View Full Version : What's the difference between knowledge and ideology?
Louise Michel
21st March 2009, 01:55
I've just been looking over an old thread that ended upwith Rosa and Invader Zim arguing over whether or not history is a science. I'd like to approach a similar question from a different angle.
There are some facts we can nail down, some things we know.
Standard medical procedures for example are definite knowledge. We can learn more and improve or discard some of them but there's no reason to debate how an appendectomy should be performed. This a simple practice-based proof. We do A and B always follows (leaving aside human error).
Then there are more evidence-based proofs such as in anthropology, geology etc. Theories, such as evolution, are tested against varying forms of data and if results are consistent and no significant counter-evidence appears we accept them as true. There is though I think a greater area of doubt attached to such theories because evidence such fossil records is often incomplete and therev is always an element of conjecture.
Then we get to history. It's also evidence-based but much of the evidence comes from human observers. This means that the element of comjecture is greater and the further back we go the less human documentation is available to us. It's interesting that there is an overall consensus on what happened and when it happened in terms of major events. Specifics (was there an historical Jesus?) are sometimes impossible to prove either way.
So in this purely abitrary schema that I'm creating knowledge becomes less demonstrable and I would say elements of ideology ie ideas that serve specific class interests or interest groups begin to get a foothold.
Psychology I can hardly count as real knowledge because there's such a wides spectrum of opposing theories and very little of them can be seriously tested - it's a subject infested with ideology particularly in the applied therapy area.
Okay, now we come to economics. This seems to me to be the most ideology-infested branch of knowledge. Alan Greenspan didn't want to regulate the banks because he believed the market and self-interest were the most efficient regulators. Spectacularly wrong! And his view was based entirely on ideology despite his experience with the capitalist market.
So I guess I'm most concerned with how we as revolutionaries create a basis of real knowledge for ourselves. Obviously there will never be set-in-concrete "truth" but neither should there be a free-for-all where most any idea, because it sounds radical, can be accepted.
All comments gratefully recieved!:)
Decolonize The Left
21st March 2009, 02:37
Let's start by defining some terms.
Science is a system based upon the scientific method. The scientific method runs as follows:
1) Identify a question, or problem.
2) Through rational thought, develop a hypothesis.
3) Test said hypothesis through controlled experiments, repeatable by any independent observer.
We can see that the scientific method is quite the sound theory for developing understanding. It is constantly engaged in self-correction, is unbiased by ideology, etc.. and is repeatable.
Now, what is knowledge?
Within epistemology, knowledge is defined by three things:
1) Belief.
2) Justification.
3) Truth.
Cartesian skepticism has brought us the understanding that the third requirement, truth, cannot be obtained. Hence, according to epistemology and skepticism, the best one can have is justified belief. What is true, or false, is impossible to "know" as it implies itself...
Now, as for your question:
So I guess I'm most concerned with how we as revolutionaries create a basis of real knowledge for ourselves. Obviously there will never be set-in-concrete "truth" but neither should there be a free-for-all where most any idea, because it sounds radical, can be accepted.
Revolutionaries, that is, revolutionary leftists, have a very sound basis for knowledge: historical materialism. Historical materialism, not to be confused with dialectical materialism (a self-contradictory theory), is rooted in material reality and engages in class analysis. Given that material reality is all we can 'know,' it is the most sound basis for any sort of analysis.
