@nti-dialectics Made Easy -- Thread Two

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

EDIT The immensely popular first thread Rosa started but went over the 500 post limit. This is the second thread continued from this. (http://www.revleft.com/vb/nti-dialectics-made-t67725/index.html)

Unfortunately, the original thread has been closed!

In 2006, a handful of comrades asked me to publish an Essay that made my objections to dialectical materialism more accessible to the absolute beginner.

Well, here it is.

Recall, this Essay is confined to very basic ideas (all of which are greatly expanded upon at my site). Many of the links I included to other sites on the internet that develop or explain some of the details more fully have been omitted from this copy -- on that, see the end.

Abbreviations used

DM = Dialectical Materialism; HM = Historical Materialism; NON = Negation of the Negation; UO = Unity of Opposites; FL = Formal Logic.

-----------------------

Logic

Dialecticians tell fibs about FL; indeed, they regularly say things like this:


"Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless." [Rob Sewell.]

"Formal categories, putting things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and development…because a static definition cannot cope with the way in which a new content emerges from old conditions." [Rees (1998), p.59.]However, I have yet to see a single quotation from a logic text (ancient or modern) that supports such allegations -- certainly dialecticians have so far failed to produce even one.

And no wonder: it is completely incorrect.

Indeed, Formal Logic uses variables -- that is, it employs letters to stand for named objects, designated expressions (some of these are called "predicates"), and the like -- all of which can and do change.

This handy device was invented by the very first logician we know of (in the West): Aristotle (384-322BC). He experimented with variables approximately 1500 years before the same tactic was extended into mathematics by Muslim Algebraists -- who in turn used them several centuries before René Descartes (1596-1650) began employing them in the 'West'.

However, Engels said the following about that particular innovation:


"The turning point in mathematics was Descartes' variable magnitude. With that came motion and hence dialectics in mathematics, and at once, too, of necessity the differential and integral calculus…." [Engels (1954), p.258.]No one doubts that modern mathematics can handle change, so why dialecticians deny this of FL is something of a mystery.

With very little variation between them, dialecticians also like to assert things like the following:


"The basic laws of formal logic are:

1) The law of identity ('A' = 'A').

2) The law of contradiction ('A' does not equal 'not-A').

3) The law of the excluded middle ('A' does not equal 'B')." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.91. Quotation marks have been altered to conform to the conventions adopted at my site.]Even a cursory examination of a handful of logic texts will show that not only are the above claims incorrect, but not even Aristotle's logic was based on these so-called 'laws'!

Sure, dialecticians claim that Aristotle founded his logic on such principles, but they have yet to produce the evidence. In fact, Aristotle knew nothing of the 'Law of Identity' [LOI], which was a medieval invention.

The LOI will be examined presently, but the 'Law of Contradiction' [LOC] merely says that if one proposition is true then its negation is false, and vice versa -- or, in some versions found in mathematical logic, it says that no contradiction can be true, but must be false. The LOC says nothing about "equality", or the lack of it.

The criticism advanced above by Woods and Grant, and by most other dialecticians, is in fact a descendant of ideas put forward by Hegel (1770-1831), who committed a series of logical blunders which dialecticians have, even to this day, failed to notice. But these errors are the only way that Hegel's 'system' can be made to seem to work.

[His ideas are destructively analysed here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm). A far easier summary of this material can be found here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm).]

In that case, the 'logic' underlying 'Materialist Dialectics' was bogus from the start.

Likewise, the 'Law of Excluded Middle' [LEM] says nothing about objects being identical, or otherwise, merely that any proposition has to be either true or false; there is no third option.

[Some claim that Quantum Mechanics [QM], among other things, has refuted this 'law', but QM has merely forced us to reconsider what we should count as a scientific proposition.]

Contrary to what we are often told, this 'law' does not deny change, nor is it incapable of handling it. Indeed, we are only capable of studying change if we are clear about what is or is not true about whatever is changing.

The LOI is equally badly handled in DM-texts; this is because dialecticians have unwisely copied the above errors from Hegel's Logic. [On that, see here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm).]

The basic idea behind the hackneyed criticism of the LOI seems to be this:


"There are three fundamental laws of formal logic. First and most important is the law of identity. This law can be stated in various ways such as: A thing is always equal to or identical with itself. In algebraic terms: A equals A.

"...If a thing is always and under all conditions equal to or identical with itself, it can never be unequal to or different from itself. This conclusion follows logically and inevitably from the law of identity. If A equals A, it can never equal non-A." [Novack (1971), p.20.]Unfortunately, this is incorrect. The LOI does not preclude change, for if an object changes, then anything identical to it will change equally quickly. Moreover, if a thing changes, it will no longer be identical with its former self.

So, far from denying change, this 'law' allows us to determine if and when it has occurred.

These criticisms now remove the main motivating point of Dialectical Logic. Hegel's system is based on a series of logical blunders, and hence, so is 'Materialist Dialectics'. Small wonder then that when it has been tested in practice, practice has refuted it.

Motion

According to Hegel, motion is 'contradictory'; unfortunately, dialecticians have bought into this rather odd idea, too.

Almost as if they are singing from the same hymn sheet, they like to argue alongside Engels as follows:


"...[A]s soon as we consider things in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another[,] [t]hen we immediately become involved in contradictions. Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place can only come about through a body at one and the same moment of time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous assertion and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is." [Engels (1976), p.152.]This is an age-old confusion derived from a paradox invented by an Ancient Greek thinker called Zeno (490?-430?BC).

As seems obvious, all objects (which are not mathematical points) actually occupy several places at once. So, for example, while you are sat reading this Essay, your body is not compressed into a tiny point!

Hence, material bodies can be in one place and in another, in the first but not wholly in the second, at the same time, and stationary all the while.

For example, a car could be parked half in, half out of a garage. Here the car is in one and the same place and not in it, and it is in two places at once (in the garage and in the yard), even while it is at rest relative to a suitable frame of reference.

In that case, this 'contradiction' does not distinguish moving from stationary bodies. So, this alleged contradiction has more to do with linguistic ambiguity than it has with anything in material reality.

Any attempt to circumvent this objection with the counter-claim that moving objects occupy regions of space equal to their own volumes (hence a moving object will occupy two of these regions at the same time, occupying and not occupying each at once) cannot work either. This is because such a re-description would clearly depict a moving body occupying a region greater than its own volume -- in which case, such objects would not so much move as expand!

Worse still, Engels's account depicts objects moving between locations outside of time (that is, with time not having advanced an instant), otherwise the said objects could not be in two places at once. This is impossible to reconcile with a materialist (or even with a comprehensible) view of nature.

Finally, as noted above, this 'contradiction' was created by notorious ambiguities in Zeno's (and thus in Hegel and Engels's) use of certain words (like "moment", "move", and "place"), which means that when these have been resolved, the alleged 'contradiction' simply disappears. [This is carried out here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2005.htm).]

DM: Imposed On Nature

Has dialectics been read from nature, or imposed on it?

It seems the former must be correct, since we regularly encounter these seemingly modest disclaimers in the writings of dialecticians:


"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Engels (1976), p.13. However, the on-line translation uses "building...into" in place of "superimposing".]Why is this important? As dialecticians themselves admit, the reading of certain doctrines into reality is a hallmark of Idealism and dogmatism. If DM is to live up to its materialist credentials, its theorists must take care to avoid doing this.

As, George Novack points out:


"A consistent materialism cannot proceed from principles which are validated by appeal to abstract reason, intuition, self-evidence or some other subjective or purely theoretical source. Idealisms may do this. But the materialist philosophy has to be based upon evidence taken from objective material sources and verified by demonstration in practice...." [Novack (1965), p.17.]Here is Communist Party theoretician, Maurice Cornforth:


"Marxism, therefore, seeks to base our ideas of things on nothing but the actual investigation of them, arising from and tested by experience and practice. It does not invent a 'system' as previous philosophers have done, and then try to make everything fit into it…." [Cornforth (1976), p.15.]However, when we examine what dialecticians actually do, as opposed to what they say they do, we find that the exact opposite is the case. For example, Engels himself went on to claim the following of motion:


"Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, nor can there be…. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; as the older philosophy (Descartes) expressed it, the quantity of motion existing in the world is always the same. Motion therefore cannot be created; it can only be transmitted…." [Engels (1976), p.74. Bold emphasis alone added.]Had this observation been derived from the facts available in Engels's day (a policy to which he had just sworn allegiance), he would have expressed himself perhaps as follows:


"Evidence so far suggests that motion is what we call "the mode of existence of matter". Never anywhere has matter without motion been observed, but it is too early to say if this must always be the case…. Matter without motion is not inconceivable, nor is motion without matter, we just haven't witnessed either yet…." [Re-vamped version of Engels (1976), p.74.]

As is easy to demonstrate, all dialecticians do the same (the evidence for this can be found here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm)). First, they disarm the reader with the 'modest' sorts of claims we saw rehearsed above; then, sometimes on the same page, or even in the very next sentence, they proceed to do the exact opposite, imposing dialectics on nature.

Why they do this (and what significance it has) will be examined below.

Traditional Thought

In the West, since Ancient Greek times, traditional theorists have been imposing their theories on nature (as Cornforth noted, above). This practice is so widespread, and has penetrated into thought so deeply, that no one notices it, even after it has been pointed out to them. Or, rather, they fail to see its significance. [More on that below, too.]

Now, if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought. As is well-known, this tactic has been used for millennia; hence we have Theology and other assorted ruling-class ideologies. All of these were imposed on reality (plainly, since they cannot be read from it).

Indeed, this is how Marx depicted things:


"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it...."[The German Ideology.]However, as Marx also noted, members of the ruling-class often rely on other layers in society to concoct the ideas they use to try to con the rest of us into accepting their system.

In Ancient Greece, with the demise of the rule of Kings and Queens, the old Theogonies [i.e., stories about the 'gods'] and myths were no longer relevant. So, in the newly emerging republics and quasi-democracies of the Sixth Century BC, far more abstract, de-personalised ideas were needed.

Enter Philosophy.

From its inception, Philosophers constructed increasingly complex and abstract systems of thought. These were invariably based on arcane terminology, impossible to translate into the material language of everyday life -- which they then happily imposed on nature.

As Marx also noted:


"...The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels (1970), p.118.]Philosophers felt they could do this, since, for them, nature was Mind (or, indeed, the product of Mind). In that case, the human mind could safely project its thoughts onto reality --, of which true thoughts were a reflection, anyway. "As above, so below", went the old Hermetic (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermeticism) saying. The microcosm (the inner world of thought) reflected the macrocosm (outer reality). This doctrine of Correspondences (as it was called) thus came to dominate all ancient and modern theories of knowledge -- in which case, all true, 'philosophical' knowledge corresponded with 'essences' that underpinned the world of experience. These 'essences' were impossible to detect in any way whatsoever (meaning that the 'uneducated' could not raise any doubts as to their existence), and were accessible by thought alone.

All this was based on the idea that language was a secret code by means of which each thinker (with the 'right sort of education' and class position, of course) could represent the 'Mind of God', or the underlying 'secrets' of nature, to him/herself. Language was thus viewed as a representational device (which was later interpreted individualistically, ad each lone theorist represetned reality to herself/himself) -- and not a means of communication created by collective labour (as Marx and Engels had argued).

Naturally, this view of discourse had profound ideological implications connected with the legitimation of class power. [More on this below.]

This ancient tradition has changed many times throughout history, as different Modes of Production rose and fell, but its main strategy and core rationale remained basically the same: the dogmatic promulgation of abstract theories that were said to reveal the underlying rational structure of reality, conveniently hidden away from the disconfirming gaze of working people -- which is why they were, and still are, inexpressible in ordinary language --, again, as Marx noted. [More on this below, as well.]

So, just like Theology, but in this case in a far more abstract and increasingly secularised form, subsequent philosophies came to reflect the 'essential' structure of reality, one that supposedly underpinned and rationalised alienated class society, mystified now by the use of increasingly baroque terminology and technical jargon.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, modern dialectics was invented by a quintessentially Idealist Philosopher working in this tradition (Hegel), and it was appropriated by Marxist classicists before the working class could provide a materialist counter-weight. DM was thus born out of Idealism, and, as we will see, it has never really escaped from its clutches -- despite the materialist flip dialecticians claim to have inflicted upon it.

And that is why dialecticians happily impose their ideas on nature: because it is traditional to do so. Moreover, since their theories are based on ancient and idealised abstractions, they plainly cannot be derived from the non-abstract material world, but must be read into it.

But, in doing this dialecticians are (unwittingly) identifying themselves with a tradition that was not built by working people and which does not serve their interests.

Furthermore, since dialectics is not based on material reality it cannot be used to help change it.

Small wonder then that it has failed our movement for so long.

Hence, for all their claim to be radical, DM-theorists are thoroughly conservative when they try to philosophise.

Indeed, despite the fact that DM-theorists appear to be challenging traditional ideas, their practice reveals they are part of a tradition that is quite happy to derive fundamental truths about nature from thought alone, just as ruling-class theorists have always done.

The 'Laws' of Dialectics

This age-old tactic (of imposing theses onto nature) can be seen if we examine the use made of Engels's so-called 'Three Laws of Dialectics':


"Dialectics as the science of universal inter-connection. Main laws: transformation of quantity into quality -- mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes -- development through contradiction or negation of the negation -- spiral form of development." [Engels (1954), p.17.]All dialecticians (i.e., the majority accept these 'Laws') impose them on nature (the evidence for this can be found here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm) and here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm)). What little data dialecticians supply to substantiate these 'Laws' is not only woefully insufficient, it is highly contentious -- [I]to say the least.

Anyone who has studied and practiced genuine science will know the lengths to which researchers have to go to alter even minor aspects of current theory, let alone justify major changes in the way we view nature.

In stark contrast, and without exception, dialecticians offer a few paragraphs of trite (and over-used) clichés to support their claims. Hence, all we find are hackneyed references to things like boiling water, balding heads, plants 'negating' seeds, Mamelukes fighting the French, a character from Molière suddenly discovering that he speaks prose, and the like, all constantly retailed. From such banalities, dialecticians suddenly derive universal laws, applicable everywhere and at all times.

Even at its best (for example, in Woods and Grant (1995), which is one of the most comprehensive defences of classical, hard-core DM to date, and in Gollobin (1986), which is in fact an up-market version of Woods and Grant), all we encounter are perhaps a few dozen pages of secondary and tertiary information, extensively padded out with repetition and bluster (much of which is taken apart here). Contrary evidence (of which there is much) is simply ignored. This is indeed Mickey Mouse Science.

In many ways, this endeavour to substantiate Engels's 'Laws' resembles Creationist attempts to show that the Book of Genesis is correct: it is heavily slanted, repetitive, selective and contentious.

The First 'Law', the alleged change of quantity into quality, ignores the many cases in nature where change is not "nodal":


"Hegel invented the nodal line of measure relations, in which small quantitative changes at a certain point give rise to a qualitative leap. The example is often given of water, which boils at 100oC at normal atmospheric pressure. As the temperature nears boiling point, the increase in heat does not immediately cause the water molecules to fly apart. Until it reaches boiling point, the water keeps its volume. It remains water, because of the attraction of the molecules for each other. However, the steady change in temperature has the effect of increasing the motion of the molecules. The volume between the atoms is gradually increased, to the point where the force of attraction is insufficient to hold the molecules together. At precisely 100oC, any increase in heat energy will cause the molecules to fly apart, producing steam." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.49.]But, not everything in nature changes in this way; consider melting glass, metal, rock, butter and plastic. No nodal points anywhere in sight, here. Do Woods and Grant (or any other DM-theorists) consider these counter-examples? Are you kidding? [More details here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm).]

And not every change in quality is produced by quantitative differences (contrary to what Engels said):


"...the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned." [Engels (1954), p.63.]There are in fact countless changes in quality that are not determined in this way. For example, there are certain molecules that have exactly the same material content and energy level as one another, but are qualitatively dissimilar because of the different spatial arrangement of their constituent atoms. These are called 'Stereoisomers'. [More examples here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm).]

So, here we have a change in quality produced by change in geometry.

Other qualitative changes in nature and society can be produced by different timing or by a different ordering of the relevant events -- or even by altering their context.[Again, examples are given here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm).]

Moreover, this 'Law' only appears to work because of the vague way that both "quantity" and "quality" have been characterised by DM-theorists. In fact, they seldom if ever bother to define these terms.

Can you imagine this happening in genuine science?

This allows DM-theorists to see changes in quality 'caused' by changes in quantity whenever and wherever they please, just as it 'permits' them to ignore the many cases where this does not happen, introducing an element of subjectivity into what is supposed to be an 'objective law'.

The other 'Laws' fare no better. Change though 'internal contradiction' will be examined in the next sub-section, but the "Negation of the Negation" [NON] depends for its 'plausibility' on the confusion of linguistic with material categories in a thoroughly traditional manner. [Again, more details here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm).]

Hence, solely on the basis that we have a negative particle in language, it is assumed that negation is a real process in nature. On that basis, of course, one would be justified in believing in Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy.

Indeed, since the veracity of the NON depends on the truth of the second 'Law', it is to that I now turn.

Internal Contradictions

Mechanical materialism holds that all things are set in motion by an external 'push' of some sort. In contrast, dialecticians claim that because of their 'internal contradictions', objects and processes in nature and society are "self-moving".

Lenin expressed this idea as follows:


"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites. The two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable?) conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal relation).

"In the first conception of motion, self-movement, its driving force, its source, its motive, remains in the shade (or this source is made external -- God, subject, etc.). In the second conception the chief attention is directed precisely to knowledge of the source of 'self-movement'.

"The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is living. The second alone furnishes the key to the 'self-movement' of everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to the 'leaps,' to the 'break in continuity,' to the 'transformation into the opposite,' to the destruction of the old and the emergence of the new." [Lenin (1961), pp.357-58.]There are a number of serious problems with this passage, not the least of which is that it clearly suggests that things are self-moving. In fact, Lenin did more than just suggest this, he insisted upon it:


"Dialectical logic demands that we go further…. [It] requires that an object should be taken in development, in 'self-movement' (as Hegel sometimes puts it)…." [Lenin (1921), p.90.]Other Marxists talk the same way; here are comrades Woods and Grant (readers will note, I am sure, how they happily impose this doctrine on nature):


"Dialectics explains that change and motion involve contradiction and can only take place through contradictions.... Dialectics is the logic of contradiction....

"So fundamental is this idea to dialectics that Marx and Engels considered motion to be the most basic characteristic of matter.... [Referring to a quote from Aristotle] [t]his is not the mechanical conception of motion as something imparted to an inert mass by an external 'force' but an entirely different notion of matter as self-moving....

"The essential point of dialectical thought is not that it is based on the idea of change and motion but that it views motion and change as phenomena based on contradiction.... Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the unity and interpenetration of opposites....

"The universal phenomena of the unity of opposites is, in reality, the motor-force of all motion and development in nature. It is the reason why it is not necessary to introduce the concept of external impulse to explain movement and change -- the fundamental weakness of all mechanistic theories. Movement, which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"...Matter is self-moving and self-organising." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-45, 47, 68, 72.]But, if this were so, nothing in nature would or could have any effect on anything else. Hence, while you might think that it is your kick that moves a ball, according to the above, the ball moves itself.

Now, in order to avoid such absurd consequences, some dialecticians have had to allow for the existence of "external contradictions", which are somehow also involved in such changes.

But, as seems obvious, this makes a mockery of the idea that all change is internally-generated, just as it undermines the contrast drawn above between mechanical and 'dialectical' theories of motion. Indeed, what becomes of Lenin's "insistence" if everything that changes in fact violates his rule?

Also, DM-theorists appeal to "internal contradictions" in order to undercut theism (there was a flavour of this too in the Woods and Grant quotation above); here is Cornforth:


"The second dogmatic assumption of mechanism is the assumption that no change can ever happen except by the action of some external cause.

"Just as no part of a machine moves unless another part acts on it and makes it move, so mechanism sees matter as being inert -- without motion, or rather without self-motion. For mechanism, nothing ever moves unless something else pushes or pulls is, it never changes unless something else interferes with it.

"No wonder that, regarding matter in this way, the mechanists had to believe in a Supreme Being to give the "initial push"....

"No, the world was not created by a Supreme Being. Any particular organisation of matter,* any particular process of matter in motion, has an origin and a beginning.... But matter in motion had no origin, no beginning....

"So in studying the causes of change, we should not merely seek for external causes of change, but should above all seek for the source of change within the process itself, in its own self-movement, in the inner impulses to development contained in things themselves." [Cornforth (1976), pp.40-43.]But, if external causes are now permitted, in order to stop this theory becoming absurd (as we saw above), then that will simply allow 'god' to sneak back in through a side door.

Of course, all this is independent of whether or not it makes sense to say that anything in nature or society can be described as a "contradiction". Dialecticians, following Hegel, certainly believe they can, but up until now they have merely been content to assert this for a fact, forgetting the proof. Hegel's authority -- that of an Idealist -- is sufficient apparently. And it is worth recalling that Hegels' use of this term was based on a crass piece of sub-Aristotelian logic.

But even if all objects and processes in fact possessed "internal contradictions", exactly as DM-theorists suppose, this would still not explain why anything actually moved or changed.

In fact, as is easy to confirm, dialecticians have been hopelessly unclear as to:

(1) Whether things change because of their internal contradictions (and/or opposites), or

(2) Whether they change into these opposites, or, indeed,

(3) Whether they create such opposites when they change.

Of course, if the third option were the case, the alleged opposites could not cause change, since they would be produced by it, not the other way round. Moreover, they could scarcely be 'internal opposites' if they were produced by change.

If the second alternative were correct, then we would see things like males naturally turning into females, the working class into the capitalist class, electrons into protons, left hands into right hands, and vice versa, and a host of other oddities. [On this, see here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm). Use the 'Quick Links' to go to the 'Dialectics Cannot Explain Change' section.]

And as far as the first option is concerned, it is worth making the following points:

[1] If objects/processes change because of already existing internal opposites, and they change into these opposites, then plainly they cannot change, since those opposites must already exist.

So, if object/process A is already composed of a dialectical union of A and not-A, and it 'changes' into not-A, where then is the change? All that would seem to happen here is that A disappears. [And do not ask where it disappears to!]

At the very least, this account of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-A itself came about. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere.

[It cannot have come from A, since A can only change because of the operation of not-A, which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past will merely reduplicate this problem.]

[2] Exactly how an (internal) opposite is capable of making anything change is left somewhat unclear, too. Given the above, not-A does not actually alter A, it merely replaces it!

[This argument is worked out in greater detail here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm), where several obvious objections are neutralised. Once more, use the 'Quick Links' to go the 'Dialectics Cannot Explain Change' section.]

Now, in order to answer such questions, dialecticians have appealed to forces (of attraction and repulsion) to explain how and why these obscure 'contradictions' are capable of actually moving bits of matter about the place.

Unfortunately, the nature of forces is a mystery even to this day; this is one reason why scientists have abandoned them, preferring to talk about exchange of energy and momentum instead.

Of course, in popular and school physics, people still talk about forces, but since there is no way of giving them any sort of physical sense (other than as part of a vector field, etc.), advanced physics translates forces in the way indicated in the previous paragraph. Indeed, in Relativity Theory, the 'force' of gravity has been replaced by the movement of objects along "geodesics".

Even Woods and Grant concede this point:


"Gravity is not a 'force,' but a relation between real objects. To a man falling off a high building, it seems that the ground is 'rushing towards him.' From the standpoint of relativity, that observation is not wrong. Only if we adopt the mechanistic and one-sided concept of 'force' do we view this process as the earth's gravity pulling the man downwards, instead of seeing that it is precisely the interaction of two bodies upon each other." [Woods and Grant (1995), p.156.]However, Woods and Grant failed to tell us how such a "relation" can make anything move; still less do they reveal how these items are 'opposites', let alone 'internal opposites'.

As physicist Max Jammer notes:


"[The eliminability of force]...is not confined to the force of gravitation. The question of whether forces of any kind do exist, or do not and are only conventions, ha[s] become the subject of heated debates....

"In quantum chromodynamics, gauge theories, and the so-called Standard Model the notion of 'force' is treated only as an exchange of momentum and therefore replaced by the ontologically less demanding concept of 'interaction' between particles, which manifests itself by the exchange of different particles that mediate this interaction...." [Jammer (1999), p.v.]This is re-iterated by Nobel prize winner, Professor Wilzcek (of MIT):


"The paradox deepens when we consider force from the perspective of modern physics. In fact, the concept of force is conspicuously absent from our most advanced formulations of the basic laws. It doesn't appear in Schrödinger's equation, or in any reasonable formulation of quantum field theory, or in the foundations of general relativity. Astute observers commented on this trend to eliminate force even before the emergence of relativity and quantum mechanics.

"In his 1895 Dynamics, the prominent physicist Peter G. Tait, who was a close friend and collaborator of Lord Kelvin and James Clerk Maxwell, wrote

"'In all methods and systems which involve the idea of force there is a leaven of artificiality...there is no necessity for the introduction of the word 'force' nor of the sense−suggested ideas on which it was originally based.'"This is probably why Engels himself said the following:


"When two bodies act on each other…they either attract each other or they repel each other…in short, the old polar opposites of attraction and repulsion…. It is expressly to be noted that attraction and repulsion are not regarded here as so-called 'forces', but as simple forms of motion." [Engels (1954), p.71. Bold emphasis added.]But, if there are no classical forces, then there can't be any (dialectical) contradictions in nature --, 'external' or 'internal' (or, at least, none that could make anything happen).

Hence, even if there were such 'contradictions' in nature, they would do no work, and DM, the erstwhile philosophy of change, would not be able to account for it!

Faced with this, some DM-apologists have tried to argue that modern science is either dominated by 'positivism', or is 'reactionary'. In other words, to save their theory, they are prepared to cling on to an animistic view of nature, one that even Engels was ready to abandon.

[However, this is a complex issue; for more details I can only refer the reader to my extensive discussion here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm).]

Totality

Dialecticians believe that everything is interconnected:


"Dialectics is the science of universal interconnections…." [Engels (1954), p.17.]

"Nothing exists or can exist in splendid isolation, separate from its conditions of existence, independent from its relationships with other things…. When things enter into such relationships that they become parts of a whole, the whole cannot be regarded as nothing more than the sum total of the parts…. [W]hile it may be said that the whole is determined by the parts it may equally be said that the parts are determined by the whole….

"Dialectical materialism understands the world, not as a complex of ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which all things go through an uninterrupted change of coming into being and passing away....

"Dialectical materialism considers that…things come into being, change and pass out of being, not as separate individual units, but in essential relation and interconnection, so that they cannot be understood each separately and by itself but only in their relation and interconnection….

"The dialectical method demands first, that we should consider things, not each by itself, but always in their interconnections with other things…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.46-48, 72.]Readers are invited to check, but we are never told what this "Totality" actually is! [More details here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011_01.htm).]

This is, of course, a doctrine that dialecticians share with all known mystical systems of thought (see, for example, here and here). As Glenn Magee notes:


"Another parallel between Hermeticism and Hegel is the doctrine of internal relations. For the Hermeticists, the cosmos is not a loosely connected, or to use Hegelian language, externally related set of particulars. Rather, everything in the cosmos is internally related, bound up with everything else.... This principle is most clearly expressed in the so-called Emerald Tablet of Hermes Trismegistus, which begins with the famous lines "As above, so below." This maxim became the central tenet of Western occultism, for it laid the basis for a doctrine of the unity of the cosmos through sympathies and correspondences between its various levels. The most important implication of this doctrine is the idea that man is the microcosm, in which the whole of the macrocosm is reflected.

"...The universe is an internally related whole pervaded by cosmic energies." [Magee (2001), p.13.]But, the vast majority of mystical systems account for change by appealing to unities of interpenetrating opposites. Consider these examples:


"The Taoists saw all changes in nature as manifestations of the dynamic interplay between the polar opposites yin and yang, and thus they came to believe that any pair of opposites constitutes a polar relationship where each of the two poles is dynamically linked to the other. For the Western mind, this idea of the implicit unity of all opposites is extremely difficult to accept. It seems most paradoxical to us that experiences and values which we had always believed to be contrary should be, after all, aspects of the same thing. In the East, however, it has always been considered as essential for attaining enlightenment to go 'beyond earthly opposites,' and in China the polar relationship of all opposites lies at the very basis of Taoist thought." [Fritjof Capra.]

"Buddhist enlightenment consists simply in knowing the secret of the unity of opposites -- the unity of the inner and outer worlds....

"Hindus envision the cosmic process as the growth of one mighty organism, the self-actualization of divinity which contains within itself all opposites."

"Sufism is usually associated with Islam. It has developed Bhakti to a high point with erotic imagery symbolising the unity of opposites. The subtle anatomy and microcosm-macrocosm model also found in Tantra and Taoism is used by it, dressed in its own symbols. Certain orders use ecstatic music and/or dance which reminds one of the Tantric celebration of the senses. Sometimes, the union of opposites is seen as a kind of gnosis. This is similar to Jnani Yoga."

"The great Fourth Hermetic Principle-the Principle of Polarity-embodies the truth that all manifested things have "two sides"; "two aspects"; "two poles"; a "pair of opposites," with manifold degrees between the two extremes. The old paradoxes, which have ever perplexed the mind of men, are explained by an understanding of this Principle. Man has always recognized something akin to this Principle, and has endeavoured to express it by such sayings, maxims and aphorisms as the following: "Everything is and isn't, at the same time"; "all truths are but half-truths"; "every truth is half-false"; "there are two sides to everything"; "there is a reverse side to every shield," etc., etc. The Hermetic Teachings are to the effect that the difference between things seemingly diametrically opposed to each is merely a matter of degree. It teaches that "the pairs of opposites may be reconciled," and that "thesis and antithesis are identical in nature, but different in degree''; and that the ''universal reconciliation of opposites" is effected by a recognition of this Principle of Polarity...." [This is from The Kybalion, reputed by some to be the third most important book of Hermeticism.][Links to where these were taken from can be found at my site; see the end.]

It would not be difficult to extend this list indefinitely to establish the fact that practically every mystic who has ever walked the earth thinks 'dialectically'.

Once again: the ruling ideas are always those of the ruling-class.

[Notice, too, how both the arguments and examples used by the above mystics are broadly similar to those found in DM-texts. Mystics, it seems, also use Mickey Mouse science to support their 'theories'.

Why both types of mystics (i.e., the traditional sort and dialectical variety) do this is explained in Essay Nine Part Two (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_01.htm).]

However, the only obvious difference between these overt mystics and the covert Dialectical-Marxist Tendency lies in the extent to which the former employ openly religious language. Even so, both are quite happy to use obscure jargon lifted from traditional Philosophy, and then impose the results on nature.

Nevertheless, and on a different tack, exactly how Dialectical Marxists know that everything is interconnected they have kept annoyingly to themselves (save the excuse that they pinched this idea from Hegel, who likewise copied it from his mystical forebears).

And it is no use dialecticians appealing to modern Physics to support this idea; the latter merely hypothesises that everything was once connected (in the alleged 'Big Bang'), not that everything is now interconnected. Indeed, certain theoretical considerations suggest that most things cannot even be connected, let alone be interconnected.



Moreover, the BBT is associated with the 'Block View'* of time (wherein everything is part of a four-dimensional manifold); in such a set-up nothing changes. Or, rather, change is no more than a subjective view of how things seem to alter. So, given this theory, objective reality is in fact changeless. In that case, this aspect of modern Physics is no friend of DM. [More on this here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011_01.htm) and here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011%2002.htm).]

[And an appeal to "Quantum Entanglement" cannot help either; at best, experimental evidence shows that certain states of matter are interlinked locally, not across billions of light years, nor indeed with the past. This is quite apart from the fact that there are Scientific Realists who question the validity of this anti-realist aspect of modern Physics.]

But, even if DM-theorists were correct, the thesis of universal interconnection is incompatible with change through 'internal contradiction', for if all change is internally-induced then no object or process could be interconnected. Alternatively, if everything is interlinked, then interconnection can play no causal role in change (or change would not be the result of 'internal contradictions', once more).

Naturally, this would lead to the rather odd result that the Sun, for example, does not ripen fruit, it ripens itself!

Or, of course, if the Sun actually does the ripening, then that would not be the result of 'internal contradictions' in fruit.

We have already seen that DM-theorists try to get around this fatal consequence of their theory by appealing to both alternatives (i.e., on the one hand claiming/insisting that everything is a sealed unit --, and is thus "self-moving" --, while on the other, asserting that everything is interconnected, and thus 'full of holes' for external causes to sneak back in), which is a rather fitting 'contradiction' in itself.

Now, dialecticians are fond of pointing to the contradictions in other, rival and thus allegedly defective systems of thought (the evidence for this allegation can be found in Essay Eleven Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2011_01.htm)) as a reason for rejecting them, but the above contradiction is of such prodigious proportions that it dwarfs any they have so far found in rival theories. Indeed, it is bizarre enough to make the usual pronouncements of "peace freedom and democracy" --, which slip off the forked tongues of US imperialists just before they invade the next 'Third World' country to steal their wealth and install 'business-friendly' regimes --, look honest, straight-forward and true in comparison.

Think about it: how can everything be maximally-interconnected and causally isolated all at the same time? And, how is it possible for everything to be internally-driven yet externally-defined (or "mediated", to use the jargon) as part of a unified Totality?

[B]Practice

Is Marxism true? How can we tell? Dialecticians have a direct answer: the validity of revolutionary socialism must be tested in practice.

But, what if it turns out that in practice they themselves reject this criterion?

Indeed, but worse: what if it should turn out that practice has refuted Dialectical Marxism?

Do we abandon the criterion of practice as a test of truth, or bury our heads in the sand and hope no one notices?

Up until now DM-fans have opted for the latter strategy.

But, is this conclusion as hasty as it is unfair?

As we will see, it is neither of these.

In order to substantiate this latest allegation, we need to back-track a little.

Lenin asserted the following:


"From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice, -- such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality." [Lenin (1961), p.171.]He was, of course, merely underlining ideas that all dialecticians hold in common. Hence, in their view, it is not enough for Marxists to try to develop the right sort of theory to explain the world, their ideas must be tested and refined in practice if they are to succeed in changing society. Indeed, no theory could be 'correct', or 'objective', without an intimate, long-term and 'dialectical' connection with political activity -- or, at the very least, with some form of material practice.

Unfortunately, as hinted at earlier, the results of "practice" have not been too kind to Marxists of every stripe. Indeed, they have been even less kind to Trotskyists (comrades not known for their 'mass following').

And they are not alone; practice has not looked at all favourably on our side as a whole for close on a hundred years. All Four Internationals have failed (or have vanished), and the 1917 revolution has been reversed. Indeed, we are no nearer (and arguably much further away from) a workers' state now than Lenin was in 1918. Practically all of the former 'socialist' societies have collapsed (and not a single worker raised his or her hand in their defence). Even where avowedly Marxist parties can claim some sort of mass following, this is passive and electoral --, and those parties themselves have openly adopted reformism (despite the contrary-sounding rhetoric).

So, if truth is tested in practice, practice has delivered a rather clear verdict: "materialist dialectics" does not work, so it cannot be true.

But, when confronted with such disconcerting facts, dialecticians tend to respond in one or more of the following ways:

1) They flatly deny that Marxism has been an abject failure.

2) If they admit to failure, they blame it on "objective factors", or on other Marxist parties.

3) They simply ignore the problem. Or:

4) They say it is too early to tell.

Now, there doesn't seem to be much point in dialecticians claiming that their theory guides all they do, avowing that truth is tested in practice, if when that practice reveals its disappointing and long-term verdict, that verdict is denied, ignored or 'explained' away. In that event, what sort of practice could possibly constitute a test of dialectics if, whatever the results, DM is always excused/exonerated? What exactly is being tested if the results of every test are ignored or re-configured as a success?

Hence, dialectics is not so much not tested in practice, as dialecticians are practiced at not testing it.

Taking each excuse, one at a time:

1) Those who think Marxism is a ringing success have so far failed to show where and how it enjoys this blessed state. [Presumably there is a Workers' State on the outer fringes of the Galaxy?]

Hardcore denial of reality of this order of magnitude is difficult to counter -- just as it is difficult to counter Christian Scientists who claim that matter is the error of mortal mind; there is no debating with this sort of Idealism, one that re-interprets the material world to suit a comforting idea, and then buries its head in its own idea of sand.

Anyone who can look at the international situation and fail to see that the vast majority of workers have not been seized by Marxism (and never have been) is probably a danger to him/herself.

[This should not be taken to mean that I think that things cannot change!]

So, when Marx said:


"The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses." [Marx (1843), p.251; quoted from here.]the only conclusions possible are that either: 1) he was wrong, or 2) dialectics has not even so much as lightly hugged the masses.

[There is a more involved explanation for the selective blindness that afflicts revolutionaries in Essay Nine Part Two (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm).]

2) Certainly objective factors have hindered the revolutionary movement (such as a relatively well-organised, rich, powerful and focussed ruling-class, nationalism and sectionalism among workers, a growing economy, etc., etc.), but the above comrades were quite specific: the veracity of a theory can only be tested in practice, and since the latter requires the subjective input of active revolutionaries, this aspect of practice has badly failed.

Often revolutionaries recognise this, but they depict it as a failure of 'revolutionary leadership', failing to note the input of dialectics. But if this theory is as central to Marxism as these comrades believe, then DM cannot be unconnected with this long-term lack of success.

So, whether or not there have been 'objective factors', practice itself has refuted the subjective side of Marxism: dialectics.

Now, since the Essays at this site show that DM is not so much false as far too confused even to be assessed for its truth or falsity, the long-term failure of Marxism is no surprise. And since this theory arose from the brains of card-carrying ruling-class theorists (like Hegel), this is doubly no surprise.

3) This is probably the safest option for dialecticians to adopt: ignore the problem. It is certainly the best one that inadvertently helps preserve the interests of the ruling-class, since it prevents the serious theoretical problems our movement faces from being addressed, guaranteeing another century of failure.

Indeed, the bosses could not have designed a better theory to screw with our heads (and initiate a monumental waste of time as our best theorists try to grapple with Hegel's fluent Martian and make sense of it) if they tried.

All this is quite apart from the fact that practice cannot distinguish between a correct and an incorrect theory. Incorrect theories can often work (and they can do so for many centuries -- for example, Ptolemaic Astronomy was highly successful for over a thousand years, and it became increasingly accurate with age), and correct ones can fail (for example, Copernican Astronomy predicted stellar parallax, which failed to be observed until the 1838, after the work of Friedrich Bessel). [More examples of both are given in Essay Ten Part One (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%20010_01.htm).]

And even if this were not so, and success were indeed a criterion of truth, since there is as yet no socialist society on earth, we will only know if Marxism is correct after the event. So, this criterion cannot tell us whether Marxism is correct now. Indeed, the following declaration could come true:


"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes." [Marx and Engels (1848), pp.35-36. Bold emphasis added.]According to this, the "contending classes" could wipe each other out --, or at least the class war could result in the "common ruin" of both (which denouement is not easy to square with the NON). Of course, should that happen, it would declare all theories false (if, that is, the criterion that truth is tested in practice is itself correct -- and the way that dialecticians ignore the deliverances of practice suggests that even they do not accept this criterion, in practice).

[NON = Negation of the Negation.]

Unfortunately, pragmatic theories (like this one) are hostages to fortune; those who adhere to them should feign no surprise if history takes little note of their hermetically-compromised day-dreams, and delivers decade after decade of refutation.

There are other (and much better, materially-based) ways of confirming the validity of HM -- these will be explored in an Essay to be published later at the main site.

All this means that if we want our practice to be more successful, we will have to remove the theory that dropped our movement into this Hermetic quagmire: DM.

The above represents about 2/3rds of the following Essay (at my site):

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm

where more details (including references and links) can be found.

Further sections dealing with how 'materialist dialectics' has damaged Marxism and why dialecticians cling on to this failed theory like grim death have also been omitted.

I would greatly appreciate it if anyone thinks I have still not made things clear, that they tell me exactly where I have failed, and I will put it right, if it is my fault.

[In the original Essay, any the technical terms I have used are linked to dictionaries and internet sites where they are clearly explained.]

Incidentally, anyone who finds the above either too difficult or too long, shorter, easier versions can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Anti-D_For_Dummies%2001.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/disclaimer.htm

[Lord Hargreaves]

Nice one Rosa - this is the clearest summary of your views that I've seen so far. This thread should become a "stickie" so we can all refer back to it later!

Personally, as you know, I do think giving up all and every kind of dialectical thinking would be a mistake, but I would obviously need to offer some good arguments to justify such a position. I wish I had the time and the motivation needed to write (and do the necessary research for) a sufficient rebuttal of your essay, but I don't. I feel someone owes you at least something, given all the time you've put in

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks LH, but this has been available at my site (and here) since August 2006.

[It's the trimmed down version here, too.]

[benhur]

Great job, Rosa. Just a quick question. Are you related to bobkindles and Jacob Richter?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


Are you related to bobkindles and Jacob Richter?

Why do you ask?

[benhur]

BenHur:



Why do you ask?

Because I see the same intellectual superiority.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


Because I see the same intellectual superiority.

Ah, I see, you accept the 'law of identity', then?

[Hyacinth]

Because I see the same intellectual superiority.
Yes, that's right, because rejecting nonsense and falsehoods counts as intellectual elitism.

BenHur:
Ah, I see, you accept the 'law of identity', then?
:lol:

[Louise Michel]

Very interesting stuff Rosa - I suppose the obvious question is, what do you think is left of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky once you extract the DM?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Historical materialism.

[Louise Michel]

Historical materialism.


Okay, okay, but give me a link to where you explain this - I'd like to jump in at this point.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LM:


Okay, okay, but give me a link to where you explain this

Explain what? Historical materialism itself?

If so, the link would be to two books that are not in fact on-line, since I do not try to explain it.

[Louise Michel]

LM:
Explain what? Historical materialism itself?

If so, the link would be to two books that are not in fact on-line, since I do not try to explain it.

Well, I'd like to look at an explanation of historical materialism that makes sense to you so I can assess a DM-free view of the theory. At a theoretical level from the very little I've read I can see and sympathise with your view but, on the other hand, Trotsky did write an amazing and prescient analysis of German fascism despite being an adherent of DM, but I can see how his catastrophist/schematic view of world history led to the demise of the 4th International.

You see the problem - great analysis mixed with badly wrong predictions.

[Hyacinth]

Well, I'd like to look at an explanation of historical materialism that makes sense to you so I can assess a DM-free view of the theory. At a theoretical level from the very little I've read I can see and sympathise with your view but, on the other hand, Trotsky did write an amazing and prescient analysis of German fascism despite being an adherent of DM, but I can see how his catastrophist/schematic view of world history led to the demise of the 4th International.

You see the problem - great analysis mixed with badly wrong predictions.
If I might take a stab at this; Marx (and even then not really in Capital), as well as others who have followed him, made the unfortunate mistake of adopting Hegelian expressions to express concepts completely unrelated to the nonsense that Hegel was talking about (if one can call talking nonsense `talking'). So, for instance, `contradiction', when used in the sense of historical materialism, expressed not a contradiction in the logical sense, but rather asserts the existence of a conflict of interests between competing classes in a class system, and the resulting instability that this creates for the system itself (or something along such lines). In short, any Hegelian terminology in historical materialism can be replaced, salva veritate, with non-Hegelian expressions from science, perhaps from systems theory or the like. Historical materialism, therefore, is in no way dialectical.

An addendum: jettisoning the Hegelian terminology actually helps to clarify the concepts of historical materialism, and rids it of the confusions that are created by the Hegelian terminology. Thus, not only can the Hegelian terminology be replaced salva veritate (preserving truth), but attempting to artificially impose a dialectical reading of historical materialism reduces it to nonsense.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Louise:


Well, I'd like to look at an explanation of historical materialism that makes sense to you so I can assess a DM-free view of the theory. At a theoretical level from the very little I've read I can see and sympathise with your view but, on the other hand, Trotsky did write an amazing and prescient analysis of German fascism despite being an adherent of DM, but I can see how his catastrophist/schematic view of world history led to the demise of the 4th International.

I am not sure how dialectics helped Trotsky understand fascism. Historical Materialism [HM] did, though.

There is an excellent dialectic-free version of HM in Gerry Cohen's book 'Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence' -- that is, if you ignore his technological determinism and functionalism, and you suppliment his theory with the corrections you find in Alex Callinicos's 'Making History' (and if you ignore Alex's few weak gestures at dialectics and his theory of agency).

If I were to write a version of HM, that is where I would begin.

My sole concern at present, however, is to stem the flow of poison into Marxism (from this ruling-class theory) first -- if I can -- before this slowly dying patient can be helped to full recovery (if that is possible now we have let the working class down so much and for so long). That will take me another ten years at least -- and I have been at this for eleven years already.

-----------------

All I would add to Hyacithn's account is that there are plenty of words in ordinary language that can be put to use (and have already been put to use) in HM. So we do not need the gobbledygook that the dialectical classicists imported from Hegel and traditional philosophy.

------------------

Incidentally, Louise, you can find short, 5000 word summaries of my essays, here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/essay_sixteen%20Index.htm

[Hit The North]

An addendum: jettisoning the Hegelian terminology actually helps to clarify the concepts of historical materialism, and rids it of the confusions that are created by the Hegelian terminology.

Can you point us in the direction of a version of historical materialism which does this?

[Hit The North]

There is an excellent dialectic-free version of HM in Gerry Cohen's book 'Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence' -- that is, if you ignore his technological determinism and functionalism, and you suppliment his theory with the corrections you find in Alex Callinicos's 'Making History' (and if you ignore Alex's few weak gestures at dialectics and his theory of agency).Cohen's version of historical materialism is an abject failure and the reason it contains technological determinism and functionalism is because these are what he puts in place to cover the gaps left by the jettisoning of dialectic concepts. In fact it could be argued that Cohen's version is precisely what you get when the dialectic is removed.

Moreover, the fact that Callinicos's attempt to rescue it also suffers from a weak theory of agency, means that it is no help at all - as this is precisely what is wrong with Cohen's work.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Cohen's version of historical materialism is an abject failure and the reason it contains technological determinism and functionalism is because these are what he puts in place to cover the gaps left by the jettisoning of dialectic concepts. In fact it could be argued that Cohen's version is precisely what you get when the dialectic is removed.

Well, I'm afraid we'll need more than just your say-so to reject the Cohen/Callinicos theory (with the dialectics, the technological determinism and the functionalism removed).


Moreover, the fact that Callinicos's attempt to rescue it also suffers from a weak theory of agency, means that it is no help at all - as this is precisely what is wrong with Cohen's work.

Not so, HM does not need a theory of agency.

One thing for certain: if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.

I note you keep ignoring this fatal defect.

[Hit The North]

Not so, HM does not need a theory of agency.



Then what are human beings doing? Sitting around while history changes around them?

[Lord Hargreaves]

So, for instance, `contradiction', when used in the sense of historical materialism, expressed not a contradiction in the logical sense, but rather asserts the existence of a conflict of interests between competing classes in a class system, and the resulting instability that this creates for the system itself (or something along such lines).

I realise this is only an off-the-cuff summary of what you are trying to get at, which is why you qualify what you say with "or something along such lines" in brackets at the end. However, even given this, I still think I should criticise your choice of phrasing in your post

So, for instance, saying there is a "conflict of interests" between classes suggests we need a good lawyer to get us into ADR before we go to court and it gets serious. It suggests the contingency of the conflict, whereas the term "contradiction" already carries within it the idea of the structural necessity of class society under capitalism.

As well as this, you lose the idea that capitalism moves by and exists in its "contradictions", since the choice of the word "instability" suggests all this class conflict stuff is a snag that might be shaken out through planning - obviously the logic of Social Democracy

Just my 2 Cents


In short, any Hegelian terminology in historical materialism can be replaced, salva veritate, with non-Hegelian expressions from science, perhaps from systems theory or the like.

Undoubtedly true, of course.

The curious thing for me, though, is that while the anti-dialectics crusaders seem to believe the fate of Marxism (and the working classes) itself rests on whether one chooses to reject dialectics, the dialecticians have generally taken the developments in analytic philosophy, psychoanalysis, Critical Theory, and sociology generally etc. in their stride as an enrichment of a proud tradition. The difference in attitudes - you wish to begrudge us our dialectics and achieve some kind of intellectual purity, while we wish you all the best in developing HM however you see fit - is very noticable.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH, I notice you help yourself to the word 'contradiction' without explaining what this word means in such contexts, or how it is of any use at all in explaining change.

Moreover:


The curious thing for me, though, is that while the anti-dialectics crusaders seem to believe the fate of Marxism (and the working classes) itself rests on whether one chooses to reject dialectics, the dialecticians have generally taken the developments in analytic philosophy, psychoanalysis, Critical Theory, and sociology generally etc. in their stride as an enrichment of a proud tradition. The difference in attitudes - you wish to begrudge us our dialectics and achieve some kind of intellectual purity, while we wish you all the best in developing HM however you see fit - is very noticable.

And us genuine materialists could point a few fingers at you mystics, and accuse you of being a little too keen to preserve the Hermetic purity of the divine vision Hegel bequeathed to you ('upside down' or the 'right way up').

But, in the end, what use is such flowery language?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Then what are human beings doing? Sitting around while history changes around them?

See, even you didn't need a theory to tell you this. Nor does Marxism.

And you are still ignoring the fatal defect I keep bringing to your attention.

I suspect we all know why...

[Lord Hargreaves]

Cohen's version of historical materialism is an abject failure and the reason it contains technological determinism and functionalism is because these are what he puts in place to cover the gaps left by the jettisoning of dialectic concepts. In fact it could be argued that Cohen's version is precisely what you get when the dialectic is removed.

I largely agree, yes. But - in keeping with the spirit of my last post - I don't think we can call Cohen's effort "an abject failure". It is without doubt a work of genius and a classic of Marxist literature.

I think we can say that the version of historical materialism he sets out has too much of a bent toward technological determinism (I don't really see much wrong with functionalism tbh) because of the analytic, "rational choice" style of his reasoning. I don't really see how such a development could have been avoided using the particular tools avaliable. The work shows precisely the "Promethean" element in Marxism which Adorno and Horkheimer were so anxious to avoid when they wrote Dialectic of Enlightenment

Those arguing against the above thesis would also have to explain away G.A. Cohen's recent turn to Rawlsian egalitarianism as, not simply a natural progression, but some kind of radical paradigmic shift, akin to some kind of senile madness or loss of nerve on his part. That isn't a task I would like to take on, personally

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Those arguing against the above thesis would also have to explain away G.A. Cohen's recent turn to Rawlsian egalitarianism as, not simply a natural progression, but some kind of radical paradigmic shift, akin to some kind of senile madness or loss of nerve on his part. That isn't a task I would like to take on, personally

It is in fact a result of the fact that his version of 'Analytic Marxism' had too little Marx in it, and not enough Analytic Philosophy.

[Lord Hargreaves]

LH, I notice you help yourself to the word 'contradiction' without explaining what this word means in such contexts, or how it is of any use at all in explaining change.

Well, I could go into some vast explanation, but to be honest I think what I said is already fairly clear. I appreciate the way of "doing philosophy" you are schooled in, such as whenever you hear a new word you immediately want it defined, but I would say you could glean much of the meaning simply from the way the word is actually being used


And us genuine materialists could point a few fingers at you mystics, and accuse you of being a little too keen to preserve the Hermetic purity of the divine vision Hegel bequeathed to you ('upside down' or the 'right way up').

Do you realise you sound just like Ayn Rand when you go one about "mystics"? Sheesh. It's such an incredibly lazy insult, since it could be applied to just about anyone with whom one disagreed.

And your status as a "genuine materialist" has to be established by argument. Since the materialism we are all united around is historical materialism (that we need to study people's "material lives" to discover what drives history), I don't see how a philosophy inspired by a particular way of doing language analysis is necessarily more "materialist" than philosophy inspired by Kant and Hegel. The dichotomy between materialism and idealism is vastly overrated, imho

[Lord Hargreaves]

LH:
It is in fact a result of the fact that his version of 'Analytic Marxism' had too little Marx in it, and not enough Analytic Philosophy.

That doesn't really explain away my comment, which was that the commitment to the techniques of analytic (politcal) philosophy was the cause of his turn to liberal egalitarianism. What would you offer as an alternative - that Cohen turned to Rawls because he got bored with Marx after a lifetime of being a Marxist, or because he got wet feet in his old age, or what?

No, obviously it was none of these things, but was more to do with the fact that Cohen didn't think Marx up to the task (thus explaining why Analytic Marxism had "too little Marx in it")

A quick quote from the 2000 preface of Karl Marx's Theory of History:


Now, the commitment of analytical Marxists to the constitutive techniques of analytical Marxism is absolute: our belief in the power of analysis, both in its broad and narrow sense, is unrevisable. And our commitment to Marxist theses (as opposed to our commitment to socialist values) is not absolute in the way that the commitment to analytic technique is. The commitment to the techniques, so we should claim, reflects nothing less than a commitment to reason itself
[...]
Thus, in all our work, it is always Marxism, not analysis, that is in question, and analysis is used to question Marxism. The analytical Marxist impetus is, in the first instance, not to revise, but to defend inherited theory. But its defence often requires extensive reconstruction: inherited theory gets transformed when it is made to measure up to anaytical standards of criticism

(bold text is mine)

What would you have to say against G.A. Cohen's own words?

And... don't you think Cohen's views above kind-of sum up your own general outlook, Rosa? :p

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH:


Well, I could go into some vast explanation, but to be honest I think what I said is already fairly clear.

As mud.


I appreciate the way of "doing philosophy" you are schooled in, such as whenever you hear a new word you immediately want it defined

Where did I ask for a definition?

[You are beginning to invent again, just like you did in that thread at the Political Crossfire forum.]

What I said was this:


LH, I notice you help yourself to the word 'contradiction' without explaining what this word means in such contexts, or how it is of any use at all in explaining change.

We already have countless words in ordinary language that can be used to explain change, and in far greater detail and with far greater precision than that provided by the jargon invented by ruling class theorists like Hegel. [Which can't account for change anyway.]



Do you realise you sound just like Ayn Rand when you go one about "mystics"? Sheesh. It's such an incredibly lazy insult, since it could be applied to just about anyone with whom one disagreed.

She also used the word 'the', as you do. What does that prove? You are an 'Objectivist'? Hardly. Same with me.

Anyway, you lot sound just like Zen Buddhists, Hermeticists, Neo-Platonists and a host of other mystics. We can name call all day if you want.

[And, materialists like me were calling you Hermeticists 'mystics' way before Ayn Rand was inflicted on humanity.]


And your status as a "genuine materialist" has to be established by argument. Since the materialism we are all united around is historical materialism (that we need to study people's "material lives" to discover what drives history), I don't see how a philosophy inspired by a particular way of doing language analysis is necessarily more "materialist" than philosophy inspired by Kant and Hegel. The dichotomy between materialism and idealism is vastly overrated, imho

The reason I use the phrase 'genuine materialist' is that it describes a frame of mind that opposes the ruling-class forms-of-thought that have colonised the brains of the vast majority of Marxists -- briefly described in the Essay extract at the beginning of this thread.

In short, unlike you mystics, we do not rely on a priori dogmatics to reveal 'hidden truths' to us (which are unavailable to the sciences) -- that is, theses derived from thought alone -- as if there were a world anterior to the material world, accessible to thought alone (and 'thought' derived from ruling-class hacks like Hegel) which these dogmas somehow 'reflect'.

But, you have had all this explained to you before.


That doesn't really explain away my comment, which was that the commitment to the techniques of analytic (politcal) philosophy was the cause of his turn to liberal egalitarianism. What would you offer as an alternative - that Cohen turned to Rawls because he got bored with Marx after a lifetime of being a Marxist, or because he got wet feet in his old age, or what?

No more than your attempt 'explained' the answer to this:


LH, I notice you help yourself to the word 'contradiction' without explaining what this word means in such contexts, or how it is of any use at all in explaining change.

And I am not offering an 'alternative' since, as I have told you countless times before, I reject all philosophical theories as self-important hot air (and that includes the ideas of Rawls, Nozick...)


What would you have to say against G.A. Cohen's own words?

Again, as I have told you, I am only interested in destroying ideas (ruling-class ideas), stopping any more posion seeping into Marxism, not in constructing an alternative theory.

So, the only thing I would say to Cohen is that he is a class traitor -- and if that is unaccepotable to you, I think you are just going to have to be brave about it.

Now, I have told you this many times, but if it takes another six month long thread for the message to sink in, so be it.


And... don't you think Cohen's views above kind-of sum up your own general outlook, Rosa?

Not even close.

Once more, you are judging me without having read my work, when, in contrast, you judge Cohen after having read his.

Hardly fair.

[Hyacinth]

I realise this is only an off-the-cuff summary of what you are trying to get at, which is why you qualify what you say with "or something along such lines" in brackets at the end. However, even given this, I still think I should criticise your choice of phrasing in your post

So, for instance, saying there is a "conflict of interests" between classes suggests we need a good lawyer to get us into ADR before we go to court and it gets serious. It suggests the contingency of the conflict, whereas the term "contradiction" already carries within it the idea of the structural necessity of class society under capitalism.

As well as this, you lose the idea that capitalism moves by and exists in its "contradictions", since the choice of the word "instability" suggests all this class conflict stuff is a snag that might be shaken out through planning - obviously the logic of Social Democracy.
I'm quite happy with the way in which you're using the term 'contradiction', if it is just meant as a technical term that is to stand as a shorthand for something like "inherent instability of capitalism arising out of the mutually exclusive interests of the competing classes existing under capitalism", then fine. But then there is nothing dialectical, in the Hegelian sense, about such "contradictions". What you seem to be doing, correctly, is jettisoning the Hegelian concepts altogether, but retaining the Hegelian terminology. If I'm mistaken about this, please correct me, and tell me what is dialectical about such "contradictions". If I'm not mistaken, then why cling to the expression "contradiction" when it carries with it all the historical baggage of Hegelianism, and all its various incarnations in the guise of Marxism?

[Hyacinth]

Can you point us in the direction of a version of historical materialism which does this?
I can indeed.



In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter Into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or — this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms — with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic — in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production.

Apart from the use of the term "contradiction" to mean "the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production", a non-dialectical meaning (unless you'd care to explain to me what any of what Marx is talking about has to do with the 'law of opposites', the 'law of negation', the 'law of transformation', I fail to see how dialectics is at all relevant to the above formulation of historical materialism), Marx refrains from employing any Hegelian concepts or Hegelian terms.

[Die Neue Zeit]

Because I see the same intellectual superiority.

"The bearer of science [not class consciousness or even revolutionary consciousness] is not the [ordinary or activist] proletariat but the [...] intelligentsia." (Karl Kautsky)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JR:


"The bearer of science [not class consciousness or even revolutionary consciousness] is not the [ordinary or activist] proletariat but the [...] intelligentsia." (Karl Kautsky)

And that, of course, is part of the problem:


For all their claims to be radical, when it comes to Philosophy, DM-theorists are surprisingly conservative (but worryingly incapable of seeing this, even after it has been pointed out to them). At a rhetorical level, this conservatism is camouflaged behind what at first appear to be a set of disarmingly modest denials --, which are then promptly ignored.

DM-theorists are anxious to deny that their system is wholly or even partly a priori, or that it has been imposed on the world and not merely read from it. However, the way that dialecticians actually phrase their ideas contradicts these superficially honest-looking claims, showing quite clearly that the opposite is in fact the case.

This inadvertent dialectical inversion -- wherein what DM-theorists say about what they do is the reverse of what they do with what they say -- neatly mirrors the distortion to which traditional philosophy has subjected language.

However, unlike dialecticians, traditional metaphysicians were quite open and candid about what they were doing; indeed, they brazenly imposed their a priori theories on reality and hung the consequences.

Because dialecticians have a novel (but nonetheless defective) view both of Metaphysics and Formal Logic (on these, see here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2012_01.htm) and here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2004.htm)), they seem oblivious of the fact that they are just as ready as traditional metaphysicians are to impose their ideas on the world, and equally blind to the fact that in so-doing they are aping the alienated thought-forms of those whose society they seek to abolish.

Naturally, this means that their 'radical' guns were spiked before they were loaded; with such weapons, it's small wonder then that DM-theorists fire nothing but philosophical blanks.

