why is DM considered a world theory?

[Black Sheep]

why is it a Weltanschauung? (yeh that's what the greek-english dictionary popped) .

edit: i accidentally posted it in philosophy, could a mod move it to learning? thnx

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

There are two interconnected reasons, I think.

1) The founders of this quasi-religion weren't workers; they came from a class that educated their children in the classics and in philosophy. This tradition taught that behind appearances there is a hidden world, accessible to thought alone, which is more real than the material universe we see around us.

This way of seeing things was invented by ideologues of the ruling class, who viewed reality this way. They invented it because if you belong to, benefit from or help run a society which is based on gross inequality, oppression and exploitation, you can keep order in several ways.

The first and most obvious way is through violence. This will work for a time, but it is not only fraught with danger, it is costly and it stifles innovation (among other things).

Another way is to persuade the majority (or a significant section of "opinion formers" and administrators, at least) that the present order either works for their benefit, is ordained of the 'gods', or that it is 'natural' and cannot be fought, reformed or negotiated with.

Hence, a world-view is necessary for the ruling-class to carry on ruling in the same old way. While the content of this ruling ideology may have changed with each change in the mode of production, its form has remained largely the same for thousands of years: Ultimate Truth is ascertainable by thought alone, and it can therefore be imposed on reality dogmatically.

So, these non-worker founders of our movement, who had been educated to believe there was this hidden world that governed everything, looked for principles in that invisible world that told them that change was inevitable, and part of the cosmic order. Enter dialectics, courtesy of the dogmatic ideas of a ruling-class mystic called Hegel.

2) That allowed the founders of this quasi-religion to think of themselves as special, as prophets of the new order, which workers, alas, could not quite grasp because of their defective education and reliance on ordinary language and 'common sense'.

Fortunately, history had predisposed these prophets to ascertain the truth about reality for them, which meant they were their 'naturally-ordained' leaders. That in turn meant these 'leaders' were also teachers of the 'ignorant masses', who could thus legitimately substitute themselves for the unwashed majority -- in 'their own interests', you understand, since the masses were too caught up in 'commodity fetishism' to see the truth for themselves.

And that is why DM is a world-view.

It is also why dialecticians cling on to this theory like grim death (and become very emotional (and abusive!) when it is attacked by yours truly), since it provides them with a source of consolation that, despite outward appearances to the contrary, and because this hidden world tells them that dialectical Marxism will one day be a success, everything is in fact peachy, and nothing in the core theory needs changing -- in spite of the fact that that core theory says everything changes! Hence, it is ossified into a dogma, and imposed on reality. A rather nice unity of opposites for you to ponder.

So, this 'theory' insulates the militant mind from the facts.

In that case:

Dialectics is the sigh of the depressed dialectician, the heart of a heartless world. It is the opiate of the party. The abolition of dialectics as the illusory happiness of the party hack is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.

Unfortunately, these sad characters will need (materialist) workers to rescue them from themselves.

[Charles Xavier]

Dialectical Materialism is not easily understood but it is deadly important to understand, it can be used to argue out things with your boss and his management team who spent years in university.

Basically settles two matters, and I will explain this in a vulgar way

1. The materialism versus Idealism debate, IE matter is primary, there is no higher consciousness or higher force. 2. Everything is interconnected.

And it will explain this.

Its something that once you get it everything will make sense. But its not something that is easy to read, it can be quite a lot to take in some sitting, you have to make an effort to read it. But spend a week reading a Dialectical Materialism book.

Because when you read Marx, Lenin, Engels' other works you are getting the conclusion on Dialectical Material, not the method.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GDII:


Dialectical Materialism is not easily understood but it is deadly important to understand, it can be used to argue out things with your boss and his management team who spent years in university.

!) Bulk Sheep did not request an explanation of this mystical theory, he asked why it's a world-view.

2) It is not possible to understand this 'theory', anyway, since it is a dogmatic system and is based on the mystical musings and logical blunders of Hegel.

Here is yet more dogma, for example:


1. The materialism versus Idealism debate, IE matter is primary, there is no higher consciousness or higher force. 2. Everything is interconnected.

GD:


But spend a week reading a Dialectical Materialism book.

What a waste of a week!:(


Because when you read Marx, Lenin, Engels' other works you are getting the conclusion on Dialectical Material, not the method.

Of course, Marx was not a dialectical materialist, as has been shown here many times.

[benhur]

why is it a Weltanschauung? (yeh that's what the greek-english dictionary popped .

edit: i accidentally posted it in philosophy, could a mod move it to learning? thnx

Isn't the answer self-evident? All life is a process of change, a movement, an evolution, and DM helps us understand the intricacies of such evolution. To us Marxists, it's terribly important that we study DM, or how else are we going to understand social evolution? Without DM to aid us in the study of history, history would be just a list of dates and figures, who did what in which century, and nothing more. With DM, we see history for what it is: a subject that traces the evolution of societies, and the direction in which things are moving, and so forth.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


All life is a process of change, a movement, an evolution, and DM helps us understand the intricacies of such evolution. To us Marxists, it's terribly important that we study DM, or how else are we going to understand social evolution? Without DM to aid us in the study of history, history would be just a list of dates and figures, who did what in which century, and nothing more. With DM, we see history for what it is: a subject that traces the evolution of societies, and the direction in which things are moving, and so forth.

But we don't need dialectics in order to do this: Historical Materialism, which is not an all-embracing, universal 'superscientific theory', as is the case with DM, is quite enough.

[Black Sheep]

another Q, not so off topic..

Does DM itself and its being a world theory has a connection with the democratic centralist structure and organization in the communist party?

[Charles Xavier]

another Q, not so off topic..

Does DM itself and its being a world theory has a connection with the democratic centralist structure and organization in the communist party?

Dialectical Materialism is a science, a methodology of examination and analysis, you can use dialectical materialism to ask whether Democratic Centralism is the best form of organization, is it flexible? Does it evolve and stuff like thats what is can be used for in this case. Its like saying what does chemistry have to do with being a electrician. Well it will explain why electricity conducts and the chemical reactions which occur, but it will not help you wire a house any better.

[Decolonize The Left]

Dialectical Materialism is a science, a methodology of examination and analysis,

Dialectical Materialism cannot be a science as it cannot follow the scientific method.


you can use dialectical materialism to ask whether Democratic Centralism is the best form of organization, is it flexible? Does it evolve and stuff like thats what is can be used for in this case.

Not only is this completely incoherent, but it also contains little, to no, content what-so-ever. Why is a theory needed to ask the question "is it flexible?"

Is my shirt flexible? Whoa... be careful there you dialectical materialist, you might stumble onto the meaning of existence! :rolleyes:


Its like saying what does chemistry have to do with being a electrician. Well it will explain why electricity conducts and the chemical reactions which occur, but it will not help you wire a house any better.

Wrong.

Chemistry actually explains things - it is observable, repeatedly, by any independent observer.
Dialectical materialism, on the other hand, isn't observable at all! It explains absolutely nothing, in fact, it unnecessarily complicates most-all-things.

- August

[Decolonize The Left]

another Q, not so off topic..

Does DM itself and its being a world theory has a connection with the democratic centralist structure and organization in the communist party?

Not sure exactly what you mean... could you elaborate a bit?

- August

[Charles Xavier]

Read it and come to your own conclusions these people will just say wrong wrong wrong without it making any sense to you or me. So your best bet is reading it to understand for yourself and come to your own conclusions.

[Black Sheep]

Not sure exactly what you mean... could you elaborate a bit?I meant if democ. centralism is an outcome of dialectic processing.


So your best bet is reading it to understand for yourself and come to your own conclusions. Any recommendations?

[Decolonize The Left]

Read it and come to your own conclusions these people will just say wrong wrong wrong without it making any sense to you or me. So your best bet is reading it to understand for yourself and come to your own conclusions.

But what is "it?" You see, there's no book on "dialectical materialism' as though it was 'biology.' And furthermore, if you were able to find a book on dialectical materialism, wouldn't it none-the-less be an opinion? For we already know it isn't a fact...

Your posts are so vague and unclear it's tough to extract any sort of actual meaning...

- August

[Decolonize The Left]

I meant if democ. centralism is an outcome of dialectic processing.

First, what do you mean by "democratic centralism."
Second, no, it is not an "outcome of dialectic processing" because such a thing is non-existent.

- August

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GDII:


Dialectical Materialism is a science,

No, it's a dogmatic system that is completely divorced from the material world (that is, what little sense can be made of it) -- and that is because it was invented by one of the all-time champion a priori dogmatists, Hegel.

-------------------------

Bulk Sheep:


I meant if democ. centralism is an outcome of dialectic processing.

No, it's a direct consequence of Historical Materialism -- which, as we both know, is a scientific theory (once the dialectical gobbledygook has been removed).

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Nice try AW, but as I noted in my first reply to Bulk Sheep here, dialectics is a quasi-religion to these comrades, so they will either totally ignore you attacking their source of opiates, or they will become abusive.

One thing they won't do, because they can't, is defend it.

After all, that why they retreated into their cozy little coven -- the DM group -- and won't let me join.

[Charles Xavier]

I meant if democ. centralism is an outcome of dialectic processing.

Any recommendations?

I think the simplest defination of the dialectic is this:

The Marxian interpretation of reality that views matter as the sole subject of change and all change as the product of a constant conflict between opposites arising from the internal contradictions inherent in all events, ideas, and movements.


The Dialectic is like this, two opposites, for example bourgeioisie and Proletariat they struggle both ways against each other, in the final struggle it is either the victory of socialism or the decay of society into fascism. The new will eventually overcome the old. Or you can take it on a cellular level if you want in biology

So recommendations

Depends on your reading Level, if you want to buy a book or read it online. Trotsky wrote some good articles on Dialectical Materialism and so did Engels. If you're from Greece I know for certain the Greek Communist Party will be selling/ lending out a variety of books on the subject. The best option is this if you can.




Anti-Duhring is a good read.


http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/index.htm


so is Dialectics of Nature, which is an unfinished work.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/index.htm


This is probably one of the bigger and better works but its hard to get through

http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/index.htm

I also have a copy of the Book Dialectical Materialism by V.G. Afanasyev, its neatly laid out into different parts of the theory. If you can get a book like that type I would certainly take it over reading Engels on a beginners understanding of the subject.


And if you want something really simple

Dialectics for kids!

http://www.dialectics4kids.com/

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GDII:


The Marxian interpretation of reality that views matter as the sole subject of change and all change as the product of a constant conflict between opposites arising from the internal contradictions inherent in all events, ideas, and movements.

Unfortunately, this is yet more a priori dogmatics!


The Dialectic is like this, two opposites, for example bourgeioisie and Proletariat they struggle both ways against each other, in the final struggle it is either the victory of socialism or the decay of society into fascism. The new will eventually overcome the old. Or you can take it on a cellular level if you want in biology

But this cannot work, since Hegel, Engels, Plekhanov and Lenin (among others) told us that these opposites must all change into one another.

In that case, the proletariat must change into the bourgeoisie, the forces of production must change into the relations of production, and vice versa!

But this is ridiculous.

Naturally, this does not mean that change cannot happen, only that if dialectics were true, it couldn't.

A more general and longer version of this argument can be found here:

http://z11.invisionfree.com/Kasama_Threads/index.php?showtopic=460

[A few posts down the page.]


Dialectics for kids!

An appallingly awful site!!

http://www.revleft.com/vb/dialectics-kids-t80721/index2.html

http://www.revleft.com/vb/dialectics-kids-t60024/index.html


Anti-Duhring is a good read.

One of the worst books ever written by a Marxist:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/anti-duhring-t80412/index.html

[benhur]

In that case, the proletariat must change into the bourgeoisie, the forces of production must change into the relations of production, and vice versa!


Good heavens, what a simplistic view! Either you're trying to be funny, or you've no idea what you're talking about. I'll give you a simple example, so you can understand without difficulty. Imagine the color white and its opposite black. What comes out of them-gray-is a new color. It's not white, it's not black, yet it contains both. Likewise, a system that evolves out of opposites will be different from the opposites, and yet retain some of the elements. This is what evolution is all about. The opposites are transcended, and yet some of the elements are also retained.

[JimmyJazz]

DM helps us understand

That's just the thing; no it doesn't, not in the scientific sense.

It doesn't make predictions. Being able to make falsifiable predictions is the criterion for something to be considered a scientific theory.

It's purely the result of inductive reasoning from a bunch of examples (usually picked out of a hat) of things that "change" in some sense.

Every source I've looked at on DM has tried to make it look like an empirical, scientific theory (even while calling it a "form of logic", strangely). But it isn't, because it doesn't make predictions. At least, I've never seen it do so.

And bear in mind something doesn't even have to make true predictions to be a theory; just falsifiable ones. If every single prediction it makes turns out to be false, then it may be a crappy scientific theory, but it would still be a scientific one, because the predictions it made were testable and falsifiable (they must have been falsifiable if they "turned out to be false", right?). But DM doesn't make falsifiable predictions, hence isn't scientific, or a theory in the scientific sense.

[Hit The North]

Being able to make falsifiable predictions is the criterion for something to be considered a scientific theory.

Does that mean astrology is a science? You can certainly make a number of falsifiable predictions with it. The same with chicken innards and tea leafs.

[JimmyJazz]

Does that mean astrology is a science? You can certainly make a number of falsifiable predictions with it.

I don't know anything about astrology.

And it is possible that falsifiable predictions is merely one of several criteria for a scientific theory. I've never had a class in philosophy of science; all my knowledge of it comes from the little blurbs you get in actual science classes.

But in any case, it is absolutely a criterion of scientific theories, and one which DM doesn't seem to meet.

It's also possible, I suppose, that astrology meets the technical requirements for a scientific theory--and that it's just a really, really crappy scientific theory (one that, in fact, performs no better than chance with the predictions it makes).


The same with chicken innards and tea leafs.

what?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


Good heavens, what a simplistic view! Either you're trying to be funny, or you've no idea what you're talking about. I'll give you a simple example, so you can understand without difficulty. Imagine the color white and its opposite black. What comes out of them-gray-is a new color. It's not white, it's not black, yet it contains both. Likewise, a system that evolves out of opposites will be different from the opposites, and yet retain some of the elements. This is what evolution is all about. The opposites are transcended, and yet some of the elements are also retained.

Well, I did say it was trhe shortened version.

Here is the fuller version:


Dialecticians seem to be unclear whether objects and processes change (1) because of their internal opposites, or whether they (2) change into these opposites as a result of their "struggle" with them, or indeed whether they (3) also produce these opposites while they change --, or they do so as a result of that change.

