Phenomenology

[Hegemonicretribution]

I did a search, and I didn't see any threads on this topic so i figured why not??

Anyway, I know there was a tendency towards direct realism prevelant here, and I assume there still is, but I was wondering what people think about phenomenological approaches to consciousness and experience?

I have always been sceptical of such approaches before, but since starting to study Merleau-Ponty specifically, I have become more sympathetic towards aspects of this approach.

Although I don't think it is a necessary conclusion, it certainly seems that phenomenology is more apt to cope with certain pathological cases such as Schneider (Goldstein/Gelb) than the other major theories.

For those who are not familiar with this case, it is basically about a veteran who suffered a head injury which left him unable to perform certain 'abstract' actions, but left him able to perform other 'concrete' actions with relative ease. The actions he could carry out included touching his nose, but not actions such as pointing at his nose. The physical capacity to conduct actions was present for Schneider, and also an awareness of what was required of him.

So far I have not discovered any non-phenomenological account that can adequately deal with this case.

I am not suggesting that phenomenolgy is not without problems, but I am suggesting that in the wake of such cases it is not without explanatory merit either. I do not have any particular question in mind, or conclusion that I wish to establish, I am just generally interested in what others have to say on this matter. I would also appreciate any suggestions for reading on this topic, partially because I am writing an essay on this, and partially because I am genuinely interested in something which has recently caused me to reconsider my opinions on a number of matters.

I would also like to know what people think more generally on (particuarly) Merleau-Ponty's views on bodily knowledge, as I believe this provides one of the most natural explanations of addiction that I have read, but this may well warrant a new topic if this one is at all poular.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Yet more a priori dogmatics Heg?

[Hegemonicretribution]

:lol: What can I say 3 years of analytic philosophy only refreshes an interest in other aproaches. Most competing views are just as guilty of being a-priori and dogmatic.

There are serious problems with any individual account, but I find that phenomenology can account for Schneider better than any realist view that I have read. I am looking for a good refutation of MP's views, or at least a reasonable contender. The physicalist and cognitive views I have come across just don't seem adequate at all.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

This:


Although I don't think it is a necessary conclusion, it certainly seems that phenomenology is more apt to cope with certain pathological cases such as Schneider (Goldstein/Gelb) than the other major theories.

For those who are not familiar with this case, it is basically about a veteran who suffered a head injury which left him unable to perform certain 'abstract' actions, but left him able to perform other 'concrete' actions with relative ease. The actions he could carry out included touching his nose, but not actions such as pointing at his nose. The physical capacity to conduct actions was present for Schneider, and also an awareness of what was required of him.

reads like the 'god-of-the-gaps' argument; if we can't account for something scientifically, we have to accept a dubious set of a priori dogmas that allegedly do the job for us.

So, 800 years ago, theorists could not explain the movement of the planets, so they had angels pushing them. These days we can't yet account for the origin of life, but creationists can if we are stupid enough to accept their 'miracles'.

Myself, I prefer to leave such things unexplained until the science catches up.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_of_the_gaps

And I cannot read MP without wanting to light up Hume's bonfire.

[Hegemonicretribution]

Any science of the mind invokes theoretical entities, and consequently most approaches are incommensurable. Mearleau-Ponty was as scientific as most psychologists writing at his time. If you really want to dismiss him on grounds of being unscientific, then we should have to dismiss the works of all those writing before modern-science emerged. We don't dismiss Mutual aid, just because the earliest accounts do not hold in the light of more recent accounts, we simply revise it. Same with evolutionary theory. MP Has gained support again in recent times because he does offer something of use to modern science.

As for the god of the gaps accusation, it simply does not hold. MP does not point to a problem and say 'phenomenology did it' he sought out particular problems within a dominatnt account, and gave a more comprehensive view. One that is no less conscilient, simple, or capable of avoiding ad-hoc hypothoses than any other view.

I am happy to leave things unexplained, and I did state several times that I do not 'buy' MP. I was specifically looking for a critique of him, especially a modern scientific refutation, because I can't find anything modern and substantial which is massively against him, although I can find a number of articles in his favour.