Dialectics is a conservative theory precisely because its adherents have adopted the distorted methods, a priori thought-forms and meaningless jargon of traditional Philosophy.

And they have done this because of their class origins...

More details here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2002.htm

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well put, Hyacinth, except the word 'contradiction' when it is imported into Marxism allows comrades to argue for any thesis they like and its opposite, on the grounds that if reality is 'contradictory' then so must be Marxist theory and tactics.

The result has been that dialectically-distracted comrades have used this word to argue for all manner of opportunist tactics and doctrines, among which are the following:

1) That idea that socialism can and cannot be built in one country (Stalinists, Maoists and Trotskyists);

2) The claim that more democracy means less democracy, the centralisation of power, the cessation and forcible suppression of inner party discussion (Stalinists and Maoists -- I am sure us Trots would argue along the same lines after the revolution; one only has to look at how quickly they all frown upon or suppress inner party discussion now!);

3) The simultaneous respecting and flouting of the rights of national minorities (Stalinists);

4) The doctrine that the social democratic parties of Europe were 'social fascists' one minute, the next that they were to be incorporated into a 'Popular Front' (Stalinists) -- the Maoists argued along the same lines with respect to the Goumindang;

5) That the fascists/Nazis were sworn enemies one minute, the next that they were allies against the 'west', the next (after Hitler invaded 'Holy Russia') that they were sworn enemies again (Stalinists) -- Trotsky used 'dialectics' to defend the invasion of Finland, so we have nothing to be proud of either!;

6) That the 'western' imperialist powers were sworn enemies one minute, but the next that they were allies against Nazi aggression, and then later that they were the enemies of the 'peace-loving' peoples of the world (Stalinists);

7) That the former USSR/communist countries of E Europe and elsewhere are (a) workers's states, (b) degenerated workers states, (c) deformed workers' states, and/or (d) state capitalist regimes (everyone);

8) That forces other than the working class are capable of leading successfully a socialist revolution, and that these forces can substitute themselves for the working class. Such forces include (a) Red army tanks, (b) guerrilla armies, (c) nationalist forces/leaders, (d) enough representatives elected to bourgeois parliaments, (e) sympathetic anti-imperialist parties, (f) students... (everyone).

And that is part of the reason why I oppose the incorporation of this word into Marxism in any shape or form.

More details here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm

[Hit The North]

Hyacinth:
Apart from the use of the term "contradiction" to mean "the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production", a non-dialectical meaning (unless you'd care to explain to me what any of what Marx is talking about has to do with the 'law of opposites', the 'law of negation', the 'law of transformation', I fail to see how dialectics is at all relevant to the above formulation of historical materialism), Marx refrains from employing any Hegelian concepts or Hegelian terms.All you are doing here is following Rosa in arguing that when Marx referred to his work as dialectical that either he was making a joke or didn't understand his own work.

My concern isn't with debunking the Hegelian content of Marx's work - he does that himself. My concern is to take seriously his claim that his view of history in general and capitalism in specific is dialectical and to try and understand what he meant by that.


If I'm not mistaken, then why cling to the expression "contradiction" when it carries with it all the historical baggage of Hegelianism, and all its various incarnations in the guise of Marxism?Why should we jettison the term when it is only a problem for philosophers like Rosa? Particularly given that, as LH points out above, the concept of structural contradiction gives us a level of understanding which employing other words such as "conflict" does not.

Outside the labyrinthine reasoning of her logic training, Rosa's main objection seems to be this:


Well put, Hyacinth, except the word 'contradiction' when it is imported into Marxism allows comrades to argue for any thesis they like and its opposite, on the grounds that if reality is 'contradictory' then so must be Marxist theory and tactics... And that is part of the reason why I oppose the incorporation of this word into Marxism in any shape or form.
Besides this being an unsupported assertion - who argues that Marxism is itself contradictory? - on the same reasoning, given that the "dictatorship of the proletariat", "socialism", "communism" and "Marxism" itself have been used to support all manner of unpleasantness, we should perhaps abandon these terms too.

While we're at it, let's abandon all phrases, terms and concepts which have been tainted by opportunism. But, then what would we be left with?

By the way, "the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production" is dialectical in the sense that they exist in an inter-relationship of mutual development and form a dynamic totality which drives conflict in other areas of social life. Now if this doesn't sound remotely Hegelian, I say, "Good!".

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


All you are doing here is following Rosa in arguing that when Marx referred to his work as dialectical that either he was making a joke or didn't understand his own work.

And you are just following the traditional line that ignores what Marx actually said.


My concern isn't with debunking the Hegelian content of Marx's work - he does that himself. My concern is to take seriously his claim that his view of history in general and capitalism in specific is dialectical and to try and understand what he meant by that.

Except, and once more, you ignore Marx's own abandonment of the word 'contradiction' (i.e., he tells us he was merely 'coquetting' with it), along with all the other Hegelian jargonised phrases (e.g., the 'unity of opposites', the 'negation of the negation', the transformation of 'quantity into quality', etc.), just as you continue ignore the fact that if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.


Besides this being an unsupported assertion - who argues that Marxism is itself contradictory? - on the same reasoning, given that the "dictatorship of the proletariat", "socialism", "communism" and "Marxism" itself have been used to support all manner of unpleasantness, we should perhaps abandon these terms too.

Only 'unsupported' in that you refuse to read the evidence and argument in support (at the link I provided). In this you are like those appologists of capitalism who say Marx's ideas are 'unsupported' but who refuse to read Das Kapital.

And as far as those other concepts you quote are concerned, their interpratation by comrades has been heavily biased by the importation of words like 'contradiction', so that they are then made to say whatever the one using that word wants them to say (as is easily confirmed by the histortical record, as I noted in my last post --, and in the arguments of many comrades here who defend the things I mentioned).

So, those other concepts you listed can be retained since their misuse can be put down to the influence of dialectics and political expediency alone.


While we're at it, let's abandon all phrases, terms and concepts which have been tainted by opportunism. But, then what would we be left with?

No, just those we have inherited from ruling-class hacks like Hegel.

Had he never lived, or had he the decency to die of typhoid 40 years earlier then he actually did, you would not even be using the word 'contradiction' in this way.


By the way, "the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production" is dialectical in the sense that they exist in an inter-relationship of mutual development and form a dynamic totality which drives conflict in other areas of social life. Now if this doesn't sound remotely Hegelian, I say, "Good!".

But then why call this a 'contradiction'; that term is Hegelian.

The only reason is, as I have pointed out: you, like the vast majority of comrades, have had your heads filled with the 'ruling ideas' of the boss class, as Marx predicted you lot would. You are all philsophical conservatives, happy to impose your ideas on nature and society (based solely on a defective series of arguments Hegel inflicted on humanity) copying the methods and thought-forms of openly ruling-class theorists over the last 2500 years.

Worse still: you all bury your heads in the sand when the ridiculous consequences of your 'theory' are pointed out to you.

And we now know why you do this: dialectics is your only source of consolation, your opiate. So you cling on to it like grim death and for non-rational reasons, just like the god-botherers of this world who cling on to their fanciful ideas for similar reasons. Dialectical Marxism is such a long-term and abject failure, you need something to convinvre you of the opposite: hence your fondness for the word 'contradiction'. This 'allows' you now to claim that 'appearances' 'contradict' underlying 'essence', which then 'permits' you to ignore what your eyes tell you: Dialecical Marxism is slowly dying.

You certainly can't defend your beliefs, you can't even explain them!

[Hit The North]

Despite the endless repetition, bluster and insults of the above, Rosa still fails to provide one quotation by a serious Marxist who claims that Marxist theory is itself contradictory. Neither does she tell us where Marx explicitly rejects the notion of social reality being contradictory. And no wonder, because he never did.

Meanwhile she continues to stand in philosophical opposition to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg and then arrogantly pronounces that it is they who are infected with ruling class ideas. It would be funny if it wasn't so boring.

[Lord Hargreaves]

I'm quite happy with the way in which you're using the term 'contradiction', if it is just meant as a technical term that is to stand as a shorthand for something like "inherent instability of capitalism arising out of the mutually exclusive interests of the competing classes existing under capitalism", then fine. But then there is nothing dialectical, in the Hegelian sense, about such "contradictions". What you seem to be doing, correctly, is jettisoning the Hegelian concepts altogether, but retaining the Hegelian terminology. If I'm mistaken about this, please correct me, and tell me what is dialectical about such "contradictions". If I'm not mistaken, then why cling to the expression "contradiction" when it carries with it all the historical baggage of Hegelianism, and all its various incarnations in the guise of Marxism?

Well yes, there is a certain argument that we use words such as "contradiction" to capture certain meanings, without them really having much to do with Hegel and his philosophy. But I don't see the problem with that, really.

Why do we keep using the terminology, when it comes with "the historical baggage of Hegelianism"? That is pretty much the reason we do keep using it. Most of the problems of historical Marxism have come from treating Marxism as a strict materialist science, forgetting its capacity for self-criticism, thereby falling into technological determinism (Stalinism) and positivism. Hegel was reintroduced into Marxism in the West by the New Left "neither Washington nor Moscow!" crowd precisely because of this failure


Apart from the use of the term "contradiction" to mean "the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production", a non-dialectical meaning (unless you'd care to explain to me what any of what Marx is talking about has to do with the 'law of opposites', the 'law of negation', the 'law of transformation', I fail to see how dialectics is at all relevant to the above formulation of historical materialism), Marx refrains from employing any Hegelian concepts or Hegelian terms.

Obviously, the "laws" of dialectics (an oxymoron) have nothing to do with Hegel, but in fact come from Engels.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Despite the endless repetition, bluster and insults of the above, Rosa still fails to provide one quotation by a serious Marxist who claims that Marxist theory is itself contradictory. Neither does she tell us where Marx explicitly rejects the notion of social reality being contradictory. And no wonder, because he never did.

You wouldn't know, because you still refuse to read the evidence.

And you need to read more carefully what I have said; here it is again, only this time get some new glasses:


Well put, Hyacinth, except the word 'contradiction' when it is imported into Marxism allows comrades to argue for any thesis they like and its opposite, on the grounds that if reality is 'contradictory' then so must be Marxist theory and tactics.

And as for this:


Neither does she tell us where Marx explicitly rejects the notion of social reality being contradictory. And no wonder, because he never did.

We have been over this many times; I did say it might take fifty or so attempts before this sank into your class-compromised skull, so here is yet another.

In Das Kapital, Marx included this summary of "his method":


"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:*

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

You will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics you have had forced down your throat, for in it there is not one ounce of Hegel -- no quantity turning into quality, no contradictions, no negation of the negation, no unities of opposites, no totality...

So, Marx's method has had Hegel totally extirpated. For Marx, putting Hegel on 'his feet' is to crush his head.

And of the few terms Marx uses of Hegel's in Das Kapital, he tells us this:


"and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him."

So, the 'rational core' of the dialectic has not one atom of Hegel in it, and Marx merely 'coquetted' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

So, far from endorsing the view that society is riven by 'contradictions', Marx used this term non-seriously.

And even if he had used this term seriously, as I keep pointing out to you, and as you keep ignoring, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.

I note you have once again ignored this fatal defect of the ruling-class theory you have naively swallowed. We both know why.

Ah, now we see the usual fall-back position adopted by generations of mystics like you -- abuse. You can't defend your 'theory' as I said, so you resort to bad-mouthing me, yet again:


Meanwhile she continues to stand in philosophical opposition to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg and then arrogantly pronounces that it is they who are infected with ruling class ideas. It would be funny if it wasn't so boring.

1) I nowhere reject Marx's theory,

2) Marx himself told us that the ruling ideas were always those of the ruling class.

3) He also told us that social being determined consciousness, and those who inflicted dialectics on our movement were not workers, but petty bourgeois theorists who derived their ideas from ruling-class hacks.

4) If truth is tested in practice, your 'theory' has been refuted, many times over. The 1917 revolution has been reversed; all four internationals have gone down the pan, and Trotskyism is among the least successful wings of Marxism -- indeed, Respect has just self-destructed (along with the 'Left List), and the SWP is a fraction of the size it was fifteen years ago (and even then it was tiny compared to the German and Italian parties 80 or so years ago).

Dialectical Marxism is an abject and long-term failure, in never ending decline, but, hey, why give up a bad idea? Forward to the next 150 years of going nowhere slowly!

Keep your head in the sand comrade; I am sure everything looks peachy when you are high on dialectical opiates...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LH, I was going to respond to you, but Hyacinth can look after himself.

[Die Neue Zeit]

JR:

And that, of course, is part of the problem:

In my instance (my rebuttal of benhur having nothing to do with dialectics), not quite. Look into the intellectual development of so-called "democratic theory" (a disillusionment with "liberal democracy"), and look into demarchy in particular. "Ordinary workers" did not develop this ideal form for the DOTP at all. Either it was developed by intellectuals from other classes (Kautsky was wrong to say bourgeois intelligentsia), or it was developed by proletarian intellectuals ("theory nuts").

[Hit The North]

R:
And you need to read more carefully what I have said; here it is again, only this time get some new glasses:Quote:

Well put, Hyacinth, except the word 'contradiction' when it is imported into Marxism allows comrades to argue for any thesis they like and its opposite, on the grounds that if reality is 'contradictory' then so must be Marxist theory and tactics.Yes, and still you are unable to identify which prominent Marxist has argued that Marxist theory and tactics must be contradictory.


We have been over this many times; I did say it might take fifty or so attempts before this sank into your class-compromised skull, so here is yet another.

In Das Kapital, Marx included this summary of "his method":
By acknowledging this writer's review, Marx is not excluding anything, so this can hardly constitute an explicit rejection of the concept of contradiction or any other concept come to that.



And even if he had used this term seriously, as I keep pointing out to you, and as you keep ignoring, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.
So if Marxism is correct that society is contradictory, this would provide a condition for preventing social change. Is this what you're arguing? So in your view what are the conditions which make social change possible?

1) I nowhere reject Marx's theory, Yes you do. You reject the theory that capitalism is riven by irresolvable contradictions which its own laws of motion produce and intensify.

If you don't agree with this principle position in Marx's analysis of capital, you have no legitimate claim to call yourself a Marxist.

But feel free to call yourself something else. May I suggest 'Irrelevant Wittgensteinian Pantomime Dame'?

[KC]

"and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him."

It's pretty funny/pitiful that in all of Rosa's posts, it always comes down to one single word that Marx said in once instance throughout his entire body of work.

That's telling.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

KC:


It's pretty funny/pitiful that in all of Rosa's posts, it always comes down to one single word that Marx said in once instance throughout his entire body of work.

He saw fit to publish this comment, and it is consistent with the description he gave of 'his method':


"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:*

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

You will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics you have had forced down your throat, for in it there is not one ounce of Hegel -- no quantity turning into quality, no contradictions, no negation of the negation, no unities of opposites, no totality...

So, Marx's method has had Hegel totally extirpated. For Marx, putting Hegel on 'his feet' is to crush his head. There is thus no 'rational core' to the 'dialectic' as you mystics would have us believe.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Yes, and still you are unable to identify which prominent Marxist has argued that Marxist theory and tactics must be contradictory.

I have, but you refuse too look.

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm#CaseStudies

[Anyone wanting to access this link fully will need to copy and paste it into their address bar since the anonymiser RevLeft uses ignores '#' sub-links. And if you copy this link, you will need to remove the anonymiser wording at the front. Otherwise, just use the 'Quick Links' at the top of the page to jump to Section (7) 'Case Studies'.]


By acknowledging this writer's review, Marx is not excluding anything, so this can hardly constitute an explicit rejection of the concept of contradiction or any other concept come to that.

Even so, he endorsed as 'his method' a summary that had every trace of Hegel removed; moreover, he showed his contempt for the 'dialectic', as you mystics understand it, by 'coquetting' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon in a few places in Das Kapital. Hardly a ringing endorsement.


So if Marxism is correct that society is contradictory, this would provide a condition for preventing social change. Is this what you're arguing? So in your view what are the conditions which make social change possible?

You have had this explained to you before, and in detail. Check this out again:

Quotes:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1350764&postcount=23

Argument:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1350765&postcount=24

Full argument here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm#Dialectics-Cannot-Explain-Change

[Again, anyone wanting to access this link fully will need to copy and paste it into their address bar since the anonymiser RevLeft uses ignores '#' sub-links. Or. once more, use the 'Quick Links' at the top of the page to jump to Section (B1) 'Why Dialectics Cannot Explain Change'.]


Yes you do. You reject the theory that capitalism is riven by irresolvable contradictions which its own laws of motion produce and intensify

In that case, Marx also rejected his own theory, since even he did not think that capitalism was "riven by irresolvable contradictions" -- a term that not even you can explain.

So, I am happy to agree with Marx and reject this unworkable 'theory' too.


If you don't agree with this principle position in Marx's analysis of capital, you have no legitimate claim to call yourself a Marxist.

Perhaps that is also why Marx said "I am no Marxist", because of irrational and emotive dogmatists like you.


But feel free to call yourself something else. May I suggest 'Irrelevant Wittgensteinian Pantomime Dame'?

I will if you will call yourself 'class traitor' and 'naive ruling-class dupe'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JR:


In my instance (my rebuttal of benhur having nothing to do with dialectics), not quite. Look into the intellectual development of so-called "democratic theory" (a disillusionment with "liberal democracy"), and look into demarchy in particular. "Ordinary workers" did not develop this ideal form for the DOTP at all. Either it was developed by intellectuals from other classes (Kautsky was wrong to say bourgeois intelligentsia), or it was developed by proletarian intellectuals ("theory nuts").

Look, I am not against theory as such, but that which has been developed by non-workers is guilty until proved innocent.

And I am not convinced that the DOP was an entirely non-working class development.

[KC]

Rosa, I understand your argument - I've read it on here countless times as you constantly spew it all over the forum. It's an argument that is based on an extreme warping of facts and meaning to the point of absurdity; it really is comical the acrobats you go through attempting to justify your nonsense.

In the end it comes down to your claim that Marx's use of one word in one instance is explicit proof of your wild assertions. However, to any reasonable person it's quite obvious that your argument is shown as absurd simply because of that fact.

But go on writing your hundred-thousand word essays and chasing those windmills if you so desire. In the end it doesn't really matter because your argument is a joke. Perhaps you will get some to coquette with it for a time, but that is inevitable for any assertion.

[Hit The North]

Rosa:
In that case, Marx also rejected his own theory, since even he did not think that capitalism was "riven by irresolvable contradictions"

Marx:
The contradictions inherent in the movement of capitalist society impress themselves upon the practical bourgeois most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle, through which modern industry runs, and whose crowning point is the universal crisis. That crisis is once again approaching, although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality of its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

KC:


Rosa, I understand your argument - I've read it on here countless times as you constantly spew it all over the forum. It's an argument that is based on an extreme warping of facts and meaning to the point of absurdity; it really is comical the acrobats you go through attempting to justify your nonsense.

1) I have to repeat it since knuckle-headed comrades like you refuse to face up to what Marx actually said.

2) What 'facts' have I distorted?


In the end it comes down to your claim that Marx's use of one word in one instance is explicit proof of your wild assertions. However, to any reasonable person it's quite obvious that your argument is shown as absurd simply because of that fact.

No, it is based on Marx's own summary of 'his method', along with other details you can find here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_01.htm




But go on writing your hundred-thousand word essays and chasing those windmills if you so desire. In the end it doesn't really matter because your argument is a joke. Perhaps you will get some to coquette with it for a time, but that is inevitable for any assertion.

I can just imagine a Philistine like you arguing in and around 1875 as follows:


Yes, Herr Marx, go on writing your million word books...

Since you can't respond to my argument, you, like so many other dialectical mystics here and elsewhere, have to resort to abuse to protect your source of opiates:


The founders of this quasi-religion weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in the classics and in philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

So, these non-worker founders of our movement, who had been educated to believe there was this hidden world that governed everything, looked for principles in that invisible world that told them that change was inevitable, and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of a ruling-class mystic called Hegel.

That allowed the founders of this quasi-religion to think of themselves as special, as prophets of the new order, which workers, alas, could not quite grasp because of their defective education and reliance on ordinary language and 'common sense'.

Fortunately, history had predisposed these prophets to ascertain the truth about reality for them, which meant they were their 'naturally-ordained' leaders. That in turn meant these 'leaders' were also teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who could thus legitimately substitute themselves for the unwashed majority -- in 'their own interests', you understand, since the masses were too caught up in 'commodity fetishism' to see the truth for themselves.

And that is why DM is a world-view.

It is also why dialecticians cling on to this theory like grim death (and become very emotional (and abusive!) when it is attacked by yours truly), since it provides them with a source of consolation that, despite outward appearances to the contrary, and because this hidden world tells them that dialectical Marxism will one day be a success, everything is in fact peachy, and nothing in the core theory needs changing -- in spite of the fact that that core theory says everything changes! Hence, it is ossified into a dogma, and imposed on reality. A rather nice unity of opposites for you to ponder.

So, this 'theory' insulates the militant mind from the facts.

In that case:

[I]Dialectics is the sigh of the depressed dialectician, the heart of a heartless world. It is the opiate of the party. The abolition of dialectics as the illusory happiness of the party hack is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that quote BTB, but we already know that Marx was merely 'coquetting' with this word in Das Kapital.

And no wonder, if dialectics were true, then change would be impossible.

I note yet again that you keep dodging this fatal defect in your mystical 'theory'.

And we all now know why...

[Hyacinth]

Why do we keep using the terminology, when it comes with "the historical baggage of Hegelianism"? That is pretty much the reason we do keep using it. Most of the problems of historical Marxism have come from treating Marxism as a strict materialist science, forgetting its capacity for self-criticism, thereby falling into technological determinism (Stalinism) and positivism. Hegel was reintroduced into Marxism in the West by the New Left "neither Washington nor Moscow!" crowd precisely because of this failure.
I'd like to see some evidence to back that up; I know of no prominent historical Marxists who have ever committed the sin of being too positivistic, or technological determinists (Cohen being an exception). The Stalinists certainly weren't either, nor was Lenin: the Soviet Union repudiated efforts on the part of some, Alexander Bogdanov among them (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Bogdanov) to reject dialectics and adopt a positivistic attitude toward Marxism, which would have been a positive development (no pun intended).

You seem to think that it is somehow mistaken to try to make historical materialism a science, this is where we part ways; it is precisely because it is not scientific enough, because it retains dialectics, that it has proven to be such a miserable failure, and has been misused by everyone, left and right, to "prove" just about any thesis that they find politically convenient at the moment. This is not science, it isn't even philosophy, it is sophistry.

As well, you seem to imply that science has no 'capacity for self-criticism'; science, if anything, does subject its own hypotheses and theories to criticism, and leaves everything open to refutation. Progress in science is made precisely when old theories are subject to criticism, new ones puth forth to better explain a phenomenon, and the old eventually abandoned. This is not to say that scientists can't be dogmatic, of course they can, and it isn't a perfect method, but it is the best we have, and its results speak for themselves: we've gone to the Moon because of science, I cannot think of any achievements of dialectics that parallel this, in fact, I cannot think of any achievements of dialectics.


Obviously, the "laws" of dialectics (an oxymoron) have nothing to do with Hegel, but in fact come from Engels.
The "laws" of dialectics are an oxymoron? So Engels didn't know what he was talking about when he called them laws? If you're dissenting with Engels, I'd be quite happy with this. I [also] think that he slips into nonsense when he tries to dabble in philosophy. But if so, then what of dialectics is it that you wish to maintain? Clearly you don't think dialectics is (though correct me if I'm wrong) something that is applicable to all of nature, pace Engels and Hegel, then what makes history special such that dialectics is applicable to it? And what is it that you mean by dialectics if you reject its various "laws"?

[Hyacinth]

All you are doing here is following Rosa in arguing that when Marx referred to his work as dialectical that either he was making a joke or didn't understand his own work.

My concern isn't with debunking the Hegelian content of Marx's work - he does that himself. My concern is to take seriously his claim that his view of history in general and capitalism in specific is dialectical and to try and understand what he meant by that.
The claim that I make is that any instance of Hegelian terminology left over in the latter Marx can be substituted salva veritate with either technical terminology borrowed from science, or ordinary language. If this is so, then there is no dialectical content in the thought of the latter Marx. Now, I've given you examples from Marx with an explanation of how the supposed dialectical terminology is to be interpreted in a non-dialectical fashion (in fact, I didn't do any exegesis, Marx tells us how the term is to be read, a reading which isn't dialectical).

What I would like to know, and I'm honestly curious here, of substance is lost on the non-dialectical reading of Marx which I, and others, have puth forth? As well as, what do you mean by 'dialectics'? I ask not to be pedantic, but because I honestly don't know, the term is thrown around so many times by different people to mean slightly different things, it is hard to keep track of who means what by it.

[Hyacinth]

An addendum:
The so-called dialectical materialists, following Engels, thought that you required dialectics to explain change, both in history as well as in the world. Plain old ordinary materialism was thought inadequate to account for change anywhere. They were mistaken; we do not need dialectics to account for change in nature; science, and ordinary language, do a fine job of accounting for it. That being said, some dialecticians seem to have retreated to a more moderate position: dialectics isn’t required to explain change in nature, we can do that through other means, but it is required to explain change in history. This thesis of historical exceptionalism, that history is somehow special and different from the other subject matters such that it required dialectical explanations when other subjects do not, is what needs defending. It is easy to see why the original dialectical materialists [mistakenly] thought dialectics necessary to account for historical change, as it was merely a consequence of their thinking that it was necessary to explain change in general. So unless a contemporary dialectician is prepared to hold onto the untenable thesis that change cannot be explained except through dialectics, they need to give us a reason to suppose that it is necessary for historical change.

[Charles Xavier]

Rosa is completely confused, when we point out that how Dialectics works, Rosa says "We don't need a theory to explain that" yet proceeds not to explain why or refute the dialectic.

Rosa you have wasted a good portion of your life being completely ignorant of what Dialectics means, Dialectic means change arising from contradictions, opposites collide and something new comes out of it.

Class Conflict is what progresses humanity forward.

I boil water, heat + water = steam, the water doesnt just adsorb the heat, it turns into another state, into a gas.

If I fight with my boss, either my job gets worse or better. It doesn't stay the same. It turns into something new, boundaries expand or they retract.

[black magick hustla]

"
I boil water, heat + water = steam, the water doesnt just adsorb the heat, it turns into another state, into a gas."

jesus, this is the worst abuse of scientific terminology. i can equally claim that there is no qualitative change because it is still water molecules.i woulds be however, wrong for saying that because the word "change" differs of meaning depending the context/language games. you canr just say dialectics "treat change" because the nature of that word is different when applied to chemistry than to sociology. its the old problem of apples and oranges

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

TA II:


Rosa is completely confused, when we point out that how Dialectics works, Rosa says "We don't need a theory to explain that" yet proceeds not to explain why or refute the dialectic.

Where do I say "We don't need a theory to explain that"? What I do say is that we do not need a philosophical theory, a scientific one will do --, and even if we did need a philosophical theory, dialectics is so piss poor, it would even fail to make the bottom of the reserve list of likely or viable candidates.


Rosa you have wasted a good portion of your life being completely ignorant of what Dialectics means, Dialectic means change arising from contradictions, opposites collide and something new comes out of it.

I am well aware of all this. I have read, studied and made detailed notes on more books and articles on this whacko 'theory' of yours than you have had hot dinners. I have asked you repeatedly to show where I go wrong, and all you do is repeat the same tired old nostrums. No surprise there, then.


Class Conflict is what progresses humanity forward.

Where have I denied that?


I boil water, heat + water = steam, the water doesnt just adsorb the heat, it turns into another state, into a gas.

Water as ice, liquid or gas is still H20, so there has been no change in quality here, as defined by Hegel:


"Quality is, in the first place, the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity, on the contrary, is the character external to being, and does not affect the being at all. Thus, e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker." [Hegel (1975) Shorter Logic, p.124, §85.]

or by the Marxist Internet Archive:


"Quality is an aspect of something by which it is what it is and not something else and reflects that which is stable amidst variation. Quantity is an aspect of something which may change (become more or less) without the thing thereby becoming something else.

"Thus, if something changes to an extent that it is no longer the same kind of thing, this is a 'qualitative change', whereas a change in something by which it still the same thing, though more or less, bigger or smaller, is a 'quantitative change'.

"In Hegel's Logic, Quality is the first division of Being, when the world is just one thing after another, so to speak, while Quantity is the second division, where perception has progressed to the point of recognising what is stable within the ups and downs of things. The third and final stage, Measure, the unity of quality and quantity, denotes the knowledge of just when quantitative change becomes qualitative change."

http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/glossary.htm#quality

So, even your example does not work, since here we have quantitative change with no qualitative change.

Of course, if you mean something else by 'quality' then what is it?

We have in fact been over this several times here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/stalin-materialism-t66588/index.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/quantity-quality-t66709/index.html

and in each case, you mystics failed to win the argument.


If I fight with my boss, either my job gets worse or better. It doesn't stay the same. It turns into something new, boundaries expand or they retract.

But, according to the dialectical prophets, if you struggle with your boss, you must also change into him/her!

Here is what I have posted on this in another thread:


Dialecticians seem to be unclear whether objects and processes change (1) because of their internal opposites, or whether they (2) change into these opposites as a result of their "struggle" with them, or indeed whether they (3) also produce these opposites while they change --, or they do so as a result of that change.

Here are a few quotations from a wide selection of theorists to that effect:


"If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues, Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen, by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, naturally veers round to its opposite.

"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975), pp.117-18.]

"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Ibid., p.174.]

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... Mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., pp.212-13.]

"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Ibid., p.179.]

"...but the theory of Essence is the main thing: the resolution of the abstract contradictions into their own instability, where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone than it is transformed unnoticed into the other, etc." [Engels (1891), p.414.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing, each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....

"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....

"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... [Ibid., pp.311-18.]

"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]

"So far we have discussed the most general and most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as in Lao-tse and his disciples -- and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus. Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.

"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.

"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.

"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid., pp.170-71.]

"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….

"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite." [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]

"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]

"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), 94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.]

"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….

"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]

"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….

"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….

"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….

"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891), p.414.]

"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.

"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....

"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]

"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'

"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.

"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.

"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)

"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.

"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.'" [Rob Sewell, quoted from here. (Link a my site; see below.)]

Bold emphases added.

References and links for all the above can be found at my site, here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm[/QUOTE]

So, have you changed into your boss? If not, then perhaps you do not 'understand dialectics'!

In my next post I will expose just one the fatal weaknesses of this 'theory'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, here it is:

As we are about to see, this idea -- that there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and "unities of opposites" (etc.), which cause change -- presents DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along the lines expressed in the DM-classics (quoted above).

[Recall that the above quotes show that dialecticians are completely unclear as to whether objects and processes change (1) because of their internal opposites/'contradictions', or whether they (2) change into these opposites as a result of their "struggle" with them, or indeed whether they (3) also produce these opposites while they change --, or they do so as a result of that change.]

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/ist; NON = Negation of the Negation; FL = Formal Logic.]

To see this particular fatal defect, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two "internal contradictory opposites" O* and O**, and it thus changes as a result.

[The same problems arise if these are viewed as 'external' contradictions.]

But, O* cannot itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory, O* could not change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that about.

Hence, it is no good propelling O** into the future so that it is now said to be what O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless O** is already there, in the present, to make that happen!

So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O* (interpreting O** now as not-O*), how can O* possibly change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?

Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might allow dialecticians to dig themselves out of this hermetic hole. Either:

(1) O* 'changes' into not-O*, meaning there would now be two not-O*s where once there was one (unless, of course, one of these not-O*s just vanishes into thin air -- see below); or:

(2) O* does not change, or it disappears. Plainly, O* cannot change into what already exists -- that is, O* cannot change into its opposite, not-O* without there being two of them (see above). But even then, one of these will not be not-O* just a copy of it. In that case, O* either disappears, does not change at all, or changes into something else; or:

(3) Not-O* itself disappears to allow a new (but copy) not-O* to emerge that O* can and does change into. If so, questions would naturally arise as to how the original not-O* could possibly cause O* to change if is has just vanished. Of course, this option merely postpones the evil day, for the same difficulties will afflict the new not-O* that afflicted the old. If it exists in order to allow O* to change, then we are back where we were to begin with.

Anyway, as should seem obvious, among other things already mentioned, alternative (2) plainly means that O* does not in fact change into not-O*, it is just replaced by it. Option (1), on the other hand, has the original not-O* remaining the same (when it was supposed to turn into its own opposite -- O* -- according to the DM-classics), and options (2) and (3) will only work if matter and/or energy can either be destroyed or created from nowhere!

Naturally, these problems will simply re-appear at the next stage as not-O* readies itself to change into whatever it changes into. But, in this case there is an added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O* in existence to make this happen. This means that the dialectical process will grind to a halt, unless a not-not-O* pops into existence to start things up again.

But what could possibly engineer that?

Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-O* itself came about in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too. [Gollobin (above) sort of half recognises this without realising either his error or the serious problems this creates.]

But, not-O* cannot have come from O* itself, since O* can only change because of the operation of not-O*, which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a 'reversed' version of the NON) will merely reduplicate the above problems.

[However, on the NON, see below.]

Now, it could be objected that all this seems to place objects and/or processes in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians make of FL. Hence, on that basis, it could be maintained that the above argument is entirely misguided.

Fortunately, repairs are easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal/external opposites" O* and O**, (the latter once again interpreted as not-O*) and it thus develops as a result.

The rest still follows as before: if object/process A is already composed of a changing dialectical union of O* and not-O*, and O* 'develops' into not-O* as a result, how is it possible for O* to change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?

Of course, it could be argued that not-O* 'develops' into O* while not-O* 'develops' into O*.

[This objection might even incorporate that eminently obscure Hegelian term-of-art: "sublation". More on that presently.]

But, if this were so, while it was happening these two would no longer be 'opposites' of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite" to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently 'subjective', once more.

But, if we ignore that 'difficulty' for now, and even supposing it were the case that not-O* 'developed' into O* while not-O* 'developed' into O*, and such process were governed by the obscure term "sublation", this alternative will still not work (as we are about to see).

Indeed, developing this option further before it is demolished, it could be argued that Engels had himself anticipated the above objections when he said:


"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels (1976) Anti-Duhring, pp.172-73.]

"But someone may object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea....

"But it is clear that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid., pp.180-81.]

Engels's argument seems to be that "dialectical negation" is not the same as ordinary negation in that it is not simple destruction. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and preserves, so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless, we have already seen here [in the original article, this 'here' links to another argument at my site, as do several of the other 'here's dotted around this post], that Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly suspect, and we will also see below [again, this 'below' refers to a later section of the essay from which this was extracted] that this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as did Engels).

Well, despite all this, is it the case that the above comments neutralise the argument presented in this part of this post? Is the argument here guilty of the following:


"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought." [Ibid.]

To answer this, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites" O* and not-O*, and thus develops as a result. On this scenario, O* would change/develop into a "sublated" intermediary, but not into not-O* -- incidentally, contradicting the DM-worthies quoted earlier. O* should, of course, change into not-O*, not into some intermediary.

Putting this minor quibble to one side, too, on this 'revised' view, let us suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter, "O*(1)" (which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation' which also 'preserves'/'sublates').

If so, then O*(1) must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-O*(1) in existence to make it develop any further.

[Recall that on this 'theory', everything (and that must include O*(1)) changes because of a 'struggle' with its opposite.]

So, there must be a not-O*(1) to make O*(1) change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt O*(1) from this essential requirement on an ad hoc basis (arguing, perhaps, that O*(1) changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that, there would seem to be no reason to accept the version of events contained in the DM-classics, which tells us that every thing/process changes because of the operation of opposites (and O*(1) is certainly a thing/process). Furthermore, if we make an exemption here, then the whole point of the exercise would be lost, for if some things do and some things do not change according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which changes were and which were not subject to it.

[This would also mean that the second 'Law' (discussed here) was not a 'law' either, just like the first.]

This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively applied exemption certificate (issued to O*(1)) would mean that nothing at all could change, for everything in the universe is in the process of change, and is thus already a 'sublated' version of whatever it used to be.

Ignoring this, too, even if O*(1) were to change into not-O*(1) (as we suppose it must, given the doctrine laid down by the DM-prophets), then all the earlier problems simply reappear, for this could only take place if not-O*(1) already existed to make it happen! But not-O*(1) cannot already exist, for O*(1) has not changed into it yet!

Once more, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of O* to produce not-O* is not ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.

In that case, let us say that O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite not-O*(s), but if that is to happen, according to the Dialectical Gospels, not-O*(s) must already exist! If so, and yet again, O* cannot turn into not-O*(s), for it already exists! On the other hand, if not-O*(s) does not already exist, then O* cannot change, for O* can only change if it struggles with what it changes into, i.e., not-O*(s).

Once more we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.

It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the point; in the real world things manifestly change. For example, it might be the case that John is a boy, but in a few years time it will be the case that John is a man. Now, the fact that other individuals are already men, does not stop John changing into a man (his opposite), as the above argues. So, John can change into his opposite even though that opposite already exists.

Or so it could be claimed.

But, this theory tells us that things/processes change because of a struggle with their opposites, and with what they become. Are we now to assume that John has to struggle with all the individuals that are already men if he is to become a man himself (if we now treat all these other men as John's opposites)? And are we to suppose that John struggles with what he is to become, even before it exists? If not, then the above response is beside the point. And, in view of the fact that John must turn into his opposite, does that mean he has to turn into these other men, or even into one of them? But he must do so if the Dialectical Holy Books are to be believed.

Anyway, according to the DM-worthies quoted above, John can only change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now. Are we now really supposed to believe that "John is a man" is struggling with "John is a boy" -- or that manhood is struggling with boyhood?

Some might be tempted to reply that this is precisely what adolescence is, and yet, in that case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would have to be locked in struggle in the present. [Of course, adolescence cannot struggle with anything, since it is an abstraction.] But, John-as-a-man does not yet exist, and so 'he' cannot struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if John-as-a-man does exist, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful self, then John-as-boy cannot change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already exists!

To be sure, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is allowed to develop naturally), but, as noted above, that opposite cannot now exist otherwise John would not need to become him!

Looking at this more concretely, in ten or fifteen years time, John will not become just any man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that John becomes "Man-J". But, once again, Man-J must exist now or John cannot change into him (if the DM-worthies quoted earlier are to be believed), for John can only become a man if he is locked in struggle with his own opposite, Man-J. But, if that is so, John cannot become Man-J since Man-J already exists!

[This, of course, is simply a more concrete version of the argument outlined above.]

Consider another hackneyed example: water turning into steam at 100oC (under normal conditions). Are we really supposed to believe that the opposite that water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? This must be so if the Dialectical Saints are to be believed.

Hence, while you might think it is the heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really happens, according to these wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water turn into steam!

In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!

In fact, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it. To identify it, we shall call it "W1", and the steam molecule it turns into "S1". But, if the DM-Worthies above are correct, S1 must already exist, otherwise W1 could not change into it! Again, if that is so, where does S1 disappear to if W1 changes into it?

In fact, according to the Dialectical Magi, since opposites turn into one another, S1 must change into W1 at the same time as W1 is turning into S1! So while you are boiling a kettle, according to this Superscientific 'theory', steam must be turning back into the water you are boiling, and it must do so at the same rate!

One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry.

This must be so, otherwise when W1 turns into S1 -- which already exists, or W1 could not change into it -- there would have to be two S1s where there used to be one! Matter created from nowhere!

Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and to any and all other alleged examples of DM-change).

It could be objected that the opposite that liquid water turns into is a gas; so the dialectical classicists are correct. However, if we take them at their word, then that gas must 'struggle' with liquid water in the here-and-now if water is to change. But that gas does not yet exist; in which case, water would never boil if this 'theory' were true. But even if it did, it is heat that causes the change not the gas! However we try and slice it, this 'theory' is totally useless -- that is, what little sense can be made of it.

This, of course, does not deny that change occurs, only that DM cannot account for it.

Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

And here is a more down-to earth argument:

[NON = Negation of the Negation.]

These dialectical 'rules' imply that cats, for example, change because of a struggle of opposites, and that they change into those opposites.

In which case, a live cat C that changes into dead cat C* must have struggled with that dead cat!

I am sure we have all witnessed such odd scenes...:rolleyes:

On the other hand, live cat C cannot change into dead cat C* since dead cat C* already exists! So C cannot die, for to do so it has to change into something that already exists, and this is impossible, even for a cat.

So, dialectical materialism, the 'world view of the proletariat' holds that cats cannot die!:lol:

On the other hand, it also holds that cats are continually scrapping with the dead cats that that they will one day turn into.:lol:

----------------------

Incidentally, the same result emerges if we consider the intermediate stages in the life and death of cat C (whether or not these are a result of the operation of the NON):

Let us assume that cat C goes through successive stages C(1), C(2), C(3)..., C(n), until at stage C(n+1) it finally pops its clogs.

But, according to the dialectical classics, C(1) can only change into C(2) because of a 'struggle' of opposites. They also tell us that C(1) inevitably changes into that opposite.

So, C(1) must both struggle with C(2) and change into it.

But then the same problems emerge, for C(1) can't change into C(2) since it already exists. If it didn't, C(1) could not struggle with it!

So, by n applications of the above argument, all the stages of a cat's life must co-exist, and no cat can change, let alone die!

These 'dialectical cats' sure are odd...

-----------------------

Now, TA II, where does any of this go wrong?

Up to now, not one single DM-fan has been able to say.

That's why they all ignore it.

[Lord Hargreaves]

I'd like to see some evidence to back that up; I know of no prominent historical Marxists who have ever committed the sin of being too positivistic, or technological determinists (Cohen being an exception). The Stalinists certainly weren't either, nor was Lenin: the Soviet Union repudiated efforts on the part of some, Alexander Bogdanov among them [...] to reject dialectics and adopt a positivistic attitude toward Marxism, which would have been a positive development (no pun intended).

Well yeah, I think we are doomed to disagree here. This seems like a debate for another time (and another thread). I think "technological determinism" to be one of the primary sins of Stalinism, originating - I have to say - in an ambiguity in Marx's own writing. The error was to see the transition from capitalism to communism as a linear temporal process, leading to the "periodization" of socialism as a distinct social formation, and the complete abolition of the idea of class conflict.


You seem to think that it is somehow mistaken to try to make historical materialism a science, this is where we part ways; it is precisely because it is not scientific enough, because it retains dialectics, that it has proven to be such a miserable failure, and has been misused by everyone, left and right, to "prove" just about any thesis that they find politically convenient at the moment. This is not science, it isn't even philosophy, it is sophistry.

As well, you seem to imply that science has no 'capacity for self-criticism'; science, if anything, does subject its own hypotheses and theories to criticism, and leaves everything open to refutation. Progress in science is made precisely when old theories are subject to criticism, new ones puth forth to better explain a phenomenon, and the old eventually abandoned. This is not to say that scientists can't be dogmatic, of course they can, and it isn't a perfect method, but it is the best we have, and its results speak for themselves: we've gone to the Moon because of science, I cannot think of any achievements of dialectics that parallel this, in fact, I cannot think of any achievements of dialectics.

I'm certainly not one of these postmodernists who thinks all science is implicated in the oppression of humanity, or whatever. That takes an insight and runs off a cliff with it. What I would identify though is the error of scientism, which is the failure to understand the delimits of science and its ultimate reliance for meaning on the Lebenswelt ("life-world"). As Jurgen Habermas defines it, scientism is: "the contention that we can no longer understand science as one form of knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science".

Obviously science allows plenty of room for particular theories to be falsified and replaced by more adequate theories according to the evidence. Indeed, we might say science moves by this very process. But as for self-criticism - that is - questioning the methods of science itself, and the place of science within knowledge generally, I have more fundamental doubts

I don't wish to deny the essence of Stalinism. It didn't go wrong because of the triumph of science over philosophy, it went wrong because of the failure to think tout court; it ended up as terror for its own sake, terror becoming the divine principle of orbit for the whole system. I just think, on critical reflection, we can learn a few lessons on the problem of scientism from the whole experience


The "laws" of dialectics are an oxymoron? So Engels didn't know what he was talking about when he called them laws? If you're dissenting with Engels, I'd be quite happy with this. I [also] think that he slips into nonsense when he tries to dabble in philosophy. But if so, then what of dialectics is it that you wish to maintain? Clearly you don't think dialectics is (though correct me if I'm wrong) something that is applicable to all of nature, pace Engels and Hegel, then what makes history special such that dialectics is applicable to it? And what is it that you mean by dialectics if you reject its various "laws"?

Engels, as far as I can see, tried to formulate independent laws of dialectics completely divorced from Hegel's overall philosophy - that is, Hegel's philosophy as a continuation of Kant's project of subjecting all reason to radical self-criticism, and of showing the falsity of seeing each "moment" of reason (and the world) as independent from its part in the "totality" of Geist. Thus his dialectics doesn't make a lot of sense. Dialectics without Hegel's system is a mistake, or it is simply using old Hegelian words for the sake of familarity or as a "trigger" for remembering other concepts

Why not laws of dialectics? Well, dialectics (read in a kind of Nietzschean vain) begins as a skeptical process, thus codifying it into "laws" seems to forget this spirit, since it smells of - as Rosa keeps on saying - a priori dogmatism. Its like establishing an organized church of atheism, or something

To vindicate Engels I think we have to read his use of "laws" here differently, as his trying to capture the basic ideas in outline for a lay audience that would not be familiar with Hegel and German Idealist philosopy. We should see him as Terrell Carver wishes us to see him (see his book in the Oxford Very Short Introduction series: I'd link you but I can't since I don't have 25 posts yet), that is, as the populizer of Marxism, getting the message out to the workers and the public-at-large. To read him as a high priest of philosophy, or whatever, is to misread him

[Charles Xavier]

Reading Rosa posts are like reading the work of an juggler that keeps dropping the ball. Combining ideas that are not connected with one another and then in broad strokes saying this is wrong because "how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry." or other such philistine non sense that honestly bare no connection the actual facts. The person who tries to divorce dialectical materialism from historical materialism is also divorcing themselves from reality.

[black magick hustla]

Reading Rosa posts are like reading the work of an juggler that keeps dropping the ball. Combining ideas that are not connected with one another and then in broad strokes saying this is wrong because "how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry." or other such philistine non sense that honestly bare no connection the actual facts. The person who tries to divorce dialectical materialism from historical materialism is also divorcing themselves from reality.


you should reply to my argument which was pretty good rather than saying i am "divorced from reality". you sound like those dumb people in critical theory departments that abuse quantum mechanics with their mystical nonsense

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

TA II:


Reading Rosa posts are like reading the work of an juggler that keeps dropping the ball. Combining ideas that are not connected with one another and then in broad strokes saying this is wrong because "how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry." or other such philistine non sense that honestly bare no connection the actual facts. The person who tries to divorce dialectical materialism from historical materialism is also divorcing themselves from reality.

In short, you can't show where my argument goes wrong. Have the decency to admit it.

According to the quotations I listed, dialectical kettles not only would never boil dry, they'd never even boil, since, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.

You need to show where my argument goes wrong, and stop making personal attacks on me to distract attention from your predicament.

[Louise Michel]

I am not sure how dialectics helped Trotsky understand fascism. Historical Materialism [HM] did, though.


I'm just starting to look at Rosa's material and think about the DM issues. So I'm just probing and thinking out loud rather than trying to argue a position or defend anything.

I don't know either how dialectics helped Trotsky to understand fascism. When I read his work I wasn't looking at it from this point of view. However Trotsky did accept dialectics so at best this did not hinder his understanding - it's a very concrete and pretty well entirely successful analysis, far too detailed to be accidental. It's hard to see how he could utilise DM when he looked at say the class nature of the Soviet Union and not use DM when he looked at Germany. DM was a part of his theoretical world view.

Also had Trotsky not been a dialectician what might/would he have done differently between 1928 and 1940. I know that's impossible to answer with any certainty but what I'm trying to get at is: how did DM inform Trotsky's practise in relation to decisions about the 4th International etc. as far as we can reasonably tell?

I'm asking this because I've just read Rosa's "summary of essay 10 part 1 - Practice: No Friend Of Dialectics" and I'm confused.

Of course this is just a summary, and maybe the original version will clarify these issues, but it's hard for me to see how a specific practice in say Russia in 1905 or 1917 was informed by an adherence to DM.

I can see how a view of history over the last couple of thousand years can be used to challenge DM but I don't know what Lenin would have done differently in 1917 had he not been an adherent of DM.

I also don't understand how defeat in the Spanish civil war says anything about DM one way or another.

Of course behind this is a question about the relationship between theory and practise. Our theories are always liable to be much wider of the mark than the natural sciences given the level of subjectivity and the sheer weight of evidence and variables involved. So it's not like we're just guessing but at best we're approximating. So given this is it correct to ascribe such importance to DM? Or am I a philistine?!:confused:

[Hyacinth]

Well yeah, I think we are doomed to disagree here. This seems like a debate for another time (and another thread). I think "technological determinism" to be one of the primary sins of Stalinism, originating - I have to say - in an ambiguity in Marx's own writing. The error was to see the transition from capitalism to communism as a linear temporal process, leading to the "periodization" of socialism as a distinct social formation, and the complete abolition of the idea of class conflict.
Fair enough, this is indeed somewhat of a tangential disagreement anyway. Though I find your characterization of Stalinism, of which I am by no means a fan, to be inaccurate. Especially when you say that it completely abolished the idea of class conflict; the Stalinists did, after all, advocate the thesis that class struggle aggravated along with the development of socailism, hardly a repudation of class conflict.


I'm certainly not one of these postmodernists who thinks all science is implicated in the oppression of humanity, or whatever. That takes an insight and runs off a cliff with it. What I would identify though is the error of scientism, which is the failure to understand the delimits of science and its ultimate reliance for meaning on the Lebenswelt ("life-world"). As Jurgen Habermas defines it, scientism is: "the contention that we can no longer understand science as one form of knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science".

Obviously science allows plenty of room for particular theories to be falsified and replaced by more adequate theories according to the evidence. Indeed, we might say science moves by this very process. But as for self-criticism - that is - questioning the methods of science itself, and the place of science within knowledge generally, I have more fundamental doubts
I don't believe either I or Rosa are advocating scientism; science is not the only road to knowledge, we come to know the world through other (quite mundane) means as well, it is just that science is especially useful, and allows us to get along in the world better than we could without it. This isn't to say that scientists aren't prone to error, or to myth making of their own, but this usually happens when scientists stop doing science and instaed venture into those dark waters that contain many shipwrecks called 'metaphysics'. The abandonment of a priori dogmatism, to borrow Rosa's expression, i.e. the abandonment of metaphysics, is not a slide into scientism. There might well be many ways to know the world, but none of them are a priori, and by extension, dialectical.


I don't wish to deny the essence of Stalinism. It didn't go wrong because of the triumph of science over philosophy, it went wrong because of the failure to think tout court; it ended up as terror for its own sake, terror becoming the divine principle of orbit for the whole system. I just think, on critical reflection, we can learn a few lessons on the problem of scientism from the whole experience
This sounds like idealism; Stalinism failed not because they failed to be sufficiently self-reflective, but rather because of the material conditions. You simply couldn't build socialism in as economcially and technologically backwards a country as Russia; the Stalinist ideology was a product of these material conditions, not vice versa. That aside, you've yet to establish that the Stalinists, for all their crimes, were guilty of the sin of scientism: to the best of my knowledge, after Lenin's repudiation of Bogdanov, and latter the triumpth of the dialecticians over the mechanists (who held a positivistic conception of Marxism), the official ideology of the Soviet Union, of Stalinism, was dialectical materialism, not any form of positivism.


Engels, as far as I can see, tried to formulate independent laws of dialectics completely divorced from Hegel's overall philosophy - that is, Hegel's philosophy as a continuation of Kant's project of subjecting all reason to radical self-criticism, and of showing the falsity of seeing each "moment" of reason (and the world) as independent from its part in the "totality" of Geist. Thus his dialectics doesn't make a lot of sense. Dialectics without Hegel's system is a mistake, or it is simply using old Hegelian words for the sake of familarity or as a "trigger" for remembering other concepts
You're right to say that laws of dialectics don't make sense, had you left it at that we could have parted amicably. It isn't that they don't make sense only apart from Hegel's system, it is rather that Hegel's system doesn't make sense. Keierkegaard aptly remarked that "[i]f Hegel had written the whole of his logic and then said, in the preface or some other place, that it was merely an experiment in thought in which he had even begged the question in many places, then he would certainly have been the greatest thinker who had ever lived. As it is, he is merely comic." Alas, if only Kieregaard were right to say that Hegel is merely comic, we wouldn't be having this discussion right now, but becasue his ideas are taken so seriously by so many comrades that they become pernecious, since they distort one's understanding.


Why not laws of dialectics? Well, dialectics (read in a kind of Nietzschean vain) begins as a skeptical process, thus codifying it into "laws" seems to forget this spirit, since it smells of - as Rosa keeps on saying - a priori dogmatism. Its like establishing an organized church of atheism, or something

To vindicate Engels I think we have to read his use of "laws" here differently, as his trying to capture the basic ideas in outline for a lay audience that would not be familiar with Hegel and German Idealist philosopy. We should see him as Terrell Carver wishes us to see him (see his book in the Oxford Very Short Introduction series: I'd link you but I can't since I don't have 25 posts yet), that is, as the populizer of Marxism, getting the message out to the workers and the public-at-large. To read him as a high priest of philosophy, or whatever, is to misread him
I'm still not quite clear whether you think dialectics applicable to all of nature, or whether it is something that is only applicable to history.

That aside, the thesis that we should read Engels as trying to popularize Marxism presumed that Marx was committed to the nonsense Engels spouted. It is not clear that Marx was committed to dialectics as presented by Engels, or Hegel, or any dialectician; if he borrowed Hegelian terminology is was because he was a product of his time, and Hegelianism had infested many academic circles. I have yet to see anyone argue convincingly that we *must* interpret Marx, at least in the latter works, esp. Capital, as employing dialectics, and not merely, as he himself says, using these expressions in his own (non-dialectical) way. Now, that being said, in the end it doesn't matter to me whether Marx was committed to dialectics or not, he may well have been (though I don't belive so), but even if he was, the core of his intellectual contribution—i.e. historical materilaism and his analysis of capitalism—can be preserved without importing dialectics into them. Marxism is not a religion, and Marx not a propher, he is subject to criticism, including that of historical materialism (that is, Marx must be understood as a product of his time), and when he made mistakes what he said is, obviously, to be rejected. The adoption of Hegelian terminology was one such error.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Louise:


However Trotsky did accept dialectics so at best this did not hinder his understanding - it's a very concrete and pretty well entirely successful analysis, far too detailed to be accidental. It's hard to see how he could utilise DM when he looked at say the class nature of the Soviet Union and not use DM when he looked at Germany. DM was a part of his theoretical world view.

And that is because he did not use DM; but it certainly hindered his understanding of the former USSR and his principled opposition to Stalinist aggression in Finland.

If you want the details, check this out:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm#CaseStudies

You will need to copy and paste this into your address bar, since the anonymiser RevLeft uses ignores '#' sub-links. Then scroll down to the section on Trotskyism. Alternatively, just click on this:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm

and use the 'Quick Links' near the top jump to section (7c) 'Dialectics Traduces Trotskyism'.


Of course this is just a summary, and maybe the original version will clarify these issues, but it's hard for me to see how a specific practice in say Russia in 1905 or 1917 was informed by an adherence to DM.

You did indeed read a summary, but all I say in Essay Ten Part One (or its summary) depends on the results of Essay Nine Part Two.

As Essay Nine Part Two argues, dialectics can in fact have no practical effect on Marxists, except negatively. Hence, in practice they never use it. It only comes in to its own when the movement is in retreat, and rationalisations for this state of affairs have to be sought out.

Of course, this is not its only function, but it does help explain why:

1) Engels only really became a latter-day mystic when the Paris Commune failed, and Chartism and the 1860s radicalisation went into reverse, why

2) Lenin only really became interested in 'philosophy' after 1905, and before 1917, why

3) Not one single Bolshevik (that I could find in the record) used dialectics in 1917-1918, and only began to argue 'dialectically' after say 1921, when the revolution began to go backward, how

4) The younger Bolshevik cadres in the early 1920s argued that all of philosophy (and not just dialectics) was simply ruling-class ideology (a crude version of my thesis), how

5) Stalin only 'discovered' dialectics and used it to begin his assault on democracy in the party around 1924/5 with the ideological counter-attack led by Deborin, how

6) Trotsky only 'discovered' dialectics after 1925, but particularly after 1930 and his political isolation and quarantine, and how

7) Mao only 'discovered' dialectics after 1926 and the defeat of the Chinese revolution....and so on.

Now, I am not saying the above did not accept this 'theory' before then, only that it grew massively in significance for them when the movement was in retreat, or when they needed to rationalise counter-revolutionary and non-Marxist tactics taken for other, more political reasons.

All of this is detailed in Essay Nine Part Two, under 'Case Studies' (link above) and 'What about 1917' (use the aforementioned 'Quick Links).

It is not possible to use dialectics in practice, it only serves to rationalise anything one likes, and its opposite, sometimes in the very next breath!

You can see this in several of the debates I have had here over the last three years. If I catch one of these mystics in a contradiction, they either ignore it (check out the response comrades have made to my demonstration that dialectics would make change impossible), or they attack me for exposing it (check out, say, Tupac Amaru II's attacks on me), or they say 'Well that's dialectics for you, what else did you expect...?' (or they use the catch all 'You don't understand dialectics', but, oddly enough, even when asked, not one of them seems able to explain it!)

Alternatively, when pressed, not a single one of them can tell us how dialectics features in a single practical example (and they have been asked scores of times here, by me and others like Hyacinth). And yet, it is the theory they tell us that guides all they do, and all that Marx, Engels, Lenin and the rest did (except, when pressed, one or two say it is not all that important, but they still adhere to it!).

So, the mystics here had to retreat into a huddle a few months back, and set up a DM group which I am not allowed to join, so they can post reassuring messages to one another.


I can see how a view of history over the last couple of thousand years can be used to challenge DM but I don't know what Lenin would have done differently in 1917 had he not been an adherent of DM.

As I pointed out, he did not in fact use this theory, but his ideas were guided by his profound understanding of historical materialism and the practical knowledge he had gained from the previous 20 years of political involvement.

[Louise Michel]

Rosa:

I've just taken a look at the section on Trotsky and these are my impressions.

I can accept in general that it's plausible to say that DM as a theoretical apriori explain-all is attractive to intellectual non-workers who are drawn to the revolutionary movement. But Trotsky who had experienced decades of struggle and had more practical experience than all members of revleft put together hardly fits this category (whatever his social origins). He must have felt that DM, on the basis of his vast experience, did help him understand political and economic developments.

It's true that DM does surface in Trotsky's writings particularly strongly during the late-thirties debate/faction fight over the nature of the Soviet Union (as far as I know, haven't read everything, not yet!!). This is a time of defeat and retreat. But doesn't Trotsky's clinging to the idea that there is still something left to defend in the SU have more to do with his personal history - ie his involvement in the revolution - rather than an adherence to DM. I mean if DM hadn't existed isn't it fair to assume that Trotsky would have have used HM to defend his thesis that the SU was a degenerate workers state, or some other theory. Theory, after all, is like putty in our hands.

Also, more generally, the SU in the 1930's was a particularly tricky problem that didn't really fit the categories of HM - what exactly was the mode of production? The economy had been centralized following a workers revolution by a party that had limited working class support and the workers had no political power.

Lenin and Trotsky had expected that the Russian revolution would be saved by the German and European revolutions (on the basis of HM I think?!) but when that didn't happen they were in unknown territory. So it's not too surprising that the analysis wasn't so precise - there's a lot more going on here than just a wrong view of DM isn't there?

Sorry if that's not so coherent but what the hell:bored: I do very much appreciate the possibilty to explore ideas here.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Louise:


I can accept in general that it's plausible to say that DM as a theoretical a priori explain-all is attractive to intellectual non-workers who are drawn to the revolutionary movement. But Trotsky who had experienced decades of struggle and had more practical experience than all members of Revleft put together hardly fits this category (whatever his social origins). He must have felt that DM, on the basis of his vast experience, did help him understand political and economic developments.