Here are a few quotations from a wide selection of theorists to that effect:


"If, for instance, the Sophists claimed to be teachers, Socrates by a series of questions forced the Sophist Protagoras to confess that all learning is only recollection. In his more strictly scientific dialogues, Plato employs the dialectical method to show the finitude of all hard and fast terms of understanding. Thus in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one. In this grand style did Plato treat Dialectic. In modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of Dialectic, and restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen, by working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no mere subjective piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it really serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, naturally veers round to its opposite.

"However reluctant Understanding may be to admit the action of Dialectic, we must not suppose that the recognition of its existence is peculiarly confined to the philosopher. It would be truer to say that Dialectic gives expression to a law which is felt in all other grades of consciousness, and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of Dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite." [Hegel (1975), pp.117-18.]

"Everything is opposite. Neither in heaven nor in earth, neither in the world of mind nor nature, is there anywhere an abstract 'either-or' as the understanding maintains. Whatever exists is concrete, with difference and opposition in itself. The finitude of things with then lie in the want of correspondence between their immediate being and what they essentially are. Thus, in inorganic nature, the acid is implicitly at the same time the base: in other words its only being consists in its relation to its other. Hence the acid persists quietly in the contrast: it is always in effort to realize what it potentially is. Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world." [Ibid., p.174.]

"The law of the interpenetration of opposites.... Mutual penetration of polar opposites and transformation into each other when carried to extremes...." [Engels (1954), pp.17, 62.]

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics, dialectical thought, is only the reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of nature. Attraction and repulsion. Polarity begins with magnetism, it is exhibited in one and the same body; in the case of electricity it distributes itself over two or more bodies which become oppositely charged. All chemical processes reduce themselves -- to processes of chemical attraction and repulsion. Finally, in organic life the formation of the cell nucleus is likewise to be regarded as a polarisation of the living protein material, and from the simple cell -- onwards the theory of evolution demonstrates how each advance up to the most complicated plant on the one side, and up to man on the other, is effected by the continual conflict between heredity and adaptation. In this connection it becomes evident how little applicable to such forms of evolution are categories like 'positive' and 'negative.' One can conceive of heredity as the positive, conservative side, adaptation as the negative side that continually destroys what has been inherited, but one can just as well take adaptation as the creative, active, positive activity, and heredity as the resisting, passive, negative activity." [Ibid., p.211.]

"For a stage in the outlook on nature where all differences become merged in intermediate steps, and all opposites pass into one another through intermediate links, the old metaphysical method of thought no longer suffices. Dialectics, which likewise knows no hard and fast lines, no unconditional, universally valid 'either-or' and which bridges the fixed metaphysical differences, and besides 'either-or' recognises also in the right place 'both this-and that' and reconciles the opposites, is the sole method of thought appropriate in the highest degree to this stage. Of course, for everyday use, for the small change of science, the metaphysical categories retain their validity." [Ibid., pp.212-13.]

"Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate. And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa." [Engels (1976), p.27.]

"Already in Rousseau, therefore, we find not only a line of thought which corresponds exactly to the one developed in Marx's Capital, but also, in details, a whole series of the same dialectical turns of speech as Marx used: processes which in their nature are antagonistic, contain a contradiction; transformation of one extreme into its opposite; and finally, as the kernel of the whole thing, the negation of the negation. [Ibid., p.179.]

"...but the theory of Essence is the main thing: the resolution of the abstract contradictions into their own instability, where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone than it is transformed unnoticed into the other, etc." [Engels (1891), p.414.]

"And so every phenomenon, by the action of those same forces which condition its existence, sooner or later, but inevitably, is transformed into its own opposite…." [Plekhanov (1956), p.77.]

"[Among the elements of dialectics are the following:] [I]nternally contradictory tendencies…in [a thing]…as the sum and unity of opposites…. [This involves] not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other [into its opposite?]….

"In brief, dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics….

"The splitting of the whole and the cognition of its contradictory parts…is the essence (one of the 'essentials', one of the principal, if not the principal, characteristic features) of dialectics….

"The identity of opposites…is the recognition…of the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendencies in all phenomena and processes of nature…. The condition for the knowledge of all processes of the world in their 'self-movement', in their spontaneous development, in their real life, is the knowledge of them as a unity of opposites. Development is the 'struggle' of opposites…. [This] alone furnishes the key to the self-movement of everything existing….

"The unity…of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute…." [Lenin (1961), pp.221-22, 357-58.]

"Hegel brilliantly divined the dialectics of things (phenomena, the world, nature) in the dialectics of concepts…. This aphorism should be expressed more popularly, without the word dialectics: approximately as follows: In the alternation, reciprocal dependence of all notions, in the identity of their opposites, in the transitions of one notion into another, in the eternal change, movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly divined precisely this relation of things to nature…. [W]hat constitutes dialectics?…. [M]utual dependence of notions all without exception…. Every notion occurs in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others." [Lenin (1961), pp.196-97.]

"'This harmony is precisely absolute Becoming change, -- not becoming other, now this and then another. The essential thing is that each different thing, each particular, is different from another, not abstractly so from any other, but from its other. Each particular only is, insofar as its other is implicitly contained in its Notion...' Quite right and important: the 'other' as its other, development into its opposite." [Ibid., p.260. Lenin is here commenting on Hegel (1995), pp.278-98; this particular quotation coming from p.285.]

"Dialectics is the teaching which shows how Opposites can be and how they happen to be (how they become) identical, -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another, -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another." [Ibid., p.109.]

"Development is the 'struggle' of opposites." [Lenin, Collected Works, Volume XIII, p.301.]

"Why is it that '...the human mind should take these opposites not as dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, transforming themselves into one another'? Because that is just how things are in objective reality. The fact is that the unity or identity of opposites in objective things is not dead or rigid, but is living, conditional, mobile, temporary and relative; in given conditions, every contradictory aspect transforms itself into its opposite....

"In speaking of the identity of opposites in given conditions, what we are referring to is real and concrete opposites and the real and concrete transformations of opposites into one another....

"All processes have a beginning and an end, all processes transform themselves into their opposites. The constancy of all processes is relative, but the mutability manifested in the transformation of one process into another is absolute." [Mao (1961b), pp.340-42.]

"The law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics....

"As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development....

"The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from beginning to end.... [Ibid., pp.311-18.]

"Second, and just as unconditionally valid, that all things are at the same time absolutely different and absolutely or unqualifiedly opposed. The law may also be referred to as the law of the polar unity of opposites. This law applies to every single thing, every phenomenon, and to the world as a whole. Viewing thought and its method alone, it can be put this way: The human mind is capable of infinite condensation of things into unities, even the sharpest contradictions and opposites, and, on the other hand, it is capable of infinite differentiation and analysis of things into opposites. The human mind can establish this unlimited unity and unlimited differentiation because this unlimited unity and differentiation is present in reality." [Thalheimer (1936), p.161.]

"So far we have discussed the most general and most fundamental law of dialectics, namely, the law of the permeation of opposites, or the law of polar unity. We shall now take up the second main proposition of dialectics, the law of the negation of the negation, or the law of development through opposites. This is the most general law of the process of thought. I will first state the law itself and support it with examples, and then I will show on what it is based and how it is related to the first law of the permeation of opposites. There is already a presentiment of this law in the oldest Chinese philosophy, in the of Transformations, as well as in Lao-tse and his disciples -- and likewise in the oldest Greek philosophy, especially in Heraclitus. Not until Hegel, however, was this law developed.

"This law applies to all motion and changes of things, to real things as well as to their images in our minds, i.e., concepts. It states first of all that things and concepts move, change, and develop; all things are processes. All fixity of individual things is only relative, limited; their motion, change, or development is absolute, unlimited. For the world as a whole absolute motion and absolute rest coincide. The proof of this part of the proposition, namely, that all things are in flux, we have already given in our discussion of Heraclitus.

"The law of the negation of the negation has a special sense beyond the mere proposition that all things are processes and change. It also states something about the most general form of these changes, motions, or developments. It states, in the first place, that all motion, development, or change, takes place through opposites or contradictions, or through the negation of a thing.

"Conceptually the actual movement of things appears as a negation. In other words, negation is the most general way in which motion or change of things is represented in the mind. This is the first stage of this process. The negation of a thing from which the change proceeds, however, is in turn subject to the law of the transformation of things into their opposites." [Ibid., pp.170-71.]

"The second dialectical law, that of the 'unity, interpenetration or identity of opposites'…asserts the essentially contradictory character of reality -– at the same time asserts that these 'opposites' which are everywhere to be found do not remain in stark, metaphysical opposition, but also exist in unity. This law was known to the early Greeks. It was classically expressed by Hegel over a hundred years ago….

"[F]rom the standpoint of the developing universe as a whole, what is vital is…motion and change which follows from the conflict of the opposite." [Guest (1963), pp.31, 32.]

"The negative electrical pole…cannot exist without the simultaneous presence of the positive electrical pole…. This 'unity of opposites' is therefore found in the core of all material things and events." [Conze (1944), pp.35-36.]

"This dialectical activity is universal. There is no escaping from its unremitting and relentless embrace. 'Dialectics gives expression to a law which is felt in all grades of consciousness and in general experience. Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being inflexible and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is exactly what we mean by the dialectic of the finite, by which the finite, as implicitly other than it is, is forced to surrender its own immediate or natural being, and to turn suddenly into its opposite.' (Encyclopedia, p.120)." [Novack (1971), 94-95; quoting Hegel (1975), p.118, although in a different translation from the one used here.]

"Contradiction is an essential feature of all being. It lies at the heart of matter itself. It is the source of all motion, change, life and development. The dialectical law which expresses this idea is the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites….

"In dialectics, sooner or later, things change into their opposite. In the words of the Bible, 'the first shall be last and the last shall be first.' We have seen this many times, not least in the history of great revolutions. Formerly backward and inert layers can catch up with a bang. Consciousness develops in sudden leaps. This can be seen in any strike. And in any strike we can see the elements of a revolution in an undeveloped, embryonic form. In such situations, the presence of a conscious and audacious minority can play a role quite similar to that of a catalyst in a chemical reaction. In certain instances, even a single individual can play an absolutely decisive role....

"This universal phenomenon of the unity of opposites is, in reality the motor-force of all motion and development in nature…. Movement which itself involves a contradiction, is only possible as a result of the conflicting tendencies and inner tensions which lie at the heart of all forms of matter....

"Contradictions are found at all levels of nature, and woe betide the logic that denies it. Not only can an electron be in two or more places at the same time, but it can move simultaneously in different directions. We are sadly left with no alternative but to agree with Hegel: they are and are not. Things change into their opposite. Negatively-charged electrons become transformed into positively-charged positrons. An electron that unites with a proton is not destroyed, as one might expect, but produces a new particle, a neutron, with a neutral charge.

"This is an extension of the law of the unity and interpenetration of opposites. It is a law which permeates the whole of nature, from the smallest phenomena to the largest...." [Woods and Grant (1995), pp.43-47, 63-71.]

"This struggle is not external and accidental…. The struggle is internal and necessary, for it arises and follows from the nature of the process as a whole. The opposite tendencies are not independent the one of the other, but are inseparably connected as parts or aspects of a single whole. And they operate and come into conflict on the basis of the contradiction inherent in the process as a whole….

"Movement and change result from causes inherent in things and processes, from internal contradictions….

"Contradiction is a universal feature of all processes….

"The importance of the [developmental] conception of the negation of the negation does not lie in its supposedly expressing the necessary pattern of all development. All development takes place through the working out of contradictions -– that is a necessary universal law…." [Cornforth (1976), pp.14-15, 46-48, 53, 65-66, 72, 77, 82, 86, 90, 95, 117; quoting Hegel (1975), pp.172 and 160, respectively.]

"Opposites in a thing are not only mutually exclusive, polar, repelling, each other; they also attract and interpenetrate each other. They begin and cease to exist together.... These dual aspects of opposites -- conflict and unity -- are like scissor blades in cutting, jaws in mastication, and two legs in walking. Where there is only one, the process as such is impossible: 'all polar opposites are in general determined by the mutual action of two opposite poles on one another, the separation and opposition of these poles exists only within their unity and interconnection, and, conversely, their interconnection exists only in their separation and their unity only in their opposition.' in fact, 'where one no sooner tries to hold on to one side alone then it is transformed unnoticed into the other....'" [Gollobin (1986), p.115; quoting Engels (1891), p.414.]

"The unity of opposites and contradiction.... The scientific world-view does not seek causes of the motion of the universe beyond its boundaries. It finds them in the universe itself, in its contradictions. The scientific approach to an object of research involves skill in perceiving a dynamic essence, a combination in one and the same object of mutually incompatible elements, which negate each other and yet at the same time belong to each other.

"It is even more important to remember this point when we are talking about connections between phenomena that are in the process of development. In the whole world there is no developing object in which one cannot find opposite sides, elements or tendencies: stability and change, old and new, and so on. The dialectical principle of contradiction reflects a dualistic relationship within the whole: the unity of opposites and their struggle. Opposites may come into conflict only to the extent that they form a whole in which one element is as necessary as another. This necessity for opposing elements is what constitutes the life of the whole. Moreover, the unity of opposites, expressing the stability of an object, is relative and transient, while the struggle of opposites is absolute, ex pressing the infinity of the process of development. This is because contradiction is not only a relationship between opposite tendencies in an object or between opposite objects, but also the relationship of the object to itself, that is to say, its constant self-negation. The fabric of all life is woven out of two kinds of thread, positive and negative, new and old, progressive and reactionary. They are constantly in conflict, fighting each other....

"The opposite sides, elements and tendencies of a whole whose interaction forms a contradiction are not given in some eternally ready-made form. At the initial stage, while existing only as a possibility, contradiction appears as a unity containing an inessential difference. The next stage is an essential difference within this unity. Though possessing a common basis, certain essential properties or tendencies in the object do not correspond to each other. The essential difference produces opposites, which in negating each other grow into a contradiction. The extreme case of contradiction is an acute conflict. Opposites do not stand around in dismal inactivity; they are not something static, like two wrestlers in a photograph. They interact and are more like a live wrestling match. Every development produces contradictions, resolves them and at the same time gives birth to new ones. Life is an eternal overcoming of obstacles. Everything is interwoven in a network of contradictions." [Spirkin (1983), pp.143-46.]

"'The contradiction, however, is the source of all movement and life; only in so far as it contains a contradiction can anything have movement, power, and effect.' (Hegel). 'In brief', states Lenin, 'dialectics can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. This embodies the essence of dialectics…'

"The world in which we live is a unity of contradictions or a unity of opposites: cold-heat, light-darkness, Capital-Labour, birth-death, riches-poverty, positive-negative, boom-slump, thinking-being, finite-infinite, repulsion-attraction, left-right, above- below, evolution-revolution, chance-necessity, sale-purchase, and so on.

