S. Zetor
1st February 2009, 18:17
Drawing the Line. The American Decision to Divide Germany. 1944-1949.
Carolyn Eisenberg.
Cambridge University Press 1996. 522 pages.
"The difficulty under which be labor is that in spite of our announced position, we really do not want nor intend to accept German unification in any terms that the Russians might agree to, even though they seemed to meet most of our requirements, since as they have declared war on European recovery, we know .. that they would .. prevent the resources of Germany from contributing."
(Walter Bedell Smith to Eisenhower, December 10, 1947)
When one hears talk about the division of Europe, the beginnings of the cold war, the iron curtain etc., it's typical to hear comments on Soviet lust for power and its urge to bolshevishise everything possible by force. Contrary to this, however, Carolyn Eisenberg shows in her book that how the Soviet Union was merely trying to hold on to what the Allied Forces agreed on in Potsdam and Yalta. As I haven't familirialised myself with the relevant liteture on post-war Eastern Europe, I can't tell how essential the role of the German developments were for other developments in the countries that came to be called 'people's democracies'. Based on Eisenberg's account, however, I might think that it was not insignificant.
From Potsdam and Yalta.. to Berlin
In Eisenberg's view "the division of Germany was fundamentally an American decision. [..] While the United States was supported by Britain, other West European nations had serious reservations." After the war the Allies were supposed to agree on how to deal with Germany. But as the race for Berlin started, it was evident that the rivalries between the Allies were becoming more visible as time went on. After the German surrender, the country was divided into occupation zones: the USSR in the east, including Berlin; the US in the south; the British in the north; and the French were granted, out of mercy, an area of their own in the west. In addition, Berlin was divided into four sections between the four powers.
In the beginning, on the US agenda were denazification and crushing Germany economically: "President Roosevelt himself had tilted U.S. directives toward a program of deindustrialization and draconian reform. This seemed to meet Stalin's economic and security requirements, and to provide him with an incentive to curb the German communists."
But near the end of the war, Roosevelt died, and Harry S. Truman became president. With Roosevelt's departure, also the more liberal New Dealers were purged from the leading positions of foreign policy. "Administration conservatives .. consolidated their control over German policy. [..] they were .. determined to rebuild postwar Germany so that it could be integrated with the capitalist economies of Europe. Not surprisingly, the ascendance of this group led to incresingly bitter conflict with the Soviet Union. There were serious tensions with the French, who were opposed to German reconstruction, and with the British, who preferred to socialize Germany's major industries. Under these conditions, the Allied Control Council was quickly paralyzed.."
When an economic depression seemed threatening in 1947, the new rulers of the US became more and more convinced that Germany must not be de-industrialised, but instead re-industrialised to be the motor of the European economy in order to save the continent from chaos.
"..[E]ven during peacetime, between sixty and seventy percent of German exports had been from heavy industry .. The only practical course was for the United States and Britain to commit themselves to the resurrection of German heavy industry - steel, chemicals, and machine tools.." (p. 285) American Association of the International Chamber of Commerce agreed: "The economic recovery of Germany will determine more than any other single factor of economic health and vigor of the rest of Europe. Next to the continued prosperity of the United States and the healthy recovery of Britain as a factor in world trade, nothing more than German recovery can influence the soundness of the whole trading system." (p. 284)
The story of Soviet culpability
"The old orthodoxy was that it was the Soviets who had forced partition. That view persisted in popular consciousness and seemed continuously validated by the existence of the Berlin Wall. [..] I wrote this book without access to the Soviet documents. Yet from the American and British records, it was apparent that during most of the occupation the Russians were pushing for unification. It was also clear that U.S. policy makers decided to divide Germany, at a point when communism was weak in the West and the Soviet desire to bolshevize the country was still in doubt. In opting for partition, the Americans were not responding to a perceived threat of left-wing revolution but to the Soviet Union's pressure to go back to Potsdam."
This orthodoxy could not tolerate reminders about, for example, someone like Molotov supporting a referendum on the new German constitution, a proposal the Americans rejected: "[the US foreign secretary] Marshall demurred, claming that 'we cannot assume at the present time or in the immediate future that the German people are prepared to act intelligently on this question.'" (p. 303)
After a ministerial meeting in Moscow in 1947, Marshall gave a radio speech, where he told that agreement had become impossible:
"[T]he Soviet Union insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany a centralised government, adopted to the seizure of absolute control of a country, which would be doomed economically." (p. 313) "He failed to mention that the Soviets had proposed a modified version of the Weimar constitution, in which excecutive authority had been reduced. Nor did he explain that it was the Soviet Union that was asking for a nationwide election to decide government structure, whereas the United States and Britain preferred to set a structure in advance of elections. [..] The clear implication of Marshall's presentation was that the Soviet Union had confronted the Western powers with a new and extravagant request for goods, designed to produce economic collapse in Germany. In reality, the Soviets had been repeating the 10 billion dollar figure for more than two years, with the original support of the United States." (p. 314-315)
"The limit of [the Americans'] statemanship resided in their unwillingness to contemplate any of the Russian terms for breaking the impasse. Soviet negotiators were advancing a moderate program: reparations from current production, assurances that the Ruhr would remain under the supervision of the Allied Control Council, a more thorough implementation of denazification, the breakup of large cartels and combines, the establishment of national labor unions, and the use of proportional representation in elections. To U.S. officials, bent on freeing the engines of German private enterprise, these proposals seemed tantamount to sabotage. And though they regularly asserted that the Russian offers were merely 'propaganda', they had no desire to put them to the test."
"This stance was partly conditioned by an awareness of Soviet vulnerability. Weakened internationally by the massive wartime damage and its nonpossession of the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union also held the poorer hand inside Germany. Because the Eastern Zone had less land, fewer people, and reduced industrial resources as compared to the western portion of the country, they seemed less likely to succeed in their area of occupation."
The Soviet sin was to hold on to what had been agreed on earlier between the Allies. But this didn't meet the US leadership's understanding of what it took to preserve capitalism in Western Europe anymore. No doubt the most annoying thing was that instead of trying to sabotage the process, the Soviet Union was, indeed, prepared to make more and more concessions in order to have at least some kind of deal. The Americans were hard pressed to find excuses to find plausible-seeming reasons to reject the watered-down offers offers of the desperate USSR.
I. Denazification
One of the first problems was that while a deal had been made on removing known nazis from leadership positions, it was difficult to find capable and trustworthy personnel to replace them in the process of reconstruction. Left-wingers were naturally out of the question; Antifa, SPD and KPD members or concentration camp survivors were not given any leadership positions in the western zones.
"On paper the figures sounded impressive. As of August 30 sixty thousand people had been stripped of their positions in the U.S. zone. Yet .. many of the individuals .. were quickly reinstated. Others were bumped down to subordinate positions from which they continued to excercise their previous authority. Then there were numerous instances where 'more than nominal' Nazis were simply replaced with different 'more than nominal' Nazis. And finally there were the thousands of culpable people who were never removed at all." (p. 129)
Even though the American probably didn't notice the irony, they thought that German businessmen were, rather than supporters, victims of nazism, because they had, in the Americans' opinion, fallen for the Hitler because of their lust for profit, instead of nazi ideology per se!
From summer 1948 onwards, after the situation had gotten worse, the US had already demanded "the quick termination of denazification. This signified a dramatic alteration in moral outlook from the closing of the Second World War." (p. 372)
"In November [1947] there were an estimated 787.000 cases still to be completed, of which approximately 640.000 had been described as 'highly incriminated persons'. By late January, the load had been reduced to 230.000 cases even though few individuals had been found guilty."
Changing the denazification plan needed to get the approval of the Länderrat. A favourable decision was secured by hinting that rejection is also perfectly ok, but in that case the 800 million support package under preparation in the US congress might not get passed. (p. 374)
II. Breaking up the cartels
In Potsdam it had been agreed that German cartels be broken up. This was meant to prevent excessive centralisation, as it had proved to be a powerful tool in Nazi hands to manipulate other countries' economies - including that of the United States. But when it was time to get to do the work, attitudes proved to have become a bit more complex. Because most of the bureaucrats in the Economic and Political Department had their backgrounds in big industry, breaking up the cartels didn't sound so good to them. "The one deviation from this pattern of inactivity concerned the largest and most powerful of these entities, the IG Farben corporation." (s. 145)
Near the end of 1947 and during 1948 the attitudes became ever more steep, and re-industrialising Germany was taken for something that should not be limited artificially.