I covered this point earlier in that Essay (in sections (2)-(6)). In fact I summarised the argument in an earlier post here:


There are two interconnected reasons, I think.

1) The founders of this quasi-religion weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in the classics and in philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

So, these non-worker founders of our movement, who had been educated to believe there was this hidden world that governed everything, looked for principles in that invisible world that told them that change was inevitable, and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of a ruling-class mystic called Hegel.

2) That allowed the founders of this quasi-religion to think of themselves as special, as prophets of the new order, which workers, alas, could not quite grasp because of their defective education and reliance on ordinary language and 'common sense'.

Fortunately, history had predisposed these prophets to ascertain the truth about reality for them, which meant they were their 'naturally-ordained' leaders. That in turn meant these 'leaders' were also teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who could thus legitimately substitute themselves for the unwashed majority -- in 'their own interests', you understand, since the masses were too caught up in 'commodity fetishism' to see the truth for themselves.

And that is why DM is a world-view.

It is also why dialecticians cling on to this theory like grim death (and become very emotional (and abusive!) when it is attacked by yours truly), since it provides them with a source of consolation that, despite outward appearances to the contrary, and because this hidden world tells them that dialectical Marxism will one day be a success, everything is in fact peachy, and nothing in the core theory needs changing -- in spite of the fact that that core theory says everything changes! Hence, it is ossified into a dogma, and imposed on reality. A rather nice unity of opposites for you to ponder.

So, this 'theory' insulates the militant mind from the facts.

In that case:

Dialectics is the sigh of the depressed dialectician, the heart of a heartless world. It is the opiate of the party. The abolition of dialectics as the illusory happiness of the party hack is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.

Unfortunately, these sad characters will need (materialist) workers to rescue them from themselves.

Trotsky's petty bourgeois upbringing pre-disposed him (as it did Marx, Engels, Lenin...) to look for a priori solutions to what were in fact scientific questions, since that is how they were educated to see the world.

And that is why Trotsky felt DM could help him, even though there is no evidence that it did.

Unless, of course, you know otherwise...


It's true that DM does surface in Trotsky's writings particularly strongly during the late-thirties debate/faction fight over the nature of the Soviet Union (as far as I know, haven't read everything, not yet!!). This is a time of defeat and retreat. But doesn't Trotsky's clinging to the idea that there is still something left to defend in the SU have more to do with his personal history - ie his involvement in the revolution - rather than an adherence to DM. I mean if DM hadn't existed isn't it fair to assume that Trotsky would have used HM to defend his thesis that the SU was a degenerate workers state, or some other theory. Theory, after all, is like putty in our hands.

Recall what I said earlier:


Now, I am not saying the above did not accept this 'theory' before then, only that it grew massively in significance for them when the movement was in retreat, or when they needed to rationalise counter-revolutionary and non-Marxist tactics taken for other, more political reasons.

And I am sure his personal involvement in the revolution coloured his view of it, but then he had already gone half-way toward recognising that the revolution had gone wrong (which was a series of steps others who had also been involved did not take) -- the only thing that stopped him making that final step was his acceptance of the alleged 'contradictory' nature of the former USSR.

Now, DM is uniquely placed to allow those who accept this theory to argue for mutually exclusive conclusions, in this case that the former USSR was a workers' state of some sort, but also where workers were not the ruling class, and were oppressed!

No other theory (outside of Zen Buddhism, perhaps) holds that nature and society are both contradictory, so no other theory 'allows' its adherents to rationalise contradictions in their own theory -- say, those concerning the nature of the former USSR.

If you read the other parts of that section of Essay Nine Part Two toward which I directed you in my last post, you will see how the Stalinists and the Maoists used dialectics to argue for the exact opposite conclusion to Trotsky, and how it allowed Tony Cliff, for instance, to do the same with his State Capitalism theory.

That is because no other theory allows its adherents to argue for anything they like, and its opposite, sometimes in the same breath.

Without dialectics to screw it around, historical materialism [HM] does not project contradictions onto reality, so it cannot be used to argue for contradictory conclusions, such as the one that holds that a state can be a workers' state (degenerate or not) even though the working class is not the ruling class, and is oppressed and exploited.

Now, Trotsky might have come round to another view of things as Stalinism expanded into E Europe after WW2, had he lived, since there you had a counter-revolutionary force (Stalinism) creating allegedly workers' states (deformed or not) when the working class was not even involved in their formation! Yet another contradiction!

Of course, DM allowed his followers to swallow this contradiction with ease, as they still do. Same with China and Cuba, etc. [For goodness sake, dialectics even 'allowed' Ted Grant to argue for proletarian Bonapartism!!]


Also, more generally, the SU in the 1930s was a particularly tricky problem that didn't really fit the categories of HM - what exactly was the mode of production? The economy had been centralized following a workers revolution by a party that had limited working class support and the workers had no political power.

I actually accept the State Capitalist interpretation of the former USSR, but even if you reject it, HM is a scientific theory and has to adapt to the way the world is, not squeeze it into an a priori mould.

So, the former USSR in the 1930s was either State Capitalist or a new mode of production -- or some other form of class society.


Lenin and Trotsky had expected that the Russian revolution would be saved by the German and European revolutions (on the basis of HM I think?!) but when that didn't happen they were in unknown territory. So it's not too surprising that the analysis wasn't so precise - there's a lot more going on here than just a wrong view of DM isn't there?

I agree, but recall once more that one of the roles DM plays is to rationalise decisions taken for other, more political reasons.

It also serves to insulate the militant mind from reality (rather like religion does with the minds of the god-botherers) as I pointed out above, and as you can see from the replies dialectically distracted comrades post in response to me.

And in this role it has 'served well' for over 130 years. I have no doubt it will continue in this vein for generations to come, helping guarantee that Dialectical Marxism maintains its long-term decline.

[Louise Michel]

Okay Rosa, I understand what you're saying. DM is like a religion that even the best revolutionaries of non-working class origin fall back on in hard times. It's hard to accept that people like Lenin and Trotsky wouldn't have been liberated from this by their practical involvement but right now I don't have enough info to agree or disagree with you though I recognize you do have a strong argument. I'll keep reading (for the next 20 years - do you think I'll catch up with you?):confused:

How do you view the scientific vs utopian socialism argument as expounded by Engels? Is Marxism scientific? If so how? I think Marxism is not scientific in the sense of the natural sciences. I don't believe there are natural laws underlying historical development (which of course pre-disposes me to your DM argument).

By the way I don't much like the state capitalist analysis - it seems to me to be a form of HM dogmatism - ie only hitherto recognized forms of production can exist. The SU was something new and unexpected that came and went and didn't fit previous patterns. As a description I think bureacratic collectivism gets close.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Louise:


I'll keep reading (for the next 20 years - do you think I'll catch up with you?)

Depends how determined you are, but there is nothing to stop you. In fact, these days, with the internet, it is so much easier.


Is Marxism scientific? If so how? I think Marxism is not scientific in the sense of the natural sciences. I don't believe there are natural laws underlying historical development (which of course pre-disposes me to your DM argument).

I think it is scientific (if DM is left out). We actually debated this here a few months ago:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/historical-materialism-scientifici-t92796/index.html


As a description I think bureacratic collectivism gets close.

Well, we can agree to differ on this for now.

But check this out:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/cliff/works/1948/xx/burcoll.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Anyone interested in seeing what fools the mystics are making of themselves in their Dialectical Coven, check this out:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/group.php?do=discuss&group=&discussionid=1600

And my replies:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/group.php?do=discuss&group=&discussionid=1606

Comrades will no doubt notice the same boorish tactics we have come to know and loathe from such saddos -- lies, misrepresentations and invention.

Plus, they just ignore stuff they cannot answer.

Expect loads more of the same over the coming weeks and months; these 'disciples of change' just do not change. http://www.mysmiley.net/imgs/smile/characters/character0051.gif

[Le Libérer]

Thread stuck.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Now unstuck; the arch-mystic objected...

[RedAnarchist]

Now unstuck; the arch-mystic objected...

Why would they object to this thread being stuck? They should be defending their viewpoint, not worrying about one thread being stuck.

Thread has been re-stuck and the DM-ists can have a stuck thread of their own if they want.

[Hit The North]

Why would they object to this thread being stuck? They should be defending their viewpoint, not worrying about one thread being stuck.


I've unstuck the thread again. Why? Because the thread only exists to provide links to Rosa's site and to document her skirmishes with other socialists on the internet. It is advertising material for her own personal project and therefore does not belong amongst the stickied posts.

Rosa is free to debate her ideas in any thread in this forum and others - and it is a freedom which she exploits to the max.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red, fair enough, but they already have such a thread:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/marxist-philosophy-t85224/index.html

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I've unstuck the thread again. Why? Because the thread only exists to provide links to Rosa's site and to document her skirmishes with other socialists on the internet. It is advertising material for her own personal project and therefore does not belong amongst the stickied posts.

Rosa is free to debate her ideas in any thread in this forum and others - and it is a freedom which she exploits to the max.

Impartial to the last, even if you have to invent a few more things along the way.

This thread advertises other sites:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/marxist-philosophy-t85224/index.html

a sticky you yourself stuck.

Nothing if not inconsistent you mystics.

[Hit The North]

Red, fair enough, but they already have such a thread:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/marxist-philosophy-t85224/index.html

That is a general information sticky linking to the philosophy resource of the Marxist Internet Archive.

[Hit The North]

This thread advertises other sites:

It takes posters to a general resource site, not one which is the intellectual property of a particular individual.

Rosa, if it is appropriate to have this thread as a sticky, why did you not sticky its forerunner when you were the moderator of this forum?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Rosa, if it is appropriate to have this thread as a sticky, why did you not sticky its forerunner when you were the moderator of this forum?

1) It would have looked far too partisan.

2) I wanted the forerunner stickied, not this one.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


That is a general information sticky linking to the philosophy resource of the Marxist Internet Archive.

1) So is my thread.

2) Other stickies are like my thread, too.

3) You closed your sticky, presumably to stop me adding anti-DM links.

[Hit The North]

1) It would have looked far too partisan.Yes, because it only functions to advertise your site.

EDIT: I'm not adding any more to this thread. If you want to take the matter to the CC then please do.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Yes, because it only functions to advertise your site.

No, because it puts the case against dialectical mysticism.


If you want to take the matter to the CC then please do.

Gone beyond that; the Admins are discussing it.

[Le Libérer]

I've restickied this thread based on its popularity over the years and the fact had it been an advert it would have been trashed 2 years ago. Thanks.

[Charles Xavier]

Shame on you for stickying it. The thread is not popular its just ones person posting 4 posts in a row.

[KC]

I don't see how this is more popular than any other thread, so I don't see the reasoning behind stickying it, either.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

KC, the original thread, '@anti-dialectics made easy thread one' was closed without my agreement (by a global mod), but I wanted that one stickied.

However, it had over 500 posts in it (which made it impractical to sticky) and over 16,000 views, making it the most popular (in terms of views) in the entire history of the Philosophy section at this board, and by a long way.

So, as a compromise, thread two was stickied.

Anyway, take it up with the admins, it was their decision.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

TAII:


Shame on you for stickying it. The thread is not popular its just ones person posting 4 posts in a row.

1) Tough luck, see my response to KC above.http://www.mysmiley.net/imgs/smile/tongue/tongue0015.gif

2) You mysitcs have had it your own way now for 150 or more years. Time to let us materialists enjoy our hard won ascendancy.

3) You lot retreated from the field to your own safe little Cabbal. Bad move...

[Charles Xavier]

This thread hasn't had replies in it for like 2 weeks how is this popular

[Hyacinth]

This thread hasn't had replies in it for like 2 weeks how is this popular
Thank you for reviving it. :)

Regardless—to get back on topic—I want to bring up an issue in public, which I've already brought up in the anti-dialectics group.

This is something that has always bewildered me; many of the so-called "dialecticians" more or less implicitly reject dialectics as it is, or minimally they think it inapplicable to nature, but history is fine (because history is not part of nature?). Yet, despite this break from dialecticians such as Engels, et al., they still cling to the Hegelian/dialetical jargon (which is pernicious enough by itself, as it causes numerous confusions).

Some of us just go further, and dispense with any remnants of the confused jargon altogether, to just historical materialism. To which they maintain either that historical materialism alone is inadequate in explaining history, or that historical materialism cannot be formulated without dialectics. Despite requests to explain why historical materialism is inadequate, or why it cannot be formulated without dialectics—or why their watered down version of dialectics is anything but historical materialism in Hegelian trappings—no answer has been forthcoming.

[Hit The North]

This is something that has always bewildered me; many of the so-called "dialecticians" more or less implicitly reject dialectics as it is, or minimally they think it inapplicable to nature, but history is fine (because history is not part of nature?).

I'm one of those who you are referring to, although I would not describe myself as a "dialectician" which is just another item of abuse invented by the author of this thread.


because history is not part of nature?Well, nature has its own history, so who would argue such a thing? But I get your point. There is obviously no human history unless human communities can produce their subsistence from nature. However, although we could argue that society and nature stand in a definite relation, there is no reason to suppose that they are identical or reducible to each other. Now, unless you want to commit the unpardonable sin of metaphysics and posit a set of over-arching laws which apply equally and uniformly to every process within our reality (whether natural or social), then surely you must agree with me.


Yet, despite this break from dialecticians such as Engels, et al., they still cling to the Hegelian/dialetical jargon (which is pernicious enough by itself, as it causes numerous confusions).
I'm all for ditching the mystifying jargon of Hegelianism and very rarely ever use it.


Some of us just go further, and dispense with any remnants of the confused jargon altogether, to just historical materialism.
Well, some would argue that rather than going further, you're going backwards to the mechanical materialism of the Scottish Enlightenment, but we'll let that pass. Meanwhile your claim that you and whomever your associates are, employ a non-dialectical historical materialism will remain unconvincing until you produce some explanation which is derived from it.

In fact, none of you can even describe what your version of historical materialism would look like apart from vague appeals to discredited models such as GH Cohen's. Rosa claims she has one but we must wait a decade or more before she unveils it!

So we still wait for a version of historical materialism which does not involve studying the contradictions between the forces and relations of production and how these contradictions are played out in the ideological battles between social classes - social classes which can only be fully understood in terms of their inner relations to each other and place within the overall mode of production.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

TAII:


This thread hasn't had replies in it for like 2 weeks how is this popular

I have already replied to this; can't you read?


the original thread, '@anti-dialectics made easy thread one' was closed without my agreement (by a global mod), but I wanted that one stickied.

However, it had over 500 posts in it (which made it impractical to sticky) and over 16,000 views, making it the most popular (in terms of views) in the entire history of the Philosophy section at this board, and bu a long way.

So, as a compromise, thread two was stickied.

-----------------------------

BTB:


In fact, none of you can even describe what your version of historical materialism would look like apart from vague appeals to discredited models such as GH Cohen's. Rosa claims she has one but we must wait a decade or more before she unveils it!

We have been over this several times, but still you prefer to invent things to attribute to me. I have said several times that Cohen's work needs supplimenting with the modifications Alex Callinicos suggested, and that is just for starters.


So we still wait for a version of historical materialism which does not involve studying the contradictions between the forces and relations of production and how these contradictions are played out in the ideological battles between social classes - social classes which can only be fully understood in terms of their inner relations to each other and place within the overall mode of production.

But, how can the relation between the forces and relations of production be a contradiction?

You have yet to explain that.

[Hyacinth]

Well, nature has its own history, so who would argue such a thing? But I get your point. There is obviously no human history unless human communities can produce their subsistence from nature. However, although we could argue that society and nature stand in a definite relation, there is no reason to suppose that they are identical or reducible to each other. Now, unless you want to commit the unpardonable sin of metaphysics and posit a set of over-arching laws which apply equally and uniformly to every process within our reality (whether natural or social), then surely you must agree with me.
Well, laws are anything more than descriptions of the behavior of a system which have predictive power. I don't think it necessary to reify laws in any way. I'm far from a reductionist, one simply cannot describe the behavior of more complex systems, such as society, or biology, etc. by using the law of a less complex system, such as physics.


Well, some would argue that rather than going further, you're going backwards to the mechanical materialism of the Scottish Enlightenment, but we'll let that pass. Meanwhile your claim that you and whomever your associates are, employ a non-dialectical historical materialism will remain unconvincing until you produce some explanation which is derived from it.

In fact, none of you can even describe what your version of historical materialism would look like apart from vague appeals to discredited models such as GH Cohen's. Rosa claims she has one but we must wait a decade or more before she unveils it!
There is no royal road to science, as Marx (and I'm sure others) said. Though I don't think Cohen's technological determinism discredited, certainly his analytic Marxism was—though not because analytic philosophy and Marxism are incompatible, his analytic Marxism suffers from sufficinecy quantiies of both—but Cohen is right to point that technology plays a great role in permitting for the existence of a certain mode of production, and by extension certain relations of production. This is not to say that technological determinism is the whole story, but it is a step in the right direction. (I have not read by Callinicos, so I cannot comment on Rosa's suggestion—though I'm most keen on checking his work out.)


So we still wait for a version of historical materialism which does not involve studying the contradictions between the forces and relations of production and how these contradictions are played out in the ideological battles between social classes - social classes which can only be fully understood in terms of their inner relations to each other and place within the overall mode of production.
Fair enough, but you seem to be employing the expression "contradiction" in a technical sense different from that which it means in formal logic, certainly different from that of Hegel/dialectics. And I'm more than happy with that, though I would prefer to see the concept that you are expressing with the term "contradiction" operationalized in systems theoretic terms. None of what you've said above is, as I see it, in conflict with Rosa's critique of dialectics (though she can step in and correct me if I'm misinterpeting her), except perhaps that she would say, and I would agree, that using the term "contradiction" to express a concept that is entirely unrelated either to dialectical contradictions, nor to contradictions in the formal sense, only serves to obscure, rather than elucidate, the concept you are trying to get across.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

In the end, BTB is just following tradition, as are most comrades who use this term but who do not know why they are using it.

[Charles Xavier]

This is a very popular thread nothing has been said for almost a week. I fail to see the reason for a sticky on the basis that its popular.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

TAII:


This is a very popular thread nothing has been said for almost a week. I fail to see the reason for a sticky on the basis that its popular.

1) I have been away for nearly a week,

2) Other stickies here receive even fewer hits per month. For example, this one:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/philosophical-resources-t32229/index.html

hasn't had a comment added for over a month.

This one:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/help-updating-stickies-t46758/index.html

hasn't had one since June 2008!

Finally, haven't you got better mystical things to do than perserverating like this?

[Charles Xavier]

TAII:



1) I have been away for nearly a week,

2) Other stickies here receive even fewer hits per month. For example, this one:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/philosophical-resources-t32229/index.html

hasn't had a comment added for over a month.

This one:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/help-updating-stickies-t46758/index.html

hasn't had one since June 2008!

Finally, haven't you got better mystical things to do than perserverating like this?

But where they stickied on the basis of popularity?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

TAII:


But where they stickied on the basis of popularity?

Where?

Here, obviously.

Next difficult question please...

[Charles Xavier]

Two more weeks without any discussion on this thread. Fail to see the popularity. Seems pretty biased actually.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

TA11, hoping to make flogging a dead horse an Olympic event:


Two more weeks without any discussion on this thread. Fail to see the popularity. Seems pretty biased actually.

But you have already conceded that sticky-ing a thread should not be based on popularity, so what are you moaning about?

Anyway, the catastrophically unpopular 'Dialectical Mystics' group has only had three or four posts in the last month. It looks like you Hermeticists can find nothing worthwhile to discuss, despite your rather weak attempts to drum up business. In fact, you have yet to debate a single substantive dialectical thesis, and most of the posts in the last two months have been about little old me.:)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Good news: scientists claim to have discovered the magnetic monopole, or something like it, foolishly having paid no attention to those comrades who daily impose dialectics on nature. Of course, if the poles of a magnet were logically linked, as dialecticians appear to believe, then Physicists would not even have tried to look for this monopole -- any more than they would attempt to find, say, Longitude 360 degrees North (that is not a misprint!). Here is the latest copy of the New Scientist:


"THEY seem magical: magnets, every child's favourite science toy. Two otherwise ordinary lumps of metal draw inexorably closer, finally locking together with a satisfying snap. Yet turn one of them round and they show an entirely different, repulsive face: try as you might to make them, never the twain shall meet.

"If magnets seem rather bipolar, that's because they are. Every magnet has two poles, a north and a south. Like poles repel, unlike poles attract. No magnet breaks the two-pole rule -- not the humblest bar magnet, not the huge dynamo at the heart of our planet. Split a magnet in two, and each half sprouts the pole it lost. It seems that poles without their twins -- magnetic 'monopoles' -- simply do not exist.

"That hasn't stopped physicists hunting. For decades they have ransacked everything from moon rock and cosmic rays to ocean-floor sludge to find them. There is a simple reason for this quixotic quest. Our best explanations of how the universe hangs together demand that magnetic monopoles exist. If they are not plain to see, they must be hiding.

"Now, at last, we have might have spied them out. The first convincing evidence for their existence has popped up in an unexpected quarter. They are not exactly the monopoles of physics lore, but they could provide us with essential clues as to how those legendary beasts behave.

"So what attracts physicists to monopoles? Several things. First, there's symmetry -- a purely aesthetic consideration, true, but one that for many physicists reveals a theory's true worth. For over a century, we have known that magnetism and electricity are two faces of one force: electromagnetism. Electric fields beget magnetic fields and vice versa.

"Accordingly, the classical picture of electromagnetism, formulated in the late 19th century, is pretty much symmetrical in its treatment of electricity and magnetism. But although positive and negative electric charges can separate and move freely in electric fields, magnetic "charge" remains bound up in pairs of north and south poles that cancel each other out. 'No monopoles' is another way of saying that there is no such thing as a freely moving magnetic charge.

"In 1931, this puzzling asymmetry caught the attention of the pioneering quantum physicist Paul Dirac. He pointed out that quantum theory did not deny the possibility of monopoles; on the contrary, they could be quite useful. His calculations showed that monopoles existing anywhere in the universe would explain why electric charge always comes in the same bite-size chunks, or quanta.

"Even so, monopoles were little more than a curiosity, and the lack of any obvious examples nearby dampened the enthusiasm for the chase. That all changed in the 1960s with the wide acceptance of the big bang theory -- the idea that the universe began in a fireball governed by a single force that has since splintered into the fundamental forces we see today. The great ambition of physics became to construct a theory that would reunite these forces.

"There are many different approaches to this goal, and almost all have an odd feature in common: they say that chunks of magnetic charge must have been created in the very first fraction of a nanosecond of the universe's existence. Some theories, like Dirac's original idea, suggest these monopoles are very massive, with a mass around 1016 times that of a proton. Other approaches suggest more modest beasts with a mass only a few thousand times the mass of the proton. But all predict they should be there.

"Suddenly monopoles assumed a new significance. Not only would the detection of magnetic monopoles be a major boost for 'grand unified' theories of how the universe began, but finding the mass of a monopole would help distinguish which of those theories were on the right track. 'The search has a low chance of paying off, but a very high importance if it did,' says Steven Weinberg of the University of Texas at Austin, who won the Nobel prize for physics in 1979 for his work on force unification.

"Sheldon Glashow of Harvard University, who also took a share of the 1979 prize, took the monopole idea a stage further. That same year, he suggested that beefy, Dirac-type monopoles might also be the answer to one of cosmology's most important unsolved problems: they might be the identity of the unseen dark matter that is thought to make up most of the universe and to have formed the structures that led to galaxies.

"Physicists thus had a wealth of reasons to believe that these 'cosmic' monopoles must exist somewhere. But where? Besides the odd tantalising glimpse, no experiment has yet produced convincing evidence of their existence (see "Race for the pole").

"There are reasons to believe they never shall. According to the inflationary theory of the universe's origin, which has gained wide currency since the 1980s, the cosmos expanded enormously fast just after the big bang. This expansion should have carried most, if not all, of the monopoles created in the first instants of the universe to a patch of the cosmos so distant that they, and information about them, will probably never reach us. Game over?

Perhaps not, if the latest research is anything to go by. Monopoles might have been under our noses for a while, in a strange type of solid known as spin ice. When this material was reported in 1997 by physicists Mark Harris of the University of Oxford, Steve Bramwell of University College London and their colleagues (Physical Review Letters, vol. 79, p 2554), monopole searches were not high on the agenda. The researchers were looking at something else entirely -- an odd property of certain solids known as magnetic frustration....

"'Suddenly, there was a community of physicists who became monopole hunters,' says Peter Holdsworth of the École Normale Supérieure in Lyon, France, one of the people bitten by the bug. Together with his colleague Ludovic Jaubert, he has produced independent confirmation of the monopole idea. In a paper published last month (Nature Physics, vol 5, p 258), the pair revisit an experiment reported in 2004 by a group led by Peter Schiffer at Pennsylvania State University in University Park. Schiffer's team had shown that when a magnetic field was applied to spin ice at low temperatures and then removed, the spins were surprisingly slow to revert to their original state (Physical Review B, vol. 64, p 064414). Jaubert and Holdsworth calculated that monopoles explain this perfectly: at low temperatures, monopoles do not have enough energy to move freely, and so make the magnetic response of the entire system sluggish by just the amount the experiments had found.

"It seems the elusive monopoles have been pinned down at last. But Blas Cabrera, who looked for monopoles in cosmic rays passing through his laboratory at Stanford University in the 1980s, sounds a note of caution. The monopoles discovered in spin ice are rather different beasts from those he and others were looking for. For a start, they are some 8000 times less magnetic and are free to move only within the spin ice, not to roam the wider universe. So they are not really analogous to electric charges, and it doesn't look as if they are going to solve the dark matter problem.

"Do they count at all? Quite possibly. When Dirac dreamed up his cosmic monopoles, he imagined a vacuum as the lowest possible energy state that free space could assume. Monopoles then represented a higher-energy 'excitation' of a vacuum, in much the same way that the low-energy two-in, two-out spin-ice state is excited to create monopoles. The new research even borrows elements of Dirac's description of free-space monopoles -- such as the invisible 'strings' he envisaged between pairs of poles that have separated. The similarities mean that the interactions of spin-ice monopoles could provide a way to learn about cosmic monopoles by proxy -- for example, how they might have interacted in the early universe.

"'Quite apart from that, the more down-to-earth monopoles might turn out to be practically useful', says Tchernyshyov. Most computer memories store information magnetically, and the ability to use magnetic rather than electric charges to read and write bits to and from those stores could have great advantages in speed and flexibility. What's more, the three-dimensional configuration of spin ice might allow for memories of much higher density than is currently possible.

"That's for the future. For Holdsworth, the mere fact that we have found monopoles somewhere -- anywhere -- is reason enough to make a song and dance about them. 'These might not be exactly the monopoles that Dirac dreamed of, but that doesn't mean they're not remarkable.'"

[Reich (2009) (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20227071.100-hunting-the-mysterious-monopole.html?page=1), pp.28-31. Quotation marks altered to conform to the conventions adopted at my site.]

If so, one the the most over-used and cliched examples DM-fans use to 'illustrate' their 'theory' (concerning the 'unity and interpenetration of opposites'), namely bi-polar magnets, is no longer of much use.

Not that it was much use before:

This is because in this case it is opposites (a north and a south) that attract one another -- they do not 'struggle', contrary to what we are told they mst do in the dialectical classics -- and it is non-opposites that repel each other (i.e., two norths or two souths); hence, like poles repel -- i.e., non-opposites 'struggle', again, contrary to the Dialectical Holy Books.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here is an article of mine, which I posted in an earlier Dialectical Materialism thread; the first half contains a very brief and down-to-earth explanation of this 'theory', while the second half contains my demoltion. Many of the original links (often indicated by the occurrence of the word "here") have been ommitted. They can be accessed by following the shortcut posted at the end:


Anti-Dialectics For Dummies

Introduction

This Essay is meant to be a very brief, simplified and down-to-earth introduction to a few of the more important arguments against classical Dialectical Materialism [DM] found at my site. It is aimed solely at those who find the Basic Introductory Essay (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm) either too difficult or too long. Hence, I have deliberately tried to keep everything exceedingly simple and concise, saying all I want to in less than 5000 words.

Those requiring more detail and/or greater sophistication should consult the longer Essays I have published at the main site (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/). Anyone who complains about the over-simplification below should re-read the title: it's "Anti-dialectics For Dummies", not experts!

As is the case with all of my Essays, nothing here should be read as an attack on Historical Materialism [HM], a theory I fully accept.

Please note, however, that in the first part of this Essay I am summarising DM (as I see it), not my own beliefs!

My criticisms begin in the second half. Numbers in brackets refer to endnotes.

So, What Is DM?

Anyone new to Marxism soon encounters DM (or, in its more political form, "Materialist Dialectics").(1)

'Mediated' Totality

But what exactly is DM? First of all we are told that it is a materialist theory; as Rob Sewell explains:


Philosophical materialism is the outlook which explains that there is only one material world.... The universe...is not the creation of any supernatural being, is in the process of constant flux . Human beings are a part of nature, and evolved from lower forms of life, whose origins sprung from a lifeless planet some 3.6 billion or so years ago. With the evolution of life, at a certain stage, came the development of animals with a nervous system, and eventually human beings with a large brain. With humans emerged human thought and consciousness. The human brain alone is capable of producing general ideas, i.e., thinking. Therefore matter...existed and still exists independently of the mind and human beings. Things existed long before any awareness of them arose or could have arisen on the part of living organisms.

...Matter is not a product of mind, but mind itself is the highest product of matter. Ideas are simply a reflection of the independent material world that surrounds us...."


And yet, this theory is much more than this, for dialecticians also believe that the world is an integrated whole, a "Totality", with all its parts interconnected and interdependent (which is roughly what "mediated" means, so far as we can tell). This Totality has developed over billions of years under the aegis (control) of a series of general laws discovered (in their modern) form by a prominent German philosopher, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1779-1831).

However Hegel was an Idealist, that is, he considered the material world to be dependent on an underlying non-material reality, a world of Ideas -- in fact this world was merely an outer form of the development of God's knowledge of 'Himself'. [How that works is best left to one side for now!]

Ruling elites have always seen the world this way; no less so Hegel.

Nevertheless, Hegel's theory was taken up by Marx and Engels, who, so legend has it, stripped away its mystical, idealist outer layers, and put its "rational core" to work in their own account of history, class struggle and social change. For them, the world of ideas was just a "reflection" of the material world in the minds of men and women.

Engels later formulated the basic ideas of this 'inverted' theory, but now applied to the whole universe, not just human history. This extended theory subsequently came to be known as "Dialectical Materialism" [DM].

In Engels's hands, and in those of later theorists, DM taught that the development of nature and society was governed by a number of inter-related laws, listed below.

Quantity And Quality [Q/Q]

Material change is not an accidental feature of the operation of nature. The qualitative aspects of things we see around us change in specific ways, according to precise laws -- or so dialecticians tell us.

The first law is the change of quantity into quality.

It is a common feature of our experience that systems and objects around us have different properties, and that these can change. Things can alter from solid to liquid, hot to cold, red to blue, and so on. Some changes are superficial (for example, if you have your hair cut, that does not really alter who you are in any significant way); others are more profound (for example, if a house burns down, that is a pretty fundamental change).

However, underlying such apparent diversity there are several unifying factors, which is where this law comes in. If matter or energy is fed into a system, at some point it will undergo a sudden, or "nodal", change. For instance, if you load straws onto the proverbial camel's back, at some point it will break.

Here is Rob Sewell again:


"It has been said that there are no sudden leaps in nature, and it is a common notion that things have their origin through gradual increase or decrease," states Hegel. "But there is also such a thing as sudden transformation from quantity to quality. For example, water does not become gradually hard on cooling, becoming first pulpy and ultimately attaining a rigidity of ice, but turns hard at once. If temperature be lowered to a certain degree, the water is suddenly changed into ice, i.e., the quantity -- the number of degrees of temperature - is transformed into quality a change in the nature of the thing." (Logic §776)

This is the cornerstone of understanding change. Change or evolution does not take place gradually in a straight smooth line.... [Ibid]

Such change is important for dialecticians since they think it helps them account for the sudden nature of revolutions and the qualitative change between different social/economic systems -- like that between Capitalism and Socialism -- among other things.

The law of the change of quantity into quality is thus diametrically opposed to any principle that advocates a gradualist/reformist route to communism -- or so we are led to believe.

The Unity And Interpenetration Of Opposites [UO]

This law is less easy to follow, but the basic idea is that according to DM-theorists, objects and processes in nature are always composed of paired "opposites". These pairs may be 'internal' to objects and processes: so we have positive and negative particles inside atoms, holding them together (as it were). Alternatively, they could be 'external': hence we have positive and negative in electricity, North and South poles in magnets, male and female organisms, and so on. [Naturally, several of these could be a mixture of internal and external factors.]

Now, these opposites are not accidentally linked, but in a real sense depend on one another. In that case, you could not have a magnetic North without a South, for example. They inter-define and inter-depend on each other; hence the use of the word "interpenetrate". Dialecticians also confusingly call these opposites "contradictions" --, or, it's the relation between them which is, but this idea is not too clear in their writings.

Nevertheless, "contradictions" are the universal motor of change in nature and society, according to dialecticians.

Quoting Sewell once more:


"In brief", states Lenin, "dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…."

The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above-below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on. [Ibid]

The Negation Of The Negation [NON]

It is undeniable that objects and processes in nature and society do not last forever. Some things crumble to dust, some explode -- while still others develop, reproduce and grow. When objects, processes or social systems are destroyed, or cease to exist as such (etc.), dialecticians say they have been "negated"; but when they develop into something new (which outcome is systematically-connected to its earlier stages, preserving aspects of the old while introducing novelty), they then say that this "negated" form has also been "negated" into something new, something of a higher type perhaps -- the "negation of the negation".

Rob Sewell again:


The law of the negation of the negation explains the repetition at a higher level of certain features and properties of the lower level and the apparent return of past features....

This whole process can be best pictured as a spiral, where the movement comes back to the position it started, but at a higher level. In other words, historical progress is achieved through a series of contradictions. Where the previous stage is negated, this does not represent its total elimination. It does not wipe out completely the stage that it supplants.

Engels gives a[n]...example from the insect world. "Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg through a negation of the egg, they pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, they pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs." [Ibid]

Formal Logic [FL]

FL was invented in the West single-handedly by Aristotle (384-322BC), as far as we know. His was the first systematic attempt to study the principles underlying valid argument patterns.

Now, one of the oddest things about dialecticians is that every last one of them criticises FL, saying things like this:


When dealing with drawn out processes or complicated events, formal logic becomes a totally inadequate way of thinking. This is particularly the case in dealing with movement, change and contradiction. Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless. Of course, this is not to deny the everyday usefulness of formal logic, on the contrary, but we need to recognise it limits. [Ibid]

It is worth noting here that the vast majority of such criticisms are aimed at Aristotelian Logic [AFL]. However, AFL is now a wholly defunct system, having been replaced over 130 years ago by far more elaborate and sophisticated systems of Modern Logic (now confusingly called "Classical Logic") and Mathematical Logic.

Unfortunately, this makes much of what dialecticians say about logic as relevant as if they were criticising ancient theories of the heavens, like Ptolemy's, while imagining they were all along addressing modern Astronomy.

Is That It?

Of course, there is much more to DM than this very brief summary would suggest. [For more details, read this.] However, if I go into this at greater length, this Essay will exceed the 5000 word limit I have set myself!

So, What's The Problem?

Disaster Central

Dialecticians tell us that truth is tested in practice.


From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice, -- such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality. [Lenin (1961), p.171. Emphasis in the original.]

In that case, what does history reveal?

Unfortunately, Dialectical Marxism has not known much in the way of success. The 1917 revolution has been reversed, practically every single 'socialist' state has abandoned Marxism, all four Internationals have gone down the pan, and few revolutionary parties these days can boast active membership levels that rise much above the risible. To cap it all, billions of workers world-wide not only ignore DM, they have never even heard of it.

And yet, most dialecticians claim that materialist dialectics lies at the heart of their revolutionary theory and practice. If so, why have none of them drawn the obvious conclusion that history has refuted their theory?

The reasons for this are complex, and will not be entered into here in any detail. However, as I argue in Essay Nine Parts One (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_01.htm) and Two (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_02.htm), this has much to do with the role dialectics plays in convincing revolutionaries that despite appearances to the contrary, history is moving their way. If dialectics operates throughout the universe, not even the capitalist class can thwart it for long.

[On this in general, see Essay Ten Part One (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%20010_01.htm).]

However, it is my contention that this theory is part of the reason why Dialectical Marxism is now almost synonymous with failure.

Clearly, such long-term lack of success suggests that this theory might not be quite as sound as DM-fans would have us believe.

No surprise therefore: that is exactly what we find.

Objections

Quantity And Quality [Q/Q]

Engels asserted the following:


...[T]he transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned. [Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added.]

As we have seen, such change is not smooth or gradual:


It will be understood without difficulty by anyone who is in the least capable of dialectical thinking...[that] quantitative changes, accumulating gradually, lead in the end to changes of quality, and that these changes of quality represent leaps, interruptions in gradualness…. That is how all Nature acts…. [Plekhanov (1956), pp.74-77, 88, 163. Bold emphases alone added.]

But there are many things in nature that change smoothly; think of melting metal, rock, glass, plastic, butter, toffee and chocolate. Sure, some things change 'nodally' (i.e., in "leaps"), but many do not. So, the 'nodal' aspect of this law is defective.

Unfortunately, this means that this law cannot be used to argue that the transformation from capitalism to socialism must be 'nodal' too (as dialecticans do), for we have as yet no idea whether or not this transformation will be one of these exceptions. Plainly, we could only use this law if it had no exceptions at all.

This means that the whole point of adopting this law in the first place has now vanished.

What about the 'quantity into quality' part? Undeniably, many material things change qualitatively, and they do so as a result of the addition or subtraction of matter and/or energy.

But not all qualitative differences are caused this way. The order in which events take place can effect quality, too. For example, try crossing a busy main road first and looking second -- now try it the other way round! And anyone who tries pouring half a litre of water slowly into a litre of concentrated sulphuric acid will face a long and painful stay in hospital, whereas the reverse action is perfectly safe.

When confronted with examples like these, dialecticians largely ignore them, but the few who don't often tell us that these aren't objections to this law, since Engels (and other DM-theorists) did not mean it to be interpreted this way. How they know this they have so far kept to themselves.

Now, this Law is so vaguely worded that dialecticians can use it in whatever way they please. If this is difficult to believe, ask the very next dialectician you meet precisely how long a "nodal point" is supposed to last; you will receive no answer. But, if no one knows, then anything from a Geological Age to an instantaneous quantum leap could be "nodal"!

And, it really isn't good enough for dialecticians to dismiss this as mere pedantry. Can you imagine a genuine scientist refusing to say how long a crucially important interval in her theory is supposed to be, and accusing you of "pedantry" for even asking?

And then enquire what a "quality" is. If your respondent knows his/her theory, you might be told it is a property the change of which alters a process/object into something new. For example, in evolution numerous small variations in organisms accumulate until a new species arises.

Unfortunately, given this explanation of "quality" many of the examples DM-theorists themselves give to illustrate their theory would fail.

For instance: the most hackneyed example they use is that of water turning to ice or steam, if cooled or heated. Given the above 'definition', this wouldn't be an example of qualitative change, since water (as ice, liquid or steam) is still water (i.e., H2O). Quantitative addition or subtraction of energy does not result in a qualitative change of the required sort; nothing substantially new emerges. This substance stays H2O throughout.

Faced with that, dialecticians may be tempted to relax the definition of a quality, so that in solid, liquid or gaseous form, water could be said to exhibit different qualities.

Unfortunately, this would rescue the above example but sink the theory. If we relax "quality" so that it applies to any qualitative difference, then we would have to include the relational properties of bodies. In that case we could easily have qualitative change with no extra matter or energy added to the system. For instance, consider three animals in a row: a mouse, a pony, and an elephant. In relation to the mouse, the pony is big, but in relation to the elephant it is small. Change in quality, but no matter or energy has been added or subtracted.

Finally, there are substances studied in Chemistry called isomers. These are molecules with exactly the same atoms, but their geometrical orientation is different, which lends to each their different properties. So, here we would have a change in geometry causing a change in quality, with the addition of no new matter or energy -- contradicting Engels:


...[Q]ualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned. [Engels (1954), p.63. Emphasis added.]

So, at the very best, this law is merely a quaint rule of thumb (a bit like: "A stitch in time saves nine"). At worst, it is like a stopped clock: totally useless, even if twice a day it tells the 'right time'.

Engels's First 'Law' is thus of no use in developing revolutionary theory, and so it has no role to play in helping change society.

The Unity And Interpenetration Of Opposites [UO]

This is perhaps the most important of these laws, for it encapsulates the principle of change, as well as that of temporary stability, in DM.

Unfortunately, dialecticians have up until now been entirely unclear whether things change because of their internal opposites, whether they change into these opposites or whether they create these opposites as they change:

Here is Lenin:


[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…. [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]

And here is Plekhanov:


And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…. [Plekhanov (1956), p.77. Emphasis added.]

And here is Mao:


Why is it that "...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another"? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute. [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42. Emphases added.]

More of the same can be found here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm).

But this leaves change a complete mystery.

To see this, let us suppose that object/process A has two opposites O* and O**, and thus changes as a result.(2) But O* cannot itself change into O** since O** already exists! If it didn't already exist, according to this theory, O* could not change, for there would be no opposite to make it do so!

And it is no good propelling O** into the future so that it would now become what O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless O** is already there to make it happen!

Of course, this is all quite apart from the fact that many things just do not change into their opposites (or even because of them). When was the last time you saw a male cat turn into a female cat? Your left hand into your right? An electron into a proton? Or even a material object turn into an immaterial one?

And are we really supposed to believe that every proletarian (as individuals or as a class) will turn into Capitalists (and/or vice versa)?

Naturally, this does not deny that change occurs, just that DM cannot account for it. Alternatively: if DM were true, change could not happen.

Thus the second 'Law' is completely useless.

The Negation Of The Negation [NON]

This law is just an extension to, and elaboration of the previous law; in that case, the NON suffers from all the latter's weaknesses.

However, the example Rob Sewell retailed is rather unfortunate:


Engels gives a[n]...example from the insect world. "Butterflies, for example, spring from the egg through a negation of the egg, they pass through certain transformations until they reach sexual maturity, they pair and are in turn negated, dying as soon as the pairing process has been completed and the female has laid its numerous eggs." [Quoted from here]

In fact, butterflies and moths go through the following stages:

Adult→egg→pupa→chrysalis→adult

Which is the negation of what here? And which is the NON?

And what about organisms that reproduce by splitting, such as amoebae and bacteria? In any such division, which half is the negation and which the NON? What about vegetative (asexual) reproduction in general, where there are no opposites (no gametes)?

Consider, too, the thoroughly reactionary life form Myxomycota (The Slime Mould), which belongs neither to the plant nor the animal kingdom, but to the Protoctista. Its life-cycle involves the following forms: a giant amoebal stage, followed by a slug-like existence, which morphs into a fungal-like fruiting body, which then releases spores.

Now it might be that this organism is so primitive that it does not 'understand' dialectics, and has thus not quite figured out which of these four stages is the 'negation', and which the NON, let alone what 'sublates' what -- especially since the first phase of its life-cycle involves a union, a 'dialectical tautology' if you will!

["Sublate" is a technical term found in dialectics and roughly means to "negate but transcend" -- it emphasises the creative/preservative, not so much the destructive, aspect of 'dialectical' negation.]

No doubt a commissar will be assigned to 're-educate' this reactionary life-form after the revolution.

There are many other examples of thoroughly revisionist organisms and processes in nature. [In fact, DM-fans ignore these just as creationists ignore inconsistencies in the Bible and the many examples of lack of design in nature.]

And with respect to the former USSR (as it was in 1917): if the NON is progressive, why did it let history down badly and allow the revolution to decay, and then go into reverse?

Is modern-day Russian really the negation of the negation of the negation of Tsarist Russia?

On the contrary, do we not rather have the complete negation of Hegel and Engels here?

Formal Logic [FL]

Dialecticians like to say things like this:

[QUOTE]Formal logic regards things as fixed and motionless. [Rob Sewell.]

Formal categories, putting things in labelled boxes, will always be an inadequate way of looking at change and development…because a static definition cannot cope with the way in which a new content emerges from old conditions. [Rees (1998), p.59.]

However, when asked to provide any evidence to support such bold assertions, DM-fans go rather quiet or just become evasive.

And it is not hard to see why: the above claims are entirely bogus. They were untrue of AFL, and they are even less true of MFL.

[AFL = Aristotelian Formal Logic; MFL = Modern Formal Logic.]

Indeed, FL uses variables -- that is, it employs letters to stand for named objects, designated processes (some of the linguistic devises used to this end are called "predicates" -- these are the parts of sentences that left over if you omit things like Proper Names, etc.), and the like -- all of which can and do change.

This handy device was invented by the very first logician we know of (in the 'West'): Aristotle (384-322BC). He experimented with variables approximately 1500 years before the same tactic was extended into mathematics by Muslim Algebraists -- who in turn used them several centuries before René Descartes (1596-1650) began employing them in the 'West'.

Indeed, Engels said the following about that particular innovation:


The turning point in mathematics was Descartes' variable magnitude. With that came motion and hence dialectics in mathematics, and at once, too, of necessity the differential and integral calculus…. [Engels (1954), p.258.]

No one doubts that modern mathematics can handle change, so why dialecticians deny this of FL when it has always used variables is therefore something of a mystery.

However, FL is a highly technical area, so I will say no more about it in this Essay. [More here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2004.htm), however.] But, I will add that those who propound a theory that cannot account for change itself (i.e., dialecticians -- we saw that earlier) are in no position to make rash allegations about FL, especially if they have yet to produce any evidence that FL is as handicapped as they say it is.

Ruling-Class Thought

Marx famously claimed:


The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. [[I]The German Ideology, quoted from here.]

Now, as is easy to show, Hegel (the Idealist originator of dialectics) lifted many of his doctrines from earlier mystics. Not only that, these ideas have appeared in the philosophical theories of ruling-class thinkers from ancient times onwards. In that case, the only conclusion possible is that dialectics must be part of the ruling ideas Marx was speaking about.

This conclusion is not easy for revolutionaries to accept, for it seems to implicate the founders of our movement in the deliberate importation of alien-class ideas into Marxism. To be sure, dialecticians say they have removed the Idealist and mystical elements of Hegel's dialectic (or, rather, they have "put Hegel's ideas on their feet", and retrieved their "rational core"), but since it is plain that the remaining husk has been imposed on nature (not read from it) in good idealist fashion, that claim is entirely bogus. [More on that here.]

However, the founders of Marxism were not workers. From infancy onwards their education was aimed at ensuring that they saw the world as ruling classes have always done -- that is, as one with an invisible, underlying 'rational' structure (accessible to thought alone), which thus helps 'justify' the status quo.

These comrades imported such alien ideas into Marxism unwittingly. They knew no better; their petty-bourgeois being determined their petty-bourgeois consciousness.

But, as should seem obvious from the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism, this importation has to be reversed.

Otherwise, we can look forward to another 150 years of failure.

NOTES

1. For the purposes of this Essay, I will ignore the difference between DM and 'materialist dialectics'. Much of what I have to say here applies to both anyway.

2. I have avoided calling these opposites A* and A**, since we would have three items here, A, A* and A**, complicating things unnecessarily. Of course, such intricacies will be introduced and taken to their logical conclusion in other Essays posted at the main site. [For example, see here (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm).]

References

Engels, F. (1954), Dialectics Of Nature (Progress Publishers).

Hegel, G. (1999), Science Of Logic (Humanity Books).

Lenin, V. (1961), Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works, Volume 38 (Progress Publishers).

Mao Tse-Tung (1961a), Selected Works Of Mao Tse-Tung, Volume One (Foreign Languages Press).

--------, (1961b), 'On Contradiction', in Mao (1961a), pp.311-47.

Plekhanov, G. (1956), The Development Of The Monist View Of History (Progress Publishers).

Rees, J. (1998), The Algebra Of Revolution (Routledge).

The original, with its links etc., can be accessed here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Anti-D_For_Dummies%2001.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

A rather sophisticated @nti-dialectical punch-up going on here (in the comments at the foot of the page):

http://marxisthumanistinitiative.org/2009/05/05/brief-comments-on-the-relationship-between-marxism-and-the-hegelian-dialectic/

[Charles Xavier]

This is pointless grandstanding by Rosa. There is no need for him to have a thread dedicated to himself stickyed.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The mystics here have been clamouring for their very own 'Confuse Yourself with Dialectics' thread/sticky (in competition with this thread/sticky), and have been granted permission to set one up.

Well, since they set up their very own Dialectical Mortuary (http://www.revleft.com/vb/group.php?groupid=62) in the autumn, nothing substantial has been posted there in well over six months, and nothing at all in nearly a month. So, it should come as no surprise that all these philosophical zombies have managed to produce now thay have been granted this permission is to change the title of the following sticky from 'Marxist Philosophy' to 'Marxist Philosophy including dialectics':

http://www.revleft.com/vb/marxist-philosophy-including-t85224/index.html

A major advance in theory, as I am sure all will agree...

[Hit The North]

I changed the title of the sticky and didn't need anybody's permission to do so. Nevertheless, I'm happy to flag it up more clearly so that comrades can read what Marxists have to say about the materialist dialectic as opposed to what Rosa has to say. :)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I changed the title of the sticky and didn't need anybody's permission to do so

Who said you did?


Nevertheless, I'm happy to flag it up more clearly so that comrades can read what Marxists have to say about the materialist dialectic as opposed to what Rosa has to say.

And yet, if the past is anything to go by, what comrades have to say about this 'theory' is either: yet more error-strewn repetition, or nothing at all!

[Charles Xavier]

Rosa what you say on this is incorrect. Material Change is part of the normal operations of nature. The old replacing the new. This is so basic even a 5th grader understands it.

"Material change is not an accidental feature of the operation of nature. The qualitative aspects of things we see around us change in specific ways, according to precise laws -- or so dialecticians tell us."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I have never denied material change -- you need to read more carefully. What I have denied is that you dialecticans can explain it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Because I have had to move my site, the Basic Introductory Essay can now be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Why%20I%20Oppose%20DM.htm

I have also completely re-written it.

The rest of my site is slowly being moved accross to here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/index.htm

[red_che]

i'm back...:cool:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The level of debate should plummet, then.:lol:

[red_che]

Which is good... Since nothing is interesting about your posts...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red:


Since nothing is interesting about your posts...

In that case, why do you stalk me here, and concentrate only on my posts?

[red_che]

Because I need something that is not interesting so that I don't get tired thinking. The revolution is quite hard. So I need to relax... :D

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red:


Because I need something that is not interesting so that I don't get tired thinking. The revolution is quite hard. So I need to relax...

Then you are troll who is out of his depth -- but we already knew that the last time you barged in here.

[red_che]

Rosa:


Then you are troll who is out of his depth -- but we already knew that the last time you barged in here.

I guess, my "vacation" for a few days will be both exciting and boring. Exciting because I will reunite with old friends :cool: and boring because I will have this childish arguments of yours once more (after several years)...:bored:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red:


and boring because I will have this childish arguments of yours once more (after several years)

So, you are back to your old ways: you can't respond to my argunents, so you just become abusive.

[red_che]

Rosa:


So, you are back to your old ways: you can't respond to my argunents, so you just become abusive.

Refer to the other thread. That's my last response for now. 'Till we argue again...:D

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Red:


Refer to the other thread. That's my last response for now. 'Till we argue again...

And yet, in that other thread, you substitute abuse for argument, too.

In that case, you seem determined to re-confirm the reputation you had here two years ago as one of the worst arguers we have ever seen at RevLeft.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The Coven has sparked to life again after a few more weeks of deadly dialectical silence.

But, what new advance in mystical lore has emerged from the in-depth discussions they regularly hold there (that is, as regularly as Halley's Comet comes around), what new gem of dialectical dopery has surfaced in this murky backwater of intellectual suicide?

Yes, you guessed it: more fibs about yours truly (since I, and not this 'theory', it seems, am the centre of attention).

Here are the latest anti-Rosa fabulations from a normally honest comrade (Random Precision -- in this case, more accurately to be called 'Rarely Precise') -- posted at the Coven (where I am not allowed to post), since this 'brave revolutionary' cannot face me in open debate (goodness knows what he will do when the first barricade goes up! Bets are off, but the smart money was not on 'runs away', but on 'wets himself'):


Of course, Rosa believes that Marx was using the word "dialectical" in such passages as jargon, or some sort of an elaborate joke on his readers. She refuses to see anything dialectical in those passages, and puts more stock in things like a misplaced comma, or an endorsement of a book review, then things like this that Marx actually elaborated at length on.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/group.php?do=discuss&group=&discussionid=2434

This extremely near-sighted comrade clearly missed my comment (repeated on many occasions) that the 'dialectical method' is in fact closer to that of Kant and Aristotle (or even the Scottish Historical Materialists).

Moreover, as he would also have seen, had he not missed his last eye check-up, the "jargon" I refer to is none other than this:


and even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him [Hegel]

Here, in Marx's words, [I]not mine, nor yet those of James Burnham or Max Eastman, we are told in no uncertain terms, what Marx's view is of the opaque terminology Hegel used (which, even to this day, not one of these moaning mystics can explain to us): it is fit only to be 'coquetted' with.


She refuses to see anything dialectical in those passages, and puts more stock in things like a misplaced comma,

Well, if this eagle-eyed comrade can see anything 'dialectical' (in the traditional sense, not Marx's sense) in this passage, he missed yet another golden opportunity to reveal this well-hidden truth to the rest of us.

From that we may conclude that this is just another rhetorical flourish which mystics like him parade in front of one another to keep their flagging morale up -- and nothing more.

Otherwise, why not tell the rest of us what these 'dialectical gems' Marx so expertly concealed are?

And the 'misplaced comma' is of course a reference to a comma the official edition of Marx's collected works saw fit to insert in the above passage:


and even, here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him [Hegel]

Here is the defective version:


and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him [Hegel]

So, the most authoritative version of this passage concurs with my interpretation, that is, that Marx was using the chapter on value as an example, not an exhaustive list, of the places where he 'coquetted'.

Any other interpretation of this passage -- i.e., one that limits his 'coquetting' to the chapter on value -- would have to explain why Marx did this only in perhaps the most important section of the book, but in other areas did not 'coquette' with Hegelian terms -- and, what is worse, what the difference is between a 'coquetted' "contradiction" and an non-'coquetted' "contradiction".

[Do not hold your breath on that one comrades, these Dialectical Dunces cannot even tell us what an ordinary 'contradiction' is!]

So, my interpretation not only agrees with this authoritative version of Das Kapital, it does not make Marx look like an inconsistent idiot.


Though for the record, I am on my way through Capital at the moment, and the dialectic is pretty much screamingly obvious on every page. I started reading by writing the concepts of dialectical logic I was seeing in the margins next to where I saw them, but pretty soon I was filling all of the margins up and poking holes through the page so I decided to stop.

Yes, and if you talk to born-again Christians, they can see the "handiwork" of 'god' everywhere, too.

Anyway, it's too bad this myopic mystic failed to note that Marx was, in his own words, 'coquetting' with these 'dialectical' phrases. And no wonder; as is very easy to show, if this 'theory' were true, change would be impossible:

Quotes:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

Argument:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401001&postcount=77


It must take a very stubborn mind to refuse to see this.

Nice of Rarely Precise to be self-critical here -- albeit, inadvertently.

[Hit The North]

This extremely near-sighted comrade clearly missed my comment (repeated on many occasions) that the 'dialectical method' is in fact closer to that of Kant and Aristotle (or even the Scottish Historical Materialists).

So now the Scottish materialists had a 'dialectical method'? Your arguments get increasingly bizarre.

With great thinkers like Adam Smith around, inventing historical materialism and applying a dialectical method, we don't really need Marx do we?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


So now the Scottish materialists had a 'dialectical method'? Your arguments get increasingly bizarre.

You clearly know nothing about Aristotle's method, which these Scottish Materialists emulated.

You'd be better off not opening your mouth in future before you attempt to gain at least a modicum of knowledge, rather than opening it prematurely and revealing your gob is as big as that gaping hole in your understanding.


With great thinkers like Adam Smith around, inventing historical materialism and applying a dialectical method, we don't really need Marx do we?

That's about as stupid as saying "With great thinkers like Galileo around, who needs Netwon?"

Not only did Marx have a high opinion of Smith, the latter's work stood in relation to Marx as Galileo's did to Newton.

[Hit The North]

True, but no one credits Galileo with Newton's achievements.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


True, but no one credits Galileo with Newton's achievements.

And where do I credit Marx's achievements on Smith? You do know that Smith invented to labour theory of value? Are you now going to say he didn't, Marx did?

And you have already had it shown you the extent to which Marx himself gave credit to Aristotle, Ferguson, Millar, Smith and Stewart for their invention of the historical method in materialism.

Apparently your memory is as short as your wind is long.

[Hit The North]

I'm objecting to you claiming historical materialism as the invention of the Scottish materialists. That there is a debt is not in question. However, the classical and foundational statements on the materialist conception of history belong to Marx. Moreover, Marx also states a debt to Hegel, but you refuse to acknowledge it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I'm objecting to you claiming historical materialism as the invention of the Scottish materialists.

On what basis? Not even Marx called his theory 'Historical Materialism'.

We call it that, and we now know where Marx derived some of the main ideas from -- as he himself admits.

[Hit The North]

Marx, doesn't simply 'derive' ideas. He systematically subjects them to critique and transforms them.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Marx, doesn't simply 'derive' ideas. He systematically subjects them to critique and transforms them.

In this you admit he 'simply' derived them from these theorists. Now, no one denies he revolutionised these ideas, like Newton revolutionised Galileo's work. And saying that dos not denigrate Newton, it just locates him rightly in the development of knowledge. Same with Marx.

Apparently, you adhere to the lone thinker, the 'great man' theory of the development of knowledge -- and that 'consciousnes' does not depend on 'being'.

[Hit The North]

Apparently, you adhere to the lone thinker, the 'great man' theory of the development of knowledge -- and that 'consciousnes' does not depend on 'being'.Where do I say that?

Now who's making stuff up?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Where do I say that?

You certainly imply it.


Now who's making stuff up?

Still you.

[Hit The North]

R:


You certainly imply it.

Really? Read what I wrote:


That there is a debt is not in question. However, the classical and foundational statements on the materialist conception of history belong to Marx. Moreover, Marx also states a debt to Hegel, but you refuse to acknowledge it.

Your inference has no basis in fact.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB


Your inference has no basis in fact.

Unlike you, I am happy to admit my error -- now, can we have you withdrawing this lie about me?

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1517762&postcount=44


Moreover, Marx also states a debt to Hegel, but you refuse to acknowledge it.

1) You are the last person to be pointing this out, sicne you not only haven't read Hegel, you refuse to read his work.

2) Where in Das Kapital does Marx acknowledge his debt to Hegel?

In fact, as we know, he went out of his way to distance himself from this mystical bumbler.

[Hit The North]

BTB



Unlike you, I am happy to admit my error -- now, can we have you withdrawing this lie about me?

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1517762&postcount=44


Which bit of that post do you want me to retract?


1) You are the last person to be pointing this out, sicne you not only haven't read Hegel, you refuse to read his work.It strikes me that whether I've read Hegel is irrelevant compared to whether Marx himself did. The point still stands.


2) Where in Das Kapital does Marx acknowledge his debt to Hegel?
Firstly, we're not talking about Das Kapital, we're talking about Marx's development of historical materialism.

Secondly:


The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.
In fact, as we know, he went out of his way to distance himself from this mystical bumbler.Did he not likewise distance himself from some of the assumptions and methods of classical political economy? Or are you arguing that there is a continuous line of thought between Smith and Marx, founded on some unproblematic general agreement on all points?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Which bit of that post do you want me to retract?

The Lot.


It strikes me that whether I've read Hegel is irrelevant compared to whether Marx himself did. The point still stands.

If, according to you, Marx thought it important enough to study Hegel, but you are now telling us that it isn't important for us/you to do so, then how do you know which parts, if any, he derived from Hegel, and if any parts he derived from Hegel are valid?