"The fact that two poles of a contradictory antithesis can manage to coexist as a whole is regarded in popular wisdom as a paradox. The paradox is a recognition that two contradictory, or opposite, considerations may both be true. This is a reflection in thought of a unity of opposites in the material world.

"Motion, space and time are nothing else but the mode of existence of matter. Motion, as we have explained is a contradiction, -- being in one place and another at the same time. It is a unity of opposites. 'Movement means to be in this place and not to be in it; this is the continuity of space and time -- and it is this which first makes motion possible.' (Hegel)

"To understand something, its essence, it is necessary to seek out these internal contradictions. Under certain circumstances, the universal is the individual, and the individual is the universal. That things turn into their opposites, -- cause can become effect and effect can become cause -- is because they are merely links in the never-ending chain in the development of matter.

"Lenin explains this self-movement in a note when he says, 'Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they become identical -- under what conditions they are identical, becoming transformed into one another -- why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as dead, rigid, but living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.'" [Rob Sewell, quoted from here.]

Bold emphases added.

References and links can be found at my site, here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

In my next post I will expose the fatal weaknesses of this 'theory', including your simplistic objection.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Ok, here it is:

As we are about to see, this idea -- that there are such things as "dialectical contradictions" and "unities of opposites" (etc.), which cause change -- presents DM-theorists with some rather nasty dialectical headaches, if interpreted along the lines expressed in the DM-classics (quoted above).

[DM = Dialectical Materialism/ist; NON = Negation of the Negation; FL = Formal Logic.]

To see this, let us suppose that object/process A is comprised of two "internal contradictory opposites" O* and O**, and it thus changes as a result.

[The same problems arise if these are viewed as 'external' contradictions.]

But, O* cannot itself change into O** since O** already exists! If O** didn't already exist then, according to this theory, O* could not change at all, for there would be no opposite to bring that about.

Hence, it is no good propelling O** into the future so that it is now said to be what O* will change into, since O* will do no such thing unless O** is already there, in the present, to make that happen!

So, if object/process A is already composed of a 'dialectical union' of O* and not-O* (interpreting O** now as not-O*), how can O* possibly change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?

Several alternatives now suggest themselves which might allow dialecticians to dig themselves out of this hermetic hole. Either:

(1) O* 'changes' into not-O*, meaning there would now be two not-O*s where once there was one (unless, of course, one of these not-O*s just vanishes into thin air -- see below); or:

(2) O* does not change, or it disappears. Plainly, O* cannot change into what already exists -- that is, O* cannot change into its opposite, not-O* without there being two of them (see above). But even then, one of these will not be not-O* just a copy of it. In that case, O* either disappears, does not change at all, or changes into something else; or:

(3) Not-O* itself disappears to allow a new (but copy) not-O* to emerge that O* can and does change into. If so, questions would naturally arise as to how the original not-O* could possibly cause O* to change if is has just vanished. Of course, this option merely postpones the evil day, for the same difficulties will afflict the new not-O* that afflicted the old. If it exists in order to allow O* to change, then we are back where we were to begin with.

Anyway, as should seem obvious, among other things already mentioned, alternative (2) plainly means that O* does not in fact change into not-O*, it is just replaced by it. Option (1), on the other hand, has the original not-O* remaining the same (when it was supposed to turn into its own opposite -- O* -- according to the DM-classics), and options (2) and (3) will only work if matter and/or energy can either be destroyed or created from nowhere!

Naturally, these problems will simply re-appear at the next stage as not-O* readies itself to change into whatever it changes into. But, in this case there is an added twist, for there is as yet no not-not-O* in existence to make this happen. This means that the dialectical process will grind to a halt, unless a not-not-O* pops into existence to start things up again.

But what could possibly engineer that?

Indeed, at the very least, this 'theory' of change leaves it entirely mysterious how not-O* itself came about in the first place. It seems to have popped into existence from nowhere, too. [Gollobin (above) sort of half recognises this without realising either his error or the serious problems this creates.]

But, not-O* cannot have come from O* itself, since O* can only change because of the operation of not-O*, which does not yet exist! And pushing the process into the past (via a 'reversed' version of the NON) will merely reduplicate the above problems.

[However, on the NON, see below.]

Now, it could be objected that all this seems to place objects and/or processes in fixed categories, which is one of the main criticisms dialecticians make of FL. Hence, on that basis, it could be maintained that the above argument is entirely misguided.

Fortunately, repairs are easy to make: let us now suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal/external opposites" O* and O**, (the latter once again interpreted as not-O*) and it thus develops as a result.

The rest still follows as before: if object/process A is already composed of a changing dialectical union of O* and not-O*, and O* 'develops' into not-O* as a result, how is it possible for O* to change into not-O* when not-O* already exists?

Of course, it could be argued that not-O* 'develops' into O* while not-O* 'develops' into O*.

[This objection might even incorporate that eminently obscure Hegelian term-of-art: "sublation". More on that presently.]

But, if this were so, while it was happening these two would no longer be 'opposites' of one another --, not unless we widen the term "opposite" to mean "anything that an object/process turns into, and/or any intermediate object/process while that is happening". Naturally, that would make this 'Law' work by definitional fiat, rendering it eminently 'subjective', once more.

But, if we ignore that 'difficulty' for now, and even supposing it were the case that not-O* 'developed' into O* while not-O* 'developed' into O*, and such process were governed by the obscure term "sublation", this alternative will still not work (as we are about to see).

Indeed, developing this option further before it is demolished, it could be argued that Engels had himself anticipated the above objections when he said:


"[RL: Negation of the negation is] a very simple process which is taking place everywhere and every day, which any child can understand as soon as it is stripped of the veil of mystery in which it was enveloped by the old idealist philosophy and in which it is to the advantage of helpless metaphysicians of Herr Dühring's calibre to keep it enveloped. Let us take a grain of barley. Billions of such grains of barley are milled, boiled and brewed and then consumed. But if such a grain of barley meets with conditions which are normal for it, if it falls on suitable soil, then under the influence of heat and moisture it undergoes a specific change, it germinates; the grain as such ceases to exist, it is negated, and in its place appears the plant which has arisen from it, the negation of the grain. But what is the normal life-process of this plant? It grows, flowers, is fertilised and finally once more produces grains of barley, and as soon as these have ripened the stalk dies, is in its turn negated. As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold. Species of grain change extremely slowly, and so the barley of today is almost the same as it-was a century ago. But if we take a plastic ornamental plant, for example a dahlia or an orchid, and treat the seed and the plant which grows from it according to the gardener's art, we get as a result of this negation of the negation not only more seeds, but also qualitatively improved seeds, which produce more beautiful flowers, and each repetition of this process, each fresh negation of the negation, enhances this process of perfection. [Engels (1976), pp.172-73.]

"But someone may object: the negation that has taken place in this case is not a real negation: I negate a grain of barley also when I grind it, an insect when I crush it underfoot, or the positive quantity a when I cancel it, and so on. Or I negate the sentence: the rose is a rose, when I say: the rose is not a rose; and what do I get if I then negate this negation and say: but after all the rose is a rose? -- These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought. Negation in dialectics does not mean simply saying no, or declaring that something does not exist, or destroying it in any way one likes. Long ago Spinoza said: Omnis determinatio est negatio -- every limitation or determination is at the same time a negation. And further: the kind of negation is here determined, firstly, by the general and, secondly, by the particular nature of the process. I must not only negate, but also sublate the negation. I must therefore so arrange the first negation that the second remains or becomes possible. How? This depends on the particular nature of each individual case. If I grind a grain of barley, or crush an insect, I have carried out the first part of the action, but have made the second part impossible. Every kind of thing therefore has a peculiar way of being negated in such manner that it gives rise to a development, and it is just the same with every kind of conception or idea....

"But it is clear that from a negation of the negation which consists in the childish pastime of alternately writing and cancelling a, or in alternately declaring that a rose is a rose and that it is not a rose, nothing eventuates but the silliness of the person who adopts such a tedious procedure. And yet the metaphysicians try to make us believe that this is the right way to carry out a negation of the negation, if we ever should want to do such a thing. [Ibid., pp.180-81.]

Engels's argument seems to be that "dialectical negation" is not the same as ordinary negation in that it is not simple destruction. Dialectical negation "sublates"; that is, it both destroys and preserves, so that something new or 'higher' emerges as a result. Nevertheless, we have already seen here [in the original article, this 'here' links to another argument at my site, as do several of the other 'here's dotted around this post], that Hegel's use of this word (i.e., "sublate") is highly suspect, and we will also see below [again, this 'below' refers to a later section of the essay from which this was extracted] that this 'Law' (i.e., the NON) is even more dubious still (partly because Hegel confused ordinary negation with 'cancelling out', or with destruction, as did Engels).

Well, despite all this, is it the case that the above comments neutralise the argument presented in this part of this post? Is the argument here guilty of the following:


"These objections are in fact the chief arguments put forward by the metaphysicians against dialectics, and they are wholly worthy of the narrow-mindedness of this mode of thought." [Ibid.]

To answer this, let us once again suppose that object/process A is comprised of two changing "internal opposites" O* and not-O*, and thus develops as a result. On this scenario, O* would change/develop into a "sublated" intermediary, but not into not-O* -- incidentally, contradicting the DM-worthies quoted earlier. O* should, of course, change into not-O*, not into some intermediary.

Putting this minor quibble to one side, too, on this 'revised' view, let us suppose that O* does indeed change into that intermediary. To that end, let us call the latter, "O*(1)" (which can be interpreted as a combination of the old and the new; a 'negation' which also 'preserves'/'sublates').

If so, then O*(1) must remain forever in that state, unchanged, for there is as yet no not-O*(1) in existence to make it develop any further.

[Recall that on this 'theory', everything (and that must include O*(1)) changes because of a 'struggle' with its opposite.]

So, there must be a not-O*(1) to make O*(1) change further. To be sure, we could try to exempt O*(1) from this essential requirement on an ad hoc basis (arguing, perhaps, that O*(1) changes spontaneously with nothing actually causing it), and yet if we do that, there would seem to be no reason to accept the version of events contained in the DM-classics, which tells us that every thing/process changes because of the operation of opposites (and O*(1) is certainly a thing/process). Furthermore, if we make an exemption here, then the whole point of the exercise would be lost, for if some things do and some things do not change according this dialectical 'Law', we would be left with no way of telling which changes were and which were not subject to it.

[This would also mean that the second 'Law' (discussed here) was not a 'law' either, just like the first.]

This is, of course, quite apart from the fact that such a subjectively applied exemption certificate (issued to O*(1)) would mean that nothing at all could change, for everything in the universe is in the process of change, and is thus already a 'sublated' version of whatever it used to be.

Ignoring this, too, even if O*(1) were to change into not-O*(1) (as we suppose it must, given the doctrine laid down by the DM-prophets), then all the earlier problems simply reappear, for this could only take place if not-O*(1) already existed to make it happen! But not-O*(1) cannot already exist, for O*(1) has not changed into it yet!

Once more, it could be objected that the dialectical negation of O* to produce not-O* is not ordinary negation, as the above seems to assume.

In that case, let us say that O* turns into its 'sublated' opposite not-O*(s), but if that is to happen, according to the Dialectical Gospels, not-O*(s) must already exist! If so, and yet again, O* cannot turn into not-O*(s), for it already exists! On the other hand, if not-O*(s) does not already exist, then O* cannot change, for O* can only change if it struggles with what it changes into, i.e., not-O*(s).

Once more we hit the same non-dialectical brick wall.

It could be objected that the above abstract argument misses the point; in the real world things manifestly change. For example, it might be the case that John is a boy, but in a few years time it will be the case that John is a man. Now, the fact that other individuals are already men, does not stop John changing into a man (his opposite), as the above argues. So, John can change into his opposite even though that opposite already exists.

Or so it could be claimed.

But, this theory tells us that things/processes change because of a struggle with their opposites, and with what they become. Are we now to assume that John has to struggle with all the individuals that are already men if he is to become a man himself (if we now treat all these other men as John's opposites)? And are we to suppose that John struggles with what he is to become, even before it exists? If not, then the above response is beside the point. And, in view of the fact that John must turn into his opposite, does that mean he has to turn into these other men, or even into one of them? But he must do so if the Dialectical Holy Books are to be believed.

Anyway, according to the DM-worthies quoted above, John can only change because of a struggle between opposites taking place in the here-and-now. Are we now really supposed to believe that "John is a man" is struggling with "John is a boy" -- or that manhood is struggling with boyhood?

Some might be tempted to reply that this is precisely what adolescence is, and yet, in that case, John-as-boy and John-as-a-man would have to be locked in struggle in the present. [Of course, adolescence cannot struggle with anything, since it is an abstraction.] But, John-as-a-man does not yet exist, and so 'he' cannot struggle with John-as-boy. On the other hand, if John-as-a-man does exist, so that 'he' can struggle with his youthful self, then John-as-boy cannot change into 'him', for John-as-a-man already exists!

To be sure, John's 'opposite' is whatever he will become (if he is allowed to develop naturally), but, as noted above, that opposite cannot now exist otherwise John would not need to become him!

Looking at this more concretely, in ten or fifteen years time, John will not become just any man, he will become a particular man. In that case, let us call the man that John becomes "Man-J". But, once again, Man-J must exist now or John cannot change into him (if the DM-worthies quoted earlier are to be believed), for John can only become a man if he is locked in struggle with his own opposite, Man-J. But, if that is so, John cannot become Man-J since Man-J already exists!

[This, of course, is simply a more concrete version of the argument outlined above.]

Consider another hackneyed example: water turning into steam at 100oC (under normal conditions). Are we really supposed to believe that the opposite that water becomes (i.e., steam) makes water turn into steam? This must be so if the Dialectical Saints are to be believed.

Hence, while you might think it is the heat/energy you are putting into the water that turns it into steam, what really happens, according to these wise old dialecticians, is that steam makes water turn into steam!

In that case, save energy and turn the gas off!

In fact, let us track a water molecule to see what happens to it. To identify it, we shall call it "W1", and the steam molecule it turns into "S1". But, if the DM-Worthies above are correct, S1 must already exist, otherwise W1 could not change into it! Again, if that is so, where does S1 disappear to if W1 changes into it?

In fact, according to the Dialectical Magi, since opposites turn into one another, S1 must change into W1 at the same time as W1 is turning into S1! So while you are boiling a kettle, according to this Superscientific 'theory', steam must be turning back into the water you are boiling, and it must do so at the same rate!

One wonders, therefore, how dialectical kettles manage to boil dry.