III. Re-establishing the Trade Unions
In Potsdam, agreements were made on re-establishment of workers' organisations. In the US zone this job got help from the American central trade unions, the more conservative AFL and the more radical CIO. "[The] CIO group was emphasising rank-and-file control of the labor movement .. this grassroots approach provoked angry opposition from some of the more conservative forces both inside and outside of the [labor relations branch of the military government]. The context of the opposition was the reawakening of the German workers, who by the summer of 1945 were beginning to organize .. despite variations of emphasis, there was widespread support for socialization and worker participation in management." (p. 153-154)
In place of this horror, the AFL-dominated Labor Relations Branch wanted the new trade unions to be "bread-and-butter kind of movement that emphasized collective bargaining and wage demands, rather than politicized groupings that focused on economic democracy." (p. 155) Which is precisely what happened.
The London Conference I: The Allies
In October 1947 a conference of the Allies was arranged in London. "With rumors afloat of possible Soviet concessions, the British asked whether there were any terms under which the United States would accept Germany's economic unification. The state department's John Hickerson replied negatively. [..] Of special concern were the intimations that the Soviet Union would recommend the removal of ALL foreign troops from German soil .. In their mutual planning, both the Americans and British were agreed that the complete removal of troops was undesirable .. their strategy would be to attach such onerous conditions .. that the Soviets would be compelled to renege." (p. 353-354)
"Despite Molotov's angry rebukes, the Russian negotiating position had not appreciably altered since Moscow. The Soviet Union was still calling for reparations from current production, democratization in the form of denazification, decartelization, and land reform, the establishment of central German economic agencies that would be subject to the attenuated authority of the zone commanders, and the creation of a provisional government elected directly by the German people. [..] Following days of boring stalemate, the Soviets suddenly came forward with an offer of compromise .. Much of it was distillation of previous positions .. For the first time since the war's end, the Soviets seemed desperate enough to subordinate their immediate reparation requirements to Anglo-American notions of European recovery." (p. 357-359)
"Within the U.S. delegation, the predominant response was one of irritation and worry .. [D]uring the next forty-eight hours Molotov continued to give ground .. Secretary Marshall quickly upped the ante by asking the CFM [Council of Foreign Ministers] to decide that after January 1948 'nothing shall be taken out of Germany' that was not paid for by money of goods .. Thus at the point that Molotov was offering to compromise the timing of the reparations program and to adjust it to Germany's other obligations, the secretary demanded complete renunciation." (s. 359)
This was something the Soviet delegation refused to swallow, and the Americans could sigh in relief as the negotiations broke down. Now it was possible to get the division of Germany really under way.
Marshall aid
As the US leadership had decided that German industries have to get going again in order to fend of the depression that was threatening the world - before the war German heavy industry was still intended to be cut down with heavy hand - it was necessary to choose the practical means to achieve it.
"To avert these perils [of Europe plunging into chaos] the United States would have to spend between 6 and 7 billion dollars a year .. The president and the Secretary of State must make 'a strong spiritual appeal to the American people to sacrifice a little themselves .. in order to save Europe from starvation and chaos' .. (p. 321)
After sufficient planning, Marshall was prepared to present the plan in public. As is known, he offered a deal to all European countries: "Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery..". (p. 322) In principle it applied also to the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, but as it was known perfectly well in the State Department, the USSR would not accept the terms of the aid: "Not only must [the Soviets] integrate their economy with the rest of Europe, accepting the policies of some transnational entity, they must also accommodate the Anglo-America[n] agenda for Germany. That would mean giving up large-scale reparations while facilitating a high level of industrial production ." (p. 324) Marshall also said openly in his speech that US interests demanded rebuilding Europe.
In the Paris negotitations in 1947 the Americans secured a propaganda victory, as the Soviet negotiators decided to leave for Moscow because of the impossible demands. The guilt for discontinuing the negotiations could thus be laid at the USSR's door.
As it has already been told, in October 1947 Molotov tried once more to seek compromise in the London conference, but here too the USSR had to discontinue the negotiations because of the foul play on the American side. The latter in turn could start accelerating the pace.
The London Conference II: Only The Western Powers
In January 1948 the German leaders were called to a meeting in Frankfurt, where they were presented with a US draft for a new administration. When the French heard about this, they felt betrayed once again, because "The Anglo-American proposal seemed alarmingly close to an actual West German government that was far too centralized for their comfort." (p. 365) The German minister-presidents accepted the draft with only significant reservations. The most notable of them was that in no case must the changes be interpreted as the beginnings of a new German government. That was, however, precisely what the Americans and the Brits had had in mind.
In February, a conference of six Western Powers - USA, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries - was arranged in London. Marshall aid had already been accepted, only France was still reticent. Ironically the greatest problems in the conference was the reparations to be paid to the USSR, in the form of production machinery to be taken out of Germany. The Americans were not in favour of it, but they didn't want to pressure the British representative, who was still prepared to give something to the Soviets. Another tricky question for the US was the clarification of the status of the Ruhr. The Benelux countries and France wanted that if a separate West Germany is really going to be established, at least the Ruhr coal mining area should be placed under international control, which needed to be clarified in detail before any decision on it was to be made.
The expectation of American funds, however, had a moderating effect on these demands. In the end the US yielded and promised that "an International Ruhr Authority would proceed the formation of a West German government." (p. 371) But this meant less what it seemed to mean. The US negotiator Douglas told his Secretary of State, that "although he had agreed that the Ruhr authority might be created before a West German government, 'immediately, possibly one day before', it would not operate until afterwards." (p. 371) In addition, no discussion had been had on what kind of powers this body was given, so the question was open here too. "When the London conference recessed on March 6 .. the most momentous [understanding] was to proceed with a West German government." (p. 371)
It has already been mentioned how the US intended to sabotage denazification and heavy industry break-up. "To improve the prospects that a separate West German state could survive and contribute to the Marshall Plan, the United States was sweeping away most of the safeguards provided in Yalta and Potsdam. By doing so, they were increasing the necessity for keeping the country divided. Clearly a unified Germany that was heavily industrialized, dominated by large corporations, still influenced by former Nazis, freed of a reparations obligation, and unrestrained by a demilitarization treaty, could be a threat to other countries, including the United States." (p. 379)
Trouble surfaces in Berlin
When the Soviet delegation had left the London conference (Oct 1947) empty handed, the atmosphere in Berlin started to deteriorate. The original division of Berlin was made with the expectation of a united Germany, and now the city with its zone divisions would be left deep within the Soviet zone.
The critical area, where the problems surfaced, was currency reform. "A currency bill had been pending in the Allied Control Council since the summer of 1946. Introduced by the Americans, it included a drastic write-down of the existing currency in the ratio of 10 to 1, and progressive capital levy, and a commitment to equalize the burdens within Germany of the economic losses from the war.." (p. 380) But Marshall had begun to think that the currency plan should be changed. The problem was that the USSR had already accepted the framework of the old plan.
When the Berlin Allied Control Council had a meeting in February, Marshall's new proposal was discussed. It "eliminated those egalitarian features of the currency proposal that the Russians had found most congenial." (p. 381) The USSR representative, marshal Sokolovsky called this into question, and demanded that with the currency reform, an all-German central bank be established, but this didn't fit well into the Americans' plans who were bent on dividing the country. Yet again the Soviets caused an embarrassing situation by expressing their readiness for a compromise. Thus, "inside the Finance Directorate, U.S. representative Jack Bennett tried to promote .. failure. In late February, he explained to General Robertson that he was seeking a report 'with disagreement on two or three world convincing points'. The amused Britisher wondered 'whether he had been able to spot such likely points in the discussions.' Bennett admitted that so far he had not, but said he would be 'searching as the discussions went on.' By early March, the 'two or three world convincing points' had not materialized because the Soviets were still making concessions." (p. 381-382.) Also the British and the French wanted a compromise. At last, on 10th March, general Clay received instructions from the State Department: "[T]he policy of this government is no longer to reach agreement on currency and financial reform." (p. 382)
At the same time, the Soviet zone made preparations to suppress the conservative CDU, as the whole leadership of the party was changed. State parliaments were henceforth run by the Socialist Unity Party that had been forged together out of communists and social democrats. Additionally the American fears were fed by the Volkskongress movement in the Eastern zone, supported by the Soviets, which loudly criticised the Western Powers' inability to unite Germany; on the Western zones communist agitation sounded the same message.