Firstly, we're not talking about Das Kapital, we're talking about Marx's development of historical materialism.

But, Hegel also derived his historical materialism from Kant, Ferguson, Millar and Smith, the first of whom was also influenced by the Scottish school.

Anyway, his most mature work of historical materialism is Das Kapital. So, where in Das Kapital did "Marx also state a debt to Hegel"?

You quote this:


The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.

Marx does not say here that he is indebted to Hegel, the best you can get from this is that he put his own attribution of being a pupil of Hegel in the past tense, and then he revealed his own (current) low opinion of Hegel by merely 'coquetting' with Hegelian terminology.

So, the only 'indebtedness' Marx owed to Hegel was the non-0serious use of a few Hegelian words.

Moreover, we already know that Marx's method -- summarised for us in that review he included in the Postface, which occurs just before the passage you quoted, but conveniently left out --, contains not one atom of Hegel.

In other words, by the time he wrote Das Kapital, historical materialism had every trace of Hegel removed -- so the extent of his 'indebtedness' to Hegel amounted to a few Hegelian jargon words, non-seriously used by Marx here and there in that book.

And, in Das Kapital itself, over and over, he mentions the above Scottish Historical Materialists (and Aristotle), but not Hegel -- not even once is he mentioned in this regard -- as an important source for some of his ideas.


Did he not likewise distance himself from some of the assumptions and methods of classical political economy? Or are you arguing that there is a continuous line of thought between Smith and Marx, founded on some unproblematic general agreement on all points?

But, in his most mature theory, he retained important strands from them. In contrast, what did he retain from Hegel? As he himself points out: a few jargonised expressions, with which he merely 'coquetted'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Duplicate post!

[Hit The North]

Which bit of that post do you want me to retract?






The Lot.



Sorry, no can do.

The rest of your post is stuff we've been over several times. I find your arguments as unconvincing as you find mine.

Have a pleasant evening.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Sorry, no can do.

And that just sums you up as an inverterate liar.


The rest of your post is stuff we've been over several times. I find your arguments as unconvincing as you find mine.

Except, mine are supported by what Marx actually published, whereas yours are only supported by tradition, and thus fantasy.


Have a pleasant evening.

And you enjoy another fifty or more years of long slow dialectical decline....

[Hit The North]

Except, mine are supported by what Marx actually published, whereas yours are only supported by tradition, and thus fantasy.


Yes, you are the first person in history to read Marx correctly.

Enjoy your delusion.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Yes, you are the first person in history to read Marx correctly.

Not so, Marx did too. And so have many others -- Althusser, for example, was 90% of the way there.

And you have no excuse; his words are there for you to see.


Enjoy your delusion.

A 'delusion' based on Marx's own words -- hardly.

And you enjoy your infatuation with tradition (and one based on a book you won't even read, let alone study!).

[DeLeonist]

Rosa , re:



So, the only 'indebtedness' Marx owed to Hegel was the non-0serious use of a few Hegelian words.


What are your views on the footnote (http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch24.htm) in Volume 1 where Marx refers to "the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic" ?

The context of the quote (referring to John Stuart Mill) makes clear that Marx is not being ironic with the Hegelian reference:



He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic. It has never occurred to the vulgar economist to make the simple reflexion, that every human action may be viewed, as “abstinence” from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a way, over Spinoza’s: “Determinatio est Negatio.”

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


What are your views on the footnote in Volume 1 where Marx refers to "the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic" ?

Marx is wrong here; Plato and other philosophers are the source of the dialectic (as other Marxist dialecticians admit).

And even if he were right, as Marx tells us, he is merely 'coquetting' with such language.

But, anyway, Hegelian contradiction is an idealist contradiction -- so this does not make sense even in DM terms.


The context of the quote (referring to John Stuart Mill) makes clear that Marx is not being ironic with the Hegelian reference:


He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic. It has never occurred to the vulgar economist to make the simple reflexion, that every human action may be viewed, as “abstinence” from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a way, over Spinoza’s: “Determinatio est Negatio."

Same comment; and Spinoza's 'principle' is defective too.

How could he (Spinoza and/or Marx) know that every 'determination is also a negation' (that is what this Latin clause means)? Did he examine every determination that has ever been attempted in human history, or will be determined, or could be determined?

So, we either attribute to Marx some odd ideas, or we conclude he is still 'coquetting'.

[DeLeonist]

Rosa, re:


Quote:


What are your views on the footnote in Volume 1 where Marx refers to "the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic" ?


Marx is wrong here; Plato and other philosophers are the source of the dialectic (as other Marxist dialecticians admit).



Regardless of whether or not Marx is wrong here, I think the comment sheds light on this frequently discussed sentence of his:

The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.


Clearly, as Marx regards the Hegelian contradiction as the ‘source of all dialectic’, this sentence should be interpreted as meaning that Marx believed Hegel was the first to present the dialectic’s general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.

It should not be interpreted as meaning that Marx believed there was something else that prevented Hegel from being the first to present it in such a manner.



And even if he were right, as Marx tells us, he is merely 'coquetting' with such language.


As discussed in the other (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1536537&postcount=115) thread, as Marx avowed himself a pupil of Hegel whilst working on Volume 1 of Capital during the same period that he coquetted with Hegelian language, the negative connotations of ‘coquetted’ do not carry much weight.

In any case, what purpose would ‘merely coquetting’ serve in the context of the footnote criticising Mill and the vulgar economists?



How could he (Spinoza and/or Marx) know that every 'determination is also a negation' (that is what this Latin clause means)? Did he examine every determination that has ever been attempted in human history, or will be determined, or could be determined?

So, we either attribute to Marx some odd ideas, or we conclude he is still 'coquetting'.

If these ideas are in fact odd, then I think it makes more sense to attribute some odd ideas to Marx than to rely on strained interpretations of what he wrote about his influences.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DeLeonist:


Regardless of whether or not Marx is wrong here, I think the comment sheds light on this frequently discussed sentence of his:


The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.

Clearly, as Marx regards the Hegelian contradiction as the ‘source of all dialectic’, this sentence should be interpreted as meaning that Marx believed Hegel was the first to present the dialectic’s general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.

I have covered this several times: Marx is right, "the mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner", what does prevent him is this:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life. [Marx and Engels (1970) The German Ideology, p.118.]

You:


Clearly, as Marx regards the Hegelian contradiction as the ‘source of all dialectic’, this sentence should be interpreted as meaning that Marx believed Hegel was the first to present the dialectic’s general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.

Not so, as I pointed out, his distortion of ordinary language is what prevents him. This is not what happens in Aristotle, who is, by and large, an ordinary language philosopher. So, are the Scottish Historical Materialists -- can't say the same of Kant.


It should not be interpreted as meaning that Marx believed there was something else that prevented Hegel from being the first to present it in such a manner.

So you say, but, fortunately for us, Marx ended all speculation when he added a summary of the 'dialectic method' in which there is not one atom of Hegel to be found -- hence, Hegel cannot have been the "first to present the dialectic’s general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner..."


As discussed in the other thread, as Marx avowed himself a pupil of Hegel whilst working on Volume 1 of Capital during the same period that he coquetted with Hegelian language, the negative connotations of ‘coquetted’ do not carry much weight.

And I have replied to that post. So I stand by my comments.


In any case, what purpose would ‘merely coquetting’ serve in the context of the footnote criticising Mill and the vulgar economists?


How could he (Spinoza and/or Marx) know that every 'determination is also a negation' (that is what this Latin clause means)? Did he examine every determination that has ever been attempted in human history, or will be determined, or could be determined?

So, we either attribute to Marx some odd ideas, or we conclude he is still 'coquetting'.

If these ideas are in fact odd, then I think it makes more sense to attribute some odd ideas to Marx than to rely on strained interpretations of what he wrote about his influences.

Since they ignored the historical materialism of Aristotle, the Scottish School, and Kant.

Now, I am not saying Marx wasn't influenced by Spinoza, and earlier theorists, or that Marx did not find this unreliable principle in Hegel, but that by no means implies he accepted Hegel's spin on it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Anyone who followed my debate with Andrew Kliman (on the nature of 'dialectical contradictions') in May, June and July will be happy to know that it has sparked to life again now that Andrew is back off holiday:

http://marxisthumanistinitiative.org/2009/05/05/brief-comments-on-the-relationship-between-marxism-and-the-hegelian-dialectic/

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, the above discussion has flared up considerably, with Dialectical Marxists and Idealists of every stripe pitching in -- all, you will no doubt notice saying more-or-less the same sorts of things that comrades here have said, but all -- you will no doubt also notice --, failing to tell us what a 'dialectical contradiction' is!

However, up to now, the debate has largely been comradely!

[New Tet]

Well, the above discussion has flared up considerably, with Dialectical Marxists and Idealists of every stripe pitching in -- all, you will no doubt notice saying more-or-less the same sorts of things that comrades here have said, but all -- you will no doubt also notice --, failing to tell us what a 'dialectical contradiction' is!


I understand it as the struggle of two or more seemingly opposite & contradictory forces eternally colliding and coming apart, each collision transforming one and the other, etc.

Weird as it may sound, the simplest way I can visualize the dialectics is as an assembled strand of say, DNA. You know how the strand seems to come apart into to separate but parallel strings and at some point become linked?

http://www.revleft.com/vb/album.php?albumid=425&pictureid=3787

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

New Tet:


I understand it as the struggle of two or more seemingly opposite & contradictory forces eternally colliding and coming apart, each collision transforming one and the other, etc.

Yes, but I have already shown that this can't work:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1221394&postcount=464

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1221395&postcount=465

Just as I have shown that if this were the case, change would be impossible:

Quotes:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

Argument:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401001&postcount=77


Weird as it may sound, the simplest way I can visualize the dialectics is as an assembled strand of say, DNA. You know how the strand seems to come apart into to separate but parallel strings and at some point become linked?

I am sorry, but I do not see how this analogy helps at all.

[New Tet]

New Tet:



Yes, but I have already shown that this can't work:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1221394&postcount=464

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1221395&postcount=465

Just as I have shown that if this were the case, change would be impossible:

Quotes:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401000&postcount=76

Argument:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1401001&postcount=77



I am sorry, but I do not see how this analogy helps at all.

I'll have to admit that the analogy sucks a bozack.

In one of the arguments linked above you mention 'classical' DM. Classical as opposed to what, historical materialism?

I can live with that as long as it helps me explain social reality to myself and others. And by experience I know it does.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

By "classical DM" I mean the theory laid down by Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Mao and/or Trotsky. I do not mean Historical Materialism [HM], a theory I fully accept (but only if these Hegelian concepts -- upside down, or 'the right way up' -- have been completely excised ).

And sure, HM does explain social reality, as you put it, but, the importation of dialectics in fact prevents it from doing this.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, it looks like this discussion has petered out, and guess what: not one of these academic Marxist could tell me what a 'dialectical contradiction' is (although they did raise all manner of irrelevant issues, rather like the comrades here):

http://marxisthumanistinitiative.org/2009/05/05/brief-comments-on-the-relationship-between-marxism-and-the-hegelian-dialectic/

So, the search goes on: is there no one on this planet who can tell us -- or do we have to begin a search in the outer fringes of the galaxy?

[Bright Banana Beard]

How can I be a dialectical mystic? The term sounds so cool.

[DeLeonist]

Rosa
Some interesting and lively jousting going on at the Marxist Humanist Initiative.

But to return to your earlier comments, I think it is important not to conflate the issue of whether Marx was correct with what he meant:





Clearly, as Marx regards the Hegelian contradiction as the ‘source of all dialectic’, this sentence should be interpreted as meaning that Marx believed Hegel was the first to present the dialectic’s general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner.


Not so, as I pointed out, his distortion of ordinary language is what prevents him. This is not what happens in Aristotle, who is, by and large, an ordinary language philosopher. So, are the Scottish Historical Materialists -- can't say the same of Kant.



You may be right here, but this is not what Marx says or implies in Capital.





It should not be interpreted as meaning that Marx believed there was something else that prevented Hegel from being the first to present it in such a manner.


So you say, but, fortunately for us, Marx ended all speculation when he added a summary of the 'dialectic method' in which there is not one atom of Hegel to be found -- hence, Hegel cannot have been the "first to present the dialectic’s general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner..."


Marx tells us that his dialectical method is in its foundations exactly opposite to the Hegelian dialectical method, so it is not surprising that there are no overt Hegelian references in the summary of Marx‘s method (though this does not imply there were no Hegelian influences on it).

It is also certainly debateable that there is “not one atom” of Hegelian influence to be found in the summary - eg “the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development and death of a given social organism and its replacement by another, higher one” is reminiscent of the processes of immanent self -development depicted (though in a idealistic form) in the Phenomenology of Mind.

But even if there is not one atom of Hegel in the brief summary of his method, that Marx believed that his method was influenced by Hegel is evident by the fact that he considered the Hegelian contradiction the source of all dialectics.

To escape this conclusion by interpreting this phrase as coquetting or sarcasm is not satisfactory. Marx is contrasting the absurd contradictions which Mill utilises with the Hegelian contradiction, which Mill cannot grasp. It would be a pointless remark if Marx was saying that Mill is equally at home with absurd and flat contradictions as he is at sea with absurd Hegelian contradictions.

The mature Marx may have been wrong about Hegel and may even have overstated the influence of Hegel upon his method, but it seems hard to deny that he believed there was a ‘rational kernel’ within Hegel which he utilised.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DeLeonist:


I think it is important not to conflate the issue of whether Marx was correct with what he meant

I disagree. Marx is in the process of waving goodbye to the Hegelian way of seeing things, and returning to the scientific method laid down by Aristotle, modernised by the Scottish Historical Materialists. So, these errors are a clear indication of the last remaining areas of confusion in Marx's mind. And that is why the very best he could do was 'coquette' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital. In the 1860s he lacked the much more sophisticate logic and vocabulary we now have in this post-Fregean world. Marx did not have the means therefore to make a total break with Hegel; but we do. The footnote you place so much store by is a clear echo of this. Had Marx lived, he would have edited this out (as Engels did anyway), since it expressed a throwback to his earlier view of things.


but this is not what Marx says or implies in Capital.

Again, I disagree. It is clear that the only way that Hegel could make his ideas even appear to work was to use distorted language. The fact that Marx chose to 'coquette' with this very language is a clear echo of his view of Hegel expressed in The German Ideology -- this is Marx's way of dealing with Hegel's odd use of language. I do the same, but I do not 'coquette' with it; I use 'scare quotes', and, of course, I have access to the more sophisticated terminology only available to us since Frege revolutionised logic in the 1880s and 1890s.


Marx tells us that his dialectical method is in its foundations exactly opposite to the Hegelian dialectical method, so it is not surprising that there are no overt Hegelian references in the summary of Marx‘s method (though this does not imply there were no Hegelian influences on it).

I have already covered this. You can't get more opposite than to reject Hegel root and branch, returning to the dialectical method largely invented by Aristotle, modernised by the Scottish school.

Sure, there is a Hegelian influence in Das Kapital. And Marx himself tells us what it is: he limited that influence to the use of Hegelian jargon with which he merely 'coquetted'.


It is also certainly debateable that there is “not one atom” of Hegelian influence to be found in the summary - eg “the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development and death of a given social organism and its replacement by another, higher one” is reminiscent of the processes of immanent self -development depicted (though in a idealistic form) in the Phenomenology of Mind.

Again, Marx helpfully ended all speculation in this regard, since he added a summary of the 'dialectic method' from which every trace of Hegel had been excised.

But you offer this up as an example of Hegel's alleged influence:


“the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development and death of a given social organism and its replacement by another, higher one” is reminiscent of the processes of immanent self -development depicted (though in a idealistic form) in the Phenomenology of Mind.

Once more, I disagree. This is a clear reference to Aristotle's theory of the development of a biological organism applied to social development, as advocated by the Scottish school, a new materialist approach to knowledge invented long before Hegel was inflicted on humanity.


But even if there is not one atom of Hegel in the brief summary of his method, that Marx believed that his method was influenced by Hegel is evident by the fact that he considered the Hegelian contradiction the source of all dialectics.

And yet this comment is based on an unpublished footnote to the second volume of Das Kapital, which not even Engels could bring himself to publish! As I noted above, this reflects one of the errors I mentioned earlier (which is why Engels left it out, as Marx would have done), an echo of the way Marx was thinking in his transition phase between the Grundrisse and the first volume of Das Kapital.


To escape this conclusion by interpreting this phrase as coquetting or sarcasm is not satisfactory. Marx is contrasting the absurd contradictions which Mill utilises with the Hegelian contradiction, which Mill cannot grasp. It would be a pointless remark if Marx was saying that Mill is equally at home with absurd and flat contradictions as he is at sea with absurd Hegelian contradictions.

"Sarcasm" is your word, not mine, nor is it Marx's. Here is the passage you rest much of your case upon:


He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic. It has never occurred to the vulgar economist to make the simple reflexion, that every human action may be viewed, as "abstinence" from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a way, over Spinoza’s: "Determinatio est Negatio."

Since I have already covered this passage (above and in earlier posts) I will say no more about it, except: this was written before Marx told us he was 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital, a comment he published (in contrast to this one that not even Engels could bring himself to publish, even though it contained new remarks about Mill). Since Hegel's 'contradictions' are not the source of all dialectic, Greek theorists are, this passage would have been edited out (as indeed it was).


The mature Marx may have been wrong about Hegel and may even have overstated the influence of Hegel upon his method, but it seems hard to deny that he believed there was a ‘rational kernel’ within Hegel which he utilised.

Well, as I have pointed out many times, there is no 'rational kernel' to a method based on distorted Hegelian language, and that is why Marx felt he had to revive the older method invented by Aristotle (modernised by the Scottish school). Since Hegel had derived many of his ideas from Aristotle (mystifying and distorting them) and from the Scottish school (via Kant), then no wonder this 'rational kernel' contains no Hegel at all, but just Aristotle, Smith, Ferguson and Millar.

How many more times to we have to go over this?

[ZeroNowhere]

How can I be a dialectical mystic? The term sounds so cool.
or: a Short History of 20th Century Marxist philosophy.


Since I have already covered this passage (above and in earlier posts) I will say no more about it, except: this was written before Marx told us he was 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital, a comment he published (in contrast to this one that not even Engels could bring himself to publish, even though it contained new remarks about Mill).Wait, Engels didn't publish it? Because it seems to be in my version, as well as the MIA one.

[DeLeonist]

Had Marx lived, he would have edited this out (as Engels did anyway), since it expressed a throwback to his earlier view of things.



Actually Marx did publish it, while he was alive, in Volume 1 of Capital (page 744 if you have the Penguin edition).

Therefore, by your own logic, the footnote expresses the view of things he had when writing Capital.



How many more times to we have to go over this?

No need to go over it any more - but you've failed to convince me of your interpretation.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ZeroNowhere:


Wait, Engels didn't publish it? Because it seems to be in my version, as well as the MIA one.

I am sorry, I relied on what DeLeonist said, and did not check it. I can't check my copy of Marx and Engels's Collected Works, since all 50 volumes are in storage (following on my recent move).

Added on edit: I can now see this was my error, not his.

I will, however, check the MIA -- do you have the exact link?

-------------------------------

This I have now done -- see my second reply to DeLeoinst below.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DeLeonist:


Actually Marx did publish it, while he was alive, in Volume 1 of Capital (page 744 if you have the Penguin edition).

Therefore, by your own logic, the footnote expresses the view of things he had when writing Capital.

I am sorry, but I thought you had said this wasn't actually published, and I was relying on that being accurate!

As I pointed out to ZeroNowhere, above, most of my books are in storage, so I can't check what you say -- which is what I normally do.

In fact, this is what you posted earlier:


Hi Rosa,

Given your interpretation above, I was wondering whether you had any thoughts on the following (from a message by Andrew Kliman here: http://archives.econ.utah.edu/archiv...4/msg00029.htm):

This is what Marx wrote about his relationship to Hegel, in a footnote
in _Capital_, Vol. II:

"In a review of the first volume of _Capital_, Mr. Duehring notes that,
in my zealous devotion to the schema of Hegelian logic, I even discovered
the Hegelian forms of the syllogism in the process of circulation. My
relationship with Hegel is very simple. I am a disciple of Hegel, and
the presumptuous chattering of the epigones who think they have buried
this great thinker appear frankly ridiculous to me. Nevertheless, I have
taken the liberty of adopting towards my master a critical attitude,
disencumbering his dialectic of its mysticism and thus putting it through
a profound change, etc."

Engels left this out of the version of Vol. II he edited. It appears in
Rubel's French edition. I have quoted from the English translation, in
Raya Dunayevskaya's _Rosa Luxemburg, Women's Liberation, and Marx's
Philosophy of Revolution_, p. 149. I do not know the exact date this
passage was written, but Dunayevskaya (ibid.) notes that "Marx wrote this
after volume 1 had already been published."

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1531165&postcount=74

Oddly enough, I had confused this with the other passage where Marx takes issue with Mill!

My mistake; but I will get back to you when I have checked it.

However, my reaction to this passage is that it is covered by what Marx said in the Postface, that he was merely 'coquetting' with Hegelian terminology here.

I will, however, deal with the objections you raised against this interpretation once I have checked this pasage.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, I have checked this passage (I can't think why I did not do this before -- something I invariably do), anyway here is it:


John St. Mill, on the contrary, accepts on the one hand Ricardo’s theory of profit, and annexes on the other hand Senior’s “remuneration of abstinence.” He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic. It has never occurred to the vulgar economist to make the simple reftexion, that every human action may be viewed, as “abstinence” from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a way, over Spinoza’s: “Determinatio est Negatio.”

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch24.htm#n28

The first thing to note is that this sentence is ambiguous:


He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic.

You seem to think its meaning is obvious, that Marx is claiming that "Hegelian contradiction is the source of all dialectic", but this is not plausible, and for several reasons:

1) Marx goes on to appeal to Spinoza's principle to illustrate the source of the dialectic:


It has never occurred to the vulgar economist to make the simple reftexion, that every human action may be viewed, as “abstinence” from its opposite. Eating is abstinence from fasting, walking, abstinence from standing still, working, abstinence from idling, idling, abstinence from working, &c. These gentlemen would do well, to ponder, once in a way, over Spinoza’s: “Determinatio est Negatio.”

which, of course, predated the invention of Hegel's supposed 'contradictions'. If so, Hegelian 'contradictions' can't be the source of all dialectic (as Marx is clearly indicated by quoting Spinoza). And, indeed, they aren't, for the dialectic originated in ancient Greece.

2. The sentence itself gives us a clue as to Marx's intentions:


He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction, the source of all dialectic.

The final clause could refer back to this:


as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction,

or to this:


He is as much at home in absurd contradictions or, what is far more likely, to this:


He is as much at home in absurd contradictions, as he feels at sea in the Hegelian contradiction,

in other words Marx is alluding here to the sort of puzzlement that motivated the early Greeks to engage in dialectic (the pursuit of truth through argument and counter-argument), puzzlement that now surfaces in Mill's mind.

And this interpretation is supported by point 1) above -- Marx appeals to the puzzling features of Spinoza's principle.

So, far from Marx being guilty of a simple historical error (the claim that Hegel's contradictions are the source of all dialectic, which they plainly aren't), he is pointing out something much less controversial, that puzzlement is the source of the dialectic (in fact, this is a remarkably Wittgensteinian claim to make).

In that case, I do not have to appeal to the 'coquetting' passage to explain Marx's use of 'contradiction' here, since he is alluding to this puzzling feature of Hegel's work, not endorsing it.

Anyway, I can only thank you for forcing me to consider this passage again, since it lends support to my view that Marx anticipated Wittgenstein in many ways, this just being the latest example: that philosophy ('all dialectic') is motivated by puzzlement, and that the only legitimate role philosophy can play isn't to try to discover hidden truths that are unavailable to the sciences, but to unravel the puzzles we sometimes find ourselves in.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I spoke too soon!

http://marxisthumanistinitiative.org/2009/05/05/brief-comments-on-the-relationship-between-marxism-and-the-hegelian-dialectic/

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1540652&postcount=143

No sooner had I written the above when an individual (who calls himself 'Juurrian') replied to an earlier response to him by me (comment 45). He quickly adopted the by-now-familiar lying, abusive and scatological mode of argument beloved of such mystics. I had up to that point been nothing but pleasant to him, which underlines the comment I made earlier:


25 years (!!) of this from Dialectical Mystics has meant I now take an aggressive stance with them every time -- I soon learnt back in the 1980s that being pleasant with them (my initial tactic) did not alter their abusive tone, their propensity to fabricate, nor reduce the amount of scatological language they used.

Is there a single dialectician on the planet who can defend effectively the "world view of the proletariat"?

And, who can do so without resorting to the usual abusive, irrational and emotional responses?

[ZeroNowhere]

Oh dear, academic-baiting. Though I do like the reference to Plato's philosopher-kings. :lol:
And really, the best chance he (or so on) had there was comparing 'dialectical contradictions' to the word 'game'. Also, I like to collect oppositions and keep them in a jar.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Me too!

[Jean-Luc Lebris]

This seems like a very reflexive response. It seems, as you outlined in your Essay Twelve, that their sense of self-worth/commitment to the revolution is based on a certain idea(s) (given the state of the left what else do they have to base it on but an idea?). So, when you take a bat to the idea, they associate so strongly with it, that they think you are attacking their character.

Very similar to psuedo-intellectuals when you challanges their 'ideas' or indoctrinated religious types when you challenge their 'beliefs' or 'faith'. This all seems strangely divorce of a marxist, scientific or even decent approach to 'progress'.

Unfortunately this type of behavior extends well beyond Dialectics in the revolutionary left. With what seems to a semi-outsider as bunch of pissed off people, with a greater than thou attitude, all teething-at-the-bit to be the next Che, Mao, Lenin.

I don't really understand which proletarians, those that are informed, think they are going to be communicating to...

Thanks for your ongoing work Rosa. I certainly enjoy reading your posts and am about half-way through your essays and find the work clear, precise and convincing.

[Jean-Luc Lebris]

On the other site Andrew never answered my questions or Rosa's rebuttals. He just dropped out of the conversation once Rosa had thoroughly pummeled him... I had no idea what he was talking about with his 'concepts' and 'intents'... Except, maybe to say, 'that language couldn't be analyzed meaningfully at all in abstraction' (whatever the hell that means :confused:)....


Andrew said:
“I’m always asking you, directly or indirectly, to first PROVE that you or anyone can meaningfully analyze language in abstraction from concepts and intents.”


I asked:

"Are the ‘concepts and intents’, as you have used it here, some sort of classification in language?



If not where and what are these ‘concepts and intents’?


If these ‘concepts and intents’ are represented WITH language, aren’t they subject to the same analysis and scrutiny as as other ‘ordinary language’?"

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for these comments, Jean-Luc:


This seems like a very reflexive response. It seems, as you outlined in your Essay Twelve, that their sense of self-worth/commitment to the revolution is based on a certain idea(s) (given the state of the left what else do they have to base it on but an idea?). So, when you take a bat to the idea, they associate so strongly with it, that they think you are attacking their character.

Very similar to psuedo-intellectuals when you challanges their 'ideas' or indoctrinated religious types when you challenge their 'beliefs' or 'faith'. This all seems strangely divorce of a marxist, scientific or even decent approach to 'progress'.

Unfortunately this type of behavior extends well beyond Dialectics in the revolutionary left. With what seems to a semi-outsider as bunch of pissed off people, with a greater than thou attitude, all teething-at-the-bit to be the next Che, Mao, Lenin.

I don't really understand which proletarians, those that are informed, think they are going to be communicating to...

Thanks for your ongoing work Rosa. I certainly enjoy reading your posts and am about half-way through your essays and find the work clear, precise and convincing.

I agree with what you say, but then vast majority of dialecticians react this way -- and that includes those who post here -- as you will soon see if you follow the links posted here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm

I try to explain why they do this (which is connected with their class position and origin), here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm

--------------------------

Actually, Andrew dropped out because one of the characters who has been posting there physically threatened him.

But, I was 'pummeling' him, as you say.

-----------------------

By the way, Jean-Luc, can you see my post number 46 there? The reason I ask is that I posted a long reply to 'Juurrian' yesterday, and my screen reads "This post is being moderated", and this message has been there for over 24 hours. So, I just wonder if others can see it, too.

[Jean-Luc Lebris]

Thanks for these comments, Jean-Luc:



I agree with what you say, but then vast majority of dialecticians react this way -- and that includes those who post here -- as you will soon see if you follow the links posted here:

I try to explain why they do this (which is connected with their class position and origin), here:

--------------------------

Actually, Andrew dropped out because one of the characters who has been posting there physically threatened him.

But, I was 'pummeling' him, as you say.

-----------------------

By the way, Jean-Luc, can you see my post number 46 there? The reason I ask is that I posted a long reply to 'Juurrian' yesterday, and my screen reads "This post is being moderated", and this message has been there for over 24 hours. So, I just wonder if others can see it, too.

I actually did mean essay Nine not Twelve in my previous post.

Rosa, I cannot see your post. I don't see a post 46 at all.

Too bad to hear about the situation with Andrew, don't wish any physical harm of course.

I have been following the posts here (lurking), especially in regards to philosophy and dialectics, so I am familiar with the type of reaction you are describing. What I don't understand is why it is so difficult to provide an explanation for 'dialectical contradictions'. It seems to me that such a large concept, especially put forth by people who pride themselves in the accountability of their analysis and theories, should be able to be explained rather simply. Further, if this 'theory' or 'concept' is going to be used to explain relationships and the interaction of human-beings and objects and everything that exists in irrefutable ways, it follows that there should be a mountain of evidence that cross references different scientific disciplines.

With out this evidence it seems that dialectical contradictions are about the same as seeing 'the hand of god' in everything or seeing the attractions of 'auras'. Simply put; rose tinted glasses. I actually don't mind the whole idea of dialectical contradiction, not as a 'law', but as nice metaphor. An interesting way of seeing things, on occasion, sometimes, when it works out. Sort of like saying, "you fill my soul with happiness", while using the word soul to mean something like 'all the things that make up who I am'. But then the whole thing seems so damn interpretable that it becames relatively meaningless, at least from a scientific point of view.

But the way the word 'contradiction' gets thrown around (along with other dialectical doozies) without the evidence seems equivalent to trying to convince everyone that color quinacridone magenta exisits everywhere in the world and wherever it shows up it is an example of 'something'.

I think the cause for this "mindset" is the cause for prejudice against alot of the left, Marxism and communism in general. In my experience, I have felt very alienated and removed from any sort of left activism because the people organizing (more often leading, appointed without any sort of democratic process) often seemed to have an air of 'entitlement' in some way. I figured this had to be a result of a inherited belief structure but could never really put my finger on it. I think essay Nine is excellent example of tracing the historical progression (or lack there of) of belief and bias in the revolutionary left.

It is hard for me to imagine such thinking people can't see they have replaced one dogma with another.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

My post was this:


Jurriaan are you addressing me, or your 'followers'?

And why the emotive and abusive response? What have I ever done to you?


"But this is a petitio principii, Rosa just assumes what has to be proved. I defined a dialectical contradiction very clearly, as two opposite conditions which nevertheless presuppose each other and depend on each other for their existence, a situation which can exist because the opposition of the two conditions is in some way mediated, or contained in some way, by something else."

In fact, I did not "assume" anything, I merely quoted Marx back at you. If you want to pick a fight with him, that's up to you.

Jurriaan:


"Rosa then argues that if the two conditions mutually exclude each other, they cannot co-exist, but this is just an assertion with an appeal to tautological definition."

I did not argue this, Marx did.

[And what is a 'tautological definition, for goodness sake?]

Jurriaan:


"BTW Rosa's Phd dissertation must be total rubbish, you can tell that straightaway from the puberal mode of argumentation."

Well, you are the one who does not seem to know the difference between an inconsistency and a contradiction, and you seem to think that formal contradictions are nonsensical -- so that accusatory finger of yours needs rotating through 180 degrees. Your grasp of logic does not appear to be all that secure.

Jurriaan:


"The real logical or semantic question is, under what condition would it make sense (or to be reasonable) to speak of two opposite conditions which nevertheless presuppose each other?"

But, this in no way helps us understand what you dialecticians are banging on about when you use the phrase "dialectical contradiction".

Jurriaan:


"Reflective dialectical thought goes right back to Heraclitus and even earlier, and there are many different ways of describing dialectical contradictions and their further implications, I don’t deny that. But the basic idea is quite simple, and there is no particular mystery about it at all, our facilitary and front office staff have deal with this sort of thing all the time."

Yes, and Heraclitus was a confused mystic, who, among other things, thought that he could determine what was true of all moving bodies and/or processes in the entire universe, for all of time, based on a badly executed thought experiment about stepping into a river!

[He screwed up because he confused count nouns with mass nouns.]

Such a priori dogmatics has dominated much of 'western' thought ever since, including that which Hegel inflicted on humanity (whom you are happy to ape).

Jurriaan:


"This already shows that Rosa does not grasp formal logic, notwithstanding the brainless Wittgenstein bullshit, which is a ruse."

Oh dear, you are really getting worked-up, aren't you?

Do you have low impulse control?

I'd get that seen to if I were you.

[Shows I hit a nerve, though, doesn't it?]

In reply to your flat denial, I can quote you as many logic textbooks as it takes that will tell you exactly what I have told you about the difference between a contradiction and an inconsistency (why, even Aristotle distinguished between the two).

Can you do the same?

I think not.

And this is not a Wittgensteinian point; as I noted, logicians since at least Aristotle's day have recognised it.

Nevertheless, I must say, I like the fine, dialectically-complex word you used in your searching, well-reasoned response to me.

What was it again? -- Oh yes: "Bullshit".

So incisive!

I can see I stand no chance...

But, may I remind you: you were the one who appealed to Wittgenstein in your last reply to me. What was all that about 'Wittgensteinian bullsh*t', then? Don't you even know your own mind?

Jurriaan (addressing me now -- I am honoured!):


"Well, it’s very simple Rosa: just like in Catch-22, what you are dealing with is that in order to apply the rule, you have to negate the rule, and in order to not apply the rule, you have to apply the rule. This may seem unprincipled, but in the bureaucracy there is always a hierarchy of principles which renders such improvisation legitimate. This situation arises, often, because academics like Rosa, who styles himself a 'Wittgensteinian Trotskyite', are paid rich helpings of tax money to devise rule systems and conceptual hierarchies which cannot in fact be applied, because these so-called 'academics' have an extremely poor understanding of what is actually humanly, socially and practically involved in a work process or an administrative process. Their task is to describe what’s happening and rendering it meaningful to the ivory tower of management, Plato's philosopher kings, but this is obviously quite different from the operative staff who actually have to make things work, and therefore face dialectical contradictions all the time."

I am not an academic, but a worker, and a trade union rep (unpaid), too. So, the above comment of yours is just hot air. But, you clearly needed to get it off your chest.

Feel better now?

Anyway, you'd do well to concentrate on what I actually say, and resist the temptation to make baseless personal attacks on me from a position of total ignorance.

Hey, but what do I know? After all you are the expert logician here. Perhaps abusive and foul language, compounded by lies and invective constitute a new form of valid argument? 'Jurriaan's lemma', perhaps?

Jurriaan (again addressing his rapidly dwindling audience):


"Here Rosa misses the point completely. The real point is that non-arbitrary human reasoning extends far beyond what we can capture in deductive and inductive inference, and that is just where dialectical reason only begins! But 'Rosa' has no grasp of it at all. Now how can we ever have any constructive discussion when Rosa doesn't even understand the most elementary problems of reason?"

And where did I deny that "human reasoning extends far beyond what we can capture in deductive and inductive inference..."?

Nowhere, that's where.

Still can't resist the temptation to make stuff up, I see.

And, may I remind you, once again, that you are the one who can't tell the difference between an inconsistency and a contradiction, and you seem to think that formal contradictions are nonsensical -- so I do not think you have any reason to indulge in all that chest-beating -- impressive though it is!

[Phew, what a 'guy', girls...!]


"This is just puberal, studenty pharisee crap once again. Of course you are going to be perpetually puzzled by the normality of 'dialectical contradictions' if you deny their existence tooth and nail! It would be like saying the sun doesn't exist, even although everybody thinks the sun does exist, on the ground that most people cannot adequately 'define' the sun in terms of formal logic. Well, big deal."

Ah, what fine, dialectico-scatological words -- coupled with impressive, diversionary bluster!

We can all learn much from you. I'm certainly taking notes!

But, wait! Where did I ask for a definition, or even one in 'Formal Logic'?

I note, however, that you did not once quote me to that effect -- better then just to make it all up, eh?

Indeed, I can quite imagine a benighted Jesuit soul like you arguing with Galileo about the Copernican system, four hundred years ago:

Seventeenth-century-Jurriaan:


"Of course you are going to be perpetually puzzled by the normality of a stationary earth, if you deny its existence tooth and nail! It would be like saying the sun doesn't exist, even although everybody thinks the sun does exist, on the ground that most people cannot adequately 'define' the sun in terms of formal logic. Well, big deal. And no, I won't look down your telescope, that is just puberal, studenty pharisee crap once again."

And look what happened to those sad dinosaurs. I'd hate to think you are headed the same direction, even though it looks like you are dead set on emulating them.

Anyway, don't say I didn't warn you...

Jurriaan -- working 'himself' up into a right old lather (crash team on stand-by, please!):


"Yeah, Rosa does need help, but he or she 'is not sure I am the person to help him or her”'. When all else fails, hang out the victim… The hypocrisy is that I already tried to help him/her, by explaining what a dialectical contradiction is and what the utility of dialectics is, in plain language, sacrificing the free time that I have. Then he/she says, 'I am not sure'. Well, big deal. On to the next one."

But, you didn't explain what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, since you missed out a key Marxist component, which makes the whole 'concept' implode.

So, not only are you not the person who can help me, you are not even the person to help yourself! This is because you do not seem to understand your own 'theory'!

Jurriaan -- now in full waffle mode:


"This again is a dumb slur from the nihilist enemy of reason which Rosa is. Einstein as a physicist was not at all an 'idealist', other than having political and human ideals. Einstein is referring to the fact that our ability to actually test theories is far more limited than our creative ability to theorize and draw logical inferences, in part because our ability to construct valid empirical tests is practically limited, whereas our ability to speculate theoretically in abstracto is much less limited, so that the effect is, that the amount of scientific theory we have, is typically disproportionately larger than the amount of valid scientific evidence to back it up. He suggests that there exists a series of basic ('axiomatic') assumptions, discovered through creative inquiry, which, 'if' they are true, would explain the scientific evidence we have, and if we do not have those assumptions, then we cannot explain the scientific evidence. This may seem to weaken the possibilities for scientific knowledge, but in fact armed with these assumptions we are able to explain very much, since we can show convincingly that predictions made using these assumptions will in most cases yield confirmation of the assumptions, or are at least consistent with what we would expect. The point is that these 'axiomatic' assumptions cannot themselves derive simply from the data, though they are informed by them – the central problem of dialectical theory – nor are they amenable to a complete proof by the data. But that is just to say that Einstein, as a scientific realist, rejected a simplistic empiricist account of the relationship between theory and data, according to which Hempelian 'covering laws are strictly generalisations from clusters of sense data. The theory, which contains many logical inferences, and the data gathered, are for Einstein 'semi-autonomous' from each other: they inform each other but are not reducible to each other. He implies thereby that the task of science is to bring the theories we have, and the data we produce, closer together in a rational way, and he expresses his optimism that creative inquiry can enable us to do this – possibly, with the belief that, since we are ourselves part of the universe, we are able to improve our understanding of it. This contrasts with the skepticist mysticism of the Popperian view according to which reality is too complex and variegated, and our abilities too limited, for us to know very much for certain about it at all, so that most people are deluded, and all we can do is demolish illusions, even although there are always far more illusions than we can demolish. Einstein suggests that in reality people are not so deluded as Karl Popper implies and that the “proof is in the pudding” ('The skeptic will say: "It may well be true that this system of equations is reasonable from a logical standpoint. But this does not prove that it corresponds to nature." You are right, dear skeptic. Experience alone can decide on truth.') – if we are able to transform nature consistent with our explicated theory of it, this is an experiential proof of sorts that we can really know essential aspects of nature, even if the proof is not an absolute and final one."

Thanks for that, but it in no way shows Einstein wasn't an idealist. Anyway, since I do not want to distract attention from the hole you have dug for yourself (in so far as you can't explain the obscure phrase "dialectical contradiction" to eagerly waiting humanity), I will give you this one for now. We can debate it another time.

Jurriaan -- the veins in 'his' neck bulging alarmingly:


"The bourgeois intellectuals wax with an air of profundity about all the things we cannot know about 'financial risk' and so on, completely ignoring what billions of ordinary folks are proving by their actions every day! Which just tells us that their so-called “innocence” (ignorance really) is just feigned, growing out of their own loves and hates. In the same way, 'Rosa' hates 'dialectical materialism' and tries to create an elaborate defence of that hate. But the real scientific questions are thereby missed altogether. I have never denied that 'dialectical materialism' is a philosophy of Marxist-Leninist bureaucratism, and I have strongly argued against its totalitarian applications. My views on this issue are on public record. But it is another thing to deny the existence of the dialectical characteristics of reality. I am not prepared to do that, in good part because I experience them every day as a normal occurrence, and to deny that would be to deny part of reality. Of course I realise that academic theorists, seeking to be profound, concoct all kinds of nonsense about dialectics, but this does not deter me at all from acknowledging the dialectical characteristics which reality can have. It is just that, rather than focusing on the nonsense, I studied writers like Charles Taylor and Mario Bunge, in other words people who tried to make some constructive sense of the notion."

Translated this reads: "Sorry, I can't explain what a 'dialectical contradiction' is, so I will just kick up a cloud of dust to hide that fact...".

As I said in my reply to Rakesh: at least have the courage to admit this openly!

It will at least mean we can stand that crash team down.

PS. If anyone wants to know why dialecticians are almost all invariably like Jurriaan here (emotive, irrational and abusive) when their precious 'theory' is attacked, I have provided a detailed explanation here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm

PPS: Jurriaan, I have added a link at my site to your reply to me since I am building up a database there of all the abusive and obnoxious dialecticians (scores of them, in fact; the vast majority of whom are as unpleasant and abusive as you are -- all without provocation, too) with whom I have debated this 'theory' over the last four years on the internet.

Since my essays will long outlast you, I have guaranteed that your rather unpleasant personality disorder will never be forgotten. Here it is:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm

Thanks, Jurriaan, for supplying me with yet more data!

Any more bile in there? Let it out, then -- it all adds to my data!

Have a nice fume...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Jean-Luc:


I have been following the posts here (lurking), especially in regards to philosophy and dialectics, so I am familiar with the type of reaction you are describing. What I don't understand is why it is so difficult to provide an explanation for 'dialectical contradictions'. It seems to me that such a large concept, especially put forth by people who pride themselves in the accountability of their analysis and theories, should be able to be explained rather simply. Further, if this 'theory' or 'concept' is going to be used to explain relationships and the interaction of human-beings and objects and everything that exists in irrefutable ways, it follows that there should be a mountain of evidence that cross references different scientific disciplines.

Well, no one here has been able to tell us either.


I actually don't mind the whole idea of dialectical contradiction, not as a 'law', but as nice metaphor. An interesting way of seeing things, on occasion, sometimes, when it works out. Sort of like saying, "you fill my soul with happiness", while using the word soul to mean something like 'all the things that make up who I am'. But then the whole thing seems so damn interpretable that it becames relatively meaningless, at least from a scientific point of view.

I agree, but the use of this 'metaphor' explains nothing either.


I think the cause for this "mindset" is the cause for prejudice against alot of the left, Marxism and communism in general. In my experience, I have felt very alienated and removed from any sort of left activism because the people organizing (more often leading, appointed without any sort of democratic process) often seemed to have an air of 'entitlement' in some way. I figured this had to be a result of a inherited belief structure but could never really put my finger on it. I think essay Nine is excellent example of tracing the historical progression (or lack there of) of belief and bias in the revolutionary left.

It is hard for me to imagine such thinking people can't see they have replaced one dogma with another.

Indeed, and this was one of the themes of Essay Nine Part Two.

-----------------------

I have e-mailed the MIH site and asked them why the moderation is taking so long.

[Jean-Luc Lebris]

Quote:
I actually don't mind the whole idea of dialectical contradiction, not as a 'law', but as nice metaphor. An interesting way of seeing things, on occasion, sometimes, when it works out. Sort of like saying, "you fill my soul with happiness", while using the word soul to mean something like 'all the things that make up who I am'. But then the whole thing seems so damn interpretable that it becames relatively meaningless, at least from a scientific point of view.
I agree, but the use of this 'metaphor' explains nothing either.


I was being sarcastic here.

One can only hope that Mr.Future-Stroke-Juurrian won't have any sort of leadership role in our movement.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ah, I see...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Over at the Coven (otherwise known as the 'Dialectical Materialism' group) it looks like the cadaver is still twitching, and that yours truly is still the centre of attention, for we have this gem from 'Philosophical Materialist':


Indeed. It doesn't matter how much Marx implemented, explained or defended dialectics post-Capital, we are told that when Marx talked dialectic(s) Marx didn't mean dialectic(s) due to some Wittgensteinian sophistry. If the latter interpretation is true then it would mean that Marx was hopelessly confused by the meanings of words.

http://www.revleft.com/vb/group.php?do=discuss&group=&discussionid=2434

1) There is absolutely nothing 'Wittgensteinian' about my arguments, and this character cannot even find one quotation from what I have said to support this latest dialectical lie.

2) This comrade can only argue this by ignoring what Marx himself said; so, if anyone is confused it's this clown.

On that, see the posts above.

[DeLeonist]

According to this review of Analytic Philosophy and the return of Hegelian Thought (http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12925), in at least some contemporary circles of Analytic philosophy there seems to be a move away from the Russellian view of Hegel as an incompetent bumbler, though in some cases from opposing perspectives (eg Brandom and Priest).

Anyone have any views on the work of the likes of McDowell, Brandom, Priest and Redding and how it relates to Marxist dialectics/ anti-dialectics?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DeLeonist:


According to this review of Analytic Philosophy and the return of Hegelian Thought, in at least some contemporary circles of Analytic philosophy there seems to be a move away from the Russellian view of Hegel as an incompetent bumbler, though in some cases from opposing perspectives (eg Brandom and Priest).

Yes I am aware of this, and that is why I said:


Except, those who know any logic by and large ignore this incompetent bumbler:

DeLeonist:


Anyone have any views on the work of the likes of McDowell, Brandom, Priest and Redding and how it relates to Marxist dialectics/ anti-dialectics?

Well, only Priest is a recognised logician, and redding has sold his soul to this Hermetic devil.

Priest's work on paraconsistency and dialetheic logic shows he has not fully understood Hegel (as others, not just me, allege) -- even if it were possible to understaad Hegel.

If you want some references on this, I can supply a list.

The others say they have been influenced by Hegel, but the evidence is rather weak.

[Paul Cockshott]

But, even if DM-theorists were correct, the thesis of universal interconnection is incompatible with change through 'internal contradiction', for if all change is internally-induced then no object or process could be interconnected. Alternatively, if everything is interlinked, then interconnection can play no causal role in change (or change would not be the result of 'internal contradictions', once more).

I suspect that in practice, in the writings of communist leaders like Lenin and Mao, this 'internal' contradiction is restricted to class conflicts within a society. They are basically saying that a system with a rich set of internal states available to it can have a dynamics between these states that depends in a large measure on social factors internal to the society.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul Cockshott:


I suspect that in practice, in the writings of communist leaders like Lenin and Mao, this 'internal' contradiction is restricted to class conflicts within a society. They are basically saying that a system with a rich set of internal states available to it can have a dynamics between these states that depends in a large measure on social factors internal to the society.

Well, I have actually covered this already; in fact they were quite general in what they said, as were other dialectical classicists, and dialecticians in general (this is a passge form my site; the use of "here" now and then refers to links at my site -- see at the end):


"If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues, Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen, by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, naturally veers round to its opposite.

"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975), pp.117-18.]

"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Ibid., p.174.]

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... Mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., pp.212-13.]

"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Ibid., p.179.]

"...but the theory of Essence is the main thing: the resolution of the abstract contradictions into their own instability, where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone than it is transformed unnoticed into the other, etc." [Engels (1891), p.414.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing, each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....

"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....

"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... [Ibid., pp.311-18.]

"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]

"So far we have discussed the most general and most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as in Lao-tse and his disciples -- and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus. Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.

"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.

"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.

"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid., pp.170-71.]

"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….

"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite." [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]

"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]

"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), 94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.]

"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….

"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]

"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….

"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….

"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….

"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891), p.414.]

"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.

"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....

"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]

"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'

"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.

"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.

"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)

"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.

"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.'" [Rob Sewell, quoted from here.]

Bold emphases added.

References and links can be found at my site, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm

Apologies for the above link, but this post is long enough as it is.

You will no doubt notice that Lenin says this idea covers everything in existence, and governs the eternal development of the world; Mao says more-or-less the same.

[Paul Cockshott]

Yes they do make quite general claims as Mao does in 'On contradiction', but I would submit that what he is really doing is using the language of dialectics as a metaphor for thinking through military and revolutionary strategy.

I think one has to distinguish between the linguistic dross and the actual use to which the language is put. Note too, his introduction of concepts like leading or dominant aspect of the contradiction which are really just concepts from strategy expressed in dialectical language.

It is just the historical accident that Marx happened to have gone to a philosophy course in a German University that landed us with this particular language. Were he formulating it at a later time he might have used the language or graph theory or Markov processes.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul:


Yes they do make quite general claims as Mao does in 'On contradiction', but I would submit that what he is really doing is using the language of dialectics as a metaphor for thinking through military and revolutionary strategy.

Well, I am suspicious of attempts to sanitise the irresponsible things the dialectical classicists had to say by invoking the use of metaphor, just as we surely are suspicious of theologians who try to sanitise the Book of Genesis in order to make it conform to modern science by saying the creation story etc. is metaphorical and allegorical.

And, Lenin did say this:


The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute….

Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others.

Bold added.

No hint of metaphor here; in fact he says this is an "absolute".

And, as I said before, Mao said more-or-less the same.


I think one has to distinguish between the linguistic dross and the actual use to which the language is put. Note too, his introduction of concepts like leading or dominant aspect of the contradiction which are really just concepts from strategy expressed in dialectical language

Well, I do not see any legitimate use at all for this sort of language; it's all dross to me, I'm afraid.


It is just the historical accident that Marx happened to have gone to a philosophy course in a German University that landed us with this particular language. Were he formulating it at a later time he might have used the language or graph theory or Markov processes.

Sure, but I have commented on this in other threads here; for example, this (this was in response to the question: why is dialectical materialism a world-view):


There are two interconnected reasons, I think.

1) The founders of this quasi-religion weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in the classics and in philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

So, these non-worker founders of our movement, who had been educated to believe there was this hidden world that governed everything, looked for principles in that invisible world that told them that change was inevitable, and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of a ruling-class mystic called Hegel.

2) That allowed the founders of this quasi-religion to think of themselves as special, as prophets of the new order, which workers, alas, could not quite grasp because of their defective education and reliance on ordinary language and 'common sense'.

Fortunately, history had predisposed these prophets to ascertain the truth about reality for them, which meant they were their 'naturally-ordained' leaders. That in turn meant these 'leaders' were also teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who could thus legitimately substitute themselves for the unwashed majority -- in 'their own interests', you understand, since the masses were too caught up in 'commodity fetishism' to see the truth for themselves.

And that is why DM is a world-view.

It is also why dialecticians cling on to this theory like grim death (and become very emotional (and abusive!) when it is attacked by yours truly), since it provides them with a source of consolation that, despite outward appearances to the contrary, and because this hidden world tells them that dialectical Marxism will one day be a success, everything is in fact peachy, and nothing in the core theory needs changing -- in spite of the fact that that core theory says everything changes! Hence, it is ossified into a dogma, and imposed on reality. A rather nice unity of opposites for you to ponder.

So, this 'theory' insulates the militant mind from the facts.

In that case:

Dialectics is the sigh of the depressed dialectician, the heart of a heartless world. It is the opiate of the party. The abolition of dialectics as the illusory happiness of the party hack is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.

Unfortunately, these sad characters will need (materialist) workers to rescue them from themselves.

Marx came from a class that educated their children to accept the idea that there is a 'rational' structure to reality, accessible to thought alone. So, had he never encountered Hegel, he'd have imbibed other a priori ideas.

Now, in itself this is no bad thing, but when Hegel's ideas (upside down or the 'right way up') became ossified into a dogma, this did have demonstrably deleterious effects on Marxism.

This is quite apart from the fact that it is impossible to make sense of these ideas.


Were he formulating it at a later time he might have used the language or graph theory or Markov processes.

I retain a healthy scepticism that dialectics can be re-formulated in such terms -- that is, without using the obscure jargon Hegel invented at some stage.

[Paul Cockshott]

It is not a question of recasting dialectics as markov processes. It is a question of having a different framework to think of change over time. That was an underlying appeal of dialectics for Engels certainly.
We know have quite a rich set of ways of thinking of this. In the 19th century there was not such a rich collection available. People always make do with the theoretical means of production to hand.

A current generation of marxists who have had a large part of their education from 19th and early 20th century texts needs to broaden their reading to realise what new conceptual models are available.

Dont downplay metaphor in practical cognition though, it is a basic conceptual mechanism that the human mind uses.

[JimFar]

It is not a question of recasting dialectics as markov processes. It is a question of having a different framework to think of change over time. That was an underlying appeal of dialectics for Engels certainly.
We know have quite a rich set of ways of thinking of this. In the 19th century there was not such a rich collection available. People always make do with the theoretical means of production to hand.

A current generation of marxists who have had a large part of their education from 19th and early 20th century texts needs to broaden their reading to realise what new conceptual models are available.

Dont downplay metaphor in practical cognition though, it is a basic conceptual mechanism that the human mind uses.

I wouldn't pretend to speak for Rosa. I myself am quite willing to concede the usefulness of metaphors in human thought. Even in the natural sciences, metaphors often play very important roles. Scientific concepts have very often been successfully used as metaphors outside their original disciplines, indeed, sometimes so successfully that the original concepts become redefined such that the newer applications of these concepts become seen as being simply extensions of the original concepts.

Rosa mentioned the invocation of the notion of metaphor by theologians. Non-fundamentalist theologians typically argue that the creation story in Genesis is to be read metaphorically rather than literally, hence in their view there is no necessary conflict between religion and science. In fact this mode of argument goes back many centuries, long before Darwin. Augustine was making similar arguments in order to resolve the conflicts between Christianity and the science of his day. Later on Aquinas developed an analogical theory of divine predicates in order to try to make sense out of religious language, especially language that is supposed to describe God. Aquinas was in effect admitting that if this language was taken literally then it must be taken to be nonsensical. So his analogical theory can be seen as an attempt to show how such language can still have cognitive meaning, despite its obvious problems. However, the theologians have never been consistent about this. If they were they would have to admit that religious language as such is literally nonsensical, and so without cognitive meaning. This point was argued quite effectively by Wittgenstein and many other 20th century thinkers, including the logical positivists, as well as people like Antony Flew, Kai Nielsen, Michael Martin and many others. Most of these people would agree that the theologians have tried to eat and have their cake too in regards to religious language. The theologians want to reserve the right to claim that they can make certain statements concerning God, the afterlife etc, that are to be taken as literally meaningful and literally true while acknowledging that most other religious language cannot be taken as literally true and so can only be understood as being metaphorical.

In times past, I was pretty sympathetic towards the idea that dialectics could play a useful role in Marxist thought as long as dialectics was understood as being just a metaphor. I have become less sympathetic to this approach partly because of Rosa's arguments but also in this board and many other forums I have seen many Marxists for whom dialectics is literally true and I have seen how that has helped lead them down the primrose path, in which it may not be such a useful metaphor, especially a much richer set to tools for thinking about change and processes of change than was the case back in the 19th century.

[spiltteeth]

I wouldn't pretend to speak for Rosa. I myself am quite willing to concede the usefulness of metaphors in human thought. Even in the natural sciences, metaphors often play very important roles. Scientific concepts have very often been successfully used as metaphors outside their original disciplines, indeed, sometimes so successfully that the original concepts become redefined such that the newer applications of these concepts become seen as being simply extensions of the original concepts.

Rosa mentioned the invocation of the notion of metaphor by theologians. Non-fundamentalist theologians typically argue that the creation story in Genesis is to be read metaphorically rather than literally, hence in their view there is no necessary conflict between religion and science. In fact this mode of argument goes back many centuries, long before Darwin. Augustine was making similar arguments in order to resolve the conflicts between Christianity and the science of his day. Later on Aquinas developed an analogical theory of divine predicates in order to try to make sense out of religious language, especially language that is supposed to describe God. Aquinas was in effect admitting that if this language was taken literally then it must be taken to be nonsensical. So his analogical theory can be seen as an attempt to show how such language can still have cognitive meaning, despite its obvious problems. However, the theologians have never been consistent about this. If they were they would have to admit that religious language as such is literally nonsensical, and so without cognitive meaning. This point was argued quite effectively by Wittgenstein and many other 20th century thinkers, including the logical positivists, as well as people like Antony Flew, Kai Nielsen, Michael Martin and many others. Most of these people would agree that the theologians have tried to eat and have their cake too in regards to religious language. The theologians want to reserve the right to claim that they can make certain statements concerning God, the afterlife etc, that are to be taken as literally meaningful and literally true while acknowledging that most other religious language cannot be taken as literally true and so can only be understood as being metaphorical.

In times past, I was pretty sympathetic towards the idea that dialectics could play a useful role in Marxist thought as long as dialectics was understood as being just a metaphor. I have become less sympathetic to this approach partly because of Rosa's arguments but also in this board and many other forums I have seen many Marxists for whom dialectics is literally true and I have seen how that has helped lead them down the primrose path, in which it may not be such a useful metaphor, especially a much richer set to tools for thinking about change and processes of change than was the case back in the 19th century.


Well first, eastern theologians have always been consistent. I'm from the Eastern Orthodox Christian church :
Here, however, are two quotes from typical priests of the third largest Christian denomination, Orthodox Christianity, Fr. Andrew Anglorus and Fr. Stephen Freeman:
…lack[ing] a Patristic understanding of the Scriptures…they do not understand the Scriptures spiritually, ascetically, allegorically, poetically, but only literally. We call such an understanding 'fundamentalist' .


Genesis, properly read, is not a science text book. It is about Christ and reveals Him as the very meaning and purpose of creation - as well as explicating His Pascha. If you don’t see that when you read the first chapter of Genesis, then no one ever taught you how to read Scripture as the primitive Church read Scripture….Scripture functions as a verbal icon - and like an icon requires an understanding of its spiritual grammar to see it correctly .
Nor is this simply a way for modern Christians to excuse obviously unscientific biblical passages. St. Maximus the Confessor, living in 500-600 A.D. wrote, “Ignorance, in other words, Hades, dominates those who understand Scripture in a fleshly (literal) way.”

But also I've never come across a Left theorist today (Alan Wood?) who uses the type of old fashioned dialectics Rosa argues against. Even if they mention Hegel, it's usually only a specific reading of Hegel, in such a way as to refuse the lure of ‘dialectical synthesis’, and so avoid any evolutionary notion of how things as such become reflexively aware of what they really are, a‘progressive development of in-itself into for-itself.’
Usually it starts from the assumption that reconciliation, mediation, and overcoming difference are impossible.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul Cockshott:


It is not a question of recasting dialectics as markov processes. It is a question of having a different framework to think of change over time. That was an underlying appeal of dialectics for Engels certainly.
We know have quite a rich set of ways of thinking of this. In the 19th century there was not such a rich collection available. People always make do with the theoretical means of production to hand.

I agree, but then why bother at all with Hegel's and/or Engels's confused thought?


Dont downplay metaphor in practical cognition though, it is a basic conceptual mechanism that the human mind uses.