This must be so, otherwise when W1 turns into S1 -- which already exists, or W1 could not change into it -- there would have to be two S1s where there used to be one! Matter created from nowhere!

Of course, the same argument applies to water freezing (and to any and all other alleged examples of DM-change).

It could be objected that the opposite that liquid water turns into is a gas; so the dialectical classicists are correct. However, if we take them at their word, then that gas must 'struggle' with liquid water in the here-and-now if water is to change. But that gas does not yet exist; in which case, water would never boil if this 'theory' were true. But even if it did, it is heat that causes the change not the gas! However we try and slice it, this 'theory' is totally useless -- that is, what little sense can be made of it.

This, of course, does not deny that change occurs, only that DM cannot account for it.

Alternatively, if DM were true, change would be impossible.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Now, smarty pants, where does my argument go wrong?

But, let's look at your actual reply:


I'll give you a simple example, so you can understand without difficulty. Imagine the color white and its opposite black. What comes out of them-gray-is a new color. It's not white, it's not black, yet it contains both. Likewise, a system that evolves out of opposites will be different from the opposites, and yet retain some of the elements. This is what evolution is all about. The opposites are transcended, and yet some of the elements are also retained.

But, according to the dialectical prophets, quoted in my last post but one, these colours should struggle with one another, and change into one another. So, does black slug it out with white? Does black change into white, and vice versa?

And your point about 'transcended opposites' was dealt with in the argument in my last post.

So, you are the joker my friend...

[Hit The North]

The same with chicken innards and tea leafs.



what?
They're both techniques for predicting future events.

Rosa! Couldn't you have provided links instead of these lengthy excerpts?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Does that mean astrology is a science? You can certainly make a number of falsifiable predictions with it. The same with chicken innards and tea leafs.

You have certainly hit on a weakness in a naive version of Popper's theory, but it is still the case that dialectics is imposed on nature and society in defiance of the facts, and that means it cannot be a science. DM is unrevised and unrevisable -- no fact is allowed ot count against it. You lot just ignore stuff you can't explain, or which fails to fit the a priori picture of the world you all have.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


Couldn't you have provided links instead of these lengthy excerpts?

I wanted an up-dated version of this argument at RevLeft -- one you could just ignore in order to confirm the above point.

What's the problem anyway? Are you worried about disc space? Is it costing you money?

[gilhyle]

I think its better that you posted it.....the error of course is at the root, in your own presumptions as to what 'account for' change must mean. You have been told this, but some things dont change.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Gil:


the error of course is at the root, in your own presumptions as to what 'account for' change must mean.

So, the alleged 'error' is not in the argument, but in a throw-away line at the end.

But, then, perhaps you can clear this up, and tell us what the 'dialectical' theory of change is.


You have been told this, but some things dont change

No I haven't -- but anyway, I am glad to see you too reject the doctrine of universal change. Welcome aboard!

However, it seems that classical dialecticians, including Hegel, did not have the benefit of your towering intellect to save them from the crass errors I have exposed.

But that is where we have the edge over them -- for, happy day(!), we do have access to your intergalactic brain.

So, over to you, Oh Great One!

Enlighten us mere mortals...

[Charles Xavier]

So anyways, as I was saying, while Rosa Lichenstein is wrong and doesn't understand dialectical materialism. You need to come to your own conclusions on the theory, one way or the other. Theres no harm in reading.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GDII:


So anyways, as I was saying, while Rosa Lichenstein is wrong and doesn't understand dialectical materialism. You need to come to your own conclusions on the theory, one way or the other. Theres no harm in reading.

1) You said it, sure, but we have yet to see you explain where I go wrong.

2) You have already been told that if I do not 'understand' dialectics, then I am in good company, since it is clear than no one does (or if they do, they have kept that fact pretty quiet for over 150 years), and that includes Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin..., and you too, since you shied away from my challenge to you earlier -- and now we know why.

As I said, you mystics have only two responses to my demolition of your 'theory': you ignore my arguments or you resort to abuse.

You fall in to the former category.

[Charles Xavier]

GDII:



1) You said it, sure, but we have yet to see you explain where I go wrong.

2) You have already been told that if I do not 'understand' dialectics, then I am in good company, since it is clear than no one does (or if they do, they have kept that fact pretty quiet for over 150 years), and that includes Engels, Plekhanov, Lenin..., and you too, since you shied away from my challenge to you earlier -- and now we know why.


How is it so hard to understand two opposites combine and create something new, motion is constant and matter cannot be separate from motion. Everything is interconnected. Matter and motion are the primary block of existence.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

GDII:


How is it so hard to understand two opposites combine and create something new, motion is constant and matter cannot be separate from motion.

1) Ah, yet more a priori dogmatics. That's all you have.

2) It is 'hard to understand' for the reasons I set out in that long post (above) that BTB complained about.

What you have to do now is show me where I go wrong.

[JimmyJazz]

They're both techniques for predicting future events.

Rosa! Couldn't you have provided links instead of these lengthy excerpts?

Oh. Well in that case I'd imagine that they are falsifiable; anything that claims to be able to predict the future in detail should be falsifiable.

But then, usually things like astrology, folk methods for predicting the future, religious prophesies, and the like, are not made in enough detail to be truly falsifiable. That's kind of the trick that gets people to keep believing them: they're in that sweet spot where they're detailed enough to be "impressive", but not enough to be easily falsifiable. Just as cold reading tells a person about their inner thoughts, or about their dead relative, in sufficiently vague terms as to never or rarely be wrong.

Dialectics seems to follow that same formula as far as I can tell. Not with bad intentions, necessarily; lots of crazy superstitions are formed with perfectly innocent intent, so it's reasonable that something much less crazy (dialectics) could be too. But the good intentions don't mean that it rises to the level of being either scientific or correct.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

JJ, the problem is that no dialectician is prepared, or has ever even been prepared to revise the theory in the light of the facts. You can see that process at work in this thread; indeed, they just ignore stuff they do not like. Just like religionists.

That is part of the reason it cannot be scientific.

[benhur]

GDII:

1) You said it, sure, but we have yet to see you explain where I go wrong.

You're denying the fact that opposites combine to create something new. When you get the basics wrong, how can we take you seriously?


As I said, you mystics have only two responses to my demolition of your 'theory': you ignore my arguments or you resort to abuse.

You fall in to the former category.

You haven't refuted DM. You have a flawed idea of DM, and it's this idea you've attempted to refute, rather than the theory itself. It's similar to a cappie equating socialism with Pol Pot, and arguing that socialism is a murderous cult thereof.

[Black Sheep]

This thing is getting derailed moree and more to something that seems like a religious debate! :thumbdown::thumbdown::thumbdown:

[Cumannach]

Bulk Sheep,

A very good introduction to Dialectical Materialism was written by Stalin. It's easy to follow, quite short and explains the basics very well. It doesn't mess around with all the philisophical intricacies.

("Dialectical and Historical Materialism")
Stalin

You can read it here;

(http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1938/09.htm)

That's if you're not afraid to read something written by Stalin, as many are.

warning; You might get infected with paranoid totalitarianism!:scared:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cummanach:


A very good introduction to Dialectical Materialism was written by Stalin. It's easy to follow, quite short and explains the basics very well. It doesn't mess around with all the philisophical intricacies.

In fact, this piece by Stalin is embarrassingly poor. Quite apart from the fact that it is yet another example of a priori dogmatics (where Stalin imposes this theory on reality, and in defiance of the facts) he makes all the usual mistakes.

The only thing Bulk Sheep will catch from it is a hatred of dialectics.

So, yes, he should read it.:lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BenHur:


You're denying the fact that opposites combine to create something new. When you get the basics wrong, how can we take you seriously?

So, you believe that the bourgeoisie and the working class will 'combine' do you?

But, according to the dialectical prophets (quoted above), these two classes should change into one another.:lol:

You can believe whacko things like this if you want, but the rest of sane humanity will conclude otherwise.


You haven't refuted DM. You have a flawed idea of DM, and it's this idea you've attempted to refute, rather than the theory itself. It's similar to a cappie equating socialism with Pol Pot, and arguing that socialism is a murderous cult thereof.

Well, you are the one who thinks that opposites will always and inevitably change into one another (or you should if you 'understand dialectics' as it is laid down in the Holy Books -- quote above): so when are males going to change into females, left hands into right hands, electrons into positrons (or is it protons), the forces of production into the relations of production?

And, until you can show where my arguments go wrong (or where my 'understanding' is defective), I have indeed refuted your mystical 'theory'.

Throwing your toys out of the pram is not an argument.

[Leo]

Maybe it would be good to go back to the initial point.


why is DM considered a world theory?

If we set aside the mystical approach to it, I'd actually argue that it isn't a weltanschauungat at all, but is merely a philosophical generalization and thus simplification of what it expresses.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Well, you'd be almost alone in that, for most Marxists regard it as 'the world-view of the proletariat', and they do so for the reasons I outlined on page one.

[Leo]

Well, you'd be almost alone in thatI'm not so sure about that.


for most Marxists regard it as 'the world-view of the proletariat'Well, most "Marxists" are Stalinists and so forth also.


and they do so for the reasons I outlined on page one. Oh yes, I saw. You are rather addressing Hegelianist dialectics though. What is called materialist dialectics on the other hand was first put forward by people such as Marx and Dietzgen and the latter certainly was a worker even if you don't consider the former to be one. And of course the first proponents of bourgeois materialism so far again before Marx and Dietzgen were - well, obviously bourgeois as well.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


I'm not so sure about that.

In view of this:


Well, most "Marxists" are Stalinists and so forth also.

and the fact that Maoists and Trotskyists accept this view of DM, it is only the libertarian Marxists and you New Communists who might not (however, I do not profess to know whether or not this is so).

In that case most Marxists do accept DM as 'the world-view of the proletariat'.


You are rather addressing Hegelianist dialectics though. What is called materialist dialectics on the other hand was first put forward by people such as Marx and Dietzgen and the latter certainly was a worker even if you don't consider the former to be one. And of course the first proponents of bourgeois materialism so far again before Marx and Dietzgen were - well, obviously bourgeois as well.

No those comments apply to both the Hegelians and the 'materialist dialecticians', as is relatively easy to show.

Proof here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2002.htm

And Dietzgen wasn't a worker (if by that you mean a proletarian):

This is what I have argued in Essay Nine Part One:


Notwithstanding this, it could be argued that as a matter of fact the idea that workers cannot comprehend DM is factually incorrect: consider the case of Joseph Dietzgen. Dietzgen, it could be maintained, is a clear example of a proletarian who became a philosopher, one who was respected to some extent by Marx, Engels and Lenin. Indeed, Dietzgen it was who independently discovered/invented DM -- allegedly.

Now, while Dietzgen's working-class credentials are (shall we say) highly dubious (see below), his revolutionary sincerity is not open to question. He was clearly a fellow comrade and nothing said here should be interpreted as detracting from that fact. But that does not mean we should appropriate his work uncritically. That would be to turn him into an icon.

Unfortunately, Dietzgen's 'proletarian' credentials are far from convincing. According to the account given by his son [E. Dietzgen (1906), pp.7-33], Dietzgen senior was a "master tanner", who, after having worked in his father's shop, turned his hand to various different occupations. These included opening a grocery store, running a bakery and a tannery business; after this, he finally assumed control of the family firm in Germany. This means that Dietzgen's proletarian credentials are only marginally more 'convincing' than those of Engels himself!

However, even if it were true that he was a genuine "horny-handed proletarian", this would still not refute the claim made earlier that workers cannot form a single DM-idea on their own this side of being 'converted' to the faith by one of the dialectical-elect. This is so for two reasons:

First: Dietzgen's philosophical writings are thoroughly confused, and are vastly inferior even to those of Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. [An example of this confusion can be found here. {This is a link to Essay Two.}] Now, the Essays published at this site have shown that the philosophical ideas of DM-classicists make little sense; if that is so, the inferior work of Dietzgen stands no chance of holding together. Hence, if Dietzgen was a worker, the claim made here that no worker can comprehend DM finds ready confirmation in this case: he clearly did not understand it!

Second, but more importantly: irrespective of whether or not his ideas are comprehensible (or even whether he understood them), Dietzgen did not actually derive DM-concepts from his own experience; according to his son he learnt them by reading the works of Philosophers. [Cf., E. Dietzgen (1906), p.8.] Hence, if anything this further substantiates the point made here: DM-theses may only be obtained (directly or indirectly) from ruling-class sources, and they have to be imported into the working-class movement in this manner -- from the "outside".

The same comments are equally applicable to the other alleged examples of 'Proletarian Philosophers' (such as Tommy Jackson and Gerry Healy).

References and links can be found here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2009_01.htm

Leo:


And of course the first proponents of bourgeois materialism so far again before Marx and Dietzgen were - well, obviously bourgeois as well.

Maybe so, but what has that got to do with anything I said?

[Leo]

In view of this : (...) and the fact that Maoists and Trotskyists accept this view of DM, it is only the libertarian Marxists and you New Communists who might not (I do not profess to know this).I am not a "New Communist" or a "libertarian marxist".


In that case most Marxists do accept DM as 'the world-view of the proletariat'.Fair enough, the minority isn't always a tiny one though.


And Dietzgen wasn't a worker (if by that you mean a proletarian):Yes, my bad - the Turkish wiki mislead me. He was a self-educated tanner though, an artisan. He wasn't an educated son of the big bourgeoisie anyway. Marx was a journalist who starved most of his life and lived off Engels basically.


Notwithstanding this, it could be argued that as a matter of fact the idea that workers cannot comprehend DM is factually incorrectI would say it is factually incorrect regardless of the example of Dietzgen. Workers are certainly capable of developing an understanding of what dialectics is as well as developing an opinion based on that understanding. Weren't you a postman yourself?

I think the idea that workers' can't understand dialectics has got to so with Stalinist intellectuals wanting create a mystical, "dialectical" explanation to their actions.


Maybe so, but what has that got to do with anything I said? Well, you are saying that dialectics as we know it today in all it's forms has it's roots in the bourgeoisie. I am saying that this applies to materialism as well.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


I would say it is factually incorrect regardless of the example of Dietzgen. Workers are certainly capable of developing an understanding of what dialectics is as well as developing an opinion based on that understanding. Weren't you a postman yourself?

I was a postal worker, yes, among other things.

My claim was based on the observation that no one understands this theory (and not just workers), since it is incomprehensible.

Again, as is easy to show.

What dialectically-distracted comrades are good at, however, as this thread alone shows, is regurgitating dialectical phraseology which they plainly haven't given much thought. When asked to explain it, they almost invariably go very quiet, very quickly. A few will put up a weak attempt to do so (Gilhyle and BTB, among others here, are good examples of this), but they soon give up when it becomes apparent that they too cannot explain it. Nor can they tell us who can!

