

And yet Lenin said everything was moved by a struggle of its 'internal opposites'.

So, what are the 'internal opposites' that move, say, a billiard ball?

Moreover, the idea here is not that everything just 'self-moves' but that they do so because of that 'struggle'.

So, what 'struggle' is going on inside a billiard ball?


If matter cannot create any self-generated impulse to move (like gravitation or electro-magnetism), and can only move by the force of something external, then reductio ad absurdum all the way back to Idealism, where no movement in the Universe could exist without a divine supernatural impulse. Again, Lenin is right.

But, how do you know that there isn't a source of movement external to the universe that scientists haven't discovered yet?

Anyway, other dialecticians found they had to appeal to 'external contradictions' to account for interaction (ruining your argument).

This is because, plainly, material bodies impact on one another. But, if motion and change were entirely internally generated, then such interactions would have no bearing on the result of any such impact. In that case, every object in the universe would be a sealed unit, moving by itself, and not passing any of its motion on to other bodies with which it came into contact.

But that would make a mockery of the idea that everything is interconnected (an idea Lenin also touted).

On the other hand, if everything is interconnected, then the motion of every single body in the universe cannot be the result of its own 'internal contradictions'.

So, if you cling on to one of these 'dialectical' theses, the other must be rejected.

You have, therefore, a rather stark choice: either, everything is inter-linked, and Lenin was wrong, or nothing is inter-linked and he was wrong anyway.

[Cumannach]

And yet Lenin said everything was moved by a struggle of its 'internal opposites'.

So, what are the 'internal opposites' that move, say, a billiard ball?

Moreover, the idea here is not that everything just 'self-moves' but that they do so because of that 'struggle'.

So, what 'struggle' is going on inside a billiard ball?


Well the atoms are in a constant state of movement, and the electrons are constantly moving round the nucleus etc. The argument is not that an object cannot be moved by an external force like a snooker que, but that it also has an intrinsic ability to create it's own movement.

What struggle of opposites is going on inside the billiard and inside it's atoms; well, the attractive force binding positive protons together in the nucleus is struggling against the positive charge of the protons which repels the protons from each other, you have the electrons and protons with opposite charges, then you have the quarks and their forces etc etc. Maybe a physicist can come on here and elaborate.



But, how do you know that there isn't a source of movement external to the universe that scientists haven't discovered yet?

What, you mean idealism?



This is because, plainly, material bodies impact on one another. But, if motion and change were entirely internally generated, then such interactions would have no bearing on the result of any such impact. In that case, every object in the universe would be a sealed unit, moving by itself, and not passing any of its motion on to other bodies with which it came into contact.


No one said one object couldn't use their own internally generated motion to impact on another object. The Sun's own gravity impacts on the Earth, but the Earth is just as capable of creating movement itself, as evidenced by the orbit of the Moon. So no, there is no contradiction.




On the other hand, if everything is interconnected, then the motion of every single body in the universe cannot be the result of its own 'internal contradictions'.

So, if you cling on to one of these 'dialectical' theses, the other must be rejected.

You have, therefore, a rather stark choice: either, everything is inter-linked, and Lenin was wrong, or nothing is inter-linked and he was wrong anyway.

No you don't, the thesis is; 'things generate their own movement' not 'things alone generate their own movement and no other things can affect them'.

[Lord Hargreaves]

On this view, presumably, when someone throws a ball, the action of throwing does not in fact move the ball. On the contrary, the ball moves itself, and it knows exactly where it is going and how to get there, traversing its path independently of gravity. Intelligent projectiles like this, it seems, need no guidance systems -- they happily 'self-develop' from A to B like unerring homing pigeons. It is to be wondered, therefore, why the US military do not invest in such smart projectiles, and save themselves billions of dollars.

Self-movement certainly does not necessitate intelligence. The example of the universe as a whole - coming-into-being without the presence of a Creator - is the obvious one


Well, perhaps Lenin was merely referring to the development of certain systems, and not the movement of objects from place to place? If so, the impertinent 'counter-example' from earlier (i.e., the one about light bulbs) would neither be valid nor sensible.

But Lenin's words were pretty clear; he asserted that DL demands and/or requires that "objects" (not processes, nor yet systems, but objects) be taken in "development, in 'self-movement'", so he included both -- development and self-movement -- in this caveat.

Nothing in Lenin's words suggests a technical meaning of "object", so what you say here doesn't follow at all. He may as well have said "stuff" or "thingamajig" for all the precision Lenin is using in this passage


Nevertheless, not even eggs develop of their own; in fact, it is hard to think of a single thing in the entire universe (of which we have any knowledge) that develops of its own, or which moves itself. Not even Capitalism does. Switch off the Sun and watch American Imperialism fold a whole lot quicker than Enron.

That obviously isn't the point. No Marxist has ever denied that "external factors" make their influence felt in the workings of capitalism - the Young Marx clearly had an awareness of nature and its importance for human beings, for instance. The actual point is merely to stress that the developmental logic of capitalism is intrinsic to the structures of capital itself


And yet, if Lenin were correct, no object in the universe could possibly interact with any other (since that would amount to external causation, and objects would not be self-motivated). Self-motivated beings must, it seems, be causally isolated from their surroundings, or they would not be self-motivated. This in turn must mean that, despite appearances to the contrary, nothing in reality interacts with anything else. That would, of course, make a mockery of the other DM-claim that everything in reality is interconnected.

I cannot for the life of me understand your reasoning here. How does it follow that "nothing in reality interacts with anything else" if Lenin's theory is true? We would need to know what "object" is supposed to mean, I guess

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cummanach:


Well the atoms are in a constant state of movement, and the electrons are constantly moving round the nucleus etc. The argument is not that an object cannot be moved by an external force like a snooker que, but that it also has an intrinsic ability to create it's own movement.

But how do these make billiard balls move, and keep on moving?

And what are the 'internal contradictions' of an electron, or of a quark?


What struggle of opposites is going on inside the billiard and inside it's atoms; well, the attractive force binding positive protons together in the nucleus is struggling against the positive charge of the protons which repels the protons from each other, you have the electrons and protons with opposite charges, then you have the quarks and their forces etc etc. Maybe a physicist can come on here and elaborate.

Once more, how do these make a billiard ball move?


What, you mean idealism?

No, I mean an external source of motion/energy, no less material than the stuff we see around us. [See below.]


No one said one object couldn't use their own internally generated motion to impact on another object. The Sun's own gravity impacts on the Earth, but the Earth is just as capable of creating movement itself, as evidenced by the orbit of the Moon. So no, there is no contradiction.

And that is precisely why later dialecticians had to invent 'external contradictions'.

But once you allow for these, the argument that there is no source of motion/energy external to the universe self-destructs (i.e., your argument against Idealism is neutralised).

Plainly, this allows 'god' in through the back door again.


No you don't, the thesis is; 'things generate their own movement' not 'things alone generate their own movement and no other things can affect them'.

But, in that case, change/movement cannot be the sole result of contradictions internal to such 'things'.

And, if that is so, Lenin was wrong.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Self-movement certainly does not necessitate intelligence. The example of the universe as a whole - coming-into-being without the presence of a Creator - is the obvious one

Who said it did? I was being ironic/sarcastic.


Nothing in Lenin's words suggests a technical meaning of "object", so what you say here doesn't follow at all. He may as well have said "stuff" or "thingamajig" for all the precision Lenin is using in this passage

As we establisdhed in our debate about Mao (at the Political Crossfire Forum), you do not appear to have read the 'dialectical classics'.

Lenin in fact said this:


"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.

"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Italic emphases in the original. Bold emphases added.]

And:


"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis ('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; -- 'breaks in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the inner impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest, indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of motion -– such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914), pp.12-13. Bold emphases added.]

And:


"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases in the original. Italic emphasis added.]

And by "object" he meant:


"[D]ialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Ibid., p.93. Bold added.]

Lenin, V. (1914), 'Karl Marx', reprinted in Lenin (1970), pp.1-18.

--------, (1921), 'Once Again On The Trade Unions, The Current Situation And The Mistakes Of Comrades Trotsky And Bukharin', reprinted in Lenin (1980), pp.70-106.

--------, (1961), Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works Volume 38 (Progress Publishers).

--------, (1970), Karl Marx (Foreign Languages Press).

--------, (1980), On The Question Of Dialectics (Progress Publishers).

So he did mean 'object' in the sense I implied -- as did other dialecticians (if you want the quotes, I can give you them).


That obviously isn't the point. - the Young Marx clearly had an awareness of nature and its importance for human beings, for instance. The actual point is merely to stress that the developmental logic of capitalism is intrinsic to the structures of capital itself

Then development cannot be the result of 'internal contradictions'.

As I said, you have a stark choice: reject the Leninist/Hegelian idea that change is the sole result of 'internal contradictions' or the idea that everything is interconnected. [But, see below.]

By the way, if you are right when you say this:


No Marxist has ever denied that "external factors" make their influence felt in the workings of capitalism

and you generalise it, then that undermines this statement of yours:


Self-movement certainly does not necessitate intelligence. The example of the universe as a whole - coming-into-being without the presence of a Creator - is the obvious one

This is becasue, if you allow capitalism to be influenced by 'external fasctors' then it will be impossible for you to limit this only to capitalism, for the earth too is affected by such factors, as is the solar systen, as is the Galaxy, as is the ...

In that case, so is the universe. [Or rather, you can only stop the above inference on an ad hoc basis.]

And so you are forced to allow 'god' back in.


I cannot for the life of me understand your reasoning here. How does it follow that "nothing in reality interacts with anything else" if Lenin's theory is true? We would need to know what "object" is supposed to mean, I guess

Simple, if, according to Lenin, change is the sole result of 'internal contradictions', then no external object can change another.

In that case, unless we allow 'influence' to mean 'does not change/alter another object', then, if all change is internally induced, no object can have an influence on another; no object can change or alter another object.

On the other hand, if objects do influence one another (in the above sense) then change cannot be the sole result of 'internal contradictions'.

On the other hand again, if you allow 'influence' to mean 'does not change/alter another object', then plainly objects do not have an effect on one another.

Either way, objects are either hermetically sealed off from one another (as Leibniz argued), or they are interconnected (as mystics avow) -- either way, Lenin was wrong.

I have summarised every option open to DM-fans to escape these conclusions in Essay Eight Part One; here is a summary of my summary:


D1: Change is internal to a system. Objects and processes in each system mutually condition one another (as UOs).

[UO = Unity of Opposites]

D2: Change to objects and processes is internally-driven -- not externally-motivated.

D3: Objects within systems change because of their internal relations/contradictions.

D4: Objects in a particular system do not have external relations with one another. What appear to be external links are in fact misperceived or misidentified internal relations.

D5: Systems themselves cannot affect each other except by their own internal inter-systemic relations of the above (D4) sort.

D6: On the other hand, individual and separate systems cannot have such an effect on one another, otherwise change would not be wholly internal to a particular system.

D7: Hence, single objects and/or processes cannot be systems, otherwise they could not influence each other (by D6).

D8: On the other hand, once more, objects and processes must be sub-systems (and hence systems in their own right), since they are composed of an indefinite (possibly infinite) number of their own sub-units (molecules, atoms, sub-atomic particles, etc.). But even then, as systems themselves, objects and processes could not influence one another (again, by D6).

D9: This means that at some point there must be simple units of 'matter' that are not themselves systems; otherwise, if everything were system-like (or if all that exists are sub-sub-sub-…systems, to infinity) nothing could have any effect on anything else (by D6) -- that is, if all change is internally-motivated.