In essence pathological cases have provided something approaching a refutation of the old view, and in over 50 years nothing has come close to explaining these cases. If this was another science, we would be approaching the point whereby it would be scientifically rigorous to look towards alternative approaches. Would you construe all paradigm shifts as a-priori nonsense? The current status quo does not have some inalienable right to be considered the only scientific approach for ever....at what point would you consider revising it? I am not suggesting avoiding science, but I am saying that to construe science as only offering one explanation which can be allocated this special status is unwarranted. Perhaps the scientific explanation you are waiting for is a modern version of MP's.

I still can not figure out what this science you speak of is, because there appear to be a number of competing theories, one of which involves a phenomenological approach, and which can offer a reasonable account of normal consciousness as well as a superior account of addiction, skill aquisition, and pathological disorders. (I haven't finished reading on this yet) If you could suggest a view which I should look at instead then I could try and do a comparitive reading, or at worst infere to the best explanation, but a dismissal of MP on grounds that are either not true, or which are equally true for competeing theories seems to be a-priori dogmatism.

If not a reasonable alternative, then how about a signpost to a major problem with his account, either specifically or generally. Or an illustration of what exactly his dogmatic and a-priori assumptions are. I don't mind you claiming that he relies upon this, but as I am asking for a critical account it would be helpful to know where they are because it is not as evident as it might be supposed.

Just to let you know I am looking to do a refutation o MP in general in my essay, but what has been offered so far is not enough to get my teeth into.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Heg:


Any science of the mind invokes theoretical entities, and consequently most approaches are incommensurable. Mearleau-Ponty was as scientific as most psychologists writing at his time. If you really want to dismiss him on grounds of being unscientific, then we should have to dismiss the works of all those writing before modern-science emerged. We don't dismiss Mutual aid, just because the earliest accounts do not hold in the light of more recent accounts, we simply revise it. Same with evolutionary theory. MP Has gained support again in recent times because he does offer something of use to modern science.

Well, if you know your Wittgenstein, then you will also know that such theories are subject to this criticism:


"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 'young science'; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory). For in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.)" [Wittgenstein (1958) Philosophical Investigations, §xiv, p.232e.]

Now, I have just published a 140,000 word Essay on this:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page_13_03.htm

aimed at showing, among other things, that a priori dogmatists like MP have to distort the verancular to make their 'theories' work -- as Marx forewarned us:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. [German Ideology, p.118.]

Or, check these out:

http://www.uea.ac.uk/%7Ej339/consc-tcs.htm

http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/docs/Relevance%20of%20W's%20phil.%20of%20psychol.%20to% 20science.pdf

http://www2.psy.uq.edu.au/CogPsych/Noetica/Articles/Candlish_ozcogsci02.pdf


I still can not figure out what this science you speak of is, because there appear to be a number of competing theories, one of which involves a phenomenological approach, and which can offer a reasonable account of normal consciousness as well as a superior account of addiction, skill aquisition, and pathological disorders. (I haven't finished reading on this yet) If you could suggest a view which I should look at instead then I could try and do a comparitive reading, or at worst infere to the best explanation, but a dismissal of MP on grounds that are either not true, or which are equally true for competeing theories seems to be a-priori dogmatism.

The problem is that theorists are still locked into the Cartesian paradigm. If psychology is to advance, this straight-jacket will have to be cast aside. You can find more details in Note One of the Essay of mine that I referred to above.

So, we do not yet have such a science; in that case I prefer not to try to fill the gaps in our knowledge by my own dogmatic 'theory' (and one based on a distortion of the vernacular), unlike 99.9% of philosophers.

[Hegemonicretribution]

Thanks Rosa, I will look at those on my day off tomorrow.

One point though, and admittedly I haven't read your arguments yet (I will be doing so soon because I have this essay in by Monday) The Cartesian paradigm is something that MP clearly rejects. Perhaps phenomenology is a bit of a misleading term in his case, because it is removed from what I previously consider this view to be. He rejects large elements of Husserl and others as well.

Also, although I am sure you have understood that I don't actually accept MP's views, I have been mostly interested in philosophy of science during my absence, and this means that I can't accept anything to do with psychology seriously.

Well maybe not everything, but he denies substance dualism, idealism and any content to consciousness. Get back to you tomorrow, and thanks again.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Heg:


The Cartesian paradigm is something that MP clearly rejects. Perhaps phenomenology is a bit of a misleading term in his case, because it is removed from what I previously consider this view to be. He rejects large elements of Husserl and others as well.

Well, he might 'say' so, but, from what you report it is clear that he does not. [It's so long since I read his work, I am sorry I can't be more precise here.]


Also, although I am sure you have understood that I don't actually accept MP's views, I have been mostly interested in philosophy of science during my absence, and this means that I can't accept anything to do with psychology seriously.

Yes, I gathered that.:)

By the way, you do not have to read all of that essay of mine, but you will find loads of references there to work that might help you with that essay of yours -- mainly in Note One (but also follow the links).

[Reclaimed Dasein]

Yet more a priori dogmatics Heg? What about MP in particular do you find a priori and dogmatic? Could you please site a passage?



reads like the 'god-of-the-gaps' argument; if we can't account for something scientifically, we have to accept a dubious set of a priori dogmas that allegedly do the job for us.

And I cannot read MP without wanting to light up Hume's bonfire.What in particular did you read by MP that you want to consign to the flames? Also, what particular passages does MP argue for "god-of-the-gaps"?


As for the god of the gaps accusation, it simply does not hold. MP does not point to a problem and say 'phenomenology did it' he sought out particular problems within a dominatnt account, and gave a more comprehensive view. One that is no less conscilient, simple, or capable of avoiding ad-hoc hypothoses than any other view.

I am happy to leave things unexplained, and I did state several times that I do not 'buy' MP. I was specifically looking for a critique of him, especially a modern scientific refutation, because I can't find anything modern and substantial which is massively against him, although I can find a number of articles in his favour.

Just to let you know I am looking to do a refutation o MP in general in my essay, but what has been offered so far is not enough to get my teeth into. Never let it be said, I'm supporting Rosa's wholesale rejection of things that I'm not convinced she's read, but it seems that MP notion of motility in the phenomenology of perception sits somewhat as an empty placeholder for freedom. I don't remember him specifically addressing what it was or how it operates except as a ground for human "freedom." To be fair, it's been a while since I've read MP, but that struck me as one of the largest critiques of him.


Well, if you know your Wittgenstein, then you will also know that such theories are subject to this criticism: Which theories of MP are subject to Wittgenstein's criticism? Can you please cite them?


http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page_13_03.htm
Please forgive me. I read through a great deal of that essay and didn't see any critique of phenomenology as a general branch of philosophy or MP in particular. I did however get some interesting, but perhaps misdirect critiques of Marcuse. I think that you're right to point out that Marcuse doesn't necessarily understand Wittgenstein, but that doesn't entail he's not valuable in pointing out the reduction of thought/critical thinking/etc that occurs in modern society.


aimed at showing, among other things, that a priori dogmatists like MP have to distort the verancular to make their 'theories' work -- as Marx forewarned us: What vernacular has MP distorted? Where?


The problem is that theorists are still locked into the Cartesian paradigm. If psychology is to advance, this straight-jacket will have to be cast aside. You can find more details in Note One of the Essay of mine that I referred to above. This has been stated before, but where is MP "locked into the cartesian paradigm?" This seems especially salient since he situates anything like mind, intentionality, or reason as solely in the body. This is why he points out that brain damage radically alters the way people behave in the world.


So, we do not yet have such a science; in that case I prefer not to try to fill the gaps in our knowledge by my own dogmatic 'theory' (and one based on a distortion of the vernacular), unlike 99.9% of philosophers. Where does MP try and fill the gaps with his own "dogmatic" theory?


Heg:Well, he might 'say' so, but, from what you report it is clear that he does not. [It's so long since I read his work, I am sorry I can't be more precise here.]

By the way, you do not have to read all of that essay of mine, but you will find loads of references there to work that might help you with that essay of yours -- mainly in Note One (but also follow the links).
If it has been a long time since you read it, what makes you sure you remember it correctly. You may have arguments against MP, but from what I can tell, so far it's just been the usual anti-dialectics stuff against someone it's not clear to me you're familiar with. I guess when all you've got is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. However, I suspect you have more than a hammer which makes me wonder why you pretty much see everything as a nail.

Also, side note, the reason so many people reacting to "language games" do so as a critique of post modernism is because Lyotard uses (you might say abuses) Wittgenstein in "The Post-Modern Condition." Sorry, I just thought I'd mention it since I saw that as a side note of someone who "was clearly attacking Wittgenstein."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

RD:


What about MP in particular do you find a priori and dogmatic? Could you please site a passage?

The lot, but here's a randomly selected passage off the internet:


That in the final analysis form cannot be defined in terms of reality but in terms of knowledge, not a thing of the physical world but as a perceived whole, is explicitly recognized by Koehler when he writes that the order in a form ‘rests’ …on the fact that each local event, one could almost say ‘dynamically knows’ others. It is not an accident that, in order to express this presence of each moment to the other, Koehler comes up with the term ‘knowledge’. A unity of this type can be found only in an object of knowledge. Taken as a being of nature, existing in space, the form would always be dispersed in several places and distributed in local events, even if these events mutually determine each other; to say that it does not suffer this division amounts to saying that it is not spread out in space, that it does not exist in the same manner as a thing, that it is the idea under which what happens in several places is brought together and resumed. This unity is the unity of perceived objects. A colored circle which I look at is completely modified in its physiognomy by an irregularity which removes something of its circular character and makes it an imperfect circle.

A priori and dogmatic.

Anyone got some matches?


Which theories of MP are subject to Wittgenstein's criticism? Can you please cite them?

You seem not to be able to read. My quotation of Wittgenstein was aimed at Heg's reference to psychology, not at that morass of confusion sometimes called 'French Philosophy', or even 'Merleau Ponty'.


Also, what particular passages does MP argue for "god-of-the-gaps"?

Same reply.


Please forgive me. I read through a great deal of that essay and didn't see any critique of phenomenology as a general branch of philosophy or MP in particular. I did however get some interesting, but perhaps misdirect critiques of Marcuse. I think that you're right to point out that Marcuse doesn't necessarily understand Wittgenstein, but that doesn't entail he's not valuable in pointing out the reduction of thought/critical thinking/etc that occurs in modern society.

Once more, that Essay was not aimed at MP, or at 'French Philosophy' in general (since I just ignore it), but at certain features of the 'dialectical understanding' of 'cognition', and I quoted it at Heg since it also addresses certain aspects of psychology, not MP.

My criticism of Marcuse was also limited to his criticism of Wittgenstein and 'Ordinary Language Philosophy', not at his analysis of anything else, valueless though that is.


This has been stated before, but where is MP "locked into the cartesian paradigm?" This seems especially salient since he situates anything like mind, intentionality, or reason as solely in the body. This is why he points out that brain damage radically alters the way people behave in the world.

His use of the word 'mind', for example, will do. If you read enough of my essay you will see why I say this. If not, not.

And this looks pretty a priori, dogmatic and a sort of 'god-of-the gaps' comment:


Never let it be said, I'm supporting Rosa's wholesale rejection of things that I'm not convinced she's read, but it seems that MP notion of motility in the phenomenology of perception sits somewhat as an empty placeholder for freedom. I don't remember him specifically addressing what it was or how it operates except as a ground for human "freedom." To be fair, it's been a while since I've read MP, but that struck me as one of the largest critiques of him.

Instead of waiting for the science to catch up, you, or even he, speculate with empty, meaningless phrases.

Anyone got a can of petrol?


If it has been a long time since you read it, what makes you sure you remember it correctly. You may have arguments against MP, but from what I can tell, so far it's just been the usual anti-dialectics stuff against someone it's not clear to me you're familiar with. I guess when all you've got is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. However, I suspect you have more than a hammer which makes me wonder why you pretty much see everything as a nail.

I will only even so much as consider re-reading all that French guff if someone holds a shotgun to my head. Short of that, I will rely on my memory and what few passages I can find on the internet.

And [I]please do not make me quote any more of this gobbledygook; I want to hang on to my breakfast a bit longer.

http://www.mysmiley.net/imgs/smile/sick/sick0001.gif

[Hegemonicretribution]

I still haven't looked over theessay yet, but I will hopefully get at least a glance at it later today.

