Utilitarianism: Ethics and Choice.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I consider myself a utilitarian when it comes to ethics. Lately, I'm encountering some stumbling blocks with the theory. Help me out if you can. Criticize the theory if you want, too.

Case 1: Voting Problem

Here, we are under a pure communist/anarchist system. To decide something that effects the lives of millions of people, such as health care policy, the communist nation decides to vote.

As a rational actor, you realize that the effort (negative utility) it takes to vote outweighs the benefits of voting (positive utility). In other words, you maximize your individual utility (utilitarianism) by not voting.

Concluding thoughts:

(1) To rationally justify voting, you have to view it as utility maximizing utility or morally obligatory. (2) If something is not utility maximizing, it is not morally obligatory (under utilitarianism). Is there a way to justify voting as utility maximizing (satisfy #1)? Is there a way to tweak utilitarianism to except some sort of obligation outside of personal interest(satisfy #2 therefore #1 as well)?

Case 2: Rape Problem

You are locked in a room with a beautiful women. She is tied up in a sexually provocative position. It is impossible for her to physically harm you or criticize you verbally. Because of physical/emotional compulsion that you have been informed of, she must do whatever you instruct. She did nothing to deserve her situation, and she can't inform you of her opinions regarding anything you do.

A third party informs you that whatever you do in the room will not leave the room. They suggest sexual intercourse. You are certain of the credibility of this informer. When you wish to leave the room, you will both be allowed to leave. When you leave the room, you will both forget all the events that transpired. Engaging in the act of rape (she cannot consent) will provide you utility (in the form of sexual pleasure). Upon conversing with the third party, he guarantees you that your personal benefit will outweigh the negative consequences.

Your utility will be maximized and she will have negative utility. Outside the room, your actions will have no consequences. It will be as if it never happened. You are completely capable of choosing either action. The third party is studying ethics. He wants to know your rational for either choice.

Concluding thoughts:

Since the person has a choice in the above circumstance, I would intuitively consider choosing rape to be an immoral action despite its utility maximization. I have no rational justification for this claim. Is my "intuition" a social construct that is falsely disregarding the rational choice. If not, how can I rationally defend my conclusion regarding this matter?

[Hegemonicretribution]

The first problem I see is that you use the language of ethics, but as this is a technical matter on my part, and we all have something apporaching what you mean by an ethical theory I shall pass on this (for now).

The second problem is that you assume utilitarianism. Fine if everyone else does the same...well kind of, but if not then there will be problems.

You have not specified a form of utilitarianism, I assume from reading what you have written that it is an act-utilitarian view that you have adopted. If so, I would suggest at least looking at rule-utilitarianism (if you haven't already) as this will further spell out some problems. I am sure that stanford has a decent page on this, or perhaps even wikipedia.

Now onto the examples.

Case1; If you are determined to stick to utilitarianism, as well the idea that you want a motivation to vote then I suggest the following; the act of not voting gives rise to a social situation where not voting makes utilitarian sense. You agree that the existence of this system is conducive to utility, so you weigh up the benifits of voting (in light of the fact that if you act in one way, that you create a situation which legitimises others doing the same) and come to the conclusion that, although the immediate utility is not apparent, that voting results in more overall utility.

The problem is that you have no way to determine the utility that would result from voting or not voting because you do cannot determine the effects your action will have on the over all structure. You also don't have a timescale to determine utility over....do you calculate immediate effects, effects a thousand years from now, or somewhere in between....or do you change the timescale you use to determine action depending upon the situation (in which case you need to account for this also).

As a means of judging action, utility might have some broad, if very confused application. For motivating action the same might be said, but to treat it is a definite principle is problematic because you have no idea (really) of the consequences that will result from your actions. At least to the extent that you would need to make this view viable.

Another (although now unnecessary) response to the voting case; the utility of not voting will only be greater if your vote was not required. As your vote becomes more important (as support for the 'right' view decreases) the utility of not voting no longer holds, because the slight inconvenience that will be caused to you by voting will be offset by the greater utility achieved by the 'right' vote passing.

Again, the idea that there is a vote seems to imply a choice. Now which of the options is in accordance with your utilitarian doctrine? Would utilitarianism not dictate that the best course of action is either predetermined by its consequences (funny phrase I know), or else not possible to determine? This again negates this apporach as a means of determining action.

Example 2, rape; This example seems massively misguided to me, and somewhat worrying. I don't know you so I won't pass comment on you yet, I will assume in your favour that this is just an example which would (apparently) show utilitarianism to justify an abhorrent practice. If so, then I suggest in future you stick to simple examples such as killing a baby to prevent a war etc...