D10: But, if there were such simple units (i.e., if they had no 'parts', and were thus not systems themselves) they would be changeless. If that weren't the case, these simple units would be UOs themselves (and thus not simple, after all), subject to their own internally-driven development. Indeed,, if they are changeless they can have no effect on one another (or they would not be changeless).

D11: Hence, reality is either composed of a (possibly) infinite hierarchy of systems that have no influence on each other, or it is made out of fundamental (non-system-like) particles that are changeless and have no effect on anything.

And:


D12: Change is a result of "internal contradictions".

D13: Objects within T change only because of this internal dynamic.

D14: Reality is a mediated T; change is a consequence of a 'struggle' between opposites.

D15: No element of reality can be considered in isolation; all mutually condition one another.

[T = 'The Totality', whatever that is...]

And so:


However, D12 is ambiguous, The word "change" could mean:

(1) "Systematic change" (that is, it could mean "change internal to a particular system"); or it could mean:

(2) "Change internal to an object" -- as it does in D13 -– leaving it unclear whether or not this sort of change is wider-ranging, involving inter-objective or trans-systematic change.

Nevertheless, D13 seems clear enough, though:

D13: Objects within T change only because of this internal dynamic.

This states that change arises only as a result of a dynamic internal to objects.

But if that were so, it would once again be difficult to see what influence objects could have on each other. If change is internal to an object, then the relations it supposedly enjoyed with other objects would be irrelevant in this respect -- ex hypothesi, they could have no impact on the changes the latter undergo. This seems to imply that objects must be self-caused/motivated beings (as Lenin alleged).

Once more however, whatever changes an object undergoes -- since these are exclusively internally-generated -- they can't be a function of the relations which that object enjoys with other objects, otherwise the cause of change would not be internal to the said object, but external, after all -- and thus not the least bit 'rational' (since this would imply a "bad infinity").

On the other hand, if change is internal to a system of mediated objects or processes, then it would not be the sole result of a dynamic internal to the objects in that system, but would be a function both of the intra-systematic relations between systems and bodies and of the 'internal contradictions' within those systems or bodies themselves.

Furthermore, if change is system-specific (that is, if it is internal, and solely confined to systems), then the relations between those systems would become problematic, once more. Clearly, change cannot be exclusively system-specific if different systems have an actual effect on one another.

The question is, which of these is the correct account? Is change (A) the result of a dynamic internal to systems, or (B) is it internal to objects, or (C) is it a consequence of the external effects bodies have on each other? [Option (C) in fact allows change to be internal to systems even while it remains external to the bodies forming that system.]

Is therefore change body-specific, system-specific, or is it inter-systematic? Or, is it (D) a complex combination of all three of these?

But, yet again: if (D) were the case, what would be the point of saying that change is motivated internally (in bodies, processes or systems) -- if it is also externally-driven?

On the other hand, why say that everything is interconnected if change is exclusively internally-generated, and the alleged interconnections between systems or bodies have no part to play in this respect?

Up until now, DM-theorists appear not to have noticed these serious difficulties implied by their 'theory' of change. Since DM is supposed to be the philosophy of change, clearly this is not a minor flaw, one that can easily be ignored.

And thus, finally, these are the only options available to DM-fans:


(A) There is only one system -- the Totality --, the contents of which are (potentially or actually) infinitely interconnected. All the objects internal to it are subject to the operation of external causes only. This is because the entire nature of the part is determined by its relation to the whole and to other parts, but not by a relation that any part has with itself, and hence not by processes internal to each object. Or:

(B) There is only one system -- the Totality --, which is (potentially or actually) infinitely interconnected. But, change is exclusively internal to each object or process (because everything is a UO) in this Totality. In that case, nothing is interconnected with anything else. Or:

(C) Change is internal to all systems, and nature forms an infinite 'ascending' and 'descending' hierarchy of systems and sub-systems ('all the way up'/'down', as it were). In such a set-up, ultimately, there is nothing that could be or could become the opposite of anything else. This is because, either:

(1) The fundamental parts of reality are extensionless 'points' -- which, because they can be mapped onto or modelled by the real numbers, have no 'size' at all. This means that such objects can have no internal connection with anything else; they are therefore eternal and changeless. If they were subject to change then they would be systems themselves and hence would not be extensionless points. As extensionless points they can have no effect on each other or on anything else, or they would change. Hence, if systems are infinitely divisible change cannot be internally-motivated -- or rather, the only change possible would be that which arises from the rearrangement of these eternally changeless 'point masses'.

Or,

(2) The fundamental parts of reality are systems. But, they cannot have opposites that cause change. This is because those opposites would have to be external to each system, and that would mean that change would not be internally-driven. Moreover, these opposites cannot be internal to that system either. If they were, that system could not change into that opposite, since that opposite would already exist. Or:

(D) Everything is a sub-system of some sort no matter how much it is sub-divided. In that case, there are no point masses, since all sub-systems are infinitely divisible. In this arrangement, while change is internal to the Totality it is not internal to its sub-systems, but external. This is because if change were exclusively internal to such sub-systems they could have no effect on one another. But, if no sub-system had any effect on any other, there would be no change in the Totality over and above, perhaps, the rearrangement of these sub-systems. Hence, if the Totality changes, its sub-systems cannot.

In that case, given this option, change would be internal to the Totality but external to its sub-systems. Moreover, even if the latter are UOs, that fact would have no influence on whether they changed or not. If it did, change would be internal to each sub-system, contrary to the supposition. So, if (D) is to stand, change would not be the result of instability internal to such sub-systems because the latter are, on this supposition, externally-motivated.

However, a moment's thought will show that this option cannot work in the way described -- if change is merely the re-arranging of subsystems, then any larger system containing these subsystems would itself change internally, contrary to the hypothesis. Or:

(E) Change is not only internal to the Totality, but it is also internal and external to its sub-systems (as they 'mediate' one another, or 'dialectically' interact). In that case, change to these sub-systems would not be the sole result of their own internal instabilities or 'inner contradictions', as dialecticians maintain.

Unfortunately, this would have profound implications for HM and the revolutionary overthrow of Capitalism, for example. The contradictions inside the latter would thus be insufficient to lead to its demise. External causes over and above the class struggle and the falling rate of profit (etc.) would be needed --, including perhaps bad weather, meteorite impact, or alien intervention (etc.).

Naturally, no one believes the class struggle is hermetically sealed against the rest of nature, but since these influences stretch off into infinity this would present HM with its own "bad infinity", which would end "who knows where?"

Not only that, if change is also external to each system, then the Totality (as a system itself) must be susceptible to just such external influences.

Any attempt to forestall that untoward implication would prompt the same sort of objection that stumps naive supporters of the Cosmological Argument [henceforth, COMA] for the existence of God: if everything has a cause, then what caused God?

Hence, if every system is subject to external causation, the question becomes: What caused the Totality?

Clearly, this challenge can only be neutralised by an appeal to the alleged 'definition' of the Totality (or by an appeal to an infinite set of causes, which stretch off to "who knows where?") -- in the way that theists respond to similar objections to the COMA. [This is not surprising, given the mystical origin of DM.]

However, as Kant noted, the COMA has to be buttressed by a surreptitious appeal to the Ontological Argument [henceforth, ONAN]. So, from the supposed definition of the word "God" (as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"), 'His' necessary and actual existence are 'derivable'. In that way, questions about 'His' origin are supposedly rendered meaningless.

In like manner, but in this case based on the meaning of "Totality" (i.e., "all that there is" or, maybe, "that than which there is nothing else", or "that outwith which nothing else can be conceived"), it could be argued that there is nothing outside the Totality that could cause it to exist.

So, the only way that dialecticians could defend this fall-back position (should they chose to adopt it) would be to use an 'atheistical' version of the ONAN, on the lines that the Totality is "that than which there is nothing else".

Of course, such a defence would make plain the Linguistic Idealism in DM, for from the meaning of a few words again substantive truths about reality will have been derived.

But, more importantly, if change is caused by the interplay of opposites, and objects and systems turn into their opposites, then, whether or not it is internally- or externally-induced, change would be impossible. As we saw in Essay Seven Part One, if the opposite of a body or system exists, it cannot change into it, for it already exists!

On the other hand, if it doesn't already exist it can play no part in helping to change that object or system!

In view of their unwise commitment to 'inverted' Hegelian 'logic', there seem to be no other options open to DM-enthusiasts.

Moreover, if the last of these options is correct then (as we will also see here -- link in the original) the similarities between DM and Mystical Christianity would become even more apparent. For if there is a force external to the Universe that conditions it, then the Totality will have an external cause after all, and the DM-search for "how" and "why" will have run into the Ground Of All Being -- which ends "we know where...".

The choice of title for such an ultimate cause does not affect any of the above points -- nor does it resolve the problems they expose -- since a Deity by any other name is still a Deity.

Plenty more details, argument and analysis here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_01.htm

[Cumannach]

Cummanach:


But how do these make billiard balls move, and keep on moving?

And what are the 'internal contradictions' of an electron, or of a quark?



What do you mean about the billiard ball- DM doesn't state that every billiard ball has to be constantly in movement with regard to some given inertial frame of reference. The billiard ball is, first of all, in movement around the sun, then around the center of the galaxy, it is also struggling to move towards the center of the earth, and is exerting a downward force on the snooker table. The top half of the billard ball is exerting a downward force on the bottom half, the gravitational force of the billard ball is impelling it to move towards every piece of matter in the Universe, taking whatever bit you want as the frame of reference. I see plenty of contradiction and constant struggle going on here I must say. An electron is on the one hand impelling itself towards any given piece of negative-charged matter by it's gravitational force on the one hand, and repelling itself from the same piece due to it's own charge (because negative repels negative). Then you have the wave/particle contradiction for the elementary particles, and that whole myriad of weird quantum crap going on. Honestly, what more could you ask for?;)





Once more, how do these make a billiard ball move?



No, I mean an external source of motion/energy, no less material than the stuff we see around us. [See below.]


You can't have an external force, when we're talking about the Universe. The Universe includes everything material.





And that is precisely why later dialecticians had to invent 'external contradictions'.

But once you allow for these, the argument that there is no source of motion/energy external to the universe self-destructs (i.e., your argument against Idealism is neutralised).

Plainly, this allows 'god' in through the back door again.



But, in that case, change/movement cannot be the sole result of contradictions internal to such 'things'.

And, if that is so, Lenin was wrong.


I don't see how allowing for external forces implies Idealism. External forces can act on objects, but these forces are material and generated by other material objects. When did Lenin state that an object's movement is solely a result of it's own exclusive generation? If he did that, he obviously wasn't thinking straight.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cummanach:


What do you mean about the billiard ball- DM doesn't state that every billiard ball has to be constantly in movement with regard to some inertial frame of reference. The billiard ball is, first of all, in movement around the sun, then around the center of the galaxy, it is also struggling to move towards the center of the earth, and is exerting a downward force on the snooker table. The top half of the billard ball is exerting a downward force on the bottom half, the gravitational force of the billard ball is impelling it to move towards every piece of matter in the Universe, taking whatever bit you want as the frame of reference. I see plenty of contradiciton and constant struggle going on here I must say. An electron is on the one hand impelling itself towards any given piece of negative-charged matter by it's gravitational force on the one hand, and repelling itself from the same piece due to it's own charge (because negative repels negative). Then you have the wave/particle contradiction for the elementary particles. Honestly, what more could you ask for?Honestly, what more could you ask for?

