is this a legitimate argument for determinism?

[redcannon]

I've been having trouble with determinism, but an idea comes to mind.

Human beings exist in four dimensions: 3 physical and 1 temporal (which is time.) However, we can only view time as a straight line because we lack the ability to exist in 5 dimensions. According to what I've heard, existing in 5 dimensions would allow humans to view time as a line (or circle, or what have you) and we could see ourselves as infants and ourselves as elderly adults by looking up and down this line. Thus, we could see our future if we had the capacity to view the universe as having more dimensions than we currently can.

But because this is all physically true (that is, confirmed by science) doesn't that mean that hard determinism is correct, and that we do not have free will at all? Rather, doesn't it mean that free will is an illusion created by our inability to see time as anything other that a straight line moving in one direction? Because if I can see my future, then the future has been pre-determined by the past (and causal events).

I just have a hard time accepting determinism to be true because I honestly don't like the idea of it.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, plainly the word 'determinism' was derived from the word 'determine', which has untoward idealist implications if it is used to depict processes in the inanimate world.

In that case 'determinism' can only seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised.

[The same goes for indeterminism, too.]

I have spelt the details out in earlier threads:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/freedom-state-mind-t56836/index.html?t=56836

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2

And the theories you refer to all depend on the reification of some rather abstruse mathematics, so you can take them with a pinch of salt.

[kiki75]

But because this is all physically true (that is, confirmed by science) doesn't that mean that hard determinism is correct, and that we do not have free will at all? Rather, doesn't it mean that free will is an illusion created by our inability to see time as anything other that a straight line moving in one direction? Because if I can see my future, then the future has been pre-determined by the past (and causal events).

The future you you'd be seeing is the you if you continued along the current path. But, if you make different choices, the future you changes.

I don't believe that. I believe something far weirder, maybe. But, in my experience, any talk of ppl in dimensions usually deals with that concept. The concept of free will is not negated by the ability to see your future self. It's not an issue of predetermination. It's a matter of things continuing along the same path/course of action. Consequences and natural progression.

Maybe I expressed that how I thought it. lol

[Revolutionary Youth]

This argument is too vague, I think I should demand more evidence, any graph or equation?

[WhitemageofDOOM]

Human beings exist in four dimensions: 3 physical and 1 temporal (which is time.) However, we can only view time as a straight line because we lack the ability to exist in 5 dimensions. According to what I've heard, existing in 5 dimensions would allow humans to view time as a line (or circle, or what have you) and we could see ourselves as infants and ourselves as elderly adults by looking up and down this line. Thus, we could see our future if we had the capacity to view the universe as having more dimensions than we currently can.

But because this is all physically true (that is, confirmed by science) doesn't that mean that hard determinism is correct

This is -not- physically true. Time is -not- a dimension, when physics talks of 4+ dimensions they literally mean 4+ spacial dimensions.
Time/Space doesn't mean that time is a spacial dimension, but that time and space are the same thing.(basically, but I'm not a relativity guy so someone better learned can correct me/explain more.)

Then there's quantum mechanics, which shows the universe to be probabilistic not deterministic.


and that we do not have free will at all? Rather, doesn't it mean that free will is an illusion created by our inability to seeFree will is still an illusion however. Decision making happens in the brain, which follows the laws of physics. At no point does decision making somehow become unattached from your past experiences and your biology. And if we have freewill our actions would then be indistinguishable from being purely random.

[redcannon]

yes, QM does throw a lot of things in the face of philosophy. Now that I remember it if we were to exist in 6 dimensions we would view all 3 physical dimensions as a single point, and we would see all possible future events as a line, which means that, in my mind, determinism might just be a fallacy. Or perhaps I have it to close to fatalism?

What does determinism mean in dialectical materialism? To what extent is the universe determinist according to Marx?

[Hit The North]

We have no way of knowing "[t]o what extent the universe is determinist according to Marx" as he didn't speculate on these matters. His work is purely concerned with society and its history. In this matter, he argued in several places that we are determined by our society and our history to an extent.