If no harm is done to the woman because she can't remember it (I don't buy this for a second), then no pleasure is achieved for you either on the same grounds.

This case really is not worthy of much comment, and to be honest I don't want to deconstructive it massively because I think what I say next should suffice as an explanation of it. A moral theory should not have reduced application in this world because of the concerns of possible worlds. In other words your utilitarianism would never have to deal with such a case, even conceivably, so don't concern yourself with such examples.

In summary; utilitarianism is flawerd because we cannot calculate the utility of our actions. Even as a standard of judgement, an action will have a differently realised utility depending upon the timescale we use.

Your examples do not work (generally) because of the flaws in your ethical account. More specifically they are particuarly poor examples of a utilitarian position because you infer such a strange and unworkable notion of utility in each. That said, I think this is something that all utilitarians do, but your examples are not a strong example of a case eitehr for or against utilitarianism.

I hope this helps, and if I have missed anything out (I may well have done) Or if someone else has replied before I post this then I will resubmit a more detailed answer later.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

I'm not sure I'm convinced with your explanation of #1, but I have similar ideas along that line (I just need to better understand and justify them). As for number 2, your explanation is perfect. Sadly, I failed to properly explain my ideas.

I actually was holding the view that a utilitarian should maximize utility of themselves and it is only a consequence that that helps others. Anyway, I hate to cut this short, but I'm still fiddling with this issue and I've got to get back to my thoughts. Thanks for the post. It was helpful.

[WhitemageofDOOM]

Case 1: Voting Problem

Voting allows one to make wide scale systematic change through consensus. I'd argue that it is positive utility if the right changes get passed, voting helps that.


Case 2: Rape Problem

The immediate question is "would she suffer" not merely int he short term(drugging can deal with that easily.) but in the long term from a sense of violation of her self. The very likely answer is yes, so while the heat of the moment utility might favor rape, the long term utility is very clearly to not rape.
I'd suggest talking about utilitarianism instead.


Since the person has a choice in the above circumstance, I would intuitively consider choosing rape to be an immoral action despite its utility maximization. I have no rational justification for this claim. Is my "intuition" a social construct that is falsely disregarding the rational choice. If not, how can I rationally defend my conclusion regarding this matter?

Intuitive morality is born out of human notions, utilitarianism is not an intuitive morality but a rational one. However dispensing with intuition and learning of objective reality is a good thing as it allows us to better act in accordance with reality. Thus understanding how we can maximize pleasure and minimize suffering.
Choice is an intuitive concept thanks to common sense dualism, but is not a rational concept. We are who we are and we can only act in accordance with such. To fully grasp utilitarianism i had to dispense with the notion that humans choose, and accept that we simply act and that those actions of consequences. I think it likely you will have to accept the same to resolve your current issues with utilitarianism.

[Hegemonicretribution]

My explanations were targetted at utilitarianism; the general thought that maximising pleasure is good. I didn't realise you were talking about individual utility.


I actually was holding the view that a utilitarian should maximize utility of themselves and it is only a consequence that that helps others. Does it help others? In general an individual taking responsibility for their own happiness is sensible, because it is the individual who best knows how to satisfy themselves. It is far from clear that everyone being involved in their own self serving projects, when personal utility is the overarching aim for all, that this would come anywhere close to constituting a desirable society.

Are you claiming that promoting the pursuit of personal gratification would lead to a better society for all? If so, this is just utilitarianism in the usual sense, except that you have suggested a guide/rule (depending on how definite this is) which states that pursuit of personal pleasure, over social utility, will lead to more overall (social) utility. If so this would need a lot of work....and it falls victim to my earlier criticisms. Now I realise what you meant I shall re-address the first case.

Ok, so personal utility is increased by not going to vote which is seen as a nuisance. Why do you claim that voting results in positive utility if you are talking about personal utility? If it does, then what is the personal pleasure gained from voting? I can see a possible, albeit weak case to be made for the positive utility of voting. I can just about see an even weaker case for the personal utility of voting, but they are simply fallacious. I won't waste time illustrating them now, because I assume you meant something else?

Now if I grant the general grounds for your first example, which I am not inclined to do because;
As a rational actor, you realize that the effort (negative utility) it takes to vote outweighs the benefits of voting (positive utility). How is this established? Rational actor? It was implicit in most of my last post that a rational actor is an impossibilty...but I shall clarify this again in a moment.