As for the articles posted, the first (although I only got half way before cutting to the citations which explained more) was fairly pro MP. It praises him for, well;
Now, it has been argued by those dissatisfied with the Cognitivist paradigm -- and quite rightly, I think, as intimated in the opening of this essay -- that there is a very impoverished conception of the physical, and in particular of the human body (when viewed as broadly mechanical), at play here; that is, in Chalmers, but also in the behaviourists and the eliminativists, and in McGinn too; indeed, in virtually the entire Modern tradition of thought about mind and body. Merleau-Ponty has probably shown this better than anyone else.[6] (http://www.uea.ac.uk/%7Ej339/consc-tcs.htm#_ftn6) It has also been repeatedly (and in my view efficaciously) argued that there is something badly awry with the conception of ‘mind’ and ‘body’ as (conceptually) separable in the first place: this has been argued, for example, by Wittgenstein (Furthermore, what Hegel, Pragmatism, Merleau-Ponty, Wittgensteinians and Philosophical Feminism have contributed to -- and what the Ethnomethodological sociologists have developed in the greatest detail -- is the understanding of the social aspects of mind/body; but it would take us too far afield to go into that question here.

I looked to the cautionary note, which seems to be closer to my own personal view;
I do not believe -- though this would take a further paper to establish firmly -- that a new ‘theory’ of bodily action (of body and mind as a composite true whole) is needed to take the place of the positions in ‘the philosophy of consciousness’ that I hope to have discredited in this paper. If a positive new conception of the body were needed to move us beyond the mechanical body of philosophical biology, then Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh’ (with perhaps some Heideggerian supplementation) would probably be the best candidate. However, my own view (see n.5 & n.14 above) is that post-McGinnian new conceptions of bodily action, drawing on these Continental thinkers and others, end up saying too much. They speak beyond the ‘limits’ of which Wittgenstein speaks. That is why I regard my approach here as building on the insights of Hegel, Merleau-Ponty, Symbolic Interactionism etc. ... but as beyond these, in virtue of its greater austerity.

The second article was, although I am sure credible, not something I wanted to spend much time on as I am reasonably familiar with Wittgenstein, and more so when it comes to sciences. From a purely practicle point of view I know that I can't do Wittgenstinian approach to this essay as my department (at least in these modules) treat it as a bit of a cop out. The essay I am doing is only short, so in order to establish such a view would largely neglect anything which would suggest a specific understanding of MP's approach. I do love Wittgenstein, but because his work is a core module at the start of second year here, he has to be used sparingly.

The third one I couldn't get to work, but I am following up a citation from the first which sounds promising so thanks :)

As for the use of 'mind' I am not certain that he does in any technical sense, except when he is denying other accounts which invoke this term. I cannot be anywhere near certain of this, but I didn't see it come up when flicking through my text just now. I only meant it in the colloquial sense in my description above.

Also, I felt that the passage offered was a bit harsh, as it neglects the arguments put foward by MP. I am not even sure where that is from because I don't remember seeing it. If you cut to the final anaysis or conclusion of anything then you can call it a-priori and dogmatic. Again, although I am not accepting MP, his project was basically that the current way of viewing things was completely fucked (which is something I think we all agree on). Instead of a wait and see approach, which I accept is acceptable (but only if someone else doesn't wait and see), MP suggest a paradigm shift to move away from the mess of crap that was and is psychology and the mind body problem. It is fine to state that it is flawed, and to place little to no belief in it, but that is not helpful for those engaged in the study of this subject. If we do want to make progress in this area, then it will be by people engaged in destroying misconceptions, and suggesting new approaches (as MP does), it will not be achieved by a prima facie rejection of any attempt offer a new analysis.

RD:
but it seems that MP notion of motility in the phenomenology of perception sits somewhat as an empty placeholder for freedom. I don't remember him specifically addressing what it was or how it operates except as a ground for human "freedom." To be fair, it's been a while since I've read MP, but that struck me as one of the largest critiques of him.
Like I said, I am barely half way through this course, so my knowledge is far from comprehensive.....

However, I do know that MP denies freedom in a radical Sartrean sense. Saying that I don't read him as particuarly deterministic (as of yet) because the ability to reckon with the possible seems to imply at least some freedom. That said, he definitely denies Sartre's view that we can always alter the projects we are engagen in.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well,I do not want to get dragged into this, since this way of doing philosophy puts me to sleep faster than any randomly selected speech by Neil Kinnock.

And yes, one of those papers is rather positive about MP, but not every Wittgensteinian is as hard core as yours truly. I still favour the incendiary approach...http://www.mysmiley.net/imgs/smile/fighting/fighting0066.gif

So, I do not propose to post any more in this thread (unless, that is, RD replies to me).

Tough luck, though, finding yourself in such a department. But, it is no surprise to me to see confirmed yet again Marx's view that the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling class. Which Uni are you at?