Partly because of these events, the Americans and the British started a more forceful suppression of the KPD. "In March, British Military Government imposed new regulations, directed at the Communists. These curbed offensive speech and publications, and facilitated the prosecution of subversive individuals." (p. 384). In the US zone, "reprisals against individual Communists, the elimination of employment with U.S. forces, exclusion from the police, a denial of travel passes for known organizers, and a purge of the bizonal agencies" were applied. (p. 384)
The Americans had given their input also to the weakening of the inter-zonal trade unions. U.S. Manpower Division implemented "a political housecleaning in the U.S. zone labor organisations. The stated purpose was 'to eliminate Communist influence in the whole trade union field .. in order to insure that the social and economic patterns now being set for Germany square with our concept of democracy'." (p. 385)
Originally the USSR had agreed that the SPD would become the ruling party in Berlin. But when the unification of Germany didn't seem to make progress, their Allied Council representative had started to sabotage all decisions with his veto. The annoyed general Clay cabled Washington that "For many months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling it may come with dramatic suddenness." (p. 387)
The new tensity in the atmosphere was, of course, a product of what the Americans had been doing themselves, but in any case Clay's cable caused considerable restlessness in the US administration. In mid-March, president Truman gave a radio speech, where he "identified a grave threat to the freedom and safety of Western Europe. This was because 'one nation has not only refused to cooperate in the establishment of a just and honorable peace but - even worse - has actively sought to prevent it'." (p. 388)
At the same time, negotiations over currency reform were under way in Berlin. When marshal Sokolovsky asked the Western representatives for the outcome of their London conference (where an agreement on establishing West Germany had been made), he was not given an adequate answer. The decisions of the meeting had been made secret, because they were known for certain to cause considerable consternation in the public opinion in France and Germany. Sokolovsky, however, thought the outcome of the conference to lie within Allied Control Commission, and when he didn't receive an answer, he protested by calling off the negotiations. But this was merely another relief for the Americans, because yet again they could put all the blame on the USSR for discontinuing the negotiations.
To underline its anger, the USSR started to inspect road and rail traffic everywhere on the way to Berlin from the Western occupation zones (excluding civilian traffic). The British declared immediately that they would not allow inspections, and Clay applied for permission to shoot soldiers who would attempt such inspections. In the end the USSR halted all trains, without inspecting them by force, but without letting them through either.
The Deal to Found West Germany
The deal to establish a West German administration got a push from the new situation. When the Americans had started preparing division without asking the opinion of the British or the French, especially the latter, after finding out what was going on, protested that they would never accept a West German administration unless such a body was first established in the East. This was because of certain domestic reasons, as will be seen shortly.
The Western Powers held a conference on 20th April in 1948 in London. The background was the disturbing (from the US point of view) developments in France. The French people were strongly behind the original plan agreed on at Yalta and Potsdam, where Germany was to be de-industrialised and put down. Prime minister Bidault was made to retreat in the face of his coalition partner, the Socialist Party, and take back his government's support for founding West Germany.
Under heavy pressure the French representative promised to keep working on the plan - on the condition that it was submitted to a vote in the parliament. "The specter of this democratic excercise disturbed the Truman administration, which had intended to provide confidential briefings to its own legislative leaders. An open fight in the French assembly would disclose 'the secret draft instructions to the Military Governors' for an Occupation Statute and the German constitution, potentially antagonizing both West European and German audiences." (p. 399-400)
In the end, the US had its way, and the core of the decision was to call a constituent assembly on 1st September. To soothe the wafflers, the decision included a sentence where it was said that "the enclosed recommendations would 'in no way preclude and on the contrary should facilitate eventual four-power agreement on Germany.'" (p. 400) Almost everybody knew that this didn't have any meaning whatsoever.
The German politicians were not happy about what had been decided for them in London; instead they found several disputable issues in the plan. "How meaningful could a new government be if the country's main industrial resources [=Ruhr] were under an international authority? They also questioned how serious was the notion of self-government, when they had been excluded from London and were about to be handed guidelines for the work of their Constituent Assembly. Meanwhile the occupation was evidently going to continue, but with no indication of how authority would be divided between the Western powers and the new German state .. Finally, there was the excruciating matter of the eastern zone. If a government was created for West Germany, what would be the impact on friends and relatives in the Russian-occupied area? And would the German public accept the explanation that the east had already been lost?" (s. 401-402)
Meanwhile the French government's Commission for Foreign Affairs accepted the plan (the vote was 21-20) with the reservations that Germany was to become a federal state, that the Ruhr was to be governed by an international body, and that French needs for security would be met. Knowing full well the impossibility to meet these requirements, prime minister Bidault took the agreement to the parliament. It was accepted with 300 for, 286 against. The vote reflected the changed opinion of the Socialists, because they didn't want to endanger their position in the government.
The currency reform and the Berlin blockade
In May, Walter Bedell Smith of the US met Molotov to express the US view on the recent, unfortunate event that had increased tensity. Bedell's task was to convey that the US was resolute. Rhetorically he said, however, that despite everything "the door would always be 'wide open for full discussion and the composing of our differences.'" (p. 404)
Yet again there followed an embarrasing situation when Molotov took Bedell Smith's rhetoric seriously. To confuse matters further, the Bedell Smith-Molotov discussion were published in Pravda, with emphasis on the parts where Bedell Smith had used his most cooperative rhetoric. "With rumours of peace circulating thoughout Europe and America, President Truman and Secretary Marshall hastily explained that Smith had not intended negotiations." (p. 405)
Meanwhile the question of Berlin was still open. The Control Council had been paralysed since marshal Sokolovsky's march out of the currency reform negotiations - which suited well with US plans. Thus they were dismayed when the French representative, general Koenig inquired from his colleagues in the Council whether any of them wanted to have a meeting. The Americans and the British declined the offer immediately, but Sokolovsky's response was not as quick, which was a cause of anxiety for the Americans. Clay vented his aggression on Koenig: "I do not know what the Soviet response will be, although obviously if they are smart and express willingness for a meeting it puts the responsibility upon the British and us to either have the meeting while we are in the middle of of currency reform and western German government, or to refuse the meeting and subsequently be charged with avoiding it for those very reasons." (p. 407)
To the relief of the Americans, Sokolovsky turned the offer down. Clay told him that that the currency reform would come into force within 48 hours. "The introduction of new Reichsmark into the western zones necessitated similar action by the Soviets lest their area of occupation be inundated with worthless currency from the West [..] The State Department [of USA] insisted that the use of the eastmark 'is not acceptable politically because currency issuance is a sovereign power.'"
The currency reform caught the French by surprise - again. Only with a margin of 18 votes they had accepted a West Germany plan, but the Americans were not respecting the reservations they had made. As usual, in the end the French gave in.
It was not long before the USSR countermeasure was felt. On 24th June West Berlin electricity was cut off, and all traffic brought to a halt.
The Germany of the Cold War starts to form
This was the beginning of the famous Berlin blockade, which is mostly presented as a malevolent Soviet sabotage measure, which the clever Western allies, however, managed to survive with their ingenious airlift; this way Europe was saved from chaos and bolshevism. The reality was a bit more complicated.
As a manoueuver of psychological warfare, the Americans decided to bring two B-29 bombers to Europe - the same that had dropped the atom bomb to Hiroshima, and played on the fact that the Soviets could not know whether they were carrying more nuclear weapons. The USSR made, however, yet another gesture towards Germany unification. The foreign ministers of the USSR and other Eastern European countries gave a declaration, which put forward "a five-point plan calling for the enforcement of German demilitarization, a four-power control of the Ruhr, the fulfillment of reparations obligations, the establishment of a unified provisional government 'consisting of representatives of democratic parties and organisations in Germany', and the rapid conclusion of a peace treaty, leading to the withdrawal of all foreign occupation troops within a year." (p. 416, footnote 17)
The British were willing to reach out to the Soviets, but not the Americans. However, when marshal Sokolovsky's conciliatory letter to the British general Robertson on 30th June persuaded the British and the French to propose a meeting, the Americans went along only on one condition: the only concent of the meeting was that Sokolovsky was asked when the blockade will end.