You miss the point, perhaps deliberately.

Here it is again:

What are the 'internal contradictions' that make a billiard ball move?

You have listed external forces acting on that ball.

What we need to know is what are the 'internal contradictions' that make the ball move, not what are the external factors.

Of course, if there are no 'internal contradictions' in moving billiard balls, then Lenin was wrong.

If there, then external factors are not what make the ball move, and Newton was wrong.


An electron is on the one hand impelling itself towards any given piece of negative-charged matter by it's gravitational force on the one hand, and repelling itself from the same piece due to it's own charge (because negative repels negative). Then you have the wave/particle contradiction for the elementary particles. Honestly, what more could you ask for?

But, what are the 'interrnal', not external, 'contradictions' in an electron that make it move?

It can't be the wave/particle duality, since that has no effect on the movement of electrons.

Anyway, the wave/particle duality is not a 'contradiction'; here is what I have written on this:


For example, DM-theorists generally argue that the wave-particle duality of light confirms the thesis that nature is fundamentally dialectical; in this case, light is supposed to be a UO of wave and particle. Precisely how they are a unity (i.e., how it could be true that matter at this level is fundamentally particulate and fundamentally non-particulate all at once) is of course left eminently obscure. Exactly how this phenomenon helps account for the material world is even less clear.

[UO = Unity of Opposites.]

Anyway, even though all dialecticians refer to this 'contradiction', not one has explained how and why it is a contradiction, nor less how and why it is a 'dialectical contradiction' (even if we knew what these were).

Consider these two propositions:

Q1: Light is a wave.

Q2: Light is particulate.

Now, Q1 would contradict Q2 if the following were the case:

Q3: No wave can be particulate.

Q4: Light must be one or the other, wave or particle.

[Q4 is required or Q1 and Q2 would merely be inconsistent.]

But is Q3 true? Surely not, for if physicists are correct, light is both! However, independently of that, there are plenty of examples of waves in nature which are particulate; e.g., sound waves, water waves and Mexican waves. So, Q3 is in fact false!

Moreover, Q4 could be false, too. Light could turn out to be something else about which we do not yet have a concept. That, of course, would make Q1 and Q2 merely inconsistent. Do 'dialectical logicians' know what to do with 'dialectical inconsistencies'?

But, even if in some way this were a contradiction it does nothing to explain change -- unless we are supposed to accept the idea that the fact that light is a particle changes it into a wave, and vice versa. Are we to conclude that these two states/processes are 'struggling' with each other? But what is the point of that? What role does this particular 'contradiction' play either in DM or in Physics? At best it seems to be merely ornamental.

Now, if we put to one side the 'solution' to this puzzle offered by, say, Superstring Theory, there are in fact more than a handful of Physicists -- with, it seems, a more robust commitment to scientific realism than the average dialectician can muster -- who believe that this 'paradox' can be resolved within a realist picture of nature. [Evidence appears here, and here. In the original, these 'here's are links to sites that attempt to give a realist explanation of the phenomena, without assuming that light can be a wave and a particle all at once] Whether or not they are correct need not detain us since DM-theorists (if consistent) ought to advise these rather rash realists not to bother trying to solve this riddle. This is because dialectics has already provided us with an a priori solution: since nature is fundamentally contradictory there is in fact no solution.

So far experiments have merely shown that under certain conditions light is particulate, under others it is wave-like, but not both.

We have yet to see the experimental proof that they are both at once.

Nevertheless, anyone not committed to such an obtuse view of reality would have good reason to question it, and this might, for all anyone knows, assist in the advancement of science.

Not so with DM-fans, whose advice could permanently hold things up.

Unfortunately, if physicists took this advice, science could not advance to a superior view of nature (if one exists) by eliminating this alleged contradiction. At best, this a priori DM-approach to knowledge would close available options down, forcing scientists to adopt a view of reality that might not be correct -- and, given what we already know about the history of Physics, probably isn't correct.

Dialectics cannot therefore help but hold up the progress of science....

More details, argument, links and references here (in Section B):

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm


You can't have an external force, when we're talking about the Universe. The Universe includes everything material.

How do you know?


I don't see how allowing for external forces implies Idealism. External forces can act on objects, but these forces are material and generated by other material objects. When did Lenin state that an object's movement is solely a result of it's generation? If he did that, he obviously wasn't thinking straight.

I have laid out the argument in full in my reply to 'Lord Hargreaves', above.

Here it is in brief:

You say that the thesis that change and development as a result of 'internal contradictions' undercuts belief in an external cause of change, and thus of an external cause of the universe, i.,e 'God'.

But, you are now quite prepared to accept that there are 'external contradictions'.

In that case, your argument is in tatters, for if there can be external causes then the inference you made to the non-existence of an external cause of the universe, namely 'God', fails.

If 'internal contradictions' are insufficient to account for change/development/movement, then how can you argue this:


If you want to talk like that about it, all matter in the Universe does create it's own movement by exerting a gravitational pull on every other bit of matter. Take the other piece of matter on which that force is exerted as the inertial frame and there you have it, every object locomotes itself, by gravitationally moving itself towards other objects

If everything in the universe requires external 'contradictions', then why not the universe itself?

This is like the response we make to the Cosmological Argument for the existence of 'God'.

Theists argue that all things require a cause, and so that cause is God.

We reply, OK, if all things require a casuse, what caused 'God'?

Same with your argument: if everything in the universe requires external 'contradictions' if it is to move and develop (whether or not they are also moved by 'internal contradictions' too), then why not the universe itself?

You can only exempt the universe from this if you are also prepared to let the theists get away with their get-out-clause.

[Lord Hargreaves]

So he did mean 'object' in the sense I implied -- as did other dialecticians (if you want the quotes, I can give you them).

I've seen these quotes and others, if only because you have posted them before. They don't affect the actual charge I made - not that Lenin was using "object" in a different sense than you are, but that Lenin is being cavalier with his terminology such that we can't draw anything from it. Unless I'm missing something, and phrases like "everything existing" and "body" are actually exercises in precise language usage



[...] if you allow capitalism to be influenced by 'external fasctors' then it will be impossible for you to limit this only to capitalism, for the earth too is affected by such factors, as is the solar systen, as is the Galaxy, as is the ...

In that case, so is the universe. [Or rather, you can only stop the above inference on an ad hoc basis.]

And so you are forced to allow 'god' back in.

Yes but you know I don't like talking about "self-movement" in an over-generalised way - which is why I wanted to stress the movement of capital and get away from the metaphysics.

I think it untenable to say "everything" is self-moving, for the basic Humean reason that we can't possibly say this because we can't possibly know everything and how it moves.

All I would say is that once we define the "object" or "system" we are talking about - where the edges of the "totality" lie - we can meaningfully emphasise the importance of understanding change within that as being internal or self-movement. Then, with this, there would be no reason to exclude external influence on this system either



Simple, if, according to Lenin, change is the sole result of 'internal contradictions', then no external object can change another.

In that case, unless we allow 'influence' to mean 'does not change/alter another object', then, if all change is internally induced, no object can have an influence on another; no object can change or alter another object.

On the other hand, if objects do influence one another (in the above sense) then change cannot be the sole result of 'internal contradictions'.

On the other hand again, if you allow 'influence' to mean 'does not change/alter another object', then plainly objects do not have an effect on one another.

Either way, objects are either hermetically sealed off from one another (as Leibniz argued), or they are interconnected (as mystics avow) -- either way, Lenin was wrong.

True enough, but I think we easily cut Lenin some slack by simply observing how vague he is being, and remembering that he - as a budding revolutionary - never seemed to have any intrinsic interest in any of this.

[Cumannach]

Cummanach:



You miss the point, perhaps deliberately.

Here it is again:

What are the 'internal contradictions' that make a billiard ball move?

You have listed external forces acting on that ball.

What we need to know is what are the 'internal contradictions' that make the ball move, not what are the external factors.

Of course, if there are no 'internal contradictions' in moving billiard balls, then Lenin was wrong.

If there, then external factors are not what make the ball move, and Newton was wrong.



But, what are the 'interrnal', not external, 'contradictions' in an electron that make it move?



You say that the thesis that change and development as a result of 'internal contradictions' undercuts belief in an external cause of change, and thus of an external cause of the universe, i.,e 'God'.

But, you are now quite prepared to accept that there are 'external contradictions'.

In that case, your argument is in tatters, for if there can be external causes then the inference you made to the non-existence of an external cause of the universe, namely 'God', fails.

If 'internal contradictions' are insufficient to account for change/development/movement, then how can you argue this:



If everything in the universe requires external 'contradictions', then why not the universe itself?

This is like the response we make to the Cosmological Argument for the existence of 'God'.

Theists argue that all things require a cause, and so that cause is God.

We reply, OK, if all things require a casuse, what caused 'God'?

Same with your argument: if everything in the universe requires external 'contradictions' if it is to move and develop (whether or not they are also moved by 'internal contradictions' too), then why not the universe itself?

You can only exempt the universe from this if you are also prepared to let the theists get away with their get-out-clause.

Rosa,

Look, you're using the billiard ball as an analogy for an indivisible particle of matter, for the elementary particle, the unit of matter. So let's take the unit of matter.

A particle of matter in and of itself, generates a force, the force of gravity. This force is intrinsic and inherent to the particle. It is a result of the object making a dent in space-time, simply by it's very existence. It is a self generating impulse of movement towards any other piece of matter. Not only that, but because of Newton's Third Law of Motion, which states that, 'for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction', our first particle, by it's own inherent property, causes the other particle to exert a force on it, in reaction, an extra impulse again, causing it to move with even greater momentum.

Therefore, material objects can and do generate their own movement, which does not mean that an external force cannot also cause an object to move. In the above case, not only does the particle make it's own movement, it is moved by an external force, the gravitational pull of the other particle. What can you possibly argue with in this?

Now, what about contradictions? Well, first of all, I cannot conceive of how you believe that an object being both a wave and a particle at the same time, is not a contradiction, but leaving that aside.

Mainstream Dialectical Materialism deals with change and development. These are processes. These are interactions. A stand alone particle independent of any development or interaction is not a process or an interaction. In fact it is nothing, it does not change. Dialectical Materialism does not concern itself with it. (And not suprisingly, because there is nothing to say about something which does not affect anything or undergo change. This abstraction is irrelevant to everything. Movement of one thing is always tied up with something, else, not least because we need a frame of reference.)



"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin Philosophical Notebooks (1961), pp.357-58. Bold emphasis added.]The equation of motion for the two particles moving towards each other in our example, due both to their self-inherent impulse, and the impulse imposed upon each by the other, is described with two opposite (contradicting) forces, 'struggling' against each other. To understand this process of movement, this development of motion, two contradictory forces need to be put into the equation. The motion is a result of the two particles being interconnected, namely they both lie within a dent of space-time made by the other. In this system of motion, in this interaction, in this process, there is a contradiction and a 'struggle'. This is all that dialectical materialism demands.

Therefore a dialectical approach is vindicated. Dialectics wins out.

Now the wave/particle duality, In my opinion, this is a contradiction, a fundamental contradiction in Nature, and a resounding victory for the Dialectical outlook. To discuss that here would be offtopic, so maybe elsewhere... Although I'm not so well informed on the Physics of it but I'll say what I can.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


I've seen these quotes and others, if only because you have posted them before. They don't affect the actual charge I made - not that Lenin was using "object" in a different sense than you are, but that Lenin is being cavalier with his terminology such that we can't draw anything from it. Unless I'm missing something, and phrases like "everything existing" and "body" are actually exercises in precise language usage

I haven't posted one of them before, namely this one:


"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90.