And I have yet to meet anyone in the last 25 or so years who can explain it. Nor have I read a single comprehensible account of it (in the many hundreds of books and articles I have had to endure in that time).


Well, you are saying that dialectics as we know it today in all it's forms has it's roots in the bourgeoisie. I am saying that this applies to materialism as well.

And that is why my materialism is not the same as theirs.

Recall, I am not claiming that everything the bourgeoisie has ever said or which their theorists have ever invented is automatically wrong. My point is that it has been a general ruling-class ploy (from ancient Greek times to today) to argue that there is an invisble world anterior to the senses, which is accessible to thought alone, which is more real that the material world. Now that doctrine plainly this serves their interests.

It is an independent matter whether this family of theories or the arguments in support of them make any sense. In fact, in my essays, I first of all show that they do not, and then I proceed to expose their ideological roots.

[Leo]

My claim was based on the observation that no one understands this theory (and not just workers), since it is incomprehensible.

It's basics are quite simple in my opinion actually if not complicated with word plays. I think everyone would be able to say that it is basically an analytical logic regarding change and it's dynamics. It basically says everything changes, that these changes occurs of interaction which we regard as conflict, that changes we regard as quantitative lead to those we regard to as qualitative, and that these changes don't happen in a linear or circular but a spiral-like dynamic.


Again, as is easy to show.

What dialectically-distracted comrades are good at, however, as this thread alone shows, is regurgitating dialectical phraseology which they plainly haven't given much thought. When asked to explain it, they almost invariably go very quiet, very quickly. A few will put up a weak attempt to do so (Gilhyle and BTB, among others here, are good examples of this), but they soon give up when it becomes apparent that they too cannot explain it. Nor can they tell us who can!

But they weren't really trying to explain what dialectics meant, they were trying to prove that it was the universally true laws of nature, that it was the ultimately correct weltanschauungat. What else can you expect when someone is trying to prove something like that?


And that is why my materialism is not the same as theirs.

OK, but then again it would equally be valid for, let's say, Marx to say that his dialectics was not the same as Hegel's, just as he said his materialism was not the same as Feuerbach's.


It is an independent matter whether this family of theories or the arguments in support of them make any sense. In fact, in my essays, I first of all show that they do not, and then I proceed to expose their ideological roots.

Fair enough.


Recall, I am not claiming that everything the bourgeoisie has ever said or which their theorists have ever invented is automatically wrong. My point is that it has been a general ruling-class ploy (from ancient Greek times to today) to argue that there is an invisble world anterior to the senses, which is accessible to thought alone, which is more real that the material world. Now that doctrine plainly this serves their interests.

Yes, of course it is clear whose interests idealism served and that idealism was basically wrong. Yet on a different point, it is important to acknowledge the contribution of what idealist philosophy expressed in regards to the development of human thought which itself was of course determined by material conditions and progress. In his Theses on Feuerbach Marx himself says: "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such."

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


It's basics are quite simple in my opinion actually if not complicated with word plays. I think everyone would be able to say that it is basically an analytical logic regarding change and it's dynamics. It basically says everything changes, that these changes occurs of interaction which we regard as conflict, that changes we regard as quantitative lead to those we regard to as qualitative, and that these changes don't happen in a linear or circular but a spiral-like dynamic.

But, as I have shown, this makes no sense at all:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1350764&postcount=23

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1350765&postcount=24

So, it's not the least bit 'simple'.


But they weren't really trying to explain what dialectics meant, they were trying to prove that it was the universally true laws of nature, that it was the ultimately correct weltanschauungat. What else can you expect when someone is trying to prove something like that?

No, they do not even try to prove it, they just impose it on reality -- as is easy to show, too.


OK, but then again it would equally be valid for, let's say, Marx to say that his dialectics was not the same as Hegel's, just as he said his materialism was not the same as Feuerbach's.

Indeed, and it is also easy to show that he abandoned the 'dialectic' as it is traditionally understood (by the vast majority of Marxists), and thus that he dropped things like the alleged 'law of the transformation of quantity into quality', 'dialectical contradictions', the 'negation of the negation', the 'unity of opposites', etc.


Yet on a different point, it is important to acknowledge the contribution of what idealist philosophy expressed in regards to the development of human thought which itself was of course determined by material conditions and progress. In his Theses on Feuerbach Marx himself says: "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such."

I disagree; idealist thought has contributed zero to human knowledge. It has, on the other hand, contributed much to ruling-class thought.

[Leo]

But, as I have shown, this makes no sense at all:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...4&postcount=23 (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1350764&postcount=23)

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.p...5&postcount=24 (http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1350765&postcount=24)

Well yes, when examined as if it was the laws of nature as claimed, it indeed does not make any sense at all - I never claimed otherwise, but I also said I don't think it was as such either. Yet something which, when declared the universal and the ultimate laws of the universe sounds mad can also be quite simple and basic when considered simply a generalization and simplification of our perceptions for example, of the way we understand things around us.


No, they do not even try to prove it, they just impose it on reality -- as is easy to show, too.

Well, when someone regards a philosophical generalization and simplification as the ultimately 'true world' theory that is bound to happen, but you know what I mean.


Indeed, and it is also easy to show that he abandoned the 'dialectic' as it is traditionally understood (by the vast majority of Marxists)

Yes, fair enough.


and thus that he dropped things like the alleged 'law of the transformation of quantity into quality', 'dialectical contradictions', the 'negation of the negation', the 'unity of opposites', etc.

Certainly he did not regard them as laws anyway.


I disagree; idealist thought has contributed zero to human knowledge. It has, on the other hand, contributed much to ruling-class thought.

But ruling-class though itself has contributed massively at times to human knowledge!

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


Yet something which, when declared the universal and the ultimate laws of the universe sounds mad can also be quite simple and basic when considered simply a generalization and simplification of our perceptions for example, of the way we understand things around us.

Which, of course, excludes dialectical materialism (or 'materialist dialectics').


But ruling-class though itself has contributed massively at times to human knowledge!

But, not Idealism.

[Cumannach]

Cummanach:



In fact, this piece by Stalin is embarrassingly poor. Quite apart from the fact that it is yet another example of a priori dogmatics (where Stalin imposes this theory on reality, and in defiance of the facts) he makes all the usual mistakes.



Yeah, because you're such a great judge of all things dialectics.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Cummanach:


Yeah, because you're such a great judge of all things dialectics.

Maybe so, maybe not, but until you can show where I go wrong, say, here:

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1350764&postcount=23

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1350765&postcount=24

or in more detail, here:

http://homepage.ntlworld.com/rosa.l/page%2007.htm

the jury is still out on this.

[Leo]

Which, of course, excludes dialectical materialism (or 'materialist dialectics').

Well, at least excludes it the way it is understood by many, yes.


But, not Idealism.

Regardless of the fact that if it made contribution to ruling-class thought, it at least indirectly make a contribution to human progress, I do think that idealists did make an abstract but direct contribution to aspects of human knowledge as well as to the way social sciences developed to an extent at specific periods.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


Well, at least excludes it the way it is understood by many, yes.

Is there perhaps a version of this ruling-class theory I haven't heard?


Regardless of the fact that if it made contribution to ruling-class thought, it at least indirectly make a contribution to human progress, I do think that idealists did make an abstract but direct contribution to aspects of human knowledge as well as to the way social sciences developed to an extent at specific periods.

Perhaps then you'd like to give us one example of this alleged 'contribution'?

[Hit The North]

A few will put up a weak attempt to do so (Gilhyle and BTB, among others here, are good examples of this),





But they weren't really trying to explain what dialectics meant, they were trying to prove that it was the universally true laws of nature, that it was the ultimately correct weltanschauungat.


I can't really speak for Gilhyle, but I don't believe either of us have attempted to claim this. I'd like to see the evidence.


Originally posted by Rosa
And that is why my materialism is not the same as theirs.

So how is your materialism different?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

BTB:


I'd like to see the evidence.

If you look at what I actually said, I did not claim this.


So how is your materialism different?

It is based on ordinary language.

[Leo]

I can't really speak for Gilhyle, but I don't believe either of us have attempted to claim this. I'd like to see the evidence.

I wasn't just referring to this thread or any posters in particular, I was trying to refer to the general approach to the question.


Is there perhaps a version of this ruling-class theory I haven't heard?

I don't know, I don't see dialectics in itself as a "theory" as I said.


It is based on ordinary language.

Dialectics too can be based on ordinary language.

[Bilan]

moved to learning at OPs request.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


Dialectics too can be based on ordinary language.

I'd like to see an example where it isn't based on a distortion of it; as Marx noted:


The philosophers have only to dissolve their language into the ordinary language, from which it is abstracted, in order to recognise it, as the distorted language of the actual world, and to realise that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life." [Marx and Engels The German Ideology, p.118. Bold emphasis added.]

And I note you dodged this challenge:


Perhaps then you'd like to give us one example of this alleged 'contribution'?

Referring to this earlier claim of yours:


Regardless of the fact that if it made contribution to ruling-class thought, it at least indirectly make a contribution to human progress, I do think that idealists did make an abstract but direct contribution to aspects of human knowledge as well as to the way social sciences developed to an extent at specific periods.

Perhaps you'll dodge my challenge above, too?

[Leo]

I'd like to see an example where it isn't based on a distortion of it; as Marx noted:

I do agree with the quote. Dialectics as Marx understood, expressed and used I would say is not based on such distortion. The one he is talking about when he says: "My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."


And I note you dodged this challenge:

I didn't "dodge" it Rosa, I simply missed it.


Perhaps then you'd like to give us one example of this alleged 'contribution'?

What can I say? I consider idealist thought, (chronologically) from Plato to even Hegel, to have made some contributions to human thought, and at least expressed thoughts of the times. I agree with Marx when he says "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such." I agree with Marx when he says "The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner." Should I go through every idealist thinker and show how they contributed?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


"My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."

But he also added a summary of 'his method':



"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'
"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx, 'Capital' (Penguin edition, 1976), pp.101-02.]

In the passage that Marx quotes not a single Hegelian concept is to be found (no "contradictions", no change of "quantity into quality", no "negation of the negation", no "unity and identity of opposites", no "interconnected Totality"), and yet Marx calls this the "dialectic Method", and says of it that it is "my method". So, Marx's "method" has had Hegel completely excised --, except for the odd phrase or two here and there with which he merely "coquetted". In that case, Marx's 'dialectic method' more closely resembles that of Aristotle and Kant.

There is thus no 'rational kernel' to Hegel's dialectic.

No wonder Marx waved it goodbye.


What can I say? I consider idealist thought, (chronologically) from Plato to even Hegel, to have made some contributions to human thought, and at least expressed thoughts of the times. I agree with Marx when he says "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism – which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such." I agree with Marx when he says "The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner." Should I go through every idealist thinker and show how they contributed?

I said just one would do.

And good luck finding it...

[Leo]

In the passage that Marx quotes not a single Hegelian concept is to be found (no "contradictions", no change of "quantity into quality", no "negation of the negation", no "unity and identity of opposites", no "interconnected Totality"), and yet Marx calls this the "dialectic Method", and says of it that it is "my method".

Certain terms not being in a certain passage doesn't really prove anything; it doesn't even prove that the concepts that aren't included aren't used even in that passage only. The fact is though that Marx does call dialectic method "my method".


So, Marx's "method" has had Hegel completely excised --, except for the odd phrase or two here and there with which he merely "coquetted".

Well in a way yes, it "turns Hegel upside down" as Marx says, and of course Marx was not a Hegelian after he grew out of it. There are clearly some influences and it is not a secret that Marx did respect Hegel a lot despite arguing strongly against Hegel's mysticism. We can at least say that there is not a trace (or very little trace) of Hegel's mysticism.


In that case, Marx's 'dialectic method' more closely resembles that of Aristotle and Kant.

With Kant I can indeed see where you are coming from - and of course Kant was influential on Hegel's dialectics as well. With Aristotle, I don't really see lots of similarities.


I said just one would do.

You can take up that Marx quote about Hegel if you want then, that would count as one example.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


Certain terms not being in a certain passage doesn't really prove anything; it doesn't even prove that the concepts that aren't included aren't used even in that passage only. The fact is though that Marx does call dialectic method "my method".

1) It does when Marx pointedly said that he would only be 'coquetting' with Hegelian terms in Das Kapital -- in other words, he would be using them non-seriously.

2) It also does when the only method Marx endorsed as his method contains not one atom of Hegel.

3) Indeed the dialectic is his method, but as I pointed out, when every trace of Hegel has been removed, Marx's method resembles the classic dialectic of Aristotle and Kant, not Hegel. So, there is no rational core to Hegel's 'dialectic'. To up-end Hegel is to crush his head.


There are clearly some influences and it is not a secret that Marx did respect Hegel a lot despite arguing strongly against Hegel's mysticism. We can at least say that there is not a trace (or very little trace) of Hegel's mysticism.

In his early work, you are right, but not in Das Kapital. So, by the time he wrote Das Kapital, not only has Hegel's mysticism gone, so has Hegel, too, and in his entirety. What few traces there of that sub-logical and incompetent bumbler in Das Kapital are a few bits of jargon, which Marx confines to 'coquetting'.

And sure, Marx thought Hegel was a great thinker, but in Das Kapital he pointedly put that comment in the past tense. If he had maintained that opinion in Das Kapital, he would not have 'coquetted' with Hegelian terms there, but would have treated then with respect.

Finally, I think Plato, for example, is a great (even a 'mighty') thinker, but I also disagree with everything he says, so much so that I too use Platonic terms in my essays non-seriously.

Same with Marx and Hegel.


With Aristotle, I don't really see lots of similarities.

Loads of them.

Try these:

http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:q0h2xTznZXcJ:www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/Honors_Theses/Theses_2003/Chau.pdf+Marx+and+Aristotle&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=uk

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=rA66GMF7aHYC&pg=PA275&lpg=PA275&dq=Marx+and+Aristotle&source=web&ots=yZpP7h70CZ&sig=Y05wks8lDXHe-Ivkmkf66zl8HXM&hl=en&ei=vVOPScbhDNit-gashYCjCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=2&ct=result

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=LXFNgxv2mxEC&pg=PA28&lpg=PA28&dq=Marx+and+Aristotle&source=web&ots=PkCYAMgirY&sig=LGtOD7jcvAsWbZxAYMlx63jqMrg&hl=en&ei=vVOPScbhDNit-gashYCjCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=6&ct=result


You can take up that Marx quote about Hegel if you want then, that would count as one example.