In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness. K. Marx Preface to "The Critique of Political Economy" http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface-abs.htm


What is society, irrespective of its form? The product of man's interaction upon man. Is man free to choose this or that form of society? By no means. If you assume a given state of development of man's productive faculties, you will have a corresponding form of commerce and consumption. If you assume given stages of development in production, commerce or consumption, you will have a corresponding form of social constitution, a corresponding organisation, whether of the family, of the estates or of the classes—in a word, a corresponding civil society. If you assume this or that civil society, you will have this or that political system, which is but the official expression of civil society... Needless to say, man is not free to choose his productive forces—upon which his whole history is based—for every productive force is an acquired force, the product of previous activity. Thus the productive forces are the result of man's practical energy, but that energy is in turn circumscribed by the conditions in which man is placed by the productive forces already acquired, by the form of society which exists before him, which he does not create, which is the product of the preceding generation. The simple fact that every succeeding generation finds productive forces acquired by the preceding generation and which serve it as the raw material of further production, engenders a relatedness in the history of man, engenders a history of mankind, which is all the more a history of mankind as man's productive forces, and hence his social relations, have expanded.
K. Marx, Letter to Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1846/letters/46_12_28.htm


"Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like an Alp on the brains of the living...." K. Marx, 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/subject/hist-mat/18-brum/ch01.htm

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Well, plainly the word 'determinism' was derived from the word 'determine', which has untoward idealist implications if it is used to depict processes in the inanimate world.

In that case 'determinism' can only seem to work if nature is anthropomorphised.

[The same goes for indeterminism, too.]

I have spelt the details out in earlier threads:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/freedom-state-mind-t56836/index.html?t=56836

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=894937&postcount=2

And the theories you refer to all depend on the reification of some rather abstruse mathematics, so you can take them with a pinch of salt.

I still don't understand how determinism anthropomorphises nature, and, if it does, that makes it false. You can change the language of it to the following.

P1: Everything that happens we could have predicted if we knew everything about the universe.
P2: If everything is predictable, all outcomes that occur are necessarily going to occur.
C: Everything that happens could not have "not" happened.

P1: Everything that happens could not have "not" happened.
P2: We can't influence outcomes.
C: We do not have free will.

This argument isn't as strong as an argument that relies on causes, and it does implicitly rely on them in P1 of the first argument. However, if causes do not exist, we can still predict things (or still do). If we can't predict things without the concept of causes, then we should adopt them for the sake of practicality (Hume, Carnap).

Maybe I'm a lost cause on your reasoning, Rosa. We used to debate this before and I never got anywhere. I honestly don't understand your argument (in and of itself). That is probably my fault, though.

If "determinism can't be true because it anthropomorphises nature" is your argument, is it possible for you to break that down into underlying premises? It seems to me that you must be implying something by the sentence, but I can't determine what it is.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Notice that you have swiched from 'causes determine their effects' (anthropomorphism) to 'we determine what will happen from the laws we have constructed' (inferentialism).

Now, if you want to turn this into an epistemologcal theory, fine, but many (perhaps you?) want to go further, and attribute to nature 'determining' or 'necessitating' causes.

[Your wording suggests that this is indeed what you intend: "all outcomes that occur are necessarily going to occur."]

But, if you do want to do that, then you must, of necessity (nice irony here!) slip back into the anthropomorphic camp.


If "determinism can't be true because it anthropomorphises nature" is your argument, is it possible for you to break that down into underlying premises? It seems to me that you must be implying something by the sentence, but I can't determine what it is.

I have done so in some of the posts I linked to.

But notice, I have never said this:


"determinism can't be true because it anthropomorphises nature"

Determinism in fact makes no sense, hence it is not capable of being true or false.

It does not make it that far.

By the way these arguments are shot through with equivocation (among other things):


P1: Everything that happens we could have predicted if we knew everything about the universe.
P2: If everything is predictable, all outcomes that occur are necessarily going to occur.
C: Everything that happens could not have "not" happened.

P1: Everything that happens could not have "not" happened.
P2: We can't influence outcomes.
C: We do not have free will.

[benhur]

Interesting topic.



P1: Everything that happens we could have predicted if we knew everything about the universe.
P2: If everything is predictable, all outcomes that occur are necessarily going to occur.
C: Everything that happens could not have "not" happened.


Every event can lead to an infinite number of outcomes. And all these possible outcomes DO occur in alternate timelines. If you toss a coin and get tails, suffice it to say you've have gotten heads in another timeline (and any other possible outcomes).