On 1st July the West German minister-presidents were told, that they should have their Constituent Assembly on 1st September at latest, "with representatives to be selected under regulations of the individual Landtage. They were also instructed to propose new Länder boundaries for approval by the military governors .. the Allies would be drafting a statute that distributed powers between the new government and the occupying authorities. .. From the German perspective, these proposals were a mixed blessing .. Without knowing the real extent of their governmental powers, they were being asked to risk their reputations on a new constitution. This step was especially dangerous since by cooperating in the formation of a government, they would be abetting in the division of their country." (p. 420)
In addition, "leaders of both CDU and SPD found the September 1 deadline to be premature and questioned the wisdom of writing constitutional provisions that did not encompass such basic economic questions as socialization and reconstruction .. As reported by Robert Murphy, the Germans were bluntly told that they had better take what was given: 1. If not they will only get less. 2. They should frankly recognize split of Germany as fact." (p. 420)
After these threats the Germans demanded that at least "'everything should be avoided that would give the character of a state' to the new organization." (p. 421) In the end a paper of sorts was produced, which general Clay wrote off as a "'cowardly in appearance and likely to lead to a type of government which could not exercise real authority.'" (p. 422)
Once more the USSR suggested negotiations on German unification (on 14th July), but to no avail. The USSR offer to transport grain to blockaded Berlin the Americans considered a cynical plot. Whether it was bluff or not, they could not afford to call it.
A Meeting with Stalin
Soon Stalin invited the Western Powers' ambassadors to talk matters over. "Stalin explained that the Soviet Union had no intention of driving the Allied forces out of Berlin. However, Western juridical rights were linked to the city's status as the capital of a United country. The ambassadors were objecting to negotiations 'under duress', but the special Western currency in Berlin was also coercive. Perceiving an opening, Smith [of USA] wondered whether Stalin was offering to lift the blockade in exchange for a removal of the Berlin B mark. The Russian leader demurred, remarking that he was not only talking about currency, but about the London decisions. Could these be suspended while the four powers resumed their negotiations?" (p. 429)
"Reacting to Stalin's concern about the West German Parliamentary Council scheduled to open on September 1, Smith maintained that 'Nothing was being done .. which could not be fitted into a central German government.'" (p. 429) It was clear, however, that Eastern Germany would be bound by an agreement, in the negotiations of which it had not taken part. This is why Stalin proposed that the blockade and the western currency would be lifted simultaneously, while at the same time foreign ministers would start discussions on all-German issues and the London conference decisions were shelved for the time being.
When it became clear that the ambassadors were not going to budge, Stalin asked "if the Westerners wished to 'settle the matter tonight?' If so, the Soviet Union would agree to a simultaneous lifting of all restrictions on transportation and the introduction into Berlin of the Soviet zone marks in place of the Western currency. He would no longer make the deferment of London a condition of agreement, although he would like it recorded that this was 'the insistent wish' of the Soviet government." (p. 430)
This caused excitement among the ambassadors. It seemed like the Berlin blockade could be lifted and the West Germany plans could keep going like before! Smith "had never seen Molotov so amiable." (p. 430), and thought personally that the US should agree to this compromise.
But the US State Department was more reserved. The Soviets would just keep repeating their demands, and once it was made public, the Americans would find it difficult to defend their plans for German division, given the waffling opinions of Britain and France, and of the Germans themselves. "The State Department quickly dispatched new instructions to Smith, telling him to obtain four-power authority over Berlin's eastern currency. When Molotov complained that this was altering the bargain, Smith insisted that the previous talks had concerned matters of principle, whereas they were presently discussing technical details." (p. 431) Molotov wondered, too, what had happened to Stalin's "insistent wish" as regards the shelving of London decisions. "Smith explained that since this was not 'a condition' of agreement, it had been omitted." (p. 431)
The meeting of the Four Allies roused considerable fear in Washington. According to the Army Plans and Operations Division, a meeting of this kind would not only be "'fruitless .. but dangerous.'" It would unleash "'appeasement pressures in France and England, strong antiseparationist feeling in Germany and the typical American public opinion sentiment for compromise.'" (p. 432)
When the ambassadors arrived in the Kremlin again on 23rd August, to their surprise they found Stalin who presented them with yet another compromise draft, where most of their currency demands were met; only the idea of a West Germany was not accepted. The ambassadors rejected the draft.
[I]"In pushing for a breach in Moscow, U.S. policy makers recognized the danger of armed conflict. The Soviets might feel more inclined to interfere with the air traffic over Berlin, setting off a chain of uncontrollable events. Even more likely was an incident inside the polarized city, which could spark an accidental military encounter." (p. 440)
The last nails in the coffin
After the UN mediation on the Berlin question had failed, armies where left to deal with the issue. Already since December 1947 the Western Allies' cooperation had given birth to thoughts about a military alliance, which were now given a push by the Berlin blockade which demanded more and more Euro-American military cooperation. At the same time the European governments couldn't help but notice that they couldn't do without their American friends. NATO was founded on 4th April 1949, and the Americans were already planning for the day when West Germany would join.
But the Soviet Union had not given up yet. While the UN mediation attempt was on, a message from Stalin was received that gave the impression that the blockade could be lifted without any concessions in the currency affair. The Americans, however, did not have a meeting before the West German constitution was accepted. That happened at last on 25 April, and two days later the US representative Jessup gave the USSR representative Malik the conditions: "Although preparations for the West German government would continue, this would 'not preclude four-power agreement whereby a Government for the whole of Germany could be established.'" Given the facts on ground this was, naturally, mere rhetoric.
By this time the USSR was well aware of its defeat. On 12th May West Berlin electricity was turned back on and traffic was allowed again.
However, once again the US had the same problem as before when they had to negotiate the German question with the Soviets. They needed a proposal that the USSR could not accept. "The obvious aim of the Kennan proposal was to end Soviet control of eastern Germany, while tying the united country to the West. Hence the Russians would be required to accept free elections, abandon the veto and join a diminished Control Commission, pull back their occupation armies, remain outside the Ruhr authority, abandon further claims for reparations, surrender their own AGS, and accept German membership in the Marshall Plan. What they would get in return was the deferral of the Basic Law pending a constitutional convention, the elimination of the American votes on the Ruhr authority, a guarantee of access to German exports, and the withdrawal of Western troops to the German periphery." (p. 479)
But even this was not strict enough. The leader of the National Security Council's German department, Robert Murphy, tweaked the proposal further and removed all concessions to the Soviet Union. Despite this, still a certain doubt lingered: even if even these conditions felt totally impossible for anyone to accept, what if the Soviet were so desperate that they would indeed accept them? Chip Bohlen of the State Department: "Their willingness 'to make far-reaching changes .. including the abandonment of reparations, a more flexible attitude on the Soviet eastern frontier, a limited participation in the existing Ruhr agreement, accompanied by a Soviet proposition to withdraw or very drastically reduce the occupying forces, would obviously present the Western powers with a very delicate and even dangerous situation.'" (p. 480)
When the ministerial conference assembled in Paris, the fears of the Americans proved unnecessary. The USSR representatives were playing the same old broken record: return to Potsdam, reparations etc. They did not accept the West German constitution, which the Americans took as a sign of Soviet bad faith.
Conclusion
[I]"To an American audience, the denouement in Germany held an obvious meaning: The Russians had split the country, and they had lost. [..] the Soviets were not the architects of the German settlement. It was the Americans and their British partners who had opted for partition with the associated congealment of the continental division. [..] [They] had initiated all the formal steps toward separation. In violation of the quadripartite framework established at Yalta and Potsdam, they had opted to fuse their two zones economically (December 1946), to incorporate western Germany in the Marshall Plan (July 1947), to implement a separate currency reform (June 1948), and to convene a Parliamentary Council for the establishment of a West German state (September 1948). In each instance, there was some equivalent move in the eastern zone. Yet the pattern on U.S.-British action and Soviet response was a consistent one." (p. 485)
"At the end of the Second World War, American policy had been different. The prevailing view then, even among administration conservatives, was that Germany should be kept together and supervised by the Great Powers. During 1946-47, as this attitude was reevaluated, one pervasive element was the mounting fear of Soviet aggression. Washington policy makers were strongly affected by the reports from George Kennan and others, who perceived a Soviet plan to take over Western Europe .. Significantly, the leaders of U.S. Military Government in Germany did not share Kennan's assessment .. If Washington officials listened more to Kennan than their representatives in Germany, this was because his gloomy prognostications fit their policy preferences. The core of realism in their position was the appreciation of a genuine clash of interests between even the minimum Soviet program for reparations and security, and their own aspirations for West European recovery and integration." (p. 488-489)
Carolyn Eisenberg.