But we have already seen that this is an empty example. In fact, Marx had to ditch Hegel completely, and return to the Historical Materialism of Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists, and also return to Aristotle, too, to make his theory work

[Leo]

1) It does when Marx pointedly said that he would only be 'coquetting' with Hegelian terms in Das Kapital -- in other words, he would be using them non-seriously.

"Non-seriously"? What do you mean? You mean as a joke or something?


2) It also does when the only method Marx endorsed as his method contains not one atom of Hegel.

Marx himself obviously disagrees on that. I certainly don't think he was a Hegelian, but he was clearly influenced by Hegel all his life to an extent. I am not even saying all this influence is good even but this is a fact.


3) Indeed the dialectic is his method,

OK, we agree on that then.


but as I pointed out, when every trace of Hegel has been removed, Marx's method resembles the classic dialectic of Aristotle and Kant, not Hegel.

As I said, I certainly do see the point about Kant, on the other hand Kant never claimed to be using dialectics let alone "classic dialectics" (the term classic dialectics more resembles Socrates and Plato to me to be honest). As for Aristotle as I said I am not convinced.


In his early work, you are right, but not in Das Kapital. So, by the time he wrote Das Kapital, not only has Hegel's mysticism gone, so has Hegel, too, and in his entirety. What few traces there of that sub-logical and incompetent bumbler in Das Kapital are a few bits of jargon, which Marx confines to 'coquetting'.

Ah, the old distinction between young Marx and mature Marx - I don't buy it to be honest, methodologically they are one and what they say are completely connected. In any case, there is some Hegelian terminology borrowed and used (albeit for completely different purposes for what Hegel intended to be, but Marx's entire relation with Hegel was this to begin with: twisting and using what Hegel said for completely different purposes, perhaps to the point of allowing it to be perceived that he "removed every trace of Hegel") as well as the commonly repeated thing about Das Kapital itself, in it's structure, being modeled after Hegel's work.


And sure, Marx thought Hegel was a great thinker, but in Das Kapital he pointedly put that comment in the past tense.

Well, Hegel was dead after all.


Finally, I think Plato, for example, is a great (even a 'mighty') thinker

Yes, he was.


Loads of them.

Try these:

http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:...lnk&cd=1&gl=uk (http://www.anonym.to/?http://74.125.77.132/search?q=cache:q0h2xTznZXcJ:www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/Honors_Theses/Theses_2003/Chau.pdf+Marx+and+Aristotle&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=uk)

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=r...um=2&ct=result (http://www.anonym.to/?http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=rA66GMF7aHYC&pg=PA275&lpg=PA275&dq=Marx+and+Aristotle&source=web&ots=yZpP7h70CZ&sig=Y05wks8lDXHe-Ivkmkf66zl8HXM&hl=en&ei=vVOPScbhDNit-gashYCjCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=2&ct=result)

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=L...um=6&ct=result (http://www.anonym.to/?http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=LXFNgxv2mxEC&pg=PA28&lpg=PA28&dq=Marx+and+Aristotle&source=web&ots=PkCYAMgirY&sig=LGtOD7jcvAsWbZxAYMlx63jqMrg&hl=en&ei=vVOPScbhDNit-gashYCjCw&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=6&ct=result)

Yet from an admittedly brief look, I saw all these form a resemblance between their ideas in the ethical and political, not in the methodological sense (and being especially skeptical of Aristotle's ideas about ethics and politics, I am rather dubious about the accuracy of what is argued as well).


But we have already seen that this is an empty example. In fact, Marx had to ditch Hegel completely, and return to the Historical Materialism of Kant and the Scottish Historical Materialists, and also return to Aristotle, too, to make his theory work

I don't think you can call Kant or the Scottish political economists "historical materialists". Especially with Kant, the man considered himself to be an idealist! I am not saying that either weren't inspirational or influential for Marx or shouldn't be as such today for marxists even, but historical materialism refers to a specific method after all.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


What do you mean? You mean as a joke or something?

No, as I said: not seriously. Marx was in the process of waving good-bye to Hegel, and these were his parting salvos in that direction. These days we put such terms in 'scare quotes'.


Marx himself obviously disagrees on that. I certainly don't think he was a Hegelian, but he was clearly influenced by Hegel all his life to an extent. I am not even saying all this influence is good even but this is a fact.

What does he 'disagree' with? The review? Well he not only quoted it, he endorsed it.

Once more, I agree, Marx was influenced by Hegel in his younger days, but by the time he got to Das Kapital, the best he could do was 'coquette' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon. [But see below.]


As I said, I certainly do see the point about Kant, on the other hand Kant never claimed to be using dialectics let alone "classic dialectics" (the term classic dialectics more resembles Socrates and Plato to me to be honest). As for Aristotle as I said I am not convinced.

Then, do the reading, and get back to us.


Ah, the old distinction between young Marx and mature Marx - I don't buy it to be honest, methodologically they are one and what they say are completely connected. In any case, there is some Hegelian terminology borrowed and used (albeit for completely different purposes for what Hegel intended to be, but Marx's entire relation with Hegel was this to begin with: twisting and using what Hegel said for completely different purposes, perhaps to the point of allowing it to be perceived that he "removed every trace of Hegel") as well as the commonly repeated thing about Das Kapital itself, in it's structure, being modelled after Hegel's work.

1) Are you trying to say that it is not possible that Marx changed his mind at some stage in his life? [But, we already know he did -- after reading Feuerbach, for example, he dropped Hegelian idealism.]

2) As for Hegelian terms, Marx himself (not me) tells us that he merely 'coquetted' with them in Das Kapital.

3) But, anyway, we needn't speculate about whether Marx dropped Hegel or not, for Marx himself indicated he did when he included that review of his book, calling it 'his method', in which there are absolutely no traces of Hegel.


Well, Hegel was dead after all.

But, the past tense refers to his being a pupil of that 'mighty thinker', not to Hegel's mortal state.

For example, I can now say that I am (present tense) a pupil of Frege, even though he died over 80 years ago. Now, if I put this in the past tense, that would imply I no longer considered myself his pupil. Marx put his identification with Hegel in just such a past tense. And that explains why he included that summary of 'his method' (in which there is no trace of Hegel) and why he merely 'coquetted' with Hegelian jargon. He would not have treated Hegel that way if he still regarded himself as a pupil of Hegel.


Yet from an admittedly brief look, I saw all these form a resemblance between their ideas in the ethical and political, not in the methodological sense (and being especially skeptical of Aristotle's ideas about ethics and politics, I am rather dubious about the accuracy of what is argued as well).

And they link this to the labour theory of value -- which is a core HM principle, Also, they link it to Aristotle's idea that human beings are political animals -- also an HM concept.

Scott Meikle sets out the evidence here:

Meikle, S. (1985), Essentialism In The Thought of Karl Marx (Open Court)

As Wikipedia notes:


Of particular importance is Hegel's appropriation of Aristotle's organicist and essentialist categories in the light of Kant's transcendental turn.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_theory#cite_ref-1

Hegel was heavily influenced in all areas of his thought by Aristotle; Marx just cut the gobbledygook, and returned to the mother lode in Aristotle. He is on record, too, saying that Aristotle was his favourite ancient philosopher.


I don't think you can call Kant or the Scottish political economists "historical materialists". Especially with Kant, the man considered himself to be an idealist! I am not saying that either weren't inspirational or influential for Marx or shouldn't be as such today for marxists even, but historical materialism refers to a specific method after all.

These aren't my terms, but those of others:

Meek, R. (1967a), Economics And Ideology And Other Essays (Chapman Hall).

--------, (1967b), 'The Scottish Contribution To Marxist Sociology', in Meek (1967a), pp.34-50.

Wood, A, (1998), 'Kant's Historical Materialism' in Kneller and Axinn, Chapter Five.

--------, (1999), Kant's Ethical Thought (Cambridge University Press).

Kneller, J., and Axinn, S, (1998), Autonomy And Community: Readings In Contemporary Kantian Social Philosophy (State University of New York Press).

[Allen Wood is also a Marxist. So was Prof Meek.]

[Leo]

No, as I said: not seriously. Marx was in the process of waving good-bye to Hegel, and these were his parting salvos in that direction. These days we put such terms in 'scare quotes'.

Hmm okay I see what you mean.

What does he 'disagree' with? The review? Well he not only quoted it, he endorsed it.


Once more, I agree, Marx was influenced by Hegel in his younger days, but by the time he got to Das Kapital, the best he could do was 'coquette' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon. [But see below.]

Which to me shows that Hegel influenced Marx's thinking but that Marx was not a Hegelian in any way.


1) Are you trying to say that it is not possible that Marx changed his mind at some stage in his life? [But, we already know he did -- after reading Feuerbach, for example, he dropped Hegelian idealism.]

No, I am saying that once established, he kept using the same methodology.


2) As for Hegelian terms, Marx himself (not me) tells us that he merely 'coquetted' with them in Das Kapital.

Well yes, he paid his respects so to speak.


3) But, anyway, we needn't speculate about whether Marx dropped Hegel or not, for Marx himself indicated he did when he included that review of his book, calling it 'his method', in which there are absolutely no traces of Hegel.

I don't think he has to be a Hegelian going on about Hegelian concepts to have traces of Hegel. He has traces of Hegel in his methodology (and not much but nevertheless), doesn't have to repeat them in his terminology though.


2) As for Hegelian terms, Marx himself (not me) tells us that he merely 'coquetted' with them in Das Kapital.

Well yes, but I don't necessarily give the same meaning to this that you do. One could give it a positive meaning as much, even more so than the negative one you are giving it. Again I am not saying Marx was an Hegelian, this term basically proves that while Marx was not a Hegelian, he was paying respects to Hegel for influencing his methodology.


3) But, anyway, we needn't speculate about whether Marx dropped Hegel or not, for Marx himself indicated he did when he included that review of his book, calling it 'his method', in which there are absolutely no traces of Hegel.

Well, he says he reversed the relation Hegel sees in between thought and matter. This is "a trace of Hegel". Had he "dropped" Hegel completely he'd be saying there is no relation between thought and matter. He summarizes his difference quite clearly: To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."


But, the past tense refers to his being a pupil of that 'mighty thinker', not to Hegel's mortal state.

Certainly. Marx being a pupil of Hegel still would mean that he would be a Hegelian. He clearly wasn't.


And they link this to the labour theory of value -- which is a core HM principle

They can link things as much as they want: Aristotle did not have a labour theory of value though. The first fella who came up with it is Ibn Haldun.


Also, they link it to Aristotle's idea that human beings are political animals -- also an HM concept.

Doesn't Marx describe human beings as laboring animals, animal laborans?

In any case though, these too are similarities in the details and aspects of Marx's thinking, but not methodological similarities.


Hegel was heavily influenced in all areas of his thought by Aristotle; Marx just cut the gobbledygook, and returned to the mother lode in Aristotle. He is on record, too, saying that Aristotle was his favourite ancient philosopher.

While I don't think Marx was too influenced by ancient philosophy to begin with, he certainly paid more attention to Epicurus than Aristotle, writing a major study about him. Of course it is not unnatural for him to be fond of Aristotle too, the guy was rather similar to Marx himself, a freaking writing machine.


These aren't my terms, but those of others:

Fair enough but still doesn't make any difference.

I would be interested in how you'd argue that, especially about Kant though. Maybe you could write something about it in this thread: http://www.revleft.org/vb/showthread.php?t=100146

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


Which to me shows that Hegel influenced Marx's thinking but that Marx was not a Hegelian in any way.

Indeed, and Hegel's influence halted at or about the time Marx write Das Kapital.


No, I am saying that once established, he kept using the same methodology.

But, Marx indicated that he had changed this 'methodology' by the time he wrote Das Kapital.


I don't think he has to be a Hegelian going on about Hegelian concepts to have traces of Hegel. He has traces of Hegel in his methodology (and not much but nevertheless), doesn't have to repeat them in his terminology though.

I nowhere said he was a 'Hegelian'; what I said is that we need not speculate since Marx helpfully added a summary of 'his method' from which every trace of Hegel had been removed. So, this new method owes nothing to Hegel.

Unless you can show otherwise.


Well yes, but I don't necessarily give the same meaning to this that you do. One could give it a positive meaning as much, even more so than the negative one you are giving it. Again I am not saying Marx was an Hegelian, this term basically proves that while Marx was not a Hegelian, he was paying respects to Hegel for influencing his methodology.

In that case, your interpetation will have to ignore the summary of 'his method' that he endorsed which contains not one atom of Hegel, or his 'method'.


Well, he says he reversed the relation Hegel sees in between thought and matter. This is "a trace of Hegel". Had he "dropped" Hegel completely he'd be saying there is no relation between thought and matter. He summarizes his difference quite clearly: To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought."

Not so, this is a return to Aristotle.

Hegel had mystified Aristotle and Kant, Marx simply indicated that he rejected this. So he is not using Hegel's method, just signalling his return to Aristotle.


Aristotle did not have a labour theory of value though. The first fella who came up with it is Ibn Haldun.

Maybe so, but the seeds of the labour theory of value are in Aristotle:

http://www.economyprofessor.com/economictheories/labor-theory-of-value.php


That however in the form of commodity values all labours are expressed as equal human labour and therefore as of equal worth could not be read by Aristotle out of the form of value because Greek society was based on slave labour and therefore had as its natural basis the inequality of people and their labour powers. The secret of the expression of value, the equality and equal worth of all labours because and insofar as they are human labour in general, can only be deciphered once the concept of human equality has the firmness of a popular prejudice. This, however, is only possible in a society in which the commodity form is the general form of the product of labour and therefore also the relation of people to each other as commodity owners is the predominant social relation. Aristotle's genius shines precisely in the fact that he discovers in the expression of value of commodities a relationship of equality. Only the historical limit of the society in which he lived prevented him from finding out in what this relation of equality consisted 'in truth'. (Das Kapital Vol. 1 MEW23:74 translation my own ME)

Bold added.

Quoted from here:

http://192.220.96.165/untpltcl/exchvljs.html

From Rubin's history:


We consider the following passage in Capital to be crucial for an understanding of the ideas of Marx which have been presented: "There was, however, an important fact which prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute value to commodities, is merely a mode of expressing all labor as equal human labor, and consequently as labor of equal quality. Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality of men and of their labor-powers. The secret of the expression of value, namely, that all kinds of labor are equal and equivalent, because, and so far as they are human labor in general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion of human equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. This, however, is possible only in a society in which the great mass of the produce of labor takes the form of commodities, in which, consequently, the dominant relation between man and man, is that of owners of commodities" (C., I, pp. 59-60). [6] The equality of the autonomous and independent commodity producers is the foundation for the equality of the exchanged goods. This is the basic characteristic of the commodity economy, of its "cell structure," so to speak. The theory of value examines the process of formation of the productive unity called a social economy from separate, one might say independent, cells. It is not without reason that Marx wrote, in the preface to the first edition of the first volume of Capital, that the "commodity form of the product of labor or the form of value of the commodity is the form of the economic cell of bourgeois society." This cell structure of the commodity society represents, in itself, the totality of equal, formally independent, private economic units.