"[D]ialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Ibid., p.93. Bold added.]

Here, Lenin calls a glass tumbler, "an object". So, my interpretation of Lenin is correct.


but that Lenin is being cavalier with his terminology such that we can't draw anything from it. Unless I'm missing something, and phrases like "everything existing" and "body" are actually exercises in precise language usage

This is on a par with your other attempt to sanitise Mao, which, as I said before, is dishonest, and reminiscent of theologians who interpret the Book of Gensis 'metaphorically' so as to make creation compatible with science.

But, anyway, how do you know Lenin was being 'cavalier'? This quote comes from a published text, so it represents his considered view.

The onus is on you to show otherwise.

The problem you face is that every time you come across a text that disagrees with your preconceived view (I say this since you appear to have formed your opinions of this 'theory' before you read the classic texts!) you have to dismiss it as 'non-literal', or 'non-serious'.

But, how do you know that the texts that seem to agree with your view are literal and serious? All you seem to have is this rule: if it agrees with my preconceived ideas, it is literal/serious, otherwise not.

And you apply this subjective criterion even to texts that have been published, and which the author in question checked before publication.


Yes but you know I don't like talking about "self-movement" in an over-generalised way - which is why I wanted to stress the movement of capital and get away from the metaphysics.

I think it untenable to say "everything" is self-moving, for the basic Humean reason that we can't possibly say this because we can't possibly know everything and how it moves.

All I would say is that once we define the "object" or "system" we are talking about - where the edges of the "totality" lie - we can meaningfully emphasise the importance of understanding change within that as being internal or self-movement. Then, with this, there would be no reason to exclude external influence on this system either

In that case, start your own thread; this one is about what Lenin actually said; it's not about what you want to focus on.

And, as for your comment on 'external influences' I have covered that. You need to address my arguments.


True enough, but I think we easily cut Lenin some slack by simply observing how vague he is being, and remembering that he - as a budding revolutionary - never seemed to have any intrinsic interest in any of this.

But, the point is that the majority of Marxists here, and the majority of active revolutionaries agree with Lenin (I gave an argument supporting this in another thread in answer to you -- link below).

Hence, I am addressing Lenin as he presented his own views and as he has been received by revolutionaries -- certainly those on this board.

So, I for one will not 'cut him any slack' here.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1385684&postcount=65

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cummanach:


Look, you're using the billiard ball as an analogy for an indivisible particle of matter, for the elementary particle, the unit of matter. So let's take the unit of matter.

No, I am referring to literal billiard balls as they roll across a table. What 'internal contradictions', not 'external contradictions or forces, make it move?

Lenin was quite clear, everything in the entire universe self-moves, and they do so because of a 'struggle of opposites'.

So, what are these internal opposites, and where is this 'struggle' as a billiard ball moves?


A particle of matter in and of itself, generates a force, the force of gravity. This force is intrinsic and inherent to the particle. It is a result of the object making a dent in space-time, simply by it's very existence. It is a self generating impulse of movement towards any other piece of matter. Not only that, but because of Newton's Third Law of Motion, which states that, 'for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction', our first particle, by it's own inherent property, causes the other particle to exert a force on it, in reaction, an extra impulse again, causing it to move with even greater momentum.

Therefore, material objects can and do generate their own movement, which does not mean that an external force cannot also cause an object to move. In the above case, not only does the particle make it's own movement, it is moved by an external force, the gravitational pull of the other particle. What can you possibly argue with in this?

Yes, I am a mathematician, I understand the mechanics; I specialised in applied mathematics and mechanics. What I cannot see are the 'internal contradictions' in every particle of matter, or in this billiard ball, if you like, that make it move.

It is no use you keep appealing to external forces. I know they can make objects move (but see below).

What you have yet to do is tell us what 'internal contradictions' make things like billiard balls move.

Now, you say that forces are intrinsic to particles, but they are carried by other particles, so they are extrinsic to most particles.

Anyway, in Relativity, there is no force of gravity. Objects move along geodesics, and not under the action of a gravitational force.

Here is what Nobel Laureate Professor Wilczek (of MIT) had to say:


"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.

"In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote:

"'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'" [Wilczek (2006), pp.37-38.]

Wilczek, F. (2006), Fantastic Realities. 49 Mind Journeys And A Trip To Stockholm (World Scientific).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frank_Wilczek

He has posted this on-line. You can find the links here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm

So, whichever way you try to slice it, your 'theory' falls flat.


Now, what about contradictions? Well, first of all, I cannot conceive of how you believe that an object being both a wave and a particle at the same time, is not a contradiction, but leaving that aside.

I gave you my reasons, you need to address them rather than speculate.


Mainstream Dialectical Materialism deals with change and development. These are processes. These are interactions. A stand alone particle independent of any development or interaction is not a process or an interaction. In fact it is nothing, it does not change. Dialectical Materialism does not concern itself with it. (And not surprisingly, because there is nothing to say about something which does not affect anything or undergo change. This abstraction is irrelevant to everything. Movement of one thing is always tied up with something, else, not least because we need a frame of reference.)

Except, Lenin said that every object self-moves because of its 'internal contradictions'; you keep dodging this.


(And not surprisingly, because there is nothing to say about something which does not affect anything or undergo change. This abstraction is irrelevant to everything. Movement of one thing is always tied up with something, else, not least because we need a frame of reference.)

This is not so; it is easy to say something about things that do not change (there are trillions of them in every grain of matter). namely. these particles that do not change.

And what are these particles? Electrons, photons and protons. Left to themselves they last forever (or billions of times longer than the universe has existed).

You might want to say they do change, but they do not do so as a result of their 'internal contradictions'

Electrons have no 'internal contradictions', neither do photons.

Moreover, it is also easy to say something about particles that do not interact -- namely: these particles do not interact.

Are there any of these? We do not know since they do not interact. But, that does not mean they do not exist. You would rule them out on an a priori basis.

So, we can say quite a lot about such things, contrary to what you asserted.


The equation of motion for the two particles moving towards each other in our example, due both to their self-inherent impulse, and the impulse imposed upon each by the other, is described with two opposite (contradicting) forces, 'struggling' against each other. To understand this process of movement, this development of motion, two contradictory forces need to be put into the equation. The motion is a result of the two particles being interconnected, namely they both lie within a dent of space-time made by the other. In this system of motion, in this interaction, in this process, there is a contradiction and a 'struggle'. This is all that dialectical materialism demands.

Therefore a dialectical approach is vindicated. Dialectics wins out.

1) You help yourself to the idea that opposite forces 'contradict' one another. I see no reason to accept this re-definition. You will need to provide argument to justify this move.

2) Anyway, such forces combine to give a resultant. So, if anything, they should be called the opposite of 'contradictions', that is 'dialectical tautologies'.

3) What causes motion is this single resultant force. So, motion is not the result of an alleged 'contradiction', but of this resultant.

4) As we have seen, these are external to each body. One force is external to the second body, and the other force is external to the first.

To make this clear, call the first object M(1), and the second M(2). Call the force exerted by M(1), F(1), and the force exerted by M(2), F(2).

Now, F(1) may or may not be internal to M(1) -- but I gave reasons to doubt this above -- but it is external to M(2). And the same is true in reverse with respect to F(2) and M(1).

So, we do not yet have a contradiction internal to M(2) or M(2), as Lenin said we should.

So, dialectics falls flat again.


Now the wave/particle duality, In my opinion, this is a contradiction, a fundamental contradiction in Nature, and a resounding victory for the Dialectical outlook. To discuss that here would be offtopic, so maybe elsewhere... Although I'm not so well informed on the Physics of it but I'll say what I can.

Well, you have simply copied this idea from other dialecticians. You have yet to answer my objections, and you certainly haven't shown it is a 'contradiction'. You have just asserted it is as an article of faith (it has to be an article of faith, since you offer no reason to say this is a 'contradiction').

But, even if it is, what use is it? Does the wave part 'struggle' with the particle part, as Lenin said they should? Does this make such particles move? Hardly!

So, even in dialectical terms, this alleged contradiction makes no sense.

[CHEtheLIBERATOR]

Lenin was santa to the russian people if you think about it.But anyway odd theory thanks for the post

[Cumannach]

No, I am referring to literal billiard balls as they roll across a table. What 'internal contradictions', not 'external contradictions or forces, make it move?As has been said, Dialectics does not demand that every movement of an object is entirely self generated. So the que hits the billiard ball. What internal contradictions describe the movement of the billiard ball; it's momentum and the force of friction it causes by impelling itself towards the centre of the Earth.


Lenin was quite clear, everything in the entire universe self-moves, and they do so because of a 'struggle of opposites'.
In the sense that you're talking about, as it happens, Lenin was right, thanks to gravity and reaction, as I pointed out above in the most basic case, of two particles.



What you have yet to do is tell us what 'internal contradictions' make things like billiard balls move.

Now, you say that forces are intrinsic to particles, but they are carried by other particles, so they are extrinsic to most particles. Anyway, in Relativity, there is no force of gravity. Objects move along geodesics, and not under the action of a gravitational force.


These comments by Wilczek about Forces not being used in a particular formulation has nothing to do with the matter at hand. You don't have to explicitly use forces in Lagrangian mechanics either, but Langrangian mechanics is just a formulation of Newtonian Mechanics, if I'm not mistaken. The whole thing I wrote doesn't rely on using Relativity and Newtonian physics at the same time anyway.


This is not so; it is easy to say something about things that do not change (there are trillions of them in every grain of matter). namely. these particles that do not change.This is not true. If they didn't change, they couldn't be percieved. How could the neurons in my mind percieve them if they didn't effect the physical world.


Electrons have no 'internal contradictions', neither do photons.Again, leaving aside the wave/particle issue, it's not just about a thing 'having' internal contradicitons, it's about their development being driven by contradictions.


Moreover, it is also easy to say something about particles that do not interact -- namely: these particles do not interact.

Are there any of these? We do not know since they do not interact. But, that does not mean they do not exist. You would rule them out on an a priori basis.Well by definition things that do not affect the Universe do not exist. That's obvious.



1) You help yourself to the idea that opposite forces 'contradict' one another. I see no reason to accept this re-definition. You will need to provide argument to justify this move.Well this is just your personal dislike for the dictionary definition of a word. Many people are satisfied with the meaning of contradiction implied here.
There's no substance in this disagreement about how you should use the word 'contradiction'.


...
So, dialectics falls flat again.No it doesn't, the dialectics is applied to the system of movement here.


But, even if it is, what use is it? Does the wave part 'struggle' with the particle part, as Lenin said they should? Does this make such particles move? Hardly!


To understand the dynamics of it, it's development, you do indeed have a struggle between the mechanics of it's wave nature and it's particle nature.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cummanch:



As has been said, Dialectics does not demand that every movement of an object is entirely self generated. So the que hits the billiard ball. What internal contradictions describe the movement of the billiard ball; it's momentum and the force of friction it causes by impelling itself towards the centre of the Earth.

Oh, but it does:


"A tumbler is assuredly both a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two properties and qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them, an infinite number of 'mediacies' and inter-relationships with the rest of the world."

"[I]f we are to have true knowledge of an object we must look at and examine all its facets, its connections and 'mediacies'. That is something we cannot ever hope to achieve completely, but the rule of comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity….

"[D]ialectical logic requires that an object should be taken in development, in change, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it). This is not immediately obvious in respect of such an object as a tumbler, but it, too, is in flux, and this holds especially true for its purpose, use and connection with the surrounding world." [Ibid., p.93.]