P1: Everything that happens could not have "not" happened.
P2: We can't influence outcomes.
C: We do not have free will.


We do have free will, which determines some of these outcomes. These outcomes occur in different quantum realities.

[WhitemageofDOOM]

Every event can lead to an infinite number of outcomes. And all these possible outcomes DO occur in alternate timelines. If you toss a coin and get tails, suffice it to say you've have gotten heads in another timeline (and any other possible outcomes).

Only in the multiple world hypothesis, i be an objective collapse man here. And it's not coin flips, it's every possible permutation of a particles position, which is a lot more than just coin flips and decisions.


We do have free will, which determines some of these outcomes. These outcomes occur in different quantum realities.

Ummm the multible world hypothesis by definition denies free will, since every possible outcome happens. And that means you always make every possible choice you could have made each moment.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

^^^I see you two guys are trapped inside the traditional way of tackling this pseudo-problem.

[Cumannach]

I heard an argument about this, can't remember where. It was just about free will. Basically; free will just means you don't know what you're going to do next or at every instant in the future. If your immediate actions are determined 'deterministically' by the exact physical state and energy of the atoms etc that make up your brain at some instant, it only follows that you don't have free will IF you're able to calculate the outcome of all your neural activity viz a viz the atoms etc. which will result in you making some decision 'wilfully'.

So determinism doesn't imply a lack of free will.

I don't know if that's right, but thought it was interesting.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cumannach:


Basically; free will just means you don't know what you're going to do next or at every instant in the future.

That can't be right, since the vast majority of us do know what we are going to do next.

[benhur]

Only in the multiple world hypothesis, i be an objective collapse man here. And it's not coin flips, it's every possible permutation of a particles position, which is a lot more than just coin flips and decisions.



Ummm the multible world hypothesis by definition denies free will, since every possible outcome happens. And that means you always make every possible choice you could have made each moment.

The two statements contradict each other.

[benhur]

Cumannach:



That can't be right, since the vast majority of us do know what we are going to do next.

I do. You're going to flame.;) That's a constant in all quantum realities, lol.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


I do. You're going to flame

Even if I were, dialectics couldn't account for it.

[peaccenicked]

"Determinism" has to be understood historically. Pour Marx he understood it in the future tense. One has to determine the difference between the "realm of necessity" and the "realm of freedom" . The dialectical transition of opposites. Without that context "determinism" is left at the level of empiricism. Sticking to the facts now rather than considering their most probable trajectory.


On a personal note one of my friends, committed suicide last night. I am very upset.
I will take some time off from Revleft.

[ZeroNowhere]

We do have free will, which determines some of these outcomes.
Prove it. Where does this 'free will' come from? It surely must be a part of the brain, but it's obviously hiding somewhere.


Every event can lead to an infinite number of outcomes. And all these possible outcomes DO occur in alternate timelines. If you toss a coin and get tails, suffice it to say you've have gotten heads in another timeline (and any other possible outcomes).
Prove it.

[Cumannach]

Cumannach:



That can't be right, since the vast majority of us do know what we are going to do next.

What (I think) I meant was, like, you're about to make a decision and you're thinking it through, say, "Will I wear this coat or this jacket today, this one or that one?" Then at last you decide to wear the jacket.

If, if it were possible for someone the day before to have noted down all the properties of the neurons and fibres and energy and atoms in your brain and all the physical properties of the material objects that you were going to come into contact with before the next morning, and write it all down in equations and solve it to find out what you would do in the morning, including what clothes you would pick, that person could have given you an envelope with a piece of paper in it on which was written what decisions you would make in the morning for example, that you would pick the jacket. (So long as giving you the envelope didn't upset the equation so much that it would effect the outcome of your decision about the jacket or so long as something else is done to compensate if it does.)

After you've decided to wear the jacket that morning, you open the envelope and read "You will have picked the jacket." Now when you were making the decision in your head about what to wear it seemed like you had free will and could choose either jacket or coat, but in fact, it was materially determined you would choose the jacket.

But it all depends on whether or not such a calculation is possible. A materialist theory doesn't neccesarily mean it's possible to make such a calculation. At least that's how I think the argument went, it's complicated stuff.