In the cited passage on Aristotle, Marx emphasizes that in slave society the concept of value could not be deduced from "the form of value itself," i.e., from the material expression of the equality of exchanged commodities. The mystery of value can only be grasped from the characteristics of the commodity economy. One should not be astonished that critics who missed the sociological character of Marx's theory of value should have interpreted the cited passage without discernment. According to Dietzel, Marx "was guided by the ethical axiom of equality." This "ethical foundation is displayed in the passage where Marx explains the shortcomings of Aristotle's theory of value by pointing out that the natural basis of Greek society was the inequality among people and among their labor-powers." [7]Dietzel does not understand that Marx is not dealing with an ethical postulate of equality, but with the equality of commodity producers as a basic social fact of the commodity economy. We repeat, not equality in the sense of equal distribution of material goods, but in the sense of independence and autonomy among economic agents who organize production.

If Dietzel transforms the society of equal commodity producers from an actual fact into an ethical postulate, Croce sees in the principle of equality a theoretically conceived type of society thought up by Marx on the basis of theoretical considerations and for the purpose of contrast and comparison with the capitalist society, which is based on inequality. The purpose of this comparison is to explain the specific characteristics of the capitalist society. The equality of commodity producers is not an ethical ideal but a theoretically conceived measure, a standard with which we measure capitalist society. Croce recalls the passage where Marx says that the nature of value can only be explained in a society where the belief in the equality of people has acquired the force of a popular prejudice. [8] Croce thinks that Marx, in order to understand value in a capitalist society, took as a type, as a theoretical standard, a different (concrete) value, namely that which would be possessed by goods which can be multiplied by labor in a society without the imperfections of capitalist society, and in which labor power would not be a commodity. From this, Croce derives the following conclusion on the logical properties of Marx's theory of value. "Marx's labor-value is not only a logical generalization, it is also a fact conceived and postulated as typical, i.e., something more than a mere logical concept."

More here:

http://www.marxists.org/archive/rubin/value/ch10.htm

See also:

http://cas.umkc.edu/ECON/Oeconomicus/Volume%20IX/Avsar1.pdf

Leo:


While I don't think Marx was too influenced by ancient philosophy to begin with, he certainly paid more attention to Epicurus than Aristotle, writing a major study about him. Of course it is not unnatural for him to be fond of Aristotle too, the guy was rather similar to Marx himself, a freaking writing machine.

And yet he quotes Aristotle across eight pages in Das Kapital, and Epicurus not once.

Here are a few of them:


The two latter peculiarities of the equivalent form will become more intelligible if we go back to the great thinker who was the first to analyse so many forms, whether of thought, society, or Nature, and amongst them also the form of value. I mean Aristotle.

In the first place, he clearly enunciates that the money form of commodities is only the further development of the simple form of value – i.e., of the expression of the value of one commodity in some other commodity taken at random; for he says:

5 beds = 1 house – (clinai pente anti oiciaς)

is not to be distinguished from

5 beds = so much money. – (clinai pente anti ... oson ai pente clinai)

He further sees that the value relation which gives rise to this expression makes it necessary that the house should qualitatively be made the equal of the bed, and that, without such an equalisation, these two clearly different things could not be compared with each other as commensurable quantities. “Exchange,” he says, “cannot take place without equality, and equality not without commensurability". (out isothς mh oushς snmmetriaς). Here, however, he comes to a stop, and gives up the further analysis of the form of value. “It is, however, in reality, impossible (th men oun alhqeia adunaton), that such unlike things can be commensurable” – i.e., qualitatively equal. Such an equalisation can only be something foreign to their real nature, consequently only “a makeshift for practical purposes.”

Aristotle therefore, himself, tells us what barred the way to his further analysis; it was the absence of any concept of value. What is that equal something, that common substance, which admits of the value of the beds being expressed by a house? Such a thing, in truth, cannot exist, says Aristotle. And why not? Compared with the beds, the house does represent something equal to them, in so far as it represents what is really equal, both in the beds and the house. And that is – human labour.

There was, however, an important fact which prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute value to commodities, is merely a mode of expressing all labour as equal human labour, and consequently as labour of equal quality. Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality of men and of their labour powers. The secret of the expression of value, namely, that all kinds of labour are equal and equivalent, because, and so far as they are human labour in general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion of human equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. This, however, is possible only in a society in which the great mass of the produce of labour takes the form of commodities, in which, consequently, the dominant relation between man and man, is that of owners of commodities. The brilliancy of Aristotle’s genius is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality....


MECW, Volume 35, Capital Volume One, pp.69-70. Bold added.

Notice, no past tense when he calls Aristotle a 'great thinker', and that his work is that of 'genius'. I do not think he ever described Hegel that way. Lenin did, but not Marx. 'Mighty thinker' is the best we get.

And here:


If a giant thinker like Aristotle erred in his appreciation of slave labour, why should a dwarf economist like Bastiat be right in his appreciation of wage labour?

Ibid., p.92.


“For two-fold is the use of every object.... The one is peculiar to the object as such, the other is not, as a sandal which may be worn, and is also exchangeable. Both are uses of the sandal, for even he who exchanges the sandal for the money or food he is in want of, makes use of the sandal as a sandal. But not in its natural way. For it has not been made for the sake of being exchanged.” (Aristoteles, “De Rep.” l. i. c. 9.)

Ibid., p.96.

He quotes him again at length on pages 163, 175, 331 (where he notes that Aristotle called 'man' a politcal animal), and then on page 411 we find this:


“If,” dreamed Aristotle, the greatest thinker of antiquity, “if every tool, when summoned, or even of its own accord, could do the work that befits it, just as the creations of Daedalus moved of themselves, or the tripods of Hephaestos went of their own accord to their sacred work, if the weavers’ shuttles were to weave of themselves, then there would be no need either of apprentices for the master workers, or of slaves for the lords.”

Maybe I'll write something on Kant -- when I have time. I am just putting the finishing touches to a 130,000 word essay, which is already ten days overdue.

[Leo]

Apologies, I didn't have time to respond to this thread:


Indeed, and Hegel's influence halted at or about the time Marx write Das Kapital.

I am not convinced, I don't think that quote shows that either.


But, Marx indicated that he had changed this 'methodology' by the time he wrote Das Kapital.

This is quite a big thing to say since it means that Marx's methodology before a certain point basically "marxist". It is evidently untrue, Marx's methodology remains the same - but of course constantly developing - methodology in more or less all his work, even before he was fully a communist.


In that case, your interpetation will have to ignore the summary of 'his method' that he endorsed which contains not one atom of Hegel, or his 'method'.

Well, lets let the man speak for himself: The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

Marx says it quite clearly whether you like it or not, and denying this reality doesn't help the point you are making.


Not so, this is a return to Aristotle.

No it isn't though, Aristotle's understanding of the relation between thought and matter is completely apart from that of Marx. Aristotle's conception, what is called universalia in rebus, basically is in the same school with Plato's conceptions later called universalia ante rem. Marx's conception stands opposed to the understanding of both Aristotle and Plato on this, and is in line with the tradition of universalia post rem, an ancient representative of which would be Antisthenes rather than Aristotle. It is of course telling how Plato and Aristotle's mystical conceptions on this question dominating medieval philosophy and represented by the likes of Augustinus, Boetius and Thomas Aquinas were challenged by the likes of William of Ockham and Roscelinius near the end of the middle ages, in a way signalling the beginning of the renassaince.


Maybe so, but the seeds of the labour theory of value are in Aristotle:

You have a point there.


And yet he quotes Aristotle across eight pages in Das Kapital, and Epicurus not once.

Well yes, then again Epicurus doesn't really have much to do with economics and Marx had already written two studies on him.


Notice, no past tense when he calls Aristotle a 'great thinker', and that his work is that of 'genius'. I do not think he ever described Hegel that way. Lenin did, but not Marx. 'Mighty thinker' is the best we get.

I don't think the degree of praises Marx made on different philosophers has got much to do with the point, what you are making is a sematic point. There is of course nothing surprising about Marx quoting Aritotle several times since he made a point about the connections he saw between what Aristotle said and his economics.


Aristotle, the greatest thinker of antiquity

Considering that Aristotle is the philosopher who has the highest amount of works that survived so that it seems as if the bastard wrote about every subject imaginable, this is an understandable comment.

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


I am not convinced, I don't think that quote shows that either.

Ok, but you will admit that my interpretation is viable.

Plus, it absolves Marx of involvement with a theory that implies change is impossible!

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1382945&postcount=54

http://www.revleft.com/vb/showpost.php?p=1382946&postcount=55


This is quite a big thing to say since it means that Marx's methodology before a certain point basically "marxist". It is evidently untrue, Marx's methodology remains the same - but of course constantly developing - methodology in more or less all his work, even before he was fully a communist.

So you say, but Marx indicated in Das Kapital that it had changed.


Well, lets let the man speak for himself: The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.

Indeed, let him speak for himself, so we need not speculate here:


"After a quotation from the preface to my 'Criticism of Political Economy,' Berlin, 1859, pp. IV-VII, where I discuss the materialistic basis of my method, the writer goes on:*

'The one thing which is of moment to Marx, is to find the law of the phenomena with whose investigation he is concerned; and not only is that law of moment to him, which governs these phenomena, in so far as they have a definite form and mutual connexion within a given historical period. Of still greater moment to him is the law of their variation, of their development, i.e., of their transition from one form into another, from one series of connexions into a different one. This law once discovered, he investigates in detail the effects in which it manifests itself in social life. Consequently, Marx only troubles himself about one thing: to show, by rigid scientific investigation, the necessity of successive determinate orders of social conditions, and to establish, as impartially as possible, the facts that serve him for fundamental starting-points. For this it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present order of things, and the necessity of another order into which the first must inevitably pass over; and this all the same, whether men believe or do not believe it, whether they are conscious or unconscious of it. Marx treats the social movement as a process of natural history, governed by laws not only independent of human will, consciousness and intelligence, but rather, on the contrary, determining that will, consciousness and intelligence. ... If in the history of civilisation the conscious element plays a part so subordinate, then it is self-evident that a critical inquiry whose subject-matter is civilisation, can, less than anything else, have for its basis any form of, or any result of, consciousness. That is to say, that not the idea, but the material phenomenon alone can serve as its starting-point. Such an inquiry will confine itself to the confrontation and the comparison of a fact, not with ideas, but with another fact. For this inquiry, the one thing of moment is, that both facts be investigated as accurately as possible, and that they actually form, each with respect to the other, different momenta of an evolution; but most important of all is the rigid analysis of the series of successions, of the sequences and concatenations in which the different stages of such an evolution present themselves. But it will be said, the general laws of economic life are one and the same, no matter whether they are applied to the present or the past. This Marx directly denies. According to him, such abstract laws do not exist. On the contrary, in his opinion every historical period has laws of its own.... As soon as society has outlived a given period of development, and is passing over from one given stage to another, it begins to be subject also to other laws. In a word, economic life offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history of evolution in other branches of biology. The old economists misunderstood the nature of economic laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry. A more thorough analysis of phenomena shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fundamentally as plants or animals. Nay, one and the same phenomenon falls under quite different laws in consequence of the different structure of those organisms as a whole, of the variations of their individual organs, of the different conditions in which those organs function, &c. Marx, e.g., denies that the law of population is the same at all times and in all places. He asserts, on the contrary, that every stage of development has its own law of population. ... With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too. Whilst Marx sets himself the task of following and explaining from this point of view the economic system established by the sway of capital, he is only formulating, in a strictly scientific manner, the aim that every accurate investigation into economic life must have. The scientific value of such an inquiry lies in the disclosing of the special laws that regulate the origin, existence, development, death of a given social organism and its replacement by another and higher one. And it is this value that, in point of fact, Marx's book has.'

"Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method, in this striking and [as far as concerns my own application of it] generous way, what else is he picturing but the dialectic method?" [Marx (1976), pp.101-02. Bold emphases added.]

You will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics comrades usually attribute to Marx, for in it there is not one ounce of Hegel -- no quantity turning into quality, no contradictions, no negation of the negation, no unities of opposites, no totality...

So, Marx's method has had Hegel totally extirpated. For Marx, putting Hegel on 'his feet' is to crush his head, and we find that the 'rational kernel' is empty.

And of the few terms Marx uses of Hegel's in Das Kapital, he tells us this:


"and even, here and there in the chapter on the theory of value, coquetted with the mode of expression peculiar to him."

So, the 'rational core' of the dialectic has not one atom of Hegel in it, and Marx merely 'coquetted' with a few bits of Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital.

That is hardly a ringing endorsement of this mystical theory.


No it isn't though, Aristotle's understanding of the relation between thought and matter is completely apart from that of Marx. Aristotle's conception, what is called universalia in rebus, basically is in the same school with Plato's conceptions later called universalia ante rem. Marx's conception stands opposed to the understanding of both Aristotle and Plato on this, and is in line with the tradition of universalia post rem, an ancient representative of which would be Antisthenes rather than Aristotle. It is of course telling how Plato and Aristotle's mystical conceptions on this question dominating medieval philosophy and represented by the likes of Augustinus, Boetius and Thomas Aquinas were challenged by the likes of William of Ockham and Roscelinius near the end of the middle ages, in a way signalling the beginning of the renassaince.

Well, I do not wish to take issue with all this here (but the argument is not as clear cut as you would have it -- I can find no reference in Marx that supports this view of yours), but even if you were right, I am not sure what this has to do with the issue at hand. I nowhere said Marx fully agreed with Aristotle.


I don't think the degree of praises Marx made on different philosophers has got much to do with the point, what you are making is a sematic point. There is of course nothing surprising about Marx quoting Aritotle several times since he made a point about the connections he saw between what Aristotle said and his economics.

Maybe so, maybe not, but the point is that Marx was happy to wave goodbye to Hegel in Das Kapital, hence his use of the past tense, and his dismissal of Hegelian jargon as a joke (i.e., something with which he 'coquetted').


Considering that Aristotle is the philosopher who has the highest amount of works that survived so that it seems as if the bastard wrote about every subject imaginable, this is an understandable comment.

I am not sure what quantity has got to do with this. Are you suggesting that Marx was that superficial?