Anyway if I do grant them, I cannot see where your conclusions come from. 1)
To rationally justify voting, you have to view it as utility maximizing utility or morally obligatory. If the first utility is not a typo, then it appears that you are talking about utilitarianism in the normal, general sense. If you are still maintaining that you are talking only about personal utility then there is no need for 2...

2)
If something is not utility maximizing, it is not morally obligatory (under utilitarianism)
If you were talking only about personal utility in 1, then 2 is already implicit in it. You do not need to state 2 at all.


Is there a way to justify voting as utility maximizing (satisfy #1)?
You can justify it however you like...that is the problem we cannot calculate utility because we do cannot tell the future. But yes, if you are determined to stick to a utilitarian account you could talk about it in terms of personal satisfaction. That will be the only motivation you can really cite for any activity not fundamental to life. That is unless you inkoke 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures, where you construe voting as a higher pleasure. I don't want to get into how much of a mess this would create though, unless you particuarly want to hear arguments against this?


Is there a way to tweak utilitarianism to except some sort of obligation outside of personal interest(satisfy #2 therefore #1 as well)?
Utilitarianism normally considers utility to operate on the large scale, the focus on the individual is only because they are the means of determining the individual actions which lead to the overall utility. I think part of the problem is that you are working with such a strange notion of utility that you are tripping yourself up. This would explain why the cases seemed so strange when I looked at them as problems for what is normally thought of as utilitarianism.

If you take voting to result in positive utility; and I see now you mean overall utility at this point, then the obligation lies there. Simple. It would have to cause you a lot of discomfort to make not voting the legitimate option.



I feel that my responses haven't been as well tailored as they might of been because I didn't understand what you meant, and I am still not sure exactly what your position is but please don't hesitate to PM me or reply with specific worries or questions. Anyway I will now try and give an argument against case 1 which should clearly explain why no version of utilitarianism can ever be useful.

OK in the case of voting you need, as a rational agent to determine first of all whether or not voting will maxismise your personal utility. Now you try and consider the pros and cons, but the problem is that you cannot work out which action will result in the most pleasure. You will miss 'the game' or something if you go, but if you don't go then the vote may not pass as you want it to. Now it is probably true that the vote not passing would be worse than missing the game, but that depends on how it would pan out and you don't know. Now you are pretty sure it won't come down to one vote, so you think about not voting, but then you would have to consider that you might be paranoid that your not-voting might have been catastrophic.Now you think about the timescale this happiness is supposed to occur over. and you have a problem because the happiness you will experience from a given action is entirely contingent upon the length of time you use to gauge the consequences of that action. So the game might be better now, but over the course of a month, it would have been better to vote because.....you would of met a great partner had you of went....but over the course of a year it would have been better to watch the game because the partner would have left and you would have been depressed.....but over 5 years voting would have been best because you develop a cure for depression...but over, well you get the point.

I started with small considerations the 'rational actor' would have to consider, and then offered some broader considerations. I could of went on to write about the calculating the actual utility of voting in virtue of traffic jams, or the weather, or contribution to pollution, or any manner of things that could result (or at least affect you) because of any action you decide upon. The considerations are practically, although not perhaps literally, infinite.

I then wrote about the utility resulting from an action, and how it is determined by a timescale. The same action may result in positive utility at point x, negative utility at point y and positive utility (again) at point z. How do we choose which one we use when calculating utility?

Now this should (although I have more to say if needs be) cast serious doubt on the usefulness of a utilitarian account. The illustration above was focused on personal utility. I didn't even have to talk about the possibility that your vote may have been wrong, and led you to a worse situation to show that you just cannot calculate utility. There are too many considerations and the result will change depending on when you try and determine it.

Now just to kill of utilitarianism once and for all!

If you give up a notion of the (unworkable) personal utility, in favour of the more common notion of utility as maximum good overall, then you still need to calculate personal utility. Personal utility must be a consideration for any form of utilitarianism.This is because you have to include yourself in the 'overall'. Also, because you do not know everyone, you will have to project some of your assumptions about a desirable world onto them. Now imagine the problems of calculating the utility of any of your actions (from above) and multiply it by 6 billion. Now recall that I didn't even start to include everything you would have to consider before, and that you have no means of considering others, and it should be clear that this approach will fail as well.

Now I have gone on for a long time trying to put this theory to bed, but before I finish I will pre-empt the most likely response to what I have said.