[Hit The North]

Cumannach:
But it all depends on whether or not such a calculation is possible.Such a calculation is not possible. Moreover it is not possible to determine whether "all the properties of the neurons and fibres and energy and atoms in your brain and all the physical properties of the material objects that you were going to come into contact with before the next morning" are the determining factors in the choice of either coat or jacket.

The most obvious material determinant of whether our hero chooses to wear a jacket or a coat is the weather which prevails that morning. If we don't allow for the idea that people are capable of reading the conditions in which they find themselves and selecting options from a menu of choices, then we present human beings as automatons, incapable of creative or rational behaviour. In that respect our model of humanity will diverge radically from the one held by Marx. With that, our politics will collapse into fatalism: 'Fuck the early morning paper sale! Fuck having that difficult argument with a racist co-worker! Let's wait until the atoms decide the day for revolution.' :rolleyes:

It is this kind of thinking which Marx escaped when he ditched "the old materialism".

[Cumannach]

I'm just being devil's advocate here.

If we had that kind of enormous calculating power, like with a quantum computer or something, the weather would have been part of the calculation like everything else. I don't think that would make human beings incapable of creativity or rational behaviour either. It would just mean that creativity and rationality would be predictable via a huge number crunching calculation.

But like I was saying, there's no neccesity in believing such a calculation is possible. Maybe a calculation to determine a human decision with that kind of accuracy is simply not possible because there's not enough computing power or time in this Universe to make it.

[Dooga Aetrus Blackrazor]

Interesting topic.



Every event can lead to an infinite number of outcomes. And all these possible outcomes DO occur in alternate timelines. If you toss a coin and get tails, suffice it to say you've have gotten heads in another timeline (and any other possible outcomes).



We do have free will, which determines some of these outcomes. These outcomes occur in different quantum realities.

The idea that different "possible worlds" exist is only true if you don't believe in determinism. Your argument is the equivalent of saying "determinism is false because we have free will." You may be right, but it really isn't a strong argument. Determinism itself states that every event can only have one possible outcome.

Take the coin example. If you flip a coin and get heads, the fact that you got heads (assuming you believe in causation) can be attributed to physical factors. The wind influenced the direction of the coin, the force of which you flipped it, et cetera. If you had all this information available, you could predict the coin toss.

Determinism argues that every event has a cause. Because of this fact, everything must be necessarily the case. As a society, we tend to want to explain things. When asked how something can happen without a cause, we usually draw a blank. We have some evidence of scientific events happening without any determinable cause (it seems to be random). However, since we can't really explain how something can happen without a reason (or a cause), we tend to continue believing in causation anyway.

Causation as a concept is incredible weak. Hume destroyed it a long time ago. However, he admitted that we simply can't disregard causation. It is too impractical. In this sense, we are almost obliged to believe in determinism as a result of having adopted it within our particular framework. It may actually be false outside how we analyze the world, but we can't analyze the world any other way.

Back to Rosa's criticism, I think I am doomed to misunderstand it. I imagine Rosa places more importance on language than I do - or dismisses causation itself. Maybe language restricts determinism from being true because it can't be explained in a rational way. I'm not sure.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Dooga:


Back to Rosa's criticism, I think I am doomed to misunderstand it. I imagine Rosa places more importance on language than I do - or dismisses causation itself. Maybe language restricts determinism from being true because it can't be explained in a rational way. I'm not sure.

Well, we all have to use language. So, if someone uses terms that imply the universe is controlled by a Cosmic Will of some sort (i.e., that events are 'determined'), then it should surprise no one if I point this out.

And, it's not as if I am the first to do this; not only did Bertrand Russell point this out, this idea is fundamental to Leibniz's criticism of physical causation (indeed, it led him to invent those 'little minds', the Monads, that ran the universe, and thus were able to determine everything, since they were intelligent, or, rather, they were the product of a super-intelligent 'god').

Russell, B. (1917a), 'On The Notion Of A Cause', in Russell (1917b), pp.132-51.

--------, (1917b), Mysticism And Logic (George Allen & Unwin).

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-causation/

http://www.iep.utm.edu/l/leib-cau.htm

I have posted the following links before (in order to provide the background details), but here they are again:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/l/lawofnat.htm

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/physical-law/cpl-all.pdf

And if you can, get hold of this:

Gallop, D. (1962), 'On Being Determined', Mind 71, pp.181-96,

on which paper I have based most of my own thinking in this area.