[Die Neue Zeit]

Marx should've agreed with Aristotle on demarchy vs. electoralism (the basis of modern-day republicanism). At least then his critique of the Paris Commune would have been stronger.

[Leo]

Ok, but you will admit that my interpretation is viable.

Yes, it is viable but I am not convinced nevertheless.


Plus, it absolves Marx of involvement with a theory that implies change is impossible!

Well, I don't think we need to push things that hard in order to distance Marx from the gross distorted Stalinist understanding of Engels' approach to the question, which in its own turn was rather dogmatic and confused, while he of course did have some points.


So you say, but Marx indicated in Das Kapital that it had changed.

That's not how I read it. He is talking about his method, he is not saying that he changed his method.


You will note that Marx calls this the 'dialectic method', and 'his method', but it is also clear that it bears no relation to the sort of dialectics comrades usually attribute to Marx, for in it there is not one ounce of Hegel -- no quantity turning into quality, no contradictions, no negation of the negation, no unities of opposites, no totality...

It can actually be argued that all these sort of things are indeed used in Das Kapital in Marx's arguements without being particularly mentioning them. On the other hand I would say that the main contribution of Hegel to Marx's method, that is seeing things not just in what they areat the moment, but historically, in what they were and what they will become, seeing things with perspective, remains.


For Marx, putting Hegel on 'his feet' is to crush his head

I'm sorry but again I am not convinced, putting something on it's doesn't mean crushing that things head. We've all read how Marx behaved those whose heads he actually crushed, he neither coquetted them nor paid them any respect.


and we find that the 'rational kernel' is empty.

Again, you can argue this, but I am simply not convinced that this is what Marx thought based on what he says.


Well, I do not wish to take issue with all this here (but the argument is not as clear cut as you would have it -- I can find no reference in Marx that supports this view of yours), but even if you were right, I am not sure what this has to do with the issue at hand.

You don't need to find a referance for it in Marx about it though, the similarity between Marx's views on the question of universals and those of the "nominalists" of the renaissance and antiquity is quite clear.


I nowhere said Marx fully agreed with Aristotle.

No, but you described this quote from Marx: "To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of 'the Idea,' he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." as a "return to Aristotle". I was pointing out that what is expressed here is basically distant from Aristotle's mystical understanding of the relationship between thought and matter.


Maybe so, maybe not, but the point is that Marx was happy to wave goodbye to Hegel in Das Kapital, hence his use of the past tense, and his dismissal of Hegelian jargon as a joke (i.e., something with which he 'coquetted').

Again I think you are reading too much into those things in a rather speculative way and it doesn't help your arguement.


I am not sure what quantity has got to do with this. Are you suggesting that Marx was that superficial?

I don't see it as being superficial. You can't really compare Aristotle with for example Thales or another philosopher whose works haven't survived. Quantity becomes quality :p:lol:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


He is talking about his method, he is not saying that he changed his method.

Except, Hegel has now completely gone, and that constitutes a major change.


Again, you can argue this, but I am simply not convinced that this is what Marx thought based on what he says.

Well, Marx's own description of 'his method', from which all traces of Hegel have been removed, plainly indicates that the 'rational kernel' of Hegel is empty.

Unless, of course, you think some traces of Hegel have been left. If so, which?


You don't need to find a referance for it in Marx about it though, the similarity between Marx's views on the question of universals and those of the "nominalists" of the renaissance and antiquity is quite clear.

So, let me get this straight; my view is based on what Marx actually said, whereas yours isn't.

That seems fair...


he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of 'the Idea.' With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought." as a "return to Aristotle". I was pointing out that what is expressed here is basically distant from Aristotle's mystical understanding of the relationship between thought and matter.

Well, this is your reading. For my part, I think Marx is just confused here; so best to pass over it in respectful silence.


Again I think you are reading too much into those things in a rather speculative way and it doesn't help your arguement.

Except, it is based on what Marx actually says, not on what traditional tells us.


I don't see it as being superficial. You can't really compare Aristotle with for example Thales or another philosopher whose works haven't survived. Quantity becomes quality

In that case, Marx should have thought highly of St Bonaventure, whose works easily dwarf those of Aristotle.

Or, if you are concentrating only on ancient philosophers, he should have thought more highly of Plato and Plotinus than he did of Epicurus or Democritus.

So, not even you believe that quantity is related to quality here.

[Leo]

Well, Marx's own description of 'his method', from which all traces of Hegel have been removed, plainly indicates that the 'rational kernel' of Hegel is empty.

It is an interpretation that doesn't really sound that reasonable, since you are basically saying that while Marx was saying something he meant the opposite.


So, let me get this straight; my view is based on what Marx actually said, whereas yours isn't.

No your view isn't based on what Marx actually said either. Marx never said that there was the slightest similarity between his and Aristotle's understanding of the question of universals. Marx, like other nominalists before himself, sees that concepts come after material reality and is shaped by it, that thought comes after matter and is shaped by it. This is basically a modern and developed understanding of what those who have been called nominalists said. Aristotle has a completely different understanding of the question of universals which is mystical.


Well, this is your reading. For my part, I think Marx is just confused here; so best to pass over it in respectful silence.

It's not "my reading", it's what he says - you can't make the point that Marx has got nothing to do with Hegel when you say ignore it when he himself says there are connections or when you just dismiss his comments as silly confused remarks. You are denying something that is obviously there. For the sake of your own arguement though, I think you should rather criticize the influences of Hegel in Marx's thought that ran through his thought and were a part of his method all his life than arguing that these things were non-existant.

Anyway, I don't find it confused at all, he quite clearly says that thoughts, concepts, universals etc. come after material reality and are shaped by them, and he is exactly rigth. What he says is the reverse of what Hegel says, that thoughts, concepts, universals etc. come before material reality and shape them, thus Marx "reverses" Hegel. The relation he has with Hegel is similar to that of Plato and Anthisthenes on this question, both of whom use the Socratic method, while Plato is saying that ideas come before material reality and that the material reality is merely shadows of ideas, and Anthisthenes criticizing him saying that universals basically names of things given to material things. Aristotle's mysticism on this quetion of course isn't even in the picture.


Except, it is based on what Marx actually says, not on what traditional tells us.

Yet nothing I said has got anything to do with "tradition". You are not basing yourself on what Marx actually says though, you rather "pass over it in respectful silence".


In that case, Marx should have thought highly of St Bonaventure, whose works easily dwarf those of Aristotle.

Or, if you are concentrating only on ancient philosophers, he should have thought more highly of Plato and Plotinus than he did of Epicurus or Democritus.

But saying that someone is the greatest philosopher of antiquity isn't exactly the same thing about thinking highly of that philsopher. Of course it doesn't just have to do with the amount of things Aristotle wrote, but they too have an influence. For example I think more highly of philosopher like Heraklitos, Democritus, Anthisthenes, Diogenes and Epicurus that I do of Aristotle. I would not say that either is a greater, mightier philsopher, than Aristotle though.


So, not even you believe that quantity is related to quality here.

Uh... i was joking :confused:

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Leo:


It is an interpretation that doesn't really sound that reasonable, since you are basically saying that while Marx was saying something he meant the opposite.

I am almost tempted to respond with 'That's dialectics for you -- a unity and identity of opposites...', but won't.

How can I be saying this when Marx himself, not me, told us he was merely 'coquetting' with Hegelian jargon in Das Kapital, and he went out of his way to add a summary of 'his method' in which not one atom of Hegel (or his method -- whatever it is) can be found.


No your view isn't based on what Marx actually said either. Marx never said that there was the slightest similarity between his and Aristotle's understanding of the question of universals. Marx, like other nominalists before himself, sees that concepts come after material reality and is shaped by it, that thought comes after matter and is shaped by it. This is basically a modern and developed understanding of what those who have been called nominalists said. Aristotle has a completely different understanding of the question of universals which is mystical.

I am sorry, you misunderstand me. When I said my view was based on what Marx said, I was referring to his jettisoning of Hegel, not his adoption of Aristotle.


It's not "my reading", it's what he says - you can't make the point that Marx has got nothing to do with Hegel when you say ignore it when he himself says there are connections or when you just dismiss his comments as silly confused remarks. You are denying something that is obviously there. For the sake of your own arguement though, I think you should rather criticize the influences of Hegel in Marx's thought that ran through his thought and were a part of his method all his life than arguing that these things were non-existant.

I don't deny Marx said those things (how cpuld I?). My point is that his words are not self-interpreting. You have your view of them, and that's OK. All I did was to point out it was your view.

For myself, I prefer not to interpret these words, since they are among the most confused things Marx said in his later work.

You are welcome to make of them what you can.


Anyway, I don't find it confused at all, he quite clearly says that thoughts, concepts, universals etc. come after material reality and are shaped by them, and he is exactly rigth. What he says is the reverse of what Hegel says, that thoughts, concepts, universals etc. come before material reality and shape them, thus Marx "reverses" Hegel. The relation he has with Hegel is similar to that of Plato and Anthisthenes on this question, both of whom use the Socratic method, while Plato is saying that ideas come before material reality and that the material reality is merely shadows of ideas, and Anthisthenes criticizing him saying that universals basically names of things given to material things. Aristotle's mysticism on this quetion of course isn't even in the picture.

I beg to differ. A priori psychology of this sort always turns me off.

And it's not even good a priori psychology. I will be publishing an essay on this in the next year or so, and will say no more about it until then.


Yet nothing I said has got anything to do with "tradition". You are not basing yourself on what Marx actually says though, you rather "pass over it in respectful silence".

Well, it seems to me that you are defending a traditional view: that Marx, in Das Kapital, found that the 'rational kernel' of Hegel's system was of great use to him, and thus that is was not empty, as I claim it is.

In fact, there is no 'rational kernel' to be found (I defy you to tell me what it is), and, as I have pointed out, Marx's own words indicate that this 'kernel' is empty.

And no wonder, if dialectics were true, change would be impossible.


You are not basing yourself on what Marx actually says though, you rather "pass over it in respectful silence".

I take from Marx what I think is defensible, and this a priori psychology (worked out in an armchair, with no experimental detail to back it up, no surveys, no brain scans, etc., etc.) isn't.

You are welcome to it; I still prefer to pass by in respectful silence. [Marx was not a deity. He screwed up from time to time. I acknowledge that fact, but do not trumpet it about the place.]


But saying that someone is the greatest philosopher of antiquity isn't exactly the same thing about thinking highly of that philsopher. Of course it doesn't just have to do with the amount of things Aristotle wrote, but they too have an influence. For example I think more highly of philosopher like Heraklitos, Democritus, Anthisthenes, Diogenes and Epicurus that I do of Aristotle. I would not say that either is a greater, mightier philsopher, than Aristotle though.

Well, we have been over this already. Here is what I posted earlier:


And yet he quotes Aristotle across eight pages in Das Kapital, and Epicurus not once.

Here are a few of them:


The two latter peculiarities of the equivalent form will become more intelligible if we go back to the great thinker who was the first to analyse so many forms, whether of thought, society, or Nature, and amongst them also the form of value. I mean Aristotle.

In the first place, he clearly enunciates that the money form of commodities is only the further development of the simple form of value – i.e., of the expression of the value of one commodity in some other commodity taken at random; for he says:

5 beds = 1 house – (clinai pente anti oiciaς)

is not to be distinguished from

5 beds = so much money. – (clinai pente anti ... oson ai pente clinai)

He further sees that the value relation which gives rise to this expression makes it necessary that the house should qualitatively be made the equal of the bed, and that, without such an equalisation, these two clearly different things could not be compared with each other as commensurable quantities. “Exchange,” he says, “cannot take place without equality, and equality not without commensurability". (out isothς mh oushς snmmetriaς). Here, however, he comes to a stop, and gives up the further analysis of the form of value. “It is, however, in reality, impossible (th men oun alhqeia adunaton), that such unlike things can be commensurable” – i.e., qualitatively equal. Such an equalisation can only be something foreign to their real nature, consequently only “a makeshift for practical purposes.”

Aristotle therefore, himself, tells us what barred the way to his further analysis; it was the absence of any concept of value. What is that equal something, that common substance, which admits of the value of the beds being expressed by a house? Such a thing, in truth, cannot exist, says Aristotle. And why not? Compared with the beds, the house does represent something equal to them, in so far as it represents what is really equal, both in the beds and the house. And that is – human labour.

There was, however, an important fact which prevented Aristotle from seeing that, to attribute value to commodities, is merely a mode of expressing all labour as equal human labour, and consequently as labour of equal quality. Greek society was founded upon slavery, and had, therefore, for its natural basis, the inequality of men and of their labour powers. The secret of the expression of value, namely, that all kinds of labour are equal and equivalent, because, and so far as they are human labour in general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion of human equality has already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. This, however, is possible only in a society in which the great mass of the produce of labour takes the form of commodities, in which, consequently, the dominant relation between man and man, is that of owners of commodities. The brilliancy of Aristotle’s genius is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived, alone prevented him from discovering what, “in truth,” was at the bottom of this equality....


MECW, Volume 35, Capital Volume One, pp.69-70. Bold added.

Notice, no past tense when he calls Aristotle a 'great thinker', and that his work is that of 'genius'. I do not think he ever described Hegel that way. Lenin did, but not Marx. 'Mighty thinker' is the best we get.

And here:


If a giant thinker like Aristotle erred in his appreciation of slave labour, why should a dwarf economist like Bastiat be right in his appreciation of wage labour?

Ibid., p.92.


“For two-fold is the use of every object.... The one is peculiar to the object as such, the other is not, as a sandal which may be worn, and is also exchangeable. Both are uses of the sandal, for even he who exchanges the sandal for the money or food he is in want of, makes use of the sandal as a sandal. But not in its natural way. For it has not been made for the sake of being exchanged.” (Aristoteles, “De Rep.” l. i. c. 9.)

Ibid., p.96.

He quotes him again at length on pages 163, 175, 331 (where he notes that Aristotle called 'man' a politcal animal), and then on page 411 we find this:


“If,” dreamed Aristotle, the greatest thinker of antiquity, “if every tool, when summoned, or even of its own accord, could do the work that befits it, just as the creations of Daedalus moved of themselves, or the tripods of Hephaestos went of their own accord to their sacred work, if the weavers’ shuttles were to weave of themselves, then there would be no need either of apprentices for the master workers, or of slaves for the lords.”

Notice, no past tense when he calls Aristotle a 'great thinker', and a 'gaint thinker' and that his work is that of 'genius'. I do not think he ever described Hegel that way. Lenin did, but not Marx. 'Mighty thinker' is the best we get.

So, Marx had a very high opinion of Aristotle. Can you think of anyone esle he described in this way? Did he describe the philosphers you mention in this way? I think not.


i was joking

So was I.