It could be responded that it is obvious that even a rational agent could not calculate their own utility for all the above reasons. In spite of this, utilitarianism might still be cited as maximising utility (in a personal sense) by allowing the individual to maximise their own happiness. The same might be said of utilitarianism in the usual sense; that encouraging the individuals who comprise society to aim for utility will in turn increase utility.

Now the claim is; that without a means to determine utility, a general project along these lines still results in higher utility.

How could anyone have determined this though, given the problems of truly determining the consequences of any one action, even when the individual is the only consideration?

I am tired and I will leave it at this, sorry about the length, but I felt I had more groundwork to do because I wasn't sure which one of several possible positions you held. I also wanted to offer comprehensive refutations from several angles.

[Hegemonicretribution]

WhitemageofDOOM (http://www.revleft.com/vb/../member.php?u=19317)

You got in there whilst I was writing my last post, and because it is pretty big I think more than an edit is in order. Anyway, assuming that you didn't read my first response in this thread I will take issue with some of what you have said, but I won't deal more generally with utilitraianism and the problems becuase I have went into detail elsewhere.


Voting allows one to make wide scale systematic change through consensus. I'd argue that it is positive utility if the right changes get passed, voting helps that.Surely everyone considers themselves to support the 'right choice'? Or at elast enough people on opposing sides to make this problematic. The utilitarian framework you have assumed rather than deduced.


The immediate question is "would she suffer" not merely int he short term(drugging can deal with that easily.) but in the long term from a sense of violation of her self.Timescale poses a more general problem, because utility is contingnent upon a particular point in time.

Also the first question is not, 'would she suffer' it is 'how do I get her out of here?' This example has no application in the real world. I am not saying that possible world arguments never have a place, but this one doesn't as Dooga has acknowledged.


The very likely answer is yes, so while the heat of the moment utility might favor rape, the long term utility is very clearly to not rape.
I'd suggest talking about utilitarianism instead. How would it favour rape in the short term? Even going along with this whole fallacy, it simply does not follow. The situation roughly is that you treat the woman as having no utility, but as someone who will come to possess utility in time. This does not happen. Even if it did, you could not ever get close to the idea that rape was the correct course of action. I am not making a deontological claim here, but I wouldn't accept your inference here unless you did a lot of work....and I really would not encourage you to waste your time on it, because it would be a waste of time.


Intuitive morality is born out of human notions, Huh? I am not sure what you mean, but intuitive morality is born out of an illusion that what we have in place when we self-reflect is intuition rather than social conditioning. By the time we can meaningfully (if ever) self reflect the effects of society will have practically determined our intuitions.


utilitarianism is not an intuitive morality but a rational one.I agree that it is not intuitive. I do not agree that it is rational. It is a result of rationalism; the a-priori school of thought which has provided us with so little except a guide to how to conduct bad philosophy. Some people assume utilitarianism, that is true. But why should they?


However dispensing with intuition and learning of objective reality is a good thing as it allows us to better act in accordance with reality. Thus understanding how we can maximize pleasure and minimize suffering.
Right and wrong here I think. I agree with the first sentence, the more we understand the world, the better we can conduct ourselves towrds it. The second sentence simply does not follow.We cannot, even hypothetically, know how to maximise utility. I would suggest reading my first post in this thread as an explanation of this.

Now choice, this is something I know that most people here dislike, but I think that a version of it can be maintained. That is a whole other topic though, and I won't go into that now. If you do get rid of choice, but maintain utilitarianism, what are you left with? A loose means of approving or disapproving of something that you can make no difference to? I don't see what you are left with.

[apathy maybe]

I'm not a utilitarian, I can't be bothered going through all the arguments again though. (I don't see how one can be a true anarchist, against oppression etc., and still be a utilitarian in all cases. As there are invariably cases, such as the kill an innocent to prevent a war, which conflict with anarchist ideals. Anyway...)

On the second case, this is an example of something that I've been thinking about a bit. Doing things without having to worry about what happens after... But I won't go into that now.

[black magick hustla]

utilitarianism is the worst of the ethical systems. How do you quantify happiness? makes absolutely no sense. Its like quantifying taste

[EqualityandFreedom]

utilitarianism is the worst of the ethical systems. How do you quantify happiness? makes absolutely no sense. Its like quantifying taste

No I'm sure absolutism is worse though not by much.

[WhitemageofDOOM]

utilitarianism is the worst of the ethical systems.

I could think of a ton of worse. And can you suggest better?


How do you quantify happiness? makes absolutely no sense.If it exists, it can be quantified. It may not be easy(oh boy is it not easy.), but it can be done.