I'm not downplaying it; indeed, quite the opposite. What I am suspicious of, as I noted, is any attempt made by comrades to sanitise the works of Idealists and Mystics with this handy magic wand.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Spiltteeth:


But also I've never come across a Left theorist today (Alan Wood?) who uses the type of old fashioned dialectics Rosa argues against. Even if they mention Hegel, it's usually only a specific reading of Hegel, in such a way as to refuse the lure of ‘dialectical synthesis’, and so avoid any evolutionary notion of how things as such become reflexively aware of what they really are, a‘progressive development of in-itself into for-itself.’

There are plenty of these quoted at my site, and if you check the websites of as many Marxist revolutionary groups as you can find (and there are hundreds) you will find that the vast majority promote the same, mind-numbingly repetitive theses derived from Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and co.

So, it's clear that the vast majority of active Marxist revolutionaries appeal to this obscure 'theory', and it's those that I seek to address, not academic Marxists who have no detectable influence on the class struggle.

Which is why I post here, and not at specialist Philosophy forums.

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul Cockshott:



I agree, but then why bother at all with Hegel's and/or Engels's confused thought?



I'm not downplaying it; indeed, quite the opposite. What I am suspicious of, as I noted, is any attempt made by comrades to sanitise the works of Idealists and Mystics with this handy magic wand.

I would not rely on Hegel or Engels at all on this. My contention though, is that the way Mao used it practically is different, and that unless and equivalent conceptual structure is created, his usage of the language of 'contradiction' can be useful for analysis of military polical conjunctures.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul Cockshott:


I would not rely on Hegel or Engels at all on this. My contention though, is that the way Mao used it practically is different, and that unless and equivalent conceptual structure is created, his usage of the language of 'contradiction' can be useful for analysis of military polical conjunctures.

I fail to see how, since the things he says are 'contradictions', aren't.

[spiltteeth]

Spiltteeth:



There are plenty of these quoted at my site, and if you check the websites of as many Marxist revolutionary groups as you can find (and there are hundreds) you will find that the vast majority promote the same, mind-numbingly repetitive theses derived from Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin and co.

So, it's clear that the vast majority of active Marxist revolutionaries appeal to this obscure 'theory', and it's those that I seek to address, not academic Marxists who have no detectable influence on the class struggle.

Which is why I post here, and not at specialist Philosophy forums.

Fair enough.

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul Cockshott:



I fail to see how, since the things he says are 'contradictions', aren't.
Words acquire new meanings over time through usage.
When the Chinese Communists ( in English translation of course ) say 'contradiction', they mean much the same as we would mean by the word 'conflict'.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

PaulCockshott:


Words acquire new meanings over time through usage.

Except, dialecticians want to retain the old meaning, at the same time as adding in their 'new meaning', which is never explained.


When the Chinese Communists ( in English translation of course ) say 'contradiction', they mean much the same as we would mean by the word 'conflict'.

But, once more, Mao wanted to use this word in both senses, for example here (to justify class collaboration with the Guomingdang, and the substitution of the CCP for the Chinese working class -- Stalin did the same sort of thing):


"The contradictory aspects in every process exclude each other, struggle with each other and are in opposition to each other. Without exception, they are contained in the process of development of all things and in all human thought. A simple process contains only a single pair of opposites, while a complex process contains more. And in turn, the pairs of opposites are in contradiction to one another.)

"That is how all things in the objective world and all human thought are constituted and how they are set in motion.

"The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no life. Without 'above', there would be no 'below').... Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed to each other, and on the other they are interconnected, interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this character is described as identity. In given conditions, all contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected. This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies 'how opposites can be ... identical'. How then can they be identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence. This is the first meaning of identity.

"But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their dependence on each other for their existence; what is more important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of contradiction.

"Why is there identity here, too? You see, by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time the ruled, is transformed into the ruler, while the bourgeoisie, the erstwhile ruler, is transformed into the ruled and changes its position to that originally occupied by its opposite. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union, as it will take place throughout the world. If there were no interconnection and identity of opposites in given conditions, how could such a change take place?

"The Kuomintang, which played a certain positive role at a certain stage in modern Chinese history, became a counter-revolutionary party after 1927 because of its inherent class nature and because of imperialist blandishments (these being the conditions); but it has been compelled to agree to resist Japan because of the sharpening of the contradiction between China and Japan and because of the Communist Party's policy of the united front (these being the conditions). Things in contradiction change into one another, and herein lies a definite identity....

"To consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the people is in fact to prepare the conditions for abolishing this dictatorship and advancing to the higher stage when all state systems are eliminated. To establish and build the Communist Party is in fact to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the Communist Party and all political parties. To build a revolutionary army under the leadership of the Communist Party and to carry on revolutionary war is in fact to prepare the conditions for the permanent elimination of war. These opposites are at the same time complementary....

"All contradictory things are interconnected; not only do they coexist in a single entity in given conditions, but in other given conditions, they also transform themselves into each other. This is the full meaning of the identity of opposites. This is what Lenin meant when he discussed 'how they happen to be (how they become) identical -- under what conditions they are identical, transforming themselves into one another'." [Mao (1961) 'On Contradiction', pp.337-40. Bold emphases added.]

There is no way that "contradiction" means "conflict" on every occasion in this passage.

Anyway, why translate this as "contradiction" and not as "conflict" when the two terms do not mean even nearly the same?

The fact that this happens in all translations into English suggests that the meaning "contradiction" is clearly preferred. The additional fact that Dialectical Marxists constantly refer to the alleged "contradictions" in capitalism, and not just the "conflicts", supports this interpretation. After all can the forces of production really "conflict" with the relations of production? Can "use value" really "conflict" with "exchange value"? Even worse, can any of these change into one another, as Mao and Lenin allege?

Now, this word ("contradiction") is only employed by Marxists because Hegel introduced it, and he did so as a result of his confusion of the 'law of identity' (LOI -- or that 'law' stated negatively) with the 'law of non-contradiction' (LOC).

But, as you no doubt know, the LOC concerns the truth-functional connection between a proposition and its negation; it is not connected in any way with the LOI, which concerns the alleged relation between an object and itself.

So, the dialectical use of this word derives solely from this crass example Hegelian 'logic'; there is no other reason to use it.

Finally, the word "conflict" is not connected to the unity and identity of opposites (UO), but the Hegelian use of "contradiction" is. So, the two terms cannot be inter-substituted.

Dialecticians need the UO to give unity to the processes they see in nature and society. But the UO is itself based on sub-Aristotelian, Hegelian 'logic', and cannot be justified in any other way.

In fact, they also need the word "contradiction" ("conflict" won't do here) to 'rationalise' all manner of sell-outs, class collaborationary about-turns, substitutionist strategies, and overnight changes of tactics, since dialectics (with this word) can be used to 'justify' practically anything at all and its opposite, almost in the same breath, simply because it is contradictory.

I have summarised Hegel's blunders here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

And the opportunist use of the word "contradiction" here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm

Use the 'Quick Links' to go to Section 7, 'Case Studies'.

[Paul Cockshott]

Without landlords, there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie. Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semicolonies, there would be no imperialist oppression of nations.
These seem reasonable points, that antagonistic social relations require two sides for the antagonism. Yes the language is archaic and derives from Hegel, but they were trying to understand real social processes - historical materialism here.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul Cockshutt:


These seem reasonable points, that antagonistic social relations require two sides for the antagonism. Yes the language is archaic and derives from Hegel, but they were trying to understand real social processes - historical materialism here.

But historical materialism does not need such archiac and useless terms; there are countless words in ordinary language which allow us to theorise and talk about change and conflict in nature and society. Here is a greatly shortened list:


Vary, alter, adjust, amend, make, produce, revise, improve, deteriorate, edit, bend, straighten, weave, twist, turn, tighten, loosen, relax, slacken, bind, wrap, pluck, tear, mend, repair, damage, mutate, metamorphose, transmute, sharpen, modify, develop, expand, contract, constrict, constrain, widen, lock, unlock, swell, flow, differentiate, divide, partition, unite, amalgamate, connect, fast, slow, swift, rapid, hasty, heat up, melt, harden, cool down, drip, cascade, drop, pick up, fade, darken, wind, unwind, meander, peel, scrape, graze, file, scour, dislodge, is, was, will be, will have been, had, will have had, went, go, going, gone, return, lost, age, flood, crumble, disintegrate, erode, corrode, rust, flake, shatter, percolate, seep, tumble, mix, separate, cut, chop, crush, grind, shred, slice, dice, saw, spread, fall, climb, rise, ascend, descend, slide, slip, roll, spin, revolve, oscillate, undulate, rotate, wave, conjure, quickly, slowly, instantaneously, suddenly, gradually, rapidly, hastily, inadvertently, accidentally, snap, join, resign, part, sell, buy, lose, find, search, explore, cover, uncover, stretch, compress, lift, put down, win, ripen, germinate, conceive, gestate, abort, die, rot, perish, grow, decay, fold, many, more, less, fewer, steady, steadily, jerkily, smoothly, quickly, very, extremely, exceedingly, intermittent, continuous, continual, push, pull, slide, jump, run, walk, swim, drown, immerse, break, charge, retreat, assault, dismantle, pulverise, disintegrate, dismember, replace, undo, reverse, repeal, enact, quash, throw, catch, hour, minute, second, instant, invent, innovate, rescind, destroy, annihilate, boil, freeze, thaw, cook, liquefy, solidify, congeal, neutralise, flatten, crimple, evaporate, condense, dissolve, mollify, pacify, calm down, terminate, initiate, instigate, enrage, inflame, protest, challenge, expel, eject, remove, overthrow, expropriate, scatter, gather, assemble, defeat, strike, revolt, riot, march, demonstrate, rebel, campaign, agitate, organise…

Naturally, it would not be difficult to extend this list until it contained literally tens of thousands of words all capable of depicting countless changes in limitless detail (especially if it is augmented with the language of mathematics). It is only a myth put about by Hegel and Marxist dialecticians that ordinary language cannot express change. On the contrary, it performs this task far better than the incomprehensible and impenetrably obscure jargon Hegel invented in order to fix something that was not broken.

[Paul Cockshott]

Paul Cockshutt:



But historical materialism does not need such archiac and useless terms; there are countless words in ordinary language which allow us to theorise and talk about change and conflict in nature and society. .

You are right, we do not need to use the Hegelian language, but this does not mean that whenever anyone used this language they were simply talking nonsense.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul Cockshott:


You are right, we do not need to use the Hegelian language, but this does not mean that whenever anyone used this language they were simply talking nonsense.

And yet, it proves quite impossible to say clearly what such characters mean when they do use such language.

[Paul Cockshott]

That may be true, but people can write obscurely and ambiguously in other language. Althusser was very anti-Hegelian, but is at times obscure.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Paul Cockshott:

Sure, but then Althusser was no less confused.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrades might like to note that I have had to move parts of my debate at Marxist Humanist Initiative [MHI] (mentioned a few pages back) to my site, since my replies are not being published. [The admins there tell me that this is because they are re-designing their site.]

I have collated the latest part of the debate here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Jurriaans_Folly.htm

where I have also responded in detail to several other comments made about me and my work at the OPE discussion board [links at the above link] by one of those who tried to debate with me at MHI.

[yuon]

Thanks LH, but this has been available at my site (and here) since August 2006.

[It's the trimmed down version here, too.]

Err, so Rosa, sorry if this has been asked before.

What's the purpose in knowing anything at all about dialectics? (Being opposed to dialectics is obvious.)

I mean, for me, someone who already doesn't see any point to dialectics, but really knows very little about it, is there any point in reading your whole essay?

(Which, despite being trimmed down, is still a bit long.)

:huh::confused:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Yuon:


What's the purpose in knowing anything at all about dialectics?

Unless like me you have to debunk it, or it is on a college course, none at all.

Take my advice, steer clear.:)

[yuon]

Thanks!:)
I'll take your advice on board :laugh: and ignore all attempts by those people to try and get me to know anything more than the minimal amount I know now. :lol:

:drool:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Good move...

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Several comrades have attempted to reply to one or two things I have said in the response mentioned above (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1561024&postcount=191). I have now replied to them here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/replies.htm

Links can be found in the above response.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrades might like to know that 'Jurriaan' has replied to me, and I have responded to him, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/jurriaan_throws_his_toys_out_of.htm

Links at the above page.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I have now written a reply to Ricahard Levins (a rather famous Marxist!), and another critic of my ideas, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/replies_to_two_critics.htm

My reply to Levins is about 1/3 of the way down the page.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The above debate has now shifted to the Marxmail site; my latest response (with links) can be found here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/yet_more_replies.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

This debate continues here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/weak_responses_from_kosloff_and_mage.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

The above debate has resumed here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/mr_b_up_to_his_old_tricks.htm

[Random Precision]

Just for kicks, I would like to see Rosa squirm out of this one. Though that said, I probably won't check for a response and I don't really care, cause I know she always manages to find some way to close her eyes to this. So, here we go:

"A certain stage of capitalist production necessitates that the capitalist be able to devote the whole of the time during which he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified, to the appropriation and therefore the control of the labour of others [fremde Arbeit], and to the sale of the products of that labour (4). The guild system of the Middle Ages therefore tried forcibly to prevent the transformation of the master of a craft into a capitalist, by limiting the number of workers a single master could employ to a very low maximum. Hence the possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the known medieval maximum. Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel, in his Logic, that at a certain point merely quantitative differences pass over by a dialectical inversion into quantitative distinctions. (5)" - Marx, Capital Vol. 1 Pt. 3 Ch. 11, p. 423 in the Penguin edition.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

RP (who answers none of my questions, many of which surely made him 'squirm', now (indirectly -- since, I am genuine materialist, it is beneath him to contact me directly) asks me this):


Just for kicks, I would like to see Rosa squirm out of this one. Though that said, I probably won't check for a response and I don't really care, cause I know she always manages to find some way to close her eyes to this. So, here we go:


"A certain stage of capitalist production necessitates that the capitalist be able to devote the whole of the time during which he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified, to the appropriation and therefore the control of the labour of others [fremde Arbeit], and to the sale of the products of that labour (4). The guild system of the Middle Ages therefore tried forcibly to prevent the transformation of the master of a craft into a capitalist, by limiting the number of workers a single master could employ to a very low maximum. Hence the possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the known medieval maximum. Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel, in his Logic, that at a certain point merely quantitative differences pass over by a dialectical inversion into quantitative distinctions. (5)" - Marx, Capital Vol. 1 Pt. 3 Ch. 11, p. 423 in the Penguin edition.

Well, Marx himself (not me) told us he was 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon here, and throughout Das Kapital.

In this particular case, we can see this from the fact that a mere increment of money does not turn a master into a capitalist. So, this isn't in fact an example of Hegel's alleged 'law' (which, as Trotsky pointed out (in his Philosophical Notebooks), Hegel applies only in a very limited sphere anyway, and certainly not here).

It takes a change in the relations of production to turn a master into a capitalist.

In fact, a master could have the same amount of money and still become a capitalist according to the way he/she uses that money, and according to the relations of production obtaining at the time.

And that is why Marx was 'coquetting' here, since what he says is not even true (given his own theory).

Anyway, I am sure comrades note RP's 'commitment' to discussion, since he reckons he won't even check this reply!

But, doesn't that make him a troll?

RP:

Now, try and answer the many questions I have asked you.

Or, alternatively, continue to 'squirm'.

[Random Precision]

Just for kicks, I would like to see Rosa squirm out of this one. Though that said, I probably won't check for a response and I don't really care, cause I know she always manages to find some way to close her eyes to this. So, here we go:

"A certain stage of capitalist production necessitates that the capitalist be able to devote the whole of the time during which he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified, to the appropriation and therefore the control of the labour of others [fremde Arbeit], and to the sale of the products of that labour (4). The guild system of the Middle Ages therefore tried forcibly to prevent the transformation of the master of a craft into a capitalist, by limiting the number of workers a single master could employ to a very low maximum. Hence the possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the known medieval maximum. Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel, in his Logic, that at a certain point merely quantitative differences pass over by a dialectical inversion into quantitative distinctions. (5)" - Marx, Capital Vol. 1 Pt. 3 Ch. 11, p. 423 in the Penguin edition.

Now I would like to issue a verbal warning to myself for trolling and driving the thread off-topic. If I do it again, someone else can PM warn me, or give me an infraction.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Who is 'squirming' now?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

After posting nearly 7000 posts here since June 2008, I thought I needed a break from RevLeft for a few weeks!

Anyway, comrades might like to know that I am posting several of Guy Robinson's essays at my site:

These had until recently been posted at Guy's site, which no longer seems to exist. In my opinion, Guy is one of the few Marxist Philosophers whose work is genuinely worth reading. Indeed, I'd go much further: I cannot praise his book, Philosophy and Mystification (Fordham University Press, 2003), too highly; it seems to me that this is how Marxist Philosophy should be done.

Now, I only encountered Guy's work in 2005, but I soon saw that he had anticipated several of my own ideas -- except he manages to express in two paragraphs what it takes me several pages to say! Unlike the vast majority of work that claims to be Marxist, Guy's work is a model of clarity. It is no accident, therefore, to see Guy writing in the Wittgensteinian (http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/Wittgenstein.htm) tradition.

I am posting these essays with his permission, but no one should assume that he agrees with any of the views expressed at my site -- other than those already contained in his essays.

The first one -- Making Materialism Historical -- has been posted here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/making_materialism_historical.htm

More to appear over the next few weeks.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

For anyone interested, I am taking on several academic dialecticians here:

http://www.marxmail.org/threads.html

There you will see the same pathetic counter-arguments and abuse from many of these comrades.

More permanenty here:

http://old.nabble.com/-Marxism--fwd-from-Rosa-Lichtenstein-td27435764.html

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

I have now published the second of Guy Robinson's essays, here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Robinson_Essay_Two_Introduction.htm

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrades may be interested in a debate I am having on MarxMail. A comrade asked me to explain one or two of my ideas that were an extension of Guy Robinson's work (see the last three posts, above).

Here was my reply:


Well, this is not the place to discuss this in detail, but I think that many traditional philosophies regarded the world as a set of processes and not things, as you say, so this is not something unique to your version of dialectics. However, as I show in that essay, such a priori and dogmatic ontologies are based on a fetishisation of language.

This observation is based on Marx's words in the German Ideology (see below) and his analysis of commodity fetishism in Das Kapital, and my work attempts to push Feuerbach's analysis (of alienated thought) to its logical conclusion, something Marx failed to do.

Now, I do not claim that dialectics is a fetish like religion, only that it depends on the fetishisation of language -- whereby the product of the social relations among of human beings (language) is misconstrued as the real relation between things, or as those things themselves. This done in the following way.

First I note what Marx said about traditional philosophy, thought and language:

"One of the most difficult tasks confronting philosophers is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world. Language is the immediate actuality of thought. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they were bound to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life....

"The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels The German Ideology (1970), p.118.]

Traditional Philosophers, those who peddle the "ruling ideas" of the ruling-class, have, since ancient Greek times, attempted to derive fundamental truths about reality from this distorted language, and thus from thought alone -- which truths they then happily imposed on nature and society dogmatically. [Why they did this we can leave for now.]

In doing this, as Wittgenstein noted, they project the means by which we represent the world (language) onto the world, so that, like the ancients who believed that the gods had created the world out of the words of their mouths, this ideal world became in effect the creation of distorted language. Instead of language reflecting the world, the world reflected language. Linguistic categories (Being, Cause, Mind, Substance, Property, Quality, etc., etc.) not only constituted this Ideal world, they ran it. This then 'allowed' traditional theorist to impose their a priori thought-forms (which changed their content with each new Mode of production) onto the world. Language was thus imbued with a power of its own, divorced/alienated from its role in communal life -- it went on holiday, as Wittgenstein also noted. It was thus fetishised. [I give an example of this from dialectics, below.]

Dialectics, of the crude sort you mention or the sophisticated sort that tends to fascinate academics, is just a third-rate version of traditional thought. As my essays show, both sorts were derived from thought/distorted language alone, and dogmatically imposed on the world. Proof here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2002.htm

Hence, it is certainly analogous to a religion because it provides Dialectical Marxists with a form of consolation (as Marx noted in his famous comment on religion). Because Dialectical Marxism is so abysmally unsuccessful, dialectics, since it teaches that appearances contradict reality, allows comrades to look at the world and see things as the opposite of what they really are. It thus insulates the militant mind from reality, just like religious belief.

So, I am pushing Feuerbach's idea much further: it's not just religious belief and theology that represent an alienated view that humans have of themselves, metaphysical thought in general (theological, secular and dialectical) represents an alienated misconstrual of social reality -- once more: the product of the social relations between human beings (language) becomes inverted, distorted and then misconstrued as the real relation between things, or as those things themselves. The 'dialectical world' reflects this distorted and fetishised language, not the other way round.

For example, that is why comrades can see what is in reality a linguistic category (contradiction) as the motive force of nature and/or society -- this is a direct fetishisation of a social form.

Incidentally, it also explains why, when I asked a few weeks ago, no one could explain what a 'dialectical contradiction is' (in fact, I have been asking comrades now for over 25 years; no luck so far!). Theologians have a similar difficulty with their concepts.

Finally, it also explains why comrades often become so emotive and irrational (often abusive) when this fetishised world view is exposed for what it is by yours truly.

The above is a very brief summary of Essay Twelve (of which the part you mentioned forms only 1/8 of the overall content), most of which has not been published yet. There, I hope to spell this out in considerable detail, showing how and why this world view (these "ruling ideas") took root in pre-Socratic Greece, and why it has dominated 'western' thought (including Hegel's work -- upside down or 'the right way up', including its allegedly 'rational kernel') ever since.

Rosa!

To which he responded:


Well you lost me I’m afraid. Let me try and summarise. Its not that dialectics is a fetish but that its apriori and based on the idea that language has a life of its own independently of the social relations of which it’s a part. You cite Marx’s own critique of the dominant idealist philosophy of his day to that effect (though you say he doesn’t go far enough).

Then you assert that ‘traditional philosophers’ then imposed these beliefs on society and nature. So let’s take an example. Plato created a theory of forms which abstracted from real objects to say that the world was an imperfect copy of the pure forms ‘laid up in heaven’ as it were. It’s easy enough to see how such ideas could be made to serve
the Greek (and later) elites.

I’m not familiar with Wittgenstein except as I get it through Robinson (and I know he was associated in an earlier(?) phase with logical positivism). But you suggest Wittgenstein recasts Marx’s basic idea of ‘being determining consciousness’ as a critique of idealism but in more linguistic terms. Anyone familiar with some kinds of discourse analysis will recognise we could substitute ‘discourse’ for ‘ideas’ in Marx’s text to make the same point. So far so good. I don’t think philosophers or academics have a lot to do with *imposing* idealist views on the public but I think I get the idea. You cite yourself and a 19000 word essay as proof that dialectics does this. So is your argument, in a nutshell, that dialectics is a form of idealism that serves the ideological purposes of Party bureaucrats?

Before going further with you post let me pause there and see if I am reading you right and ask some questions. I. If you are concerned that idealist philosophy is a kind of
apriorism (or linguistic fetishism) what are you proposing as the alternative? I gather you are influenced by analytic philosophy but as you are quick to draw links between philosophies and the interests of those who promote them surely the general run of Analytic philosophers are liberals (at best) and Cohen’s work (as a Marxist example) represents a pretty fetishised view of economic laws determining something called History (with a capital H) in a way that reminds me of the traditional Communist approach. In addition I wonder why we are focused so much on fighting Marx's battle with idealist philosophy when it seems to me that the greater threat comes from reductionist science rather than say postmodern idealism, which is closer to where this discussion began.

I’ll have a go at explaining a dialectical contradiction when I have some time

Shane

Part 2

You then argue that not only does it have an ideological purpose but comrades and, indeed, militants use dialectics as a kind of religion – which strikes me as a pretty extraordinary kind of claim. I don’t see you are pushing Feurebach’s idea since you seem to me to reiterate what Marx said that idealist metaphysics (the dominant philosophical current of his day) inverted being and consciousness. I don’t think anyone on this list disagrees – though you seem certain that dialectics is an example of this kind of idealism – and cannot have a materialist form or be useful in any way – and argue
I guess implicitly that we should follow Cohen and Roemer and others into Analytic Marxism (a topic of which I know nothing – but certainly they can’t be seen as true revolutionaries as opposed to the ‘academics’ and third raters who
use dialetics to mislead militant and are somehow responsible for the state of
the far left.

Leaving that aside you say that comrades take a linguistic category namely ‘contradiction’ and claim it is a motive force of society. This is exactly the kind of thing I asked you about before like using the Dialectic as a kind of demiurge. It’s a pretty crude fetishisation if that’s the best dialectical philosophy can produce. You claim comrades can’t see this because they treat it as form of religion – such you haven’t found anyone in 25 years who can explain what a ‘dialectical contradiction’ is. I find this a pretty spectacular claim and I’m not sure if I should rise to such a daunting challenge. But first up I wouldn’t call a contradiction a linguistic category – here’s how I put it together.

If we are trying to understand ‘Capital’ as a series of social relations we begin by an empirical examination of what is going on in terms of its history and its structure to demonstrate how these things have given rise to the present conjuncture. Marx begins with the commodity which he notes is fetishised as having a life of its own. He then starts to examine the relations which make it up – bracketing off the complexities and gradually elaborating an understanding of how the processes that make up capital works. If we abstract from that we can say that he is looking at a process – and all processes have forces that preserve the status quo and forces that change it – these forces are in contradiction. We could say, abstractly, that Marx identifies 2 main contradictions: With the working class (one source of value) Capitalists seeks to expand profit and to limit wages and workers resist this. This process is contradictory because these 2 forces operate to pull in different directions. Likewise the contradiction between capitalists seeking to expand profits infinitely in a finite world. It is the struggle over these contradictions that drives the whole system. We can argue for more complexity but these are basic.

Surely there’s nothing in there that would suggest that I think the 2 contradictions are some linguistic form that CAUSE the changes – or even that I think there is no contradiction in the real world (between capital and labour and between capital/nature as actions of real people with real interests) such that I am imposing them on the world.

I don’t feel any need to become abusive or irrational either despite your claim but I'd be interested in how you think we should spell out how this should work.

I'll add my reply in the next post:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Here is my reply:


Shane:

"It's not that dialectics is a fetish but that it's a priori and based on the idea that language has a life of its own independently of the social relations of which it's a part."

Well, that's not what I argued. Just like traditional thought, dialectics is based on a fetishisation of language whereby, what had been the product of the social relations among human beings (language) was transformed and misconstrued as a relation between things, or those things themselves.

I gave an example of this from dialectics: the use of "contradiction". Hegel misconstrued a social form (our ability to contradict one another) with a real relation between things (between a thing and its unique "other", to use his jargon). He did this by a further misconstrual; he thought that the 'negative form of the law of identity' implied the law of non-contradiction, which it doesn't. The demonstration of that I won't go into here; you can find the details in this essay:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

Summarised here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

The dogmatic and a priori nature of Hegels' work was allegedly inverted by Marxist dialecticians, but that has in no way affected this fetishisation, or its a priori and dogmatic status. So, for them, too, what had been the product of the relations between human beings (the capacity we have to gain-say one another) has been transformed into a real relation between things. Hence, with respect to 'contradictions', these are now said to power every change in the entire universe; a relation between human beings is now seen as a real relation between things, and a verbal form is now attributed with the power to move everything in reality; this word has been fetishised. This distorted social form is then imposed on nature and society, dogmatically and as an a priori truth. It is taken as a given by all Dialectical Marxists.

Shane:

"Then you assert that 'traditional philosophers' then imposed these beliefs on society and nature."

I think you misunderstand me; I am in fact alluding to Engels's words, when he said:

"Finally, for me there could be no question of superimposing the laws of dialectics on nature but of discovering them in it and developing them from it." [Anti-Dühring, p.13.]

Engels manifestly does not do this; he lifted his most important dialectical ideas from Hegel, and (super-)imposed them on reality. So have all dialecticians since, just as all traditional philosophers have done. So, by "imposition" I mean "read into nature, not read from it".

That is why I said that in this way, instead of language reflecting the world, the world reflects language -- the world of traditional philosophy (and dialectics) is a reflection of language, not the other way round. I call this Linguistic Idealism -- the world is constructed out of the specialised terminology of the philosophers. "Contradiction" is just one example, but I gave others in my last post (e.g., "Substance", "Quality", "Cause", "Concept", and so on),

Shane:

"I'm not familiar with Wittgenstein except as I get it through Robinson (and I know he was associated in an earlier(?) phase with logical positivism)."

Well, some of Wittgenstein's early work was appropriated by the Logical Positivists (but, they misconstrued what he was trying to say), and he met with them several times in the late 1920s and early 1930s, but he was never one of them, and rejected their core ideas.

Shane:

"But you suggest Wittgenstein recasts Marx’s basic idea of 'being determining consciousness' as a critique of idealism but in more linguistic terms."

I do not think I suggest this. Wittgenstein nowhere openly appropriates any of Marx's ideas (although he was influenced indirectly by Marx's ideas in his lengthy discussions with Pierro Sraffa), but several of the things Marx says (about language, etc.) uncannily anticipate Wittgenstein's criticism of traditional philosophy (for example, that it is based on a distortion of ordinary language, among other things).

Shane:

"You cite yourself and a 19000 word essay as proof that dialectics does this. So is your argument, in a nutshell, that dialectics is a form of idealism that serves the ideological purposes of Party bureaucrats?"

Well, that essay is in fact 50,000 words long, and in a later essay I argue that dialectics is the ideology of substitutionist elements in Marxism.

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_01.htm

Shane:

"I. If you are concerned that idealist philosophy is a kind of apriorism (or linguistic fetishism) what are you proposing as the alternative?"

Well, this is what I point out in the opening essay of my site:

"From time to time readers will find themselves asking the following question of the author: 'Well, what's your theory then?' No alternative philosophical theory will be advanced here (or anywhere else for that matter). This tactic has not been adopted out of cussedness -- or even out of diffidence --, but because it is an important part of the Wittgensteinian method (employed here) not to advance philosophical theories. Wittgenstein's approach means that no philosophical theory makes any sense. Why this is so will be considered at length in Essay Twelve Part One."

So, I have no alternative philosophical theory, nor do I want one -- , and I argue that we do not need one.

Shane:

"I gather you are influenced by analytic philosophy but as you are quick to draw links between philosophies and the interests of those who promote them surely the general run of Analytic philosophers are liberals (at best) and Cohen's work (as a Marxist example) represents a pretty fetishised view of economic laws determining something called History (with a capital H) in a way that reminds me of the traditional Communist approach."

In fact, many prominent and influential analytic philosophers were socialists or Marxists (Russell, Carnap, Schlick, Neurath, Ayer, Austin, Ryle, Davidson, Robinson,...), but I agree with you about Cohen. The problem with Cohen is that he was not analytic enough.

Even so, the tradition in analytic philosophy that has influenced me the most is that which derives from Wittgenstein, and he was an anti-philosopher. Moreover, he came closer than any other major philosopher since Marx to adopting a class view of society, as I show here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Wittgenstein.htm

Shane:

"I wonder why we are focused so much on fighting Marx's battle with idealist philosophy when it seems to me that the greater threat comes from reductionist science rather than say postmodern idealism, which is closer to where this discussion began."

This is only a relatively minor threat to active revolutionaries. The latter are, however, in thrall to a very crude version of the dialectic, and that is why I have concentrated on this crude version in my essays (I am trying to influence revolutionaries, not academics). Now, it is my contention that this theory is part of the reason why Dialectical Marxism has been such a long-term failure. Hence, POMO is only a threat to academic Marxists, whose work anyway has little or no impact on the class war.

Shane:

"and argue I guess implicitly that we should follow Cohen and Roemer and others into Analytic Marxism (a topic of which I know nothing – but certainly they can’t be seen as true revolutionaries as opposed to the 'academics' and third raters who use dialectics to mislead militant and are somehow responsible for the state of the far left."

No, I am not an 'Analytic Marxist', nor do I agree with their ideas (although, I have to say, much of Cohen's classic book on Marx's theory of history strikes me as a major step in the right direction, if one ignores his technological determinism and his functionalism).

And, I have not argued this anywhere:

"who use dialectics to mislead militant and are somehow responsible for the state of the far left."

Militants, by and large ignore academic Marxists; they look to Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin, Mao and/or Trotsky (and their epigones) for instruction, and it is these classicists who mislead them. Now, there are many reasons why the far left is almost synonymous with long-term and abject failure, but to claim that our core theory, dialectics, has nothing to do with this is, quite frankly, bizarre -- especially when dialecticians spare no effort telling us that the truth of a theory is tested in practice. If this theory has no practical consequences, why cling on to it? On the other hand, if it has, then there must be a link between our failure and this theory. In fact, I spell out exactly what that link is in this essay:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm

Shane:

"You claim comrades can’t see this because they treat it as form of religion – such you haven’t found anyone in 25 years who can explain what a ‘dialectical contradiction’ is. I find this a pretty spectacular claim and I’m not sure if I should rise to such a daunting challenge. But first up I wouldn’t call a contradiction a linguistic category – here’s how I put it together."

1) Please note that I have never said that dialectics is a 'form of religion' only that it operates in ways analogous to religious affectation -- as a source of consolation.

2) Well, I have not only been asking comrades for over 25 years, I have read practically everything there is to read on this published in the English language -- and it's still not clear what these obscure 'dialectical contradictions' are. In fact, the exact opposite is the case: no sense can be made of them.

Shane:

"If we are trying to understand ‘Capital’ as a series of social relations we begin by an empirical examination of what is going on in terms of its history and its structure to demonstrate how these things have given rise to the present conjuncture. Marx begins with the commodity which he notes is fetishised as having a life of its own. He then starts to examine the relations which make it up – bracketing off the complexities and gradually elaborating an understanding of how the processes that make up capital works. If we abstract from that we can say that he is looking at a process – and all processes have forces that preserve the status quo and forces that change it – these forces are in contradiction. We could say, abstractly, that Marx identifies 2 main contradictions: With the working class (one source of value) Capitalists seeks to expand profit and to limit wages and workers resist this. This process is contradictory because these 2 forces operate to pull in different directions. Likewise the contradiction between capitalists seeking to expand profits infinitely in a finite world. It is the struggle over these contradictions that drives the whole system. We can argue for more complexity but these are basic."

Well, I have read this sort of explanation so many times the ink is beginning to fade. You will note, however, that in trying to tell us what a 'dialectical contradiction' is you use the word "contradiction". This is, at best, a circular explanation. We still do not understand this use of this word.

But, you add:

"This process is contradictory because these 2 forces operate to pull in different directions. Likewise the contradiction between capitalists seeking to expand profits infinitely in a finite world. It is the struggle over these contradictions that drives the whole system. We can argue for more complexity but these are basic."

But, why is this a contradiction? No one who asserted that force P -- expressed as a vector, say (25i+25j+25k) -- was counter-acted by force Q (-25i-25j-25k) would be contradicting themselves. So, you must be using "contradiction" in a new, and as yet unexplained sense. But what is it?

Marx also says that the 'halves' of a 'contradiction' "mutually exclude" one another. In that case, they cannot co-exist. But if that is so, they can't contradiction one another (any more than an existent force can counteract a non-existent one).

As I said, I have seen such 'explanations' now for more years than I care to mention, and none tells us what one of these obscure 'dialectical contradictions' are. They all beat about the bush, like you.

And no wonder. This term was lifted from the mystical meanderings of Hegel, who derived his own use of this word from an argument replete with sub-Aristotelian logic. The founders of our movement appropriated this word, without giving it any critical examination (probably because they knew even less logic than Hegel), and comrades since have similarly used it -- mainly because it is traditional to do so. When pressed to explain it they all flounder -- a sure sign they haven't though much about it.

Why is this important? There are many reasons, but the two most significant for present purposes are these:

1) The use if this word has allowed revolutionaries argue for any tactical conclusion they like, and then the opposite the next day. It was used by Stalin in the following way:

"It may be said that such a presentation of the question is 'contradictory.' But is there not the same 'contradictoriness' in our presentation of the question of the state? We stand for the withering away of the state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the mightiest and strongest state power that has ever existed. The highest development of state power with the object of preparing the conditions for the withering away of state power -- such is the Marxist formula. Is this 'contradictory'? Yes, it is 'contradictory.' But this contradiction us bound up with life, and it fully reflects Marx's dialectics." [Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU(B), June 27,1930. Bold emphasis added.]

Here, he justifies less democracy as more democracy purely because it is a contradiction!

Moreover, he and his henchmen found it possible to 'justify' the idea that socialism could be built in one country by, among other things, the dubious invention of "internal" versus "external" contradictions, later bolstered by the concoction of "principal" and "secondary" contradictions, along with the highly convenient idea that some contradictions were, and some were not, "antagonistic". Hence, the obvious class differences that remained, or which soon emerged in the former USSR were either non-existent or were in fact "harmonious"; the real enemies (i.e., the source of all those nasty "principal" (or perhaps even the "antagonistic") contradictions) were the external, imperialist powers.

The dire political consequences of the idea that socialism could be built in one country can be seen in the subsequent use to which dialectics was put to defend and rationalise this counter-revolutionary idea, and to try to limit (or deny) the catastrophic damage it inevitably inflicted on the international workers' movement, and on Marxism in general.

And this is where dialectics comes into its own: short-term and lunatic policies sold to party cadres (world-wide) by the use of dialectics -- a 'method' that 'permits' the justification of anything whatsoever, and its opposite, sometimes in the same breath. And similar ideas are still being peddled to us on the same basis. Trotskyists, of course, argue for the exact opposite conclusion using equally sound 'dialectical' arguments to show how and why the revolution decayed, among other things.

Later on, 'Materialist Dialectics' was used to justify/rationalise the catastrophic and reckless class-collaborationist tactics imposed on both the Chinese and Spanish revolutions, just as they were employed to rationalise/justify the ultra-left, "social fascist" post-1929 about-turn by the communist movement. This crippled the fight against the Nazis by suicidally splitting the left in Germany, pitting communist against socialist, while Hitler laughed all the way to the Reichstag.

This 'theory' then helped 'excuse' the rotation of the Communist Party through another 180 degrees in its next class-collaborationist phase, the "Popular Front" --, and then through another 180 (in order to 'justify' the unforgivable Hitler-Stalin pact) as part of the newly re-discovered 'revolutionary defeatist' stage --, and through yet another 180 two years later in the shape of 'The Great Patriotic War', following upon Hitler's predictable invasion of the "Mother Land" -- "Holy Russia".

This is why the word "contradiction", as used by dialecticians, is so pernicious.

Sure, the above moves were taken for hard-headed political reasons, but the ideological justification for such rapid about-turns came from the use of this word. No other theory (apart perhaps from Zen Buddhism) glories in contradictions so much as Dialectical Marxism.

Maoists use it to prove the Stalinists are wrong, who return the compliment, and they both use 'the dialectic' to prove the Trotskyists are not Marxists (since they do not 'understand' the 'contradictory' nature of, say, the former USSR, or China, or world capitalism, or...), and the many hundreds of Trotskyist sects use it to prove the Maoists and the Stalinists do not understand the 'contradictory' nature of..., and they use it to prove that each and every other Trotskyist sect is wrong too, and on the same basis.

Hence, because of such 'contradictions' this theory can be used to prove almost anything you like, and its opposite.

2) The dialectic tells us that appearances 'contradict' underlying essence. This allows militants to ignore the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism, thus preventing an honest accounting of why this has happened. So, it not only insulates the militant mind from the facts, it prevents them from doing anything about it. As result, Dialectical Marxism takes another spin across the flatlands of failure.

You can even see this happening at Marxmail; as soon as it is learnt that I am attacking the dialectic, comrades switch off, and refuse even to consider my arguments, branding me non-Marxist, or even anti-Marxist (even though my sole aim is to make Marxism more successful by eliminating one of the reasons why it hasn't been). So, adherence to a theory (to which few comrades have given much thought) insulates them from any consideration that the dialectic might not be all that it is cracked up to be. As I said above, the idea that our core theory is in no way responsible for our failures is bizarre, and yet highly intelligent comrades think along these lines.

This is because as Marx noted: the ruling ideas are in every age those of the ruling class, and the founders of our movement imported the ideas of a card-carrying ruling class hack, Hegel. The (ideological) wells were thus poisoned before anyone took a sip from them.

Shane:

"Surely there’s nothing in there that would suggest that I think the 2 contradictions are some linguistic form that CAUSE the changes – or even that I think there is no contradiction in the real world (between capital and labour and between capital/nature as actions of real people with real interests) such that I am imposing them on the world."

Well, your reference to real people is of course what we find in Historical Materialism, and I note that you can only make this work if you drop the obscure term 'contradiction'. There are countless words in ordinary language that can be used to account for change, we do not need to use this fetishised word.

And despite what you say, contradictions are what human beings do -- they contradict (="gain-say") one another, and they do so in language. By fetishising this word, just as commodities are fetishised, those who do so cannot see this fetishisation for what it is. Nor can you.

Shane:

"I don’t feel any need to become abusive or irrational either despite your claim but I'd be interested in how you think we should spell out how this should work."

You are an exception; virtually everybody with whom I have debated this, even before we begin, has been highly abusive toward me, and this has gone on now for over 25 years. I have collated the many hundreds of examples of this that have taken place on the internet over the last five years here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm

Finally, how will [I]what work?

Rosa!

[S.Artesian]

"A certain stage of capitalist production necessitates that the capitalist be able to devote the whole of the time during which he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified, to the appropriation and therefore the control of the labour of others [fremde Arbeit], and to the sale of the products of that labour (4). The guild system of the Middle Ages therefore tried forcibly to prevent the transformation of the master of a craft into a capitalist, by limiting the number of workers a single master could employ to a very low maximum. Hence the possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the known medieval maximum. Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel, in his Logic, that at a certain point merely quantitative differences pass over by a dialectical inversion into quantitative distinctions. (5)" - Marx, Capital Vol. 1 Pt. 3 Ch. 11, p. 423 in the Penguin edition.


Well, Rosa posted the link to this discussion on Marxmail, and I followed the link to see what bit of Marx she would distort and dissemble next—and sure enough her reply of October 14 is Rosa distorting and dissembling at her best worst:
Marx is not saying in any way shape or form that it is a simple quantity of money that transforms the guild master into the capitalist. Marx is saying:
1. To become a capitalist, to become capital personified, the wannabe bourgeois must be able to devote full time to the appropriation of the labor of others, and the sale of the products so appropriated.
2. The guild system attempted to restrict the guild master not through restrictions on money, but through restriction on the number of workers a single master could employ.
3. Restricting these numbers meant, of course, that the guild master could not exist off the appropriation of the labor of others, and the sale of products from that labor of others, but had to devote considerable time to direct labor himself.
4. That not just any amount of money could transform a person into a capitalist, but a significant amount of money, a “critical mass,” was necessary to employ labor in excess of the restrictions of the guild system.
5. This finds its concrete historical expression in the fact that it is not guild masters who transform the social relations of production, but merchants and the like who develop the “putting out” [in textiles, fabrics, weaving, draperies] system of work to home laborers with monetary outlays beyond what the guild master could afford given the restrictions on his source of income. And again, it is these emerging capitalists, not the guild masters, who begin the accumulation of the means of production in a centralized location for the exchange with detached, “free,” labor via the wage form.
6. If Rosa ever actually read Marx without her ideological blinders on, she just might learn something about the actual historical dialectic Marx was explicating, but then again, if people in hell had ice-water, they wouldn’t be so thirsty.
SA

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S.Artesian (we all thought he'd pissed of in a huff the last time I wiped the floor with him):


Well, Rosa posted the link to this discussion on Marxmail, and I followed the link to see what bit of Marx she would distort and dissemble next—and sure enough her reply of October 14 is Rosa distorting and dissembling at her best worst:

Marx is not saying in any way shape or form that it is a simple quantity of money that transforms the guild master into the capitalist. Marx is saying:

1. To become a capitalist, to become capital personified, the wannabe bourgeois must be able to devote full time to the appropriation of the labor of others, and the sale of the products so appropriated.

2. The guild system attempted to restrict the guild master not through restrictions on money, but through restriction on the number of workers a single master could employ.

3. Restricting these numbers meant, of course, that the guild master could not exist off the appropriation of the labor of others, and the sale of products from that labor of others, but had to devote considerable time to direct labor himself.

4. That not just any amount of money could transform a person into a capitalist, but a significant amount of money, a “critical mass,” was necessary to employ labor in excess of the restrictions of the guild system.

5. This finds its concrete historical expression in the fact that it is not guild masters who transform the social relations of production, but merchants and the like who develop the “putting out” [in textiles, fabrics, weaving, draperies] system of work to home laborers with monetary outlays beyond what the guild master could afford given the restrictions on his source of income. And again, it is these emerging capitalists, not the guild masters, who begin the accumulation of the means of production in a centralized location for the exchange with detached, “free,” labor via the wage form.

6. If Rosa ever actually read Marx without her ideological blinders on, she just might learn something about the actual historical dialectic Marx was explicating, but then again, if people in hell had ice-water, they wouldn’t be so thirsty.

Marx says, as you quote:


"A certain stage of capitalist production necessitates that the capitalist be able to devote the whole of the time during which he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified, to the appropriation and therefore the control of the labour of others [fremde Arbeit], and to the sale of the products of that labour (4). The guild system of the Middle Ages therefore tried forcibly to prevent the transformation of the master of a craft into a capitalist, by limiting the number of workers a single master could employ to a very low maximum. Hence the possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the known medieval maximum. Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel, in his Logic, that at a certain point merely quantitative differences pass over by a dialectical inversion into quantitative distinctions. (5)" - Marx, Capital Vol. 1 Pt. 3 Ch. 11, p. 423 in the Penguin edition.

Bold added.

So, let's look at your slanted interpretation:


1. To become a capitalist, to become capital personified, the wannabe bourgeois must be able to devote full time to the appropriation of the labor of others, and the sale of the products so appropriated.

To become a capitalist, there must be a change in the relations of production; it is not up to the individual to become a capitalist, unless, of course, we were all to become idealists.


2. The guild system attempted to restrict the guild master not through restrictions on money, but through restriction on the number of workers a single master could employ.

3. Restricting these numbers meant, of course, that the guild master could not exist off the appropriation of the labor of others, and the sale of products from that labor of others, but had to devote considerable time to direct labor himself.

4. That not just any amount of money could transform a person into a capitalist, but a significant amount of money, a “critical mass,” was necessary to employ labor in excess of the restrictions of the guild system.

But, employers had employed many labourers in the ancient world, but they could not become capitalists, no matter how many they took on.

So, the critical mass you speak of does not exist; it takes a change in social relations for a man/woman to be a capitalist whether they employ one or one million workers.


5. This finds its concrete historical expression in the fact that it is not guild masters who transform the social relations of production, but merchants and the like who develop the “putting out” [in textiles, fabrics, weaving, draperies] system of work to home laborers with monetary outlays beyond what the guild master could afford given the restrictions on his source of income. And again, it is these emerging capitalists, not the guild masters, who begin the accumulation of the means of production in a centralized location for the exchange with detached, “free,” labor via the wage form.

Except, no matter how many of these there are, unless and until there is a change in the social relations of production, there can be no capitalists. This transformation can happen, as I pointed out above, and in my earlier post, while supervenient on any number of employees an individual employs. So, once more, it's not numbers but social relations that determine who is or who is not a capitalist.


6. If Rosa ever actually read Marx without her ideological blinders on, she just might learn something about the actual historical dialectic Marx was explicating, but then again, if people in hell had ice-water, they wouldn’t be so thirsty

But it is you who refuses to read Marx, since he was quite clear:


"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:*

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

You will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics you have uncritically swallowed, for in it there is not one ounce of Hegel -- no quantity turning into quality, no contradictions, no negation of the negation, no unities of opposites, no totality...

So, Marx's method has had Hegel totally extirpated. For Marx, putting Hegel on 'his feet' is to crush his head.

And of the few terms Marx uses of Hegel's in Das Kapital, he tells us this:


"and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him."

So, Marx's use of the phrase "Hegel's Law" (which isn't a law anyway, since most things in reality disobey it) is, as he says, non-serious; these days we'd put 'scare quotes' around it -- as indeed I do.

[S.Artesian]

If we are going to talk about the actual historical evolution of capitalism and capitalists, then let's do so.

If we want to talk about this paragraph from Marx then let's concentrate on that. You state in your October 14 post that "it takes a change in the relations of production to turn a master into a capitalist." Marx isn't saying anything about what it takes to change a guild master into a capitalist. On the contrary, he is stating why the guild master did not become a capitalist.

You state: "In fact, a master could have the same amount of money and still become a capitalist according to the way he/she uses that money, and according to the relations of production obtaining at the time."

Historically, that is not accurate, and it is not accurate on the class, social level. While individual masters may or may not have become capitalists, the social class, or sector, of guild masters did not become the class of capitalists. Historically, it is much more accurate to say a) they were ruined b) they became proletarians.

"A master could become a capitalist depending upon the way he or she used the money and the social relations at the time"? What complete ahistorical nonsense, actual ignorance. My aunt could have been my uncle depending on the chromosomes she inherited from my grandfather is essentially what Rosa is arguing... to which we can only reply.... "you're kidding me, right?"

The master was a master precisely because of a specific social relation of the times; the wannabe bourgeois, most likely a merchant, could become a capitalist only through a different social relation. The issues are a) how did that social relation come into being b) how did it expand c) what were the critical differences between the new social relations and the old social relations.

Marx is stating that in fact a different social relation is required to become a capitalist, one where the owner can devote himself to expropriating the collective labor of others. The token of that collective expropriation becomes money, money on a large, circulating, social platform.

-- Time for announcement of full disclosure: I am here only pointing out that what Marx said is not what Rosa says he said. I guess it's a bit ironic since I personally do not hold to the "quantity becoming quality" bit, since history clearly shows that qualitative change is the originator of transformation-- that qualitative change has to achieve a certain specific gravity, a certain expansion, and if it doesn't achieve that increase in quantity, it will certainly die-- i.e. proto-capitalist farming in Catalonia as opposed to feudal property relations-- but I'm for quality first. The point here is that Marx did not say, that the sufficient condition for a transformation into a capitalist is the quantity of money deployed. He's not saying that at all. He's pointing out that a capitalist to become a capitalist must be able to aggrandize labor on a scale larger than that of the pre-existing social relations of guild master and apprentice, shop worker, etc.


Return from digression:

While individual masters may or may not have become capitalists, the social class, or sector, of guild masters did not become the class of capitalists. Historically, it is much more accurate to say a) they were ruined b) they became proletarians.

A master could become a capitalist depending upon the way he or she used the money and the social relations at the time? The master existed as an agent, a factor, a element of a specific social relation of production—circumscribed by his relation to the labor of others in his workshop, his guild, and his own labor. This is why a) not just any amount of money defines the capitalist—it is the oversight, the ownership of the labor-power of others. The amount of money necessary to allow, support, that devotion to expropriation is above the level of money required, utilized, and available for the pre-existing mode of production b) The quantity of money must be sufficient to employ this wage-labor socially, producing articles that both have utility and value; that can be exchange based on the actual labor time necessary for their reproduction.


Rosa says that employers in the past employed workers on a large scale, but they weren't capitalists. Marx in this paragraph is not talking about "the past"-- generic, he is specifically talking about the middle age guild system and why the system required limitations on the "outside" labor the master employed.

Sure in the past, there have been projects employing masses of laborers-- as slaves, as debt peons, as builders of pyramids and religious structures, as soldiers-- and of course those eras did not produce capitalism or capitalists-- because a) the specific organization of agriculture was not capitalist b) without that organization of agriculture there could not be sufficient, sustained release of labor power .

And finally, Marx is not describing or ascribing to money the singular ability to transform the social relations of production. He is pointing out the larger quantity of money that a merchant/wannabe manufacturing capitalist requires to produce himself as a capitalist, to reproduce himself as capital personified.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


If we want to talk about this paragraph from Marx then let's concentrate on that. You state in your October 14 post that "it takes a change in the relations of production to turn a master into a capitalist." Marx isn't saying anything about what it takes to change a guild master into a capitalist. On the contrary, he is stating why the guild master did not become a capitalist.

You state: "In fact, a master could have the same amount of money and still become a capitalist according to the way he/she uses that money, and according to the relations of production obtaining at the time."

Historically, that is not accurate, and it is not accurate on the class, social level. While individual masters may or may not have become capitalists, the social class, or sector, of guild masters did not become the class of capitalists. Historically, it is much more accurate to say a) they were ruined b) they became proletarians.

Well, I do not see how any of this helps you rehabilitate Hegel, or his alleged 'law'. I was addressing what Marx and you said. If you now want to change your story, fine. But, then the alleged Hegelian 'law' still does not apply. There is no addition of quantity here 'passing over' into a change of quality. What we have is a change in the relations of production, not an incremental change at all.


"A master could become a capitalist depending upon the way he or she used the money and the social relations at the time"? What complete ahistorical nonsense, actual ignorance. My aunt could have been my uncle depending on the chromosomes she inherited from my grandfather is essentially what Rosa is arguing... to which we can only reply.... "you're kidding me, right?"

The master was a master precisely because of a specific social relation of the times; the wannabe bourgeois, most likely a merchant, could become a capitalist only through a different social relation. The issues are a) how did that social relation come into being b) how did it expand c) what were the critical differences between the new social relations and the old social relations.

Marx is stating that in fact a different social relation is required to become a capitalist, one where the owner can devote himself to expropriating the collective labor of others. The token of that collective expropriation becomes money, money on a large, circulating, social platform.

In your haste, and your obvious emotional state -- why do you dialecticians get so emotional? -- you perhaps missed the subjunctive mood I used. Moreover, I'm glad you now concede that it's a change in social relations that creates capitalists, not Hegel's alleged 'law'.


A master could become a capitalist depending upon the way he or she used the money and the social relations at the time? The master existed as an agent, a factor, a element of a specific social relation of production—circumscribed by his relation to the labor of others in his workshop, his guild, and his own labor. This is why a) not just any amount of money defines the capitalist—it is the oversight, the ownership of the labor-power of others. The amount of money necessary to allow, support, that devotion to expropriation is above the level of money required, utilized, and available for the pre-existing mode of production b) The quantity of money must be sufficient to employ this wage-labor socially, producing articles that both have utility and value; that can be exchange based on the actual labor time necessary for their reproduction.

Well, the more you say, the less applicable Hegel's alleged 'law' seems to be.


Rosa says that employers in the past employed workers on a large scale, but they weren't capitalists. Marx in this paragraph is not talking about "the past"-- generic, he is specifically talking about the middle age guild system and why the system required limitations on the "outside" labor the master employed.

It's interesting, and brave of you think that the middle ages is not in the past, even for Marx -- but I suspect he'd disagree with you. So, my point still stands: it's not the quantities involved that makes a capitalist, but the new relations of production.


Sure in the past, there have been projects employing masses of laborers-- as slaves, as debt peons, as builders of pyramids and religious structures, as soldiers-- and of course those eras did not produce capitalism or capitalists-- because a) the specific organization of agriculture was not capitalist b) without that organization of agriculture there could not be sufficient, sustained release of labor power .

I wish you'd make your mind up; if it were mere quantitative increase that creates a capitalist, then why tell us all this? It simply drives more nails into the coffin that contains Hegel's alleged 'law'


And finally, Marx is not describing or ascribing to money the singular ability to transform the social relations of production. He is pointing out the larger quantity of money that a merchant/wannabe manufacturing capitalist requires to produce himself as a capitalist, to reproduce himself as capital personified.

Who said he was? Not me.


-- Time for announcement of full disclosure: I am here only pointing out that what Marx said is not what Rosa says he said. I guess it's a bit ironic since I personally do not hold to the "quantity becoming quality" bit, since history clearly shows that qualitative change is the originator of transformation-- that qualitative change has to achieve a certain specific gravity, a certain expansion, and if it doesn't achieve that increase in quantity, it will certainly die-- i.e. proto-capitalist farming in Catalonia as opposed to feudal property relations-- but I'm for quality first. The point here is that Marx did not say, that the sufficient condition for a transformation into a capitalist is the quantity of money deployed. He's not saying that at all. He's pointing out that a capitalist to become a capitalist must be able to aggrandize labor on a scale larger than that of the pre-existing social relations of guild master and apprentice, shop worker, etc.

It's as fascinating, as it is amusing to see what gyrations you mystics will put yourselves through to try to defend something that isn't a law anyway, and was never a law even when Hegel put pen to misuse 200 years ago, as the good people at RevLeft have had proven to them in several threads listed here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm

So, no wonder Marx "coquetted" with this non-law.

However, from your amateur attempt to indulge in a rather convoluted form of casuistry, it's clear that you are already resiling from your earlier bombastic claims that I have got Marx wrong, and that Hegel's alleged 'law' applies in this case, for it's now apparent that it's not the quantities involved that creates a capitalist, but a specific social change that allows him/her to employ/exploit more people.

Please post more of the same meandering prose so that the funeral of this 'law' can run to its completion... :)

[S.Artesian]

I am not in the business, in this discussion, of rehabilitating Hegel, or anyone, and any so-called laws. The question is NOT "are dialectics valid," but rather did Marx use, or claim to use, dialectics or a dialectical method in his analysis of capitalism? In the cited paragraph from Capital, he clearly indicates that he does so claim and does so use.

The problem with any discussion with Rosa is that she can add nothing new to an analysis of Marx's concrete work. She must, and must always, fall back on her particular misinterpretation of Marx's phrase about having "coquetted" with forms of expression peculiar to Hegel. Marx qualifies that term, that flirtation, in specifying where and how the flirtation appears-- and that is in the discussion of value.

In discussing what Marx said in the cited paragraph, Rosa appears to be of two minds-- 1) Marx is wrong in his concrete analysis of the transformation of a wannabe into an actual capitalist 2) Marx is just trying to scare his reader by pretending to endorse Hegel's law of transformation.

When challenged on the actual historical details of the "personification of capital" into the capitalist, Rosa, no surprise, has nothing to offer except her inability to comprehend specific social relations of production i.e. she insists that Marx is wrong and that any amount of money could transform the guild master into a capitalist provided the fundamental social relation of capitalism existed.

What Rosa fails to grasp, besides Marx, besides Marx's extraction of Hegel, is fittingly, concrete history. And that concrete history shows that the guild master could not become the capitalist because of the precise social relations of production defining the guild, the guild master, and the relation of the master to the laborers in the workshop. To preserve those relations, the guild insisted on restrictions on the labor that could be employed.

Marx is not arguing that the quantitative accumulation of money changes the qualitative social relation of capital-- the organization of the means of production as private property and labor as wage-labor. Marx is arguing that for the wannabe bourgeois, for the emerging and still petty bourgeois, for the merchant to become the industrial or manufacturing capitalist, he must be able to devote all his time, his labor time to overseeing, maintaining, capital--the expropriation of the labor of others. The transformation that is quantitative in the use of money is quantitative to the emerging capitalist, becoming the qualitative transformation into the full time capitalist.

Rosa, as is her usual pathology, misses the historical specificity of Marx's analysis-- a specificity that Marx makes explicit in the very first words of the paragraph:
"A certain stage of capitalist production necessitates..."

A certain stage-- unlike Rosa, Marx clearly is aware that the fundamental social relation of capital has already been established and he is discussing an ensuing moment when "part-time" capitalists cannot satisfy the needs of capitalist reproduction. Clearly, Marx is describing what it takes for the part-time capitalist to become the full-time capitalist-- to "out-exploit" the guild master, and that takes access, control, expropriation of collective labor on a scale of greater than that of the guild master to command the labor of apprentices, assistants, laborers.

The qualitative social relation has been established-- expanding the social relation requires the transformation of the small time capitalist into the big, and full, time capitalist. "Hence the minimum sums of money advanced" had to exceed the maximum sums of the guild system. And that increase in quantity precipitated, enabled, the qualitative transformation of the use of the capitalists' own time.

Marx, in this discussion of the transformation of the capitalist, and the applicability of Hegel's "quantity into quality," isn't flirting with anything, isn't trying to shock, titillate, scare, or otherwise obscure his actual appreciation and use of dialectic.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian, I will reply to you tomorrow; I need to respond to 'Shane' first:

A few posts back, I published a debate I was having at MarxMail. For my anti-dialectical sins, I have now been removed from that mailing list.

One of the owners, a former Orthodox Trotskyist, has thus shown he is even more intolerant than Trotsky himself, who would not countenance the expulsion of anti-dialecticians in the former SWP-US from that party, in the 1930s.