Cambridge University Press 1996. 522 pages.
"The difficulty under which be labor is that in spite of our announced position, we really do not want nor intend to accept German unification in any terms that the Russians might agree to, even though they seemed to meet most of our requirements, since as they have declared war on European recovery, we know .. that they would .. prevent the resources of Germany from contributing."
(Walter Bedell Smith to Eisenhower, December 10, 1947)
When one hears talk about the division of Europe, the beginnings of the cold war, the iron curtain etc., it's typical to hear comments on Soviet lust for power and its urge to bolshevishise everything possible by force. Contrary to this, however, Carolyn Eisenberg shows in her book that how the Soviet Union was merely trying to hold on to what the Allied Forces agreed on in Potsdam and Yalta. As I haven't familirialised myself with the relevant liteture on post-war Eastern Europe, I can't tell how essential the role of the German developments were for other developments in the countries that came to be called 'people's democracies'. Based on Eisenberg's account, however, I might think that it was not insignificant.
From Potsdam and Yalta.. to Berlin
In Eisenberg's view "the division of Germany was fundamentally an American decision. [..] While the United States was supported by Britain, other West European nations had serious reservations." After the war the Allies were supposed to agree on how to deal with Germany. But as the race for Berlin started, it was evident that the rivalries between the Allies were becoming more visible as time went on. After the German surrender, the country was divided into occupation zones: the USSR in the east, including Berlin; the US in the south; the British in the north; and the French were granted, out of mercy, an area of their own in the west. In addition, Berlin was divided into four sections between the four powers.
In the beginning, on the US agenda were denazification and crushing Germany economically: "President Roosevelt himself had tilted U.S. directives toward a program of deindustrialization and draconian reform. This seemed to meet Stalin's economic and security requirements, and to provide him with an incentive to curb the German communists."
But near the end of the war, Roosevelt died, and Harry S. Truman became president. With Roosevelt's departure, also the more liberal New Dealers were purged from the leading positions of foreign policy. "Administration conservatives .. consolidated their control over German policy. [..] they were .. determined to rebuild postwar Germany so that it could be integrated with the capitalist economies of Europe. Not surprisingly, the ascendance of this group led to incresingly bitter conflict with the Soviet Union. There were serious tensions with the French, who were opposed to German reconstruction, and with the British, who preferred to socialize Germany's major industries. Under these conditions, the Allied Control Council was quickly paralyzed.."
When an economic depression seemed threatening in 1947, the new rulers of the US became more and more convinced that Germany must not be de-industrialised, but instead re-industrialised to be the motor of the European economy in order to save the continent from chaos.
"..[E]ven during peacetime, between sixty and seventy percent of German exports had been from heavy industry .. The only practical course was for the United States and Britain to commit themselves to the resurrection of German heavy industry - steel, chemicals, and machine tools.." (p. 285) American Association of the International Chamber of Commerce agreed: "The economic recovery of Germany will determine more than any other single factor of economic health and vigor of the rest of Europe. Next to the continued prosperity of the United States and the healthy recovery of Britain as a factor in world trade, nothing more than German recovery can influence the soundness of the whole trading system." (p. 284)
The story of Soviet culpability
"The old orthodoxy was that it was the Soviets who had forced partition. That view persisted in popular consciousness and seemed continuously validated by the existence of the Berlin Wall. [..] I wrote this book without access to the Soviet documents. Yet from the American and British records, it was apparent that during most of the occupation the Russians were pushing for unification. It was also clear that U.S. policy makers decided to divide Germany, at a point when communism was weak in the West and the Soviet desire to bolshevize the country was still in doubt. In opting for partition, the Americans were not responding to a perceived threat of left-wing revolution but to the Soviet Union's pressure to go back to Potsdam."
This orthodoxy could not tolerate reminders about, for example, someone like Molotov supporting a referendum on the new German constitution, a proposal the Americans rejected: "[the US foreign secretary] Marshall demurred, claming that 'we cannot assume at the present time or in the immediate future that the German people are prepared to act intelligently on this question.'" (p. 303)
After a ministerial meeting in Moscow in 1947, Marshall gave a radio speech, where he told that agreement had become impossible:
"[T]he Soviet Union insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany a centralised government, adopted to the seizure of absolute control of a country, which would be doomed economically." (p. 313) "He failed to mention that the Soviets had proposed a modified version of the Weimar constitution, in which excecutive authority had been reduced. Nor did he explain that it was the Soviet Union that was asking for a nationwide election to decide government structure, whereas the United States and Britain preferred to set a structure in advance of elections. [..] The clear implication of Marshall's presentation was that the Soviet Union had confronted the Western powers with a new and extravagant request for goods, designed to produce economic collapse in Germany. In reality, the Soviets had been repeating the 10 billion dollar figure for more than two years, with the original support of the United States." (p. 314-315)
"The limit of [the Americans'] statemanship resided in their unwillingness to contemplate any of the Russian terms for breaking the impasse. Soviet negotiators were advancing a moderate program: reparations from current production, assurances that the Ruhr would remain under the supervision of the Allied Control Council, a more thorough implementation of denazification, the breakup of large cartels and combines, the establishment of national labor unions, and the use of proportional representation in elections. To U.S. officials, bent on freeing the engines of German private enterprise, these proposals seemed tantamount to sabotage. And though they regularly asserted that the Russian offers were merely 'propaganda', they had no desire to put them to the test."
"This stance was partly conditioned by an awareness of Soviet vulnerability. Weakened internationally by the massive wartime damage and its nonpossession of the atomic bomb, the Soviet Union also held the poorer hand inside Germany. Because the Eastern Zone had less land, fewer people, and reduced industrial resources as compared to the western portion of the country, they seemed less likely to succeed in their area of occupation."
The Soviet sin was to hold on to what had been agreed on earlier between the Allies. But this didn't meet the US leadership's understanding of what it took to preserve capitalism in Western Europe anymore. No doubt the most annoying thing was that instead of trying to sabotage the process, the Soviet Union was, indeed, prepared to make more and more concessions in order to have at least some kind of deal. The Americans were hard pressed to find excuses to find plausible-seeming reasons to reject the watered-down offers offers of the desperate USSR.
I. Denazification
One of the first problems was that while a deal had been made on removing known nazis from leadership positions, it was difficult to find capable and trustworthy personnel to replace them in the process of reconstruction. Left-wingers were naturally out of the question; Antifa, SPD and KPD members or concentration camp survivors were not given any leadership positions in the western zones.
"On paper the figures sounded impressive. As of August 30 sixty thousand people had been stripped of their positions in the U.S. zone. Yet .. many of the individuals .. were quickly reinstated. Others were bumped down to subordinate positions from which they continued to excercise their previous authority. Then there were numerous instances where 'more than nominal' Nazis were simply replaced with different 'more than nominal' Nazis. And finally there were the thousands of culpable people who were never removed at all." (p. 129)
Even though the American probably didn't notice the irony, they thought that German businessmen were, rather than supporters, victims of nazism, because they had, in the Americans' opinion, fallen for the Hitler because of their lust for profit, instead of nazi ideology per se!
From summer 1948 onwards, after the situation had gotten worse, the US had already demanded "the quick termination of denazification. This signified a dramatic alteration in moral outlook from the closing of the Second World War." (p. 372)
"In November [1947] there were an estimated 787.000 cases still to be completed, of which approximately 640.000 had been described as 'highly incriminated persons'. By late January, the load had been reduced to 230.000 cases even though few individuals had been found guilty."
Changing the denazification plan needed to get the approval of the Länderrat. A favourable decision was secured by hinting that rejection is also perfectly ok, but in that case the 800 million support package under preparation in the US congress might not get passed. (p. 374)
II. Breaking up the cartels
In Potsdam it had been agreed that German cartels be broken up. This was meant to prevent excessive centralisation, as it had proved to be a powerful tool in Nazi hands to manipulate other countries' economies - including that of the United States. But when it was time to get to do the work, attitudes proved to have become a bit more complex. Because most of the bureaucrats in the Economic and Political Department had their backgrounds in big industry, breaking up the cartels didn't sound so good to them. "The one deviation from this pattern of inactivity concerned the largest and most powerful of these entities, the IG Farben corporation." (s. 145)
Near the end of 1947 and during 1948 the attitudes became ever more steep, and re-industrialising Germany was taken for something that should not be limited artificially.
III. Re-establishing the Trade Unions
In Potsdam, agreements were made on re-establishment of workers' organisations. In the US zone this job got help from the American central trade unions, the more conservative AFL and the more radical CIO. "[The] CIO group was emphasising rank-and-file control of the labor movement .. this grassroots approach provoked angry opposition from some of the more conservative forces both inside and outside of the [labor relations branch of the military government]. The context of the opposition was the reawakening of the German workers, who by the summer of 1945 were beginning to organize .. despite variations of emphasis, there was widespread support for socialization and worker participation in management." (p. 153-154)
In place of this horror, the AFL-dominated Labor Relations Branch wanted the new trade unions to be "bread-and-butter kind of movement that emphasized collective bargaining and wage demands, rather than politicized groupings that focused on economic democracy." (p. 155) Which is precisely what happened.
The London Conference I: The Allies
In October 1947 a conference of the Allies was arranged in London. "With rumors afloat of possible Soviet concessions, the British asked whether there were any terms under which the United States would accept Germany's economic unification. The state department's John Hickerson replied negatively. [..] Of special concern were the intimations that the Soviet Union would recommend the removal of ALL foreign troops from German soil .. In their mutual planning, both the Americans and British were agreed that the complete removal of troops was undesirable .. their strategy would be to attach such onerous conditions .. that the Soviets would be compelled to renege." (p. 353-354)
"Despite Molotov's angry rebukes, the Russian negotiating position had not appreciably altered since Moscow. The Soviet Union was still calling for reparations from current production, democratization in the form of denazification, decartelization, and land reform, the establishment of central German economic agencies that would be subject to the attenuated authority of the zone commanders, and the creation of a provisional government elected directly by the German people. [..] Following days of boring stalemate, the Soviets suddenly came forward with an offer of compromise .. Much of it was distillation of previous positions .. For the first time since the war's end, the Soviets seemed desperate enough to subordinate their immediate reparation requirements to Anglo-American notions of European recovery." (p. 357-359)
"Within the U.S. delegation, the predominant response was one of irritation and worry .. [D]uring the next forty-eight hours Molotov continued to give ground .. Secretary Marshall quickly upped the ante by asking the CFM [Council of Foreign Ministers] to decide that after January 1948 'nothing shall be taken out of Germany' that was not paid for by money of goods .. Thus at the point that Molotov was offering to compromise the timing of the reparations program and to adjust it to Germany's other obligations, the secretary demanded complete renunciation." (s. 359)
This was something the Soviet delegation refused to swallow, and the Americans could sigh in relief as the negotiations broke down. Now it was possible to get the division of Germany really under way.
Marshall aid
As the US leadership had decided that German industries have to get going again in order to fend of the depression that was threatening the world - before the war German heavy industry was still intended to be cut down with heavy hand - it was necessary to choose the practical means to achieve it.
"To avert these perils [of Europe plunging into chaos] the United States would have to spend between 6 and 7 billion dollars a year .. The president and the Secretary of State must make 'a strong spiritual appeal to the American people to sacrifice a little themselves .. in order to save Europe from starvation and chaos' .. (p. 321)
After sufficient planning, Marshall was prepared to present the plan in public. As is known, he offered a deal to all European countries: "Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery..". (p. 322) In principle it applied also to the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, but as it was known perfectly well in the State Department, the USSR would not accept the terms of the aid: "Not only must [the Soviets] integrate their economy with the rest of Europe, accepting the policies of some transnational entity, they must also accommodate the Anglo-America[n] agenda for Germany. That would mean giving up large-scale reparations while facilitating a high level of industrial production ." (p. 324) Marshall also said openly in his speech that US interests demanded rebuilding Europe.
In the Paris negotitations in 1947 the Americans secured a propaganda victory, as the Soviet negotiators decided to leave for Moscow because of the impossible demands. The guilt for discontinuing the negotiations could thus be laid at the USSR's door.
As it has already been told, in October 1947 Molotov tried once more to seek compromise in the London conference, but here too the USSR had to discontinue the negotiations because of the foul play on the American side. The latter in turn could start accelerating the pace.
The London Conference II: Only The Western Powers
In January 1948 the German leaders were called to a meeting in Frankfurt, where they were presented with a US draft for a new administration. When the French heard about this, they felt betrayed once again, because "The Anglo-American proposal seemed alarmingly close to an actual West German government that was far too centralized for their comfort." (p. 365) The German minister-presidents accepted the draft with only significant reservations. The most notable of them was that in no case must the changes be interpreted as the beginnings of a new German government. That was, however, precisely what the Americans and the Brits had had in mind.
In February, a conference of six Western Powers - USA, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries - was arranged in London. Marshall aid had already been accepted, only France was still reticent. Ironically the greatest problems in the conference was the reparations to be paid to the USSR, in the form of production machinery to be taken out of Germany. The Americans were not in favour of it, but they didn't want to pressure the British representative, who was still prepared to give something to the Soviets. Another tricky question for the US was the clarification of the status of the Ruhr. The Benelux countries and France wanted that if a separate West Germany is really going to be established, at least the Ruhr coal mining area should be placed under international control, which needed to be clarified in detail before any decision on it was to be made.
The expectation of American funds, however, had a moderating effect on these demands. In the end the US yielded and promised that "an International Ruhr Authority would proceed the formation of a West German government." (p. 371) But this meant less what it seemed to mean. The US negotiator Douglas told his Secretary of State, that "although he had agreed that the Ruhr authority might be created before a West German government, 'immediately, possibly one day before', it would not operate until afterwards." (p. 371) In addition, no discussion had been had on what kind of powers this body was given, so the question was open here too. "When the London conference recessed on March 6 .. the most momentous [understanding] was to proceed with a West German government." (p. 371)
It has already been mentioned how the US intended to sabotage denazification and heavy industry break-up. "To improve the prospects that a separate West German state could survive and contribute to the Marshall Plan, the United States was sweeping away most of the safeguards provided in Yalta and Potsdam. By doing so, they were increasing the necessity for keeping the country divided. Clearly a unified Germany that was heavily industrialized, dominated by large corporations, still influenced by former Nazis, freed of a reparations obligation, and unrestrained by a demilitarization treaty, could be a threat to other countries, including the United States." (p. 379)
Trouble surfaces in Berlin
When the Soviet delegation had left the London conference (Oct 1947) empty handed, the atmosphere in Berlin started to deteriorate. The original division of Berlin was made with the expectation of a united Germany, and now the city with its zone divisions would be left deep within the Soviet zone.
The critical area, where the problems surfaced, was currency reform. "A currency bill had been pending in the Allied Control Council since the summer of 1946. Introduced by the Americans, it included a drastic write-down of the existing currency in the ratio of 10 to 1, and progressive capital levy, and a commitment to equalize the burdens within Germany of the economic losses from the war.." (p. 380) But Marshall had begun to think that the currency plan should be changed. The problem was that the USSR had already accepted the framework of the old plan.
When the Berlin Allied Control Council had a meeting in February, Marshall's new proposal was discussed. It "eliminated those egalitarian features of the currency proposal that the Russians had found most congenial." (p. 381) The USSR representative, marshal Sokolovsky called this into question, and demanded that with the currency reform, an all-German central bank be established, but this didn't fit well into the Americans' plans who were bent on dividing the country. Yet again the Soviets caused an embarrassing situation by expressing their readiness for a compromise. Thus, "inside the Finance Directorate, U.S. representative Jack Bennett tried to promote .. failure. In late February, he explained to General Robertson that he was seeking a report 'with disagreement on two or three world convincing points'. The amused Britisher wondered 'whether he had been able to spot such likely points in the discussions.' Bennett admitted that so far he had not, but said he would be 'searching as the discussions went on.' By early March, the 'two or three world convincing points' had not materialized because the Soviets were still making concessions." (p. 381-382.) Also the British and the French wanted a compromise. At last, on 10th March, general Clay received instructions from the State Department: "[T]he policy of this government is no longer to reach agreement on currency and financial reform." (p. 382)
At the same time, the Soviet zone made preparations to suppress the conservative CDU, as the whole leadership of the party was changed. State parliaments were henceforth run by the Socialist Unity Party that had been forged together out of communists and social democrats. Additionally the American fears were fed by the Volkskongress movement in the Eastern zone, supported by the Soviets, which loudly criticised the Western Powers' inability to unite Germany; on the Western zones communist agitation sounded the same message.
Partly because of these events, the Americans and the British started a more forceful suppression of the KPD. "In March, British Military Government imposed new regulations, directed at the Communists. These curbed offensive speech and publications, and facilitated the prosecution of subversive individuals." (p. 384). In the US zone, "reprisals against individual Communists, the elimination of employment with U.S. forces, exclusion from the police, a denial of travel passes for known organizers, and a purge of the bizonal agencies" were applied. (p. 384)
The Americans had given their input also to the weakening of the inter-zonal trade unions. U.S. Manpower Division implemented "a political housecleaning in the U.S. zone labor organisations. The stated purpose was 'to eliminate Communist influence in the whole trade union field .. in order to insure that the social and economic patterns now being set for Germany square with our concept of democracy'." (p. 385)
Originally the USSR had agreed that the SPD would become the ruling party in Berlin. But when the unification of Germany didn't seem to make progress, their Allied Council representative had started to sabotage all decisions with his veto. The annoyed general Clay cabled Washington that "For many months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks, I have felt subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling it may come with dramatic suddenness." (p. 387)
The new tensity in the atmosphere was, of course, a product of what the Americans had been doing themselves, but in any case Clay's cable caused considerable restlessness in the US administration. In mid-March, president Truman gave a radio speech, where he "identified a grave threat to the freedom and safety of Western Europe. This was because 'one nation has not only refused to cooperate in the establishment of a just and honorable peace but - even worse - has actively sought to prevent it'." (p. 388)
At the same time, negotiations over currency reform were under way in Berlin. When marshal Sokolovsky asked the Western representatives for the outcome of their London conference (where an agreement on establishing West Germany had been made), he was not given an adequate answer. The decisions of the meeting had been made secret, because they were known for certain to cause considerable consternation in the public opinion in France and Germany. Sokolovsky, however, thought the outcome of the conference to lie within Allied Control Commission, and when he didn't receive an answer, he protested by calling off the negotiations. But this was merely another relief for the Americans, because yet again they could put all the blame on the USSR for discontinuing the negotiations.
To underline its anger, the USSR started to inspect road and rail traffic everywhere on the way to Berlin from the Western occupation zones (excluding civilian traffic). The British declared immediately that they would not allow inspections, and Clay applied for permission to shoot soldiers who would attempt such inspections. In the end the USSR halted all trains, without inspecting them by force, but without letting them through either.
The Deal to Found West Germany
The deal to establish a West German administration got a push from the new situation. When the Americans had started preparing division without asking the opinion of the British or the French, especially the latter, after finding out what was going on, protested that they would never accept a West German administration unless such a body was first established in the East. This was because of certain domestic reasons, as will be seen shortly.
The Western Powers held a conference on 20th April in 1948 in London. The background was the disturbing (from the US point of view) developments in France. The French people were strongly behind the original plan agreed on at Yalta and Potsdam, where Germany was to be de-industrialised and put down. Prime minister Bidault was made to retreat in the face of his coalition partner, the Socialist Party, and take back his government's support for founding West Germany.
Under heavy pressure the French representative promised to keep working on the plan - on the condition that it was submitted to a vote in the parliament. "The specter of this democratic excercise disturbed the Truman administration, which had intended to provide confidential briefings to its own legislative leaders. An open fight in the French assembly would disclose 'the secret draft instructions to the Military Governors' for an Occupation Statute and the German constitution, potentially antagonizing both West European and German audiences." (p. 399-400)
In the end, the US had its way, and the core of the decision was to call a constituent assembly on 1st September. To soothe the wafflers, the decision included a sentence where it was said that "the enclosed recommendations would 'in no way preclude and on the contrary should facilitate eventual four-power agreement on Germany.'" (p. 400) Almost everybody knew that this didn't have any meaning whatsoever.
The German politicians were not happy about what had been decided for them in London; instead they found several disputable issues in the plan. "How meaningful could a new government be if the country's main industrial resources [=Ruhr] were under an international authority? They also questioned how serious was the notion of self-government, when they had been excluded from London and were about to be handed guidelines for the work of their Constituent Assembly. Meanwhile the occupation was evidently going to continue, but with no indication of how authority would be divided between the Western powers and the new German state .. Finally, there was the excruciating matter of the eastern zone. If a government was created for West Germany, what would be the impact on friends and relatives in the Russian-occupied area? And would the German public accept the explanation that the east had already been lost?" (s. 401-402)
Meanwhile the French government's Commission for Foreign Affairs accepted the plan (the vote was 21-20) with the reservations that Germany was to become a federal state, that the Ruhr was to be governed by an international body, and that French needs for security would be met. Knowing full well the impossibility to meet these requirements, prime minister Bidault took the agreement to the parliament. It was accepted with 300 for, 286 against. The vote reflected the changed opinion of the Socialists, because they didn't want to endanger their position in the government.
The currency reform and the Berlin blockade
In May, Walter Bedell Smith of the US met Molotov to express the US view on the recent, unfortunate event that had increased tensity. Bedell's task was to convey that the US was resolute. Rhetorically he said, however, that despite everything "the door would always be 'wide open for full discussion and the composing of our differences.'" (p. 404)
Yet again there followed an embarrasing situation when Molotov took Bedell Smith's rhetoric seriously. To confuse matters further, the Bedell Smith-Molotov discussion were published in Pravda, with emphasis on the parts where Bedell Smith had used his most cooperative rhetoric. "With rumours of peace circulating thoughout Europe and America, President Truman and Secretary Marshall hastily explained that Smith had not intended negotiations." (p. 405)
Meanwhile the question of Berlin was still open. The Control Council had been paralysed since marshal Sokolovsky's march out of the currency reform negotiations - which suited well with US plans. Thus they were dismayed when the French representative, general Koenig inquired from his colleagues in the Council whether any of them wanted to have a meeting. The Americans and the British declined the offer immediately, but Sokolovsky's response was not as quick, which was a cause of anxiety for the Americans. Clay vented his aggression on Koenig: "I do not know what the Soviet response will be, although obviously if they are smart and express willingness for a meeting it puts the responsibility upon the British and us to either have the meeting while we are in the middle of of currency reform and western German government, or to refuse the meeting and subsequently be charged with avoiding it for those very reasons." (p. 407)
To the relief of the Americans, Sokolovsky turned the offer down. Clay told him that that the currency reform would come into force within 48 hours. "The introduction of new Reichsmark into the western zones necessitated similar action by the Soviets lest their area of occupation be inundated with worthless currency from the West [..] The State Department [of USA] insisted that the use of the eastmark 'is not acceptable politically because currency issuance is a sovereign power.'"
The currency reform caught the French by surprise - again. Only with a margin of 18 votes they had accepted a West Germany plan, but the Americans were not respecting the reservations they had made. As usual, in the end the French gave in.
It was not long before the USSR countermeasure was felt. On 24th June West Berlin electricity was cut off, and all traffic brought to a halt.
The Germany of the Cold War starts to form
This was the beginning of the famous Berlin blockade, which is mostly presented as a malevolent Soviet sabotage measure, which the clever Western allies, however, managed to survive with their ingenious airlift; this way Europe was saved from chaos and bolshevism. The reality was a bit more complicated.
As a manoueuver of psychological warfare, the Americans decided to bring two B-29 bombers to Europe - the same that had dropped the atom bomb to Hiroshima, and played on the fact that the Soviets could not know whether they were carrying more nuclear weapons. The USSR made, however, yet another gesture towards Germany unification. The foreign ministers of the USSR and other Eastern European countries gave a declaration, which put forward "a five-point plan calling for the enforcement of German demilitarization, a four-power control of the Ruhr, the fulfillment of reparations obligations, the establishment of a unified provisional government 'consisting of representatives of democratic parties and organisations in Germany', and the rapid conclusion of a peace treaty, leading to the withdrawal of all foreign occupation troops within a year." (p. 416, footnote 17)
The British were willing to reach out to the Soviets, but not the Americans. However, when marshal Sokolovsky's conciliatory letter to the British general Robertson on 30th June persuaded the British and the French to propose a meeting, the Americans went along only on one condition: the only concent of the meeting was that Sokolovsky was asked when the blockade will end.