- August
BobKKKindle$
21st March 2009, 03:55
There are some facts we can nail down, some things we know.This in itself is a hugely contested statement, and the nature of the relationship between the external world and our sensory experiences is an issue that has troubled and confused philosophers ever since the dawn of mankind. It is accepted that our senses do not always convey an accurate picture of what the real world is like - we can have hallucinations if we take certain drugs, and it is also often the case that we think we are having a "real experience" when we are actually just dreaming, and only realize that we were having a dream after we wake up. Given that our senses are not infallible, in the sense that they do not always allow us to objectively experience what is "out there", what reason is there to assume that our senses are accurate at any given point in time? It is entirely possible that all of our sensory experiences are just the result of a scientist stimulating different areas of our brain in order to create the illusion that we are doing and feeling certain things, perhaps as part of a deranged experiment, with our brain having been placed in a vat of nutrients, without a supporting body. The most radical form of this skeptical position is the notion that we could be the only person in existence (otherwise known as a solipsism) and all of the people we think we interact with on a daily basis are, as with any other sensory experience, merely internal, because we have no way of making sure that they exist in any meaningful form, independent of our perceptions. The only thing that we know for certain exists is our own mind, because in order to have sensory experiences in the first place, and to discuss philosophy, there needs to be some kind of object capable of generating logical arguments - hence Descartes' statement cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am. Descartes was forced to assume that God exists in order to show that our senses are accurate, on the grounds that God is a benevolent being, and would therefore never have any reason to equip us with senses that do not accurately convey the external world. Hobbes, who adopted a mechanical explanation for sensory experiences, according to which all such experiences are merely the result of physical objects coming into contact with our bodies and sending physical motions inwards towards our heart and mind, was able to give a partial answer to the skeptical challenge by arguing that, even if our senses are inaccurate, there must be some kind of physical world out there, that exists independently of us, because in the absence of an external world there would be no possible source for our experiences, given that the mind is incapable of spontaneously generating experiences without an external stimulus.
Hit The North
21st March 2009, 14:17
Let's start by defining some terms.
Science is a system based upon the scientific method. The scientific method runs as follows:
1) Identify a question, or problem.
2) Through rational thought, develop a hypothesis.
3) Test said hypothesis through controlled experiments, repeatable by any independent observer.
This version of scientific enquiry is only good for testing the natural world as the experimental method cannot be used to help us understand the social world (except by revealing very basic mechanics of social behaviour). It is therefore of little use to revolutionaries.
We can see that the scientific method is quite the sound theory for developing understanding. It is constantly engaged in self-correction, is unbiased by ideology, etc.. and is repeatable. In itself the experimental method doesn't help us to understand the reality we are dealing with, only isolated elements of it. Theoretical or synthetic thinking is necessary to join the dots.
Also, the idea that the scientific method is not touched by ideology is to assume some remote, privileged position where a scientist can step out of their social being. Even the act of formulating a research question is informed by previous research and training into a particular tradition of practices with a corresponding way of thinking.
So the claim that science stands above ideology is not absolutely convincing.
Originally posted by Louis Michel
So I guess I'm most concerned with how we as revolutionaries create a basis of real knowledge for ourselves. Obviously there will never be set-in-concrete "truth" but neither should there be a free-for-all where most any idea, because it sounds radical, can be accepted.
We do it through critique of other ideological claims to truth; and by opposing against them claims which show the world from our perspective.
Foucault argues that knowledge is inextricably bound up with power: that one constitutes the other. This is particularly true of knowledge about society - but then, all knowledge is social.
The philosophers have interpreted the world. The point, however, is to change it.
Rosa Lichtenstein
21st March 2009, 15:02
BTB:
This version of scientific enquiry is only good for testing the natural world as the experimental method cannot be used to help us understand the social world (except by revealing very basic mechanics of social behaviour). It is therefore of little use to revolutionaries.
I think this is correct as far as it goes, but you might want to add that Marxism is still an evidence-based science.
Also, the idea that the scientific method is not touched by ideology is to assume some remote, privileged position where a scientist can step out of their social being. Even the act of formulating a research question is informed by previous research and training into a particular tradition of practices with a corresponding way of thinking.
So the claim that science stands above ideology is not absolutely convincing.
Certainly, science as it is practiced in class society can become heavily biased ideologically, but that does not mean that science must always be this way.
--------------------
Lousie, I am busy right now, but I will try to add some thoughts later.