If comrades read my replies above, they will see that I allege that this 'theory', because it acts as a form of consolation (details above), turns otherwise intelligent comrades into intolerant martinets, in the same way that religious dogma does likewise to the openly superstitious. This incident merely confirms I was right.

And, comrades can check by Googling my name and MarxMail (I'd post the link, but it changes regularly) that I was a model of politeness, unlike my persona here.

So, the only reason I was banned is that this comrade cannot stand to have a theory that has little other than failure to its name questioned.

As I allege in the OP to this thread: Dialectical Marxists cling on to this 'theory' like grim death (I also explain there why they do this).

Anyway, Shane has posted a reply to me:


Hi

Well I will try to keep it brief since it’s clear we that even when I paraphrase you, you say that you didn’t say that or I should read another 50000 words so you can clarify your point. I didn’t mean that Wittgenstein drew on Marx (W was far too conservative for that) but obviously their thought overlaps or we wouldn’t be discussing Robinson in the first place. It’s no surprise that comrades here
think that you mean that dialectics is the cause of the all our problems – because that’s what you imply. If you mean that Diamat was part of the ideological justification of party-state rule, well yes of course but if it’s not the cause of anything - so what?

I think its disingenuous to say you have no philosophy to offer as if that’s what I expected – when I ask how it ‘works’ I want to know how a Marxist like you who rejects a key element in the tradition back to Engels (back 150 years would be before Marx wrote ‘Capital’) explains the workings of capitalism. I thought maybe it was Analytical Marxism but apparently not – and here you say that in the best of them – Cohen one has only (only?!) to ignore the technological determinism and functionalism. The irony here is that functionalism is a product of a non-dialectical view – all social (or other) processes are system maintaining, which is essentially what the Right Hegelians were on about (i.e. there are no contradictory processes). And it is to contradiction that I want to turn.

You assert that ‘contradiction’ can only mean a human (and in this case individual) activity. I contradict you and you contradict me but of course this isn’t the meaning most of us give it at all. Just to make sure – here is your first mention of it:

the use of "contradiction". Hegel misconstrued a social form (our ability to contradict one another) >with a real relation between things.

Now our ability to contradict each other is not a social form – it’s a speech act. Hegel is analysing underlying processes – which he takes to be ‘ideas’ – and how they unfold in the material world – which as historical materialists we take to be arse-about. Now despite the fact that I asked you specifically if you thought most dialectical thinkers (like Rees) reified the dialectic – i.e. attributed causal powers to the concept – you said ‘no’. But now you re-assert it again (quote “Marxist dialecticians... with respect to 'contradictions', these are now said to power every change in the entire universe”).

Now we come to my example (which you say you have heard a thousand times) but what exactly is your critique? You make 5 assertions:

1. That I use the word ‘contradiction’ in trying to explain it. I’m not sure what to make of this. You want a definition of the word? Not an example of its explanatory USE. So you say it’s incoherent. I use the word to mean that processes are made up of elements which result in changes in the system. ‘Contradictory’ processes are those processes which pull the system in different directions. And again ‘contradiction’ is a concept I am using to explain the real, material processes, the concept doesn’t cause it, it’s just a shorthand way of capturing those ideas. This is really a common way to speak despite your seeming mystification by it – we routinely talk of ‘capitalism’ as a thing or as causing outcomes because it captures what we mean, even tho it’s reification.

2. That we shouldn’t call it a contradiction because if 2 forces P & Q act in opposite directions we don’t call that a ‘contradiction’. No we don’t but that because forces like this operate *externally* on objects and we are talking about processes which constitute capitalism, not something that acts on it from the outside.

3. Marx said that contradictions are ‘mutually exclusive’ and that if this were so they couldn’t co-exist. If this is true one can only wonder what sort of fool Marx was to fall into such an elementary logical trap. Because you think in terms of forces acting on objects which are external then Marx makes no sense but if you think of capital as a class *process* there are forces acting *within* that system that act in different directions they mutually ‘exclude each’ other because the system cannot be maintained and BOTH
these processes continue (i.e. capital accumulation will eventually destroy its material base in the environment (one set of contradictions) or capital exploitations of wage labor will collapse the system or workers will overthrow it). Now this lies at the heart of a revolutionary Marxist perspective.

4. Because ‘contradiction’ is incoherent it allows Stalinists to argue for any conclusion they like. This is of course what I mentioned before. The idea of the ‘Dialectic’ as some sort of motive force which is the sort of crude reification that you were assuring me you didn’t mean by ‘dialectical marxists’. I have Rees’s book downstairs but have never read it – maybe I should fish it out and see if he does this. Of course dialectics can be used as ideologically – like a religion - so can positivism or other forms of materialism. Stalinist apologetics is beside the point – the use of ‘principle’ and ‘secondary’, and what have you, may just be about the complexity of the system you are describing, not an apology for it or an excuse to justify stupidity. Nevertheless it’s pretty clear that you think dialectical philosophy to be the villain as if some other form of Marxism couldn’t have been pulled into service.

5. That real people come into the equation only when I drop the word ‘contradiction’. All I can say is that we are describing class processes. You say other words would be better – well perhaps but let’s see your brief description of how capitalism works using ‘gainsay’.

You seem to think that human actions can only be individuals (is that why you use the example of a contradiction as individuals contradicting each other?) rather than classes. Marxists don’t say the ‘working class contradicts the capitalists’ as if they are 2 individuals speaking to each other – yet you say this is the only way the term makes sense. What we do say (at times) is that working class interests are in contradiction to those of capitalists – by which we mean that neither can’t have they interests fully realised and the system survive.

I don’t think its beating around the bush. You claim to be a historical materialist so once we eliminate the pernicious effect of dialectics - how will we be explaining Marxism to people? How would you have written ‘Capital’ 150 years ago without the pernicious influence of dialectics.

Shane

My reply will follow presently.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Shane:


Well I will try to keep it brief since it’s clear we that even when I paraphrase you, you say that you didn’t say that or I should read another 50000 words so you can clarify your point. I didn’t mean that Wittgenstein drew on Marx (W was far too conservative for that) but obviously their thought overlaps or we wouldn’t be discussing Robinson in the first place. It’s no surprise that comrades here
think that you mean that dialectics is the cause of the all our problems – because that’s what you imply. If you mean that Diamat was part of the ideological justification of party-state rule, well yes of course but if it’s not the cause of anything - so what?

1) It's quite clear from what I posted what I said; why paraphrase me when it is easy to cut and paste these days? I quote you; I do not try to paraphrase what you say.

2) Wittgenstein was not a conservative. Here is what I have already written on this (links and references can be found in the original essay; link at the end):


Most revolutionaries seem to regard Analytic Philosophy as something of a conservative or ideological phenomenon, with Wittgenstein's work perhaps being seen as a particularly good example of this. That view has partly been motivated by the widely held opinion that Wittgenstein was a conservative and that he pandered to mystical and religious ideas.

That this received picture is incorrect can be seen by reading Alan Janik's essays "Nyiri on the Conservatism of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy" -- which was a reply to Nyiri (1998) --, and "Wittgenstein, Marx and Sociology", both reprinted in Janik (1985), pp.116-57. See also Crary (2000).

In fact, not only were many of Wittgenstein's friends and pupils prominent Marxists -- e.g., Pierro Sraffa, Maurice Dobb, Nicholas Bakhtin, George Thomson, Maurice Cornforth, David Hayden-Guest, and Roy Pascall (cf., Monk (1990), pp.343, 348; Rhees (1984), pp.x, 48; and Sheehan (1993), pp.303, 343) --, but one of his foremost 'disciples' (Rush Rhees) at one point contemplated joining the RCP (i.e., the 1940's Trotskyist version, not that recent right-wing joke of the same name, now happily defunct), and asked Wittgenstein for advice on this. [Cf., Rhees (1984), pp.200-09.]

Rhees and Monk record the many sympathetic remarks Wittgenstein made about Marxism, about workers and about revolutionary activity. While these are not in themselves models of 'orthodoxy', they reveal how close Wittgenstein came to adopting a very weak form of class politics in the 1930s -- certainly closer than any other major philosopher had done since Marx himself; cf., Rhees (1984), pp.205-09. [Cf., also Norman Malcolm's Introduction to Rhees's book, pp.xvii-xviii, Monk (1990), pp.343-54, and Monk (2007).]

In fact, Monk reports a comment made by George Thomson on Wittgenstein's attitude to Marxism: "He was opposed to it in theory, but supported it in practice", and notes another friend who remembers Wittgenstein saying that he was "a communist, at heart" (Monk (1990), p.343). He concludes:


There is no doubt that during the political upheavals of the mid-1930s Wittgenstein's sympathies were with the working class and the unemployed, and that his allegiance, broadly speaking, was with the left….

Despite the fact that Wittgenstein was never at any time a Marxist, he was perceived as a sympathetic figure by the students who formed the core of the Cambridge Communist Party, many of whom ([David] Hayden-Guest, [John] Cornford, Maurice Cornforth, etc.) attended his lectures. [Monk (1990), pp.343, 348.]

In Rhees's book, Fania Pascall -- who was another Marxist friend of Wittgenstein's, married to Communist Party intellectual Roy Pascall, translator of The German Ideology into English --, reports that Wittgenstein had actually read Marx (cf., Rhees (1984), p.44), but, the source of this information appears to be John Moran [Cf., Moran (1972)]. Garth Hallett's otherwise comprehensive survey omits reference to this alleged fact. [Cf., Hallett (1977), pp.759-75.] But if, as we will see, he had read Lenin, and all his close friends were Marxists, it is a safe bet that he had also read Marx.

Rhees and Monk also note that when Wittgenstein visited Russia he met Sophia Yanovskaya, who was Professor of Mathematical Logic at Moscow University and one of the co-editors of Marx's Mathematical Manuscripts. [Cf., Yanovskaya (1983), in Marx (1983).] She apparently advised him to "read more Hegel" (which suggests he had already read some). [Monk (1990), p.351, and Rhees (1984), p.209.] In fact, Yanovskaya even went as far as to recommend Wittgenstein for the chair at Kazan University (Lenin's old college) and for a teaching post at Moscow University (Monk (1990), p. 351). These were hardly posts one would have offered to just anyone in Stalin's Russia in the mid-1930s, least of all to someone unsympathetic toward Communism.

[DM = Dialectical Materialism.]

Monk suggests that Yanovskaya formed the (false) impression that Wittgenstein was interested in DM (ibid.), but Drury (another of Wittgenstein's pupils) informs us that Wittgenstein had a low opinion of Lenin's philosophical work (but, exactly which part this refers to we do not know; but this does indicate that Wittgenstein had at least read Lenin since he never passed comments on second-hand reports of other writers' work), but the opposite view of his practical endeavours:


Lenin's writings about philosophy are of course absurd, but at least he did want to get something done. [Drury, quoting Wittgenstein from recollection, in Rhees (1984), p.126.]

Fania Pascall also records Wittgenstein's friendship with Nicholas Bakhtin (ibid., p.14), and notes that at one time he expressed a desire to go and live in Russia, as we have seen (ibid., pp.26, 29, 44, 125-26, 198-200). In fact he actually visited Russia in September 1935 (cf., Monk (1990), pp. 347-53), when he met the above Professor Yanovskaya. Like many other Cambridge intellectuals at the time his desire to live in the USSR was motivated by his false belief that under Stalin it was a Workers' State. In this regard, of course, his intentions are more significant than his mistaken views. One only has to contrast Wittgenstein's opinion of Russia with that of, say, Bertrand Russell -- his former teacher -- to see how sympathetic in comparison Wittgenstein was to revolutionary Marxism, even if, like many others, he finally mistook the latter for Stalinism. [Cf., Drury's memoir in Rhees (1984), p.144, and Russell (1962).] John Maynard Keynes (another of Wittgenstein's friends) wrote the following in a letter to the Russian ambassador Maisky (who had in fact once been a Menshevik) about Wittgenstein's plans to live in Russia:


I must leave it to him to tell you his reasons for wanting to go to Russia. He is not a member of the Communist Party, but has strong sympathies with the way of life which he believes the new regime in Russia stands for. [John Maynard Keynes to Maisky, quoted in Rhees (1984), p.199. Also quoted more fully in Monk (1990), p.349.]

In his biography of Wittgenstein, Ray Monk plays down Wittgenstein's proposed move, and, relying on Fania Pascall's view of Wittgenstein's motives, interprets it as a reflection of his attachment to a Tolstoyian view of the Russian peasantry and the 'dignity of manual labour'. While this clearly was a factor, it cannot explain Wittgenstein's positive remarks about the gains he believed workers had made because of the revolution -- but, given what happened to the Russian peasantry in Stalin's Russia in the 1930s, this is surely the least likely explanation! On this, Rhees is clearly a more reliable guide; he knew Wittgenstein better than almost anyone else. Moreover, it sits rather awkwardly with Keynes's comments above; there Keynes notes that Wittgenstein was sympathetic to "the way of life which he believes the new regime in Russia stands for" -- notice the comment about the regime, and not just the way of life.

[The full details of Wittgenstein's desire to live in Russia, and his visit, can be found in Monk (1990), pp.340-54.]

Moreover, his closest friend before he met Rhees was Francis Skinner, who had wanted to volunteer to fight in Spain as part of the International Brigade (he was finally rejected on health grounds).

In addition, Wittgenstein thought that Alan Turing (who was also one of his 'part time' pupils for a brief period in the 1930s) believed that he (Wittgenstein) was trying to introduce "Bolshevism" into Mathematics, because of his criticisms of the irrational fear of contradictions among mathematicians. [Cf., Monk (1990), pp.419-20; see also Hodges (1983), pp.152-54.]

As Wittgenstein himself said:


Turing does not object to anything I say. He agrees with every word. He objects to the idea he thinks underlies it. He thinks we're undermining mathematics, introducing Bolshevism into mathematics. But not at all. [Wittgenstein (1976), p.76.]

On this, and Wittgenstein's 'radical Bolshevism', see Ray Monk's on-line essay, (link in the original essay).


The changes Wittgenstein wished to see are...I believe, so radical that the name 'full-blooded Bolshevism' suggests itself as a natural way to describe the militant tendency of his remarks. [Monk (1995).]

See also Monk (2007).

Finally, but perhaps most importantly, Wittgenstein himself declared that his later Philosophy had been inspired by his regular conversations with Pierro Sraffa (Gramsci's friend). The extent of Sraffa's influence is still unclear (however, see below), but Wittgenstein himself admitted to Rhees that it was from Sraffa that he had gained an "anthropological" view of philosophical problems. [Cf., Monk (1990), pp.260-61. Cf., also Malcolm (1958), p.69, von Wright (ND), pp.28, 213, and Wittgenstein (1998), p.16.]

In the Preface to what is his most important and influential work, Wittgenstein had this to say:


Even more than this…criticism I am indebted to that which a teacher of this university, Mr P. Sraffa, for many years unceasingly practiced on my thoughts. I am indebted to this stimulus for the most consequential ideas of this book. [Wittgenstein (1958), p.viii. Bold emphasis added.]

This is quite remarkable: the author of what many believe to be the most original and innovative philosophical work of the 20th century -- and one that, if correct, brings to an end 2500 years of traditional Philosophy -- claims that his most "consequential" ideas were derived from a man who was an avowed Marxist!

Attempts to reconstruct Sraffa's influence on Wittgenstein are in their early stages, and they are not likely to progress much further unless some hard evidence turns up; to date, these attempts are based largely on supposition and inference. On this, see Sharpe (2002), Davis (2002) and Rossi-Landi (2002), pp.200-04.

Now, it is not being maintained here that Wittgenstein was a closet revolutionary, only that he has been rather badly misrepresented; a demonstrably erroneous view of his political leanings has been fostered by some of his 'disciples', who have (or have had) their own political agendas in mind.

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Wittgenstein.htm

3) Where exactly do I imply that dialectics is the cause of all our woes? I note you do not even attempt to quote me to that effect. In fact, I go out of my way, several times, at my site and in my essays to say things like this:


(1) It is important to emphasise from the outset that I am not blaming the long-term failure of Dialectical Marxism solely on the acceptance of the Hermetic ideas dialecticians inherited from Hegel.

It is worth repeating this since I still encounter comments on Internet discussion boards, and still receive e-mails from those who claim to have read the above words, who still think I am blaming all our woes on dialectics. I am not.

However, no matter how many times I repeat this caveat, the message will not sink in (and this is after several years of continually making this very point!).

It seems that this is one part of the universe over which the Heraclitean Flux has no power!

What is being claimed, however, is that adherence to this 'theory' is one of the subjective reasons why Dialectical Marxism has become a bye-word for failure.

There are other, objective reasons why the class enemy still runs this planet, but since revolutions require revolutionaries with ideas in their heads, this 'theory' must take some of the blame.

So, it is alleged here that dialectics has been an important contributory factor.

It certainly helps explain why revolutionary groups are in general vanishingly small, neurotically sectarian, studiously unreasonable, consistently conservative, theoretically deferential to 'tradition', and almost invariably lean toward some form of substitutionism.

Naturally, this has had a direct bearing on our lack of impact on the working-class over the last seventy years or so -- and probably for much longer -- and thus on the continuing success of Capitalism.

The following 'Unity of Opposites' is difficult to explain otherwise:

The larger the proletariat, the smaller the impact that Dialectical Marxism has on it.

Sadly, this will continue while comrades cling on to this regressive doctrine.

Any who doubt this are encouraged to read on, where those doubts will be severely bruised, if not completely laid to rest.

This has not been tucked away in an obscure corner of my site; it's on the opening page!

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/index.htm

More to follow in my next post.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Shane:


If you mean that Diamat was part of the ideological justification of party-state rule, well yes of course but if it’s not the cause of anything - so what?

Where did I say it wasn't the cause of anything? You seem to flip from one extreme to the next; one minute you say I imply it is the cause of all our woes, the next that it is the cause of nothing at all!


I think its disingenuous to say you have no philosophy to offer as if that’s what I expected – when I ask how it ‘works’ I want to know how a Marxist like you who rejects a key element in the tradition back to Engels (back 150 years would be before Marx wrote ‘Capital’) explains the workings of capitalism. I thought maybe it was Analytical Marxism but apparently not – and here you say that in the best of them – Cohen one has only (only?!) to ignore the technological determinism and functionalism. The irony here is that functionalism is a product of a non-dialectical view – all social (or other) processes are system maintaining, which is essentially what the Right Hegelians were on about (i.e. there are no contradictory processes). And it is to contradiction that I want to turn.

1) What I reject is the philosophical theory that Engels imposed on Historical Materialism, not Historical Materialism itself. I did say this in my earlier post, so I do not know how you managed to miss it.

2) I'm not convinced that there is such a thing as a 'dialectical view' of anything, since dialectics makes no sense at all. So, functionalism cannot be a non-dialectical view if there is no such thing as a dialectical view to begin with. That would be like asserting that, say, the scientific work of Newton represents a non-Jabberwocky view of the universe.


You assert that ‘contradiction’ can only mean a human (and in this case individual) activity. I contradict you and you contradict me but of course this isn’t the meaning most of us give it at all. Just to make sure – here is your first mention of it:

Well, if you try to contradict anyone not already seduced by Hegelian philosophy, or 'materialist dialectics', they will understand you readily. On the other hand, if you try to sell them the idea that this involves a real-world 'unity of opposites', they will not know what you are talking about. The fact that you would then have to explain yourself (whether or not you were successful in this) would tell us that the word "contradict" (or even "contradiction") does not ordinarily mean what dialecticians tell us it means. That is why I quoted Marx to this effect:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.

Hegel's 'innovative' employment of this word (itself based on a series of crass logical blunders) represents just such a distortion. And the same is true of the use to which Marxist Dialecticians put this word.


Now our ability to contradict each other is not a social form – it’s a speech act. Hegel is analysing underlying processes – which he takes to be ‘ideas’ – and how they unfold in the material world – which as historical materialists we take to be arse-about. Now despite the fact that I asked you specifically if you thought most dialectical thinkers (like Rees) reified the dialectic – i.e. attributed causal powers to the concept – you said ‘no’. But now you re-assert it again (quote “Marxist dialecticians... with respect to 'contradictions', these are now said to power every change in the entire universe”).

I'm intrigued that you think speech acts are not social forms (on this, see the end). Where do you think they are learnt and take place; on Jupiter?

And Hegel is not analysing anything; he is imposing his mystical ideas on reality, based on a crass example of sub-Aristotelian logic. To that end, as Marx says, he has to distort ordinary language.

You now say this:


Now despite the fact that I asked you specifically if you thought most dialectical thinkers (like Rees) reified the dialectic – i.e. attributed causal powers to the concept – you said ‘no’. But now you re-assert it again (quote “Marxist dialecticians... with respect to 'contradictions', these are now said to power every change in the entire universe”)

What you wanted to know was if I thought they caused change, which I do not; but dialecticians certainly think they do, and like Hegel they are quite happy to impose them on reality, and they do this in defiance of their constant claim that they do not do this.


Now we come to my example (which you say you have heard a thousand times) but what exactly is your critique? You make 5 assertions:

That I use the word ‘contradiction’ in trying to explain it. I’m not sure what to make of this. You want a definition of the word? Not an example of its explanatory USE. So you say it’s incoherent. I use the word to mean that processes are made up of elements which result in changes in the system. ‘Contradictory’ processes are those processes which pull the system in different directions. And again ‘contradiction’ is a concept I am using to explain the real, material processes, the concept doesn’t cause it, it’s just a shorthand way of capturing those ideas. This is really a common way to speak despite your seeming mystification by it – we routinely talk of ‘capitalism’ as a thing or as causing outcomes because it captures what we mean, even tho it’s reification.

1) No, I do not want a definition; a clear explanation (and the first in 200 years) of what a 'dialectical contradiction' is will do.

2) Now, you, like all other dialecticians, help yourself to this word, and use it to try to add to the explanation of change that is already available in Historical Materialism, without this word. You use it to account for " processes which pull the system in different directions", when, as I pointed out, that is a distortion of this word. Why use it? It bears no relation to its use in ordinary language or in logic. It adds nothing to the account available to us in Historical Materialism. It is like a wheel in a machine that does no work.

3) You then say:


And again ‘contradiction’ is a concept I am using to explain the real, material processes, the concept doesn’t cause it, it’s just a shorthand way of capturing those ideas. This is really a common way to speak despite your seeming mystification by it – we routinely talk of ‘capitalism’ as a thing or as causing outcomes because it captures what we mean, even tho it’s reification.

But it doesn't help in any way; you might just as well use "banana" for all the use it is. And it's a pernicious 'shorthand', too, for the reasons I suggested in my last reply to you.


That we shouldn’t call it a contradiction because if 2 forces P & Q act in opposite directions we don’t call that a ‘contradiction’. No we don’t but that because forces like this operate *externally* on objects and we are talking about processes which constitute capitalism, not something that acts on it from the outside.

So, what is the point, then, of your earlier metaphor?


‘Contradictory’ processes are those processes which pull the system in different directions.

If this is not an appeal to forces, then what is it?


Marx said that contradictions are ‘mutually exclusive’ and that if this were so they couldn’t co-exist. If this is true one can only wonder what sort of fool Marx was to fall into such an elementary logical trap. Because you think in terms of forces acting on objects which are external then Marx makes no sense but if you think of capital as a class *process* there are forces acting *within* that system that act in different directions they mutually ‘exclude each’ other because the system cannot be maintained and BOTH these processes continue (i.e. capital accumulation will eventually destroy its material base in the environment (one set of contradictions) or capital exploitations of wage labor will collapse the system or workers will overthrow it). Now this lies at the heart of a revolutionary Marxist perspective.

1) In fact, what I claim is that Marx is merely "coquetting" with this word in Das Kapital, as he himself tells us in the Preface to the second edition.

2) And it is no use appealing to what is internal to capitalism, since these 'pulling apart' 'forces'/'contradictions' are still external to any process on which they allegedly act.

3) You now say this:


Because you think in terms of forces acting on objects which are external then Marx makes no sense but if you think of capital as a class *process* there are forces acting *within* that system that act in different directions they mutually ‘exclude each’ other because the system cannot be maintained and BOTH these processes continue (i.e. capital accumulation will eventually destroy its material base in the environment (one set of contradictions) or capital exploitations of wage labor will collapse the system or workers will overthrow it). Now this lies at the heart of a revolutionary Marxist perspective.

Bold added.

But in that case, Marx would have said that these 'contradictions' "seek to mutually exclude one another", or will "one day mutually exclude one another". But he doesn't. He says they mutually exclude one another, in the here and now; present perfect tense. If so, they can't co-exist, so they can't 'contradict' one another.

4) Now I'm quite happy with most of the things you say above, indeed, I totally agree with them, but the explanation you give is in terms of Historical Materialism, and it only becomes obscure, indeed it is negated, by the use of this term drawn from mystical Hegelianism (upside down or the 'right way up'). Historical Materialism ceases to work it this term is imported. No wonder Marx 'coquetted' with it.

You then say this:


Because ‘contradiction’ is incoherent it allows Stalinists to argue for any conclusion they like. This is of course what I mentioned before. The idea of the ‘Dialectic’ as some sort of motive force which is the sort of crude reification that you were assuring me you didn’t mean by ‘dialectical marxists’. I have Rees’s book downstairs but have never read it – maybe I should fish it out and see if he does this. Of course dialectics can be used as ideologically – like a religion - so can positivism or other forms of materialism. Stalinist apologetics is beside the point – the use of ‘principle’ and ‘secondary’, and what have you, may just be about the complexity of the system you are describing, not an apology for it or an excuse to justify stupidity. Nevertheless it’s pretty clear that you think dialectical philosophy to be the villain as if some other form of Marxism couldn’t have been pulled into service.

1) I did not say this: "Because ‘contradiction’ is incoherent it allows Stalinists to argue for any conclusion they like", what I said is that whether or not dialectics is incoherent it can be used this way, to justify anything you like and its opposite. And that is because it glories in 'contradictions', only now they are used in their logical sense, to justify two propositions as true, but both of which cannot be true (and both of which cannot be false), by-passing the more limited use you allege is present in Das Kapital.

2) I do not think dialectics is the villain here; those are your words again, not mine. What dialectics has done is make a bad situation far worse, in that it has been used to saddle Marxism with anti-Marxist and opportunist policies and tactics.

3) And it is arguable that other parts of Marxism could have been used -- and yet I'd like to see you try! -- , but only dialectics allows those who use it to argue one thing one minute, and then its exact opposite the next -- or, in many cases, both at once!

Nothing in Historical Materialism allows this. Dialectics positively encourages it. In fact, the only other 'theory' I can think of that would 'permit' this is Zen Buddhism.

4. And it's not just the Stalinists who do this; you will find more than enough evidence at my site that Maoists and Trotskyists do this too, and all the time:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm

Use the 'Quick Links' at the top to jump to Section 7: Case Studies.


That real people come into the equation only when I drop the word ‘contradiction’. All I can say is that we are describing class processes. You say other words would be better – well perhaps but let’s see your brief description of how capitalism works using ‘gainsay’.

No need to; Historical Materialism, without this obscure term, does the job quite nicely.


You seem to think that human actions can only be individuals (is that why you use the example of a contradiction as individuals contradicting each other?) rather than classes. Marxists don’t say the ‘working class contradicts the capitalists’ as if they are 2 individuals speaking to each other – yet you say this is the only way the term makes sense. What we do say (at times) is that working class interests are in contradiction to those of capitalists – by which we mean that neither can’t have they interests fully realised and the system survive.

I do not think that human beings should be considered as individuals; in fact, I have published a 140,000 word essay at my site which argues for the exact opposite. That is why I have called this a social form -- which, you, not me, denied. See above.

So, yes individuals use the word "contradiction" in the way I allege, but only because they have been socialised to do so.

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page_13_03.htm

Now, I partially agree with this (indeed, I make this point in Essay Eight Part Two):


Marxists don’t say the ‘working class contradicts the capitalists’ as if they are 2 individuals speaking to each other – yet you say this is the only way the term makes sense. What we do say (at times) is that working class interests are in contradiction to those of capitalists – by which we mean that neither can’t have they interests fully realised and the system survive.

With suitable change in wording, this could in fact have come from that essay. But this use of the word bears no relation to those obscure 'dialectical contradictions', a phrase that is still in need of explication.


I don’t think its beating around the bush. You claim to be a historical materialist so once we eliminate the pernicious effect of dialectics - how will we be explaining Marxism to people? How would you have written ‘Capital’ 150 years ago without the pernicious influence of dialectics.

I do not need to speculate; if you look at my answer to comrade Artesian above, you will see that I allege that, by the time he came to write [i]Das Kapital[/], Marx waved good bye to the sort of dialectics that most comrades have uncritically swallowed, and that his 'dialectic' bears a much closer relation to the dialectic found in Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists.

More on that here:

'Scottish School':

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1195129&postcount=57

Aristotle:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1356284&postcount=68

[S.Artesian]

Take your time Rosa, I'm sure I've heard it all before, numerous times. Just one thing, I am not your comrade. Anyone who calls me a class-traitor is not a comrade.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Where did I say you were my comrade, or I was yours? Using the phrase 'comrade Artesian' is like using the phrase "Brother William" in a monastery.

I will continue to use it, however, even if only to annoy you...:)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


I am not in the business, in this discussion, of rehabilitating Hegel, or anyone, and any so-called laws. The question is NOT "are dialectics valid," but rather did Marx use, or claim to use, dialectics or a dialectical method in his analysis of capitalism? In the cited paragraph from Capital, he clearly indicates that he does so claim and does so use.

Even though you are trying to rehabilitate his alleged 'law', and suggest Marx agreed with it or used it.

And, I agree that the question is this: "did Marx use, or claim to use, dialectics or a dialectical method in his analysis of capitalism?"

However, you go on to say:


In the cited paragraph from Capital, he clearly indicates that he does so claim and does so use.

Well, we needn't speculate, for in that passage, quoted above, many times, there is no trace of Hegel at all. So Marx's 'dialectic' has had Hegel extirpated: no 'unity of opposites', no 'negation of the negation', no 'transformation of quantity into quality', no 'contradictions', no 'totality'... He calls this de-Hegelianised 'dialectic' his method.

So, this is not the 'dialectic' as you know it.




The problem with any discussion with Rosa is that she can add nothing new to an analysis of Marx's concrete work. She must, and must always, fall back on her particular misinterpretation of Marx's phrase about having "coquetted" with forms of expression peculiar to Hegel. Marx qualifies that term, that flirtation, in specifying where and how the flirtation appears-- and that is in the discussion of value.

1) Are you addressing me or your microscopic audience?

2) You have alleged this many times before. But, what has it got to do with whether Marx used the traditional form of the 'dialectic', which is what you said was the main point?

3) And in what way have I 'misinterpreted Marx when he tells us he 'coquetted' with Hegelian jargon? Perhaps you think 'coquetted' means: 'dealt with in a serious and scientific manner'? Or that when he tells us he was doing this he was merely joshing?


In discussing what Marx said in the cited paragraph, Rosa appears to be of two minds-- 1) Marx is wrong in his concrete analysis of the transformation of a wannabe into an actual capitalist 2) Marx is just trying to scare his reader by pretending to endorse Hegel's law of transformation.

1) Still not addressing me but your zero fans, I see.

2) But, nowhere have I said Marx was wrong -- when he wrote [i]Das Kapital, he had waved good bye to all this Hegelian guff (upside down or the 'right way up'). Marx's use of the 'Hegelian Law' is akin to a Darwinian's use of anthropomorphic terms (like 'selection', and 'selfish') to explain what she/he means. So, it's not used to 'scare' anyone. I can't think where you got that idea from. Nor will I defend everything Marx says. Sometimes he was inconsistent; hence his work needs to be read with some sensitivity.


When challenged on the actual historical details of the "personification of capital" into the capitalist, Rosa, no surprise, has nothing to offer except her inability to comprehend specific social relations of production i.e. she insists that Marx is wrong and that any amount of money could transform the guild master into a capitalist provided the fundamental social relation of capitalism existed.

Well, this is just your previous post re-jigged. Again, nowhere do I say Marx is wrong; what a careful interpreter will do is interpret what he has to say in the light of what he has published elsewhere -- that capitalists can only emerge when there has been a change in the relations of production. Now, you say of this, the following:


When challenged on the actual historical details of the "personification of capital" into the capitalist, Rosa, no surprise, has nothing to offer except her inability to comprehend specific social relations of production

And yet what do you offer by way of proof for this allegation? This:


she insists that Marx is wrong and that any amount of money could transform the guild master into a capitalist provided the fundamental social relation of capitalism existed.

It might help to look at what Marx says again:


A certain stage of capitalist production necessitates that the capitalist be able to devote the whole of the time during which he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified, to the appropriation and therefore the control of the labour of others [fremde Arbeit], and to the sale of the products of that labour (4). The guild system of the Middle Ages therefore tried forcibly to prevent the transformation of the master of a craft into a capitalist, by limiting the number of workers a single master could employ to a very low maximum. Hence the possessor of money or commodities actually turns into a capitalist only where the minimum sum advanced for production greatly exceeds the known medieval maximum. Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel, in his Logic, that at a certain point merely quantitative differences pass over by a dialectical inversion into quantitative distinctions. (5)" - Marx, Capital Vol. 1 Pt. 3 Ch. 11, p. 423 in the Penguin edition.

Bold added.

It's plan from this that Marx is talking about those who are already capitalists; the transformation of others who aren't yet capitalists -- well, they can only become capitalists in a capitalist economy, if they exceed a certain minimum amount of money. In that case, a change in the relations of production must already exist if this is to happen. Hence, I was right to say that no amount of money, if these relations do not exist, will turn anyone into a capitalist.

There is none of the following apparent in Marx's reasoning:


"This is precisely the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap; for example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes at which -- under normal pressure -- the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where consequently quantity is transformed into quality." [Engels (1976) Anti-Dühring, p.56. I have used the online version here, but quoted the page numbers for the Foreign Languages edition. Bold emphasis added.]

"With this assurance Herr Dühring saves himself the trouble of saying anything further about the origin of life, although it might reasonably have been expected that a thinker who had traced the evolution of the world back to its self-equal state, and is so much at home on other celestial bodies, would have known exactly what's what also on this point. For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules -- including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms -- chemistry -- in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. -- Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring." [Ibid., pp.82-83. Bold emphasis added.]

There is no gradual increment in Marx's reasoning; it's not as if a proto-capitalist, in a medieval economy, could save his/her pennies, increasing gradually from, say, $1 to $1.01, to $1.02...., finally reaching $150,000 (in medieval money, of course), at which point, hey presto, with no change in the relations of production, this proto-capitalist changes into a capitalist. Or that if medieval merchants/guild masters save carefully, the relations of production will automatically change! Nor is there any suggestion of this in a newly founded capitalist economy. But, Hegel's 'law' requires gradualness, as Engel's notes. Marx surely knew this, and that it does not apply in the case he considers. Hence, he 'coquetted' with a 'law' that does not apply in this case.

So, a change in the relations of production is crucial here, not this non-existent gradual increase.


What Rosa fails to grasp, besides Marx, besides Marx's extraction of Hegel, is fittingly, concrete history. And that concrete history shows that the guild master could not become the capitalist because of the precise social relations of production defining the guild, the guild master, and the relation of the master to the laborers in the workshop. To preserve those relations, the guild insisted on restrictions on the labor that could be employed.

I'm not too sure what this detail has got to do with general point that it takes a change in the social relations of production to create capitalists.


Marx is not arguing that the quantitative accumulation of money changes the qualitative social relation of capital-- the organization of the means of production as private property and labor as wage-labor. Marx is arguing that for the wannabe bourgeois, for the emerging and still petty bourgeois, for the merchant to become the industrial or manufacturing capitalist, he must be able to devote all his time, his labor time to overseeing, maintaining, capital--the expropriation of the labor of others. The transformation that is quantitative in the use of money is quantitative to the emerging capitalist, becoming the qualitative transformation into the full time capitalist.

In other words, this 'law' does not apply, since it takes a qualitative change in the relations of production before these quantities become significant. And, as I noted, even on your account there is no 'gradualness', so there can be no break in 'gradualness', no 'leap'.


Rosa, as is her usual pathology, misses the historical specificity of Marx's analysis-- a specificity that Marx makes explicit in the very first words of the paragraph:

"A certain stage of capitalist production necessitates..."

A certain stage-- unlike Rosa, Marx clearly is aware that the fundamental social relation of capital has already been established and he is discussing an ensuing moment when "part-time" capitalists cannot satisfy the needs of capitalist reproduction. Clearly, Marx is describing what it takes for the part-time capitalist to become the full-time capitalist -- to "out-exploit" the guild master, and that takes access, control, expropriation of collective labor on a scale of greater than that of the guild master to command the labor of apprentices, assistants, laborers.

Indeed, but once again, whatever the specifics, a social change is required first, as I maintained.


The qualitative social relation has been established-- expanding the social relation requires the transformation of the small time capitalist into the big, and full, time capitalist. "Hence the minimum sums of money advanced" had to exceed the maximum sums of the guild system. And that increase in quantity precipitated, enabled, the qualitative transformation of the use of the capitalists' own time.

Again, this concedes the point: what is crucial here is a social change, not the quantities involved.

This can be seen from the fact that Marx tells us he was merely 'coquetting' with this jargon. But in your haste to re-habilitate Hegel (which is what you are doing despite your denial), you deliberately choose to ignore his warning.


Marx, in this discussion of the transformation of the capitalist, and the applicability of Hegel's "quantity into quality," isn't flirting with anything, isn't trying to shock, titillate, scare, or otherwise obscure his actual appreciation and use of dialectic

Except he tells us he was...

[S.Artesian]

You hardly annoy me, Rosa. I quite enjoy how you dissemble and deny your own statements when they're pushed back at you. And I love how illogical you truly are.

[S.Artesian]

One more time:

1. the transformation at stake is the transformation from part/small time capitalist to full/big time capitalist.

2. at a certain point, the capitalist must make that qualitative transition--

3. How does the capitalist make that transition-- by employing, exploiting more labor more thoroughly than the guild master.

4. How does the capitalist accomplish that engagement of labor-- through ownership of a quantity of the means of production and subsistence [commodities]and/or money which he can advance for labor-power; and thatquantity must exceed the maximum available under those engaging labor in the pre-existing social relations of production.

5. This leads Marx to include the reference as to the correctness of Hegel's law regarding the transition from quantity to quality through dialectical inversion. He isn't providing the equivalent of "scare quotes" when he writes this. He is endorsing Hegel's law and "dialectical inversion."

6. Rosa's answer-- which she offers without a shred of historical knowledge and data is that the guild master could have become a capitalist with a smaller or greater mass of money if the social relations are different. She ignores the fact that the guild master could not have become a capitalist based on his social existence as a guild master because those are the social relations that define his production, the money he accumulates, the labor he can employ. Right, the guild master could become a capitalist if social relations were different. That is to say-- if a frog had wings he wouldn't bump his ass on the ground. Rosa has accomplished a feat of circular unreasoning equivalent to that obscure practice of grabbing a ducks head from the inside and pulling the head back and through its own cloaca, thus effectively turning the duck inside out. It might still look like a duck, walk like a duck, quack like a duck, but it sure as hell won't fly like a duck.

7. Historically, the fact of the matter is that the guild master did not become a capitalist; that the part-time capitalist-- at a certain stage in his accumulation of capital-- had to become a full time capitalist. This represents a qualitative transformation of capitalist production-- namely that the quantity of accumulated capital regards ceaseless production and attention in order to maintain valorisation, and that capitalist production is/has become the dominant social relation of production.

8. Rosa confuses the transformation of the critical social relation of production with the transformation Marx is describing, which he says manifest the transformation of quantity into quality, of the "proto"-capitalist to the established, dominant capitalist.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S Artesian:


You hardly annoy me, Rosa. I quite enjoy how you dissemble and deny your own statements when they're pushed back at you. And I love how illogical you truly are.

On the contrary, it's quite plain that I do; why else would you internet stalk me?


I quite enjoy how you dissemble and deny your own statements when they're pushed back at you

And I enjoy your unsupported allegations; if the above were the case, you'd quote these alleged inconsistencies. The fact that you don't tells us all we need to know.


And I love how illogical you truly are

Just trying to catch you up, sweetie...:)

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

S. Artesian:


One more time:

1. the transformation at stake is the transformation from part/small time capitalist to full/big time capitalist.

2. at a certain point, the capitalist must make that qualitative transition--

But you have yet to show that Marx argues that there is a gradual increase followed by a "leap", which is in fact the 'law' Hegel inflicted on humanity.


3. How does the capitalist make that transition-- by employing, exploiting more labor more thoroughly than the guild master.

4. How does the capitalist accomplish that engagement of labor-- through ownership of a quantity of the means of production and subsistence [commodities]and/or money which he can advance for labor-power; and thatquantity must exceed the maximum available under those engaging labor in the pre-existing social relations of production.

Same comment.


5. This leads Marx to include the reference as to the correctness of Hegel's law regarding the transition from quantity to quality through dialectical inversion. He isn't providing the equivalent of "scare quotes" when he writes this. He is endorsing Hegel's law and "dialectical inversion."

But, this is not Hegel's 'law', so no wonder Marx said he was 'coquetting'.


6. Rosa's answer-- which she offers without a shred of historical knowledge and data is that the guild master could have become a capitalist with a smaller or greater mass of money if the social relations are different. She ignores the fact that the guild master could not have become a capitalist based on his social existence as a guild master because those are the social relations that define his production, the money he accumulates, the labor he can employ. Right, the guild master could become a capitalist if social relations were different. That is to say-- if a frog had wings he wouldn't bump his ass on the ground. Rosa has accomplished a feat of circular unreasoning equivalent to that obscure practice of grabbing a ducks head from the inside and pulling the head back and through its own cloaca, thus effectively turning the duck inside out. It might still look like a duck, walk like a duck, quack like a duck, but it sure as hell won't fly like a duck.

I'm not sure what this has to do with anything I said; but hey, while spoil a fictional masterpiece?


7. Historically, the fact of the matter is that the guild master did not become a capitalist; that the part-time capitalist-- at a certain stage in his accumulation of capital-- had to become a full time capitalist. This represents a qualitative transformation of capitalist production-- namely that the quantity of accumulated capital regards ceaseless production and attention in order to maintain valorisation, and that capitalist production is/has become the dominant social relation of production.

8. Rosa confuses the transformation of the critical social relation of production with the transformation Marx is describing, which he says manifest the transformation of quantity into quality, of the "proto"-capitalist to the established, dominant capitalist.

Once more, where is the 'gradual increase' and the 'break in continuity', here?

So, Marx is still 'coquetting'...

[S.Artesian]

Stalking you? Girl.. don't flatter yourself. You got nothing I want. I am merely challenging you, and your repetition compulsion for distorting what Marx wrote. You don't want to accept the challenge? Just say so. I have no interest in pursuing this with somebody who won't accept challenges.

No, I don't have to show any gradual change leading to a leap-- I don't have to show that that is in fact what Hegel means; I don't have to document the transformation from the part-time capitalist to the full-time capitalist.

I only have to point out that Marx isn't flirting with Hegel when he wholeheartedly endorses "dialectical inversion" and the correctness of Hegel's law of transformation. You want to argue that law, or that dialectical inversion? Go argue with Marx. He said it. He meant it.

He, Marx said, that he wasn't coquetting with dialectic, but with forms of expression peculiar to him-- Hegel-- and the coquetting was "here and there," in the chapter on the theory of value.

Those who read your millions of words could save a lot of time by reading Marx's preface to the 2nd edition for themselves where Marx explains his relation to Hegel and Hegel's dialectic in no uncertain, and no coquettish words, concluding that preface with the words-- "That crisis is once again approaching although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality fo its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new holy Prusso-German empire."

And read the paragraph above that where Marx describes why, in its rational form, dialectic is a scandal to the bourgeoisie... "because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its invetable breaking up;..... because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary."

That's not flirtation-- that's passionate attraction and affirmation.

Marx held out hope for even the mushroom upstarts of Germany that the beginning of the crisis known as the "Long Deflation" in 1873 would teach them the importance of dialectics.

I hold out no such hope for our Rosa.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


Stalking you? Girl.. don't flatter yourself.

Your words say one thing, your actions another.


You got nothing I want. I am merely challenging you, and your repetition compulsion for distorting what Marx wrote. You don't want to accept the challenge? Just say so. I have no interest in pursuing this with somebody who won't accept challenges.

Except, it's you who ignores what he says.


No, I don't have to show any gradual change leading to a leap-- I don't have to show that that is in fact what Hegel means; I don't have to document the transformation from the part-time capitalist to the full-time capitalist.

But, you do if this is the 'Hegelian Law' and not your cobbled-together, substitute for it. Of course, if it's not the 'Hegelian Law', then Marx was indeed 'coquetting' when he said it was.


I only have to point out that Marx isn't flirting with Hegel when he wholeheartedly endorses "dialectical inversion" and the correctness of Hegel's law of transformation. You want to argue that law, or that dialectical inversion? Go argue with Marx. He said it. He meant it.

Except Marx says:


Here, as in natural science, is shown the correctness of the law discovered by Hegel, in his Logic, that at a certain point merely quantitative differences pass over by a dialectical inversion into quantitative distinctions. (5)"

Bold added.

So, it is 'Hegel's law' that incorporates this alleged 'dialectical inversion'. In which case, there should be, as Engels noted, a 'nodal line', whereby small gradual increases pass over in to a sudden 'leap'.

But, this does not happen in the case under consideration; hence 'Hegel's law' does not apply here, and Marx was 'coquetting' when he said it did.

As you yourself noted:


Go argue with Marx. He said it. He meant it.


He, Marx said, that he wasn't coquetting with dialectic, but with forms of expression peculiar to him-- Hegel-- and the coquetting was "here and there," in the chapter on the theory of value.

Well, once more, Marx saved us the trouble of speculating, for in the Preface to the second edition of Das Kapital he added this passage (I'm surprised you haven't seen it before):


"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

You will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics you have uncritically swallowed, for in it there is not one atom of Hegel -- no 'quantity turning into quality', no 'contradictions', no 'negation of the negation', no 'unity of opposites', no 'totality'...

So, Marx's method has had Hegel totally extirpated. For Marx, putting Hegel on 'his feet' is to crush his head. Marx's 'dialectic' thus more closely resembles that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists. It resembles Hegel's 'dialectic' (upside down, or the 'right way up') not at all.

And what few terms Marx uses of Hegel's in Das Kapital, he tells us this:


"and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him."

Hence, the 'dialectic' as you understand it has been extirpated from Das Kapital, so Marx did not need to 'coquette' with it, nor did I say he did -- but he did 'coquette' with what few Hegelian terms one finds in that book.


Those who read your millions of words could save a lot of time by reading Marx's preface to the 2nd edition for themselves where Marx explains his relation to Hegel and Hegel's dialectic in no uncertain, and no coquettish words, concluding that preface with the words-- "That crisis is once again approaching although as yet but in its preliminary stage; and by the universality for its theatre and the intensity of its action it will drum dialectics even into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new holy Prusso-German empire."

But, we already know that this 'dialectic' is not the dialectic you have uncritically swallowed, but one that resembles that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists.


And read the paragraph above that where Marx describes why, in its rational form, dialectic is a scandal to the bourgeoisie... "because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up;..... because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary."

Same comment. We have discussed these passages dozens of times at RevLeft, for example, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/scrapping-dialectics-would-t79634/index4.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158574&postcount=73

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1158816&postcount=75

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1161443&postcount=114

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1163222&postcount=124

http://www.revleft.com/vb/dialectics-and-political-t118934/index.html

You really are going to have to do better than this if you want to rehabilitate Hegel.


That's not flirtation-- that's passionate attraction and affirmation.

Too bad it's not the 'dialectic' that tradition has forced upon you.


Marx held out hope for even the mushroom upstarts of Germany that the beginning of the crisis known as the "Long Deflation" in 1873 would teach them the importance of dialectics.

Same comment.


I hold out no such hope for our Rosa.

Well, your abject failure above suggests that even here you are probably woefully wrong too.

Not doing too well are you..?:(

[S.Artesian]

I'm doing just fine Rosa. Your argument is with Marx. It's his claim that his description validates the transformation of quantity into quality.

Regarding Marx's quote from the journalist reviewing Capital, yep, Marx says that this is what this layman is doing--describing in layman's language the transposition of the foundation of dialectic that Marx accomplished and employed-- from the movement of consciousness and to the real content of history.

It's possible to use equally layman like language to describe Marx's Capital without using the terms valorisation, expanded reproduction, or even use-vale and exchange value. Does that mean anything regarding Marx's own use of the terms? His own methodology exploring capital?

But Rosa lives in a world of disavowal, where Marx didn't mean what he said, but said what he didn't mean, and then said he was saying what he didn't mean, so we could be absolutely certain that he didn't say what he clearly said-- he righted Hegel's dialectic. He made it rational.

Keep on disavowing, Rosa. Keep repeating "It isn't so, it isn't so." Repeat it 5 million times. Quantity might pass over into quality and maybe someone else will agree with you.

[S.Artesian]

And for those of you who might want to know how Marx viewed this paragraph in Capital-- from his correspondence with Engels in 1867:

You are quite right about Hofmann. Incidentally, you will see from the conclusion to my Chapter III, where I outline the transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist — as a result of purely quantitative changes — that in the text there I quote Hegel’s discovery of the law of the transformation of a merely quantitative change into a qualitative one as being attested by history and natural science alike.


And his regard for Hegel:


And what this Lange has to say about the Hegelian method and my application of the same is simply childish. First, he understands rien [nothing] about Hegel’s method and, therefore, second, still less about my critical manner of applying it. In one respect he reminds me of Moses Mendelssohn. That prototype of a windbag once wrote to Lessing asking how he could possibly take ‘that dead dog Spinoza’ au sérieux! In the same way, Mr Lange expresses surprise that Engels, I, etc., take au sérieux the dead dog Hegel, after Büchner, Lange, Dr Dühring, Fechner, etc., had long agreed that they — poor dear — had long since buried him. Lange is naïve enough to say that I ‘move with rare freedom’ in empirical matter. He has not the slightest idea that this ‘free movement in matter’ is nothing but a paraphrase for the method of dealing with matter — that is, the dialectical method.

Marx to Kugelmann 1870

[Meridian]

I don't think it is particularly interesting whether or not Marx fancied Hegel's theories or not. I am not sure it has much to do with revolutionary practice or theory, actually.

That said... Aware readers embarking upon Hegel will notice a distinct lack of revolutionary thought and a distinct presence of gibberish. Therefore I find it weird that Marx prescribed to any of it at all. On the other hand, he was a product of his time and age.

It wouldn't surprise me if the connection between revolutionary theory (that is plainly an empiric study of the capitalist production mode, historical materialism, class awareness) and obscure hegelianism has been more than a little harmful to the practice of the former. There is certainly no obvious, "inherent" connection between the two that should be maintained.

[S.Artesian]

It's particularly important to Rosa who claims Marx extirpated completely "dialectics." I find it particularly uninteresting to argue with anyone about the abstracts of dialectics, and dialectical logic vs. formal logic, etc.

I find historical accuracy very interesting and very important-- for it is the historical transposition of dialectic that Marx executes, grounding it in the content of history which is the social organization of labor, a transposition Marx refers to as "extracting" the "rational" portion of Hegel's dialectic which "allows" Marx to analyze, and explain, the actual interrelation of use and exchange values, the conflict between means and relations of productions, the contradictions in capital's raison d'etre, which is the self-expansion of value.

You want to chuck Hegel and his dialectic out the window? Be my guest, but then the obligation is upon you not to argue the superiority of formal logic over Hegel's logic, but to provide an analysis of history, of the social organization of labor, that is superior to Marx's.

Rosa, of course, has no interest in taking one single step into any concrete analysis of the conflict between capital and wage-labor-- because she can't; because she doesn't grasp the transposition Marx accomplished-- and so for her, it's all about language, empiricism, and formal logic.

Marx and Engels could only produce Theses on Feuerbach because after crossing that brook of fire they were able to redirect the river of dialectic.

[Dermezel]

This essay completely destroys Rosa's Ayn Rand style arguments:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/caudwell/1938/reality.htm



IT has been obvious for some time that the world of physics has been deviating farther and farther from the world of perception. The world of physics is a world composed of points and instants and lines, bare of quality. Nothing in it can be felt, smelt, or seen. The world of relativity physics, which combines space and time, seems to take us ever farther from reality as directly experienced. How is this, for physics is built up from the results of perception? The discrepancy between Newton’s and Einstein’s theories was settled in favour of Einstein by perception – the Michelson-Morley experiment, the eclipse experiment and observation of Mercury’s movements. The perceived world therefore is primary and gives status to the various possible self-consistent logical worlds. The perceived world is real. Should it not therefore be possible to express the world of physics in terms of less abstract entities? Could we not make it sound like the real world? That was the goal of Whitehead’s method of Extensive Abstraction.

To take an example, space may be defined as built up of points, and betweenness, a property of these points; and these points may be defined in various ways. The Euclidean method was to define a point as an entity having position but no magnitude, which is obviously a thing never met with in perception. Points may also be defined as the class of ordered triads of real numbers with their signs, which seems an even more remote definition but is, thanks to the development of Cantorian transfinites, one which gives the required properties of continuity to space. Either definition is equally satisfactory for developing a geometry.

Whitehead suggests instead that we should regard points as of the class of ‘sets’ of volumes. For example, the set of concentric spheres converging in a limit gives all the extensive relations of a point. The intensive properties of such a set are not what we might expect from a point, but the intensive relations of such entities do not concern us any more than the interior of the earth concerns the map-maker. Whitehead develops his theory with great logical skill. He treats time in a similar way, using a class of overlapping events to represent the ‘instant’ of older physics. Russell has a method different in detail, but similar in principle.

Whitehead and Russell therefore make the curious assumption that ‘volumes’ or ‘events’ are more gross and perceptually obvious to anyone than points or instants. But a volume is an abstract idea. Our sensory surfaces, with which we gain our knowledge of external reality, are all areas, not volumes, and the nerve endings are dotted about this area, each ending providing a point of sensation, which is a kind of minimum sensory datum. Thus sensation is, like mathematical space, built up of points, lines and areas, and these are built up by experience into volumes. Even a line or area will be explored by the motion of the point nerve-endings over it. Points can therefore claim at least as much concrete existence in perception as volumes. True, physiological points, unlike geometrical points, have magnitude, but it does not feel as if they had, because they constitute a threshold. In any case, perceptual volumes differ as widely from geometrical volumes as sensory from geometrical points.

The perception of abstract volumes in fact require a high order of sophistication. We never perceive abstract volume without considerable education in abstractions. I doubt if anyone even among painters, saw volume, until Cezanne. Neither primitive man, nor the Bushman, nor the average child, perceive volume in the abstract, if their paintings are any clue. It is always stuff, voluminous things, vapour, clouds, mass, that we perceive. Matter is perceptual; volume is not.

But I am even more critical of the assumption that it is only from what we perceive that physical abstractions are built up. On what grounds can this be justified? It is I who experience. My conscious world is filled, not only with things, volumes, points, but with desires, hopes, and memories. Why must these be omitted? Why do those very philosophers such as Kant, Whitehead and Russell, who hold the egoistic components of the conscious field to be primary, demand that physics be built up out of secondary entities?

They do so because the bourgeois philosopher cannot help producing this dualism, and yet he remains unconscious of its source. It is not Berkeley who fights mechanical materialism, but Berkeley who generates it. Condillac does not refute solipsism, he produces it. Hume does not dissolve the causal world of physics in which atoms move according to the foresight of a divine calculator; on the contrary, it is Hume who calls such a parody of reality into existence.

Given in reality is subject and object. No sphere of reality is absolutely self-determined, for if it were it would be unknowable, and therefore would not exist. Between subject and object exists a network of relations, including the conscious field. Since no part of reality is isolated, this conscious field must directly or indirectly have determining links with every part of reality. Since reality is becoming subject to endless change, this conscious field may continually increase in size and still more intricately develop inside reality.

Because it is a relation or sum of relations, the conscious field ‘contains’ (or has as terms) both subject and object, by whose interaction it is generated. Now in the analysis of this field there are four alternatives.

(a) We may sort this bunch of relations, each of which has the form s-o (subject related to object), on the assumption that o depends on s, which is self-determined. We then get a world of phenomena in which everything known is generated by the subject or ‘I’, which is therefore primary. This of course is solipsism.

(b) We may sift through all these relations on the assumption that s depends on o, which is self-determined. We then get a world of phenomena in which everything known is generated by the object or ‘external’ world, which is therefore primary. This is mechanical materialism.

Either point of view lands us in difficulties. If the subject is self-determined, how does it come into existence? If the object is self-determined, how does it come to be known? If all relations (i.e. qualities) are not completely real but only one term is real and the other dependent and secondary, what in fact are the real parts of qualities? Whether we adopt position (a) or (b) we reach the depressing conclusion that no qualities are really real. If we are physicists, and our programme is to confine ourselves to qualities independent of the subject – objective facts – we soon find that the observer is involved in all such qualities as colour, smell, taste. Further research, such as that of relativity physics, shows us that the observer is even involved in such apparently objective qualities as size, shape, mass, motion, time, distance. In all such qualities the observer must be specified. We finally get nothing absolute but mathematical equations, which express only the comparability of these qualities among themselves, and are therefore purely metrical. But mathematical equations are thoughts; they do not exist concretely. We are therefore back at a completely subjective world, having started out in pursuit of a completely objective world.

(b) If we are philosophers, instead of physicists, and our programme is to confine ourselves to qualities independent of the object – the general truths achievable by ‘pure’ thought – we soon find that the object is involved in all such apparently subjective qualities as causality, perception, thought. We finally get nothing absolute but Universals, or concepts such as Whiteness, Truth, and the like. These concepts must however exist independently of the thinker’s brain, for this brain is a particular object. These Universals must one by one be stripped of all the distinctions that arise from particularities, and thus we are left with nothing but the laws of the comparability of Ideas among themselves, in other words, with logic. We get a world in which the sole realities are Ideas or Universals existing independently of the thinker according to logical laws – the idealism of Hegel. But such a world exists independently of the subject. We are therefore back at a completely objective world, having started out in pursuit of a completely subjective one. And we are all ready to start out on another circle.

Like Fabre’s processionary caterpillars on the rim of a jam jar, we can walk that circle again and again, the most dreary captivity of thought. It is one that every philosopher has hitherto been doomed to tread, and now bourgeois physics is treading it too. It is the circle of thought divorced from action: the cage of pure reason.

(c) No attempts to heal the dualism by combining the two positions have been successful. Any such compromises forcibly fly apart. The simplest compromise, that of Hume, Kant, Mach, Avenarius and the neo-realists, is to assert that phenomena (or sensa) are primary, that is, exist by themselves. But it is impossible to carry through such an argument logically, for the phenomena become completely lawless, they are simply a heap of relations, which we can take any way. Imagine a fabric being spun by a loom. If we snip the threads close to the shuttles, the whole weaving process becomes confusion, there is no pattern. How can colour generate size, size beauty, or beauty logic without the basis of the material object or subject? Such a world is not a subject either of discussion or thought, it is a mere chance collocation. The laws of science or thought are then simply convenient methods of enumerating these phenomena. One method is as good as another. There is no question of differing degrees of truth or reality. There is no meaning in the query whether one statement is truer than another. The most that can be claimed is that one is more economical – but it may be economical of paper, breath, thought, or bodily energy, and therefore, in a paper shortage, science might be completely transformed in all its hypotheses. This is not irony; it is a true statement of the Machian-Kantian position. A diagram may illustrate the problem.
wheel

The centre disc, A, is the subject. The outer disc, B, is the object. The threads represent the relations between them, or the phenomena. The whole system is the developing Universe. The pattern is all formed by one thread which, running through every hole, weaves the continuous intricate system. By declaring that only phenomena are real, phenomenalism, in all its forms, snips off these threads at the holes, and it is now no longer possible to understand the laws of their spacing, tension, or interweaving.

Not all relations are known and conscious, but by following the endless thread, we come on new relations. We follow its course by means of action to change the object whose results, summarised in scientific laws, express objective reality in terms of thought and are able to predict the course of the thread. Thus phenomenalism (positivism) is anti-scientific, for it gives us no reason to suppose that the Universe of phenomena need be linked by any relations. On the contrary, such relations are declared to be unknowable. The linkage is provided by the material basis of phenomena, and positivism denies the knowability of this matter.