On 1st July the West German minister-presidents were told, that they should have their Constituent Assembly on 1st September at latest, "with representatives to be selected under regulations of the individual Landtage. They were also instructed to propose new Länder boundaries for approval by the military governors .. the Allies would be drafting a statute that distributed powers between the new government and the occupying authorities. .. From the German perspective, these proposals were a mixed blessing .. Without knowing the real extent of their governmental powers, they were being asked to risk their reputations on a new constitution. This step was especially dangerous since by cooperating in the formation of a government, they would be abetting in the division of their country." (p. 420)
In addition, "leaders of both CDU and SPD found the September 1 deadline to be premature and questioned the wisdom of writing constitutional provisions that did not encompass such basic economic questions as socialization and reconstruction .. As reported by Robert Murphy, the Germans were bluntly told that they had better take what was given: 1. If not they will only get less. 2. They should frankly recognize split of Germany as fact." (p. 420)
After these threats the Germans demanded that at least "'everything should be avoided that would give the character of a state' to the new organization." (p. 421) In the end a paper of sorts was produced, which general Clay wrote off as a "'cowardly in appearance and likely to lead to a type of government which could not exercise real authority.'" (p. 422)
Once more the USSR suggested negotiations on German unification (on 14th July), but to no avail. The USSR offer to transport grain to blockaded Berlin the Americans considered a cynical plot. Whether it was bluff or not, they could not afford to call it.
A Meeting with Stalin
Soon Stalin invited the Western Powers' ambassadors to talk matters over. "Stalin explained that the Soviet Union had no intention of driving the Allied forces out of Berlin. However, Western juridical rights were linked to the city's status as the capital of a United country. The ambassadors were objecting to negotiations 'under duress', but the special Western currency in Berlin was also coercive. Perceiving an opening, Smith [of USA] wondered whether Stalin was offering to lift the blockade in exchange for a removal of the Berlin B mark. The Russian leader demurred, remarking that he was not only talking about currency, but about the London decisions. Could these be suspended while the four powers resumed their negotiations?" (p. 429)
"Reacting to Stalin's concern about the West German Parliamentary Council scheduled to open on September 1, Smith maintained that 'Nothing was being done .. which could not be fitted into a central German government.'" (p. 429) It was clear, however, that Eastern Germany would be bound by an agreement, in the negotiations of which it had not taken part. This is why Stalin proposed that the blockade and the western currency would be lifted simultaneously, while at the same time foreign ministers would start discussions on all-German issues and the London conference decisions were shelved for the time being.
When it became clear that the ambassadors were not going to budge, Stalin asked "if the Westerners wished to 'settle the matter tonight?' If so, the Soviet Union would agree to a simultaneous lifting of all restrictions on transportation and the introduction into Berlin of the Soviet zone marks in place of the Western currency. He would no longer make the deferment of London a condition of agreement, although he would like it recorded that this was 'the insistent wish' of the Soviet government." (p. 430)
This caused excitement among the ambassadors. It seemed like the Berlin blockade could be lifted and the West Germany plans could keep going like before! Smith "had never seen Molotov so amiable." (p. 430), and thought personally that the US should agree to this compromise.
But the US State Department was more reserved. The Soviets would just keep repeating their demands, and once it was made public, the Americans would find it difficult to defend their plans for German division, given the waffling opinions of Britain and France, and of the Germans themselves. "The State Department quickly dispatched new instructions to Smith, telling him to obtain four-power authority over Berlin's eastern currency. When Molotov complained that this was altering the bargain, Smith insisted that the previous talks had concerned matters of principle, whereas they were presently discussing technical details." (p. 431) Molotov wondered, too, what had happened to Stalin's "insistent wish" as regards the shelving of London decisions. "Smith explained that since this was not 'a condition' of agreement, it had been omitted." (p. 431)
The meeting of the Four Allies roused considerable fear in Washington. According to the Army Plans and Operations Division, a meeting of this kind would not only be "'fruitless .. but dangerous.'" It would unleash "'appeasement pressures in France and England, strong antiseparationist feeling in Germany and the typical American public opinion sentiment for compromise.'" (p. 432)
When the ambassadors arrived in the Kremlin again on 23rd August, to their surprise they found Stalin who presented them with yet another compromise draft, where most of their currency demands were met; only the idea of a West Germany was not accepted. The ambassadors rejected the draft.
[I]"In pushing for a breach in Moscow, U.S. policy makers recognized the danger of armed conflict. The Soviets might feel more inclined to interfere with the air traffic over Berlin, setting off a chain of uncontrollable events. Even more likely was an incident inside the polarized city, which could spark an accidental military encounter." (p. 440)
The last nails in the coffin
After the UN mediation on the Berlin question had failed, armies where left to deal with the issue. Already since December 1947 the Western Allies' cooperation had given birth to thoughts about a military alliance, which were now given a push by the Berlin blockade which demanded more and more Euro-American military cooperation. At the same time the European governments couldn't help but notice that they couldn't do without their American friends. NATO was founded on 4th April 1949, and the Americans were already planning for the day when West Germany would join.
But the Soviet Union had not given up yet. While the UN mediation attempt was on, a message from Stalin was received that gave the impression that the blockade could be lifted without any concessions in the currency affair. The Americans, however, did not have a meeting before the West German constitution was accepted. That happened at last on 25 April, and two days later the US representative Jessup gave the USSR representative Malik the conditions: "Although preparations for the West German government would continue, this would 'not preclude four-power agreement whereby a Government for the whole of Germany could be established.'" Given the facts on ground this was, naturally, mere rhetoric.
By this time the USSR was well aware of its defeat. On 12th May West Berlin electricity was turned back on and traffic was allowed again.
However, once again the US had the same problem as before when they had to negotiate the German question with the Soviets. They needed a proposal that the USSR could not accept. "The obvious aim of the Kennan proposal was to end Soviet control of eastern Germany, while tying the united country to the West. Hence the Russians would be required to accept free elections, abandon the veto and join a diminished Control Commission, pull back their occupation armies, remain outside the Ruhr authority, abandon further claims for reparations, surrender their own AGS, and accept German membership in the Marshall Plan. What they would get in return was the deferral of the Basic Law pending a constitutional convention, the elimination of the American votes on the Ruhr authority, a guarantee of access to German exports, and the withdrawal of Western troops to the German periphery." (p. 479)
But even this was not strict enough. The leader of the National Security Council's German department, Robert Murphy, tweaked the proposal further and removed all concessions to the Soviet Union. Despite this, still a certain doubt lingered: even if even these conditions felt totally impossible for anyone to accept, what if the Soviet were so desperate that they would indeed accept them? Chip Bohlen of the State Department: "Their willingness 'to make far-reaching changes .. including the abandonment of reparations, a more flexible attitude on the Soviet eastern frontier, a limited participation in the existing Ruhr agreement, accompanied by a Soviet proposition to withdraw or very drastically reduce the occupying forces, would obviously present the Western powers with a very delicate and even dangerous situation.'" (p. 480)
When the ministerial conference assembled in Paris, the fears of the Americans proved unnecessary. The USSR representatives were playing the same old broken record: return to Potsdam, reparations etc. They did not accept the West German constitution, which the Americans took as a sign of Soviet bad faith.
Conclusion
[I]"To an American audience, the denouement in Germany held an obvious meaning: The Russians had split the country, and they had lost. [..] the Soviets were not the architects of the German settlement. It was the Americans and their British partners who had opted for partition with the associated congealment of the continental division. [..] [They] had initiated all the formal steps toward separation. In violation of the quadripartite framework established at Yalta and Potsdam, they had opted to fuse their two zones economically (December 1946), to incorporate western Germany in the Marshall Plan (July 1947), to implement a separate currency reform (June 1948), and to convene a Parliamentary Council for the establishment of a West German state (September 1948). In each instance, there was some equivalent move in the eastern zone. Yet the pattern on U.S.-British action and Soviet response was a consistent one." (p. 485)
"At the end of the Second World War, American policy had been different. The prevailing view then, even among administration conservatives, was that Germany should be kept together and supervised by the Great Powers. During 1946-47, as this attitude was reevaluated, one pervasive element was the mounting fear of Soviet aggression. Washington policy makers were strongly affected by the reports from George Kennan and others, who perceived a Soviet plan to take over Western Europe .. Significantly, the leaders of U.S. Military Government in Germany did not share Kennan's assessment .. If Washington officials listened more to Kennan than their representatives in Germany, this was because his gloomy prognostications fit their policy preferences. The core of realism in their position was the appreciation of a genuine clash of interests between even the minimum Soviet program for reparations and security, and their own aspirations for West European recovery and integration." (p. 488-489)