In the meantime, may I recommend you get hold of this (Marxist) book:
Clifford Conner (2005), A People's History Of Science. Miners, Midwives And "Low Mechanicks" (Nation Books).
It shows how the development of science in class society has travelled along two simultaneous, parallel routes: the Pythagorean/Platonic, theory-laden path, and the practical/working class, craft-based path.
The latter is not ideologically tainted, but the former is.
Louise Michel
21st March 2009, 17:20
This in itself is a hugely contested statement, and the nature of the relationship between the external world and our sensory experiences is an issue that has troubled and confused philosophers ever since the dawn of mankind. It is accepted that our senses do not always convey an accurate picture of what the real world is like
I accept this and thank you for a very interesting summary of these issues - I just think that to function effectively you have to make the assumption that those things you experience as real are in fact real.
We do it through critique of other ideological claims to truth; and by opposing against them claims which show the world from our perspective.
This is probably my main issue here because doesn't all knowledge then become relative - ie there's no way of seeing beyond your own perspective. This of course doesn't mean that all perspectives are equally valid but how do determine which one gives you the most accurate view?
Marx did I think deal with this but I've never understood the argument. Did he take the view that since the working class represents the possibility of human progress an analysis based on the perspective of the working class gives us - I don't know - objective knowledge, truth such as it is at that historical moment?
Certainly, science as it is practiced in class society can become heavily biased ideologically, but that does not mean that science must always be this way.
Again, this is maybe the same question, but does communism in its completed form (beyond transitions etc) imply the death of ideology?
Also thanks for the book recommendation Rosa - it's a bit difficult to get hold of books right now because I'm in Peru and mailing costs are very high but I've made a note for next time I'm home.
Rosa Lichtenstein
21st March 2009, 18:03
Louise:
but does communism in its completed form (beyond transitions etc) imply the death of ideology?
I think so.
Incidentally, here's a good on-line article on ideology:
http://marxmyths.org/joseph-mccarney/article.htm
benhur
21st March 2009, 20:09
Knowledge has to be objective. Ideology is usually subjective.
Louise Michel
21st March 2009, 21:03
Quote taken from Ideology and False Consciousness (see Rosa's link above):
The correct conclusion is surely that, for Marx, ideology is conceptually compatible with both theoretical comprehension and incomprehension. This is to suggest that ideology is not, for him, an epistemological category of any kind. In more concrete terms he is, it may be said, indifferent to questions of truth status in deciding to designate items as ‘ideological’.
Rosa:
Well, that's very interesting. So I suppose when you say ideology will not exist under communism you mean the current divisions of thinking and knowledge will disappear to be replaced by a more 'holistic' (hate that word but can't think of another) world view.
Also if the term ideology is taken to mean the ways in which we are conscious or not conscious of the underlying economic and social structures then there is no dichotomy between knowledge and ideology - they could be one and the same thing (or not, as the case may be).
My dichotomy may be better put as knowledge vs dogmatism. My particular interest in these sort of issues is because above all we have to learn to think. It's no good repeating somebody else's explanation if you don't really know what it means. And to be able to think we need criteria for evaluating the information we take in.
Arguing with many leftists (I don't mean here) is like arguing with Jehovah's Witnesses. As soon as you find a flaw in the argument they look at you as though you're mentaly deficient and tell you read this or that article that will set you straight.
Also, ah ha, has just occured to me - it's Alan Greenspan's class perspective that doesn't allow him to understand the way banks work whereas from a working class perspective it's obvious they should be either controled, nationalized or abolished - so where you are in the class structure gives you a better or worse opportunty to see how things really are?
Hmmm, interesting but too abstract. Why is a worker better placed to see what's really going on than a capitalist?
Louise Michel
21st March 2009, 21:15
Knowledge has to be objective. Ideology is usually subjective.
That was my understanding up until about an hour ago. Take a look at the article linked to in Rosa's post and see what you think.
Rosa Lichtenstein
21st March 2009, 22:23
Louise:
Well, that's very interesting. So I suppose when you say ideology will not exist under communism you mean the current divisions of thinking and knowledge will disappear to be replaced by a more 'holistic' (hate that word but can't think of another) world view.
McCarney (who unfortunately died in a car accident a few years ago) only mentions his positive view of ideology briefly in this essay (that it, that ideology is purely a weapon in the class war, and can involve truths as well as falsehoods).
He works the detail out more fully in his book: The Real World Of Ideology (upon which many of my own ideas are based).
So, if there is no class war, there is no ideology.
Arguing with many leftists (I don't mean here) is like arguing with Jehovah's Witnesses. As soon as you find a flaw in the argument they look at you as though you're mentally deficient and tell you read this or that article that will set you straight.
I know exactly what you mean, for I was brought up (until my teenage years) as a JW!
Dialecticians here respond in the same way!
Why is a worker better placed to see what's really going on than a capitalist?
Because ruling-class thought is based on the a priori idea that behind appearances there is an invisible world, accessible by thought alone, which is more real that the world we see around us, as I have pointed out to you before.
The 'superior' education petty-bourgeois and bourgeois individuals receive shapes their thinking for the rest of their lives.
This is not so with workers, who in general (if we ignore religion for the moment) do not have such ideas implanted in their heads. They see the world in all its immediacy (that does not, of course, mean they do not form false beliefs about nature and society).
Here's how I have put this in Essay Nine Part One:
The fact that HM so easily meshes with the lives of workers is, of course, why some of them become revolutionaries; HM relates to ordinary human beings in a way that DM cannot since it speaks to them in terms with which they can readily connect. In this sense HM captures what they in effect "already know", once they encounter it.
This is because HM is consonant with -- and it is dependent upon concepts developed out of -- conventions and material practices that relate to, and underlie, human language and communication in general. This in turn is because HM's central concerns revolve around the self-emancipation of workers, and its scientific structure explains how and why workers are oppressed and exploited.
Moreover, since HM is also predicated on the social nature of language -- how the latter originated in, and arose out of collective labour --, it cannot help but mesh with workers' experience of exploitation and oppression, as well as with aspects of life that all of us share as members of the same "form of life". Since ordinary language is the language of the working-class, it cannot avoid reflecting a working-class view of life.
All of these factors find expression in the language that working people have developed over tens of thousands of years (right across the planet) in their material interaction with each other and with the natural and social world. Because of this, HM is capable of explaining to workers the significance of their experience of class society and of how they can fight to win back control over their lives.
This means that HM does not have to be brought to ordinary people from the "outside" (unlike DM); its basic concepts are already there in workers, who, as ordinary human beings, share a collective history and (largely) common class-origin. In that case, workers just need reminders (as it were).
So, HM speaks to workers because of their experience of oppression and exploitation (and consequent alienation) -- and because it provides them with a social and political account of how these can be eradicated as a result of their own activity, their own struggles.
This is partly why HM makes immediate sense to most workers (when they are ready to listen), and why it appears so obvious to Marxists -- and to anyone who has had to work for a living under Capitalism. In fact, it is difficult to believe that anyone who has had to work for a living under Capitalism could read, say, Marx's [I]1844 Paris Manuscripts and fail to appreciate the profound insights into their condition that Marx so brilliantly outlines.
Marx's analysis (here and elsewhere) speaks to workers' collective experience of alienation, their sense of fragmentation from their "species being", aggravated by the division of labour and compounded by class control. It also addresses the connection these have with collective and individual self-development, the relationships we have with other human beings (and with nature itself) -- and with our consequential de-humanisation. These profound truths do not really need to be taught (as would be the case if these were merely empirical facts); most human beings (who have to work for a living) just need to be reminded of them -- or merely of their significance. That is indeed why the content of HM often hits people like a bucket of cold water in the face.
As most revolutionaries know, it is not difficult to convince workers (when they are on strike, say) about the realities of class division, the nature of the class struggle, the role of the Police, and of exploitation -- along with a host of other HM-ideas. All that militants need to add to this (apart from the things listed in the next but one paragraph) are wider generalisations and deeper analyses.
This means that revolutionaries are not prophets or visionaries, they are organisers and administrators. Anything else would amount to substituting themselves for the class. HM reminds them of this; DM helps them forget.
Revolutionary politics actually brings to workers a developed theory (HM) that generalises their experience (relating it to previous generations), providing the tactics, strategy and organisation necessary to further their struggles, and ultimately how to terminate Capitalism -- once they have overthrown it. In fact, this is all that needs to be "brought to workers".
Because HM is based on and addresses their experience and their suppressed awareness of their own de-humanised condition, their struggle, it is actually introduced to workers, as it were, 'from the inside'.
That is why HM, unlike DM, cannot form the ideological basis for substitutionism.
At a stroke, that solves Lenin's 'problem'. [This was outlined earlier in this Essay.]
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_01.htm
Since ordinary language expresses our species' relationship with the material world, and with one another, and since the vernacular dominates the thinking of ordinary workers, their thought (while not always correct) is not systematically distorted as is the case with ruling class thought:
The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphases added.]
Lynx
21st March 2009, 22:36
I cannot fix my computer with ideology, so what use is it?
I'm led to believe that some people have a need to associate themselves with a labeled set of ideas, on their journey through life. While this may have some benefit in terms of identifying and organizing with other people, it is also limiting to the individual.
Ideology is to be discarded as soon as possible, replaced with inquiry and know-how.
Louise Michel
21st March 2009, 22:41
Because ruling-class thought is based on the a priori idea that behind appearances there is an invisible world, accessible by though alone, which is more real that the world we see around us, as I have pointed out to you before.
The 'superior' education petty-bourgeois and bourgeois individuals receive shapes their thinking for the rest of their lives.
This is not so with workers, who in general (if we ignore religion for the moment) do not have such ideas implanted in their heads. They see the world in all its immediacy (that does not mean they do not form false beliefs about nature and society).
Okay, and is it not also because workers have no real stake in the current mode of production? In fact, particularly in situations of economic crisis, they have an immediate interest in replacing the rule of a minority with the rule of the majority.
Sorry to hear about the JW upbringing - they seem to be one of the most depressing sects around. At least the mormons like to dance. Can't imagine a JW dancing - maybe they'll make up for it when Rapture sweeps them off their feet!
Rosa Lichtenstein
21st March 2009, 22:44
Louise:
Okay, and is it not also because workers have no real stake in the current mode of production? In fact, particularly in situations of economic crisis, they have an immediate interest in replacing the rule of a minority with the rule of the majority.
Sure, but that does not explain why their ideas are not systematically distorted.
Can't imagine a JW dancing
Well they do, and they enjoy life too (only in 'moderation').
They might be misguided, but they are not as dire as you might think. [Most of my relatives are JWs! They are not a miserable bunch; quite the opposite in fact.]
And they do not believe in the 'rapture', either.
Louise Michel
21st March 2009, 22:47
Marx's analysis (here and elsewhere) speaks to workers' collective experience of alienation, their sense of fragmentation from their "species being", aggravated by the division of labour and compounded by class control. It also addresses the connection these have with collective and individual self-development, the relationships we have with other human beings (and with nature itself) -- and with our consequential de-humanisation. These profound truths do not really need to be taught (as would be the case if these were merely empirical facts); most human beings (who have to work for a living) just need to be reminded of them -- or merely of their significance. That is indeed why the content of HM often hits people like a bucket of cold water in the face.
Also, I meant to say, that this info needs to be more widely diffused and emphasised because Marx is often seen as someone who simply wants to equalize economic conditions.
Rosa Lichtenstein
21st March 2009, 22:52
Well, the view I outlined is fundamental to 'socialism from below':
http://www.marxists.org/archive/draper/1966/twosouls/index.htm
Workers have to emancipate themselves, otherwise they will never overcome their own alienation.
No one (no party, leader or red army) can do it for them.
Indeed, any attempt to do this for them will just perpetuate their sense of powerlessness.
Pogue
21st March 2009, 22:54
This in itself is a hugely contested statement, and the nature of the relationship between the external world and our sensory experiences is an issue that has troubled and confused philosophers ever since the dawn of mankind. It is accepted that our senses do not always convey an accurate picture of what the real world is like - we can have hallucinations if we take certain drugs, and it is also often the case that we think we are having a "real experience" when we are actually just dreaming, and only realize that we were having a dream after we wake up. Given that our senses are not infallible, in the sense that they do not always allow us to objectively experience what is "out there", what reason is there to assume that our senses are accurate at any given point in time? It is entirely possible that all of our sensory experiences are just the result of a scientist stimulating different areas of our brain in order to create the illusion that we are doing and feeling certain things, perhaps as part of a deranged experiment, with our brain having been placed in a vat of nutrients, without a supporting body. The most radical form of this skeptical position is the notion that we could be the only person in existence (otherwise known as a solipsism) and all of the people we think we interact with on a daily basis are, as with any other sensory experience, merely internal, because we have no way of making sure that they exist in any meaningful form, independent of our perceptions. The only thing that we know for certain exists is our own mind, because in order to have sensory experiences in the first place, and to discuss philosophy, there needs to be some kind of object capable of generating logical arguments - hence Descartes' statement cogito ergo sum, I think therefore I am. Descartes was forced to assume that God exists in order to show that our senses are accurate, on the grounds that God is a benevolent being, and would therefore never have any reason to equip us with senses that do not accurately convey the external world. Hobbes, who adopted a mechanical explanation for sensory experiences, according to which all such experiences are merely the result of physical objects coming into contact with our bodies and sending physical motions inwards towards our heart and mind, was able to give a partial answer to the skeptical challenge by arguing that, even if our senses are inaccurate, there must be some kind of physical world out there, that exists independently of us, because in the absence of an external world there would be no possible source for our experiences, given that the mind is incapable of spontaneously generating experiences without an external stimulus.
Why do you refuse to space your writings out?
Louise Michel
21st March 2009, 22:59
Workers have to emancipate themselves, otherwise they will never overcome their own alienation.
No one (no party, leader or red army) can do it for them.
Indeed, any attempt to do this for them will just perpetuate their sense of powerlessness.
I completely agree. Maybe I cold start a thread on this. In the politics section I suppose.
Rosa Lichtenstein
21st March 2009, 23:00
Sure, why not?
black magick hustla
22nd March 2009, 07:49
This version of scientific enquiry is only good for testing the natural world as the experimental method cannot be used to help us understand the social world (except by revealing very basic mechanics of social behaviour). It is therefore of little use to revolutionaries.
In itself the experimental method doesn't help us to understand the reality we are dealing with, only isolated elements of it. Theoretical or synthetic thinking is necessary to join the dots.
Obviously we cannot make controlled experiments of society but the premise of experimentalism- i.e. empiricism, is really important and I think the basis of historical materialism. "Theoretical or synthetic" thinking is necessary in all scientific fields - but it must be based on observationsd.
black magick hustla
22nd March 2009, 07:52
now, our ethical motives that underly our political beliefs are outside the field of science. However, these ethical principles cannot be argued and thus if we argue about things that encompass them, i.e. war is bad because misery is bad, we must have an ethical common ground on the question of finding misery bad because then the whole discourse turns worthless. However, the issue of whether BTB made a post in this thread does not require us to agree on any sort of "moral" common ground because such issue is self- evident. So in a way, empirical considerations might be worthless to substanciate our ethical motives but they are necessary for our theoretical frameworks.
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