Its like quantifying tasteI'm 100% sure that we could quantify how much you liked things given enough information about you and your reactions to things.


I don't see how one can be a true anarchist, against oppression etc., and still be a utilitarian in all cases. As there are invariably cases, such as the kill an innocent to prevent a war, which conflict with anarchist ideals. Anyway...

Let me rephrase your argument. "Would you start a war to save an innocent?"

[black magick hustla]

I could think of a ton of worse. And can you suggest better?
Suggesting "better" moral frameworks is for priests. I do think however, that utilitarianism is incompatible with communist principles.



If it exists, it can be quantified. It may not be easy(oh boy is it not easy.), but it can be done.

not everything can be quantified. mathematics is the language of quantities, and happiness is not one. mathematics for example, cannot express literature or taste.


I'm 100% sure that we could quantify how much you liked things given enough information about you and your reactions to things.
This is not the same as "happiness".

[Hegemonicretribution]

I could think of a ton of worse. And can you suggest better?

I can think of equally bad theories, there are no 'good' ones out there. Dispensing with moral language is a start of a better approach...


If it exists, it can be quantified. It may not be easy(oh boy is it not easy.), but it can be done.
Did you read my first response, or to a degree my second response to DAB? I thought I had refuted the ability to quantify utility, if you didn't see the first post at least I felt I offered some fairly convincing arguments. If you disagree with me I would appreciate a rejection of these arguments or at least a justification of your position in light of them.


I'm 100% sure that we could quantify how much you liked things given enough information about you and your reactions to things.

Even if you establish a fixed (albeit arbitrary) means of determining pleasure, you still have to determine pleasure over a vertain time. The only real option would be immediate gratification. The problem then is that you have no motivation for any necessary action.


Let me rephrase your argument. "Would you start a war to save an innocent?"

Good twist on it, I liked this response.

The only issue is that somebody operating from within certain deontological or virtue ethicist frameworks would not accept this characterisation. It is itself an acceptance utilitarianism which means that you would equate these two cases.

Now material reality and all that yes....but that is why I would choose to reject consequentialist theories too.

A deontologist (assuming a do not kill rule) would view the situation as very difficult, but for them there would be no option of killing the innocent. End of discusion; adherence to such rule is what is moral on such an account.

The virtue-ethicist may well have an obligation to prevent war...but this will depend on the individual. No possible answer here.

[BobKKKindle$]

The big problem for utilitarianism, regardless of whether we see it as an individual or social ethical doctrine, is the question of how we should go about defining utility. If we define utility solely in terms of the sensations we derive from having particular experiences, or engaging in a certain activity, then it logically follows that the ideal situation both for a given individual and the whole of mankind would be to have every single person hooked up a machine that satisfies all of our nutritional needs and continuously dispenses pleasure-inducing drugs, leaving everyone in a state of blissful ignorance, with no knowledge of who we are, and what we are capable of doing. This is the logical implication of crass utilitarianism, and yet it is intuitively repugnant - most people, if asked, would not opt for such a situation, because we do not live merely with the aim of enjoying pleasurable sensations, we also enjoy certain activities for their own sake, and we occasionally enter into activities that are physically unpleasant if doing so allows us to expand our knowledge of the external world as well as ourselves, thereby allowing us to become more fully-rounded individuals, and realize our potential. Kymlicka gives writing poetry as an example of this. This poses difficulties for utilitarianism, because it indicates that the human condition cannot be reduced to a single aim - we are complicated creatures, with needs that are conditioned by our social environment and past experiences, who do many different things for many different reasons. In addition, there are also different types of utilitarianism, such that simply saying that you follow utilitarian ethics does not tell us much about your views on how humans should make decisions. There are very few philosophers who would argue that each individual should consider what will generate the most happiness for them as individuals every time they have to make a decision, because utilitarianism is generally seen as a social doctrine, given that ethics is, by its very nature, concerned with relations between individuals, and what individuals can justifiably do to each other. For this reason, the most common manifestation of utilitarianism is rule utilitarianism, according to which we should construct social and political rules based on what will generate the most happiness, and stick to these rules, even if, in a specific case, breaking the rules and following an alternative course of action would be more useful. Even if we assume that it is possible to effectively define utility, there are also reasons to question the assumption that the pursuit of utility is the ideal ethical standard for decision-making and government policy. Most importantly, utilitarianism completely rejects the moral obligations that we have to ourselves and other members of the community, because there is no morality independent of utility, and so it would be morally justified for individuals to be sacrificed if doing so generated immense pleasure for a group of sadists.