"Nowadays, the ideas of development…as formulated by Marx and Engels on the basis of Hegel…[encompass a process] that seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis ('negation of negation'), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in a straight line; -- a development by leaps, catastrophes, revolutions; -- 'breaks in continuity'; the transformation of quantity into quality; -- the inner impulses to development, imparted by the contradiction and conflict of the various forces and tendencies acting on a given body, or within a given phenomenon, or within a given society; -- the interdependence and the closest, indissoluble connection of all sides of every phenomenon…, a connection that provides a uniform, law-governed, universal process of motion -– such are some of the features of dialectics as a richer (than the ordinary) doctrine of development." [Lenin (1914), pp.12-13. Bold emphases added.]

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.

"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.

"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Italic emphases in the original. Bold emphases added.]

You can find the references in my earlier post.

I don't think you guys actually read the Dialectical Gospels!



You are just back-tracking since I have raised an issue you have never considered; which shows how little thought you lot give to you own 'theory'!

In that case, we are still waiting for you to reveal to us the 'inner contradictions' that impel a billiard ball along, or an electron, or an arrow, or a or planet, or a star, or a tumbler...

Looks like [I]nothing moves according to its own 'internal contradictions'...


In the sense that you're talking about, as it happens, Lenin was right, thanks to gravity and reaction, as I pointed out above in the most basic case, of two particles.

Once more, you keep perseverating on external factors.

This cannot work, and I explained why.

Here it is again:



1) You help yourself to the idea that opposite forces 'contradict' one another. I see no reason to accept this re-definition. You will need to provide argument to justify this move.

2) Anyway, such forces combine to give a resultant. So, if anything, they should be called the opposite of 'contradictions', that is 'dialectical tautologies'.

3) What causes motion is this single resultant force. So, motion is not the result of an alleged 'contradiction', but of this resultant.

4) As we have seen, these are external to each body. One force is external to the second body, and the other force is external to the first.

To make this clear, call the first object M(1), and the second M(2). Call the force exerted by M(1), F(1), and the force exerted by M(2), F(2).

Now, F(1) may or may not be internal to M(1) -- but I gave reasons to doubt this above -- but it [I]is external to M(2). And the same is true in reverse with respect to F(2) and M(1).

So, we do not yet have a contradiction internal to M(2) or M(2), as Lenin said we should.

So, where are the 'internal contradictions' of, say, an apple that falls to the earth?

And please do not tell me about the pull of gravity, etc. since, according to modern physics, it's not a force, and anyway, it is external to the apple.


Again, leaving aside the wave/particle issue, it's not just about a thing 'having' internal contradictions, it's about their development being driven by contradictions.

1) Well, Lenin said all things 'self-move' according to their 'internal contradictions'. So how does light (or an electron) being a wave/particle make it move?

Once more you ignored this question. I am not, however, surprised by that. In your unenviable position, I would too.

2) You have yet to show that this is a 'contradiction' to begin with. As I noted, you have just copied this idea without giving it any thought, and now find you can't defend it. You certainly cannot answer my objections.


Well this is just your personal dislike for the dictionary definition of a word. Many people are satisfied with the meaning of contradiction implied here.

Well, no; I actually gave you my reasons. You need to address them, just as I address yours. Ignoring them is not doing you any favours.

And, what dictionary are you using?


There's no substance in this disagreement about how you should use the word 'contradiction'.

In that case, if, say, a cappie describes capitalism as 'stable, fair, and non-exploitative', but refused to say why he/she asserted it, you'd be quite happy if he/she then said:


There's no substance in this disagreement about how you should use the words 'stable', 'fair' and 'non-exploitative'.

especially if you had already laid out your reasons why this is not the case, would you?

But, we already know where this use of "contradiction" came from. It did not arise in the sciences, logic or in ordinary language, but in mystical theology, as Hegel tried to re-jig Aristotle's logic to support his Hermetic 'theory'.

On that, see this article at the Marxist Internet Archive:

http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/magee.htm

So, this use of "contradiction" was borrowed from Hegel, who in turn 'obtained' it from his unwise attempt to state the so-called 'Law of Identity' [LOI] negatively. From A = A he 'derived' what he thought was also the 'Law of non-contradiction' [LOC]: "A cannot be A and at the same time not A" -- which isn't even, of course, a contradiction!

But even if it were, the LOI concerns the alleged identity of an object with itself, whereas the LOC concerns the logical connection between a proposition and its negation. The LOC is not about objects (let alone their identity), and the LOI is not about propositions. Indeed, if a proposition were an object, it could say nothing, and if it wasn't self-identical, it wouldn't be a proposition to begin with, and so could say nothing determinate.

So, it is from this very basic error that Hegel's claim that everything is 'contradictory' derives, not from a scientific analysis of reality. That, and tradition are the only reasons comrades use this word today in the way you do. This is not to deny that capitalism is unstable, but it is to deny that we can learn anything at all about it from that Christian mystic, Hegel (upside down or even 'the right way up').

You can find this argument set out in more detail here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

Now, I am using the word 'contradiction' in a perfectly ordinary way, "contra-dict" = "speak-against".

This word applies to what we say. Only mystic would want to use it in the way that Hegel does (based on defective reasoning, and Hermetic theosophy).

Now, you might be using it in a new, and as yet unexplained sense, but what is it?

Unless you can say, your argument falls flat again, just as the cappie above would find with his/her argument.


No it doesn't, the dialectics is applied to the system of movement here.

Well, I have covered that option, so you need to address what I said, not simply repeat yourself.

Here then are the only options left to you (based on what Lenin and other dialecticians have said):



D1: Change is internal to a system. Objects and processes in each system mutually condition one another (as UOs).

[UO = Unity of Opposites]

D2: Change to objects and processes is internally-driven -- not externally-motivated.

D3: Objects within systems change because of their internal relations/contradictions.

D4: Objects in a particular system do not have external relations with one another. What appear to be external links are in fact misperceived or misidentified internal relations.

D5: Systems themselves cannot affect each other except by their own internal inter-systemic relations of the above (D4) sort.

D6: On the other hand, individual and separate systems cannot have such an effect on one another, otherwise change would not be wholly internal to a particular system.

D7: Hence, single objects and/or processes cannot be systems, otherwise they could not influence each other (by D6).

D8: On the other hand, once more, objects and processes must be sub-systems (and hence systems in their own right), since they are composed of an indefinite (possibly infinite) number of their own sub-units (molecules, atoms, sub-atomic particles, etc.). But even then, as systems themselves, objects and processes could not influence one another (again, by D6).

D9: This means that at some point there must be simple units of 'matter' that are not themselves systems; otherwise, if everything were system-like (or if all that exists are sub-sub-sub-…systems, to infinity) nothing could have any effect on anything else (by D6) -- that is, if all change is internally-motivated.

D10: But, if there were such simple units (i.e., if they had no 'parts', and were thus not systems themselves) they would be changeless. If that weren't the case, these simple units would be UOs themselves (and thus not simple, after all), subject to their own internally-driven development. Indeed,, if they are changeless they can have no effect on one another (or they would not be changeless).

D11: Hence, reality is either composed of a (possibly) infinite hierarchy of systems that have no influence on each other, or it is made out of fundamental (non-system-like) particles that are changeless and have no effect on anything.

And:

D12: Change is a result of "internal contradictions".

D13: Objects within T change only because of this internal dynamic.

D14: Reality is a mediated T; change is a consequence of a 'struggle' between opposites.

D15: No element of reality can be considered in isolation; all mutually condition one another.

[T = 'The Totality', whatever that is...]

However, D12 is ambiguous; the word "change" could mean:

(1) "Systematic change" (that is, it could mean "change internal to a particular system"); or it could mean:

(2) "Change internal to an object" -- as it does in D13 -– leaving it unclear whether or not this sort of change is wider-ranging, involving inter-objective or trans-systematic change.

Nevertheless, D13 seems clear enough, though:

D13: Objects within T change only because of this internal dynamic.

This states that change arises only as a result of a dynamic internal to objects.

But if that were so, it would once again be difficult to see what influence objects could have on each other. If change is internal to an object, then the relations it supposedly enjoyed with other objects would be irrelevant in this respect -- ex hypothesi, they could have no impact on the changes the latter undergo. This seems to imply that objects must be self-caused/motivated beings (as Lenin alleged).

Once more however, whatever changes an object undergoes -- since these are exclusively internally-generated -- they can't be a function of the relations which that object enjoys with other objects, otherwise the cause of change would not be internal to the said object, but external, after all -- and thus not the least bit 'rational' (since this would imply a "bad infinity").

On the other hand, if change is internal to a system of mediated objects or processes, then it would not be the sole result of a dynamic internal to the objects in that system, but would be a function both of the intra-systematic relations between systems and bodies and of the 'internal contradictions' within those systems or bodies themselves.

Furthermore, if change is system-specific (that is, if it is internal, and solely confined to systems), then the relations between those systems would become problematic, once more. Clearly, change cannot be exclusively system-specific if different systems have an actual effect on one another.

The question is, which of these is the correct account? Is change (A) the result of a dynamic internal to systems, or (B) is it internal to objects, or (C) is it a consequence of the external effects bodies have on each other? [Option (C) in fact allows change to be internal to systems even while it remains external to the bodies forming that system.]

Is therefore change body-specific, system-specific, or is it inter-systematic? Or, is it (D) a complex combination of all three of these?

But, yet again: if (D) were the case, what would be the point of saying that change is motivated internally (in bodies, processes or systems) -- if it is also externally-driven?

On the other hand, why say that everything is interconnected if change is exclusively internally-generated, and the alleged interconnections between systems or bodies have no part to play in this respect?

Up until now, DM-theorists appear not to have noticed these serious difficulties implied by their 'theory' of change. Since DM is supposed to be the philosophy of change, clearly this is not a minor flaw, one that can easily be ignored.

And thus, finally, these are the only options available to DM-fans:

(A) There is only one system -- the Totality --, the contents of which are (potentially or actually) infinitely interconnected. All the objects internal to it are subject to the operation of external causes only. This is because the entire nature of the part is determined by its relation to the whole and to other parts, but not by a relation that any part has with itself, and hence not by processes internal to each object. Or:

(B) There is only one system -- the Totality --, which is (potentially or actually) infinitely interconnected. But, change is exclusively internal to each object or process (because everything is a UO) in this Totality. In that case, nothing is interconnected with anything else. Or:

(C) Change is internal to all systems, and nature forms an infinite 'ascending' and 'descending' hierarchy of systems and sub-systems ('all the way up'/'down', as it were). In such a set-up, ultimately, there is nothing that could be or could become the opposite of anything else. This is because, either:

(1) The fundamental parts of reality are extensionless 'points' -- which, because they can be mapped onto or modelled by the real numbers, have no 'size' at all. This means that such objects can have no internal connection with anything else; they are therefore eternal and changeless. If they were subject to change then they would be systems themselves and hence would not be extensionless points. As extensionless points they can have no effect on each other or on anything else, or they would change. Hence, if systems are infinitely divisible change cannot be internally-motivated -- or rather, the only change possible would be that which arises from the rearrangement of these eternally changeless 'point masses'.

Or,

(2) The fundamental parts of reality are systems. But, they cannot have opposites that cause change. This is because those opposites would have to be external to each system, and that would mean that change would not be internally-driven. Moreover, these opposites cannot be internal to that system either. If they were, that system could not change into that opposite, since that opposite would already exist. Or:

(D) Everything is a sub-system of some sort no matter how much it is sub-divided. In that case, there are no point masses, since all sub-systems are infinitely divisible. In this arrangement, while change is internal to the Totality it is not internal to its sub-systems, but external. This is because if change were exclusively internal to such sub-systems they could have no effect on one another. But, if no sub-system had any effect on any other, there would be no change in the Totality over and above, perhaps, the rearrangement of these sub-systems. Hence, if the Totality changes, its sub-systems cannot.

In that case, given this option, change would be internal to the Totality but external to its sub-systems. Moreover, even if the latter are UOs, that fact would have no influence on whether they changed or not. If it did, change would be internal to each sub-system, contrary to the supposition. So, if (D) is to stand, change would not be the result of instability internal to such sub-systems because the latter are, on this supposition, externally-motivated.

However, a moment's thought will show that this option cannot work in the way described -- if change is merely the re-arranging of subsystems, then any larger system containing these subsystems would itself change internally, contrary to the hypothesis. Or:

(E) Change is not only internal to the Totality, but it is also internal and external to its sub-systems (as they 'mediate' one another, or 'dialectically' interact). In that case, change to these sub-systems would not be the sole result of their own internal instabilities or 'inner contradictions', as dialecticians maintain.

Unfortunately, this would have profound implications for HM and the revolutionary overthrow of Capitalism, for example. The contradictions inside the latter would thus be insufficient to lead to its demise. External causes over and above the class struggle and the falling rate of profit (etc.) would be needed --, including perhaps bad weather, meteorite impact, or alien intervention (etc.).

Naturally, no one believes the class struggle is hermetically sealed against the rest of nature, but since these influences stretch off into infinity this would present HM with its own "bad infinity", which would end "who knows where?"

Not only that, if change is also external to each system, then the Totality (as a system itself) must be susceptible to just such external influences.

Any attempt to forestall that untoward implication would prompt the same sort of objection that stumps naive supporters of the Cosmological Argument [henceforth, COMA] for the existence of God: if everything has a cause, then what caused God?

Hence, if every system is subject to external causation, the question becomes: What caused the Totality?

Clearly, this challenge can only be neutralised by an appeal to the alleged 'definition' of the Totality (or by an appeal to an infinite set of causes, which stretch off to "who knows where?") -- in the way that theists respond to similar objections to the COMA. [This is not surprising, given the mystical origin of DM.]

However, as Kant noted, the COMA has to be buttressed by a surreptitious appeal to the Ontological Argument [henceforth, ONAN]. So, from the supposed definition of the word "God" (as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived"), 'His' necessary and actual existence are 'derivable'. In that way, questions about 'His' origin are supposedly rendered meaningless.

In like manner, but in this case based on the meaning of "Totality" (i.e., "all that there is" or, maybe, "that than which there is nothing else", or "that outwith which nothing else can be conceived"), it could be argued that there is nothing outside the Totality that could cause it to exist.

So, the only way that dialecticians could defend this fall-back position (should they chose to adopt it) would be to use an 'atheistical' version of the ONAN, on the lines that the Totality is "that than which there is nothing else".

Of course, such a defence would make plain the Linguistic Idealism in DM, for from the meaning of a few words again substantive truths about reality will have been derived.

But, more importantly, if change is caused by the interplay of opposites, and objects and systems turn into their opposites, then, whether or not it is internally- or externally-induced, change would be impossible. As we saw in Essay Seven Part One, if the opposite of a body or system exists, it cannot change into it, for it already exists!

On the other hand, if it doesn't already exist it can play no part in helping to change that object or system!

In view of their unwise commitment to 'inverted' Hegelian 'logic', there seem to be no other options open to DM-enthusiasts.

Moreover, if the last of these options is correct then (as we will also see here -- link in the original) the similarities between DM and Mystical Christianity would become even more apparent. For if there is a force external to the Universe that conditions it, then the Totality will have an external cause after all, and the DM-search for "how" and "why" will have run into the Ground Of All Being -- which ends "we know where...".

The choice of title for such an ultimate cause does not affect any of the above points -- nor does it resolve the problems they expose -- since a Deity by any other name is still a Deity.

Plenty more details, argument and analysis here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_01.htm

But, even if you ignore this, again(!), Lenin was quite clear that every object in the universe changes according to a 'struggle' of internal opposites.

So, once more, what are the 'internal opposites' (not 'external' opposites, or even a combination of 'external and internal' opposites) that make, say, a football fly through the air?

If you can't say, then, as I noted, Lenin was wrong, and dialectics falls flat once more.


To understand the dynamics of it, it's development, you do indeed have a struggle between the mechanics of it's wave nature and it's particle nature.

But, how does that make an electron move?

[Surely they move because of the electrodynamics of the electron/proton pair?]

And if there is a 'struggle', which one wins?

And how does a particle 'struggle' with a wave?

You keep leaving these salient details out.

And we both know why...

[Lord Hargreaves]

LH:
Here, Lenin calls a glass tumbler, "an object". So, my interpretation of Lenin is correct.
If you say so, Rosa


This is on a par with your other attempt to sanitise Mao, which, as I said before, is dishonest, and reminiscent of theologians who interpret the Book of Gensis 'metaphorically' so as to make creation compatible with science.

Well yes, we've been through this before. What I consider to be an attempt to read Lenin or Mao in their own terms, you see as attempting to "sanitise" them. Fine, whatever.


But, anyway, how do you know Lenin was being 'cavalier'? This quote comes from a published text, so it represents his considered view.

The onus is on you to show otherwise.

The problem you face is that every time you come across a text that disagrees with your preconceived view (I say this since you appear to have formed your opinions of this 'theory' before you read the classic texts!) you have to dismiss it as 'non-literal', or 'non-serious'.

But, how do you know that the texts that seem to agree with your view are literal and serious? All you seem to have is this rule: if it agrees with my preconceived ideas, it is literal/serious, otherwise not.

And you apply this subjective criterion even to texts that have been published, and which the author in question checked before publication.

I don't really know how to argue the point, to be honest. We'll have to agree to disagree. Lenin is - to my mind, anyway - clearly not being technical and is clearly not writing for philosophical community, but is trying to explain some basic thoughts for "the workers". Trying to find an entire polished worldview from these notebooks and articles is self-evidently absurd in my opinion




And, as for your comment on 'external influences' I have covered that. You need to address my arguments.

As I said, it depends on what we are talking about. Clearly there is no need to bring God into anything if "everything existing" - meaning the universe, or whatever - moves itself. Other than that, using a smaller conception of totality (something less than the entire universe) and allowing external influences obviously does not necessitate external influences, thus - again - there is no need for an infinite regress back to God


But, the point is that the majority of Marxists here, and the majority of active revolutionaries agree with Lenin (I gave an argument supporting this in another thread in answer to you -- link below).

Hence, I am addressing Lenin as he presented his own views and as he has been received by revolutionaries -- certainly those on this board.

I don't care what other people think, so I will approach the debate from a different point of view


So, I for one will not 'cut him any slack' here.

Perhaps you should, since neither I - nor anyone else, I would venture - can much see the relevance of this to actual revolutionary struggle.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


If you say so, Rosa

No, Lenin says so. Can't you read?


What I consider to be an attempt to read Lenin or Mao in their own terms, you see as attempting to "sanitise" them. Fine, whatever.

As I said, your method is to read these texts, and when you come across something you do not like, you view it as non-literal/metaphorical.

So, your subjective reception of these texts is then made into a criterion of interpretation, which, as we have seen, winds up with you concluding the opposite view to that which is presented in those very texts.

For example, you claimed that the word 'object' is not as I was reading it, but when I quoted a passage from a published work of Lenin's which specifically says that such objects include glass tumblers, you just say "If you say so".

You cannot expect to be taken seriously if you dissemble like this.


I don't really know how to argue the point, to be honest. We'll have to agree to disagree. Lenin is - to my mind, anyway - clearly not being technical and is clearly not writing for philosophical community, but is trying to explain some basic thoughts for "the workers". Trying to find an entire polished worldview from these notebooks and articles is self-evidently absurd in my opinion

But, that is the point; as dialectics has been handed down to us revolutionary Marxists, it just does not work, and it is not clear how it can be fixed.

That is the purpose of this thread, to show comrades that what they have taken to be a 'world view' (and the majority of Marxists here at RevLeft do just that) is unworkable.

And these problems were inherited from Hegel, who was a professional philosopher.


As I said, it depends on what we are talking about. Clearly there is no need to bring God into anything if "everything existing" - meaning the universe, or whatever - moves itself. Other than that, using a smaller conception of totality (something less than the entire universe) and allowing external influences obviously does not necessitate external influences, thus - again - there is no need for an infinite regress back to God

I am not sure you will want to argue this way, for if you want to hermetically seal off one part of the universe from the rest --, say, the planet earth --, and discount all external influences (howsoever you want to interpret that phrase -- but you do not say, so I can only think you are playing for time, since you clearly haven't given this much thought before), then the idea that everything is interconnected must go out of the window. And that is quite apart from the fact that this would be a false and ad hoc move. False, because clearly there are immensely important outside influences on the earth (too obvious to list); ad hoc, since you have no reason to stop at just the earth.

Finally, Hegel rejected this option (as have the majority of dialecticians) since it depends on what he called a 'bad infinity'. For him, this meant that in order to give an account of the natural world, one had to include 'god'.

Now, if you reject [I]that, but allow external influences, I cannot see how you can avoid this 'bad infinity'. [I hope you know what I am referring to here!]

On the other hand, if you reject these 'external influences', I cannot see how you can avoid accusations of implausibility and ad hoc-ness, which I outlined above.

Seems to me, you are so desperate you are prepared to try anything to save this un-workable theory.

So, one by one, classic dialectical texts have to be 'sanitised', and then classic dialectical theses are either rejected or are cut to ribbons in your desperate attempt to salvage something from the wreckage..

In the end, under repeated attacks from me, there will be nothing left to defend, or nothing of note worth preserving.

Of course, like the Black Knight in Monty Python, who successively loses limbs in combat, you can claim such mortal blows are 'only scratches', but you will end up looking no less ridiculous for all that.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3oW12hWu5w


BLACK KNIGHT: None shall pass.
ARTHUR: What?
BLACK KNIGHT: None shall pass.
ARTHUR: I have no quarrel with you, good Sir knight, but I must
cross this bridge.
BLACK KNIGHT: Then you shall die.
ARTHUR: I command you as King of the Britons to stand aside!
BLACK KNIGHT: I move for no man.
ARTHUR: So be it!
[hah]
[parry thrust]
[ARTHUR chops the BLACK KNIGHT's left arm off]
ARTHUR: Now stand aside, worthy adversary.
BLACK KNIGHT: 'Tis but a scratch.
ARTHUR: A scratch? Your arm's off!
BLACK KNIGHT: No, it isn't.
ARTHUR: Well, what's that then?
BLACK KNIGHT: I've had worse.
ARTHUR: You liar!
BLACK KNIGHT: Come on you pansy!
[hah]
[parry thrust]
[ARTHUR chops the BLACK KNIGHT's right arm off]
ARTHUR: Victory is mine!
[kneeling]
We thank thee Lord, that in thy merc-
[hah]
BLACK KNIGHT: Come on then.
ARTHUR: What?
BLACK KNIGHT: Have at you!
ARTHUR: You are indeed brave, Sir knight, but the fight is mine.
BLACK KNIGHT: Oh, had enough, eh?
ARTHUR: Look, you stupid bastard, you've got no arms left.
BLACK KNIGHT: Yes I have.
ARTHUR: Look!
BLACK KNIGHT: Just a flesh wound.