So clear is this difficulty, that positivism is never carried out thoroughly to the end. In Kant’s critical idealism, the object is smuggled in as the unknowable thing-in-itself, and the subject as ‘the categories’. In Mach the unknowable Ding-an-Sich reappears, but the subject is now smuggled in under the form of the ‘most economical laws of thought’, the subject being the judge of economy.

Phenomenalism does not therefore, as was supposed by the critical idealists, the positivists, and the neo-realists, reconcile the dualism of subjectivism or objectivism. It cannot in fact exist for a moment as a system, and either one or both positions have to be smuggled in, so that the system, as it develops, becomes either subjectivism or objectivism, or yet another nominal alternative. If a relation between two terms exists, i.e. if the reality is A plus B, it is possible to take either A, or B, or (and this is the position of phenomenalism) we may take the plus alone, and claim to be reconciling the dualism. But of course we are not. We are forced in practice to join one party or the other.

(d) The final alternative is to omit the plus altogether. How then explain the knowledge by B of A, and the effect shown by A of B’s actions upon A. By something that is neither B nor A, something that is outside reality – i.e. God. This is the philosophy of Descartes and Leibnitz. Spinoza’s system has certain affinities with it, and chiefly differs in its resolute monism. According to such philosophers, A and B function entirely separately, and the congruity of these, functioning – Man knowing the world by thought and the world showing traces of Man’s action on it – is explained by the fact that they were arranged beforehand by God, like elaborate mechanisms, so to run in time. In such a world, if the system is consistently carried out, no qualities are real, for neither subjective (mental) qualities, nor objective (material) qualities are primary. All are generated by God. The only real qualities therefore are the absolute qualities of theology – Omniscience, Omnipotence, Perfect Love, and so forth. Man and the world of colour, hope, and life are simply a shadow-show. But just as the stripping of the subjective element from objective qualities reduces them to mere equations, and the reverse process reduces them to logic, so the elimination of both subjective and objective elements in the qualities of a world, from which the relations have already been excluded, leaves us with nothing but the fact that these elements are produced by an unknown outside term, or ‘First Cause’. Even the theological attributes of God vanish, and we have only the uncaused Cause – another name for the self-determined primary term, which was given in our premises. We simply take out again the empty thing we put in.

Why does thought torment itself with this dualism, selecting every possible combination, yet thrown always back upon itself? And what is the solution? The second question will be answered first. The solution is dialectical materialism. Dialectical materialism goes behind subject and object to the material basis from which their antagonism arose.

(e) A and B, and the relations between them, are all real. The Universe is one, and is as a whole absolutely self-determined, but no part of it is absolutely self-determined. All that is real exists, and all that is real is determined, that is, every part of the Universe is in mutually determining A-B relations with the rest of the Universe. Everything therefore is knowable, for the meaning of knowable is simply this, the possibility of expressing a determining relation between that unknown but knowable thing, and a thing already known. This possibility is given in our premises.

This is our premise: that the Universe is a material unity, and that this is a becoming.

This material unity of becoming cannot be established by thought alone. It is established by thought in unity with practice, by thought emerging from practice and going out into practice. Phenomena are exhibited by the thing-in-itself, and if we can by practice force the thing-in-itself to exhibit phenomena according to our desire, then we know this much about the thing-in-itself – that in certain circumstances it will exhibit certain phenomena.

This is positive knowledge about the thing-in-itself. When we can in practice achieve all possible transformations, we have all possible knowledge about the thing-in-itself. Thus we prove that the universe is a material unity by proving in practice the material basis of all phenomena. This material basis is the thing-in-itself, or the like content of any phenomena exhibited by the thing-in-itself. This proof of material unity is secured by change and is therefore a process of becoming, of differentiation, of the emergence of the new. But it is a proof of unity, of the sameness, likeness, or determinism in all phenomena.

‘The point is to change the world, not to interpret it.’ For it is not possible to interpret the world, except by changing it. Thus the impasse of philosophers is seen to be the impasse of philosophy, and a proof of the impossibility of interpreting the world by thought alone.

A-B do not exist as eternally discrete entities. The Universe is a becoming, a development. The becoming is primary. Reality does not become in time and space, but time and space are aspects of its becoming. Becoming is change. If a thing is changed, it manifests an unlike, a hitherto non-present quality. If change is real, and by our premises it is primary, such a quality does not come into existence either by the gradual decrement of a known quality to nothing, or the gradual increment of a very faint quality to something. Before, it was not, not in any way. Now it is, in every way. There has therefore been a ‘jump’. To deny this is to deny the reality of change, and to suggest that the quality was already there, but so faintly we did not ‘notice it’. But nothing new would then have come into being. There would therefore have been no change, and reality is, by our definition, change.

Although such a quality is new, it is not arbitrary, i.e. absolutely self-determined. By definition, the Universe is one. A quality that is self-determined is, as we saw, unknowable. Therefore each new quality, as it leaps into existence, is determined by all qualities up till then present in the universe.

These qualities do not come into being in time. Time does not flow on while they emerge. The emergence of such qualities is what time is. Time then is an aspect of, or abstraction from, change. Time is new quality as it emerges.

But change does not merely involve the coming into existence of qualities. If we find different qualities lying about, even though they mutually determine each other, we cannot say ‘something has changed’. The qualities may be qualities of different things, and so there will have been no change. There must therefore be something in all qualities that remains the same, even though these qualities are new, otherwise we cannot say, the ‘Universe has changed’. There must be something like in all unlikes. Otherwise we could say, ‘these unlikes are not changed things, they are different things. We have not moved in time, but in space.’ How else can we distinguish motion in time from motion in space, unless time is not something in which things change, but the change itself?

But if the newness of quality, the unlikeness, as it emerges, is time, the oldness, the likeness, is space. Qualities do not arrange themselves homogeneously in space, space is the homogeneity in their qualities. Space is quantity or known quality as it remains unchanged; it is therefore the thing-in-itself, the material unity of the Universe. The Universe is a spatial Universe. Space therefore is an aspect of matter, which is precisely what relativity physics has established by practice. Mass-energy, or the likeness in phenomena, generates space. This is established by practice.

All laws of development, of evolution, of difference, of quality, of aesthetics, of consciousness, are temporal. All laws of conservation, of metrics, of comparability, of universal and unchanging relations, are spatial.

But time and space are only aspects of becoming or change. If we could completely abstract time or space, and divide relations into a set entirely temporal, and a set entirely spatial, we should have two absolutely self-determined spheres, contradicting our premises for each sphere would be unknowable to the other sphere. Therefore no absolute time or space, as premised in Newtonian dynamics, exists. We know both time and space and prove this by their mutual convertibility, by the change of qualities and the reproduction of quantities.

Neither does an absolute spatio-temporal continuum, expressible in purely metrical terms, exist. Such a continuum would after all be purely spatial, for it would be expressible entirely in terms of quantity. It would be self-determined, and independent of all quality. It would therefore be unknowable to quality, and quality would be unknowable to it. Hence Einstein’s relativity physics still contains an illegitimate absolute, which accounts for its being irreconcilable with quantum phenomena.

We take as our premise ‘becoming’, the becoming of a material unity which is generated by our transformation of matter. Becoming, which involves change, which involves like and unlike, involves also development. If we had no development, we would have no ‘becoming’. In development there is a relation between the qualities A, B, C, D, E, which is not only mutually determining, but such that A is in some way contained in B, B in C, C in D, and D in E, but not E in D, D in C, C in B, B in A. This relation, which is technically called ‘transitive but assymetrical’, is involved in the process of becoming, just as are the existence of like and unlike. If becoming were otherwise, if qualities could not all be ranged in this unique order, we should come upon groups of qualities such, for example, that A would be contained in B, and then B in A; or in some other way there would be a ‘break’ or return to a quality in which all the new qualities of the interim no longer appear. But such a return is indistinguishable from the previous situation, and therefore we no longer have a process of becoming, but of unbecoming. Moreover the relation of containing and being-contained is, in development, mutually determining. If therefore the series of qualities (or events) in any way returns on itself in this fashion, the Universe splits in two ‘in time’. We have two or more sets of self-determined qualities, sufficient to themselves, each unknowable and non-existent to the other.

We now see that the determination of qualities as they appear is a relation of a special sort. It is a transitive assymetrical relation known as ‘cause and effect’, in which one quality mutually determines another in a way which may be described as the containing (or sublation) of one quality in another. And all qualities (or events) may, by this means, be ranged in a unique order.

Moreover since no set of qualities is self-determined, we can never have a set of distinguishable qualities such that A alone determines or is contained in B; B alone determines or is contained in C, and so on, otherwise the series A, B, C, would be self-determined and unknowable. This would only be permissible if this series were the Universe. But we do not regard the Universe as composed of one event at a time. We do not believe that, whatever cross-section we took of the mass of qualities that we call the Universe, we would reveal over all the sections one quality only. If we could do that, space would then be separable from time, and we could collect spatial and temporal qualities in self-determined sets, which is contrary to our premises and experience. This cross-section would correspond to a universal or absolute present, which is permitted to Newtonian dynamics but is rightly eliminated from relativity physics.

Since then this series is impermissible, the qualities are always arranged as follows: A and A1 contained in B. B and B1, contained in C. A2 and A3 contained in B1. The only arrangement which will now completely satisfy all our premises is that each new quality, as it emerges, is determined by another quality (subject or antithesis) and the rest of the Universe (object or thesis). This does not apply merely to the qualities of cognition but to all events. In older formulations of causality, it would be stated that each ‘event’ (new quality) has a ‘cause’ (prior quality) and a ‘ground’ (the rest of the Universe). The ground is currently omitted for reasons of economy. For example, we say a bell is the cause of a sound. The air, earth, fixed stars must, however, be as they are in order for the bell to produce the sound. Any general scientific law must contain Universal constants. This is recognised by modern relativity physics (p) and quantum physics (h).

This then leads to the dialectical law of becoming, applicable to all qualities, that is, to all events. Any new quality, as it emerges, is determined by (or ‘contains’) a prior quality (the cause) and the rest of the Universe of qualities. Or, more strictly – since becoming is logically prior to time and space – the two terms determining a quality, (a) the prior quality and (b) all other determining qualities, are to that quality cause and ground, and contain its past time and its surrounding space. All other qualities, not contained in this way, are part of its effect, and contain its future time. It is this relation which enables us to settle causality and time and space, which are never absolute, but relative to a quality.

Logically we express this as follows. Every new quality (B) is the synthesis of an opposition between (A) the cause, prior quality or thesis, and its negation (not-A), or antithesis – the rest of the Universe of qualities existent in relation to A. This dialectical movement does not take place in Time and Space, but Time and Space are abstractions from it.

Thus time not only is an abstraction of the unlikeness in qualities, but is also and therefore the abstraction of the assymetrical relations between them which leave time open and ‘infinite’, and make its process and its arrangement unique, so that we cannot conceive the past in the future, or yesterday to-morrow, or ourselves going backwards in time. To go backwards in time would be to shed those qualities which contain the past, layer after layer, till we reach the past. But all that retraced ‘shed’ past, now no longer being in determining relations with the past-become-present, would cease to exist, and we should not have gone backwards in time. Or to go backwards in time would be to come again on to the qualities of the past which, contained in the present, now also contain the present, so that we revolve in a self-determined circle like a needle stuck in a gramophone record, and can therefore know nothing outside that circle, either past or future. We and the ‘outside’ would be non-existent to each other.

Space is not only an abstraction of the likeness in qualities, but it is also and therefore an abstraction of the symmetrical relations between them which make space closed and finite, and makes its process and its arrangement non-unique, so that we cannot conceive one part of space being different from another part, nor our being unable to retrace our steps over any distance we have traversed, just as we cannot conceive one part of time being like another part, nor of our being able to go back over any portion of time we have traversed. For if the qualities A, B, C, D, and E are assymetrically transitive, so that A is contained in B, B in C, and C in D, and D in A, there is a common relation to all events – in this particular series it is A, for if A is in B, and B is in C, and C is in D, and D is in E, A must be in E. A therefore, is the spatial relation or likeness in development. It is that which develops, just as the unlike elements are the qualities exhibited by it in its development.

Every quality is an event; every event is a quality. Every quality of event is a relation between the subject A, and the object not-A – the rest of the Universe. The simplest quality (or event) is a quantum, in which there is a relation between the electron A and the rest of the Universe not-A. Relations peculiar to A and general to the Universe must therefore both figure in the complete specification of a quantum. A quantum is the most temporal quality we can abstract, just as the interval is the most spatial.

Development does not take place in time and space. Development, becoming, and change, secrete time and space. Time and space are abstractions of it. Memory exhibits the assymetrical transitive relations we have mentioned, so does experience. They are therefore more concrete, nearer to reality and to becoming, than abstract time or space, or even the abstract spatio-temporal continuum. Learning, growth and evolution are not qualities absolutely peculiar to life; they are what we call becoming in its living aspects. Becoming includes both spatial finity and temporal infinity.

We now see that there is a universal dialectic of reality, a mode of movement which is prior to time, space, life and all other events and qualities. This dialectic proceeds as follows. First we have a quality. But a quality is a relation between subject and object, between A, subject, and not-A, the rest of the Universe. But the rest of the Universe not-A, has as its object A, to A it is subject and to it A is the rest of the Universe. The most ‘primitive’ quality we take therefore has two terms and a relation, this relation is involved in ‘becoming’ and ensures that the process of reality is open and ‘infinite’ at both ends.

Our most infinite regress into the past brings us therefore to a quality, to an event. We cannot imagine anything simpler, for such a simplex one-term thing would be absolutely self-determined and could not be known-by-us, since knowing is a mutually determining relation between us and the thing. Any known event is already a quality, is already a subject-object relation. It already involves within itself an antagonism which can generate the means by which it is known.

We may take either term as primary and the other as dependent on it. Since we can take either term as primary, neither can be primary. They may be regarded as simultaneous. But they are not independent terms, for they are connected by a relation. The simplest quality therefore reveals itself as a subject-object relation. But the process of becoming involves that a new quality emerges (or event occurs) not by the increment of something already there, but abruptly, exhibiting something altogether unlike. But it also involves that this new state contains the first old quality in addition to the unlike new. This new state or quality is also analyseable as a two-term relation, and must in turn be succeeded by a new quality.

In other words, the fundamental mode of motion is a state, revealed to contain a thesis and an antithesis each of which is all that is not the other (are opposites), and yet neither are self-determined but are on the contrary, in mutually determining relation (unity of opposites). This is the thesis and antithesis. This state must give place to another, containing both the old quality (A and B) and yet an unlike element C. This is the synthesis. This quality, when it reveals its dualism, no longer reveals the dualism A and B, for this dualism parted between it (relation of subject to rest of Universe) the whole of reality. There is now newness, so therefore the same portioning of reality can no longer reveal the same dualism. The old dualism is therefore ‘reconciled’ in the new synthesis C, which itself however can now be analysed as a two-term relation, the foundation of another movement.

Quantity is the comparison of qualities among themselves. For this to be possible, they must all have a common element of likeness. Yet this likeness, constantly, by the dialectic movement, gives birth to the new. Quantity becomes quality, yet remains quantity. This movement guarantees the determinism of becoming, but not its pre-determinism. The pre-determinism of becoming is a nightmare arising from mechanical materialism.

This movement is not imposed on becoming by thought. It is the only way becoming can really become, conformably to our reason and experience; and it is in our reason because our experience is part of this becoming. This movement contains within it time and space, memory and perception, quality and quantity, all of which entities are abstractions from it. Time is the difference between synthesis and the preceding relation, space is the similarity between them. The dialectic movement of the Universe does not occur in space and time, it gives rise to them. The external world does not impose dialectic on thought, nor does thought impose it on the external world. The relation between subject and object, ego and Universe is itself dialectic. Man, when he attempts to think metaphysically, merely contradicts himself, and meanwhile continues to live and experience reality, dialectically.

Knowledge of reality can only be generated when subject and object attack each other dialectically, each changing the other in the process. The change of the object is man’s transformation of nature. The change of the subject is knowledge. Thus dialectical materialism heals the subject-object dualism, not by denying one (idealism or mechanical materialism) or both (positivism), but by making this antagonism the creative source of knowledge, as an active relation in which both man’s theory and practice are generated.

We thus see that the dualism that torments philosophy, the dualism between the mind and nature, between the subject and object, between the ego and the external world, is the analysis of a quality, or the two-term relation, which is not unique to mind but part of the process of becoming. The same dual relation describes the relation between a quantum and its surroundings. We make the problem needlessly difficult by making our ‘A’ term not any particular human brain but men’s brains in general, and ‘not-A’ not Nature at any particular time but nature throughout the past. The dialectic relation still retains its essential form, but is difficult to analyse fruitfully. It is quite legitimate to do this, but it is simpler to take one human brain in particular, or even a particular set of relations such as perception. The basic dialectic remains the same, and the analysis is now simpler.

The question of which is first, mind or matter, is not therefore a question of which is first, subject or object. Every discernment of a quality (mind, truth, colour, size) is the discernment of a two-term relation between a thing as subject and the rest of the Universe. Mind is the general name for a relation between the human body, as subject, and the rest of the Universe. The human body is a general name for a relation between the rest of the Universe, as subject, and the mind, as object. Mind is a loose name for such relations holding with all such human bodies (or including perhaps the bodies of animals) just as body is a loose name for such relations holding with all minds. Going back in the Universe along the dialectic of qualities we reach by inference a state where no human or animal bodies existed and therefore no minds. It is not strictly accurate to say that therefore the object is prior to the subject any more than it is correct to say the opposite. Object and subject, as exhibited by the mind relation, come into being simultaneously. Human body, mind, and human environment cannot exist separately, they are all parts of the one set. What is prior is the material unity from which they arise as an inner antagonism.

We can say that relations seen by us between qualities in our environment (the arrangement of the cosmos, energy, mass, all the entities of physics), existed before the subject-object relationship implied in mind. We prove this by the transformations which take place independent of our desires. In this sense nature is prior to mind and this is the vital sense for science. These qualities produced, as cause and ground produce effect, the synthesis, or particular subject-object relationship which we call knowing. Nature therefore produced mind. But the nature which produced mind was not nature ‘as seen by us’, for this is importing into it the late subject-object relationship called ‘mind’. It is nature as known by us, that is, as having indirect not direct relations with us. It is nature in determining relation with, but not part of, our contemporary universe. Yet, by sublation, this nature that produced mind is contained in the universe of which the mind relation is now a feature; and that is why it is known to us.

Such a view of reality reconciles the endless dualism of mentalism or objectivism. It is the Universe of dialectical materialism. Unlike previous philosophies it includes all reality; it includes not only the world of physics, but it includes smells, tastes, colours, the touch of a loved hand, hopes, desires, beauties, death and life, truth and error. In such a view all things pass away, for all things must change, and yet nothing passes away, for the past is sublated in the future. Such a world is finite and infinite; it contains both.

All other philosophies split on this rock, that they contain self-determined spheres of qualities, whether this be the continuum of Einstein (for relativity physics is a philosophy) or the world of Ideas of Plato, or the world of sensory data of Berkeley, or the world of ‘values’ of axiologists. But one is then driven into the difficulty that here on the one side one has a self-determined sphere of values, tensors, ideas, or sensa, not in relation with all other nameable qualities on the other side. Therefore one of these two spheres is primary and real, and the other secondary and unreal, or not really real. In the world of physics for instance, smells, colours, hardnesses and shapes are not really real. But the reality of dialectical materialism is competent to include all these qualities as real, for all are in mutually determining relations with each other. There is no closed world of art, physics, morals, or mind. All these worlds are open, and are part of the one causality and process; and of no quality must it be said ‘this is an appearance or an illusion’. Such a world includes as real not only all truths, but all errors, yet error remains opposed to and distinguishable from truth. Such a world includes future and past, but the future remains opposed to and distinguishable from the past.

Moreover, such a world of reality, although it contains all qualities and all experience and has no closed parts, is yet as a whole self-determined. It requires for its movement no unknowable forces, general indeterminism, or mysterious gods. It is free in itself. Precisely because it contains in itself no closed worlds and in it truth and error, being and not-being, mutually determine each other, it is not itself determined. Such a Universe is therefore monistic and pluralistic, just as it is finite and infinite. Its future is not fully predictable, because if the unlikenesses in qualities were predictable, they would not be new. But its future is fully determined, because if the quantities of the future were not like those of the present it would no longer be one Universe of becoming.

In such a Universe, thought is real; it plays a real role; but matter is real. Thought is a relation of matter; but the relation is real; it is not only real but determining. It is real because it is determining. Mind is a determining set of relations between the matter in my body and in the rest of the Universe. It is not all the set, for not all the necessities whereby my body and the rest of the Universe mutually determine each other is known to me, not all my being is conscious being. In so far as these relations are conscious, I am free, for to be free is to have one’s conscious volition determine the relations between the Universe and oneself. The more these relations between my body and the Universe are part of my conscious volition the more I am free. These relations are necessary or determining relations. Freedom is the consciousness of necessity.

This is the theory of dialectical materialism which is itself the outcome of a dialectical movement. A philosophy is generated in society and is therefore the outcome of a social movement. The early mechanical materialism of Descartes and Hobbes, strengthened by Condillac and d’Holbach and accepted as the official methodology of physics, produced its opposite, idealism, and this reached its climax with absolute idealism. Absolute idealism is the apex of bourgeois philosophy, and all succeeding philosophies are either pedestrian recapitulations of earlier philosophies or simple eclecticism. There has been no noteworthy bourgeois philosopher since Hegel. For these two opposing bourgeois philosophies, by their very contradictions, gave rise to their synthesis, dialectical materialism. This was the outcome of classical bourgeois philosophy. It synthesised these elements not by a rigid formalism but by proceeding beyond philosophy, by becoming a sociology and exhibiting how both mechanical materialism and objective idealism were generated, as a social product, in social action upon reality through economic production.

Dialectical materialism was itself an outcome of the contradictions of capitalist economy. When communism and dialectical materialism emerged, all the discoveries of bourgeois science that made such a view of the Universe necessary now began to distort the framework of bourgeois culture, so that it could no longer hold the forces it had generated and bourgeois theory became a brake instead of an aid to action and discovery. Relativity and quantum physics, experimental psychology, evolution and genetics, anthropology, comparative religion, are a few of the disruptive forces in modern culture, which necessarily give rise to semi-dialectical philosophies, to incomplete attempts at synthesising the anarchy of bourgeois thought. The characteristic of the relation of bourgeois theory to practice in science is that the more general the theory, the more it is a hindrance to practice; the mote detailed and particular it is, the less it acts as a distorting force.
* * * * *

Neo-Realism (or neo-Platonism) is, in its various forms, but a late development of phenomenalism or positivism. Concepts of ‘organisation’, entelechy, closed spheres of value and the like, merely represent the veering of positivism towards objective idealism and mentalism. It is easy enough to see that such philosophies do not heal dualism, and do not give any thorough-going reality to all classes of experience. Whitehead, Russell, the Gestalt psychologists, Eddington, Jeans, Broad, and the many others only differ in their capacities for logic, or the narrowness of their aims and content. It is not really possible to sit on the fence in bourgeois dualism. Sooner or later one finds oneself on one side and to-day that side is always idealism, never mechanical materialism. Of course such late bourgeois idealism has never the scope or coherence of Hegelian Idealism, just because all the old confidence has gone. The bourgeois no longer really believes in himself or his theory.

Morgan and Alexander may be bracketed as leaders of a popular philosophy which really found its pioneer in Spencer and its most subtle exponent in Bergson. Impressed by the fact of biological evolution, a concrete proof of the transformability of matter, that life has a dialectical history, such philosophers attempt to forge a dialectical ‘theory of life’ which takes the following form: New unpredictable qualities appear as jumps. Thus, ‘liquidity’ represents one jump, ‘life’ another, ‘mind’ a third, and so forth. These qualities emerge.

Such a philosophy collapses, however, because these qualities, or jumps, are imposed. They do not result from qualities which are two-termed relations, whose terms, by their repulsion, created the synthetic quality that ‘emerges’. Mind is a simple one-term quality without relation; such qualities are not therefore after all real. In spite of the desperate attempts of such philosophers to save sensory data, sensa remain secondary and unreal. Moreover time and space are not the dialectical change. They are (according to Alexander) the matrices in which the change takes place. As with Plato, space is the womb of all becoming.

Thus, instead of a world of becoming in which all unfolds itself with complete determinism, because all phenomena are materially real, we have a world unfolded in time and space by the Jack-in-the-box appearance of new and unpredictable qualities. Such a philosophy is incompetent to explain society or the generation either of itself or other philosophies. It cannot heal dualism.

It gives rise to the question, if these qualities are not determined but imposed, who imposes them? We thus return to a very early philosophy, to a god determining but Himself self-determined, outside the Universe, who arbitrarily pumps in these qualities into a passive world. It makes no difference whether, as with Bergson, such a god exists now or, as with Alexander, such a god exists in the future and is continually attracting these qualities out of the world, as the sun raises blisters on the skin.

These new bourgeois evolutionary philosophies which start out to be dialectical and scientific, end by being less so than the older bourgeois philosophies. The world becomes an amorphous mass lying in Time and Space with no determining relations between its phenomena, for all values are imposed upon it in an arbitrary way, as if it were a piece of dough. Such philosophies fail in their primary motive, that of synthesising bourgeois philosophy. Should anyone wish to have the melancholy proof of this, they need only read Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity, which proves his philosophy to be inadequate even to contain relativity physics.

Indeed, unless such a philosophy can penetrate to the seat of bourgeois dualism – its genesis in the society that produced it – it cannot escape from dualism. It cannot reconcile dualism, any more than the separate boughs of a tree can be ‘reconciled’ if we cannot see the trunk. Mechanical materialism and absolute idealism represent the extremest possible antitheses of bourgeois dualism and any philosophy which does not reconcile them is doomed to be a less logical philosophy. Bergson is as good an example as any of the bourgeois who, striving to escape from bourgeois categories, in fact falls back into them. He attempts to describe an evolutionary world, but at the end, all he has is a static world, whose mass is moved on by an external elan vital. He attempts to describe a world in which Time is real, because the past is conserved in the present. But his past conserved in the present is a world in which Time is unreal, because the qualities which make the past present are not temporal, they are products of an outside force, Life, and Time therefore becomes merely the empty stage of their exhibition.

Bergson attempts to describe a world in which mind has significance, and is real, but he creates a world in which mind, because it is separate from matter and plays on it as organ, is a complete machine without mind. All sensa, all values, and all qualities are either not in the world, and are therefore an unreal facade, or are in the world, in which case they are not mental. He endeavours to pose intuition as a synthesis of instinct and intelligence. He attempts to escape from metaphysical dualism and the weakness of formal logic – that nothing emerges which is not already there – but he only does so by demarcating instinct and intelligence as if they were entirely separate things. But this is not so; all instincts have intelligent modifications, and are conditioned by experience. All intelligence utilizes organic instruments (the brain, existing reflexes). The difference is a matter of degree. By making it absolute, Bergson achieves as his new term, intuition. What is his intuition? Exactly what he is trying to escape from – scholasticism! Intuition, as Bergson visualises it, solves problems ‘by pure thought’, and not as problems are in fact solved – by instinct, modified by experience, becoming increasingly conscious and therefore increasingly intelligent. Now this solving of problems without modification by practice is precisely the method of metaphysics and logic – of all the rationalism which Bergson rightly condemns for its sterility. Thus Bergson’s intuition is not a synthesis of two contradictions. The contradiction is not between instinct and intelligence, but between instinctive action and conscious thought, and the synthesis is science, a positive activity which, on the one hand, changes the world to man’s instinctive desires and, on the other hand, changes man by making him more conscious of reality. But Bergson, revolting against metaphysics, produces simply an extreme form of rationalism, his ‘intuition’.

All these late bourgeois philosophies fail in this one elementary requirement:

(1) ‘Do they explain (that is, include) all the scientific discoveries of their era, in the one framework?’

Not one of them is competent to do this. There are two other requirements:

(2) ‘Do they include, as real and unified, all forms of experience – colours, sounds, values, aims, time, space and change?’

(3) ‘Do they account, not only for these, but for the evolution of all the various arts, sciences, and religions in their historical evolution, and for their own explanation of them? In other words, do they explain not only the objects of experience, but the evolution of explanations of these objects, both in their truth and their falsity?’

Obviously a philosophy which achieves these goals has transformed itself into a sociology, but it is a measure of the poverty of bourgeois philosophy that not only does it fail in all attempts at solving the first question, but the very need to solve the other two hardly presents itself. When one views, in their contemporary cultures, the achievements of Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, it is possible to realise how far-reaching has been the dissolution of bourgeois culture. It is even possible for M. Maritain, speaking as a Thomist, to hurl insults at contemporary bourgeois philosophy:

‘The drama of Western culture consists in the fact that its stock of common metaphysics has been reduced to an utterly inadequate minimum, so that only matter holds it together, and matter is incapable of keeping anything together.’

It is not either matter or metaphysics that is responsible for the decomposition of bourgeois culture, but the social anarchy rooted in its economy. But whatever the cause, this decomposition has now advanced to a stage where a Scholastic philosopher can reproach the bourgeois philosophers with a ‘betrayal’ of reason and with an ‘incoherent’ world-view. Would not Newton, Galileo, Bacon and Descartes turn in their graves if they knew the time had come when a medievalist could reproach their heirs with a ‘betrayal of reason’? Nothing could reveal more clearly the retrogression of bourgeois philosophy.

Because bourgeois intellectual confusion is rooted in the form of society of which it is a product, it cannot attain to the consistent world-view of dialectical materialism without seeing what is the law of motion of this society that produces bourgeois philosophy, and what will be its outcome. But when one has seen that, one has ceased to be bourgeois; one no longer stands in one’s own light and can see bourgeois culture clearly. One has become a Communist.
* * * * *

This transition, which involves understanding in oneself all the formulas and conventions imposed by one’s bourgeois upbringing and deriving therefrom something more fundamental, is not easy. Thus, many even of those people who see clearly the bankruptcy of capitalism, and the analytical power of Marxism, are unable to grasp the synthesis. They remain bourgeois, and therefore they impose on themselves the task of ‘improving’ or ‘modifying’ dialectical materialism. They propose to bring it ‘up-to-date’, by modifying it according to the lessons learned from recent scientific development.

They do not see that such a programme is simply one of making dialectical materialism bourgeois – making it moreover not classical bourgeois, which could merely mean dissolving it into the Hegelianism or mechanical materialism of which it is the outcome, but degenerate bourgeois, making it Bergsonian or Machian. They do not see that the task vis-à-vis dialectical materialism and the latest developments of bourgeois science is not that of bringing dialectical materialism up to date, but that of bringing these anarchic developments up to date by synthesising them in the consistent world-view of Marxism. This is obvious, for on the one hand one has a coherent system – dialectical materialism – and on the other hand one has a chaotic confusion of ‘discoveries’ – relativity physics, quantum physics, Freudism, anthropology, genetics, psycho-physiology, which are based on exclusive assumptions and contradict or ignore each other. If there is to be any relation between these two groups at all, obviously dialectical materialism must impose its coherence on the mish-mash, and not the mish-mash its incoherence on dialectical materialism. The second programme is simply pointless. It would be better to leave things as they are.

Of course in practice all who set themselves the second programme perform it in a typically bourgeois way. Whatever the particular closed world of bourgeois ideology they inhabit – physics, psychology, economic, philosophy, art, or religion – it is the limited and exclusive categories of that world they would enforce on the universal categories of dialectical materialism. The dialectical materialism so ‘improved’ is not only therefore now inadequate to take in all the other closed worlds that this particular bourgeois renovator does not inhabit, but soon proves itself as incapable as ordinary bourgeois philosophy of dealing completely even with the closed world in which resides the expert in modernising. Necessarily so, for the closed world is just the characteristic of bourgeois bankruptcy.

To return to the question with which this essay began: Can physics, in its final stages of relativity, be restored to the world of real experience? Can I, as I live, remember, think, move, see and act, find in that concrete immediate experience the refined concepts of relativity physics? Not only can I, but I must, for relativity physics is extracted from perception and experience, just as is Newtonian physics. The fall of an apple, the passage of light, the motion of earth and sun, the weight of objects, all these experienced perceived realities gave a common content to Newtonian and Einsteinian hypothesis. But there was also a difference, and this too owed its existence to an experience – to the Michelson-Morley experiment. And the confirmation of the later theory was due to experience, to seen things, the precession of the perihelion of Mercury, the bending of light rays by gravitation, and the gain in mass of w particles. Therefore all the entities of this physics, whose form could be determined by experience, must exist in experience.

I live, therefore I think I am. I have experience whether I perceive or reflect and this is common to both feelings, that I endure. ‘I,’ a thing that remains unchanged. But this ‘I’ endures; it lives. It sees, suffers, thinks of things that are not the same, for sometimes it has suffering, sometimes joy. Sometimes it sees one thing, sometimes another. And yet it is always the ‘I’, the unchanging thing, that sees and suffers. So that this always like ‘I’, is also unlike; continually, new things emerge and yet my perception of these things shows the same element in their behaviour to me. They too endure, and yet they change. Always there is a like perpetually manifesting unlike; continually there is unlikeness revealing a like. This is experience, or becoming.

Becoming, because I remember. First I suffered, then I rejoiced, then I feared. Suffering, I did not know of the rejoicing or the fear. Rejoicing, I ‘remembered’ the suffering, it tinged my rejoicing; but I did not yet know fear. Fearing at last, I remembered that I had rejoiced with a memory of suffering, and suffered but with no memory of fear or rejoicing. All my feelings could be arranged in that order, in which the subsequent included memories of the precedent, but not vice versa. This order of feelings I called ‘Time’. Every item in it had this unlikeness which yet could by memory range them in a unique order.

But not my perceptions of things. These things had an order among themselves. I could go to a thing, and then walk to another thing, and then it appeared that, exactly retracing my steps, I could come on the original thing. Exactly retracing my steps; here was a difference. For I could experience a thing; then experience another thing, then return to the original thing and yet remember not only my experience of another thing, but my earlier experience of the original thing. Thus I had no unique endless order, but a closed order which I could repeat in endless ways. All these repetitions, these recurrences, could be ranged in this likeness upon unlikeness. I called this ‘Space’.

And now I was able to distinguish more sharply between my own feelings, which were always in Time, in a unique order, and things, which were ranged in Space, in an order not unique but closed.

I was inclined to separate Time from Space, and my feelings from things; but this was wrong. They were different; they were opposite; but how could I say they were exclusive, for the relations between them were just what experience was? Every experience contained a feeling, a newness, a knowledge that Time had moved on, and a thing, an oldness, a knowledge that I had met this before. I who had the feelings of difference, yet remained I. I remained I because I myself was a thing – a body. The things, whose relations remained repeatable and non-unique, caused the change in my feelings. Every experience contained subject and object, time and space. I discovered I could never separate them in experience. How could the statement that they were absolutely separate therefore have meaning? Moreover Time and Space always contained an experience or relation between things. How then could the statement that things had relations in Time and Space, conceived as neutral containers, have meaning? It was just my experience in my relations with things which gave me my ideas of time-relations and space-relations. How could these relations exist without terms, as things-in-themselves? If I made this mistake (and for a time I did make it) it was one for which I had no warrant. It led me into all kinds of paradoxes, so I gave it up, and set out to measure and classify and compare, not happenings in Time and Space, but the time and space in happenings.

How did I carry out this important task? First of all by the invention of numbers. All qualities, all elements in the flux of experience, are becoming. There is a likeness, a something that changes, and an unlikeness, the changefulness of this thing. Moreover there are not merely bundles of likeness and unlikeness, but all qualities can be arranged in a unique order, such that event A is ‘memorably’ contained in B, event B in C, event C in D. This ‘nesting’ of events involves that there is something common to all events. Thus, in the series just named, quality A is common to all events. Experience never finds an end to the events in either direction.

This gives us the series of integers: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. The series is dialectic; each number synthesises (memorably contains) every previous number, and yet contains a new quality, for how otherwise could we differentiate it? This series is thus adequate to describe all quantities, for it describes the essential process of becoming.

But the series is not unique. 2 may be determined by 1 and 1, or 1/2 and 3/2, and so on. Each quality is then the limit of an infinite number of different possible series.

Let us take two things – two likenesses. We take a thing here, where I am now, and a thing there where I am not now. We measure the number of like events between these things. For example we ourselves pace backwards and forwards (9 steps on each journey, 9 events). This is a like relation. The original thing returned to after our pacing has changed, but, because there is a likeness recogniseable beneath the change, we call it ‘the same thing’.

Thus space becomes a relation between ourself and things. We pace between things. We never find distance except as a relation between ourselves and things (ourselves pacing, measuring, and watching). Distance becomes the measurement of like events among themselves by us.

Just because the two sets of nine like events also had an element of unlike and were arranged inclusively in our memory in the series 1-9 and 10-18, they were valid as a measurement of like things. Thus we find an element of unlikeness in all our relations of like things determining them. Time always figures in space.

We decide to find how little time need figure in space. Time is the element of unlikeness, what is the minimum? In the pacing of like events forward or back between things, there is always this unlikeness. The fewer the events, the less the unlikeness. We find that of all relations involving likeness and unlikeness, the light ray can mediate between things with the least unlikeness in contemporary events.

This relation, the light relation, is therefore the most spatial relation between events. It is a minimum relation. A minimum relation is unique. We therefore have a minimum relation which, when it occurs between two things, involves the least element of unlikeness between all other related qualities in the world. This minimum relation we call zero interval, but, discovering the same relation in a different sphere, we call this minimum relation the quantum. Zero interval is the least unlikeness in the universe which will differentiate ‘between’ things, and make them different in space. The quantum is the least unlikeness in things which will integrate a thing and make it the same in time.

What is the most temporal relation? It is that relation which has the most likeness in it. But we recognise things as ‘knots’ of likeness. Therefore the greatest possible likeness in relations inheres within what we call a thing. While qualities are emerging in experience, those which show most likeness have as their relation maximum interval, which is the most spatial relation. We say, this thing follows a geodesic. The geodesic relation is the relation a thing’s qualities have among themselves and therefore it is the most temporal relation. Discovering the same relation in a different sphere, we call it an electron.

But now we close the circle. This likeness is only evidenced in a bunch of relations. It is an intersection of qualities; the most like element in them. But in each quality, because we can distinguish between the qualities, there is an unlikeness. The electron never exists in itself, always it is manifesting unlikenesses. But the light interval, although it connects two different things, yet connects them, and therefore is the result of an element of likeness in its opposed terms.
* * * * *

What world follows from all this?

(a) Time and space are the way we sort the qualities in which material things participate. Each sorting is different for each thing; therefore each has its own time and space. There is nothing outside this emergence of qualities, not even relations, for every quality contains a subject, a relation, and an object (the rest of the universe). These qualities are discontinuous and have a minimum, the quantum or the light ray, and a maximum, the characteristic of following a geodesic and being matter, but neither is separate from the other. The quantum is the unit of time, the electron of space, but each is involved in the other, each emerges from the one material becoming of experience.

All these qualities, according to their difference and likeness, can be sorted in a unique series: i.e. the Universe is completely determined. The series nowhere holds back on itself; no sphere is self-determined. The series is not time; time merges from the subject-object analysis; time is contained in the series, but only as the ‘perspective’ of one particle. This is true also of space.

Time, like space, is three-dimensional (past, present, future). But because time is an accretion of unlikenesses, these three dimensions always distinguish themselves. Those of space must be distinguished, because space is an accretion of likenesses. That is why wave mechanics requires six dimensions to describe the relation of two electrons, for there is never a relation between two electrons only, but between an electron and the rest of the world.

This is the world of experience as seen by dialectical materialism. It is not only a world of experience, but also a world of biology, psychology, sociology, art and physics. Not only is it the world of relativity physics, but it is also, and at the same time, the world of quantum physics.

The world, in the process of becoming, exhibits an accumulation of unlikeness. Likeness has as one aspect organisation. This increase of unlikeness appears, therefore, as an increase of disorganisation. This is the ‘entropy gradient’, the basis of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

It is maintained by bourgeois physics, however, that a Universal return from disorder to order, i.e. a return of the series from A includes B, B includes C, to C includes B, is not impossible, but only grossly improbable. This is based on a misunderstanding, due to the concept of Time as the matrix of becoming.

Time is in fact the inclusive series of unlike qualities such that A includes B, and B includes C. Consequently it is by definition impossible to talk of such a series returning on itself in time, for Time is the non-returning of the series. The last of such a series that returned would be ‘past’.

If anyone could define Time in any other way, so as to produce a more consistent world-view and upset our experience and the discoveries of relativity physics, then that would no longer be the case. But until they do reach such a formulation, no meaning can be assigned to a Universe which returns to a previous order from disorder. It is not extremely improbable, but impossible, for it is a contradiction in terms. If it happened, or could be shown to be possible, it would indicate, not only that our present definition of Time is wrong but also what Time really is.

The physicist, confronted by a small-scale infringement of the law – e.g. gas gathering into half of a receptacle and leaving the other in a vacuum, would reason in this way: ‘Here is disorder becoming order, which is just what cannot happen since it means the time in this receptacle has, so to speak, gone backwards in comparison to my time. I therefore conclude that in fact it has not gone back, and that there is a subsequency about the local accumulation of a gas, which can only mean that it is part of a larger increase in unlikeness or disorder. In other words I must assume that this gas must have been acted upon by forces outside itself, and that there is an outside cause for this behaviour. If not, it is my time that has gone backwards, and I am living into the past. But this receptacle is too small for this to be a necessary deduction.’

The concept of entropy involves that the system in which entropy must increase is self-determined and therefore unknowable and non-existent. The second Law of Thermodynamics therefore only applies accurately to the whole Universe and the probability it measures is really the degree of its inaccuracy.

It follows from a dialectical world-view that nothing is absolute and self-determined but the Universe itself. The complexity of men’s conscious relations with the Universe may grow continuously, but they will never be co-incident with the Universe. Their very increase is the generation of new qualities which now form part of the unknown. Thus nothing is unknowable because nothing is self-determined or unmediated, but absolute knowledge is unattainable. Every expression or vehicle of knowledge, every formulation of consciousness, is incomplete. It does not ‘contain’ an error, but its limited truth is determined by its limited error. The elimination of its error does not give us absolute truth: a new hypothesis is required synthesising them in an ampler statement. This can only come about if the error in the former hypothesis has been revealed in practice – if the contradiction implicit in it has become overt, and truth and error have flown asunder, generating a new truth. Man therefore learns by his mistakes. The discovery of an error is the discovery of a new truth, for, if the error is discoverable, the new truth is now knowable. This is the ‘unity of truth and error’, and it is not a ‘mysticism’ of dialectics, but is a description of a process common to the methodology of science and life.

Are we therefore, as dialectical materialists, supporters of Vaihinger’s ‘Als 0b’ (The Philosophy of ‘As If’. – Ed.) and the value of fictions? No, for to believe in the absolute value of error as an end is to be as limited as to believe in an absolute truth. In dialectics an error cannot be tolerated. The antagonism between truth and error is real. Once known, once this negation has revealed itself, the intolerableness of error prevents thought from resting upon it, and man moves on to a new truth. But according to Vaihinger, man is consciously content with error and rests on it. Thought loses its impetus. Vaihinger’s view remains a metaphysical bourgeois doctrine. He is a positivist: his position is that reality is unknowable. Since entities are unknowable in themselves, everything that works is as true as it is possible for a thing to be true.

But dialectics, if it is to justify its programme, must explain the origin of this ‘tired’ bourgeois philosophy. It must leave no sphere self-determined. It must close the changing circle of being. Why has dualism wrecked bourgeois philosophy? Why was Platonism ‘congealed’ and not dialectical? Why is Marxism dialectical?

If no sphere is self-determined, ideology must be in a mutually determining relation with the society of which it is a product. They must fit each other at every level, like hand and glove, like river and river bed, for philosophy is a social product. This arises from the very fact that we can talk about society. The private thoughts of an individual are inaccessible; the desires of a man to do something are invisible. But as soon as man’s thoughts issue in language, in concepts, in a coherent system, they become social. They have adopted social forms: language and ideas, evolved by the process of society. Such a public system of thought is a social product. And as soon as man’s desires to do something result in action, in the moulding of material into something socially recognised as having use and value, here too aim becomes end, desire becomes a social product. Thought and will are private and personal; a philosophy and a commodity are social products. Yet thought and will, though private, are determined by the philosophy and material products of the society into which a man is born. What I am taught and what I see round me, influence what I think about and what I desire.

Thus thought is naturally dialectic in so far as it is part of the process of society. At each stage thought and material being are flung apart and return on each other, in mutual determinism, generating the new qualities of society. How then does thought become congealed? Bourgeois revolt gives rise to mechanical materialism. This in turn generates idealism. But these two opposites cannot be reconciled within the framework that produced them. All thought that remains within these two poles becomes non-dialectic. It becomes barren logic-chopping. The true synthesis is Marxism; but Marxism is revolutionary; it rests on a revolution of the class structure of society. It is the class structure of society that is holding back the dialectical movement of thought. The poverty of bourgeois philosophy is rooted in the breakdown of bourgeois economy. These outworn production relations are holding back the productive forces of society, holding back not merely the full produce of idle factory plants, derelict coffee plantations, unploughed fields and unemployed men, but of human brains.
* * * * *

We know the bourgeois illusion to be a reflex of the class structure of bourgeois society. The first stage is the bourgeois revolt: ‘I am free in so far as I throw off all social restraint.’ Man, by the insurgent exercise of his desires, can dominate his environment, not as master dominates slave – such relations are banned – not by a simple fiat of his will – but as an owner dominates his property, as a craftsman dominates his tool, a farmer his land – by knowing its laws. The bourgeois sees the environment as his tool in the first stage of the bourgeois development.

This first dialectic movement of the revolutionary bourgeoisie gives rise to Elizabethan tragedy, to the exploration of the world, to Spanish and Tudor monarchy, to Galileo, to the splendid collation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, finally to Newtonism and Cartesianism. The discovery of the ‘law of gravity’, of analytical geometry, of the farthest limits of the world, marks the crescendo of the bourgeois explosion into the environment. The bourgeois has now seized the environment as tool. The mechanical materialistic philosophy of Hobbes, Condillac, D’Holbach, and the like expresses the limit of the vast social movement which has already, in reaching the limit, clearly revealed its opposite. This is the apogee (1750) of the first stage of capitalism.

For from the environment, dominated as a tool in the extraverted, exploring period of social relations, we now pass to the bourgeois himself in the introverted analytical period. All the bourgeois acts of will at first flow into the environment, and are there realised. This is not in his opinion a determining relation, for the bourgeois is, by his initial revolution, free in himself. Because therefore this is not a mutually determining relation, because he knows as it were by simple inspection, he has no two-way connexion with his environment. He has no guarantee that the environment known by him has an independent existence. If it determined his knowing, even as his knowing determined it, this would perforce constitute independent existence on its part. But the bourgeois denies this! Hence Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Comte, and neo-positivism. In this second stage of bourgeois economy we have the birth of idealism. The environment either does not exist, or is unknowable. Mind is primary.

This development is the result of industrial capitalism, of the terrific power over its environment manifested by the machine. This makes it seem as if the mind is everything, and the environment nothing. It makes mind seem the sole active force generating all quality.

Society can only seem to be the success of individual will in an economy in which men act as if their sole actions are undetermined and primary. The bourgeois producing for the market, free from all social control and restraint, believes that in doing what seems most to fulfil his will to profit, he is free. The market, the regulator of bourgeois economy, stands to him as environment, and shields him from reality.

In fact his actions are determined by the market and the market itself is determined by the completely blind actions of thousands of men like himself, but the law of its determinism is unknown to him. There is no control, no awareness of the relations between individual producers which determine slump and boom. Hence the bourgeois regards the success of society in changing the environment, not as the outcome of social laws, but as the outcome of free individual mind, as the success of personal conation. When he is sufficiently insulated from the environment by the development of his class, this becomes idealism.

Such an idealistic philosophy is necessarily the philosophy of a ruling class, with whom the environment seems to obey their free will as will. The proletariat cannot generate such a philosophy because this same capitalist economy exploits them. It forces them to bring their labour power into the market to sell to the best bidder or go empty away if there is none. Its anarchy makes them unfree. It does not fulfil their wills, it exploits them.

The proletariat has a remedy, that of social organisation. By combining into trade unions, and accepting social constraints, not haphazard but to a conscious end – higher wages, better conditions – the workers secure the fulfilment of their wills. And in the factories where they work, their organisation is what gives labour its productivity.

Thus the proletariat, generated by the exploitation of bourgeois economy, cannot accept any philosophy that sees freedom in lack of social organisation and constraint; the path of freedom, the road of fulfilment of desire. On the contrary, the only way they can realise their wills is by establishing, in bitter fight, the organisations and social restraints (Factory Acts, Right to Strike, etc.) which the bourgeois rejected. Thus the operation of bourgeois economy generates its negation in its exploited class.

But this negation is not a return to medieval philosophy, which bourgeois philosophy itself negated. Medieval social restraints were unconscious; their organisations were not planned to secure an end; they were rigid, inflexible, imposed from above. They did not represent mass co-operation but lord-and-slave domination. They were the product of a class society.

Thus the philosophy enforced on one, by being a member of the proletariat, is higher than either feudal or bourgeois philosophy. It is nearer to reality; it includes them both. It includes the organisation embodied consciously in feudal society, but it does not permit these organisations to arise as expressions of the privilege of a ruling class. They arise from the needs of the co-operative task, just as to lift a huge rock necessitates co-operative action by a gang of men and this action is not imposed by a lord’s will, but by the shape and weight of the stone and the nature of the tools available.

In Hegelianism the Idea becomes absolute, objective, and creates the whole world. This is the climax of bourgeois philosophy. Concurrently bourgeois economy is reaching its apex.

Up till then there had been no dualism in bourgeois philosophy, only the dialectic yea and nay of thought generating greater complexity and subtlety. Up till then there had been no strife between bourgeois social relations and productive forces, only a tension generating still greater fertility. But now this becomes dualism.

Formal logic is not a law of thought, it is a rule of symbolism. If we are to denote social references by social referents, if we are to indicate for social purposes socially interesting events in the flux of becoming by discrete, permanent symbols, there is one elementary necessity:

Each discrete permanent symbol must denote an entity on which our actions will converge.

For example, if by ‘this rock’ we sometimes mean a tree, sometimes a cloud, there will be no social convergence. But a language is designed to secure social convergence. Hence ‘this rock’ must always secure social convergence.

This involves the so-called ‘Laws of thought’. The Law of Contradiction, ‘a thing cannot both be A and Not-A,’ secures unidirection in social convergence. The Law of the Excluded Middle, ‘a thing must be either A or Not-A,’ secures unanimity in social convergence.

Logical laws are therefore social. They are approximate rules which must be obeyed if language is to fulfil a social function. They are in no way true of the nature of reality. They do not in fact make any statement about the nature of reality. They merely make the following statement:

‘It is desirable to ensure co-operation in the active relation of society to reality.’

Of course this is tautologous, inasmuch as the existence of a language implies not merely the recognition of this law, but the fact that, even before language came into being, there must have been social co-operation to bring it into being. That is why logic is a late outgrowth from language.

Formal logic does not express the vital nature of reality, but expresses certain abstract characteristics of social action. Its laws are manifestly untrue as statements of reality. It is not true that a thing is either A or not A. Yesterday it was A; to-day it is not-A. It is not true that a thing cannot both be and not be A. To-day I am alive, some day I will be dead. To-morrow I will or will not be dead. Both alternatives are equally true. The use of the verb ‘is’ gives a spurious truth to the methodological rules of logic: it implies a universal instant; but this we know from relativity physics to be impossible. There is only a social instant. There is a ‘present’ common to members of society existing and moving at roughly the same speed and in the same place in the Universe and able therefore to undertake a cooperative task. Outside this society, the ‘is’ becomes a ‘was’ or ‘will-be’, and the ‘laws’ of logic cease to be valid. Even within society logic is only approximately true. It is a rough ‘working’ rule like the absolute Time and Space of conversation and appointment-making which is also an unreal social approximation.

Social tasks show us change in reality. Our symbols must be continually altered; our thoughts and forms continually become qualified and enriched. Our active contact with reality ensures a continual dialectical change in thought and perception, and the constant ingression of the new as the result of our changing relations with it. Thought therefore needs only to go out in action to remain dialectical; hence the dialectical nature of scientific hypotheses. The hypothesis goes out in the experiment and, as a ‘result’, becomes changed, and returns upon the hypothesis to alter it. The fresh hypothesis now gives rise to a fresh experiment. The experiment, if it negates the hypothesis, produces a new one, competent to synthesise both the negation and the original hypothesis.

Whenever we see thought becoming non-dialectical and logical, there must be a breach between thought and action.

Instead of preoccupying itself with the changing subject-object relation, mind preoccupies itself with the forms of that symbolism which, in the past, has contained old dialectical formulations of realities. This indicates a similar process in society itself. The productive relations of society have become separated and antagonistic from the productive forces. The ruling class, the class whose philosophy language expresses, has ceased to be fertile, and has withdrawn and become merely parasitic. Thought has become introverted. We see this emphasis on logic, formalism, and withdrawal from action in the Hellenistic, Scholastic, and modern bourgeois philosophies. We see it in all developed philosophies, for the towering of philosophy as queen of thought is itself the reflection of a class cleavage. The development of logistic in contemporary thought is, like neo-realism, a good example of this trend. Logistic is a preoccupation not with the use of mathematics but with the nature of its symbolism. As a result, logistic has not generated a single new development in mathematical thought.

Dialectics is not therefore – as the Scholastics imagined formal logic to be – a machine for extracting the nature of reality from thought. It is the denial of the possibility of the existence of such a machine. It is a recognition of mutually determining relations between knowing and being. It is a creed of action, a constant goad forcing the thinker into reality. Thought is knowing; the experience is being, and at each new step new experience negates old thought. Yet their tension causes an advance to a new hypothesis more inclusive than the old. When capitalism has generated at one pole, the exploited proletariat, with unprecedented misery, and at the other end, the exploiting bourgeoisie, with unprecedented wealth, a new quality emerges from their antagonism, that of Communism. A synthesis of the contradictions of bourgeois economy having come into being, these contradictions are now revealed nakedly as truth and error. Bourgeois philosophy now becomes sterile dualism, and it is proletarian philosophy or Marxism which is dialectic. But because it is the task of the proletariat, arising from the mode of their generation, to solve the problem of human relations and of the gulf between knowing and being, Marxism is more than a philosophy, it is a sociology. It is a theory of the concrete society in which philosophy, and other forms of ideology, are generated.

Bourgeois philosophy, therefore, can generate no greater philosophy than Hegel’s, any more than feudalism could generate anything higher than Thomism, or Hellenism anything more all-embracing than Platonism and Aristotelianism. To rise beyond Hegel’s idealistic synthesis, one must see that the mind in its turn is determined by social relations, that knowing is a mutually determining relation between subject and object, that freedom is not accident but the consciousness of necessity. One must see that if freedom for a man in society is the attainment of individual desires, it involves conscious co-operation with others to obtain them, and that this conscious co-operation will itself transform a man’s desires. To see this is to cease to be a bourgeois, and to cease to tolerate bourgeois economy. One is already a communist revolutionary. Bourgeois economy itself produces these, for to be shown that freedom does not lie in lack of social organisation is to be proletarianised. It is to be declassed if one is a bourgeois or to be made class-conscious if one is a proletarian. It is to find how helpless one is by oneself to resist the dominating and exploiting relations that are concealed in bourgeois economy.

To have become a dialectical materialist is to have been subject to exploitation, want, war, anxiety, insecurity; to have had one’s barest human needs denied or one’s loved ones tormented or killed in the name of bourgeois liberty, and to have found that one’s ‘free-will’ alone can do nothing at all, because one is more bound and crippled in bourgeois economy than a prisoner in a dungeon – and to have found that in this condition the only thing that can secure alleviation is co-operation with one’s fellow men in the same dungeon, the world’s exploited proletariat. This cooperation itself imposes on one’s actions laws deriving from the nature of society and of the aims one has in common with those others. Then one has ceased to be a bourgeois philosopher: one has become a dialectical materialist. One has seen how men can leave the realm of necessity for that of freedom, not by becoming blind to necessity, or by denying its existence, but by becoming conscious of it.

[Dermezel]

It's fucking brutal. Caudwell is going off on theoretical physics, and super-technical philosophical reasoning while Rosa is parroting Ayn Rand.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Thanks for that Dermezel, but I fail to see how this addresses anything I have said -- especially since Caudwell died many years before I was born!

[In fact, many of the things he says agree with much of what I say!]

And, how exactly am I 'parroting Ayn Rand'?

Perhaps you can enlightlen us here, or quote the passages above that show where I have gone wrong -- since I can't find them.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian (apologies for the delay in replying, but I have been away):


It's particularly important to Rosa who claims Marx extirpated completely "dialectics." I find it particularly uninteresting to argue with anyone about the abstracts of dialectics, and dialectical logic vs. formal logic, etc.

Oh dear! Still incapable of reading simple English, I see! Here is what I actually said:


You will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics you have uncritically swallowed, for in it there is not one atom of Hegel -- no 'quantity turning into quality', no 'contradictions', no 'negation of the negation', no 'unity of opposites', no 'totality'...

So, Marx's method has had Hegel totally extirpated. For Marx, putting Hegel on 'his feet' is to crush his head. Marx's 'dialectic' thus more closely resembles that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists. It resembles Hegel's 'dialectic' (upside down, or the 'right way up') not at all.

So, where do I say the dialectic has been extirpated? What I alleged was that Marx himself indicates that his version of the dialectic has not one atom of Hegel in it (upside down, or the 'right way up').

You need to address that allegation, not a figment of your over-emotional imagination.


I find historical accuracy very interesting and very important-- for it is the historical transposition of dialectic that Marx executes, grounding it in the content of history which is the social organization of labor, a transposition Marx refers to as "extracting" the "rational" portion of Hegel's dialectic which "allows" Marx to analyze, and explain, the actual interrelation of use and exchange values, the conflict between means and relations of productions, the contradictions in capital's raison d'etre, which is the self-expansion of value.

Except, Marx himself (not I, not Burnham, not Eastman, not Struve...), Marx himself tells us that Hegel has been completely deleted from 'his method'; so the above is just hot air.


You want to chuck Hegel and his dialectic out the window? Be my guest, but then the obligation is upon you not to argue the superiority of formal logic over Hegel's logic, but to provide an analysis of history, of the social organization of labor, that is superior to Marx's.

The point is that Marx wanted to do this long before I was even thought of, but, as we can see, you choose to ignore what he says.

And I have demonstrated the superiority of formal logic over Hegel's sub-Aristotelian 'logic', here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2004.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

Summarised here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htm

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Summary_of_Essay_Four_Part_One.htm


Rosa, of course, has no interest in taking one single step into any concrete analysis of the conflict between capital and wage-labor-- because she can't; because she doesn't grasp the transposition Marx accomplished-- and so for her, it's all about language, empiricism, and formal logic.

No need to; as I have told you several before (but you prefer to ignore what both I and Marx tell you): there are plenty of comrades who have done this far better than I can. What I can bring to this is something novel: the first demonstration in over 150 years that our core theory (the sort of 'dialectics' that has you in its thrall) is seriously defective.

No wonder then that is has presided over 150 years of almost total failure....:(


Marx and Engels could only produce Theses on Feuerbach because after crossing that brook of fire they were able to redirect the river of dialectic.

Except, as Marx himself tells us: by the time he came to write Das Kapital ], he had 'crossed another river', and was happy to use the sort of dialectic one finds in Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


And for those of you who might want to know how Marx viewed this paragraph in Capital-- from his correspondence with Engels in 1867:

You are quite right about Hofmann. Incidentally, you will see from the conclusion to my Chapter III, where I outline the transformation of the master of a trade into a capitalist — as a result of purely quantitative changes — that in the text there I quote Hegel’s discovery of the law of the transformation of a merely quantitative change into a qualitative one as being attested by history and natural science alike

You have already had it pointed out to you that no unpublished source can countermand a published work.