ARTHUR: Look, stop that.
BLACK KNIGHT: Chicken! Chicken!
ARTHUR: Look, I'll have your leg. Right!
[whop]
BLACK KNIGHT: Right, I'll do you for that!
ARTHUR: You'll what?
BLACK KNIGHT: Come 'ere!
ARTHUR: What are you going to do, bleed on me?
BLACK KNIGHT: I'm invincible!
ARTHUR: [B]You're a loony.
BLACK KNIGHT: The Black Knight always triumphs!
Have at you! Come on then.
[whop]
[ARTHUR chops the BLACK KNIGHT's other leg off]
BLACK KNIGHT: All right; we'll call it a draw.
ARTHUR: Come, Patsy.
BLACK KNIGHT: Oh, oh, I see, running away then. You yellow
bastards! Come back here and take what's coming to you.
I'll bite your legs off!

If this were you, you'd probably say, in response to King Arthur telling you your arm has just been chopped off: "If you say so..."


I don't care what other people think, so I will approach the debate from a different point of view

Good for you, but this thread is about what Lenin said, not about what you would like him to have said.


Perhaps you should, since neither I - nor anyone else, I would venture - can much see the relevance of this to actual revolutionary struggle.

Well, that is true of every dialectical thesis, not just this one.

[Cumannach]

But Rosa, not a single one of those quotes states that an object like a particle or billiard ball can only move by external forces, rather than generate it's own movement and also be subject to external forces.

About simple motion; As dialectics itself stresses, to speak about the movement of a single object like a particle or football in total isolation is meaningless. Any object moving does so with relation to some other object. Take a basic kind of movement, gravitational. To understand the movement of this system of objects (which is also to say either one of them) requires to take into account the opposite gravitational forces, the interconnection of the two masses, reacting on each other. Trying to understand the phenomena of movement without these ideas is difficult to the point of impossible. Further, the key to understanding the movement is in it's own self-development, and not some external driver.

Thus Dialectics are a pretty good metaphysics for basic mechanics.

An apple falling to the Earth: What are the internal contradictions within the movement of the apple, the development of the apple's position, it's trajectory in space over time, the process of it's falling from the tree:

The internal force of the apple drawing it to the ground (gravity), the reaction of this, the force of the earth pushing the apple towards it (gravity) the force the apple exerts on the air molecules underneath it, (resistance) and the reaction force this brings back on to the apple pushing it away from the air (resistance). These will give you the equation of motion, the movement of the apple, the apple falling to the earth. Dialectics prevails, with internal contradictions and interconnectedness.

Don't tell me not to use gravity, you're the one who opened a thread called 'Lenin refutes Newton'. Is it now you who are refuting Newton? All of this is still applicable anyway at low mass/velocities. Do you accept the dialectical nature of Newtonian mechanics now, and shall we move on to relativity?

This arguing over the meaning of the word contradiction is ridiculous. You can call two internal opposing elements whatever you want.

You can misunderstand anything if you want to be pedantic. It's like saying evolution is refuted because the use of the word 'selection' in Natural Selection is not actually valid in a particular sense of the word if you look at it in one way, since Nature can't 'select' anything since it doesn't have a mind to make such a choice.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cummanch:


But Rosa, not a single one of those quotes states that an object like a particle or billiard ball can only move by external forces, rather than generate it's own movement and also be subject to external forces.

In that case, your argument about idealism falls flat, for if objects can move because of external forces, then a theist only has to remind you that this is also true of the universe. And what can you say in reply?

But, Lenin specifically says that objects 'self-move'; they can hardly self-move if something else moves them.

And if that is so, for Lenin, external forces were not involved. And that is why he argued:


"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.

"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new.

"The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58. Italic emphases in the original. Bold emphases added.]

Notice, Lenin contrasts the first conception (an appeal to external forces) with the second (the idea that everything in the universe 'self-moves' because of a struggle of opposites).

He did not say most things, or they do a bit of both, he says:


The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing

Notice: 'self movement' -- not movement by something else. And this covers "everything existing".

Not much wiggle room there.

And as if to make things really awkward for you, he went in to say:


"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90. Bold emphases in the original. Bold emphasis added.]

So, the question remains, if your theory "demands" you take an object (Lenin gives as his example of an object an ordinary glass tumbler in this passage -- I quoted it earlier), such as this tumbler, in 'self-movement' under the operation of a 'struggle' of opposites. what are these internal (not external) opposites that make this tumbler move?

It is not use quoting external factors here, since Lenin "demands" you tell us what these internal opposites are.

And Lenin is not alone in this; here are other dialecticians who say the same thing:


"The basis of all things is therefore the law of change, the law of constant motion. Two philosophers particularly (the ancient Heraclitus and the modern Hegel…) formulated this law of change, but they did not stop there. They also set up the question of the manner in which the process operates. The answer they discovered was that changes are produced by constant internal contradictions, internal struggle. Thus, Heraclitus declared: 'Conflict is the mother of all happenings,' while Hegel said: 'Contradiction is the power that moves things.'"

"The most general and the most inclusive fundamental law of dialectics from which all others are deduced is the law of permeation of opposites. This law has a two-fold meaning: first, that all things, all processes, all concepts merge in the last analysis into an absolute unity, or, in other words, that there are no opposites, no differences which cannot ultimately be comprehended into a unity. Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. [B]This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality....

"...[I]t is more difficult with such opposites as true and false and still more difficult with the concepts of being and non-being, which are the most general of all, the most inclusive, and, at the same time the poorest in content. The average person will say: how can one unite such absolute opposites as being and non-being? Either a thing is or it is not. There can be no bridge or common ground between them. In the treatment of Heraclitus I have already shown how the concepts of being and non-being actually permeate each other in everything that changes, how they are contained in changing things at the same time and in the same way; for a thing which is developing is something and at the same time it is not that something. For example: a child which is developing into a man is a child and at the same time not a child (sic). So far as it is becoming a man it ceases to be a child. But it is not yet a man, because it has not yet developed into a man. The concept of becoming contains the concepts of being and non-being. In this concept they permeate each other....

"We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics...the law of development through opposites.... Not until Hegel was this law completely developed.

"This law applies to all motion and change of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds....

"...[This law] states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.

"...The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to law of the transformation of things into their opposites...." [Thalheimer (1936), pp.161, 165-66, 170-71. Bold emphases added.]

"Each phase of the plant's manifestation appears as a reality and then is transformed in the course of development into an unreality or an appearance. This movement, triadic in this particular case, from unreality to reality and then back again to unreality, constitutes the essence, the inner movement behind all appearance....

"In this dialectical movement, in this passage out of and into opposition, resides the secret to the movement of all real things.... Dialectics is the logic of matter in motion and thereby the logic of contradictions, because development is inherently self-contradictory. Everything generates within itself that force which leads to its negation, its passing away into some other and higher form of being....

"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escape from its unremitting and relentless embrace...." [Novack (1971), pp.87, 94. Bold emphases added.]

""The second dogmatic assumption of mechanism is the assumption that no change can ever happen except by the action of some external cause.

"Just as no part of a machine moves unless another part acts on it and makes it move, so mechanism sees matter as being inert -- without motion, or rather without self-motion. For mechanism, nothing ever moves unless something else pushes or pulls is, it never changes unless something else interferes with it.

"No wonder that, regarding matter in this way, the mechanists had to believe in a Supreme Being to give the "initial push"....

"So in studying the causes of change, we should not merely seek for external causes of change, but should above all seek for the source of change within the process itself, in its own self-movement, in the inner impulses to development contained in things themselves...."

"...'[S]truggle' is not external and accidental. It is not adequately understood if we suppose that it is a question of forces or tendencies arising quite independently the one of the other, which happen to meet, to bump up against each other and come into conflict.

"No. The struggle is internal and necessary; for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole.

"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions.

"Thus, for example, the old mechanist conception of movement was that it only happened when one body bumped into another: there were no internal causes of movement, that is, no 'self-movement', but only external causes. But on the contrary, the opposed tendencies which operate in the course of the change of state of a body operate on the basis of the contradictory unity of attractive and repulsive forces inherent in all physical phenomena....

"Why should we say that contradiction is the driving force of change? It is because it is only the presence of contradictions in a process which provides the internal conditions making change necessary.... It is the presence of contradictions, that is of contradictory tendencies of movement, or of a unity and struggle of opposites, which brings about changes of movement in the course of a process. [Cornforth (1976), pp.40-43; 90, 94. Bold emphases added.]

"Hegel pointed out that the co-existence, the unity, the interpenetration of opposites constitutes an inner and inherent contradiction, a basic instability in all things which leads to development and change....

The existence of contradictions in all things gives rise to self-movement."

"All motion has a cause....

"[B]A fundamental cause of all motion, all change, is the internal contradictions of the changing object. In the final analysis, every object, every phenomenon, changes, moves, is transformed and modified under the influence of its internal contradictions...." [Mandel (1979), p.162. Bold emphasis added.]

"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction....

"So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [And, referring to a quote from Aristotle, they add (RL)] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....

"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites....

"The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"...Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 72. Bold emphases added.]

CPSU theorists:

"The essence of the dialectical contradiction may be defined as an interrelationship and interconnection between opposites in which they mutually assert and deny each other (sic), and the struggle between them serves as the motive force, the source of development. This is why the law in question is known as the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.

"This law explains one of the most important features of dialectical development: motion, development takes place as self-motion, self-development. This concept is highly relevant to materialism. It means that the world develops not as a result of any external causes but by virtue of its own laws, the laws of motion of matter itself. It has dialectical meaning because it indicates that the source, the motive force of development of phenomena is to be found in their internal contradictions. In the past some materialists who rejected any supernatural force as a constant factor influencing natural processes nevertheless had to fall back on the mysterious 'first impulse' that was supposed to have set matter in motion.

"The dialectical doctrine that the motion or development of nature is in fact self-motion, self-development, explains why many contemporary bourgeois philosophers are so vehement in their attacks on the proposition of the contradictory essence of things. Development understood in this way leaves no room for a 'transcendental', mystical 'creative force' external to nature....

"Postulating that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and processes and comprise the motive force of the self-development of nature and society, materialist dialectics explains how this process takes place." [Konstantinov, et al. (1974), pp.144-45. Italic emphases in the original. Bold emphases added.]

"Contradiction also expresses this feature of the relation of opposition, i.e., the mutual exclusion and mutual presupposing of its formative aspects. It can therefore be briefly defined as the unity of opposites which mutually exclude one another and are in struggle. The law of dialectics that demonstrates the driving force of contradictions is formulated as the law of the unity and struggle of opposites.

"According to this law, contradictions are the inner impetus of development, the source of the self-movement and change of things. If things were a constant identity in themselves, and lacked differences and contradictions, they would be absolutely immutable.... Contradiction is a dynamic relation of opposites.... The determining element in contradiction is therefore the struggle of opposites." [Kharin (1981), p.125. Bold emphasis added.]

"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. To be means to be in motion.... Like matter, motion is uncreatable and indestructible. It is not introduced from outside but is included in matter, which is not inert but active. Motion is self-motion in the sense that the tendency, the impulse to change of state is inherent in matter itself: it is its own cause." [Spirkin (1983), p.75. Bold emphasis added.]

"The development of the most diverse objects and phenomena shows that opposite aspects cannot exist peacefully side by side; the contradictory, mutually exclusive character of opposites necessarily causes a struggle between them. The old and the new, the emergent and the obsolete must come into contradiction, must clash. It is contradiction, the struggle of opposites that comprises the main source of development of matter and consciousness....

"...The struggle of opposites is the inner content, the source of the development of reality.

"Such is the essence of the dialectical law of the unity and struggle of opposites.

"...Motion, as understood by Marxist dialectics, is the self-motion of matter, internal motion, whose driving forces or impulses are contained within the developing objects and phenomena themselves." [Afanasyev (1968), pp. 95, 97-98. Bold emphasis added.]

This is an ancient ruling-class idea, touted by Plato:


"Athenian. Then we must say that self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves the other is second." [Plato (1997b), p.1552.]

References can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2008_01.htm

I'll respond to the rest of what you say in my next post.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cummanach:


About simple motion; As dialectics itself stresses, to speak about the movement of a single object like a particle or football in total isolation is meaningless. Any object moving does so with relation to some other object. Take a basic kind of movement, gravitational. To understand the movement of this system of objects (which is also to say either one of them) requires to take into account the opposite gravitational forces, the interconnection of the two masses, reacting on each other. Trying to understand the phenomena of movement without these ideas is difficult to the point of impossible. Further, the key to understanding the movement is in it's own self-development, and not some external driver.

Then why do all of the above speak about the self-movement' of every object in the universe. If in the end, motion is a result of the relationships between objects, locomotion is not 'self-movement'.

And we have already seen that gravitation is not a force in modern Physics.

Now, I know that "trying to understand the phenomena of movement without these ideas is difficult to the point of impossible", but then that just means that Lenin was woefully wide of the mark.


Further, the key to understanding the movement is in it's own self-development, and not some external driver

Er, (somewhat ironically) you seem to have contradicted yourself here!


Thus Dialectics are a pretty good metaphysics for basic mechanics.

Not so; it puts mechanics back 2300 years, at least to the time of Plato.


An apple falling to the Earth: What are the internal contradictions within the movement of the apple, the development of the apple's position, it's trajectory in space over time, the process of it's falling from the tree:

The internal force of the apple drawing it to the ground (gravity), the reaction of this, the force of the earth pushing the apple towards it (gravity) the force the apple exerts on the air molecules underneath it, (resistance) and the reaction force this brings back on to the apple pushing it away from the air (resistance). These will give you the equation of motion, the movement of the apple, the apple falling to the earth. Dialectics prevails, with internal contradictions and interconnectedness.

Once more, this introduces an external force (which isn't even a force!).

What we want to know are the 'internal contradictions' in this apple that make it move.

You keep ignoring this, and try to sneak in external factors (such as gravity and friction).

Remember, Lenin "demands" you take an apple in self-movement.

Let me underline this for the tenth time: Lenin did not 'demand' you take an object like an apple in self-movement and movement by something else, just in self-movement.

So, what makes and apple self-move?


Don't tell me not to use gravity, you're the one who opened a thread called 'Lenin refutes Newton'. Is it now you who are refuting Newton? All of this is still applicable anyway at low mass/velocities. Do you accept the dialectical nature of Newtonian mechanics now, and shall we move on to relativity?

I did not say I agree with Newton, so you can only defend Lenin by contradicting modern Physics. If I introduce another thread 'Dialectics refutes Einstein', what are you going to say?

That, my friend, is no victory at all.

But, even if you are right, the force of gravity on an apple is external. Here is my earlier argument that shows this:


1) You help yourself to the idea that opposite forces 'contradict' one another. I see no reason to accept this re-definition. You will need to provide argument to justify this move.

2) Anyway, such forces combine to give a resultant. So, if anything, they should be called the opposite of 'contradictions', that is 'dialectical tautologies'.

3) What cause motion is this single resultant force. So, motion is not the result of an alleged 'contradiction', but of this resultant.

4) As we have seen, these are external to each body. One force is external to the second body, and the other force is external to the first.

To make this clear, call the first object M(1), and the second M(2). Call the force exerted by M(1), F(1), and the force exerted by M(2), F(2).

Now, F(1) may or may not be internal to M(1) -- but I gave reasons to doubt this above -- but it [B]is external to M(2). And the same is true in reverse with respect to F(2) and M(1).

So, we do not yet have a contradiction internal to M(2) or M(2), as Lenin said we should.

So, dialectics falls flat again

You keep ignoring this.


This arguing over the meaning of the word contradiction is ridiculous. You can call two internal opposing elements whatever you want.

So, you are happy to drop this Hegelian term.

It is in fact central to the dialectical theory of change. You clearly haven't read Lenin too carefully; drop this word, and that theory falls before it reaches the first hurdle -- i.e., me and my demonstration that if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.

But, even if this were not so, we are still waiting for you to tell us what the opposed opposites are inside a billiard ball, an apple (or even a tumbler) are that make them move.

You have yet to say.

[I]I am beginning to suspect you can't.


You can misunderstand anything if you want to be pedantic. It's like saying evolution is refuted because the use of the word 'selection' in Natural Selection is not actually valid in a particular sense of the word if you look at it in one way, since Nature can't 'select' anything since it doesn't have a mind to make such a choice.

Are you saying that the word 'contradiction' merely is metaphorical, just as 'selection' clearly is?

If so, then you are like those theologians who 're-interpret' the Book of Genesis as 'figurative' just so that it will agree with modern science.

If you are, how do you know that 'opposite' is not figurative too? In that case, dialectics reduces to metaphysical poetry.

I can live with that...

If not, what are you saying?

[Das war einmal]

I'm just agreeing with you. As you point out (endlessly it seems), Lenin was no philosopher. I mean he thought that objects moved by themselves, so I wouldn't even buy a used car from that guy never mind a philosophy book. It probably wouldn't have an engine in it! The car, not the book. By the way, we used to have a branch member who thought as Lenin did - I guess he was a Leninist. We'd say, "Hey, Brian, where's the subs tin?" And he'd reply, steady as you like, "It must have moved off by itself." Later, we discovered that he wasn't a Leninist at all. He was a kleptomaniac.


LMAO!:lol::lol::lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

RR, I don't think you appreciate that BTB is not being serious, here, but ironic.

Sad, but it's the only way he can cope with the demolition of his 'theory'.

[Hit The North]

RR, ignore Rosa. It seems to have escaped her comprehension that when you respond with "LMAO :lol::lol::lol:", it's generally because you do realise that something is humorous and not serious.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^As I said, you guys have to trivialise this just so you can cope.

[Hit The North]

I am merely a follower in your wake, dear lady.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I am merely a follower in your wake, dear lady.

More like a wake for dialectics.

[CHEtheLIBERATOR]

Oddly enough I kind of get it and it might be true

[robbo203]

Anton Pannekoek wrote an interesting book back in the 1930s which exposed Lenin as a mere bourgeois philosopher whose simplistic materialism diverged sharply from Marx's . Here is a useful reference http://libcom.org/library/lenin-as-philosopher-pannekoek

[ÑóẊîöʼn]

The internal force of the apple drawing it to the ground (gravity), the reaction of this, the force of the earth pushing the apple towards it (gravity) the force the apple exerts on the air molecules underneath it, (resistance) and the reaction force this brings back on to the apple pushing it away from the air (resistance). These will give you the equation of motion, the movement of the apple, the apple falling to the earth. Dialectics prevails, with internal contradictions and interconnectedness.Ordinary logic is perfectly capable of describing this phenomenon. In fact, mathematics, not dialectics, is the most powerful tool for this purpose.

[gilhyle]

But, Lenin specifically says that objects 'self-move'; they can hardly self-move if something else moves them.

For the record, it is this part of your argument that is wrong Rosa - it is precisely by understanding how the operation of external causes works because of the identity of the object - which identity relies on the external relations as well as the internal relations of the object - that one attains a dialectical view of the causal process - a view of the causal process which has the purpose of understanding the moment of causation not as a causal relation but as a moment of the transformation of a totality.

But all this is quite irrelevant. What you do Rosa, is to treat dialectical notions as methphysical claims and to subject them to analytical critique. Lo and behold they fail this misapplied test ! That only impresses the person seeking a merely analytical perspective. Since you seek that, it impresses you. To you the alternative - in which abstract terms are irredemably vague when expresed abstractly - is unacceptable. But that is your own prejudice. For the dialectician, the vagueness of generalisations is not only acceptable because Lenin is writing for a popular audience, but because all such abstract theorising is necessarily vague in order to be valid. The dialectician is happy with this vagueness, knowing that in more concrete study, its vagueness will be disipated by attention to detail.

Thus the dialectician achieves - and is happy to have achieved - a general formulation which points out the errors of the analytical forms of thinking which dominate within the dominant ideologies, but without believing the she has achieved anything like the kind of philosophical theorising which the dominant ideology - in secular imitation of relgious speculation - thinks it can attain. The dialectician knows that she has only achieved the critique of the confinement of thinking within analytical methodologies - which serves dominant social relations - and no more.

btw you are right about 'forces' Rosa and Hegel agreed with you on that.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gilhyle, on the occasion of this latest glorious return of yours for yet another bruising:


For the record, it is this part of your argument that is wrong Rosa - it is precisely by understanding how the operation of external causes works because of the identity of the object - which identity relies on the external relations as well as the internal relations of the object - that one attains a dialectical view of the causal process - a view of the causal process which has the purpose of understanding the moment of causation not as a causal relation but as a moment of the transformation of a totality.

1) I dealt with this objection; you need to learn to read more carefully.

2) Yet more a priori dogmatics from you/Hegel, imposed on reality in defiance of the claim that you mystics never do this.


What you do Rosa, is to treat dialectical notions as methphysical claims and to subject them to analytical critique. Lo and behold they fail this misapplied test ! That only impresses the person seeking a merely analytical perspective. Since you seek that, it impresses you. To you the alternative - in which abstract terms are irredemably vague when expresed abstractly - is unacceptable. But that is your own prejudice. For the dialectician, the vagueness of generalisations is not only acceptable because Lenin is writing for a popular audience, but because all such abstract theorising is necessarily vague in order to be valid. The dialectician is happy with this vagueness, knowing that in more concrete study, its vagueness will be disipated by attention to detail.

What you mystics do is to take perfectly ordinary words, mangle them, and then claim to have 'discovered' something profound as a result of such lexicographical surgery -- as if screwing around with words can reveal 'hidden truths' about fundamental aspects of reality.

Well, for you idealists, I suppose you are just being consistent.


Thus the dialectician achieves - and is happy to have achieved - a general formulation which points out the errors of the analytical forms of thinking which dominate within the dominant ideologies, but without believing the she has achieved anything like the kind of philosophical theorising which the dominant ideology - in secular imitation of relgious speculation - thinks it can attain. The dialectician knows that she has only achieved the critique of the confinement of thinking within analytical methodologies - which serves dominant social relations - and no more.

In fact what it achieves is exactly what Max Eastman said of it:


Hegelism is like a mental disease -- you cannot know what it is until you get it, and then you can't know because you have got it.

You, of course, being one of its saddest victims.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Robbo 203:


Anton Pannekoek wrote an interesting book back in the 1930s which exposed Lenin as a mere bourgeois philosopher whose simplistic materialism diverged sharply from Marx's . Here is a useful reference

And, Pannekoek, of course, was himself a petty bourgeois theorist (hardly a philosopher), whose materialism was scarcely more credible than Lenin's.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Che:


Oddly enough I kind of get it and it might be true

Precisely what do you get, and what might be true?