Moreover, as we have seen, Marx's example is not an instance of Hegel's alleged 'law', which Marx must have known. In that case, he was still 'coquetting' with Hegelian terms in his letters to Engels.


And his regard for Hegel:

And what this Lange has to say about the Hegelian method and my application of the same is simply childish. First, he understands rien [nothing] about Hegel’s method and, therefore, second, still less about my critical manner of applying it. In one respect he reminds me of Moses Mendelssohn. That prototype of a windbag once wrote to Lessing asking how he could possibly take ‘that dead dog Spinoza’ au sérieux! In the same way, Mr Lange expresses surprise that Engels, I, etc., take au sérieux the dead dog Hegel, after Büchner, Lange, Dr Dühring, Fechner, etc., had long agreed that they — poor dear — had long since buried him. Lange is naïve enough to say that I ‘move with rare freedom’ in empirical matter. He has not the slightest idea that this ‘free movement in matter’ is nothing but a paraphrase for the method of dealing with matter — that is, the dialectical method.

Marx to Kugelmann 1870

These, and several other unpublished texts have been quoted here many times by comrades just as desperate as you to rehabilitate this mystical bumbler (Hegel). It is tedious to have to bat them into touch every few months...

We already know what Marx meant by his 'critical method' of applying Hegel's 'logic' (and from a published work, too): at most, one should merely 'coquette' with a few Hegelian phrases, here and there.

The summary of 'his method' (that Marx quotes in Das Kapital), just confirms this: Hegel has been totally extirpated. One can't get more critical than that!

But, what of this?


In the same way, Mr Lange expresses surprise that Engels, I, etc., take au sérieux the dead dog Hegel, after Büchner, Lange, Dr Dühring, Fechner, etc., had long agreed that they — poor dear — had long since buried him.

Marx merely tells us that this character, Lange, thinks he takes Hegel seriously. Now, this would have presented Marx with an ideal opportunity to put all doubt to rest, but he pointedly does not. In fact, in Das Kapital, in his greatest published work, he indicates the exact opposite, that he does not take Hegel seriously, since all he did there was 'coquette' with Hegelian jargon!:lol:

[S.Artesian]

Sophist Rosa plays her version of spin the bottle and winds up always kissing the her own reflection.

Correspondence between Marx and Engels hardly ranks as hearsay, marginalia, secondary sources, etc. Sophist Rosa may wish it so, but wishing does not make it so.

As for Marx and dialectics-- I looked back at the earlier posts in this thread and found this from Sophist Rosa on March 31, 2009:

"But, how can the relation between the forces and relations of production be a contradiction?

You have yet to explain that."

Unfortunately, nobody, it appears to me took up the challenge. I am more than happy to provided sophist Rosa clarifies:

1. is it her contention that such a contradiction does not, for Marx, play a critical, decisive role in the development and potential for the overthrow of capitalism?

2. is it her contention that there is no "dialectic" between means and relations of production; no logical, self-organized, unity between means and relations which is at one and the same time an opposition?

3. when it IS explained what the contradiction between means and relations of production, their "dialectic" actually is, does Rosa agree to stop all this bullshit about coquetting and acknowledge that Marx did employ a method in his analysis that extracted the "rational" from Hegel's dialectic?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


Sophist Rosa plays her version of spin the bottle and winds up always kissing the her own reflection.

Nice sophistical rhetoric, unfortunately not supported by a single quote from a published work of Marx's (post Das Kapital).


Correspondence between Marx and Engels hardly ranks as hearsay, marginalia, secondary sources, etc. Sophist Rosa may wish it so, but wishing does not make it so.

They are in fact important sources of information, but, and once more, what they tell us cannot countermand what we find in published work.


As for Marx and dialectics-- I looked back at the earlier posts in this thread and found this from Sophist Rosa on March 31, 2009:

"But, how can the relation between the forces and relations of production be a contradiction?

You have yet to explain that."

Unfortunately, nobody, it appears to me took up the challenge. I am more than happy to provided sophist Rosa clarifies:

1. is it her contention that such a contradiction does not, for Marx, play a critical, decisive role in the development and potential for the overthrow of capitalism?

2. is it her contention that there is no "dialectic" between means and relations of production; no logical, self-organized, unity between means and relations which is at one and the same time an opposition?

3. when it IS explained what the contradiction between means and relations of production, their "dialectic" actually is, does Rosa agree to stop all this bullshit about coquetting and acknowledge that Marx did employ a method in his analysis that extracted the "rational" from Hegel's dialectic?

My contention is not that the relation between the forces and relations of production do not "play a critical, decisive role in the development and potential for the overthrow of capitalism", when plainly they do. My contention is that this relation cannot be called contradiction, unless the word "contradiction" is being used in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense.

No wonder Marx felt he had to "coquette" with it.

Now, if you, my dear mystic, had read what I have written on this in my essays, before shooting from the hip, you'd have seen that I say this many times -- even clearly enough for one as confused as you are to see.

Moreover, you have also been told many times, but you continue to ignore this, that I fully accept historical materialism.


is it her contention that there is no "dialectic" between means and relations of production; no logical, self-organized, unity between means and relations which is at one and the same time an opposition?

Are you directing these questions at me, or at your dwindling and yawning audience?

Speaking for myself, but clearly not for you, I am quite happy with 'the dialectic' as Marx understood it, helpfully summarised for us in his most important published work:


"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:*

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02.]

No Hegel anywhere in site. No 'contradictions', no 'unity of opposites', no 'negation of the negation', no 'quantity passing over into quality', no 'Totality'...

So, Marx's 'dialectic' more closely resembles that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists.

More on that here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1195129&postcount=57

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1356284&postcount=68

Moreover, I am also happy to use words like "opposition" and "struggle", and any other ordinary language terms (provided they haven't been given a Hegel-speak make-over).


when it IS explained what the contradiction between means and relations of production, their "dialectic" actually is, does Rosa agree to stop all this bullshit about coquetting and acknowledge that Marx did employ a method in his analysis that extracted the "rational" from Hegel's dialectic?

Nice use of dialectical-scatological language, as I predicted many years ago:


For anyone interested, check out (here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/RevLeft.htm)) the desperate 'debating' tactics used by Dialectical Mystics in their attempt to respond to my ideas.

You will no doubt notice that the vast majority all say the same sorts of things, and most of them pepper their remarks with scatological and abusive language. And they all like to make things up, too, about me and my beliefs.

25 years (!!) of this from Dialectical Mystics has meant I now take an aggressive stance with them every time -- I soon learnt back in the 1980s that being pleasant with them (my initial tactic) did not alter their abusive tone, their propensity to fabricate, nor reduce the amount of scatological language they used.

So, these days, I generally go for the jugular from the get-go.

Apparently, they expect me to take their abuse lying down, and regularly complain about my "bullying" tactics.

These mystics can dish it out, but clearly they cannot take it.

Given the damage their theory has done to Marxism (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm), and the abuse they all dole out, they are lucky this is all I can do to them.

[Why they do this is explained here (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm).]

And, of course, if anyone is "bulshi**ing", it was Marx, since "coquetting" was his word, not mine.

Anyone would think that 'comrade' Artesian believes that I have access to a time machine, and have mischievously gone back to the 1860s and altered Marx's own words!:lol:

But, is anyone clearer what the 'contradiction' is between the forces and relations of production?:confused:

If they are, please could they help this struggling mystic out, and explain it to him?

After over 25 years extensive and intensive research over this, I must admit, I can't...:(

[S.Artesian]

Means and relations of production assume an oppositional identity to each other, based on a necessary shared identity; they contradict each other dialectically... that is to say..

Wait a minute, Rosa didn't answer the question. I can show exactly how the means and relations exist in a dialectical contradiction within capitalism-- dialectical as Marx understood and overtook dialectical from Hegel; in contradiction in that at a certain point there unity become an antagonism and an obstruction to its own existence.

Explaining this is a snap for anyone who has truly studied Marx's analysis of capitalism, but I won't go any further until we get some answers from Rosa-- when this is explained to her, the person who claims she knows Marx but doesn't know this, will she then acknowledge, whether Marx's interpretation of Hegel agrees with hers or not, Marx was certain that he was using Hegel's dialectic to extract a rational kernel.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian, still struggling to find a single published comment of Marx's which supports the mystical view of Das Kapital he has uncritically swallowed:


Means and relations of production assume an oppositional identity to each other, based on a necessary shared identity; they contradict each other dialectically... that is to say..

1) Why is this a 'contradiction'? Unless, of course, you are using "contradiction" in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense. But what is it?

2) But Marx said that the two 'halves' of a contradiction are "mutually exclusive". If so, the forces of production cannot co-exist with the relations of production -- destroying Historical Materialism! No wonder he began to "coquette" with this word.:)


Wait a minute, Rosa didn't answer the question. I can show exactly how the means and relations exist in a dialectical contradiction within capitalism-- dialectical as Marx understood and overtook dialectical from Hegel; in contradiction in that at a certain point there unity become an antagonism and an obstruction to its own existence.

1) I deny this is a contradiction, and you have yet to show it is one ('dialectical' or otherwise).

2) Marx, in Das Kapital, tells us he began to "coquette" with this word, since it cannot be literally applied to capitalism (or anything else, for that matter).


Explaining this is a snap for anyone who has truly studied Marx's analysis of capitalism, but I won't go any further until we get some answers from Rosa-- when this is explained to her, the person who claims she knows Marx but doesn't know this, will she then acknowledge, whether Marx's interpretation of Hegel agrees with hers or not, Marx was certain that he was using Hegel's dialectic to extract a rational kernel.

1) You mean "for anyone who has ignored what Marx himself tells us", of course.:lol:

2) Or, do you know of a quotation from any of Marx's published works after he wrote Das Kapital (or even in Das Kapital) where he says he is using Hegel's dialectical method?

3) So, you are trying to rehabilitate Hegel, as I alleged.:(

[S.Artesian]

What Marx says is that he is using dialectics, and that Hegel was the first to give dialectics its full expression. You can make of that what you want, but what you want doesn't make it what it is, which in Marx's own words is extracting the rational from Hegel. The rational, for Marx, is the content of history. For Hegel that content is the movement of consciousness through and to the point of self-consciousness. For Marx, that content is the social organization of labor.

On a different thread, in response to a different request, I provided the elements of Marx's dialectic and his use and meaning of contradiction.

On this thread: Is it Rosa's contention that the contradiction between means and relations of production does not exist for Marx? That such a contradiction cannot logically exist regardless of Marx's opinion?

Marx wrote more than volume 1 of Capital. And as great as that volume is, as Marx himself wrote later, the volume is by no means complete and does not examine capital in its full development, in the critical area of expanded social reproduction. Of course, he doesn't say that in volume 1, so perhaps we should disregard Marx's own statements in vols. 2 and 3.

In any case-- Marx's analysis of the development of capital includes, actually is derived, from his analysis of its contradictions, its self-generated, and self-reflected antagonisms, and the fact that those contradictions are the very elements of its identity that define it as capital in the first place. These are the elements of Marx's own work that he his continuously exploring; that provide the very continuity of his work from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts through and beyond vol 3 of Capital.

Once Rosa answers the questions, I'll be more than happy to explain Marx to Rosa since she is obviously incapable of explaining it to or by herself.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


What Marx says is that he is using dialectics, and that Hegel was the first to give dialectics its full expression. You can make of that what you want, but what you want doesn't make it what it is, which in Marx's own words is extracting the rational from Hegel. The rational, for Marx, is the content of history. For Hegel that content is the movement of consciousness through and to the point of self-consciousness. For Marx, that content is the social organization of labor.

1) We have already established that Marx's own summary -- or, rather the one he quoted and endorsed as 'the dialectic method' and 'his method' -- contains not one atom of Hegel. No 'contradictions', no 'negation of the negation', no 'unity of opposites', no 'quantity passing over into quality', no 'Totality'...

2) Marx does not say this:


and that Hegel was the first to give dialectics its full expression.

This is what he in fact said:


The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. But just as I was working at the first volume of “Das Kapital,” it was the good pleasure of the peevish, arrogant, mediocre Epigonoi [Epigones – Büchner, Dühring and others] who now talk large in cultured Germany, to treat Hegel in same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a “dead dog.” I therefore openly avowed myself the pupil of that mighty thinker, and even here and there, in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to him. The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/p3.htm

Bold added.

Now, you have already tried to use this passage, when you were here last and were sent packing with your tail between your legs.


The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner

And Marx is quite right, this by no means prevents Hegel from doing this, but what does prevent him from being the first "to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner" is the fact that Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists had beaten him to it.

Hence, Marx abandoned Hegel's mystical theory, and reverted to the rational theory first propounded (in embryonic form) by the above characters.

And that is why he endorsed the review he added to the Afterword to the Second Edition (from which every trace of Hegel had been removed), and merely 'coquetted' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

So, according to Marx's summary (not mine) -- or, rather, the one he endorsed -- the 'rational kernel' of Hegel's method is empty, whereas that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish School is not.

And, once more, that is why the summary he added contains no Hegel at all.

Now, can we move on, or do you need me to walk you through this again?


On a different thread, in response to a different request, I provided the elements of Marx's dialectic and his use and meaning of contradiction.

Well, either it was so brief, one needed anti-blinking tablets to save missing it, or it was non-existent.

To settle this, can you post the link?


Marx wrote more than volume 1 of Capital. And as great as that volume is, as Marx himself wrote later, the volume is by no means complete and does not examine capital in its full development, in the critical area of expanded social reproduction. Of course, he doesn't say that in volume 1, so perhaps we should disregard Marx's own statements in vols. 2 and 3.

Well, these were not published by Marx, but by Engels, but even if they had been published by Marx, I can't see how they help you in your desperate bid to re-habilitate Hegel.


In any case-- Marx's analysis of the development of capital includes, actually is derived, from his analysis of its contradictions, its self-generated, and self-reflected antagonisms, and the fact that those contradictions are the very elements of its identity that define it as capital in the first place. These are the elements of Marx's own work that he his continuously exploring; that provide the very continuity of his work from the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts through and beyond vol 3 of Capital.

Well, you are merely rehearsing the traditional fairy tale we have heard countless times over the last 130 years or so -- while ignoring, once more, Marx's actual words, where he waves goodbye to all this mystical junk -- helping yourself on the way, like all the other traditionalists, to a phrase ("dialectical contradiction") which no one, least of all you, has yet explained.


Once Rosa answers the questions, I'll be more than happy to explain Marx to Rosa since she is obviously incapable of explaining it to or by herself.

Don't hold your breath, since you'll never see me joining you in trying to make sense of the traditional view you have uncritically swallowed.

And you needn't condescend to 'explain' the traditional view to me; I came across it first in the 1970s, and have been studying it ever since. So I already know what it is.

Fortunately, knowing a little too much logic and philosophy of logic -- unlike you --, I did not fall for this guff.

Hence, I prefer Das Kapital as Marx intended it -- free of this Hegelian garbage.

[S.Artesian]

Classic example of Rosa's sophistry: This by Marx,

"The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."

becomes this, by Rosa

And Marx is quite right, this by no means prevents Hegel from doing this, but what does prevent him from being the first "to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner" is the fact that Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists had beaten him to it."

What incredible distortion, deliberate I might add, by our no-nothing pseudo-Marxist. Marx clearly is stating that Hegel's mystification of dialectic to the contrary notwithstanding, dialectics are first given their "general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner" by Hegel. Rosa turns that into a statement that has Marx saying that Hegel didn't give dialectics its first full [or comprehensive and conscious] explanation at all, something else prevented Hegel from being the first.

Sophistry to the max, that's all Rosa has in her empty gun. Her arguments are loaded all right, but they're loaded with blanks.

So for Rosa, Marx didn't really say what he said, he said something that is really something else, so that he wound up saying what she says he in fact never said.

So where does Marx, the man who admits, proudly, to taking Hegel seriously, to having been a student of that mighty thinker, to having demonstrated, to his own satisfaction, the correctness of Hegel's notion of the transformation of quantity into quality ever say that he has abandoned, extirpated Hegel's dialectic for that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Materialists? Where does he state that in a published work, or an unpublished work?

Notice how Rosa won't accept the challenge about means and relations of production. Why can't she answer those questions? She asked earlier how can the means and relations of production contradict each other. There are 2 questions I asked her to answer to provide some more information. They are easy questions to answer. Is it Rosa's contention that means and relations of production can never be in contradiction regardless of what Marx thought, or is it her contention that Marx did not think there was a contradiction between the means and relations of production?

I could offer some educated guesses why she won't answer--

--she's ignorant of this critical issue;
--this is an issue that doesn't lend itself to her particular, and near psychotic distortion of language;
--she actually doesn't understand the question because she doesn't understand anything about Marx;
--all of the above

You're a fraud and a fool Rosa. A poseur.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


And Marx is quite right, this by no means prevents Hegel from doing this, but what does prevent him from being the first "to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner" is the fact that Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists had beaten him to it."

What incredible distortion, deliberate I might add, by our no-nothing pseudo-Marxist. Marx clearly is stating that Hegel's mystification of dialectic to the contrary notwithstanding, dialectics are first given their "general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner" by Hegel. Rosa turns that into a statement that has Marx saying that Hegel didn't give dialectics its first full [or comprehensive and conscious] explanation at all, something else prevented Hegel from being the first.

In fact, Marx's exact words do not say this, as I pointed out. Your uncritical adherence to the traditional, mystical view of 'the dialectic', as opposed to the materialist version invented (in embryonic form) by Aristotle, developed by Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists (from whom both Kant and Hegel got their ideas, before the latter mystified them) prevents you seeing this. This is compounded by the fact that you choose to ignore Marx's own published summary -- or, rather the one he endorsed -- which briefly encapsulates this scientific theory, and from which every trace of Hegel has been removed.


Sophistry to the max, that's all Rosa has in her empty gun. Her arguments are loaded all right, but they're loaded with blanks.

Nice rhetoric, but you need to back it up with a published remark of Marx's (from Das Kapital or later) that supports your mystical view of the 'dialectic'.

[We already know you can't, or you would have done so by now.]


So for Rosa, Marx didn't really say what he said, he said something that is really something else, so that he wound up saying what she says he in fact never said.

In fact, and once more, you are the one who wants to rehabilitate the mystical version of the dialectic, ignoring the scientific version Marx endorsed in the Postface to the Second Edition of Das Kapital, which contains not one atom of Hegel.

In which case, no wonder Marx says that Hegel's mystical version is not what prevents him from being the first to do what you allege; the historical fact that he wasn't the first to do this does that!

Or do you want to deny that both Kant and Hegel derived this theory from Ferguson, Millar, Robertson, Smith and Stewart?

Given the additional fact that not one of you can explain this mystical version (you can't even tell us what a 'dialectical contradiction' is!), genuine materialists would be unwise to listen to you.


So where does Marx, the man who admits, proudly, to taking Hegel seriously, to having been a student of that mighty thinker, to having demonstrated, to his own satisfaction, the correctness of Hegel's notion of the transformation of quantity into quality ever say that he has abandoned, extirpated Hegel's dialectic for that of Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish Materialists? Where does he state that in a published work, or an unpublished work?

1) Marx put all that praise of Hegel in the past tense.

2) It is possible to call someone a 'mighty thinker' but reject all he/she has to say. For example, I think Plato is a great thinker, but I reject 99.99% of what he says.

3) In relation to the few places where he does mention Hegel's ideas in the body of Das Kapital, we already have Marx's words that he was merely 'coquetting'. In other words, his non-serious use of these ideas (the equivalent to our use of 'scare quotes', perhaps) in no way constitutes an endorsement of a 'law' that (a) does not work, anyway (as I have shown in my essays), and (b) does not even apply to the example he chose (as I have shown in earlier posts in this thread)!

4) Finally, I posted links in an earlier post (to earlier threads) that answer your long-winded question. It's hardly my fault if you ignored them. Here they are again:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1195129&postcount=57*

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1356284&postcount=68

The fact that Marx abandoned Hegel can be seen from a summary of 'his method', the 'dialectic method' he added to the Postface to the Second Edition of Das Kapital. I suspect you haven't seen it before. So here it is:


"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:*

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

In this summary, there is not one atom of Hegel. No 'contradictions', no 'negation of the negation', no 'quantity passing over into quality', no 'unity of opposites', no 'Totality'... Had Marx not abandoned Hegel he would have added "Oh, by the way, this reviewer left out "contradiction", "negation of the negation", "unity of opposites", "quantity passing over into quality"..., all of which are key dialectical concepts...", or words to that effect.

But, alas for you, he didn't.

What he did say was that when the unwary reader came across his own use of such words, they should recall that he was merely "coquetting" with them.


Notice how Rosa won't accept the challenge about means and relations of production. Why can't she answer those questions? She asked earlier how can the means and relations of production contradict each other. There are 2 questions I asked her to answer to provide some more information. They are easy questions to answer. Is it Rosa's contention that means and relations of production can never be in contradiction regardless of what Marx thought, or is it her contention that Marx did not think there was a contradiction between the means and relations of production?

1) You have yet to explain how this is a 'contradiction', or even what 'dialectical contradictions' are. And you are not alone; over the last 200 years, no one has been able to say what they are -- unless, of course, you know differently.

2) Here are your questions, which you did not ask me, but your dwindling band of readers, of whom the Maoist, Red Cat seems to be the latest most sycophantic, and probably only one left:


1. is it her contention that such a contradiction does not, for Marx, play a critical, decisive role in the development and potential for the overthrow of capitalism?

2. is it her contention that there is no "dialectic" between means and relations of production; no logical, self-organized, unity between means and relations which is at one and the same time an opposition?

3. when it IS explained what the contradiction between means and relations of production, their "dialectic" actually is, does Rosa agree to stop all this bullshit about coquetting and acknowledge that Marx did employ a method in his analysis that extracted the "rational" from Hegel's dialectic?

Now, even though you did not pose these to me, I answered them, as follows (which, in your obviously emotional state, you seem to have missed/ignored):


My contention is not that the relation between the forces and relations of production do not "play a critical, decisive role in the development and potential for the overthrow of capitalism", when plainly they do. My contention is that this relation cannot be called contradiction, unless the word "contradiction" is being used in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense.

No wonder Marx felt he had to "coquette" with it.

Now, if you, my dear mystic, had read what I have written on this in my essays, before shooting from the hip, you'd have seen that I say this many times -- even clearly enough for one as confused as you are to see.

Moreover, you have also been told many times, but you continue to ignore this, that I fully accept historical materialism.

Now, do you need me to post this again before you stop saying I ignored your 'challenge'?

You now add this gloss on the above:


Is it Rosa's contention that means and relations of production can never be in contradiction regardless of what Marx thought, or is it her contention that Marx did not think there was a contradiction between the means and relations of production?/

Well, as far as I'm aware, Marx did not call this a contradiction in Das Kapital (and even if he had have done, we already know he was merely "coquetting" with this term), or in any published work after he wrote Das Kapital.

Again, if you know differently, you have been unwisely silent on the issue.

So, unless you tell us how these can possibly be in contradiction, I can help you no more.

Of course, and once more, you might be using "contradiction" in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense. No problem with that, but what is it?

You refuse to say...:(

The reason for your reticence might have two sources: (1) Your obvious infacility with logic, and (2) you might have seen (from the Mao thread in the Theory section) that this mystical 'theory' of yours implies that change is impossible.



I could offer some educated guesses why she won't answer--

--she's ignorant of this critical issue;
--this is an issue that doesn't lend itself to her particular, and near psychotic distortion of language;
--she actually doesn't understand the question because she doesn't understand anything about Marx;
--all of the above


Far more interesting is your refusal, or perhaps incapacity, to tell us what a 'dialectical contradiction' is so I can make sense of your 'challenge'.


You're a fraud and a fool Rosa. A poseur.

Maybe so, maybe not, but one thing is clear: you are plainly out of your depth in logic --, so your only option is to become abusive, as I predicted above.

[S.Artesian]

What you have, what you are, Rosa is a repetition compulsion, repeatedly distorting the same portions of Marx's writing over and over again in a ritual, an incantation, turning the distortions into mantra, hoping, despite your self-proclaimed opposition to Hegel, that quantity really can become quality, and if you repeat your mantra enough times somebody might believe it.

You're like Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz, clicking your heels together and repeating "There's no place like home, there's no place like home...." and hoping that will get you back to.... Kansas.

You know what a mantra is, don't you Rosa? A collection of meaningless sounds that when repeated induces a trance-like state in the speaker. Perfect.

Except this isn't the emerald city and you have no ruby slippers on your feet of clay.

But if it's Marx's dialectic that is at issue, and what Marx perceives and analyzes as the dialectical contradictions of capital, I did indeed answer that question in a response to Louise in another thread.

If anyone else is interested, because I know Rosa most certainly isn't interested in anything that has the slightest thing to do with Marx's actual analysis of the contradictions of capital-- its self-oppositions-- I reproduce it here:

"Marx states clearly in the preface to the 2nd edition that he uses dialectic, his dialectic is the opposite of Hegel's; his dialectic has extracted the rational kernel; the capital's cycles are the product of its inherent contradictions.

The question you are really asking is what does Marx consider to be the inherent contradictions of capital?

1. The primary, genetic, inherent, contradiction is the social relation of production established between wage-labor and capital. Each exists in the organization of the other. Capital represents the accumulated, dead labor, of the laborers, which stands in opposition to them in the very process of production. As capital develops it expands this relation with wage-labor, but it is not just any sort of expansion.

2. Further contradiction developed in Marx's dialectic of industrial capital: For capital to become capital, the means of production must confront the laborer in a specific condition -- that condition requires that means of production exist as private property; those means of production organized as private property have to be exchanged, have to be animated by labor organized as wage-labor. This is a social organization of labor, requiring the detachment, the dispossession of labor from the means of its own subsistence. So with labor organized as living wage labor creating exchange value, the capitalists, the owners of the private property expropriate the surplus value, expanding the means of production, their private property, which now stands in opposition to the "free" dispossessed laborers-- commanding their labor. Dead labor confronts living labor as its master.

3. Further contradiction of capital as developed in Marx's dialectic: As expropriated value, value organized as private property, the articles so produced can have no immediate, direct use for the owners. Their is no value, no profit, realizable in immediate direct consumption by the owners of the objects they own. Consequently the value commanded by private property, by dead labor over living labor, has to establish itself, realize itself in the market of exchange with all other objects so produced, which gets us to...

4. The single-cell "organism" of contradiction in Marx's dialectic of industrial capitalism-- the commodity; the dual nature of the commodity. Use-value and exchange-value; both exist in the organization of the other under capitalism. With out establishing a use-value in the market, without satisfying the need of someone else, the commodity cannot realize the portion of surplus value contained therein. Without its exchange value, without being able to return a profit, the usefulness of the object is of no consequence. Production stops. The commodities are destroyed, warehoused, stock-piled, retired.

Right now, US railroads have approximately 25% of their freight car fleets in storage. Each of these cars is a useful article, but the use of these cars will not provide a profit, as the overall decline in the profitability of the economy means their is no need, no use for the usefulness of the cars.


About 14% of the world's commercial jet aviation fleet is also in storage in desert areas for similar reason.

Milk has been dumped in both Europe and the US due to overproduction. Has the useful nature of milk declined? Is there less poverty, less malnutrition suddenly? No, there's more poverty recently. But the use value is of no consequence as the production of milk cannot realize, cannot actually obtain a portion of the socially available surplus value in the markets needed to support the reproduction of milk as commodity capital.

Consider also, production of objects that can't find a use. It doesn't matter how much of the time spent in producing those articles is surplus labor time. None of it will be realized.

5. A further contradiction in the development of capitalism as analyzed in Marx's dialectic: the conflict between the means and relations of production. Capital to be capital means the realization of expanded value. To realize more value in the market, or rather, capital must not only command, aggrandize, exploit labor-power, it must command, aggrandize, exploit labor-power through its relative reduction in production. It must expel labor from the production process, relatively, at the same time as it demans greater access to "free" dispossessed labor.

Consequently the technical component, the "dead" labor of capital increases, and as it increases the overproduction of capital increases-- the very organization of the means of production as private property which so propels capital to hurry to the markets to realize surplus value; that drives capitalist production to employ ever greater more extensive more efficient means of production, (which are of course the accumulated value now brought back into production to yield more accumulated value) entails that the more capital exchanges itself with wage-labor, the relatively less it is exchanging of itself with wage-labor. Thus capital is "overproduced." The rate of profit declines, and its decline is precipitated by the very same relation that heralded capital's expansion. The means of production have outgrown their organization as private property, producing for exchange. To emancipate those means of production however requires the abolition of wage-labor. The class of wage-laborers in overthrowing the class relation that binds them to dead-labor initiates the process of overcoming its own organization as wage-laborers. I guess if you want to, you could call wage-labor the negation, and this overthrow of the totality of the social relation called capital, the negation of that negation. I don't, because I don't particularly like the phrase.

6. Throughout the body of Marx's work, extending beyond any of the remarks in any of the prefaces; in both publish and unpublished works, Marx refers to capital as "contradiction in motion." He is not kidding. In volume 2, he shows the simultaneous yet oppositional movements of capital reproduction inherent in the turnovers of fixed capital and circulating capital. In vol 3 he shows the origin and development of the decline in the rate of profit, and its impact on capitalist production as a whole. "
________

Those are my answers to the critical question of what constitutes the contradictions of capital-- the oppositions generated to its very existence, its very success by its very existence and by its very success-- as analyzed by Marx.

For Rosa, all this is just so much immaterial immaterial as her pseudo-Marxism is in fact a gigantic step backward from Marx-- a step back into philosophy which Marx, extracting the rational kernel from Hegel really put an end to; just as his analysis of capital puts an end to political economy [I personally get almost a big a laugh out of those pretending to be "Marxist political economists," as I do out of those claiming to be "Marxist philosophers-- whether they claim to be philosophers of dialectical materialism, or philo-sophisters like our Rosa.

So-- did Aristotle, Kant, the Scottish materialists utilize, work with "dialectics"? Sure they did, as a matter of fact, we might say they coquetted with dialectics. Marx says Hegel was the first to give dialectic its comprehensive, conscious expression. Rosa twists that into language that would make Milton Friedman, David Stockman, George Gilder, and the other sophist-philosophers of wealth as poverty proud to be at her dinner table.

Where does Marx ever say he abandoned Hegel for the Scottish materialists? For Kant? No place.

So Rosa, back to the question-- is it your contention that Marx in his analysis of the contradictions of capital; in his analysis of the antagonisms of capital, which are self-generated, and both propel and limit its expansion; in his analysis of the social relation of production that comes into conflict with the very growth of the means of production it compels, is NOT analyzing a contradiction? Marx does not believe these oppositions to be contradictions? Marx does not think capital has any contradictions internal to its very existence?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


What you have, what you are, Rosa is a repetition compulsion, repeatedly distorting the same portions of Marx's writing over and over again in a ritual, an incantation, turning the distortions into mantra, hoping, despite your self-proclaimed opposition to Hegel, that quantity really can become quality, and if you repeat your mantra enough times somebody might believe it.

1) I find it necessary to repeat certain things since a) You ignore them and b) You keep repeating the same tired arguments between posts.

2) You have yet to show that I have 'distorted' Marx -- indeed, you keep repeating that particular mantra, but unwisely omit the proof.:(

3) And your joke about 'quantity and quality' is tired too; I cracked it here back on 2006 when one of your mystical, dialectical friends kept repeating somewhat similar things to you. Original you lot ain't...


You're like Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz, clicking your heels together and repeating "There's no place like home, there's no place like home...." and hoping that will get you back to.... Kansas.

And you remind me of the Tin man -- brainless.:)


You know what a mantra is, don't you Rosa? A collection of meaningless sounds that when repeated induces a trance-like state in the speaker. Perfect.

Indeed, since the early 1980s I have been accusing you mystics of producing little other than Dialectical Mantras.


Except this isn't the emerald city and you have no ruby slippers on your feet of clay.

And you have little between your ears -- but, you don't find me making fun of the afflicted.


But if it's Marx's dialectic that is at issue, and what Marx perceives and analyzes as the dialectical contradictions of capital, I did indeed answer that question in a response to Louise in another thread.

Oh dear, you are repeating yourself again; I've told you a million times not to do it, too!

In which case, if you can repeat yourself, you can't cavil if I do the same, can you?

So, here we go again: we need not speculate what Marx's 'dialectic' was, since he helpfully put paid to all speculation, adding a summary of it written by a reviewer, which he endorsed as 'his method', and 'the dialectic method', in which not even a mystic like you, armed with an electron microscope, will be able to find any Hegel at all.

So, precisely what motivates you into wanting to rehabilitate this mystical incompetent is perhaps something we should leave to the professionals.


If anyone else is interested, because I know Rosa most certainly isn't interested in anything that has the slightest thing to do with Marx's actual analysis of the contradictions of capital-- its self-oppositions-- I reproduce it here:

But, there are no 'contradictions in capitalism -- unless, of course you are using this word in a new and-as-yet unexplained sense. But, and once more, what is it? You refuse to say.:(

Moreover, by the time Marx came to write Das Kapital, he had abandoned this idea, content to merely "coquette" with this word.

So, no Marxist should be interested in your mystical version of Das Kapital, least of all us genuine materialists.


Marx states clearly in the preface to the 2nd edition that he uses dialectic, his dialectic is the opposite of Hegel's; his dialectic has extracted the rational kernel; the capital's cycles are the product of its inherent contradictions.

Well, as you have had pointed out to you before: one can't get more opposite to Hegel than to reject him root and branch, which is what he did in Das Kapital -- as he tells us.


The question you are really asking is what does Marx consider to be the inherent contradictions of capital?

None at all, since he abandoned the idea.

There now follows the gazillionth repetition of the Dialectical Mantra that traditionalist have been inflicting on the workers' movement for over a hundred years (not noticing that workers in their billions ignore them -- no prizes for guessing why!).


1. The primary, genetic, inherent, contradiction is the social relation of production established between wage-labor and capital. Each exists in the organization of the other. Capital represents the accumulated, dead labor, of the laborers, which stands in opposition to them in the very process of production. As capital develops it expands this relation with wage-labor, but it is not just any sort of expansion.

But this isn't even a contradiction! Let alone a 'dialectical contradiction', a notion to which this author, like and all you mystics, has simply helped him/herself, without explaining what it means.

No good asking you to help us out, is there -- you too refuse to say.:(


2. Further contradiction developed in Marx's dialectic of industrial capital: For capital to become capital, the means of production must confront the laborer in a specific condition -- that condition requires that means of production exist as private property; those means of production organized as private property have to be exchanged, have to be animated by labor organized as wage-labor. This is a social organization of labor, requiring the detachment, the dispossession of labor from the means of its own subsistence. So with labor organized as living wage labor creating exchange value, the capitalists, the owners of the private property expropriate the surplus value, expanding the means of production, their private property, which now stands in opposition to the "free" dispossessed laborers-- commanding their labor. Dead labor confronts living labor as its master.

Oh dear, this too isn't even a contradiction -- unless, of course you can tell us exactly why it is one. [Ha, some hope!]

2/2 duds so far. Not a good start.


3. Further contradiction of capital as developed in Marx's dialectic: As expropriated value, value organized as private property, the articles so produced can have no immediate, direct use for the owners. Their is no value, no profit, realizable in immediate direct consumption by the owners of the objects they own. Consequently the value commanded by private property, by dead labor over living labor, has to establish itself, realize itself in the market of exchange with all other objects so produced, which gets us to...

4. The single-cell "organism" of contradiction in Marx's dialectic of industrial capitalism-- the commodity; the dual nature of the commodity. Use-value and exchange-value; both exist in the organization of the other under capitalism. With out establishing a use-value in the market, without satisfying the need of someone else, the commodity cannot realize the portion of surplus value contained therein. Without its exchange value, without being able to return a profit, the usefulness of the object is of no consequence. Production stops. The commodities are destroyed, warehoused, stock-piled, retired.

Right now, US railroads have approximately 25% of their freight car fleets in storage. Each of these cars is a useful article, but the use of these cars will not provide a profit, as the overall decline in the profitability of the economy means their is no need, no use for the usefulness of the cars.

About 14% of the world's commercial jet aviation fleet is also in storage in desert areas for similar reason.

Milk has been dumped in both Europe and the US due to overproduction. Has the useful nature of milk declined? Is there less poverty, less malnutrition suddenly? No, there's more poverty recently. But the use value is of no consequence as the production of milk cannot realize, cannot actually obtain a portion of the socially available surplus value in the markets needed to support the reproduction of milk as commodity capital.

Consider also, production of objects that can't find a use. It doesn't matter how much of the time spent in producing those articles is surplus labor time. None of it will be realized.

5. A further contradiction in the development of capitalism as analyzed in Marx's dialectic: the conflict between the means and relations of production. Capital to be capital means the realization of expanded value. To realize more value in the market, or rather, capital must not only command, aggrandize, exploit labor-power, it must command, aggrandize, exploit labor-power through its relative reduction in production. It must expel labor from the production process, relatively, at the same time as it demands greater access to "free" dispossessed labor.

Consequently the technical component, the "dead" labor of capital increases, and as it increases the overproduction of capital increases-- the very organization of the means of production as private property which so propels capital to hurry to the markets to realize surplus value; that drives capitalist production to employ ever greater more extensive more efficient means of production, (which are of course the accumulated value now brought back into production to yield more accumulated value) entails that the more capital exchanges itself with wage-labor, the relatively less it is exchanging of itself with wage-labor. Thus capital is "overproduced." The rate of profit declines, and its decline is precipitated by the very same relation that heralded capital's expansion. The means of production have outgrown their organization as private property, producing for exchange. To emancipate those means of production however requires the abolition of wage-labor. The class of wage-laborers in overthrowing the class relation that binds them to dead-labor initiates the process of overcoming its own organization as wage-laborers. I guess if you want to, you could call wage-labor the negation, and this overthrow of the totality of the social relation called capital, the negation of that negation. I don't, because I don't particularly like the phrase.

6. Throughout the body of Marx's work, extending beyond any of the remarks in any of the prefaces; in both publish and unpublished works, Marx refers to capital as "contradiction in motion." He is not kidding. In volume 2, he shows the simultaneous yet oppositional movements of capital reproduction inherent in the turnovers of fixed capital and circulating capital. In vol 3 he shows the origin and development of the decline in the rate of profit, and its impact on capitalist production as a whole. "

I have lumped these together to save having to say the same thing over an over: While I looked as hard as could, I couldn't see a single contradiction in there anywhere.

No wonder, then, that Marx told us he was merely "coquetting" with this word in Das Kapital.

So, the fairy story you mystics have been telling since the 1880s hasn't improved with age.

6/6 duds then.


Those are my answers to the critical question of what constitutes the contradictions of capital-- the oppositions generated to its very existence, its very success by its very existence and by its very success-- as analyzed by Marx.

But why are these 'contradictions'? You keep forgetting to tell us. :(


For Rosa, all this is just so much immaterial immaterial as her pseudo-Marxism is in fact a gigantic step backward from Marx-- a step back into philosophy which Marx, extracting the rational kernel from Hegel really put an end to; just as his analysis of capital puts an end to political economy [I personally get almost a big a laugh out of those pretending to be "Marxist political economists," as I do out of those claiming to be "Marxist philosophers-- whether they claim to be philosophers of dialectical materialism, or philo-sophisters like our Rosa.

Well you keep repeating things like this, but, alas, you also keep forgetting to provide the proof.

Just one published quotation from Marx (in Das Kapital, or later) that tells us his dialectic contains these Hegelian terms-of-art (upside down or the 'right way up') will shut me up.

Why can't you find one? It must be so frustrating for emotional mystics like you not be able to do so.

After all, it's about time someone put me in my place. Too bad you do not seem up to the task; your rhetoric is not too hot, too!


So-- did Aristotle, Kant, the Scottish materialists utilize, work with "dialectics"? Sure they did, as a matter of fact, we might say they coquetted with dialectics. Marx says Hegel was the first to give dialectic its comprehensive, conscious expression. Rosa twists that into language that would make Milton Friedman, David Stockman, George Gilder, and the other sophist-philosophers of wealth as poverty proud to be at her dinner table.

In fact Marx said the following about Hegel:


The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

Now, as Marx well knew, the Scottish Materialists (and Aristotle) discovered the historical materialist method, so that is why he said this: "The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner", since that is not what prevents Hegel being the first here. What prevents him being the first is the fact that others had been there before him!

What Hegel did was to appropriate this older dialectic and mystify it. So, when the mystical stuff has been removed, the rational kernel amounts to nothing more than the core theory found in Aristotle, Kant and the Scottish School.

I'm surprised you need me to tell you this. It has been known on the left since at least the 1920s (first aired in an article by Roy Pascal, as far as I am aware).

In order to upgrade your defective knowledge in this area, 'comrade' Artesian, may I suggest you check these links out, where I give the details:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1195129&postcount=57

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1356284&postcount=68


Where does Marx ever say he abandoned Hegel for the Scottish materialists? For Kant? No place.

Once more, check the above out for the answer.


So Rosa, back to the question-- is it your contention that Marx in his analysis of the contradictions of capital; in his analysis of the antagonisms of capital, which are self-generated, and both propel and limit its expansion; in his analysis of the social relation of production that comes into conflict with the very growth of the means of production it compels, is NOT analyzing a contradiction? Marx does not believe these oppositions to be contradictions? Marx does not think capital has any contradictions internal to its very existence?

I was wondering when you'd get back on topic!

I've already told you what I think; can I take it then that the above comment indicates you want me to repeat myself yet again?

Ok, just for you, since you are so cute: http://freesmileyface.net/smiley/Love/love-085.gif


My contention is not that the relation between the forces and relations of production do not "play a critical, decisive role in the development and potential for the overthrow of capitalism", when plainly they do. My contention is that this relation cannot be called contradiction, unless the word "contradiction" is being used in a new and as-yet-unexplained sense.

No wonder Marx felt he had to "coquette" with it.

Now, if you, my dear mystic, had read what I have written on this in my essays, before shooting from the hip, you'd have seen that I say this many times -- even clearly enough for one as confused as you are to see.

Moreover, you have also been told many times, but you continue to ignore this, that I fully accept historical materialism.

In short, these are not contradictions to begin with, so there is no need for Marx to 'analyse' them.

And nor did he -- since, as he himself tells us, he was "coquetting" with this word.

I'm sorry if I haven't told you this before...:(

[S.Artesian]

Oh Rosa, you are pathetic. Marx doesn't say that the Scottish materialists have replaced Hegel, or provided a dialectic to counter the dialectic as Marx demonstrates it-- he says they've provided the first cracks at writing an actual material history of society, which is exactly parallel the Marx's "positive" comments on the physiocrats; Marx's positive comments on Ricardo for grasping, in part, surplus value; etc. etc.

You truly are an ignoramus-- the elements I laid out are the elements of Marx's analysis of the contradictions of capital-- contradictions that he explores prior to during and after vol 1 of Capital.

Vol 1, by Marx's own admission, examines capital only in a restricted manifestation-- that of simple accumulation, simple reproduction. It is the latter part of vol 2 and into vol 3 that Marx moves into expanded reproduction, the total process of accumulation on the expanding basis.

Marx states in his preface to the first edition of vol 1 that "The work, the first volume which I now submit to the public, forms the continuation of my "Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie" [A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy] published in 1859."

Capital Vol 1 is a continuation of that earlier work, and itself an exploration that will require subsequent volumes of and for elaboration. Marx doesn't present vol 1 as complete unto itself, as separate and apart from any of his previous [or later] work, and it is certainly not separate from the notebooks he filled developing his analysis.

Marx talks of his attempts to "popularize" his discussion of the substance and magnitude of value. He explains how difficult it is to grasp the essence of the value form [and he specifically identifies the commodity, the value form of the commodity as the economic "cell" of capital].

With the exception of that section on the commodity and value, Marx says vol 1 cannot be accused of being difficult. Exactly. Vol 1 is not the magnum opus of his work-- it is essentially the first volume to the magnum opus of his work that had been going even before vol 1 appeared.

Now what puts the means and relations of production into dialectical contradiction with each other according to the magnum opus which is all of Marx's work?-- Just this:

1. Capital is defined by its social relation; it is the means of production organized as private property owned by a class; its is the stripping bare of labor so that labor now confronts the condition of its own existence as belonging to someone, some class, other than itself. Capital and wage-labor each exist only in the organization of the other.

2. The capitalist can accumulate value only through the exchange of the means of production with that wage, living, labor. Labor finds it has no use for itself other than its value in exchange for the means of subsistence.

3. To aggrandize more value, to valorise production, the capitalist has to reduce the labor time necessary for the worker to reproduce values equivalent to his or her means of subsistence, or reduce the time necessary for the production of the means of subsistence themselves, or in some circumstances reduce wages below the level required for subsistence. In any and all cases, the capitalist has to appropriate more surplus value, and continuously drive the cost of production below the price of production.

4. To do that, the capitalist must replace living labor by accumulated labor, by introducing more efficient, more rapid, more "productive" machinery; by increasing the technical components of production relative to the labor component. Thus, the more capital exchanges itself with its identical opposite, with the very "thing" that through its social relation makes it capital, the less, proportionately, relatively,and absolutely it exchanges of itself with labor. Capital overproduces itself as capital, and the very thing that drives its expanded reproduction, the need to aggrandize surplus value, now becomes a restriction to it. This self-generating contradiction is manifested in declining profits, the tendency of the rate of profit to decline, in overproduction.

5. The very expansion of the means of production now runs into the limitation of the very social relation, need,-- the aggrandizement of surplus value, the valorisation process, profit-- that gave it life. That social relation, profit, now finds in that very expanded reproduction, that accumulation, which it must achieve the very obstacle to its own preservation and to further accumulation. Thus the means and relations of production are in dialectical contradiction; the same exchange between labor and property that forces each to drive the expansion of the other becomes obstacle to both.

Now to grasp this-- one has to truly penetrate the value-form-- which is exactly why Marx, in preparing to write Vol 1 remarked how helpful he found Hegel's Science of Logic... which is why Marx maintains that he, Marx, takes Hegel seriously.

And this is the reason why Rosa has absolutely nothing to say about capitalism-- zero, nothing; because she understands nothing of Marx's real magnum opus, which is the alienation, transformation, aggrandizement of social labor as private property, as value.

Anybody truly interested in Marx's dialectic should take the time to read-- no, not the Science of Logic first, but Vols 30, 33, 34 of the Collected works-- his economic manuscripts.

Oh yeah, before I forget-- contradictory: noun: 1. a proposition, assertion, or principle that contradicts another; adjective: (2) of opposite, character or tendency, diametrically opposed, contrary. Oxford English Dictionary.

Example: Capital is a contradictory system-- with the very same mechanism for its expansion producing the diametric opposite of expansion, contraction; with the very method for increasing the accumulation of wealth becoming the limit to, and destruction of, that wealth..

Please provide your definition of historical materialism, and your analysis of the relationship of capital to wage-labor.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


Oh Rosa, you are pathetic. Marx doesn't say that the Scottish materialists have replaced Hegel, or provided a dialectic to counter the dialectic as Marx demonstrates it-- he says they've provided the first cracks at writing an actual material history of society, which is exactly parallel the Marx's "positive" comments on the physiocrats; Marx's positive comments on Ricardo for grasping, in part, surplus value; etc. etc.

Where did I say that Marx claimed this: "the Scottish materialists have replaced Hegel, or provided a dialectic to counter the dialectic as Marx demonstrates it"?

What I have done is show that Marx rejected Hegel, and I then inferred that he had reverted to the rational version of Historical Materialism which he, not me, attributes to the Scottish School, and to Aristotle.

Once more, you can find my reasoning in the threads I linked to above.

Now you need to address this, not invent stuff to put in my mouth.

The following now shows how desperate you are becoming, since it is clear that you are once again substituting abuse for proof:


You truly are an ignoramus-- the elements I laid out are the elements of Marx's analysis of the contradictions of capital -- contradictions that he explores prior to during and after vol 1 of Capital.

Vol 1, by Marx's own admission, examines capital only in a restricted manifestation-- that of simple accumulation, simple reproduction. It is the latter part of vol 2 and into vol 3 that Marx moves into expanded reproduction, the total process of accumulation on the expanding basis.

Except, he told us he was merely "coquetting" with this word. That makes you an even bigger 'ignoramus' than I will ever be.:)


Marx states in his preface to the first edition of vol 1 that "The work, the first volume which I now submit to the public, forms the continuation of my "Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie" [A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy] published in 1859."

But, whatever happened to Marx's thought between this and his publishing Das Kapital, it clearly induced him into rejecting every last trace of Hegel.

Oh dear! Here follows yet another repetitive outline of the traditional, mystical version of Marx's work we have all heard a gazillion times (do try to stay awake at the back!):


Capital Vol 1 is a continuation of that earlier work, and itself an exploration that will require subsequent volumes of and for elaboration. Marx doesn't present vol 1 as complete unto itself, as separate and apart from any of his previous [or later] work, and it is certainly not separate from the notebooks he filled developing his analysis.

Marx talks of his attempts to "popularize" his discussion of the substance and magnitude of value. He explains how difficult it is to grasp the essence of the value form [and he specifically identifies the commodity, the value form of the commodity as the economic "cell" of capital].

With the exception of that section on the commodity and value, Marx says vol 1 cannot be accused of being difficult. Exactly. Vol 1 is not the magnum opus of his work-- it is essentially the first volume to the magnum opus of his work that had been going even before vol 1 appeared.

Now what puts the means and relations of production into dialectical contradiction with each other according to the magnum opus which is all of Marx's work?-- Just this:

1. Capital is defined by its social relation; it is the means of production organized as private property owned by a class; its is the stripping bare of labor so that labor now confronts the condition of its own existence as belonging to someone, some class, other than itself. Capital and wage-labor each exist only in the organization of the other.

2. The capitalist can accumulate value only through the exchange of the means of production with that wage, living, labor. Labor finds it has no use for itself other than its value in exchange for the means of subsistence.

3. To aggrandize more value, to valorise production, the capitalist has to reduce the labor time necessary for the worker to reproduce values equivalent to his or her means of subsistence, or reduce the time necessary for the production of the means of subsistence themselves, or in some circumstances reduce wages below the level required for subsistence. In any and all cases, the capitalist has to appropriate more surplus value, and continuously drive the cost of production below the price of production.

4. To do that, the capitalist must replace living labor by accumulated labor, by introducing more efficient, more rapid, more "productive" machinery; by increasing the technical components of production relative to the labor component. Thus, the more capital exchanges itself with its identical opposite, with the very "thing" that through its social relation makes it capital, the less, proportionately, relatively, and absolutely it exchanges of itself with labor. Capital overproduces itself as capital, and the very thing that drives its expanded reproduction, the need to aggrandize surplus value, now becomes a restriction to it. This self-generating contradiction is manifested in declining profits, the tendency of the rate of profit to decline, in overproduction.

5. The very expansion of the means of production now runs into the limitation of the very social relation, need,-- the aggrandizement of surplus value, the valorisation process, profit-- that gave it life. That social relation, profit, now finds in that very expanded reproduction, that accumulation, which it must achieve the very obstacle to its own preservation and to further accumulation. Thus the means and relations of production are in dialectical contradiction; the same exchange between labor and property that forces each to drive the expansion of the other becomes obstacle to both.

['Please, no more of this! I want to hang onto my lunch a bit longer...]

And yet, you are still helping yourself to a phrase ("dialectical contradiction") that you have yet to explain (but see below).

We are beginning to think you can't...:(


Now to grasp this-- one has to truly penetrate the value-form-- which is exactly why Marx, in preparing to write Vol 1 remarked how helpful he found Hegel's Science of Logic... which is why Marx maintains that he, Marx, takes Hegel seriously.

Where does he say he "takes Hegel seriously" in Das Kapital? In fact, he indicated the exact opposite, when he told us he was merely "coquetting" with some of Hegel's jargon.

Unless, of course, you think that Marx thought that "to coquette" really means "to take seriously"? :lol:

Still addressing your by now non-existent audience (even Red Cat has deserted you!), and not me, I see:


And this is the reason why Rosa has absolutely nothing to say about capitalism-- zero, nothing; because she understands nothing of Marx's real magnum opus, which is the alienation, transformation, aggrandizement of social labor as private property, as value.

Maybe so, maybe not, but at least I am not trying to rehabilitate the work of an incomprehensible mystic, whose ideas no one can explain (least of all you!), in an attempt to breath life into a 'theory' that has presided over little other than long-term and extensive failure.


Anybody truly interested in Marx's dialectic should take the time to read-- no, not the Science of Logic first, but Vols 30, 33, 34 of the Collected works-- his economic manuscripts.

Which, alas for you, Marx chose not to publish.


Oh yeah, before I forget-- contradictory: noun: 1. a proposition, assertion, or principle that contradicts another; adjective: (2) of opposite, character or tendency, diametrically opposed, contrary. Oxford English Dictionary.

But, as I have pointed out to other comrades who have tried to quote various dictionaries at us:


To be sure, one online dictionary (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/contradiction) says the following sort of thing:

"contradiction, n 1: opposition between two conflicting forces or ideas..."

However, it is worth recalling that dictionaries are repositories of usage, and are neither normative nor prescriptive. Here, this dictionary is clearly recording the dialectical use of this word, after the invention of dialectics. That does not imply that this word means anything when used this way. It also defines the word "Nirvana" --, but which materialist wants to admit that that word actually means/refers to anything (that is, apart from its emotional import)?

Indeed, they 'define' many things dialecticians would disagree with. For example:

"God: A being conceived as the perfect, omnipotent, omniscient originator and ruler of the universe, the principal object of faith and worship in monotheistic religions.

"The force, effect, or a manifestation or aspect of this being.

"A being of supernatural powers or attributes, believed in and worshiped by a people, especially a male deity thought to control some part of nature or reality.

"An image of a supernatural being; an idol.

"One that is worshiped, idealized, or followed: Money was their god...."

And (http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negation):

"negation n 1: a negative statement; a statement that is a refusal or denial of some other statement 2: the speech act of negating 3: (logic) a proposition that is true if and only if another proposition is false."

No mention here of "sublation" or the 'negation of the negation' here, but does that force dialecticians into accepting this 'definition'? Of course not; they pick and choose when it suits them.

Consider, too, the definition of "wage":

"1. Payment for labour or services to a worker, especially remuneration on an hourly, daily, or weekly basis or by the piece.

"2. wages Economics The portion of the national product that represents the aggregate paid for all contributing labour and services as distinguished from the portion retained by management or reinvested in capital goods.

"3. A fitting return; a recompense." [Quoted from here (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/wage); spelling altered to conform to UK English.]

"An amount of money paid to a worker for a specified quantity of work, usually expressed on an hourly basis." [Quoted from here (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/wage); spelling altered to conform to UK English.]

Are there any Marxists who would accept this definition of what wages really are?

Hence, dictionaries record ideology as much as they record use or meaning.

With respect to "contradiction", the writers of the first dictionary have plainly recorded the animistic use of this word employed by dialectical mystics.

Moreover, as this shows (http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_02.htm), since no literal sense can be made of the equation of forces and contradictions, dialecticians should not believe all they read in dictionaries (or Thesauruses).

And, of course, Marx told us that the two 'halves' of a 'contradiction' "mutually exclude" one another, in which case they cannot co-exist. But that implies that the relations of production cannot co-exist with the forces of productions! This, in turn, implies that they cannot 'contradict' one another.

On the other hand, if they do co-exist, then they cannot mutually exclude one another, as Marx alleged. Either way, this term cannot be being used literally. But, if not, what sense does it have?

You are silent on the issue.

No wonder then that Marx found he had to "coquette" with this word.

And, even if the above definition were acceptable (which it isn't), it still does not tell us what a 'dialectical contradiction' is.

Finally, you need to show that both Hegel and Marx used the above dictionaries, and thus meant the same as these dictionaries by their use of that word (and, of course, that both Hegel and Marx used the word in the same way, all the while ignoring the fact that Marx said he was just "coquetting" with it anyway!).


Example: Capital is a contradictory system-- with the very same mechanism for its expansion producing the diametric opposite of expansion, contraction; with the very method for increasing the accumulation of wealth becoming the limit to, and destruction of, that wealth.

But, it can't be, since Marx himself told us that he was merely "coquetting" when he used this word.


Please provide your definition of historical materialism, and your analysis of the relationship of capital to wage-labor.

I will when I have finished my project (in about ten years' time).

You will just have to wait for that historic day...

[S.Artesian]

You really are ignorant of Marx. Truly. You have never read vols 2,3 of Capital. Never read TSV. You have never read the economic manuscripts.

What a fraud you are to deny that Marx analyzed capital as the expropriation of living labor, as capital being nothing other than the reverse identity, the complementary opposite, of wage-labor.

You have exposed your own ignorance to a degree that exceeds even my expectations.

You actually state that the very mechanism by which capital expands, accumulates cannot cause its contraction, its "dis-accumulation." And you claim Marx as the source for such ignorance. You're stupider than you imagine, but not stupider than I suspected.

That anyone takes you seriously as a Marxist is an indication of how far the working class has been forced to retreat in this era.

You are engaged in nothing more than the continuous disavowal of reality-- there's a term for that pathology-- psychosis.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

'Comrade' Artesian:


You really are ignorant of Marx. Truly. You have never read vols 2,3 of Capital. Never read TSV. You have never read the economic manuscripts.

1) You keep saying things like this, but ignore my replies: I have been reading and studying Marx since the mid-1970s. While I can't claim to have read every single page of the 50 volume Collected Works on my shelves, there is little in there I haven't read and/or studied.

2) Marx did not publish volumes 2 and 3 of Das Kapital, Engels did, and he had an axe to grind. Nor did Marx publish TSV, or the 'economic manuscripts'.

3) But even if he had, there is nothing in these volumes that supports your attempt to rehabilitate that logical incompetent, Hegel -- if there were, you'd have rubbed my face in it by now.

4) You have been told this several times, so please, can we move on?

Now, instead of perseverating on unpublished works, you'd be far better off concentrating on his published work (contemporaneous to Das Kapital or later), where it is plain that Marx waved goodbye to that mystic, and fell back on the rational core of the dialectic laid down in Aristotle, Kant, Ferguson, Millar, Robertson, Smith and Stewart.

Just as you'd be far better occupied in trying to tell us what a 'dialectical contradiction' is -- and for the first time in 200 years, so good luck on that one!


What a fraud you are to deny that Marx analyzed capital as the expropriation of living labor, as capital being nothing other than the reverse identity, the complementary opposite, of wage-labor.

Where did I deny this? What I did deny was that it is a contradiction. You have yet to show it is.:(

So, far from it being the case that I am a 'fraud', it's quite clear you are a bare-faced liar.

And it's also plain why you have to lie: you can't respond effectively to the points I have made. So, you just repeat the same tired old points (for the nth time) and put words in my mouth that I haven't said, nor which can reasonably be inferred from what I have said.


You have exposed your own ignorance to a degree that exceeds even my expectations.

10/10 for baseless accusation; 0/10 for proof.


You actually state that the very mechanism by which capital expands, accumulates cannot cause its contraction, its "dis-accumulation." And you claim Marx as the source for such ignorance. You're stupider than you imagine, but not stupider than I suspected.

Where do I say this?

Yet another lie.

I just refuse to call it a 'contradiction', and you have yet to show it is one.

On the contrary, I'm quite happy with causal talk.


That anyone takes you seriously as a Marxist is an indication of how far the working class has been forced to retreat in this era.

You are engaged in nothing more than the continuous disavowal of reality-- there's a term for that pathology-- psychosis.

Oh so emotional!

But, thanks for conforming to the stereotype of a dialectical mystic:


All this explains why, to each DM-acolyte, the dialectic is so personal, and so intimately their own possession, and why you can almost feel their hurt when it is comprehensively trashed, as it has been here.

Hence, any attack on this 'precious jewel' is an attack on the revolutionary ego itself, and must be resisted with all the bile at its command.

And that explains, too, all the abuse you will get if you think to challenge the dialectical doctrines of a single one of these Hermetic Head Cases.

From here:

http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2009_02.htm

Where I explain why you mystics are all emotional, irrational and abusive -- and little else.

And we are still waiting to be told what a 'dialectical contradiction' is. Perhaps you need more time; after all, you Hermeticists have only had 200 years to do this....:rolleyes: